Defence and Security of India - Dec2009/Jan 2010

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

JANUARY 2010

DSIVOLUME 2 ISSUE 3 Rs 250

After twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir, the battleagainst militancy may have been won but the larger war

for sustainable peace is still being foughtI AMITABH MATTOO

DEFENCE COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS Defence ties between countries is an essential componentof foreign policy initiatives I K SUBRAHMANYAM

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

LEAP INTO THE FUTUREIndia and Russia may soon sign an agreement to produce aFifth Generation Fighter Aircraft I AJAI SHUKLA

OF

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LETTER FROM THE editor

Of course, thesituation is stillnot normal.After a lull,early Januarywitnessed aprolongedhigh-profilegun battle withmilitants holedup in a hotel, inSrinagar’s busyLal Chowk.

Mannika ChopraEDITOR

Defence & Security of India

ecember 2009 marks twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir. Years filledwith grief and protests and the death of many thousands of people.Twenty years on, it’s time to see where the Kashmir issue stands today.The picture has certainly changed. From the violence that used to be aregular feature in the 1990s it is now at its lowest ebb ever. Officials say,last year, saw the death of 79 civilians, 72 security forces and 235militants. It is still too many but compare that to 1995 when the toll was

nearly 6,000. That was the time when the Valley had security forces dotted all over the landscape;when reporters were led to meet their separatist sources blindfolded in downtown Srinagar sothat they could not reveal their whereabouts to Indian intelligence agencies.

Now there is a picture of relative calm in the beleaguered State. 30,000 security personnel havebeen withdrawn from the border region. Of course the situation is still not normal. After a lull,early January witnessed a prolonged high-profile gun battle with militants holed up in a hotel,in Srinagar’s busy Lal Chowk. There have been other skirmishes and the controversial death of twoyoung girls has once again raised the question of human rights infringements by the State. Butthe prospect of peace in the Kashmir Valley is not a complete impossibility. In an insightful essay,on the eve of India’s 60th year of becoming a Republic,DSI looks at the how in two decades thenuances over Kashmir have changed and how there is a growing consciousness about the need tointroduce certain flexibility on the part of the Indian State to resolve the Kashmir conflict.

It’s been a long pending issue. But now it seems that India and Russia are on the verge of signing anagreement on the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). The financial and technical partnership hasbeen through years of hard bargaining but the deal is almost inked. The FGFA’s supermaneuverability and high endurance is expected to add to the Indian Air Force’s requirements forcross-spectrum warfare from low intensity conflict to conventional and nuclear warfare.

Bangladesh, though it covers a small territory, is strategically significant for India. In manyways then Prime Minister’s Shiekh Haseena’s visit to India was an opportunity to begin a new erain bilateral ties and to resolve historic differences. DSI examines why an economically strong,secular and democratic Bangladesh is crucial for New Delhi.

As usual we welcome your feedback and suggestions which you can send [email protected]. Should you want to subscribe to the magazine please contact ourmarketing team at [email protected] and it will do the rest.

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FOREIGN POLICY ANDCOOPERATION 20

SYMBIOTICRELATIONSHIP Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives anddiplomatic action.

2

COMBATAIRCRAFT 14

LEAP INTO THE FUTUREFor years India andRussia have haggledover the FifthGeneration FighterAircraft configuration,capabilities anddevelopment work-share. Now apparentlythe two sides are close tosigning an agreement.

CLIMATE CHANGE 34

SECURITYIMPLICATIONSRising temperatures, surging seas,melting glaciers, droughts andmass migrations, all caused by climate change, are a threat toglobal stability.

NEIGHBOURS 26

EXPANDINGHORIZONSSheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India this January has potentiallychanged the trajectory of bilateralties between India and Bangladesh

NATIONAL SECURITY 40

ACTION NOT TAKEN The debate continues over having aChief of Defence Staff who will haveencompassing control over the IndianArmy,Navy and Air Force and also havecommand over the management of thenation’s nuclear arsenal.

COVER STORY 6

VALLEYOF HOPE?After twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir and with 30,000security personnel having been withdrawn from the Valley, itstime to think of enduring ways to end the conflict.

Cover Photo: Javeed Shah/Indian Express

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FOREIGN POLICY ANDCOOPERATION 20

SYMBIOTICRELATIONSHIP Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policy initiatives anddiplomatic action.

2

COMBATAIRCRAFT 14

LEAP INTO THE FUTUREFor years India andRussia have haggledover the FifthGeneration FighterAircraft configuration,capabilities anddevelopment work-share. Now apparentlythe two sides are close tosigning an agreement.

CLIMATE CHANGE 34

SECURITYIMPLICATIONSRising temperatures, surging seas,melting glaciers, droughts andmass migrations, all caused by climate change, are a threat toglobal stability.

NEIGHBOURS 26

EXPANDINGHORIZONSSheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India this January has potentiallychanged the trajectory of bilateralties between India and Bangladesh

NATIONAL SECURITY 40

ACTION NOT TAKEN The debate continues over having aChief of Defence Staff who will haveencompassing control over the IndianArmy,Navy and Air Force and also havecommand over the management of thenation’s nuclear arsenal.

COVER STORY 6

VALLEYOF HOPE?After twenty years of insurgency in Kashmir and with 30,000security personnel having been withdrawn from the Valley, itstime to think of enduring ways to end the conflict.

Cover Photo: Javeed Shah/Indian Express

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CONTRIBUTORS

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK, and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. Heis also the India

correspondent for the DailyTelegraph, London, and

the Irish Times.

RAHUL BEDI

DSIJANUARY, 2010

JANUARY 2010 VOLUME 2, ISSUE 3

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraCORRESPONDENTMangala RamamoorthyART DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar, Moeen AijazBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop AroraMANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaCOORDINATORRonald MicahCIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONAshwani RaiPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda PRESIDENTXavier CollacoCHAIRMANJ S Uberoi

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected]/TurkeyLiat Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email : [email protected], [email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected]/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/ChinaDr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA InternationalTel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email : [email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.All correspondence should be addressed to Media TransasiaIndia Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

Amitabh Mattoo is professor of International

Studies at New Delhi'sJawaharlal Nehru University.

A member of the NationalKnowledge Commission, a

high-level advisory group tothe Prime Minister of India,

he was also the Vice-Chancellor of the

University of Jammu. Aformer member of India's

National Security Council'sAdvisory Board, he has been

a member of the task forceconstituted by Indian Prime

Minister Manmohan Singhon Global Strategic

Developments. A visitingProfessor at Stanford

University, he has publishedeight books and contributed

to many leadingpublications.

AMITABH MATTOO

AJAI SHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

medium. He is ConsultingEditor (Strategic Affairs) for

Business Standard and has been Consulting

Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news

broadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

K. Subrahmanyam is ahighly-regarded and

international strategicaffairs analyst and

commentator. Joining theIndian Administrative

Service in 1951, he wasSecretary Defence

Production till becoming thefounding Director of the

Institute for Defence Studiesand Analyses in 1968. He haschaired the Joint Intelligence

Committee in New Delhi. A Nehru Fellow and a VisitingProfessor, St.John's College,

he has also been a consultingeditor with The Econmic

Times and The Times of India.He has served as the

Convenor of the NationalSecurity Advisory Board and

Chairman of the KargilReview Panel. During his

career Mr Subrahmanyamhas authored and edited

16 books.

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

Narendra Sisodia is theDirector General of the

Institute for Defence Studiesand Analyses, New Delhi. He

was earlier Secretary in theMinistries of Finance andDefence, Government of

India and Vice-Chancellor ofUniversity of Udaipur.

He joined the IndianAdministrative Service in

1968 and served as JointSecretary in the Ministry of

Defence and was AdditionalSecretary in the National

Security CouncilSecretariat, where he was

member of the Task Force onReforming the Management

of Defence. A formerConvenor of Indian Pugwash

Society, he has also been aconsultant to the United

Nations DevelopmentProgramme.

NARENDRASISODIA

KANWAL SIBAL

Kanwal Sibal was ForeignSecretary to the Government

of India from 2002 to 2003.Most recently he was India’s

Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007). Joining the Indian

Foreign Service in 1966, hebegan his career in France

(1968-1973) and was DeputySpokesman in the Ministry of

External Affairs (1973-1975).Currently, he is a member of

the National SecurityAdvisory Board.

Lt Gen Daljeet Singh, hasbeen former army

commander, WesternCommand. He also

commanded a corps in theNorth East, a division in a

strike corps and a brigade inJammu & Kashmir. Having

held several key operationalappointments, he has taughtat the Army War College and

the Defence Services StaffCollege. He has represented

the Indian Army on severaldelegations abroad and is agraduate of the Commandand General Staff College,

USA, and the School ofInfantry, United Kingdom.

DALJEET SINGH

Contributors-final 2ND.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 25/01/10 5:07 PM Page 1


CONTRIBUTORS

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK, and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. Heis also the India

correspondent for the DailyTelegraph, London, and

the Irish Times.

RAHUL BEDI

DSIJANUARY, 2010

JANUARY 2010 VOLUME 2, ISSUE 3

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraCORRESPONDENTMangala RamamoorthyART DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar, Moeen AijazBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop AroraMANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaCOORDINATORRonald MicahCIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONAshwani RaiPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda PRESIDENTXavier CollacoCHAIRMANJ S Uberoi

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected]/TurkeyLiat Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email : [email protected], [email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected]/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/ChinaDr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA InternationalTel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email : [email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.All correspondence should be addressed to Media TransasiaIndia Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

Amitabh Mattoo is professor of International

Studies at New Delhi'sJawaharlal Nehru University.

A member of the NationalKnowledge Commission, a

high-level advisory group tothe Prime Minister of India,

he was also the Vice-Chancellor of the

University of Jammu. Aformer member of India's

National Security Council'sAdvisory Board, he has been

a member of the task forceconstituted by Indian Prime

Minister Manmohan Singhon Global Strategic

Developments. A visitingProfessor at Stanford

University, he has publishedeight books and contributed

to many leadingpublications.

AMITABH MATTOO

AJAI SHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

medium. He is ConsultingEditor (Strategic Affairs) for

Business Standard and has been Consulting

Editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news

broadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

K. Subrahmanyam is ahighly-regarded and

international strategicaffairs analyst and

commentator. Joining theIndian Administrative

Service in 1951, he wasSecretary Defence

Production till becoming thefounding Director of the

Institute for Defence Studiesand Analyses in 1968. He haschaired the Joint Intelligence

Committee in New Delhi. A Nehru Fellow and a VisitingProfessor, St.John's College,

he has also been a consultingeditor with The Econmic

Times and The Times of India.He has served as the

Convenor of the NationalSecurity Advisory Board and

Chairman of the KargilReview Panel. During his

career Mr Subrahmanyamhas authored and edited

16 books.

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

Narendra Sisodia is theDirector General of the

Institute for Defence Studiesand Analyses, New Delhi. He

was earlier Secretary in theMinistries of Finance andDefence, Government of

India and Vice-Chancellor ofUniversity of Udaipur.

He joined the IndianAdministrative Service in

1968 and served as JointSecretary in the Ministry of

Defence and was AdditionalSecretary in the National

Security CouncilSecretariat, where he was

member of the Task Force onReforming the Management

of Defence. A formerConvenor of Indian Pugwash

Society, he has also been aconsultant to the United

Nations DevelopmentProgramme.

NARENDRASISODIA

KANWAL SIBAL

Kanwal Sibal was ForeignSecretary to the Government

of India from 2002 to 2003.Most recently he was India’s

Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007). Joining the Indian

Foreign Service in 1966, hebegan his career in France

(1968-1973) and was DeputySpokesman in the Ministry of

External Affairs (1973-1975).Currently, he is a member of

the National SecurityAdvisory Board.

Lt Gen Daljeet Singh, hasbeen former army

commander, WesternCommand. He also

commanded a corps in theNorth East, a division in a

strike corps and a brigade inJammu & Kashmir. Having

held several key operationalappointments, he has taughtat the Army War College and

the Defence Services StaffCollege. He has represented

the Indian Army on severaldelegations abroad and is agraduate of the Commandand General Staff College,

USA, and the School ofInfantry, United Kingdom.

DALJEET SINGH

Contributors-final 2ND.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 25/01/10 5:07 PM Page 1

DSIJANUARY 2010

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COVER STORY

7

On December, 18, last year, theUnion Defence Minister, A.K.Antony, announced the

Government of India’s decision to pullback 30,000 soldiers of the Indian Armyfrom Jammu and Kashmir. According toAntony,now that the situation in the Statewas improving, the Government wantedto “reduce the visibility and presence” ofthe armed forces in J&K. Although therewere some signs of increased violence inthe State and of increased infiltration of

militants from Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, in January this year, itwas also decided that the Central ReservePolice Force would, instead, of the IndianArmy, patrol the highway between theJammu and the Kashmir Valley. Inaddition, instructions had been sent by theCentral Government to discontinue theuse of combat uniform by all Central Policeorganisations and the State Police.

Earlier, in October last year, addressinga public rally, while inaugurating therailway line between Anantnag andQazigund in Kashmir, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh said: “Today, I want toreiterate that we are ready for talks withthose people who want to restore peace,tranquility and development in Jammuand Kashmir. We want to take all thesections of society of Jammu and Kashmirwith us for the political and diplomaticsolution of the Kashmir issue.”

The Union Home Minister,P. Chidambaram, had already signaled that“quiet diplomacy”was at work and dialoguewith those out of the mainstream of Jammuand Kashmir’s politics was being initiated

Two decades of insurgency have taught us that the Kashmir issue needs to be dealt with

politically and diplomatically

AMITABH MATTOO

People listening to a

politician during an

election campaign

near Dal Lake flanked

by security forces

OF HOPE?VALLEY

KEY POINTSn In the wake of the inclusive electionsto the State Assembly last year, andthese current developments, it is easyto forget 1989-1990 when the worstcrisis in Jammu and Kashmir’s modernhistory first erupted.n Kashmir is unique, and must be dealtwith accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’suniqueness is obvious for a variety ofhistorical reasons recognised even bythe Supreme Court.

JAV

EE

D S

HA

H/IN

DIA

N E

XPR

ES

S

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DSIJANUARY 2010

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COVER STORY

7

On December, 18, last year, theUnion Defence Minister, A.K.Antony, announced the

Government of India’s decision to pullback 30,000 soldiers of the Indian Armyfrom Jammu and Kashmir. According toAntony,now that the situation in the Statewas improving, the Government wantedto “reduce the visibility and presence” ofthe armed forces in J&K. Although therewere some signs of increased violence inthe State and of increased infiltration of

militants from Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, in January this year, itwas also decided that the Central ReservePolice Force would, instead, of the IndianArmy, patrol the highway between theJammu and the Kashmir Valley. Inaddition, instructions had been sent by theCentral Government to discontinue theuse of combat uniform by all Central Policeorganisations and the State Police.

Earlier, in October last year, addressinga public rally, while inaugurating therailway line between Anantnag andQazigund in Kashmir, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh said: “Today, I want toreiterate that we are ready for talks withthose people who want to restore peace,tranquility and development in Jammuand Kashmir. We want to take all thesections of society of Jammu and Kashmirwith us for the political and diplomaticsolution of the Kashmir issue.”

The Union Home Minister,P. Chidambaram, had already signaled that“quiet diplomacy”was at work and dialoguewith those out of the mainstream of Jammuand Kashmir’s politics was being initiated

Two decades of insurgency have taught us that the Kashmir issue needs to be dealt with

politically and diplomatically

AMITABH MATTOO

People listening to a

politician during an

election campaign

near Dal Lake flanked

by security forces

OF HOPE?VALLEY

KEY POINTSn In the wake of the inclusive electionsto the State Assembly last year, andthese current developments, it is easyto forget 1989-1990 when the worstcrisis in Jammu and Kashmir’s modernhistory first erupted.n Kashmir is unique, and must be dealtwith accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’suniqueness is obvious for a variety ofhistorical reasons recognised even bythe Supreme Court.

JAV

EE

D S

HA

H/IN

DIA

N E

XPR

ES

S


DSIJANUARY 2010

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COVER STORY

nadir, with short periods of optimism,because of the Kashmir insurgency. In1990, it is believed, the two countries wereclose to a nuclear exchange which wasavoided because of a high-levelintervention by the United States.Similarly, the Kargil war of 1999 wascaused by an ambitious Pakistan seekingto inject life into the insurgency, but itcould have easily led to a full-blown war.

India’s counter-insurgency strategygradually got refined during these years.A realisation that indiscriminate use offorce would only strengthen theinsurgency, led to a more sophisticatedcounter-insurgency strategy. This includedthe creation of a unified headquarters, adivision of responsibilities between theIndian Army, the paramilitary forces andthe police: the importance of psychologicalwarfare was also recognised.

The intelligence agencies got empoweredas never before and at one stage, it seemedthat it was more a war between the “agencies”then between the people and the State.

Regional tensions too were heightenedwith a growing polarisation betweenJammu, Ladakh and the Valley, withJammu demanding Statehood and LadakhUnion Territory status. As a guesstimate,about fifty percent of India’s diplomaticresources, in these years, were spent oncountering Pakistan’s propaganda anddiplomatic offensive in capitals the worldover and in multilateral forums.

The Importance of J&KApart from its geo-strategic location, it isKashmir’s singular importance to the veryidea of India, which is often forgotten. AMuslim-majority State that voluntarilyacceded to India in 1947 lent tremendousstrength to the construction of India as avibrant, secular and pluralistic State. Thebattle, therefore, to win back the hearts andminds of the Kashmiri people is critical notjust for the recovery of the ideals thatinspired Indian nationhood, but is centralto the war against obscurantism andfundamentalism.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singhrecently declared: “Real empowerment,my friends, is not about slogans. Onlywhen every man, woman and child fromLadakh to Lakhanpur and from Kargil toKathua through Kashmir feels secure, inevery sense of the word, can we truly saythat people have been empowered.Security is freedom from fear and this iswhat we want to achieve. We want thepeople of Jammu and Kashmir to be freefrom all fears about their future. It is onlythis sense of comprehensive security,within a framework of good governancethat can really empower the people.

We want the people to be physicallysecure and this can only happen if violenceand terrorism ends permanently. We wantthe people to be economically secure and thiscan only happen if the tremendous potentialof the State is channelised and every citizenhas access to quality education and healthcare. We want every group to be politicallysecure and this can only happen once poweris decentralised to the villages. Finally,wewant every community to be culturally andsocially secure. This means that we value thecultural distinctiveness of every communityand create conditions for the flowering oftheir languages, their lifestyles and their artsand crafts. And we have to ensure that thosewho have been displaced can return to theirhomes. This vision of empowerment andcomprehensive security is related to goodgovernance and people’s activeparticipation in formulating policies andmonitoring their implementation.”

This vision of comprehensive securitymust surely guide all new initiativestowards Jammu and Kashmir and must bebased on the following five Ds:

DemocracyElections in Jammu and Kashmir are muchmore than a democratic ritual. In thepopular Kashmiri imagination, they havebeen powerful symbols of faith and

with the support of the State Government.In December, the Justice Sagheer AhmedReport on Central-State relations (basedon the recommendations of the FifthWorking Group set up by the PrimeMinister) was also released. Although farfrom being substantive and widelycriticised, the report signaled thewillingness of New Delhi to deal withissues of autonomy, self-rule anddevolution of power more meaningfullythan before. In the wake of the inclusiveelections to the State Assembly last year,and these current developments, it is easyto forget 1989-1990 when the worst crisisin Jammu and Kashmir’s modern historyfirst erupted.

The InsurgencyIt was an extraordinary sight. On December13, 1989, as four militants of the Jammu andKashmir Liberation Front were released indowntown Srinagar, in exchange of theUnion Home Minister’s daughter. It was, asif, the whole of the Kashmir Valley hadcome to celebrate the return of these“heroes” from Indian jails. Over the nextfew days, the streets of Srinagar wereoverwhelmed by Kashmiris convinced thatazadi was round the corner. Ironically, theState-run Doordarshan broadcast graphicimages of the fall of the Romaniancommunist party and the execution of itsleader Nicolae Ceausescu, convincingmany Kashmiris that the Indian State toowas, at least in Kashmir, on the verge ofcollapsing as had the Communist empire.Buses in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk wouldadvertise their destination as Sopore,Kupwor, Upore (from Sopore to Kupwaraand then across the Line of Control) asthousands of Kashmiri boys in phirans andrunning shoes went to Pakistan to betrained as militants.

An unprepared Indian State reacted,first with disbelief and then with anoveruse of force, causing avoidablecollateral damage and human rightsabuses. Human Rights activists’ dubbed itIndia’s Kashmir war while the Indianestablishment dubbed it Pakistan’s proxywar against India; part of its policy tobleed India by inflicting a ‘thousand cuts’on the country.

The truth was somewhere in the middle:Pakistan fanned the fires that were homegrown. As George Fernandes, then incharge of Kashmir Affairs, put it: “I do notbelieve any foreign hand created theKashmir problem. The problem was createdby us…others took advantage of it.”

Much water has flowed down theJhelum since then. The home-growninsurgency became a virtual jihadsponsored by Pakistan, but it was probablythe greatest challenge that India has everfaced as an Independent State. Eventwenty years after the militant insurgencyin Jammu and Kashmir caught virtuallythe whole Indian security establishmentnapping, the wounds are still with us. Thebattle against militancy may have beenwon, but the larger war for sustainablepeace in Kashmir is still being fought. It isonly by learning the right lessons from thetwo decades of pain and tragedy, can wereally prevent another cycle of discontent,violence, insurgency and counter-insurgency in the future.

Unfortunately, tactical approachesbased on bureaucratic ad hocism,merelyto buy time, simply do not work; onlythrough comprehensive strategic thinkingthat takes a long-term view of the State andputs in place in a plan-of-action thatdelivers can India truly win the hearts andminds of the people of Kashmir. The peaceof a grave yard is, after all, different fromthe peace of a garden.

The ConsequencesThe reality is that the consequences of thetwo decades of insurgency are still with us,especially in Kashmir. The mostdestructive impact was on Kashmirisociety itself. Once deified for its culture ofnon-violence, tolerance and pluralism, theValley was traumatised, scarred and itscomposite culture shattered. In themartyrs’ graveyard in downtownSrinagar, are buried thousands ofKashmiris who were killed fighting forwhat they believed was the right and justcause of their people. In regiments, allacross India, are photographs and tributesto all those soldiers who died, tragically,fighting—many times—their own people,and so is the case with the Boder SecurityForce, the Central Reserve Police Force andthe J&K Police. This, of course, is not toforget the thousands who were widowed,orphaned or disabled. Kashmir almost lostits soul during these two decades andcertainly its innocence, as almost everyfamily experienced a personal tragedy.

The sight of thousands of KashmiriPandits living in shabby camps, in Jammuand elsewhere, is a grim reminder of thiscommunity in exile,displaced by the conflictand because of a cause they could neveridentify with instinctively or cerebrally.

India’s relations with Pakistan reached a

India’s counter-insurgency strategy

gradually got refined. A realisation that

indiscriminate use offorce would only

strengthen theinsurgency, led to a more sophisticated

plan of action.

”

AFP

Security Forces flush out

militants holed up in a hotel in

Lal Chowk in Srinagar after a

night-long gun battle


DSIJANUARY 2010

98

COVER STORY

nadir, with short periods of optimism,because of the Kashmir insurgency. In1990, it is believed, the two countries wereclose to a nuclear exchange which wasavoided because of a high-levelintervention by the United States.Similarly, the Kargil war of 1999 wascaused by an ambitious Pakistan seekingto inject life into the insurgency, but itcould have easily led to a full-blown war.

India’s counter-insurgency strategygradually got refined during these years.A realisation that indiscriminate use offorce would only strengthen theinsurgency, led to a more sophisticatedcounter-insurgency strategy. This includedthe creation of a unified headquarters, adivision of responsibilities between theIndian Army, the paramilitary forces andthe police: the importance of psychologicalwarfare was also recognised.

The intelligence agencies got empoweredas never before and at one stage, it seemedthat it was more a war between the “agencies”then between the people and the State.

Regional tensions too were heightenedwith a growing polarisation betweenJammu, Ladakh and the Valley, withJammu demanding Statehood and LadakhUnion Territory status. As a guesstimate,about fifty percent of India’s diplomaticresources, in these years, were spent oncountering Pakistan’s propaganda anddiplomatic offensive in capitals the worldover and in multilateral forums.

The Importance of J&KApart from its geo-strategic location, it isKashmir’s singular importance to the veryidea of India, which is often forgotten. AMuslim-majority State that voluntarilyacceded to India in 1947 lent tremendousstrength to the construction of India as avibrant, secular and pluralistic State. Thebattle, therefore, to win back the hearts andminds of the Kashmiri people is critical notjust for the recovery of the ideals thatinspired Indian nationhood, but is centralto the war against obscurantism andfundamentalism.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singhrecently declared: “Real empowerment,my friends, is not about slogans. Onlywhen every man, woman and child fromLadakh to Lakhanpur and from Kargil toKathua through Kashmir feels secure, inevery sense of the word, can we truly saythat people have been empowered.Security is freedom from fear and this iswhat we want to achieve. We want thepeople of Jammu and Kashmir to be freefrom all fears about their future. It is onlythis sense of comprehensive security,within a framework of good governancethat can really empower the people.

We want the people to be physicallysecure and this can only happen if violenceand terrorism ends permanently. We wantthe people to be economically secure and thiscan only happen if the tremendous potentialof the State is channelised and every citizenhas access to quality education and healthcare. We want every group to be politicallysecure and this can only happen once poweris decentralised to the villages. Finally,wewant every community to be culturally andsocially secure. This means that we value thecultural distinctiveness of every communityand create conditions for the flowering oftheir languages, their lifestyles and their artsand crafts. And we have to ensure that thosewho have been displaced can return to theirhomes. This vision of empowerment andcomprehensive security is related to goodgovernance and people’s activeparticipation in formulating policies andmonitoring their implementation.”

This vision of comprehensive securitymust surely guide all new initiativestowards Jammu and Kashmir and must bebased on the following five Ds:

DemocracyElections in Jammu and Kashmir are muchmore than a democratic ritual. In thepopular Kashmiri imagination, they havebeen powerful symbols of faith and

with the support of the State Government.In December, the Justice Sagheer AhmedReport on Central-State relations (basedon the recommendations of the FifthWorking Group set up by the PrimeMinister) was also released. Although farfrom being substantive and widelycriticised, the report signaled thewillingness of New Delhi to deal withissues of autonomy, self-rule anddevolution of power more meaningfullythan before. In the wake of the inclusiveelections to the State Assembly last year,and these current developments, it is easyto forget 1989-1990 when the worst crisisin Jammu and Kashmir’s modern historyfirst erupted.

The InsurgencyIt was an extraordinary sight. On December13, 1989, as four militants of the Jammu andKashmir Liberation Front were released indowntown Srinagar, in exchange of theUnion Home Minister’s daughter. It was, asif, the whole of the Kashmir Valley hadcome to celebrate the return of these“heroes” from Indian jails. Over the nextfew days, the streets of Srinagar wereoverwhelmed by Kashmiris convinced thatazadi was round the corner. Ironically, theState-run Doordarshan broadcast graphicimages of the fall of the Romaniancommunist party and the execution of itsleader Nicolae Ceausescu, convincingmany Kashmiris that the Indian State toowas, at least in Kashmir, on the verge ofcollapsing as had the Communist empire.Buses in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk wouldadvertise their destination as Sopore,Kupwor, Upore (from Sopore to Kupwaraand then across the Line of Control) asthousands of Kashmiri boys in phirans andrunning shoes went to Pakistan to betrained as militants.

An unprepared Indian State reacted,first with disbelief and then with anoveruse of force, causing avoidablecollateral damage and human rightsabuses. Human Rights activists’ dubbed itIndia’s Kashmir war while the Indianestablishment dubbed it Pakistan’s proxywar against India; part of its policy tobleed India by inflicting a ‘thousand cuts’on the country.

The truth was somewhere in the middle:Pakistan fanned the fires that were homegrown. As George Fernandes, then incharge of Kashmir Affairs, put it: “I do notbelieve any foreign hand created theKashmir problem. The problem was createdby us…others took advantage of it.”

Much water has flowed down theJhelum since then. The home-growninsurgency became a virtual jihadsponsored by Pakistan, but it was probablythe greatest challenge that India has everfaced as an Independent State. Eventwenty years after the militant insurgencyin Jammu and Kashmir caught virtuallythe whole Indian security establishmentnapping, the wounds are still with us. Thebattle against militancy may have beenwon, but the larger war for sustainablepeace in Kashmir is still being fought. It isonly by learning the right lessons from thetwo decades of pain and tragedy, can wereally prevent another cycle of discontent,violence, insurgency and counter-insurgency in the future.

Unfortunately, tactical approachesbased on bureaucratic ad hocism,merelyto buy time, simply do not work; onlythrough comprehensive strategic thinkingthat takes a long-term view of the State andputs in place in a plan-of-action thatdelivers can India truly win the hearts andminds of the people of Kashmir. The peaceof a grave yard is, after all, different fromthe peace of a garden.

The ConsequencesThe reality is that the consequences of thetwo decades of insurgency are still with us,especially in Kashmir. The mostdestructive impact was on Kashmirisociety itself. Once deified for its culture ofnon-violence, tolerance and pluralism, theValley was traumatised, scarred and itscomposite culture shattered. In themartyrs’ graveyard in downtownSrinagar, are buried thousands ofKashmiris who were killed fighting forwhat they believed was the right and justcause of their people. In regiments, allacross India, are photographs and tributesto all those soldiers who died, tragically,fighting—many times—their own people,and so is the case with the Boder SecurityForce, the Central Reserve Police Force andthe J&K Police. This, of course, is not toforget the thousands who were widowed,orphaned or disabled. Kashmir almost lostits soul during these two decades andcertainly its innocence, as almost everyfamily experienced a personal tragedy.

The sight of thousands of KashmiriPandits living in shabby camps, in Jammuand elsewhere, is a grim reminder of thiscommunity in exile,displaced by the conflictand because of a cause they could neveridentify with instinctively or cerebrally.

India’s relations with Pakistan reached a

India’s counter-insurgency strategy

gradually got refined. A realisation that

indiscriminate use offorce would only

strengthen theinsurgency, led to a more sophisticated

plan of action.

”A

FP

Security Forces flush out

militants holed up in a hotel in

Lal Chowk in Srinagar after a

night-long gun battle


1110

DSIJANUARY 2010COVER STORYbetrayal;of resistance and accommodation;of hope and disillusionment; of confidenceand uncertainty. Through the 1950s and the1960s, stage-managed elections were seenas a betrayal of the trust of 1947. The 1977election, the fairest the State had witnessedsince Independence, became a liet motif offaith and accommodation. The 1987election,neither free nor fair,paved the wayfor militancy in the State.

Confidence in the democratic processwas restored considerably when, for thefirst time ever, in 2002, the electorate wasable to dislodge the ruling party. The 2008election will also be recognised as a markerfor its inclusiveness and credibility,despiteconsiderable odds. While 43.69 percent ofthe electorate had voted in 2002, the figurewas 61.49 percent in 2008, respectable byany national or international standard.More significantly, all the districts of theKashmir Valley (outside Srinagar)witnessed a healthy turnout of more than45 percent,with Kupwara and Bandipora—once at the heart of separatist politics—registering 68.22 percent and 59.66 percentrespectively. This faith in democracy mustbe strengthened by ensuring not just thefairness of all future elections, but that realdemocracy is in operation up to thepanchayat level.

DialoguesSecond is the issue of the three dialoguesthat are vital to re-build the culture ofmutual respect, tolerance, accommodationand faith in peaceful conflict resolution.Only the myopic will suggest that popularalienation has ended or separatistsentiment is dead. The challenge,consequently, is to ensure that there is alarger dialogue with separatists and evenformer militant groups which need notdelegitimise the elections or underminethe elected representatives. This shouldnot be difficult to engineer if there is a clearpolitical will and the task of interlocutingis not left to intelligence operatives orretired babus. This is something that theHome Minister must make into a mantra.

The dialogue must be unconditionaland continuous and should address bothpolitical as well as humanitarian issues thatcould build confidence and trust(including the issue, for example, of therelease of political detainees and ensuring astricter enforcement of human rights).

Internally, it is also vital to build,through talks, a process of reconciliationbetween Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammuand the sub-regions. There has been

growing regional and communalpolarisation, which needs to be urgentlyaddressed. The dialogue within should becomplimented by the re-starting of theNew Delhi-Islamabad back channel onKashmir, to ensure—inter alia—thatPakistan has no incentive to subvert theinternal track. This should, of course, takeoff from precisely where the previouslydesignated special envoys had paused intheir discussions.

DevolutionThe third challenge is to arrive at a consensuson devolution and decentralisation. There aremany proposals on the table, including thoseon autonomy, self-rule, self-governance andachievable nationhood. A sincerity ofpurpose, together with an imaginative andcreative play with many of these ideas,should make it possible to arrive at anagreement amongst the main stakeholders inJammu, Kashmir and Ladakh on thequantum of political space needed, at everyadministrative level, for true empowerment ofall the people of the State, as well as on theinstitutions and mechanisms needed tosupport this architecture.

Autonomy and self-rule must not beviewed as dirty words,and an ‘autonomous’or ‘self-ruled’ Kashmir could become a

model of cooperative federalism. Autonomyis about empowering people, makingpeople feel that they belong, and aboutincreasing the accountability of publicinstitutions and services. It is, in essence,synonymous with decentralisation anddevolution of power,phrases that have beenon the charter of virtually every politicalparty in India. In Jammu and Kashmir,autonomy carries tremendous resonancewith the people because puppet leadersfrom the State colluded with the Centralleadership and gradually eroded theautonomy promised by the Constitution.There is no contradiction between wantingKashmir to be part of the nationalmainstream and the State’s desire forautonomous self-governance.

Separatism grows when people feeldisconnected from the structures of powerand the process of policy formulation; incontrast, devolution ensures popularparticipation in the running of the polity.If this balance is struck, Jammu andKashmir could become a model of ‘co-operative federalism’, a special model thatcould be gradually applied to other Statesin the Union.

Six-Point PlanRestoration of autonomy in Kashmir,however, does not require elaboratereports or reference to past agreementsand accords. They obfuscate rather thanclarify the issue of meaningful self-governance. Autonomy can be achieved in

the State through a simple six-point plan.First, restore the nomenclature. The terms

Sadar-i-Riyasat and Wazir-e-Azam,whichwere used until 1965 for the Governor andthe Chief Minister of the State, still haveimportant symbolic value for people of theState. Literally translated, the terms standfor head of State and Prime Minister. Thisnomenclature should be restored. Insubstance, this change will neither enlargenor diminish the powers of the Governor orthe Chief Minister. This will also not leadto a shift in their order of precedence.

Second, give the State a role in theselection of its Governor. According toArticle 155 of the Indian Constitution, the‘Governor of the State shall be appointedby the President by warrant under his hand

and seal.’Until 1965, the Sadar-i-Riyasat inKashmir was elected by the StateLegislature,but it was clear that he should bea person acceptable to the Centre and beappointed by the President. The Governor iswidely viewed in Jammu and Kashmir as aninstrument through which the Centre—and more often the political party in power—has furthered its interests in the State. Theoffice of the Governor, in whom theConstitution vests the executive power ofthe State should be above narrow partisanpolitics. The Governor could be elected bythe State Legislature and be appointed bythe President and,by virtue of Article 156(1),hold office at the pleasure of the President.Or alternatively, the State Governmentcould submit a panel of names for the

President to appoint asGovernor the personhe finds the mostsuitable from the panel.The appointee wouldhold office at thePresident’s pleasure.

Third, preventmisuse of Article 356.This article deals with

‘provisions in case of the failure of theConstitutional machinery in States.’ Themisuse of Article 356 is a matter that hascaused widespread concern in all theStates. The matter is being considered bythe Inter-State Council and some agreedmodifications and safeguards mightemerge. While some might argue that itwould be imprudent and impractical toexempt Jammu and Kashmir from thepurview of the article altogether (althoughthe State was brought under its purviewonly in 1964), it is still possible to modify itsignificantly to prevent misuse withoutcompromising on measures that might beneeded to deal with real emergencies.

In case of a Constitutional breakdown,provisions should be made for holdingelections within a maximum of threemonths and for the appointment of aneminent persons’ group from within theState to review the situation in caseelections cannot be held within threemonths because of violence or otherdisturbances. The verdict of the groupshould be final.

Fourth, give State services moreauthority and increase their quota in the AllIndia Services. Part XIV of the Constitutionwhich deals with the services did not applyinitially to Jammu and Kashmir. But theprovisions of Article 312 relating to All IndiaServices were extended in1958. Under the

The 2008 election willalso be recognised as a

marker for itsinclusiveness and

credibility, despiteconsiderable odds. Thisfaith in democracy must

be strengthened byensuring not just thefairness of all future

elections, but that realdemocracy is in

operation up to thepanchayat level.

”Kashmiris queue

to vote in Dawar

Gurez near the

Line of Control

(LoC), during the

fifth and final

phase of India’s

national elections

during May 2009

AFP


1110

DSIJANUARY 2010COVER STORYbetrayal;of resistance and accommodation;of hope and disillusionment; of confidenceand uncertainty. Through the 1950s and the1960s, stage-managed elections were seenas a betrayal of the trust of 1947. The 1977election, the fairest the State had witnessedsince Independence, became a liet motif offaith and accommodation. The 1987election,neither free nor fair,paved the wayfor militancy in the State.

Confidence in the democratic processwas restored considerably when, for thefirst time ever, in 2002, the electorate wasable to dislodge the ruling party. The 2008election will also be recognised as a markerfor its inclusiveness and credibility,despiteconsiderable odds. While 43.69 percent ofthe electorate had voted in 2002, the figurewas 61.49 percent in 2008, respectable byany national or international standard.More significantly, all the districts of theKashmir Valley (outside Srinagar)witnessed a healthy turnout of more than45 percent,with Kupwara and Bandipora—once at the heart of separatist politics—registering 68.22 percent and 59.66 percentrespectively. This faith in democracy mustbe strengthened by ensuring not just thefairness of all future elections, but that realdemocracy is in operation up to thepanchayat level.

DialoguesSecond is the issue of the three dialoguesthat are vital to re-build the culture ofmutual respect, tolerance, accommodationand faith in peaceful conflict resolution.Only the myopic will suggest that popularalienation has ended or separatistsentiment is dead. The challenge,consequently, is to ensure that there is alarger dialogue with separatists and evenformer militant groups which need notdelegitimise the elections or underminethe elected representatives. This shouldnot be difficult to engineer if there is a clearpolitical will and the task of interlocutingis not left to intelligence operatives orretired babus. This is something that theHome Minister must make into a mantra.

The dialogue must be unconditionaland continuous and should address bothpolitical as well as humanitarian issues thatcould build confidence and trust(including the issue, for example, of therelease of political detainees and ensuring astricter enforcement of human rights).

Internally, it is also vital to build,through talks, a process of reconciliationbetween Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammuand the sub-regions. There has been

growing regional and communalpolarisation, which needs to be urgentlyaddressed. The dialogue within should becomplimented by the re-starting of theNew Delhi-Islamabad back channel onKashmir, to ensure—inter alia—thatPakistan has no incentive to subvert theinternal track. This should, of course, takeoff from precisely where the previouslydesignated special envoys had paused intheir discussions.

DevolutionThe third challenge is to arrive at a consensuson devolution and decentralisation. There aremany proposals on the table, including thoseon autonomy, self-rule, self-governance andachievable nationhood. A sincerity ofpurpose, together with an imaginative andcreative play with many of these ideas,should make it possible to arrive at anagreement amongst the main stakeholders inJammu, Kashmir and Ladakh on thequantum of political space needed, at everyadministrative level, for true empowerment ofall the people of the State, as well as on theinstitutions and mechanisms needed tosupport this architecture.

Autonomy and self-rule must not beviewed as dirty words,and an ‘autonomous’or ‘self-ruled’ Kashmir could become a

model of cooperative federalism. Autonomyis about empowering people, makingpeople feel that they belong, and aboutincreasing the accountability of publicinstitutions and services. It is, in essence,synonymous with decentralisation anddevolution of power,phrases that have beenon the charter of virtually every politicalparty in India. In Jammu and Kashmir,autonomy carries tremendous resonancewith the people because puppet leadersfrom the State colluded with the Centralleadership and gradually eroded theautonomy promised by the Constitution.There is no contradiction between wantingKashmir to be part of the nationalmainstream and the State’s desire forautonomous self-governance.

Separatism grows when people feeldisconnected from the structures of powerand the process of policy formulation; incontrast, devolution ensures popularparticipation in the running of the polity.If this balance is struck, Jammu andKashmir could become a model of ‘co-operative federalism’, a special model thatcould be gradually applied to other Statesin the Union.

Six-Point PlanRestoration of autonomy in Kashmir,however, does not require elaboratereports or reference to past agreementsand accords. They obfuscate rather thanclarify the issue of meaningful self-governance. Autonomy can be achieved in

the State through a simple six-point plan.First, restore the nomenclature. The terms

Sadar-i-Riyasat and Wazir-e-Azam,whichwere used until 1965 for the Governor andthe Chief Minister of the State, still haveimportant symbolic value for people of theState. Literally translated, the terms standfor head of State and Prime Minister. Thisnomenclature should be restored. Insubstance, this change will neither enlargenor diminish the powers of the Governor orthe Chief Minister. This will also not leadto a shift in their order of precedence.

Second, give the State a role in theselection of its Governor. According toArticle 155 of the Indian Constitution, the‘Governor of the State shall be appointedby the President by warrant under his hand

and seal.’Until 1965, the Sadar-i-Riyasat inKashmir was elected by the StateLegislature,but it was clear that he should bea person acceptable to the Centre and beappointed by the President. The Governor iswidely viewed in Jammu and Kashmir as aninstrument through which the Centre—and more often the political party in power—has furthered its interests in the State. Theoffice of the Governor, in whom theConstitution vests the executive power ofthe State should be above narrow partisanpolitics. The Governor could be elected bythe State Legislature and be appointed bythe President and,by virtue of Article 156(1),hold office at the pleasure of the President.Or alternatively, the State Governmentcould submit a panel of names for the

President to appoint asGovernor the personhe finds the mostsuitable from the panel.The appointee wouldhold office at thePresident’s pleasure.

Third, preventmisuse of Article 356.This article deals with

‘provisions in case of the failure of theConstitutional machinery in States.’ Themisuse of Article 356 is a matter that hascaused widespread concern in all theStates. The matter is being considered bythe Inter-State Council and some agreedmodifications and safeguards mightemerge. While some might argue that itwould be imprudent and impractical toexempt Jammu and Kashmir from thepurview of the article altogether (althoughthe State was brought under its purviewonly in 1964), it is still possible to modify itsignificantly to prevent misuse withoutcompromising on measures that might beneeded to deal with real emergencies.

In case of a Constitutional breakdown,provisions should be made for holdingelections within a maximum of threemonths and for the appointment of aneminent persons’ group from within theState to review the situation in caseelections cannot be held within threemonths because of violence or otherdisturbances. The verdict of the groupshould be final.

Fourth, give State services moreauthority and increase their quota in the AllIndia Services. Part XIV of the Constitutionwhich deals with the services did not applyinitially to Jammu and Kashmir. But theprovisions of Article 312 relating to All IndiaServices were extended in1958. Under the

The 2008 election willalso be recognised as a

marker for itsinclusiveness and

credibility, despiteconsiderable odds. Thisfaith in democracy must

be strengthened byensuring not just thefairness of all future

elections, but that realdemocracy is in

operation up to thepanchayat level.

”Kashmiris queue

to vote in Dawar

Gurez near the

Line of Control

(LoC), during the

fifth and final

phase of India’s

national elections

during May 2009

AFP


DSIJANUARY 2010

12

COVER STORY

13

scheme, entry into the IndianAdministrative Service and the IndianPolice Service is both by direct examinationand selection of promotees from the StateCivil Service by the Union Public ServiceCommission. In most States, the State quotahas been around 33 percent but in the case ofKashmir this has been 50 percent.

There is reason to expect that, aselsewhere, with improvements in thequality of education in Kashmir, the numberof direct recruits fromthe State will increase inthe years ahead. Evenotherwise, the Jammuand Kashmir selectionquota (from within theState Services) should beincreased for a period of20 years to 75 percentgiven the disruption thatthe educational system in the State has facedover the last decade.

The Kashmir Administrative Services(KAS) and the Kashmir Police Service (KPS)have suffered severe neglect andmarginalisation over the last decade. Partof the problem has to do with training but itis critical that KAS and KPS officers aregiven promotions and positions ofauthority and have a career track similar toIAS and IPS officers.

Fifth,provide guarantees for the future.Many people genuinely feel that even if apackage of autonomy or self-rule is workedout, a future Central Government may, incollusion with the State’s political leaders,renege on an agreement that is made today.This is based on the past experience of theState’s relationship with the Centre. It isessential, therefore, that specialConstitutional guarantees are introducedto ensure that the State’s autonomy is noteroded. It may be necessary, for instance,to introduce a provision in the Constitutionwhich would provide for a referendum inthe State before any major amendment thatwould affect its ties with the Unionbecomes a law.

Finally, ensure greater regional balance,but rule out a division of the State. There arepowerful forces demanding a trifurcationof the main regions of the State —Jammu,Kashmir and Ladakh—into separateadministrative units. Posing as animaginative solution, this demand, ifconceded, could lead to violent socialdisruptions in the State and create acommunal polarisation that would not justirretrievably destroy the cultural and socialfabric of the State but have perilous

consequences for communal relations in therest of India.

In addition, trifurcation would foreverend the possibilities of reviving the pluraltraditions of communal harmony in theState that had once made it a symbol of thevery idea of India: unity in diversity.

Regional harmony, it should be clearfrom experience, cannot be ensured throughpartitions, but through a decentralisationand devolution of financial and economicpower that will treat the panchayat as theprimary unit of governance. Jammu andKashmir is not Assam or Uttar Pradeshwhere the carving of smaller States willprovide for better governance. On the

contrary, it is a recipe for disaster.These internal discussions must flow

into the back-channel, which can thenattempt to work out a non-territorialIndia-Pakistan settlement on Jammu andKashmir based on providing a similarpolitical architecture on both sides of theLine of Control while working towardsconverting it into a line of peace thatallows for the free movement of people,goods, services and ideas. Cooperation inareas of mutual interest like water,transport, agriculture and education willrequire the creation gradually of trans-LoC mechanisms and institutions. Theimplementation of such an understanding

should create the conditions for a win-winsolution without needing to address hardissues of political sovereignty.

DemilitarisationAn issue which is both controversial and yetessential to building peace is demilitarisation.Demilitarisation must not be confused withmerely the withdrawal of troops. Instead,militarisation is a culture that legitimises theuse of violence and force, rewards machismoand physical aggressiveness, patronisesintolerance and repression and iscontemptuous of marginal groups. No oneactor can be held responsible for themilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir,

particularly over the last two decades and noone action will change this reality.

In many ways, militarisation is, to useAshis Nandy’s classic phrase, an “intimateenemy”. All stakeholders, State and non-State, have an obligation to re-create ademilitarised culture of peace. What isrequired is deep introspection, a changedmindset and, of course, a change of heartand policy.

A Truth Commission would be an idealstarting point for the creation of a newdemilitarised culture of peace. Symboli-cally, the withdrawal of 30,000 troops fromthe Valley has sent a signal of theGovernment of India’s sincerity of purpose.

But much will also depend onPakistan’s actions in ending thesponsorship of violence as well as theability of the Kashmiris themselves to resistattempts that legitimise violence and forcethem to abandon once again theirdistinctly non-violent historic identity.

Development and GovernanceFinally, of course, is the development ofJammu and Kashmir, which has been acentral part of the Prime Minister’s visionfor the State. Other than improvedconnectivity and infrastructure, it isessential to give the youth of Jammu andKashmir a greater stake in the country’sbooming knowledge economy. Given thegeography of the State, and its growingendowment of skills, electronic exports ofservices may play a more significant role inits beneficial economic integration than the

export of apples and handicrafts. The StateGovernment must also pay attention to therecommendations of the working groupon ensuring good governance in the State,which include, the introduction of e-governance—to make Government at thedistrict and tehsil level more efficient,accountable and transparent—and forextending the 73rd Amendment to trulyempower the Panchayati Raj system.

However, for the State Government, animportant priority must be to devise andimplement a comprehensive policy for theyoung men and women of the State. TheState has witnessed consistently highlevels of educated unemployment and lowlevels of vocationally skilled humanresources. With more than 2,00,000unemployed, and in many caseunemployable (other than as white collarworkers for the Government), the youthhave formed the bed rock of the militantmovement over the last two decades. Thechallenge now is to use this energy ofthe young Kashmiris to build peace.

Re-training hubs in all the districtheadquarters must be immediatelyestablished to ensure that a significantsection of unemployed educated youthbecome employable within six months to ayear. With an extensive use of Informationand Communication Technology, it shouldbe possible to annually produce more than20,000 skilled and employable workers fromthe 22 district re-training centres.

These centres could be establishedthrough a public-private partnership or bycreating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).Public-private partnerships are also needed toenhance international connectivity byextending broad-band access in the State—with stronger incentives provided throughthe existing universal access funds fortelecommunications.

In the long-term,given the geography ofthe State and its growing endowments ofskills, electronic exports of services mayplay a more significant role in revitalising itseconomy than other traditional sectors.

Kashmir is unique, and must be dealtwith accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’suniqueness is obvious for a variety ofhistorical reasons recognised even by theSupreme Court. In 1984, in Khazan Chandvs. the State of Jammu and Kashmir, thecourt unambiguously held that the Stateholds ‘a special place in the Constitutionalset up of the country.’ The biggest lesson ofthe insurgency is to deal with J&Kspecially and politically rather thanbureaucratically.

Activists from

the All Parties

Hurriyat

Conference shout

pro-freedom

slogans during a

rally in Srinagar

in August, 2009

In Jammu and Kashmir,autonomy carries

tremendous resonancewith the people becausepuppet leaders from the

State colluded with theCentral leadership and

gradually eroded theautonomy promised by

the Constitution.

”

AFP


DSIJANUARY 2010

12

COVER STORY

13

scheme, entry into the IndianAdministrative Service and the IndianPolice Service is both by direct examinationand selection of promotees from the StateCivil Service by the Union Public ServiceCommission. In most States, the State quotahas been around 33 percent but in the case ofKashmir this has been 50 percent.

There is reason to expect that, aselsewhere, with improvements in thequality of education in Kashmir, the numberof direct recruits fromthe State will increase inthe years ahead. Evenotherwise, the Jammuand Kashmir selectionquota (from within theState Services) should beincreased for a period of20 years to 75 percentgiven the disruption thatthe educational system in the State has facedover the last decade.

The Kashmir Administrative Services(KAS) and the Kashmir Police Service (KPS)have suffered severe neglect andmarginalisation over the last decade. Partof the problem has to do with training but itis critical that KAS and KPS officers aregiven promotions and positions ofauthority and have a career track similar toIAS and IPS officers.

Fifth,provide guarantees for the future.Many people genuinely feel that even if apackage of autonomy or self-rule is workedout, a future Central Government may, incollusion with the State’s political leaders,renege on an agreement that is made today.This is based on the past experience of theState’s relationship with the Centre. It isessential, therefore, that specialConstitutional guarantees are introducedto ensure that the State’s autonomy is noteroded. It may be necessary, for instance,to introduce a provision in the Constitutionwhich would provide for a referendum inthe State before any major amendment thatwould affect its ties with the Unionbecomes a law.

Finally, ensure greater regional balance,but rule out a division of the State. There arepowerful forces demanding a trifurcationof the main regions of the State —Jammu,Kashmir and Ladakh—into separateadministrative units. Posing as animaginative solution, this demand, ifconceded, could lead to violent socialdisruptions in the State and create acommunal polarisation that would not justirretrievably destroy the cultural and socialfabric of the State but have perilous

consequences for communal relations in therest of India.

In addition, trifurcation would foreverend the possibilities of reviving the pluraltraditions of communal harmony in theState that had once made it a symbol of thevery idea of India: unity in diversity.

Regional harmony, it should be clearfrom experience, cannot be ensured throughpartitions, but through a decentralisationand devolution of financial and economicpower that will treat the panchayat as theprimary unit of governance. Jammu andKashmir is not Assam or Uttar Pradeshwhere the carving of smaller States willprovide for better governance. On the

contrary, it is a recipe for disaster.These internal discussions must flow

into the back-channel, which can thenattempt to work out a non-territorialIndia-Pakistan settlement on Jammu andKashmir based on providing a similarpolitical architecture on both sides of theLine of Control while working towardsconverting it into a line of peace thatallows for the free movement of people,goods, services and ideas. Cooperation inareas of mutual interest like water,transport, agriculture and education willrequire the creation gradually of trans-LoC mechanisms and institutions. Theimplementation of such an understanding

should create the conditions for a win-winsolution without needing to address hardissues of political sovereignty.

DemilitarisationAn issue which is both controversial and yetessential to building peace is demilitarisation.Demilitarisation must not be confused withmerely the withdrawal of troops. Instead,militarisation is a culture that legitimises theuse of violence and force, rewards machismoand physical aggressiveness, patronisesintolerance and repression and iscontemptuous of marginal groups. No oneactor can be held responsible for themilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir,

particularly over the last two decades and noone action will change this reality.

In many ways, militarisation is, to useAshis Nandy’s classic phrase, an “intimateenemy”. All stakeholders, State and non-State, have an obligation to re-create ademilitarised culture of peace. What isrequired is deep introspection, a changedmindset and, of course, a change of heartand policy.

A Truth Commission would be an idealstarting point for the creation of a newdemilitarised culture of peace. Symboli-cally, the withdrawal of 30,000 troops fromthe Valley has sent a signal of theGovernment of India’s sincerity of purpose.

But much will also depend onPakistan’s actions in ending thesponsorship of violence as well as theability of the Kashmiris themselves to resistattempts that legitimise violence and forcethem to abandon once again theirdistinctly non-violent historic identity.

Development and GovernanceFinally, of course, is the development ofJammu and Kashmir, which has been acentral part of the Prime Minister’s visionfor the State. Other than improvedconnectivity and infrastructure, it isessential to give the youth of Jammu andKashmir a greater stake in the country’sbooming knowledge economy. Given thegeography of the State, and its growingendowment of skills, electronic exports ofservices may play a more significant role inits beneficial economic integration than the

export of apples and handicrafts. The StateGovernment must also pay attention to therecommendations of the working groupon ensuring good governance in the State,which include, the introduction of e-governance—to make Government at thedistrict and tehsil level more efficient,accountable and transparent—and forextending the 73rd Amendment to trulyempower the Panchayati Raj system.

However, for the State Government, animportant priority must be to devise andimplement a comprehensive policy for theyoung men and women of the State. TheState has witnessed consistently highlevels of educated unemployment and lowlevels of vocationally skilled humanresources. With more than 2,00,000unemployed, and in many caseunemployable (other than as white collarworkers for the Government), the youthhave formed the bed rock of the militantmovement over the last two decades. Thechallenge now is to use this energy ofthe young Kashmiris to build peace.

Re-training hubs in all the districtheadquarters must be immediatelyestablished to ensure that a significantsection of unemployed educated youthbecome employable within six months to ayear. With an extensive use of Informationand Communication Technology, it shouldbe possible to annually produce more than20,000 skilled and employable workers fromthe 22 district re-training centres.

These centres could be establishedthrough a public-private partnership or bycreating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).Public-private partnerships are also needed toenhance international connectivity byextending broad-band access in the State—with stronger incentives provided throughthe existing universal access funds fortelecommunications.

In the long-term,given the geography ofthe State and its growing endowments ofskills, electronic exports of services mayplay a more significant role in revitalising itseconomy than other traditional sectors.

Kashmir is unique, and must be dealtwith accordingly. Jammu and Kashmir’suniqueness is obvious for a variety ofhistorical reasons recognised even by theSupreme Court. In 1984, in Khazan Chandvs. the State of Jammu and Kashmir, thecourt unambiguously held that the Stateholds ‘a special place in the Constitutionalset up of the country.’ The biggest lesson ofthe insurgency is to deal with J&Kspecially and politically rather thanbureaucratically.

Activists from

the All Parties

Hurriyat

Conference shout

pro-freedom

slogans during a

rally in Srinagar

in August, 2009

In Jammu and Kashmir,autonomy carries

tremendous resonancewith the people becausepuppet leaders from the

State colluded with theCentral leadership and

gradually eroded theautonomy promised by

the Constitution.

”A

FP


DSIJANUARY 2010

14

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

15

India is close to signing an agreement with Russiato jointly develop the Sukhoi T-50, termed as PAK-FA by Russia and known in India as the FifthGeneration Fighter Aircraft

Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy,which translates into English asProspective Aircraft Complex of FrontlineAviation) has carried out high-speed taxitrials in Siberia, the final preparation for itsfirst-ever flight, which is evidentlyimminent. The PAK-FA programme aimsto produce the first Gen5 fighter builtoutside America.

Sources in the Ministry of Defence(MoD) in New Delhi say that India is veryclose to signing a detailed agreement withRussia to jointly develop the PAK-FA,which India terms as the Fifth GenerationFighter Aircraft (FGFA). For years

Moscow and New Delhi have haggledover the FGFA’s configuration,capabilities and development work-share. Now, apparently, the two sides areclose to an agreement.

The contract will be signed betweenBangalore-based Hindustan AeronauticsLimited (HAL) and Russia’s UnitedAircraft Corporation (UAC),which owns acontrolling interest in Sukhoi. They willcommit to jointly developing andbuilding 250 fighters for the Indian AirForce (IAF) and an equal number forRussia. The door will remain open foradditional orders from either partner

country, as well as for export,which willbe contingent on both sides agreeing.

Equal StakesHAL and UAC will set up a joint venturecompany, similar to the Brahmos JV, inwhich both sides will own equal stakes.Much of the development work willcontinue to take place in the aviationR&D establishments of both partnercountries. India’s Aeronautical Develop-ment Agency (ADA),which oversees theTejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)programme, will not be concerned withthe FGFA. Instead, the ADA will focus on

LEAP INTO THE FUTURE

AJAI SHUKLA

An artist’s impression

of the Sukhoi T-50

Fighter Aircraft

In the world of combat aviation, thelast decade has been ruled by anunchallenged king—the United States

Air Force’s F-22 Raptor—the world’s onlyFifth Generation (Gen5) fighter. TheRaptor has all the attributes of a Gen5fighter, be it stealth (both active andpassive), advanced data fusion tech-niques for giving the pilot near-totalsituational awareness, high super cruiseability and high agility through deviceslike thrust vectoring.

But the Raptor is under a cloud. TheUS will build only 187 of these Gen5fighters after experiencing its big

problems: high costs and maintenance.Each hour that the US $350 million-fighter flies, it costs America almost US$50,000. And for each hour of flying, itneeds 30 hours of maintenance. TheSoviet threat might have justified thisexpense, but today as US DefenseSecretary Robert Gates said, the Raptor isa “niche silver-bullet solution” against athreat that is nowhere in sight.

Even as Gates spoke, a new challengerto the Raptor was being born in Russia.During the closing weeks of 2009,Sukhoi’s T-50 fighter prototype (termedthe PAK-FA, an acronym for Perspektivnyi

KEY POINTSn The contract is likely to be signed between the Bangalore-basedHindustan Aeronautics Limited andRussia’s United Aircraft Corporation.They will commit to jointly developingand building 250 fighters for theIndian Air Force and an equal numberfor Russia.n The joint venture will cater to boththe Russian and Indian Air Forces,producing two different, but closelyrelated aircraft.

Sukhoi-T50-edited 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:31 PM Page 1

DSIJANUARY 2010

14

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

15

India is close to signing an agreement with Russiato jointly develop the Sukhoi T-50, termed as PAK-FA by Russia and known in India as the FifthGeneration Fighter Aircraft

Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy,which translates into English asProspective Aircraft Complex of FrontlineAviation) has carried out high-speed taxitrials in Siberia, the final preparation for itsfirst-ever flight, which is evidentlyimminent. The PAK-FA programme aimsto produce the first Gen5 fighter builtoutside America.

Sources in the Ministry of Defence(MoD) in New Delhi say that India is veryclose to signing a detailed agreement withRussia to jointly develop the PAK-FA,which India terms as the Fifth GenerationFighter Aircraft (FGFA). For years

Moscow and New Delhi have haggledover the FGFA’s configuration,capabilities and development work-share. Now, apparently, the two sides areclose to an agreement.

The contract will be signed betweenBangalore-based Hindustan AeronauticsLimited (HAL) and Russia’s UnitedAircraft Corporation (UAC),which owns acontrolling interest in Sukhoi. They willcommit to jointly developing andbuilding 250 fighters for the Indian AirForce (IAF) and an equal number forRussia. The door will remain open foradditional orders from either partner

country, as well as for export,which willbe contingent on both sides agreeing.

Equal StakesHAL and UAC will set up a joint venturecompany, similar to the Brahmos JV, inwhich both sides will own equal stakes.Much of the development work willcontinue to take place in the aviationR&D establishments of both partnercountries. India’s Aeronautical Develop-ment Agency (ADA),which oversees theTejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)programme, will not be concerned withthe FGFA. Instead, the ADA will focus on

LEAP INTO THE FUTURE

AJAI SHUKLA

An artist’s impression

of the Sukhoi T-50

Fighter Aircraft

In the world of combat aviation, thelast decade has been ruled by anunchallenged king—the United States

Air Force’s F-22 Raptor—the world’s onlyFifth Generation (Gen5) fighter. TheRaptor has all the attributes of a Gen5fighter, be it stealth (both active andpassive), advanced data fusion tech-niques for giving the pilot near-totalsituational awareness, high super cruiseability and high agility through deviceslike thrust vectoring.

But the Raptor is under a cloud. TheUS will build only 187 of these Gen5fighters after experiencing its big

problems: high costs and maintenance.Each hour that the US $350 million-fighter flies, it costs America almost US$50,000. And for each hour of flying, itneeds 30 hours of maintenance. TheSoviet threat might have justified thisexpense, but today as US DefenseSecretary Robert Gates said, the Raptor isa “niche silver-bullet solution” against athreat that is nowhere in sight.

Even as Gates spoke, a new challengerto the Raptor was being born in Russia.During the closing weeks of 2009,Sukhoi’s T-50 fighter prototype (termedthe PAK-FA, an acronym for Perspektivnyi

KEY POINTSn The contract is likely to be signed between the Bangalore-basedHindustan Aeronautics Limited andRussia’s United Aircraft Corporation.They will commit to jointly developingand building 250 fighters for theIndian Air Force and an equal numberfor Russia.n The joint venture will cater to boththe Russian and Indian Air Forces,producing two different, but closelyrelated aircraft.


DSIJANUARY 2010

17

indigenously developing a MediumCombat Aircraft (MCA).

India and Russia will pick up equalshares of the tab while co-developing theFGFA. The cost is expected to be around US $8-$10 billion (Rs 37,000-Rs 45,000 crore).Once developed, say IAF and MoD sources,the cost of manufacturing each FGFA willbe approximately US $100 million (Rs 400-Rs 500 crore); that is under one-third theprice of the F-22 Raptor.

Sukhoi’s current prototype is tailored toRussian Air Force requirements. But the IAFhas different specifications and the JV willcater to both air forces, producing twodifferent, but closely related aircraft. Forexample,Russia wants a single-seat fighter;the IAF, happy with the Sukhoi-30MKI,insists upon a twin-seat fighter with onepilot flying and the other handling thesensors, networks and weaponry. Now,India has agreed to buy a mix of about 50single-seat and 200 twin-seat aircraft.Russia, in turn,will consider buying moretwin-seat aircraft to use as trainers.

Enthusiasm is growing on the Indianside, especially amongst planners in theIAF and in HAL. Late last year, a DefenceMinistry delegation to Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Organisation(KnAAPO), Sukhoi’s flagship aircraftfacility in Siberia, was shown the PAK-FAprototype, on which Russia claims to haveworked for almost five years: that firstviewing, carefully choreographed bySukhoi,deeply impressed the Indians. Thenew fighter, standing dramatically alone

on the tarmac, simultaneouslywaggling all its control surfacesappeared to be waving a welcometo the visiting Indians.

An official from India’s MoD,who was a part of that delegation,recounts: “It is an amazing lookingaircraft. It has a Radar Cross Section (RCS)of just 0.5 square metres as compared to theSukhoi-30 MKI’s RCS of about 20 squaremetres… it is a true stealth aircraft.” (See Box).

Russia’s interest in having India onboard was first conveyed a decade ago, in2000, when Sukhoi’s celebrated chiefMikhail Pogosyan invited a visiting IndianAir Force officer out to dinner in Moscow.Boris Yeltsin’s disastrous presidency hadjust ended, and Russia’s near-bankruptcywas reflected in the run-down condition ofthe famous restaurant where they dined.The IAF officer recounts that Pogosyan wasin his element, a string of jokes translatedby a female interpreter.

After many toasts Pogosyan turnedserious, switching the conversation to asecret project that, officially, did not even

exist. Sukhoi, he confided tothe IAF officer,had completedthe design of a Gen5 fighter,as advanced as the F-22Raptor. Sukhoi would goahead with developing thenew fighter if India partnered

Russia, sharing the costs of developing thefighter at KnAAPO.

A Different Ball GameGetting India to fund Russian weaponsprogrammes was Moscow’s mantra forthose difficult times. Through the 1990s—when thousands of Russian military designbureaus were folding up for want of fundsand a bankrupt Moscow was forced tocancel 1,149 ongoing R&D projects—India’sdefence purchases had kept Russia’sdefence industry alive. New Delhi hadbankrolled, in turn, the development of theSukhoi-30 fighter, the Talwar-class stealthfrigates, the Uran and Klub ship-bornemissiles and the MiG-21 upgrade.

But co-developing a Fifth GenerationFighter is a different ball game, financially

16

and technologically and at that time,India’s Tejas LCA programme was still togain momentum. Low on confidence,capability and cash, India’s MoD was notthen ready to sign up with Russia for theGen5 programme. In the mid-2000,Russia’s new hydrocarbon revenues andPutin’s geopolitical ambitions brought ago-ahead for Sukhoi to develop the PAK-FA. A string of lucrative Su-27 and Su-30sales to China, India and Malaysia alsobrought Sukhoi cash to pursuedevelopment of the PAK-FA.

Those jingling cash registersnotwithstanding, Moscow knew thatgoing alone in developing a FifthGeneration Fighter would be risky andexpensive. A partner like India wouldallow Russia to spread the developmentrisk and provide a large assured purchaseof the final product. The success of theIndo-Russian Brahmos partnership furtherencouraged both countries to co-developthe FGFA.

Today, five years into the FGFA’sdevelopment, the final lap is underway to

bring in India. In November 2007, Indiaand Russia signed an Inter-GovernmentalAgreement on co-developing the fighter,but it has taken two more years to agreeupon common specifications,define workshares for development and manufactureand to resolve issues of IntellectualProperty Rights.

The Russian Goliath has beenunsparing in negotiating with the IndianDavid. Having designed over a 100 aircraft(including India’s Su-30MKI), built over10,000 fighters and with 50 world aviationrecords to its credit, the SukhoiCorporation, understandably, regardsHAL as very much the greenhorn.

But HAL has managed to obtain a 25percent share of design and developmentwork in the FGFA programme. This willinclude critical software, including themission computer (the Su-30MKI missioncomputer is entirely Indian), navigationsystems, most of the cockpit displays, thecounter measure dispensing systems and themajor design task of modifying Sukhoi’ssingle-seat prototype into the twin-seat

fighter that the Indian Air Force demands.India will also contribute its expertise in

aircraft composites, honed whiledeveloping the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.Russia has traditionally built metallicaircraft; just 10 percent of the Su-30MKIfuselage is built from titanium andcomposites. In contrast, the FGFA’s fuselagewill be 25 percent titanium and 20 percentcomposites. For this, Russia’s expertise in

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

Russia wants a single-seatfighter; the IAF, happy with

the Sukhoi-30MKI, insistsupon a twin-seat fighter

with one pilot flying and theother handling the sensors,

networks and weaponry.Now, India has agreed to

buy a mix of about 50 single-seat and 200

twin-seat aircraft.

”

SKETCHES OF PAK-FA

An aircraft is made stealthy byminimising a range of detection

signatures, including radar, infrared,visual, accoustic and smoke; reducingRadar Cross Section (RCS) is especiallychallenging. Categorising the RCS of aSukhoi-30MKI as 20 square metresimplies that the fighter is as visible toenemy radar as a metallic disc with asurface of 20 square metres. The FGFA,far less visible to radar, would have asignature barely 1/40th of that.

SUPERIOR STEALTH(Above) The

current prototype

of PAK-FA is

tailored to the

Russian Air Force

requirements


DSIJANUARY 2010

17

indigenously developing a MediumCombat Aircraft (MCA).

India and Russia will pick up equalshares of the tab while co-developing theFGFA. The cost is expected to be around US $8-$10 billion (Rs 37,000-Rs 45,000 crore).Once developed, say IAF and MoD sources,the cost of manufacturing each FGFA willbe approximately US $100 million (Rs 400-Rs 500 crore); that is under one-third theprice of the F-22 Raptor.

Sukhoi’s current prototype is tailored toRussian Air Force requirements. But the IAFhas different specifications and the JV willcater to both air forces, producing twodifferent, but closely related aircraft. Forexample,Russia wants a single-seat fighter;the IAF, happy with the Sukhoi-30MKI,insists upon a twin-seat fighter with onepilot flying and the other handling thesensors, networks and weaponry. Now,India has agreed to buy a mix of about 50single-seat and 200 twin-seat aircraft.Russia, in turn,will consider buying moretwin-seat aircraft to use as trainers.

Enthusiasm is growing on the Indianside, especially amongst planners in theIAF and in HAL. Late last year, a DefenceMinistry delegation to Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Organisation(KnAAPO), Sukhoi’s flagship aircraftfacility in Siberia, was shown the PAK-FAprototype, on which Russia claims to haveworked for almost five years: that firstviewing, carefully choreographed bySukhoi,deeply impressed the Indians. Thenew fighter, standing dramatically alone

on the tarmac, simultaneouslywaggling all its control surfacesappeared to be waving a welcometo the visiting Indians.

An official from India’s MoD,who was a part of that delegation,recounts: “It is an amazing lookingaircraft. It has a Radar Cross Section (RCS)of just 0.5 square metres as compared to theSukhoi-30 MKI’s RCS of about 20 squaremetres… it is a true stealth aircraft.” (See Box).

Russia’s interest in having India onboard was first conveyed a decade ago, in2000, when Sukhoi’s celebrated chiefMikhail Pogosyan invited a visiting IndianAir Force officer out to dinner in Moscow.Boris Yeltsin’s disastrous presidency hadjust ended, and Russia’s near-bankruptcywas reflected in the run-down condition ofthe famous restaurant where they dined.The IAF officer recounts that Pogosyan wasin his element, a string of jokes translatedby a female interpreter.

After many toasts Pogosyan turnedserious, switching the conversation to asecret project that, officially, did not even

exist. Sukhoi, he confided tothe IAF officer,had completedthe design of a Gen5 fighter,as advanced as the F-22Raptor. Sukhoi would goahead with developing thenew fighter if India partnered

Russia, sharing the costs of developing thefighter at KnAAPO.

A Different Ball GameGetting India to fund Russian weaponsprogrammes was Moscow’s mantra forthose difficult times. Through the 1990s—when thousands of Russian military designbureaus were folding up for want of fundsand a bankrupt Moscow was forced tocancel 1,149 ongoing R&D projects—India’sdefence purchases had kept Russia’sdefence industry alive. New Delhi hadbankrolled, in turn, the development of theSukhoi-30 fighter, the Talwar-class stealthfrigates, the Uran and Klub ship-bornemissiles and the MiG-21 upgrade.

But co-developing a Fifth GenerationFighter is a different ball game, financially

16

and technologically and at that time,India’s Tejas LCA programme was still togain momentum. Low on confidence,capability and cash, India’s MoD was notthen ready to sign up with Russia for theGen5 programme. In the mid-2000,Russia’s new hydrocarbon revenues andPutin’s geopolitical ambitions brought ago-ahead for Sukhoi to develop the PAK-FA. A string of lucrative Su-27 and Su-30sales to China, India and Malaysia alsobrought Sukhoi cash to pursuedevelopment of the PAK-FA.

Those jingling cash registersnotwithstanding, Moscow knew thatgoing alone in developing a FifthGeneration Fighter would be risky andexpensive. A partner like India wouldallow Russia to spread the developmentrisk and provide a large assured purchaseof the final product. The success of theIndo-Russian Brahmos partnership furtherencouraged both countries to co-developthe FGFA.

Today, five years into the FGFA’sdevelopment, the final lap is underway to

bring in India. In November 2007, Indiaand Russia signed an Inter-GovernmentalAgreement on co-developing the fighter,but it has taken two more years to agreeupon common specifications,define workshares for development and manufactureand to resolve issues of IntellectualProperty Rights.

The Russian Goliath has beenunsparing in negotiating with the IndianDavid. Having designed over a 100 aircraft(including India’s Su-30MKI), built over10,000 fighters and with 50 world aviationrecords to its credit, the SukhoiCorporation, understandably, regardsHAL as very much the greenhorn.

But HAL has managed to obtain a 25percent share of design and developmentwork in the FGFA programme. This willinclude critical software, including themission computer (the Su-30MKI missioncomputer is entirely Indian), navigationsystems, most of the cockpit displays, thecounter measure dispensing systems and themajor design task of modifying Sukhoi’ssingle-seat prototype into the twin-seat

fighter that the Indian Air Force demands.India will also contribute its expertise in

aircraft composites, honed whiledeveloping the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.Russia has traditionally built metallicaircraft; just 10 percent of the Su-30MKIfuselage is built from titanium andcomposites. In contrast, the FGFA’s fuselagewill be 25 percent titanium and 20 percentcomposites. For this, Russia’s expertise in

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

Russia wants a single-seatfighter; the IAF, happy with

the Sukhoi-30MKI, insistsupon a twin-seat fighter

with one pilot flying and theother handling the sensors,

networks and weaponry.Now, India has agreed to

buy a mix of about 50 single-seat and 200

twin-seat aircraft.

”

SKETCHES OF PAK-FA

An aircraft is made stealthy byminimising a range of detection

signatures, including radar, infrared,visual, accoustic and smoke; reducingRadar Cross Section (RCS) is especiallychallenging. Categorising the RCS of aSukhoi-30MKI as 20 square metresimplies that the fighter is as visible toenemy radar as a metallic disc with asurface of 20 square metres. The FGFA,far less visible to radar, would have asignature barely 1/40th of that.

SUPERIOR STEALTH(Above) The

current prototype

of PAK-FA is

tailored to the

Russian Air Force

requirements


19

titanium structures will be complementedby India’s experience in composites.

Emerging Military Aeronautical PowerEven with just a 25 percent share of design,South Block policymakers consider theFGFA project an important step towardsIndia’s emergence as a military aeronauticalpower. Developing 25 percent of this fighteris far better than just transferringtechnology to build it in India, as we didwith the Su-30MKI,” points out a seniorMoD official.

The HAL-UAC partnership, whenfunctional, will mark a significant shift inthe aeronautical relationship betweenIndia and Russia. For decades during theSoviet era, HAL was very much the kidbrother to Moscow’s big brother. Evenwhile developing experience inmanufacturing high-quality aviationproducts, HAL continued for decades toplay a technologically subordinate role,assembling and building fighters thatRussia had designed. Now, forced toaccept HAL as a design partner, theRussians have made it clear that theyexpect quality and Sukhoi will not let itsaviation reputation be tarnished.

In June 2008, Vyacheslav Trubnikov,then Russia’s Ambassador to India and anexpert on Russia’s defence industry,made it

clear that equity in work shares wassecondary to ensuring a successful product.Trubnikov gave an insight into Russianthinking when he said, “The (FGFA) brand isIndian-Russian… whether the aircraft is 30percent Indian or 70 percent Indian. It is ajoint product and we together areresponsible for it. No one will say thatRussians are excellent because their part ofthe aircraft is excellent. If the product isexcellent, then our partnership in creatingthis product is excellent, independent of thepercentage of our cooperation in terms ofmoney value or technical characteristics. Weshould be equally demanding of eachother… This is not just a show of ourpolitical friendship.”

Highlighting Russia’s scepticism aboutHAL’s credentials for designing a Gen5fighter, Trubnikov pointed out, “I knowperfectly well the Russian ability. But I don’tknow what contribution the Indian sidemight make. So one must ask the question tothe Indian designers, to HAL… what is theirclaim for building a fighter of the FifthGeneration type, either avionics or engine?What might be India’s contribution? To beabsolutely frank, I don’t know.”

On Russia’s contribution, though, thereis no doubt in India. Ashok Baweja, whoheaded HAL until April 2009, franklyadmitted: “India can only (develop a FGFA)

by partnering with Russia. Theyhave so much experience. It’snot just the design… you mustalso have materials like mergingsteel, titanium, composite alloysand the industrial base toconvert these into high-techcomponents like gyros, sensors and optics.”

India’s work share is also reduced by itslate arrival in the FGFA developmentproject. Russia’s UAC argues that Sukhoihas already finished much of the work,with5,000 Sukhoi engineers having alreadyworked for five years on the FGFA design.Such claims are hard to verify, but it isknown that Sukhoi Design Bureau hasabout 8,000 engineers,distributed betweenmany different programmes.

Not Sitting IdleIndian officials believe, though, that theproject is still at an early stage. Baweja inearly 2009 assessed: “The FGFA’s first flightis just the beginning of the programme. Myunderstanding is that the Russians aregoing ahead (with the test) to validate theFGFA’s “proof of concept” (conceptualdesign). Whatever composite materials theyhave now, they’ll use. But, because thecomposites will change, the FGFA will keepevolving for a fairly long time.”

India’s Minister of State for Defence,

Pallam Raju, admits that thedelay has been damaging. Rajupoints out that: “The longerIndia waits to join the project;the lesser will be ourcontribution. But we are notsitting idle. Through the MoD’s

existing programmes (such as the TejasLCA),we are building up our capabilities.”

The FGFA, says a senior MoD official, isunlikely to enter service with the IAF for atleast another decade. In his estimation, “Itwill take another four to five years todevelop many of the FGFA’s systems. Thenthe aircraft will undergo at least 2,000 hoursof certification flying and, possibly, somereconfiguration.” Even by this optimisticestimation, the first single-seat FGFAs willstart being produced around 2017. AndIndia’s twin-seat fighter will take at leastanother two years.

But whenever it is inducted into service,the FGFA is likely to be a clear notch abovethe aircraft that India is currently evaluatingfor its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraftpurchase. Even the most advanced ofthese—the Dassault Rafale, the Gripen NGand the Eurofighter—are Generation 4.5fighters. The FGFA and the MCA,whenever the ADA produces that aircraft,are planned as the IAF’s backbone into thesecond half of this century.

18

DSIJANUARY 2010

The Russian Goliath hasbeen unsparing in

negotiating with the IndianDavid. Having designed

over a 100 aircraft(including India’s

Su-30MKI),built over 10,000fighters and with 50 world

aviation records to itscredit, the Sukhoi

Corporationunderstandably regards

HAL as very much thegreenhorn.

”

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

(Above) Minister of

State for Defence

Pallam Raju. (Left)

Former Russian

Ambassador to India

Vyacheslav Trubnikov

AFP


19

titanium structures will be complementedby India’s experience in composites.

Emerging Military Aeronautical PowerEven with just a 25 percent share of design,South Block policymakers consider theFGFA project an important step towardsIndia’s emergence as a military aeronauticalpower. Developing 25 percent of this fighteris far better than just transferringtechnology to build it in India, as we didwith the Su-30MKI,” points out a seniorMoD official.

The HAL-UAC partnership, whenfunctional, will mark a significant shift inthe aeronautical relationship betweenIndia and Russia. For decades during theSoviet era, HAL was very much the kidbrother to Moscow’s big brother. Evenwhile developing experience inmanufacturing high-quality aviationproducts, HAL continued for decades toplay a technologically subordinate role,assembling and building fighters thatRussia had designed. Now, forced toaccept HAL as a design partner, theRussians have made it clear that theyexpect quality and Sukhoi will not let itsaviation reputation be tarnished.

In June 2008, Vyacheslav Trubnikov,then Russia’s Ambassador to India and anexpert on Russia’s defence industry,made it

clear that equity in work shares wassecondary to ensuring a successful product.Trubnikov gave an insight into Russianthinking when he said, “The (FGFA) brand isIndian-Russian… whether the aircraft is 30percent Indian or 70 percent Indian. It is ajoint product and we together areresponsible for it. No one will say thatRussians are excellent because their part ofthe aircraft is excellent. If the product isexcellent, then our partnership in creatingthis product is excellent, independent of thepercentage of our cooperation in terms ofmoney value or technical characteristics. Weshould be equally demanding of eachother… This is not just a show of ourpolitical friendship.”

Highlighting Russia’s scepticism aboutHAL’s credentials for designing a Gen5fighter, Trubnikov pointed out, “I knowperfectly well the Russian ability. But I don’tknow what contribution the Indian sidemight make. So one must ask the question tothe Indian designers, to HAL… what is theirclaim for building a fighter of the FifthGeneration type, either avionics or engine?What might be India’s contribution? To beabsolutely frank, I don’t know.”

On Russia’s contribution, though, thereis no doubt in India. Ashok Baweja, whoheaded HAL until April 2009, franklyadmitted: “India can only (develop a FGFA)

by partnering with Russia. Theyhave so much experience. It’snot just the design… you mustalso have materials like mergingsteel, titanium, composite alloysand the industrial base toconvert these into high-techcomponents like gyros, sensors and optics.”

India’s work share is also reduced by itslate arrival in the FGFA developmentproject. Russia’s UAC argues that Sukhoihas already finished much of the work,with5,000 Sukhoi engineers having alreadyworked for five years on the FGFA design.Such claims are hard to verify, but it isknown that Sukhoi Design Bureau hasabout 8,000 engineers,distributed betweenmany different programmes.

Not Sitting IdleIndian officials believe, though, that theproject is still at an early stage. Baweja inearly 2009 assessed: “The FGFA’s first flightis just the beginning of the programme. Myunderstanding is that the Russians aregoing ahead (with the test) to validate theFGFA’s “proof of concept” (conceptualdesign). Whatever composite materials theyhave now, they’ll use. But, because thecomposites will change, the FGFA will keepevolving for a fairly long time.”

India’s Minister of State for Defence,

Pallam Raju, admits that thedelay has been damaging. Rajupoints out that: “The longerIndia waits to join the project;the lesser will be ourcontribution. But we are notsitting idle. Through the MoD’s

existing programmes (such as the TejasLCA),we are building up our capabilities.”

The FGFA, says a senior MoD official, isunlikely to enter service with the IAF for atleast another decade. In his estimation, “Itwill take another four to five years todevelop many of the FGFA’s systems. Thenthe aircraft will undergo at least 2,000 hoursof certification flying and, possibly, somereconfiguration.” Even by this optimisticestimation, the first single-seat FGFAs willstart being produced around 2017. AndIndia’s twin-seat fighter will take at leastanother two years.

But whenever it is inducted into service,the FGFA is likely to be a clear notch abovethe aircraft that India is currently evaluatingfor its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraftpurchase. Even the most advanced ofthese—the Dassault Rafale, the Gripen NGand the Eurofighter—are Generation 4.5fighters. The FGFA and the MCA,whenever the ADA produces that aircraft,are planned as the IAF’s backbone into thesecond half of this century.

18

DSIJANUARY 2010

The Russian Goliath hasbeen unsparing in

negotiating with the IndianDavid. Having designed

over a 100 aircraft(including India’s

Su-30MKI),built over 10,000fighters and with 50 world

aviation records to itscredit, the Sukhoi

Corporationunderstandably regards

HAL as very much thegreenhorn.

”

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

(Above) Minister of

State for Defence

Pallam Raju. (Left)

Former Russian

Ambassador to India

Vyacheslav Trubnikov

AFP


The foreign policy of any nation spansa range of interactions with othercountries in the areas of politics,

economics, culture, technology anddefence. The degree of importance ofdefence cooperation with another powerwill depend on the security environmentand security interests of the twointeracting nations. To a large extent inrespect of leaders of international alliances,such as the US and USSR during the Cold

War, it was influenced mostly by Cold Warideological politics though that factor is nolonger operative. Since the end of the ColdWar, there are other international systemicfactors under operation which determinethe scope of defence cooperation betweennations and its nature. Defencecooperation may be considered as anindicator of the comfort level in therelationship between two nations.

As has it happened between the US andChina it is possible for two nations to haveone of the largest economic and traderelationships in the world and to have tensof thousands of students of one countrystudying in the other and yet not to haveany meaningful defence cooperation interms of sale of military hardware. Thereare exchanges of visits of defenceleaderships at the highest level and eveneach other’s presence at military exercisesin the two countries. But the US will notsell to China sophisticated, high-technology military equipment. That is atruer indication of the systemic uneaseunderlying the relationship betweentotalitarian China and democratic US thanthe Chinese being the largest exporter tothe US and China holding more than $ 800billion worth of US treasury bonds.

Similarly, there was a time when the USwas supplying food grains on a large scaleto support food shortage relief efforts in

Indian and US Army officers shake

hands at the start of a Indo-US

Joint Exercise named Yudh Abhyas

at Babina in Uttar Pradesh in

October 2009

Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policyinitiatives and diplomatic action

KEY POINTSn The degree of importance of defencecooperation with another powerdepends on the security environmentand interests of two nations.n In today’s post-Cold War andglobalised world, defence and foreignpolicy cooperation go together.n For India the purchase of 126 combataircraft either from Russia or the US wouldindicate a major foreign policy initiative.

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

AFP

SYMBIOTICRELATIONSHIPS

DSIJANUARY 2010

20


21

Defence Cooperation.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 24/01/10 3:13 PM Page 1

The foreign policy of any nation spansa range of interactions with othercountries in the areas of politics,

economics, culture, technology anddefence. The degree of importance ofdefence cooperation with another powerwill depend on the security environmentand security interests of the twointeracting nations. To a large extent inrespect of leaders of international alliances,such as the US and USSR during the Cold

War, it was influenced mostly by Cold Warideological politics though that factor is nolonger operative. Since the end of the ColdWar, there are other international systemicfactors under operation which determinethe scope of defence cooperation betweennations and its nature. Defencecooperation may be considered as anindicator of the comfort level in therelationship between two nations.

As has it happened between the US andChina it is possible for two nations to haveone of the largest economic and traderelationships in the world and to have tensof thousands of students of one countrystudying in the other and yet not to haveany meaningful defence cooperation interms of sale of military hardware. Thereare exchanges of visits of defenceleaderships at the highest level and eveneach other’s presence at military exercisesin the two countries. But the US will notsell to China sophisticated, high-technology military equipment. That is atruer indication of the systemic uneaseunderlying the relationship betweentotalitarian China and democratic US thanthe Chinese being the largest exporter tothe US and China holding more than $ 800billion worth of US treasury bonds.

Similarly, there was a time when the USwas supplying food grains on a large scaleto support food shortage relief efforts in

Indian and US Army officers shake

hands at the start of a Indo-US

Joint Exercise named Yudh Abhyas

at Babina in Uttar Pradesh in

October 2009

Military and defence cooperation between countries is an essential component of foreign policyinitiatives and diplomatic action

KEY POINTSn The degree of importance of defencecooperation with another powerdepends on the security environmentand interests of two nations.n In today’s post-Cold War andglobalised world, defence and foreignpolicy cooperation go together.n For India the purchase of 126 combataircraft either from Russia or the US wouldindicate a major foreign policy initiative.

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

AFP

SYMBIOTICRELATIONSHIPS

DSIJANUARY 2010

20


21


India and provided large economic aid.But because of their military alliancerelationship with Pakistan they would notsupply India basic combat equipment.That again was a clear indication of thequality of relationship between India andUS till President Clinton’s visit to India inthe year 2000.

India was able to rely on the SovietUnion for most of its defence equipmentrequirements during the Cold War period.That relationship continues even after theend of the Cold War. India is able to getRussian help for building its nuclearsubmarine, lease out Russian nuclearsubmarines, obtain frontline Russiancombat aircraft and has a joint R&Dprogramme to develop the FifthGeneration Fighter Aircraft and theBrahmos missile.

This speaks volumes about the intimacyand quality of the relationship between thetwo countries. Russia does not help Chinain building nuclear vessels or collaboratein joint R&D programmes in aircraft ormissile development though it is theprimary supplier of defence equipment toChina. That again indicates the quality of

their relationship. Yet Russia holds jointmilitary exercises with China.

While no doubt defence cooperation is asalient component of a country’s foreignpolicy it is necessary to analyse theconstituent aspects of defence cooperationto understand the nature and quality of therelationship between any two countries.

The US has been having and continuesto have very close defence cooperationrelationship with Pakistan going back tothe mid-50s, with two breaks, one in the’70s, following the Bangladesh war, andthe second in the ’90s, following theinvocation of the Pressler Amendment.Today, the US is providing billions ofdollars of military aid to Pakistan. Therelationship between the countries ishowever, far from cordial.

The US drone aircraft are attackingtargets in Pakistan with missiles and the USis pressing an unwilling Pakistan to takemilitary action against various terroristgroups, some of which the Pakistani Armyconsiders as its strategic assets. Therefore, itis difficult to have a straight correlationbetween defence cooperation and foreignpolicy relationship.

Yet in today’s post-Cold War,and increasingly globalisingworld, by and large, defenceand foreign policy cooperationgo together. The former USSecretary of State,CondeleezzaRice described the present dayworld and the security threatsfaced by the international community in thefollowing words. She wrote: “For the firsttime since the peace of Westphalia in 1648the prospect of violent conflict betweengreat powers is becoming ever moreunthinkable. Major States are increasinglycompeting in peace,not preparing for war. Toadvance this remarkable trend, the UnitedStates is transforming our partnerships withnations, such as Japan and Russia,with theEuropean Union and especially with Chinaand India.” She further defined weak andfailing States, terrorism, pandemics,organised crime and weapons of massdestruction as the new threats to nations.

In the light of such perceptions,US policytowards India underwent a major changefrom the beginning of the second term ofPresident George W. Bush. The US signaledto India that it was dehyphenating India

and Pakistan in its policies andwas prepared to sell hightechnology equipment to India.Even earlier in 2002 US had soldANTPQ-37 Fire-Finding Radartill then denied to India. Thisitself followed the Indian-USDefence Cooperation during the

US operation,Enduring Freedom, launchedagainst the Taliban in Afghanistan inOctober 2001. The Indian Navy escorted theUS supply vessels through the MalaccaStraits against the active threat of Al Qaeda’sterrorism in Southeast Asia.

On June 28, 2005 the Defence Ministerof India and US Defence Secretary signedthe Defence Framework Agreement threeweeks in advance of the Indian PrimeMinister’s State visit to Washington.Though it was not a case of direct defencecooperation, the US commitment to workto get the international nuclear non-proliferation regime to be modified toenable India to get the waiver from theNuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines.Thus India became eligible forinternational civil nuclear energycooperation while retaining its nuclear

DSIJANUARY 2010

22 23

Pakistani tribesmen

offer funeral prayers

for the victims of a

US missile strike

attack in the main

town of Miranshah on

February 15, 2009

US President Barack

Obama shakes hands

with Chinese

President Hu Jintao

after a joint press

conference in Beijing

in November 2009


AFP

AFP

In the light of suchperceptions, US policy

towards India underwent amajor change from the

beginning of the secondterm of President GeorgeW. Bush. The US signaled

to India that it wasdehyphenating India and

Pakistan in its policiesand was prepared to sell

high technologyequipment to India.

Even earlier in 2002 UShad sold ANTPQ-37

Fire-Finding Radar tillthen denied to India.

”


India and provided large economic aid.But because of their military alliancerelationship with Pakistan they would notsupply India basic combat equipment.That again was a clear indication of thequality of relationship between India andUS till President Clinton’s visit to India inthe year 2000.

India was able to rely on the SovietUnion for most of its defence equipmentrequirements during the Cold War period.That relationship continues even after theend of the Cold War. India is able to getRussian help for building its nuclearsubmarine, lease out Russian nuclearsubmarines, obtain frontline Russiancombat aircraft and has a joint R&Dprogramme to develop the FifthGeneration Fighter Aircraft and theBrahmos missile.

This speaks volumes about the intimacyand quality of the relationship between thetwo countries. Russia does not help Chinain building nuclear vessels or collaboratein joint R&D programmes in aircraft ormissile development though it is theprimary supplier of defence equipment toChina. That again indicates the quality of

their relationship. Yet Russia holds jointmilitary exercises with China.

While no doubt defence cooperation is asalient component of a country’s foreignpolicy it is necessary to analyse theconstituent aspects of defence cooperationto understand the nature and quality of therelationship between any two countries.

The US has been having and continuesto have very close defence cooperationrelationship with Pakistan going back tothe mid-50s, with two breaks, one in the’70s, following the Bangladesh war, andthe second in the ’90s, following theinvocation of the Pressler Amendment.Today, the US is providing billions ofdollars of military aid to Pakistan. Therelationship between the countries ishowever, far from cordial.

The US drone aircraft are attackingtargets in Pakistan with missiles and the USis pressing an unwilling Pakistan to takemilitary action against various terroristgroups, some of which the Pakistani Armyconsiders as its strategic assets. Therefore, itis difficult to have a straight correlationbetween defence cooperation and foreignpolicy relationship.

Yet in today’s post-Cold War,and increasingly globalisingworld, by and large, defenceand foreign policy cooperationgo together. The former USSecretary of State,CondeleezzaRice described the present dayworld and the security threatsfaced by the international community in thefollowing words. She wrote: “For the firsttime since the peace of Westphalia in 1648the prospect of violent conflict betweengreat powers is becoming ever moreunthinkable. Major States are increasinglycompeting in peace,not preparing for war. Toadvance this remarkable trend, the UnitedStates is transforming our partnerships withnations, such as Japan and Russia,with theEuropean Union and especially with Chinaand India.” She further defined weak andfailing States, terrorism, pandemics,organised crime and weapons of massdestruction as the new threats to nations.

In the light of such perceptions,US policytowards India underwent a major changefrom the beginning of the second term ofPresident George W. Bush. The US signaledto India that it was dehyphenating India

and Pakistan in its policies andwas prepared to sell hightechnology equipment to India.Even earlier in 2002 US had soldANTPQ-37 Fire-Finding Radartill then denied to India. Thisitself followed the Indian-USDefence Cooperation during the

US operation,Enduring Freedom, launchedagainst the Taliban in Afghanistan inOctober 2001. The Indian Navy escorted theUS supply vessels through the MalaccaStraits against the active threat of Al Qaeda’sterrorism in Southeast Asia.

On June 28, 2005 the Defence Ministerof India and US Defence Secretary signedthe Defence Framework Agreement threeweeks in advance of the Indian PrimeMinister’s State visit to Washington.Though it was not a case of direct defencecooperation, the US commitment to workto get the international nuclear non-proliferation regime to be modified toenable India to get the waiver from theNuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines.Thus India became eligible forinternational civil nuclear energycooperation while retaining its nuclear

DSIJANUARY 2010

22 23

Pakistani tribesmen

offer funeral prayers

for the victims of a

US missile strike

attack in the main

town of Miranshah on

February 15, 2009

US President Barack

Obama shakes hands

with Chinese

President Hu Jintao

after a joint press

conference in Beijing

in November 2009


AFP

AFP

In the light of suchperceptions, US policy

towards India underwent amajor change from the

beginning of the secondterm of President GeorgeW. Bush. The US signaled

to India that it wasdehyphenating India and

Pakistan in its policiesand was prepared to sell

high technologyequipment to India.

Even earlier in 2002 UShad sold ANTPQ-37

Fire-Finding Radar tillthen denied to India.

”


weapons outside the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is perhaps thestrongest US signal on defence cooperationwith India heralding a radical change in theUS foreign policy and the emergence of anIndo-US strategic partnership.

This transformation was accompaniedby the Indo-US air, sea and land jointexercises programmed on a regularperiodic basis and the major purchases ofdefence equipment such as anamphibious landing ship, transport aircraftfor special forces and maritimereconnaissance aircraft. Recent reports alsosuggest that the likely acquisition of LightWeight 155 mm US Howitzers by India.The recent State visit of Manmohan Singhto Washington and the conclusion of the‘End Use Monitoring Agreement’accommodating the Indian demands havefurther strengthened Indo-US defence ties.

The deal which the entire world iswatching, one of the largest purchases inthe history of the arms sales, is that of 126Combat Aircraft. Two US companies,Boeing and Lockheed-Martin,have fieldedtheir aircraft along with the French, theSwedish and Russian ones and the Eurofighters for competitive selection. Such alarge aircraft purchase cannot be decidedmerely on the basis of a lowest-unit costsystem. While the purchase of aircrafteither from Sweden or the French or theEuropean consortium could be considered

a commercial purchase, for India thepurchase of aircraft either from Russia orUS would mean a major foreign policyinitiative. India certainly intends to makethis purchase the foundation of the futureaircraft development and production inthe country.

For India, the potential securitychallenger is China. This aircraft purchasewill create a strong defence partnershipwith the country of choice. If the Russianaircraft is chosen it will further cement theexisting strategic partnership betweenIndia and Russia, the two Asian countrieswhich have a mutuality of potentialsecurity challenge from a fast rising and an

increasingly assertive China.If on the other hand the US aircraft

were to be chosen it will reinforce thegrowing Indo-US strategic partnership.China has emerged as the challenger of theUS in its role as the preeminent powershaping the political, economic andcultural values of the international system.While China is not democratic, the US andIndia are and they share an interest inensuring that the 21st century world isshaped by democratic values. A largenumber of US firms, including defencefirms, are already setting up R&D centres inIndia. While the Chinese are seen asaiming to exclude US from Asia and

emerge as an Asianhegemon, India has a stakein keeping US engaged inAsia to countervail China.

Therefore, the pattern ofdefence cooperation that islikely to develop as a resultof this aircraft deal is goingto influence and shape thestrategic relationships andforeign policies of India and other majorpowers. It will also mean very intensiveinteraction between the emerging privatesector Indian defence industries and thoseof the US or Russia and developmentof joint ventures.

Today,US, Russia and toa much lesser extent Franceare three centres of defencetechnology generationwhile India and China arethe two largest markets fordefence equipment. India isin a position to develop jointventures with the defenceindustries of any of the

three and contribute to R&D and costreductions in the production ofsubsystems. Except in the US, China,Russia and India, the trend is towardsreduction of defence expenditures. India’sdefence modernisation programme will be

a sizeable one and an India growing at 9-10 percent, as is widely forecast, will beable to afford it unlike in the 20th century.

This modernisation can be donethrough strategic partnerships with one ortwo major powers or scattered over anumber of countries as part of a lowest-bidpurchase exercise on the basis of individualsystem decisions or an ad hoc basis. Butthat will not yield foreign policy dividends.

These are not to be considered asroutine procurement decisions of theMinistry of Defence alone. These arenational decisions to be taken on the basisof considerations of long-term nationalsecurity and national interests.

(Above) Brahmos Missile

was a result of a joint R&D

programme between India

and Russia. (Left) Russian

President Dmitry Medvedev

and Indian Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh at the

Kremlin in Moscow on

December 7, 2009

DSIJANUARY 2010

24 25

India was able to rely onthe Soviet Union for mostof its defence equipmentrequirements during the

Cold War period. Thatrelationship continues

even after the end of theCold War. This speaks

volumes about theintimacy and quality of

the relationship betweenthe two countries.

”


AFP

Defence Cooperation 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:34 PM Page 5

weapons outside the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is perhaps thestrongest US signal on defence cooperationwith India heralding a radical change in theUS foreign policy and the emergence of anIndo-US strategic partnership.

This transformation was accompaniedby the Indo-US air, sea and land jointexercises programmed on a regularperiodic basis and the major purchases ofdefence equipment such as anamphibious landing ship, transport aircraftfor special forces and maritimereconnaissance aircraft. Recent reports alsosuggest that the likely acquisition of LightWeight 155 mm US Howitzers by India.The recent State visit of Manmohan Singhto Washington and the conclusion of the‘End Use Monitoring Agreement’accommodating the Indian demands havefurther strengthened Indo-US defence ties.

The deal which the entire world iswatching, one of the largest purchases inthe history of the arms sales, is that of 126Combat Aircraft. Two US companies,Boeing and Lockheed-Martin,have fieldedtheir aircraft along with the French, theSwedish and Russian ones and the Eurofighters for competitive selection. Such alarge aircraft purchase cannot be decidedmerely on the basis of a lowest-unit costsystem. While the purchase of aircrafteither from Sweden or the French or theEuropean consortium could be considered

a commercial purchase, for India thepurchase of aircraft either from Russia orUS would mean a major foreign policyinitiative. India certainly intends to makethis purchase the foundation of the futureaircraft development and production inthe country.

For India, the potential securitychallenger is China. This aircraft purchasewill create a strong defence partnershipwith the country of choice. If the Russianaircraft is chosen it will further cement theexisting strategic partnership betweenIndia and Russia, the two Asian countrieswhich have a mutuality of potentialsecurity challenge from a fast rising and an

increasingly assertive China.If on the other hand the US aircraft

were to be chosen it will reinforce thegrowing Indo-US strategic partnership.China has emerged as the challenger of theUS in its role as the preeminent powershaping the political, economic andcultural values of the international system.While China is not democratic, the US andIndia are and they share an interest inensuring that the 21st century world isshaped by democratic values. A largenumber of US firms, including defencefirms, are already setting up R&D centres inIndia. While the Chinese are seen asaiming to exclude US from Asia and

emerge as an Asianhegemon, India has a stakein keeping US engaged inAsia to countervail China.

Therefore, the pattern ofdefence cooperation that islikely to develop as a resultof this aircraft deal is goingto influence and shape thestrategic relationships andforeign policies of India and other majorpowers. It will also mean very intensiveinteraction between the emerging privatesector Indian defence industries and thoseof the US or Russia and developmentof joint ventures.

Today,US, Russia and toa much lesser extent Franceare three centres of defencetechnology generationwhile India and China arethe two largest markets fordefence equipment. India isin a position to develop jointventures with the defenceindustries of any of the

three and contribute to R&D and costreductions in the production ofsubsystems. Except in the US, China,Russia and India, the trend is towardsreduction of defence expenditures. India’sdefence modernisation programme will be

a sizeable one and an India growing at 9-10 percent, as is widely forecast, will beable to afford it unlike in the 20th century.

This modernisation can be donethrough strategic partnerships with one ortwo major powers or scattered over anumber of countries as part of a lowest-bidpurchase exercise on the basis of individualsystem decisions or an ad hoc basis. Butthat will not yield foreign policy dividends.

These are not to be considered asroutine procurement decisions of theMinistry of Defence alone. These arenational decisions to be taken on the basisof considerations of long-term nationalsecurity and national interests.

(Above) Brahmos Missile

was a result of a joint R&D

programme between India

and Russia. (Left) Russian

President Dmitry Medvedev

and Indian Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh at the

Kremlin in Moscow on

December 7, 2009

DSIJANUARY 2010

24 25

India was able to rely onthe Soviet Union for mostof its defence equipmentrequirements during the

Cold War period. Thatrelationship continues

even after the end of theCold War. This speaks

volumes about theintimacy and quality of

the relationship betweenthe two countries.

”


AFP

Defence Cooperation 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:34 PM Page 5

The quality of our relations withBangladesh has not matched theintrinsic importance of that country

to us. It is geo-political, to begin with.Bangladesh cuts us off from the north-eastern part of our country. This is a regiondisturbed by insurgencies; its integrationwith the rest of India is weak; it has laggedbehind in development. The difficulties weface there could have been considerablylessened with easier access to it throughBangladesh.

Beyond that, promoting the economiclinkages of this Indian region toBangladesh and Myanmar could havebenefitted all three countries. Gas fromMyanmar could have been imported toIndia through a pipeline across Bangladeshterritory,with earnings from transit fees forBangladesh and establishment of firmereconomic links of Myanmar with India.The last has importance in terms ofbalancing in some measure China’sincreasing penetration of Myanmar.

An open Bangladeshi approach to transitissues would have also fitted well into theconcept of regional integration within theframework of BIMSTEC, that is the Bay ofBengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technicaland Economic Cooperation,not to mentionMyanmar’s eventual membership ofSAARC. But Bangladesh, aware of ourvulnerabilities and wanting to retain a majorleverage against us in bilateral relations,hasspurned, until now, our requests for transitrights or has balked at projects that couldpromote more integration of the largerregion under India’s lead. To what extentanti-India forces in Bangladesh have alignedtheir thinking with Chinese interests in thisregion needs closer examination.

Bangladesh has allowed its territory to beused as a safe haven for anti-Indianinsurgent groups like the United FrontLiberation Front of Asom (ULFA). India hasso far failed to find a policy mix to induce

KANWAL SIBAL

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India is an occasion to initiate a new thrust in India-Bangladesh relations

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina

inspects an Indian Guard of Honour at the

ceremonial reception during her three-day

visit to New Delhi in January 2010

AFP

DSIJANUARY 2010

26

NEIGHBOURS

27

EXPANDINGHORIZONS

KEY POINTSn India has so far failed to find a policymix to induce greater Bangladeshcooperation on national security issues.n It is important for both Bangladesh andIndia that the visit of Sheikh Hasina beseen as being successful.n Sheikh Hasina is friendly towards India,an asset especially now that she ispolitically more powerful than she waswhen she was last Prime Minister.

Bangladesh 2ND.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:38 PM Page 1

The quality of our relations withBangladesh has not matched theintrinsic importance of that country

to us. It is geo-political, to begin with.Bangladesh cuts us off from the north-eastern part of our country. This is a regiondisturbed by insurgencies; its integrationwith the rest of India is weak; it has laggedbehind in development. The difficulties weface there could have been considerablylessened with easier access to it throughBangladesh.

Beyond that, promoting the economiclinkages of this Indian region toBangladesh and Myanmar could havebenefitted all three countries. Gas fromMyanmar could have been imported toIndia through a pipeline across Bangladeshterritory,with earnings from transit fees forBangladesh and establishment of firmereconomic links of Myanmar with India.The last has importance in terms ofbalancing in some measure China’sincreasing penetration of Myanmar.

An open Bangladeshi approach to transitissues would have also fitted well into theconcept of regional integration within theframework of BIMSTEC, that is the Bay ofBengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technicaland Economic Cooperation,not to mentionMyanmar’s eventual membership ofSAARC. But Bangladesh, aware of ourvulnerabilities and wanting to retain a majorleverage against us in bilateral relations,hasspurned, until now, our requests for transitrights or has balked at projects that couldpromote more integration of the largerregion under India’s lead. To what extentanti-India forces in Bangladesh have alignedtheir thinking with Chinese interests in thisregion needs closer examination.

Bangladesh has allowed its territory to beused as a safe haven for anti-Indianinsurgent groups like the United FrontLiberation Front of Asom (ULFA). India hasso far failed to find a policy mix to induce

KANWAL SIBAL

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s three-day visit to India is an occasion to initiate a new thrust in India-Bangladesh relations

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina

inspects an Indian Guard of Honour at the

ceremonial reception during her three-day

visit to New Delhi in January 2010

AFP

DSIJANUARY 2010

26

NEIGHBOURS

27

EXPANDINGHORIZONS

KEY POINTSn India has so far failed to find a policymix to induce greater Bangladeshcooperation on national security issues.n It is important for both Bangladesh andIndia that the visit of Sheikh Hasina beseen as being successful.n Sheikh Hasina is friendly towards India,an asset especially now that she ispolitically more powerful than she waswhen she was last Prime Minister.


greater Bangladesh cooperation on thisissue of national security. Repeated attemptsin the past to persuade the BangladeshGovernment to flush out these insurgentshas elicited obfuscatory responses. Such safehavens in foreign territories for insurgenciesmakes it exceedingly difficult to stampthem out, as the world has learnt in thecase of safe havens in Pakistan for theAfghan Taliban that are now wreakinghavoc in Afghanistan.

Erosion of SecularismElements in Bangladesh are also responsiblefor exposing us to terrorist threat from itssoil. To extend the terrorist threat to usgeographically and open new infiltrationroutes,Pakistan has successfully linked upwith Islamist forces in Bangladesh,traditionally hostile to India. These forces,represented by the Jamaat-i-Islami, haverisen alarmingly in Bangladesh in the wakeof its turbulent politics. The steady erosion

of secularism in Bangladesh,unmindful ofits Hindu minority, has been a frontalchallenge to India’s regional weight. Fromour point of view, the consolidation ofsecular forces in Bangladesh represents anextension of our political philosophy in theregion’s multi-religious context and astrong rebuff to the expanding extremistideologies promoted by Pakistan andconservative Arab influence. A secularwedge between the two large Muslimcountries of South Asia is politicallyimportant as, in our longer term interest,forces of moderation must be seen to beresisting radical Islam.

Beyond all this, Bangladesh isimportant keeping external factors likeChina in mind. Most of our neighbours,threatened by India’s overwhelming sizeand power, have sought to buildcountervailing ties with China. Politicalsupport against Indian hegemony,economic and military assistance, are

It was important for SheikhHasina’s political position inBangladesh, and the growth

of our ties, that her visit tobe seen as successful bothin Bangladesh and in India.

The most problematicbilateral issues have been

those of connectivity,security, balance of trade

and water resources.

”

Indian Border Security Forces andBangladeshi Rifles conduct a joint

foot patrol on the India-Bangladeshborder at Narshing Garh, near

Agartala in July 2009

28

NEIGHBOURS

AFP


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amongst the tools China hasused to undermine ourleadership role in SouthAsia. China’s naval designsin the Indian Ocean includea foothold on Bangladesh’scoast. Improved India-Bangladesh relations areimportant for containingthe space for China, backedby its rapidly growingeconomic and militarymuscle, to spread its influence in ourneighbourhood at our strategic expense.

India’s profile as a world economicpower is rising with its high growth rates,its entrepreneurial dynamism, humanresource potential and scientific andtechnological strength. Yet this globalacknowledgement of India’s economicstature, reflected in its G-20 membership,has not got translated into dividendslocally in South Asia. Many in India are

critical of our failure tointegrate the smallereconomies of the regioninto the much larger Indiaeconomy through a policyof targetted concessions.Such a strategy would haveyielded tangible rewardsby improving politicalrelationships that, in turn,would have limited thescope for adversarial

interests to fish in South Asia’s troubledwaters. Bangladesh has constantlycomplained about its trade imbalance withIndia, persistently demanding unilateraltariff concessions on items consideredsensitive by India.

Regional Test CaseIndia’s relations with its neighbours havebeen marred by territorial disputes, borderproblems, illegal movement of people,

religious and ethnic factors, complaintsabout India’s selfishness, insensitivity andinterference. All these elements haveblighted our ties with Bangladeshalthough India brought the country intopolitical existence and the two shareexceptional cultural and linguistic bonds.In many ways Bangladesh has been a testcase of our ability to manage the challengeswe face in our neighbourhood, but successhas eluded us.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit toIndia from January 10 to13 was an occasionto “launch a new phase” in India-Bangladesh relations as the jointcommuniqué on the visit affirms. Herdecisive victory in the December 2008elections (230 out of 300 seats on her ownand 262 with allies) that saw thedecimation of Begum Zia’s BangladeshiNationalist Party (BNP) does make her amuch more credible partner than before inre-shaping our bilateral ties.

The revival of secular forces inBangladesh, spurred by Sheikh Hasina’sown convictions, is welcome. Groundevidence of this is the revival of theprosecution of the killers of SheikhMujibur Rehman; the resumption of thetrial of the 1971 war criminals; the decisionto enact the Vested Property Return(amendment) Act 2009 that will enable thereturn of Hindu properties confiscatedduring the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict andefforts to ban religion based parties.

Sheikh Hasina has friendly sentimentsfor India—an asset in a situation in whichshe is politically more powerful than shewas when she was last PrimeMinister. This time, acting on hercampaign promise that no one will beallowed to “carry out terrorism in India”,she took, prior to her visit to Delhi, theundoubtedly courageous act to hand overto India ULFA leaders, ArabindaRajkhowa, Raja Baruah, Chitraban

Hazarika and Sasha Choudhury as well aswell as two Lashkar-e-Toiba operativesprovided sanctuary in Bangladesh.

It was important for Sheikh Hasina’spolitical position in Bangladesh, and thegrowth of our ties, for her visit to be seen assuccessful both in Bangladesh and inIndia.The most problematic bilateral issueshave been those of connectivity, security,balance of trade and water resources. Onconnectivity, India has beenaccommodative;on transit to Nepal, though,its request for a railway link to Bhutanremains pending. In return,Bangladesh hasagreed to allow the use of Mongla andChittagong ports for movement of goods toand from India through road and rail. Thisfacility will be extended to Nepal and Bhutantoo, with the implication that India willeventually allow movement of goods tothese two countries across its territory. Thesetransit arrangements have been wisely putin a larger regional context to reduce

Bangladesh Chief AdviserFakhruddin Ahmed (thirdfrom left) and PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh,along with head of othermember countries, at thesecond BIMSTEC Summit inNew Delhi. (Right) Membersof the ULFA, SashadharChoudhury and ChitrabanHazarika, at the Guwahaticourt in November 2009

DSIJANUARY 2010

30

NEIGHBOURS

31

India’s relations with itsneighbours have been

marred by territorialdisputes, border problems,illegal movement of people,religious and ethnic factors,

complaints about India’sselfishness, insensitivity

and interference. All theseelements have blighted our

ties with Bangladesh.

”

PH

OTO

S: A

FP


amongst the tools China hasused to undermine ourleadership role in SouthAsia. China’s naval designsin the Indian Ocean includea foothold on Bangladesh’scoast. Improved India-Bangladesh relations areimportant for containingthe space for China, backedby its rapidly growingeconomic and militarymuscle, to spread its influence in ourneighbourhood at our strategic expense.

India’s profile as a world economicpower is rising with its high growth rates,its entrepreneurial dynamism, humanresource potential and scientific andtechnological strength. Yet this globalacknowledgement of India’s economicstature, reflected in its G-20 membership,has not got translated into dividendslocally in South Asia. Many in India are

critical of our failure tointegrate the smallereconomies of the regioninto the much larger Indiaeconomy through a policyof targetted concessions.Such a strategy would haveyielded tangible rewardsby improving politicalrelationships that, in turn,would have limited thescope for adversarial

interests to fish in South Asia’s troubledwaters. Bangladesh has constantlycomplained about its trade imbalance withIndia, persistently demanding unilateraltariff concessions on items consideredsensitive by India.

Regional Test CaseIndia’s relations with its neighbours havebeen marred by territorial disputes, borderproblems, illegal movement of people,

religious and ethnic factors, complaintsabout India’s selfishness, insensitivity andinterference. All these elements haveblighted our ties with Bangladeshalthough India brought the country intopolitical existence and the two shareexceptional cultural and linguistic bonds.In many ways Bangladesh has been a testcase of our ability to manage the challengeswe face in our neighbourhood, but successhas eluded us.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit toIndia from January 10 to13 was an occasionto “launch a new phase” in India-Bangladesh relations as the jointcommuniqué on the visit affirms. Herdecisive victory in the December 2008elections (230 out of 300 seats on her ownand 262 with allies) that saw thedecimation of Begum Zia’s BangladeshiNationalist Party (BNP) does make her amuch more credible partner than before inre-shaping our bilateral ties.

The revival of secular forces inBangladesh, spurred by Sheikh Hasina’sown convictions, is welcome. Groundevidence of this is the revival of theprosecution of the killers of SheikhMujibur Rehman; the resumption of thetrial of the 1971 war criminals; the decisionto enact the Vested Property Return(amendment) Act 2009 that will enable thereturn of Hindu properties confiscatedduring the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict andefforts to ban religion based parties.

Sheikh Hasina has friendly sentimentsfor India—an asset in a situation in whichshe is politically more powerful than shewas when she was last PrimeMinister. This time, acting on hercampaign promise that no one will beallowed to “carry out terrorism in India”,she took, prior to her visit to Delhi, theundoubtedly courageous act to hand overto India ULFA leaders, ArabindaRajkhowa, Raja Baruah, Chitraban

Hazarika and Sasha Choudhury as well aswell as two Lashkar-e-Toiba operativesprovided sanctuary in Bangladesh.

It was important for Sheikh Hasina’spolitical position in Bangladesh, and thegrowth of our ties, for her visit to be seen assuccessful both in Bangladesh and inIndia.The most problematic bilateral issueshave been those of connectivity, security,balance of trade and water resources. Onconnectivity, India has beenaccommodative;on transit to Nepal, though,its request for a railway link to Bhutanremains pending. In return,Bangladesh hasagreed to allow the use of Mongla andChittagong ports for movement of goods toand from India through road and rail. Thisfacility will be extended to Nepal and Bhutantoo, with the implication that India willeventually allow movement of goods tothese two countries across its territory. Thesetransit arrangements have been wisely putin a larger regional context to reduce

Bangladesh Chief AdviserFakhruddin Ahmed (thirdfrom left) and PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh,along with head of othermember countries, at thesecond BIMSTEC Summit inNew Delhi. (Right) Membersof the ULFA, SashadharChoudhury and ChitrabanHazarika, at the Guwahaticourt in November 2009

DSIJANUARY 2010

30

NEIGHBOURS

31

India’s relations with itsneighbours have been

marred by territorialdisputes, border problems,illegal movement of people,religious and ethnic factors,

complaints about India’sselfishness, insensitivity

and interference. All theseelements have blighted our

ties with Bangladesh.

”P

HO

TOS

: AFP


domestic political resistance in Bangladesh.Significantly, an Indian grant for theconstruction of the proposed Akhaura-Agartala railway link has been accepted,implying improved connectivity to theNortheast for us.

On security issues, there is a mutualassurance that the territory of either will notbe used for training or sanctuary by foreignor domestic terrorist,militant and insurgentorganisations. Agreements on combatingterrorism, mutual legal assistance oncriminal matters and transfer of sentencedpersons were signed. It was agreed toconclude discussions expeditiously onsharing of Teesta waters. On the Tipaimukhproject, India has promised not to take stepsthat would adversely impact Bangladesh.On trade matters, India will allow duty freeaccess to SAARC LDCs (least developedcountries) to the Indian market and it hasreduced the number of items from India’snegative list of direct interest to Bangladesh.India will supply 250 MWs of electricity toBangladesh,and inter-grid connectivity willbe considered.

A major gesture by India is theannouncement of a credit line of $1 billionfor a range of projects. Bangladesh’sdecision to support India’s candidature forthe permanent membership of the

Security Council should be lauded.All in all, Sheikh Hasina’s visit should,

hopefully, “launch a new phase” in India-Bangladesh relations. The start has beensound, even though many difficult issuesthat remain, such as the demarcation of themaritime boundary and sharing of waters.On all these issues the modalities for

moving forward have been agreed upon,but the actual outcomes will need time,patience and a realistic give-and-take. Implementing agreementsexpeditiously will be a challenging task asbureaucratic resistance can be expected.The politics of Bangladesh might havechanged, but whether the bureaucracy haschanged equally in its thinking andattitudes remains to be seen.

The Opposition in Bangladesh,with itsanti-India mindset, has ruled the countryfor most of its independent life, and itscapacity to generate resistance should notbe underestimated. Already it is crying thatSheikh Hasina has surrenderedBangladesh’s national interests to India,with the BNP Secretary General KhandekarDelawar calling the visit a “total failure”. Onher return the Prime Minister, flanked bysenior party and alliance leaders, inresponse to a threat of agitation by acombined Opposition, has spiritedlydefended the results of her visit to India,emphasising the advances made in trade,connectivity,water sharing and power.

It is to be hoped that the “historicopportunity to write a new chapter’ in theIndia-Bangladesh relationship that thejoint communiqué mentions will not belost this time.

A view of MonglaPort in Bangladesh

AFP

32

NEIGHBOURS

Implementing agreementsexpeditiously will be a

challenging task asbureaucratic resistance can

be expected. The politics ofBangladesh might have

changed, but whether thebureaucracy has changedequally in its thinking and

attitudes remains to be seen.

”


216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 1/24/10 5:43:09 PM1/24/10 5:43:09 PM

DSIJANUARY 2010

34

CLIMATE CHANGE

35

AFP

SECURITYIMPLICATIONSChanging global climate will impact geopolitics, national security and human security

KEY POINTSn While climate change is a globalsecurity challenge, its impact on differentcountries and communities will vary.n Climate change alone may not causewars, but could accentuate existinginter-State tensions which could resultin conflicts.n Defence forces will need to preparethemselves for adapting to a changedoperational environment and to deal withnew sources of conflicts and large scalehumanitarian disasters.

NARENDRA SISODIA

Climate change is likely to pose gravechallenges for human society andsecurity. Nation-States and

communities are likely to encounter seriousfood and water scarcity,destructive naturaldisasters and widespread diseases. In thenear future, there does not appear to be anyprospect of a solution, political ortechnological, which can prevent theimpact of climate change.

That climate change is a reality is nolonger disputed. There may be debatesabout its scope, timing and impacts.However, the consensus after the FourthAssessment Report of Inter-GovernmentalPanel of Climate Change (IPCC) is that thephenomenon is real. The IPCC Reportpaints six green-house gas emission

scenarios for globalwarming and sea-levelrise till the end ofTwenty First Century.

According to themildest scenario, thebest estimate for meantemperature is 1.8degrees Centigrade ascompared to 4 degreesCentigrade for the

most severe scenario (likely range–2.4 to 6.4degrees Centigrade). The mean sea levelrise in the mildest case is expected to be inthe range of 0.18-0.38 metres and for themost severe scenario in the range of 0.26-0.59 metres.

Climate change will be a pervasive andglobal phenomenon. It will impactgeopolitics, national security and mostimportantly, human security. While thephenomenon will be global, its impact willdiffer from region to region and fromcountry to country. Some countries mayeven benefit from climate change initially,while others may face an existential threatdue to sea level rise. Even within a country,

Villagers walk

against a

backdrop of

cyclone clouds in

Bhubaneswar. The

cyclone last year

left at least

300,000 people

marooned in India

and Bangladesh

Climate Change.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 10:11 AM Page 1

DSIJANUARY 2010

34

CLIMATE CHANGE

35

AFP

SECURITYIMPLICATIONSChanging global climate will impact geopolitics, national security and human security

KEY POINTSn While climate change is a globalsecurity challenge, its impact on differentcountries and communities will vary.n Climate change alone may not causewars, but could accentuate existinginter-State tensions which could resultin conflicts.n Defence forces will need to preparethemselves for adapting to a changedoperational environment and to deal withnew sources of conflicts and large scalehumanitarian disasters.

NARENDRA SISODIA

Climate change is likely to pose gravechallenges for human society andsecurity. Nation-States and

communities are likely to encounter seriousfood and water scarcity,destructive naturaldisasters and widespread diseases. In thenear future, there does not appear to be anyprospect of a solution, political ortechnological, which can prevent theimpact of climate change.

That climate change is a reality is nolonger disputed. There may be debatesabout its scope, timing and impacts.However, the consensus after the FourthAssessment Report of Inter-GovernmentalPanel of Climate Change (IPCC) is that thephenomenon is real. The IPCC Reportpaints six green-house gas emission

scenarios for globalwarming and sea-levelrise till the end ofTwenty First Century.

According to themildest scenario, thebest estimate for meantemperature is 1.8degrees Centigrade ascompared to 4 degreesCentigrade for the

most severe scenario (likely range–2.4 to 6.4degrees Centigrade). The mean sea levelrise in the mildest case is expected to be inthe range of 0.18-0.38 metres and for themost severe scenario in the range of 0.26-0.59 metres.

Climate change will be a pervasive andglobal phenomenon. It will impactgeopolitics, national security and mostimportantly, human security. While thephenomenon will be global, its impact willdiffer from region to region and fromcountry to country. Some countries mayeven benefit from climate change initially,while others may face an existential threatdue to sea level rise. Even within a country,

Villagers walk

against a

backdrop of

cyclone clouds in

Bhubaneswar. The

cyclone last year

left at least

300,000 people

marooned in India

and Bangladesh


36

CLIMATE CHANGE

those in the coastal region or living in highaltitude mountains may face differentchallenges. Developed countries withstrong institutions and high per capitaincome levels,may have a greater resiliencein facing consequences of climate change,whereas poorer countries with weakinstitutional structures may become farmore vulnerable. Thus, while climatechange is a global security challenge, itsimpact on different countries andcommunities will vary.

Geo-Political ConsequencesClimate change is likely to haveunpredictable geo-political consequences.The melting of the Arctic ice is opening thenorth-west passage linking Europe withAsia and North America. This will providenew shipping and trading route. Themelting of the Arctic ice is also likely tomake large areas in the region accessiblefor exploitation of natural resources like oil,natural gas and other minerals. TheRussians have already claimed part of thisarea. Other countries of the region are also

increasing their presence to lay claim toparts of the region. Experts feel that suchgrowing rivalry could lead to tensions andeven armed conflicts.

Similarly, the melting of the perma-froston the Tibetan plateau would have adverseconsequences for countries of the region.While melting of the perma-frost couldprovide more arable land to China, it willfurther encourage Han migration to Tibet,changing its demographic balance andaccentuating the existing tensions in Tibet.

Climate change is likely to lead to large-scale migrations causing instability in theaffected regions. There were 191 millionmigrants in the world in the year 2005. It isestimated that there would be about 50million more migrants due toenvironmental factors alone. Theinadequate capacity to deal with climatechange is likely to lead to scarcity of foods,water and resources, in turn adding to theflow of migrants and leading to tensions incountries to which they migrate.

The South Asian region will beparticularly vulnerable to climate change. It is

Large-scale migrations fromcountries like Bangladesh,

Sri Lanka, Maldives andNepal would alter the

demographic balance inparts of India. Migration tolarge cities could severely

impact infrastructure, publicservices like health,

sanitation, water supply andtransport, leading to bigger

slums, crime, inter-community tensions, unrest

and violence.

”

Flood-affected

villagers being rescued

by the Indian Army in

Golapganj in the

eastern state of Bihar.

Over 600,000 people

were evacuated in

September, 2008

AFP


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DSI■ India’s only magazine on national security, strategic affairs & policy matters.

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■ High quality strategic affairs magazine with South Asian perspective coveringregion's linkages with China, Indian Ocean region, near Middle East & SouthCentral Asia.

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38

CLIMATE CHANGE

likely to make the monsoon pattern erraticlike a decline in the winter rains. SomeHimalayan glaciers could melt or fragment inthe near future impacting on lean seasonflows. There is a likelihood of more frequentfloods, droughts, desertification andextreme weather events. Rising sea level willinundate coastal regions of Bangladesh andIndia and islands like Maldives may evensub-merge. Temperature and monsoonvariations, soil-erosion due to floods and sealevel rise are likely to lead to food and waterscarcity. Chronic hunger, water shortage,health problems coupled with low-adaptation capacity could create aconducive climate for violence, organisedcrime and militancy.

Large-scale migrations fromneighboring countries like Bangladesh,Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal wouldalter the demographic balance in parts ofIndia. Migration to large cities couldseverely impact infrastructure, publicservices like health, sanitation watersupply and transport, lead to biggerslums, crime, inter-community tensions,unrest and widespread violence. Disputesregarding water sharing in a scarcityscenario could lead to tensions betweenIndia and China, India and Bangladeshand India and Pakistan.

One consequence of climate changewould be the more frequent occurrence ofextreme weather events and disasters likehurricanes, floods and famines. Large-scale

disasters place great demand on securityforces to manage disaster and providehumanitarian relief.

Implications for Armed ForcesClimate change could also have importantimplications for the armed forces and warfighting. While making precise predictionsis risky, such scenarios should beanticipated to prepare for all kinds ofcontingencies. For instance, a rapid melt-down of glaciers can disruptcommunications and lead to flash-floods.In case of melting and flash-floods, existingdefence works and communicationinfrastructure may be affected; andartillery guns mounted on ice pillars mayhave to be deployed on differentplatforms. Unanticipated melting maymake movement of troops dangerous.

One important adjustment needed bythe armed forces will be to prepare foralternative fuels,which may be necessarydue to the decline in hydro-carbonresources. Extreme weather and climaticconditions will demand a reassessment ofgreater wear and tears of militaryequipment.

The climate change and sea level rise islikely to have important implications for theoperational environment of the navies. Asthe Tsunami disaster of 2004 demonstrated,navies may be required for well-coordinatedand massive humanitarian missions.

Climate change alone may not cause

wars, but could accentuate existing inter-state tensions which could result inconflicts. It will also have graveimplications for human security. These willvary among States and communities,depending both on the severity of impactand the capacity of their institutions to dealwith climate change.

Defence forces will need to preparethemselves for adapting to a changedoperational environment; new sources ofinter-state tensions and conflicts and to dealwith large-scale humanitarian disasters.

In an article, ‘The Security Implicationsof Climate Change’, published inWashington Quarterly, John Podesta andPeter Ogden have pointed out anotherdanger – the danger of desensitisation. Theauthors believe that with progress ofinformation and communicationtechnologies people will become muchmore aware of the adverse impact ofclimate change, as well as the growing gapbetween the privileged and the deprivedpeople. However, the messages andpictures that lead to action could alsoeventually desensitise people to stories offamine, conflict, disaster, death anddestruction. The authors believe that thethreat of desensitisation could prove to bethe most serious of all threats, asdesensitisation is likely to accentuate thevictims’miseries and prevent cooperativeaction needed to deal with the globalchallenge of climate change.

One important adjustmentneeded by the armed forces

will be to prepare foralternative fuels, which may

be necessary due to adecline in hydro-carbon

resources. Extreme weatherand climatic conditions will

also demand areassessment of greaterwear and tear of military

equipment.

”A view of the Lirung Glacier in the LantangValley, some 60 km northwest of Kathmandu.The glacier has retreated at least twokilometres in recent decades, an effect ofglobal warming that is worrying local residents.

AFP


DefenceServices

GovernmentSecurity Event

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DSIJANUARY 2010

40

NATIONAL SECURITY

41

The office of a Chief of Defence Staff should beintroduced only if it will be a major force multiplier

and prove to be an effective value addition

ACTION NOT T AKEN

The Standing Committee on Defence,in its report tabled in the Parliamentrecently, criticised the Government

and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for softpeddling the issue of appointing a Chief ofDefence Staff (CDS). The need for this officehad been outlined in the Governmentreport following the Kargil ReviewCommittee findings way back in 2001;nineyears later, the Government is beingaccused of inaction.

The post of CDS described then as beingcritical for national security was expected to

take charge of andmanage the nation’snuclear arsenal and alsobring about a level ofsynergy among theArmy, the Navy and theAir Force by resolvinginter-service doctrinal,

planning, operational and procurementissues. It has also been pointed out that thisappointment has been successfullyintroduced in 67 countries.

In its detail, the Indian proposal hasenvisaged an all-encompassing control inthe hands of the CDS over the armed forcesin times of peace and war. Vested with theauthority to coordinate and resolve

issues mentioned above including theprocurement (read modernisation of theforces), the CDS is also meant to control thecapital expenditure of the defence forces. Intheory, the Chiefs of the three services willneed to get clearance from the CDS beforedeploying their combat power.

Such sweeping authority in the handsof one office is, however, not necessarilythe system being followed in countrieswhich have adopted the concept of theCDS. The appointment has differentconnotations in different nations. Eachnation has evolved and designed its owncommand and control structure, accordingto its specific security needs. And keepingthis in mind, India too needs to assess whatis the best option to follow.

The present system has a Chief of StaffCommittee (COSC) at the top of thepyramid. Indeed, India has undertakenseveral military operations sinceIndependence with varying degrees ofsuccess, using this structure. In 1948, therewas an exceedingly well-fought operationin which the cooperation between theIndian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force(IAF) was exemplary. And though the 1962war with China was a major fiasco and ahuge embarrassment to the nation, the 1971war with Pakistan was a major success and aperfect example of effective joint-manshipamongst the Army, the Navy and the AirForce. Our operations in Sri Lanka did notgo well,while our intervention in Maldivesin support of the incumbent Governmentwas planned and executed at the tri-servicelevel in a most effective manner. In theongoing counter-insurgency operations,the IAF (Indian Air Force) was exceedinglysensitive to the needs of the land forces andmany pilots risked their lives in executingseemingly impossible missions.

Clearly then, India’s defence forces

DALJEET SINGH

Soldiers from

the Indian Army

march during

the Republic Day

Parade rehearsal

in New Delhi in

January 2010

KEY POINTSn Each nation has evolved and designedits own command and control structureand introduced the office of the Chief of Defence Staff according itssecurity needs.n Operationally, there is little requirementfor an empowered CDS. As a system,armed forces are just not prepared forabsorbing the proposed concept, which initself demands major changes.

CDS-edited.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 25/01/10 5:52 PM Page 1

DSIJANUARY 2010

40

NATIONAL SECURITY

41

The office of a Chief of Defence Staff should beintroduced only if it will be a major force multiplier

and prove to be an effective value addition

ACTION NOT T AKEN

The Standing Committee on Defence,in its report tabled in the Parliamentrecently, criticised the Government

and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for softpeddling the issue of appointing a Chief ofDefence Staff (CDS). The need for this officehad been outlined in the Governmentreport following the Kargil ReviewCommittee findings way back in 2001;nineyears later, the Government is beingaccused of inaction.

The post of CDS described then as beingcritical for national security was expected to

take charge of andmanage the nation’snuclear arsenal and alsobring about a level ofsynergy among theArmy, the Navy and theAir Force by resolvinginter-service doctrinal,

planning, operational and procurementissues. It has also been pointed out that thisappointment has been successfullyintroduced in 67 countries.

In its detail, the Indian proposal hasenvisaged an all-encompassing control inthe hands of the CDS over the armed forcesin times of peace and war. Vested with theauthority to coordinate and resolve

issues mentioned above including theprocurement (read modernisation of theforces), the CDS is also meant to control thecapital expenditure of the defence forces. Intheory, the Chiefs of the three services willneed to get clearance from the CDS beforedeploying their combat power.

Such sweeping authority in the handsof one office is, however, not necessarilythe system being followed in countrieswhich have adopted the concept of theCDS. The appointment has differentconnotations in different nations. Eachnation has evolved and designed its owncommand and control structure, accordingto its specific security needs. And keepingthis in mind, India too needs to assess whatis the best option to follow.

The present system has a Chief of StaffCommittee (COSC) at the top of thepyramid. Indeed, India has undertakenseveral military operations sinceIndependence with varying degrees ofsuccess, using this structure. In 1948, therewas an exceedingly well-fought operationin which the cooperation between theIndian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force(IAF) was exemplary. And though the 1962war with China was a major fiasco and ahuge embarrassment to the nation, the 1971war with Pakistan was a major success and aperfect example of effective joint-manshipamongst the Army, the Navy and the AirForce. Our operations in Sri Lanka did notgo well,while our intervention in Maldivesin support of the incumbent Governmentwas planned and executed at the tri-servicelevel in a most effective manner. In theongoing counter-insurgency operations,the IAF (Indian Air Force) was exceedinglysensitive to the needs of the land forces andmany pilots risked their lives in executingseemingly impossible missions.

Clearly then, India’s defence forces

DALJEET SINGH

Soldiers from

the Indian Army

march during

the Republic Day

Parade rehearsal

in New Delhi in

January 2010

KEY POINTSn Each nation has evolved and designedits own command and control structureand introduced the office of the Chief of Defence Staff according itssecurity needs.n Operationally, there is little requirementfor an empowered CDS. As a system,armed forces are just not prepared forabsorbing the proposed concept, which initself demands major changes.


DSIJANUARY 2010

42

NATIONAL SECURITYhave achieved great success and also facedserious failures using the same system,which has evolved and matured over sixdecades. Thanks to this process a delicatebut effective balance between the threeservices has been established. And thesystem has been responsive and hasdelivered on many occasions.

A major deciding factor in determiningthe outcome of our military operations hasbeen the level of preparation, theorganisational and structural ability of thearmed forces and the leadership at a givenpoint in time. Would the outcome havebeen any different had the CDS systembeen in place? Most probably not.

In the process of changing this systemwe must be convinced that the change willindeed be a major force multiplier in theway security forces undertake theirbusiness and at the same time be a greatvalue addition. Will the introduction ofCDS make the forces more responsive toemerging challenges to national security?Will it improve the combat power of thesecurity forces? Will our deterrence powerbecome more effective? These are somequestions we need to answer.

Present and Future Security ChallengesA nation’s security structure is driven bypresent and future security challenges,which have to be met and managedthrough the collective effort of all theinstruments of national power. Fromwithin the consequent national strategy,military strategy is deduced and pertinentdoctrine and concepts defined. To meet thedemands of such evaluation, the contoursand profiles of force structure, weapon,equipment and support systems areconditioned in fiscal and time possibilitiesand converted into templates andorganisational structures,which make thesecurity forces pertinent to the demands ofnational security.

India is faced with an unstable nucleararc, extending from Pakistan through Iranto China. While facing this threat, it has alsoto strengthen its conventional capability tosecure its frontiers, particularly againstChina. Considering the huge gap betweensecurity forces of the two countries, India islikely to remain in catch-up mode for sometime. In the interim, it has to rapidly put inplace an effective conventional deterrenceagainst China. Besides being flanked by theworld’s largest drug-producing area, theGolden Triangle to the east and the GoldenCrescent to the west, India is surrounded bythe world’s most unstable nations and has

several thousand kilometres of border thatis not recognised internationally.

Future conventional war is most likely tobe triggered somewhere along the LoC andmay spill over into the plains, and in allprobability remain limited to specific areas;falling short of an all-out war. Our securityforces have to be prepared to rapidlyengage in and win such battles in a limitedspace of time. It is also imperative that Indiamakes the shift from a defensive centricforce structure (a limiting concept in itself) tothat of a regional capability, which canundertake and win regional wars.

At home, security forces have to beprepared to continue fighting insurgencyand be prepared to meet the asymmetric(terrorist type) threats. India has the highestnumber of homegrown insurgencies in theworld and has suffered more than any othernation at the hands of the terrorists andforces inimical to the well being of the nation.Along a coastline of over 7,600 km, they haveto guard its shores to prevent non-Statethreats from manifesting inland. Besidesthey have to guard and secure the nation’seconomic interests in the Indian Oceanregion. Analyses of the instrumentalitiesrequired to meet and neutralise such

challenges will indicate whether there is aneed to shift to the CDS system.

The creation and operationalisation of acredible nuclear deterrence is a nationalimperative. The setting up of the StrategicForces Command has gone a long way in

putting a pertinent deterrence in place. Thecommand is headed by a three star AirMarshal or General or Admiral and ismanned by a tri-service staff. The entirenuclear arsenal, including the infrastructureand resources, should be placed under thisorganisation and its commander mustreport directly to the highest authority ofthe nation. Probably, this is the case evennow. The organisation has matured overthe few years of its existence and littlechange in the responsibility or the span ofits control is expected in the near future.

Autonomous Organisation The organisation needs to be strengthenedby making it more autonomous. In thenuclear arena, the command and controlneeds to be based on a sharp and shortchain,which incorporates inbuilt securitydimensions and involves minimumpersonalities. The super imposition of aCDS on the system will only serve to addone more chain,making the organisationtop heavy, inducing duplication andbringing in a larger number of people intothe loop. At the individual level, there is nodifference in the experience and capabilityof the commander of the Strategic Forces

The iconic visual of Indian Army soldiers

firing Bofors guns against Pakistani shelling

during the 1999 Kargil war. (Right) Indian

Navy guest-troops march down the Champs

Elysees avenue in Paris during rehearsal for

the Bastille Day parade

The notion of a CDS is aconcept and a foundationon which the entire force

structure is built. It is not astandalone definition as it

is being made out to be. TheIndian armed forces are

organised into watertightservice structures with

little inter-service activityor training.

”43

AFP


DSIJANUARY 2010

42

NATIONAL SECURITYhave achieved great success and also facedserious failures using the same system,which has evolved and matured over sixdecades. Thanks to this process a delicatebut effective balance between the threeservices has been established. And thesystem has been responsive and hasdelivered on many occasions.

A major deciding factor in determiningthe outcome of our military operations hasbeen the level of preparation, theorganisational and structural ability of thearmed forces and the leadership at a givenpoint in time. Would the outcome havebeen any different had the CDS systembeen in place? Most probably not.

In the process of changing this systemwe must be convinced that the change willindeed be a major force multiplier in theway security forces undertake theirbusiness and at the same time be a greatvalue addition. Will the introduction ofCDS make the forces more responsive toemerging challenges to national security?Will it improve the combat power of thesecurity forces? Will our deterrence powerbecome more effective? These are somequestions we need to answer.

Present and Future Security ChallengesA nation’s security structure is driven bypresent and future security challenges,which have to be met and managedthrough the collective effort of all theinstruments of national power. Fromwithin the consequent national strategy,military strategy is deduced and pertinentdoctrine and concepts defined. To meet thedemands of such evaluation, the contoursand profiles of force structure, weapon,equipment and support systems areconditioned in fiscal and time possibilitiesand converted into templates andorganisational structures,which make thesecurity forces pertinent to the demands ofnational security.

India is faced with an unstable nucleararc, extending from Pakistan through Iranto China. While facing this threat, it has alsoto strengthen its conventional capability tosecure its frontiers, particularly againstChina. Considering the huge gap betweensecurity forces of the two countries, India islikely to remain in catch-up mode for sometime. In the interim, it has to rapidly put inplace an effective conventional deterrenceagainst China. Besides being flanked by theworld’s largest drug-producing area, theGolden Triangle to the east and the GoldenCrescent to the west, India is surrounded bythe world’s most unstable nations and has

several thousand kilometres of border thatis not recognised internationally.

Future conventional war is most likely tobe triggered somewhere along the LoC andmay spill over into the plains, and in allprobability remain limited to specific areas;falling short of an all-out war. Our securityforces have to be prepared to rapidlyengage in and win such battles in a limitedspace of time. It is also imperative that Indiamakes the shift from a defensive centricforce structure (a limiting concept in itself) tothat of a regional capability, which canundertake and win regional wars.

At home, security forces have to beprepared to continue fighting insurgencyand be prepared to meet the asymmetric(terrorist type) threats. India has the highestnumber of homegrown insurgencies in theworld and has suffered more than any othernation at the hands of the terrorists andforces inimical to the well being of the nation.Along a coastline of over 7,600 km, they haveto guard its shores to prevent non-Statethreats from manifesting inland. Besidesthey have to guard and secure the nation’seconomic interests in the Indian Oceanregion. Analyses of the instrumentalitiesrequired to meet and neutralise such

challenges will indicate whether there is aneed to shift to the CDS system.

The creation and operationalisation of acredible nuclear deterrence is a nationalimperative. The setting up of the StrategicForces Command has gone a long way in

putting a pertinent deterrence in place. Thecommand is headed by a three star AirMarshal or General or Admiral and ismanned by a tri-service staff. The entirenuclear arsenal, including the infrastructureand resources, should be placed under thisorganisation and its commander mustreport directly to the highest authority ofthe nation. Probably, this is the case evennow. The organisation has matured overthe few years of its existence and littlechange in the responsibility or the span ofits control is expected in the near future.

Autonomous Organisation The organisation needs to be strengthenedby making it more autonomous. In thenuclear arena, the command and controlneeds to be based on a sharp and shortchain,which incorporates inbuilt securitydimensions and involves minimumpersonalities. The super imposition of aCDS on the system will only serve to addone more chain,making the organisationtop heavy, inducing duplication andbringing in a larger number of people intothe loop. At the individual level, there is nodifference in the experience and capabilityof the commander of the Strategic Forces

The iconic visual of Indian Army soldiers

firing Bofors guns against Pakistani shelling

during the 1999 Kargil war. (Right) Indian

Navy guest-troops march down the Champs

Elysees avenue in Paris during rehearsal for

the Bastille Day parade

The notion of a CDS is aconcept and a foundationon which the entire force

structure is built. It is not astandalone definition as it

is being made out to be. TheIndian armed forces are

organised into watertightservice structures with

little inter-service activityor training.

”43

AFP


and the proposed CDS with equal service,raised through the same process andconditioned by equal exposure. Thepresent system is therefore appropriateand the super imposition of a CDS is likelyto be counterproductive.

Asymmetric ThreatsThe Army has to be prepared to fight theasymmetric threat, ensure security ofnational institutions and more importantlythe people. Even today, the security forcesare fighting several insurgencies at home,which are going to continue to demand ahuge involvement of the Army. Inmanning our unrecognised borders, oursoldiers are deployed in an eyeball focuswith the other side in hundreds of posts inmost inhospitable terrain and weatherconditions. These operations are mainlyArmy responsibilities. The role of the AirForce has been and will continue to imparttactical mobility and logistic support to thetroops. Significant and critical to thesuccess of the operations the participationof the Air Force is at the regional level. Thesuper imposition of a CDS will have noimpact on these operations.

The 26/11 attcks notwithstanding, Indiadoes not face a conventional threat fromthe sea. The IN has to control the coastalareas, secure territorial waters, protect theExclusive Economic Zone and safeguardIndia’s economic interests in the IndianOcean region. It has to deter, detect andobviate any attempt at sea-bound terroriststrikes inland. Aerial surveillance has greatutility in this context. This capabilityshould become an organic component ofthe Navy. Leaving it under the Air Forceand expecting a CDS to affect coordinationis likely to fall short of the requirement.

Briefly, then the security challengesfacing India are vast and varied. Fromnuclear level to terrorist strikes, each ofthese demands a different forceconfiguration in response. India cannotafford this and therefore the answer is tohave highly modernised and flexible forcesthat are enabled to meet any of theenvisaged threats. As a nation,we attempt toraise and build a new force each time we arefaced with an adversity and hope that thiswill solve our problems. Equally,we havethe tendency to impose organisations at thevery top. This may look good from apolitical and media point of view, but if weare serious about security of the nation weneed to move away from such tendenciesand strengthen our existing capability at acutting-edge level.

The notion of a CDS is a concept and afoundation on which the entire forcestructure is built. It is not a standalonedefinition as it is being made out to be. TheIndian armed forces are organised intowatertight service structures with littleinter-service activity or training. It ispossible for a Navy officer to rise to thelevel of Chief of Naval Staff without seeingan Army unit or having visited an Air Forcebase. The same is true of an Air Force andan Army officer. Expecting him tocoordinate operational concepts andresolve doctrinal issues is asking fordisaster. He will depend more and more onhis advisers. Do we want that?

Our training institutions are dedicatedto the respective service and inter-servicetraining is exceedingly limited. Even in tri-service institutions, the inter-service contentin limited. We will need to change this andrestructure our training concepts and movetowards joint-manship training. A desirableshift, but one which will take time. Beforethis happens and takes roots,we should noteven think of a CDS system.

Based on the nation’s securityimperatives each service is divided intoregional commands, composed andstructured to meet such challenges. Eachof these service commands are differentlyconfigured and their geographical areas of

responsibility are completely different andvaried. Given these atmospherics,how willa CDS exercise control over the fieldforces? The lesson is clear;we need to firstconsolidate and restructure the defenceforces at the regional command level withall resources of the Army, Navy and AirForce within a geographically defined area

under one commanderbefore the CDS systembegins to becomerelevant and effective.

From a historicalperspective, too, thepresent system with theCOSC at the head hasmatured and does notindicate any need for a

change. Operationally, there is littlerequirement for an empowered CDS. As asystem, armed forces are just not preparedfor absorbing the proposed concept,whichin itself demands major changes.

How are we going to select the CDS? Willit be a merit-based consideration or are wegoing to go the safest path of appointing theCDS from each service in turn. What will behis tenure? Considering all this, we must

modernise our armed forces by improvingtheir capability with better technologies andweapon systems, enhancing their strengthin numbers and enabling them in a mannerto achieve the critical mass to transit tomodern armed forces.

The reluctance of the MoD inimplementing the concept of the CDS hasnothing to do with keeping the armedforces in place. It has more to do withground realities and the needs of nationalsecurity,which is probably the motivatingforce behind such reluctance. Let us for achange look at the lowest level, the levelconsisting of our gallant soldiers, sailorsand airmen and not ask for moreGenerals,Admirals and Air Marshals eachtime there is a call for modernisation. Ourpresent system is good and yes we mustimprove on it.

The members of the COSC are notcompeting with each other and are thesenior-most officers of the three services.Of course a little inter-service competition isgood. And history has shown us that thethree services have and will close rankswhenever the nation is faced with amilitary challenge—CDS or no CDS.

44

Indian sailors

perform a drill

on board the

Indian Navy ship

INS Vidyut

(K48) during an

exercise in the

Arabian Sea in

December 2009

DSIJANUARY 2010NATIONAL SECURITY

CONTACT - Maritime Australia Limited PO Box 4095 Geelong, Victoria 3220 Australia E: [email protected] T: +61 (0)3 5282 0500 F: +61 (0)3 5282 4455 www.pacific2010.com.au

PACIFIC2010 International Maritime and Naval Exposition willbe a unique marketing, promotional and networking forum.PACIFIC2010 will be a comprehensive showcase of the latestdevelopments in naval, underwater and commercial maritimetechnology.

PACIFIC2010 will also feature a number of timely and highlyinformative industry conferences and seminars.PACIFIC2010 will be the most comprehensive industry event ofits type ever staged in the Asia Pacific region and will providea focused and informed business environment.

We need to firstconsolidate and

restructure the defenceforces at the regional

command level with allresources of the Army,

Navy and Air Force within a geographicallydefined area under one

commander before the CDS system begins

to become relevant and effective

”A

FP


and the proposed CDS with equal service,raised through the same process andconditioned by equal exposure. Thepresent system is therefore appropriateand the super imposition of a CDS is likelyto be counterproductive.

Asymmetric ThreatsThe Army has to be prepared to fight theasymmetric threat, ensure security ofnational institutions and more importantlythe people. Even today, the security forcesare fighting several insurgencies at home,which are going to continue to demand ahuge involvement of the Army. Inmanning our unrecognised borders, oursoldiers are deployed in an eyeball focuswith the other side in hundreds of posts inmost inhospitable terrain and weatherconditions. These operations are mainlyArmy responsibilities. The role of the AirForce has been and will continue to imparttactical mobility and logistic support to thetroops. Significant and critical to thesuccess of the operations the participationof the Air Force is at the regional level. Thesuper imposition of a CDS will have noimpact on these operations.

The 26/11 attcks notwithstanding, Indiadoes not face a conventional threat fromthe sea. The IN has to control the coastalareas, secure territorial waters, protect theExclusive Economic Zone and safeguardIndia’s economic interests in the IndianOcean region. It has to deter, detect andobviate any attempt at sea-bound terroriststrikes inland. Aerial surveillance has greatutility in this context. This capabilityshould become an organic component ofthe Navy. Leaving it under the Air Forceand expecting a CDS to affect coordinationis likely to fall short of the requirement.

Briefly, then the security challengesfacing India are vast and varied. Fromnuclear level to terrorist strikes, each ofthese demands a different forceconfiguration in response. India cannotafford this and therefore the answer is tohave highly modernised and flexible forcesthat are enabled to meet any of theenvisaged threats. As a nation,we attempt toraise and build a new force each time we arefaced with an adversity and hope that thiswill solve our problems. Equally,we havethe tendency to impose organisations at thevery top. This may look good from apolitical and media point of view, but if weare serious about security of the nation weneed to move away from such tendenciesand strengthen our existing capability at acutting-edge level.

The notion of a CDS is a concept and afoundation on which the entire forcestructure is built. It is not a standalonedefinition as it is being made out to be. TheIndian armed forces are organised intowatertight service structures with littleinter-service activity or training. It ispossible for a Navy officer to rise to thelevel of Chief of Naval Staff without seeingan Army unit or having visited an Air Forcebase. The same is true of an Air Force andan Army officer. Expecting him tocoordinate operational concepts andresolve doctrinal issues is asking fordisaster. He will depend more and more onhis advisers. Do we want that?

Our training institutions are dedicatedto the respective service and inter-servicetraining is exceedingly limited. Even in tri-service institutions, the inter-service contentin limited. We will need to change this andrestructure our training concepts and movetowards joint-manship training. A desirableshift, but one which will take time. Beforethis happens and takes roots,we should noteven think of a CDS system.

Based on the nation’s securityimperatives each service is divided intoregional commands, composed andstructured to meet such challenges. Eachof these service commands are differentlyconfigured and their geographical areas of

responsibility are completely different andvaried. Given these atmospherics,how willa CDS exercise control over the fieldforces? The lesson is clear;we need to firstconsolidate and restructure the defenceforces at the regional command level withall resources of the Army, Navy and AirForce within a geographically defined area

under one commanderbefore the CDS systembegins to becomerelevant and effective.

From a historicalperspective, too, thepresent system with theCOSC at the head hasmatured and does notindicate any need for a

change. Operationally, there is littlerequirement for an empowered CDS. As asystem, armed forces are just not preparedfor absorbing the proposed concept,whichin itself demands major changes.

How are we going to select the CDS? Willit be a merit-based consideration or are wegoing to go the safest path of appointing theCDS from each service in turn. What will behis tenure? Considering all this, we must

modernise our armed forces by improvingtheir capability with better technologies andweapon systems, enhancing their strengthin numbers and enabling them in a mannerto achieve the critical mass to transit tomodern armed forces.

The reluctance of the MoD inimplementing the concept of the CDS hasnothing to do with keeping the armedforces in place. It has more to do withground realities and the needs of nationalsecurity,which is probably the motivatingforce behind such reluctance. Let us for achange look at the lowest level, the levelconsisting of our gallant soldiers, sailorsand airmen and not ask for moreGenerals,Admirals and Air Marshals eachtime there is a call for modernisation. Ourpresent system is good and yes we mustimprove on it.

The members of the COSC are notcompeting with each other and are thesenior-most officers of the three services.Of course a little inter-service competition isgood. And history has shown us that thethree services have and will close rankswhenever the nation is faced with amilitary challenge—CDS or no CDS.

44

Indian sailors

perform a drill

on board the

Indian Navy ship

INS Vidyut

(K48) during an

exercise in the

Arabian Sea in

December 2009

DSIJANUARY 2010NATIONAL SECURITY

CONTACT - Maritime Australia Limited PO Box 4095 Geelong, Victoria 3220 Australia E: [email protected] T: +61 (0)3 5282 0500 F: +61 (0)3 5282 4455 www.pacific2010.com.au

PACIFIC2010 International Maritime and Naval Exposition willbe a unique marketing, promotional and networking forum.PACIFIC2010 will be a comprehensive showcase of the latestdevelopments in naval, underwater and commercial maritimetechnology.

PACIFIC2010 will also feature a number of timely and highlyinformative industry conferences and seminars.PACIFIC2010 will be the most comprehensive industry event ofits type ever staged in the Asia Pacific region and will providea focused and informed business environment.

We need to firstconsolidate and

restructure the defenceforces at the regional

command level with allresources of the Army,

Navy and Air Force within a geographicallydefined area under one

commander before the CDS system begins

to become relevant and effective

”

AFP


RAHUL BEDI

46

THERE’S an old French adage that says, ‘Plus çachange, plus c’est la même chose’, which means morethe things change, the more they remain the same.The saying fittingly applies to the state of affairs inthe Ministry of Defence (MoD) looking at thelong-delayed and desperately-needed modernisationof country’s military set up to meet the growingchallenges in a turbulent neighbourhood.

Complex and constantly changing procurementpolicies, announced under the guise of greaterefficiency and transparency, alongside recurringcorruption scandals are blocking the country’smuch-required materiel acquisition and renovation.Even Union Minister of Defence A.K. Antonyresignedly declared recently that despite theGovernment earmarking a huge budget for hisMinistry regularly, the allocations don’t fully reflectin the defence modernisation efforts.

The MoD’s inability to take timely decisions hasresulted in the capital outlay of Rs 42.17 billion forthe financial year 2007-08 earmarked for purchases,upgrades and modernisation being returnedunspent to the federal fund. Earlier, Rs 183 billionwas similarly returned unused in the period from2002 to 2007 as tenders were issued and thenwithdrawn, and again re-issued contributing tooverall delays resulting in operational shortcomings.

Service officers admit that the operational

competence of its nearly 1.5 million-strong armedforces is being ‘compromised’ by equipmentdeficiencies and long-stalled modernisationprogrammes.

“Increased budgetary support each year makeslittle or no difference to military capacity building asprocurement procedures are complex, bureaucraticand riddled with delays,” said former Lt Gen V.K.Kapoor. To be effective, the entire procedure forexpending the capital account needs an overhaul,he declared, adding that the gap between thedesired and existing military capability was rapidlywidening.

Military planners say that all these adversefactors impinged negatively on the military’soverall aim of becoming network-enabled by lastyear and network-centric in 2010. The outstandingequipment shortfall list is embarrassingly long andnowhere near acquisition. It includes 197 LightUtility Helicopters (LUHs) for Army Aviation Corps(AAC) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) to replace theobsolete HSA 316B Chetak and HSA 315B Cheetahhelicopters. The shortfall also includes some3,000-3,600 varied 155mm light weight, towed,wheeled and tracked howitzers for around 180 of theArmy’s 220 artillery regiments, in accordance withthe long-pending modernisation drive under theFiled Artillery Rationalisation Programme. The

Some Things Never ChangeThe HSA 316B Chetak helicopters need replacement

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DSI JANUARY, 2010

Defence Buzz.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 25/01/10 1:50 PM Page 1

215x276dsi.indd 1215x276dsi.indd 1 9/2/2009 4:34:56 PM9/2/2009 4:34:56 PM

Army has acquired no new artillery after1987 when the import of 410 Bofors FH 77B155mm howitzers triggered one of India’smost celebrated defence scandals that stillrumbles on. Many of the FH 77B guns are nowbeing cannibalised to keep the remainder inservice leaving a vital operational gap in theArmy’s firepower.

The procurement, development andupgrade of the Army’s Main Battle Tank(MBT)–like the T-90s, locally designed Arjunand the T-72M1s–for the Army’s 59 armouredregiments remain horribly delayed. Forinstance, the majority of the 1,800 T-72M1MBTs, currently blind in the dark, still awaitnight sights after years of tendering andtrials, the latest round ending inconclusivelylast year.

The bulk of the Army’s air defence guns,like Bofors L-70s and the Soviet Zu-23-2s andZSU-23-4s, and missiles like the RussianOSA-AK and Kradvats, date back to 30-40years, they need urgent replacement. Also,the ambitious Future Infantry Soldier as aSystem (F-INSAS) programme to upgrade465 infantry and ‘dedicated’ paramilitarybattalions by 2020 has also been deferred.

The Indian Air Force (IAF), for its part, ispreoccupied with restoring its depletingassets, which will shortly decrease from theexisting 30-odd combat squadrons to around26. A large number of Soviet and Russian MiG21 variants, MiG 23s and around 100-110 MiG 27fighters, which are not under upgrade, willretire. The IAF has repeatedly warned theCentral Government to either implementcorrective measures to acquire additionalfighters or lose air superiority overnuclear-rival Pakistan but to little avail.

The IAF’s air-defence groundenvironment systems, that go back to1970-71, too were woefully inadequate foreffective surveillance, despite significantchanges in the security scenario, technologyand growing magnitude of sophisticatedaerial threats.

The Indian Navy’s (IN) six FrenchScorpene submarines under construction atMazagaon Dockyard Limited since 2006 face amassive cost escalation over the original Rs 187.98 billion contract inked in October2005. Consequently, their delivery datesbetween 2012 and 2017 also stand postponedas inconclusive talks, wracked by accusationsand counter-accusations, continue over theprice hike.

The Navy’s woes over the three-fold priceincrease from $974 million to nearly $3billion of INS Vikramaditya (ex-AdmiralGorshkov)—the 44,700 tonne Russianaircraft carrier whose arrival has been

delayed by four years to 2012-13, too awaitsresolution.

The IN faces a grave shortage of combataircraft to operate off the deck of its sole,recently retrofitted aircraft carrier, INS Viraat.Its anti-submarine warfare helicopters arewell beyond their retirement age. It also facesthe prospect by 2012 of deploying less thanhalf its already deficient submarine fleetnumbering 18, when 63 percent of it would beup for retirement.

In Troubled WatersTHE combat aircraft-strapped India Navy (IN)has dispatched a Request for Information(RFI) to overseas manufacturers for a newergeneration of fighter planes to operate fromaircraft carriers, which it plans to induct intoservice by 2015 and beyond. The RFI sent toBoeing of US, Dassault of France and

RAC-MiG of Russia for an alternatedeck-based aircraft last November, though ofa generic nature, could result in an initialorder for 16 fighters and will be followed-upby a procurement of up to 40 aircrafts.

The proposed aircraft could end upconstituting the air arm of Project 71, the37,500-tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier-I(IAC-I) currently being built at CochinShipyard Limited, and at least one, if not two,follow-on carriers the IN plans to construct.

Meanwhile, with the development of thenaval version of the locally designed TejasLight Combat Aircraft (LCA) in difficulty, theIN is seeking alternate fighter options forboth IAC-I and IAC-II. So far, the IN hasacquired 16 MiG-29K/KuB fighters—four ofwhich arrived early December—for INSVikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), innorthern Russia under a deal inked in January2004. They would operate from the Navy’s

48

DSI JANUARY, 2010

Navy faces a severe shortage of fighters to operate the recently retrofitted INS Viraat



50

shore-based facility at Goa on the west coasttill the INS Vikramaditya arrives in 2013-14.

Presently, the Navy faces a severeshortage of fighters to operate off the deckof INS Viraat. Merely eight single-seat SeaHarrier Mk 51s and three twin-seat SeaHarrier Mk 60s of the original 30 BAEServices naval fighters inducted into the INfrom 1984 onwards remain operational, withthe majority lost in accidents.

Multi-Role TankerTransportsTHE Ministry of Defence (MoD) hassummarily cancelled the $ 1.06 billion tenderfor six Multi-Role Tanker Transports (MRTTs)for the IAF—the European AeronauticDefence and Space Company (EADS)-builtAirbus Military A-330 MRTT was thepreferred choice—further delaying theinduction of crucial equipment and furtherreducing India’s credibility as a reliablecustomer with overseas vendors on whom itremains hopelessly dependent.

Last year, the Indian Air Force (IAF)recommended the A-330 MRTT over the rivalRussian Ilyushin IL-78, of which it hadacquired six in 2004 for Rs 8 billion. Butignoring its evaluation, following over twoyears of extended trials, the MoD dispatcheda cryptic letter to EADS in New Delhi onJanuary 4, 2010, withdrawing the contract onthe verge of closure.

MoD sources said the MRTT requirement

would now be re-tendered globally resultingin interminable delays. The request forproposal is to be sent not only to EADS andRussia but also to Boeing. “It will now takemany more years to shortlist another MRTTunless the MoD insists we acquire theIL-78’s against our better judgment,” an IAFofficer said, declining to be identified.

The terminated tender required Airbus todeliver the first A-330 MRTT to the IAFwithin three years of inking the deal and theremaining five within 15 months thereafter.Defence industry sources said ‘vestedinterests’ had influenced the Cabinetmeeting held on December 29, 2009, thatdecided to cancel the acquisition of thebadly-needed MRTTs. They claimed thatDefence Minister A.K. Antony, despiteentreaties by the IAF, cancelled the MRTTpurchase following objections over theA-330’s high cost.

Under the Defence ProcurementProcedures or DPP only the lowest bid—orL1—is acceptable, but IAF officials said thatthe equipment’s life cycle cost had not beentaken into account to make it more competitivein the long run. Official sources said that theMoD’s decision had ‘severely angered’ theIAF which desperately needs mid-airrefuellers for its enhanced regional role andfor out-of-area operations, a requirement thatwas slated to increase as it acquired 200-300additional fighters over the next decade.

“The A-330 MRTT scores above the IL-78but the final decision will be taken by theGovernment,“ former Air Chief Marshal Fali

H. Major said in May 2009, before he retired.He also declared that the IL-78 had failed tomeet the IAF’s requirements.

The IAF also believed the A-330 MRTT’swere not only technologically superior to theIL-78’s but also more fuel efficient and thatmany of its systems could be overhauledlocally as several airlines in the countryoperated various Airbus models, therebyreducing its overall cost.

By opting for the A-330 MRTTs the IAFwas also expressing its long-standingdiscontent with Russian equipment andattempting to diversify its predominantlySoviet and Russian platforms. SuccessiveIAF chiefs had criticised Moscow for itsafter sales service, inadequate sparesupplies and extended delivery time lines forvaried materiel essential for operationalpreparedness.

Coastal SecurityAFTER the November 2008 Mumbai terrorattacks, India committed itself to spending$10 billion on augmenting its homelandsecurity by 2016, particularly its coastaldefence. But once again persistentbureaucratic vacillation, turf wars and anoverall sense of ennui have enveloped thenational security establishment intoachieving little or nothing.

At the heart of the impasse lies ajurisdiction battle between the HomeMinistry and the Indian Navy (IN) that hasbeen accorded the lead role to co-ordinate

DSI JANUARY, 2010

EADS-built Airbus Military A-330 MRTT was the preferred choice of the Indian Air Force


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the functioning of several agencies forcoastal and off-shore security like the IndianCoast Guard (ICG) and the respectiveprovincial maritime police forces to securethe country’s vast coastline.

In the unresolved standoff, the HomeMinistry wants the Maritime Security Adviser,a three-star IN officer, to operate under theNavy, and on the other hand, requires that hereport to the National Security Adviser. INchief Admiral Nirmal Verma put itdiplomatically when he stated at an annualpress conference ahead of Navy Day inDecember 2009 that the delay was because“one agency feels they should have a muchlarger role to play and they should head it.”

The maritime security plan envisages thecreation of a 1,000-strong IN-led force knownas the Sagar Prahari Bal (SeawardDefence Force), equipped with 80 fastinterceptor craft.

Furthermore, the proposalenvisages the State marine policeforces with jurisdiction extending 5kmfrom the shore and spread over 10coastal opening, 73 police stations, 97checkpoints, 58 outposts and 30operational barracks. To augment theircapability, the Government plans toprocure a total of 204 interceptor craft,a mix of 5-tonne Invader and 12-tonneHellraiser rigid-hull inflatable boats, 10of which have been acquired outrightfrom Motomarine of Greece.

Deliveries of the interceptors tocoastal police stations beganincrementally in April 2009, with thearrival of the boats from Greece, andwere due to be completed by end-2010. Buttheir delivery deadline has been extendedbecause of delays in construction of 194crafts that are being built under licence byGarden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers inKolkata and Goa Shipyard Ltd.

Also under discussion is a national C3Inetwork for real time maritime domainawareness that links IN and ICG operationrooms, a multi-agency static coastal radar andAutomatic Identification System (AIS) chainat 46 sites. This includes the provision for AIStransponders and installation of a Vessel andAir Traffic Management System for alloffshore development areas. Some radar andAIS sites have already been identified, but theequipment is yet to be acquired. Nineadditional ICG stations have been approvedon paper, but their existence remainscircumscribed by the lack of adequate trainingfacilities and material paucity.

Further, tenders for 80 interceptor boatswere issued in mid-2009, but no contracts

have yet been inked. Another majorinstitutional drawback is that there are amultiplicity of at least a dozen agenciesfollowing their own procedures, a handicapthe IN hopes to overcome through advancedinformation systems and procedures thatawait closure.

Proposals also include the developmentof intelligence networks amongst fishingcommunities and issuing identity cards to all fishermen and other residents of coastal villages.

The additional procurement of maritimepatrol aviation assets, including unmannedaerial vehicles for both the IN and the ICG, isunder discussion, with the IN negotiating toacquire five Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI)-built EL/M-2083 aerostat programmable

radar to plug vital surveillance gaps in itscoastal security.

The proposed APR, which the IN wouldbe operating for the first time, in addition toground-based radar, surveillance aircraftand unmanned aerial vehicles wouldsignificantly enhance the IN’s ability to‘seamlessly’ monitor vital portions of its7,600km-long coastline.

The erection of an Integrated HarbourDefence System to secure the IN’s assetsagainst any sea-borne attack that wouldinclude diver detection sonar and highresolution radar, which are capable ofpicking up all movement up to a distance of 70km, is also envisaged. This scheme includesthe installation of electronic sea fences fixedon the ocean bed close to harbours toprevent any diver or a boat from swimming orsailing through. It is only when a warship orboat exits or enters any IN harbour would the‘electronic net’ be lifted to permit the vesselto pass through.

And as for Mainland Security...Homeland security proposals also includeupgrading the federal intelligence agenciesand Central Paramilitary Force (CPF), all ofwhich received a 25 percent increase in theirbudget spending for 2009-10.

The over one-million-strong CPF underthe Home Ministry has been allocated Rs126.34 billion for 2009-10, a massive increaseover its previous years’ allocation. Overall,numbers in CPF have also been enhanced bythe addition of 80 battalions (around70,000-80,000 personnel) who needequipping.

The immediate CPF acquisitions includesome 80 anti-landmine vehicles, 10,000lighter bullet-proof jackets and an equalnumber of helmets, in addition to better

weaponry like assault rifles andcarbines. Led by the MoD, thesecurity agencies also plan onerecting a network-centric gridlinking the country’s information andintelligence gathering systems.

The newly established unifiedtechnical intelligence gatheringcentre, the autonomous NationalTechnical Research Organisation,which manages all technical inputsfrom multiple sources, including themilitary, is also being upgraded.

Priority, however, is beingaccorded to the Special Forces (SF)National Security Guard (NSG)whose capabilities were foundseverely wanting during itsengagement with the terrorists inMumbai.

The NSG’s acquisition list includesbody-worn video and audio bugs to captureand transmit real-time live images andsounds during operations and X-ray viewingsystems to facilitate real-time measurementof objects located behind obstructions likewalls and similar barriers.

They are also seeking Mini-RemotelyOperated Vehicles (MROV) that can belaunched for surveillance inside buildingsand installations, aircraft, trains and ships,passenger terminals and under vehicles.

The NSG is seeking MROVs with thecapability to climb stairs and gradients of upto 45 degrees, in addition to possessingcolour video cameras, night-visioncapability and modular weapon mountingsystems, say SF sources. Improvedcommunication is also a priority but sadly allthis equipment is yet to be inducted, despitethe hysteria on upgrading the NSG’sfirepower and communication systems afterthe 26/11 fiasco.

DSI JANUARY, 2010

Naval Chief Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma in his

Defence Ministry office


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Documents

Defence and Security of India - Dec2009/Jan 2010