Decentralized Versus Centralized Collective Bargaining is the Collective Bargaining Structure in Spain Effecient

8/12/2019 Decentralized Versus Centralized Collective Bargaining is the Collective Bargaining Structure in Spain Effecient

1/35

Decentralized versus Centralized Collective Bargaining: Is the Collective Bargaining Structure

in Spain Efficient?Author(s): Jesus FerreiroSource: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer, 2004), pp. 695-728Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4538902.

Accessed: 27/03/2014 05:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

M.E. Sharpe, Inc.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toJournal of Post

Keynesian Economics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 103.24.98.179 on Thu, 27 Mar 2014 05:25:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4538902?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4538902?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mes


2/35

This content downloaded from 103.24.98.179 on Thu, 27 Mar 2014 05:25:42 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/35

696 JOURNALOF POST KEYNESIANECONOMICS

inplace nfluencepaygrowth, nd,moreconcretely,whetherhe inter-mediate tructuresncollectivebargainingn Spaindogiverise to ex-cessive increases in wages and salaries that affect inflation andunemploymentates.To thisaim, irst,wepresenthedataoncollectivebargainingtructuresn Spain.Second,we test thehypothesishat hedegreeofcollectivenegotiationoverages adeterminantnunemploy-ment.Finally,we analyze he influence f collectivebargainingtruc-ture n Spainonpayincreases, s agreedwithin he various unctionallevelsof suchbargaining.TheoreticalrameworkIntheneoclassicalmodels,abormarkets ork nanefficientway.Wagelevelandgrowth resetaccordingo the ndividualroductivity.Work-ers are hiredup to the level in whichmarginal roductivityf laborequals ealwage.Wage evel,therefore,saclearing-marketrice,ead-ingto anequilibrium,hat s, fullemployment. nydeparturerom hismodel eadsto aninefficientworking f thelabormarket:wageswillnot clear he market ndtheequilibrium illnot be reached.f wagesare not set in an individualwaybutin a collectiveway, productivitylevelandgrowthwillnotbe theonlydeterminantsfwages.Thecollec-tiveactionwillgiveworkers bargainingower hatwill beused ogetexcessive wages, hat s,wageshigherhan hemarket-clearingnes.Theexcessivewagewill be the ultimateeasonof theunemployment.Thesizeofunemploymentilldepend nthesize oftheexcessivewage.Therateof coverage f thecollectivebargaining illdirectlynfluencethesizeof theexcessivewage,and, herefore,hecurrentatesof unem-ployment nd nflationBentolila ndJimeno, 002;Layardtal.,1991;Millard ndMortensen,997;Milner, 995;NickellandvanOurs, 000).Besides hecoverage f collectivebargaining,tsstructures alsoim-portant:hedegreeof coordinationf wage-setting ystems nfluencedirectly npaygrowth nd,consequently,nfluencehemacroeconomicoutcomesnterms f inflation ndunemployment.hereasonsthat heinternalizationf theexternalitiesrising romanexcessivewagede-pendsof thedegreeof centralization-decentralizationf collectivebar-gaining. na neoclassicalabormarket, nexcessivewage-that is, awagehigherhan he ndividualroductivity-meanshatworkers an-notgetajob: oranemployedworker,nexcessivewageclaimwillleadto losinghis or her ob. Unemployment ill alwaysbe voluntaryndindividual. owever,fthewagesaresetcollectively, nexcessivewageclaimdoesnotnecessarilyead o ob osssince henegative onsequences



4/35

DECENTRALIZEDERSUSCENTRALIZEDOLLECTIVEARGAINING97oftheexcessivewageclaims anbe externalized.f thesubsequentrofitsqueezes offsetwithhigherprices,all theagentswill be affectedbyanincreasenprices.But fthehigherwagesarenot ullyoffsetbyanequiva-lentprice ncrease, rofits,nvestmentnd,subsequently,mploymentcanbenegatively ffected.n anopeneconomy, nincreaseninflationwilllead olowercompetitivenessndemployment.Only f thenegative onsequencesf an excessivewage growthareinternalized,neconomywill reachbettermacroeconomicutcomes,that s, lowerratesof unemploymentnd nflation. herefore,hestruc-tureofcollectivebargainingan mprovehemacroeconomicutcomes.Nonetheless,heres notageneralizedonsensus boutwhat ystemofcollectivebargainingenerateshebestmacroeconomicutcomes:omeauthorsrguehatullycentralizednd ullydecentralizedenerateimi-larpositiveoutcomes, therauthors rgue hat hebetter utcomes regenerated yafullydecentralizedystem,and, inally,other tudies r-gue thata fullycentralizedystem s thebest one (BrunoandSachs,1985;Calmfors ndDrifill,1988;Layard t al., 1991;NickellandvanOurs,2000;Soskice,1990).Ina decentralizedollectivebargaining, agesaresetfortheworkersof a firmorcompany.f we assume hat heonlycontent f collectivebargainings to setthe rateof wagegrowth,hismustbe similarotheproductivity rowth n everyunit.An excessivewagegrowthwouldgenerate profit queeze hatwould eadto lower nvestment ndem-ployment r to higherprices hatwould eadto lowercompetitivenessandemployment.nanycase,it willbeinthe nterest f theworkersosetexcessivewagesthatcanendangerheirobs.Onthecontrary,nafullycentralizedollectivebargaining,heobjec-tive of thetradeunionss toimprovehewelfare nd he obsecurity fall theworkers.A wagegrowthwillbepassed or the wholeeconomythatdoesnotgenerate egativemacroeconomiconsequences. hecur-rent evels of unemploymentnd nflationwill be keydeterminantsfthewagegrowth ndnationwideroductivityrowthwill betheguide-line forthe commonwagegrowth.Thecompanies rindustrieswhoseproductivity rowths below thenationwide roductivityrowthwillsuffer romanexcessivewagegrowth; owever,hosenegative onse-quences,higherpricesandemploymentestructionnthoseunions,willbe fullyoffsetby thefallingpricesandthecreation f employmentnthehigherproductivityndustriesndcompanies.Therelationmong ollective argainingtructuresndmacroeconomicoutcomesnvolves hat he evel of thenon-acceleratingnflation ateofunemploymentNAIRU)n aneconomysrelatedo theprevailing age



5/35

698 JOURNAL F POSTKEYNESIANCONOMICSbargainingtructureMartin, 999). nthissense, eteris aribus,hangesinthecollectivebargainingtructure illalsochange heNAIRU, husmoving he verticalPhillips urve: hangeso a morecentralized r de-centralizedollectivebargaining illreduceheNAIRU,whilechangestoanintermediatetructure illincrease heNAIRU.A descriptionof collectivebargaining n SpainOneofthemain riticismsgainsthecurrenttructuref collectivebar-gainingnSpains its intermediateegree, structurehathas ntensifiedover heyears ince hewagemoderationgreed nin the ncomes olicypacts (Revenga,1994),as signedsince 1977(whenthe Pactosde laMoncloaweresignedbythegovernmentnd hedifferent olitical ar-ties,with hesupportromunions ndbusiness rganizations)ntil1984(yearof thesigningof theAcuerdoEconomico Social).Accordingotheabove heoreticalnalyses,hefullydecentralizedrcentralized ollectivebargaininghouldprovide quallyefficientout-comesregarding ay increases.Bothcollectivebargainingtructuresshould urnout to be identical. twouldbe thesame ooptfora decen-tralized argainingtructurer for a centralizedne. In a strictlyheo-retical iew, hismeans quating fullycentralizedollectivebargainingstructure hereasinglerate orpaygrowths set for hewholeeconomy(awage-incomesolicypact)andanabsolutelyndividualizedtructure(intermsof wagegrowth).ntheSpanish ase,thismeansequating,nterms f macroeconomicfficiency, ompany-levelgreements ith n-dustryagreementst national evel. This wouldmake hemequivalentto eachother, irst,a collectivebargainingtructure hereonlycom-pany-levelagreementsxist, second,a collectivebargainingtructurewhere nlynationalndustry-levelgreementsxist,and, inally, mixedsituationwhere heresonlyastructure herein othkindsofcollectivebargaininggreementsoexist.As seenin Table1, showing hesalaried mployees overedby thedifferentunctionalevelsofcollectivebargaining,heSpanishasedif-fersfrom he abovesituation. hecollectivebargainingtructures anintermediatene,withapredominancefprovincialndustryollectivebargaininggreements.' rom1981to2001,theshared ompany-levelagreementsndthoseagreedata nationalndustryevel fell from54.9percento 35.8percent.Thisdrop s moremarkednthe case of com-

IThose affectingfirmsof a specific industryandlocatedin a province.



6/35

Table 1Workers covered by collective bargaining agreements1981 1982 1983 1984

Total 4,435,178 6,262,875 5,610,999 6,181,921Companyagreements 928,934 985,682 984,396 1,060,494Provincial 377,967 418,091 417,736 495,232

Regional 35,768 13,846 8,880 11,269Interregional 515,199 553,745 557,780 553,993Otheragreements 3,506,244 5,277,193 4,626,603 5,121,427Companies group 40,573 14,685 12,370 16,755Local industry 14,616 29,426 23,620 17,165Provincial ndustry 1,893,325 3,326,614 2,921,102 3,316,789Interprovincialndustry 53,287 135,605 176,697 232,051Regional 8,168 6,585 - 75,867Interregional 45,119 129,020 176,697 156,184Nationalindustry 1,504,443 1,770,863 1,492,814 1,538,667



7/35

Table 1(Continued)

1988 1989 1990 1991Total 6,864,738 6,993,751 7,623,867 7,821,850Company agreements 1,070,424 1,061,926 1,132,581 1,151,003

Provincial 478,876 503,519 529,730 550,979Regional 31,246 24,091 38,005 33,743Interregional 560,302 534,316 564,846 566,281Otheragreements 5,794,314 5,931,825 6,491,286 6,670,847Companies group 12,071 10,582 12,795 17,200Local industry 16,104 19,862 11,476 10,538Provincial ndustry 3,761,432 3,804,184 4,173,171 4,380,753Interprovincialndustry 132,242 203,870 303,952 303,612Regional 110,510 191,729 214,600 208,796Interregional 21,732 12,141 89,352 94,816Nationalindustry 1,872,465 1,893,327 1,989,892 1,958,744



8/35

1995 1996 1997 1998Total 7,605,073 8,128,193 8,365,095 8,750,577Companyagreements 1,043,730 1,061,474 998,342 1,021,507Provincial 474,392 487,218 484,725 492,315Regional 59,814 74,141 80,979 79,272Interregional 509,524 500,115 432,638 449,920Otheragreements 6,561,343 7,066,719 7,366,753 7,729,070

Companies group 28,066 34,948 34,803 46,779Localindustry 11,169 136,724 13,793 11,223Provincial ndustry 4,202,023 4,218,987 4,297,015 4,536,484Interprovincialndustry 255,714 447,161 486,748 534,452Regional 237,371 428,668 481,646 525,997Interregional 18,343 18,493 5,102 8,455Nationalindustry 2,064,371 2,228,899 2,534,394 2,600,132Source:Anuariode EstadisticasLaborales deAsuntosSociales,Misterioae Trabajo ndAsunto* provisional data.



9/35

702 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIANECONOMICS

pany-levelagreements,a continuousandprogressive all (fallingto 11.3percentof the total salariedemployees coveredby such agreements n2001), than in that of the industryagreementsata national evel, whichrose from 1991 until 1999.AnothercriticismaimedattheSpanishcollectivebargaining tructureis its excessive atomization,arisingfromthe excessive numberof non-company-levelcollective bargainingagreements,thus makingthe re-quiredcoordinationnecessaryfor collective bargainingdifficult.Table2 shows thehighnumberof collective bargainingagreementssignedin2000, which would confirmthe increasingatomization n Spanishcol-lective bargaining f we consider the increase in the total numberofagreements signed since 1981. Nonetheless, in 2000, 73.3 percentoftotal collective bargainingagreementswere companyagreements:be-tween 1981 and 2000 types of collective bargainingagreementsotherthannoncompanyones increasedby 55.2 percentwhile company-levelones rose by 117.7 percent.In fact, the much-reviledprovincialagree-ments have keptsteadysince 1992. Thus,the structural tomizationofcollective bargaining n Spainis a directconsequenceof this risingde-centralization.

However,the atomizationof collective bargaining hould not be ana-lyzed looking solely at thenumberof collective bargainingagreementssignedbutalso atthetotalnumberof employeescoveredby suchagree-ments. The rise in the number of company-levelagreementshas notresulted n an increase nthe numberof employeescoveredby thisformof collectivebargaining,uchrisebeingminimalbetween 1981 and2000.On the contrary, n thatperiodthere has been a high increaseof theworkerscoveredbynational ndustryagreementsand,mainly,by indus-tryagreementsata provincial evel.This conclusion is reinforced f we analyzeTable 3. Until 1997, theaveragenumberof employeescoveredbyeachcollectiveagreementwaslower thanthatof theearly1980s.Sincethen,theaveragesize of collec-tive bargainingagreements ncreased,because of the increasein higherlevel agreements.The size of company-level agreementshas slowlyfallen,adirectoutcomeof the fall in averagesize of Spanishcompanies.The atomization n Spanishcollective bargaining s, therefore,a directconsequenceof therise inthenumberof company-levelagreementsandthedecreaseregistered n theaveragesize of Spanishcompanies.Actu-ally, the very existence of this phenomenonof smaller workforcesinSpanishcompaniescreatesseriousdoubtsabout heviabilityof a decen-tralizedcollective bargainingstructuren a productivestructuredomi-natedby very smallcompanies(Finaet al., 2001).



10/35

Table 2Collective bargaining agreements signed in Spain for functional levels of bargain1981 1982 1983 1984

Total 2,672 3,473 3,176 3,796Company agreements 1,768 2,242 2,083 2,539Provincial 1,543 1,935 1,735 2,231Regional 32 16 22 31Interregional 193 291 281 277Otheragreements 904 1,231 1,138 1,257Companies group 45 27 31 34Local industry 31 46 42 43Provincial ndustry 767 1,077 998 1,108Interprovincialndustry 17 27 16 22Regional 8 9 -6Interregional 9 18 16 16Nationalindustry 44 54 51 50



11/35

Table 2(Continued)

1988 1989 1990 1991Total 4,096 4,302 4,595 4,848Company agreements 2,826 3,016 3,254 3,474

Provincial 2,464 2,637 2,839 3,021Regional 40 50 55 63Interregional 322 329 360 390Otheragreements 1,270 1,286 1,341 1,374Companies group 20 25 33 43Local industry 36 36 31 33Provincial ndustry 1,126 1,135 1,179 1,203Interprovincialndustry 29 27 31 30Regional 20 20 20 21Interregional 9 7 11 9Nationalindustry 59 63 67 65



12/35

1995 1996 1997 1998Total 4,827 5,028 5,040 5,091Company agreements 3,461 3,661 3,669 3,690Provincial 2,993 3,174 3,174 3,200Regional 95 111 125 136Interregional 373 376 370 354Otheragreements 1,366 1,367 1,371 1,401Companies group 67 70 68 65Local industry 26 31 31 26Provincial ndustry 1,159 1,147 1,145 1,174Interprovincialndustry 38 44 47 54Regional 32 37 43 51Interregional 6 7 4 3Nationalindustry 76 75 80 82Source:Anuariode EstadisticasLaboralesy deAsuntosSociales,Ministeriode Trabajo nd Asunto* provisional ata.



13/35

Table 3Average number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreement

1981 1982 1983 1984Total 1,646 1,850 1,730 1,629Company agreements 522 451 470 418

Provincial 244 221 234 222Regional 1,084 865 386 364Interregional 2,589 2,014 1,937 2,000Otheragreements 3,828 4,401 4,020 4,074Companies group 863 524 412 493Localindustry 487 654 576 399Provincial ndustry 2,424 3,171 2,886 2,993Interprovincialndustry 2,960 5,650 11,044 10,548Regional 908 941 - 12,645Interregional 5,013 7,589 11,044 9,762Nationalindustry 37,611 33,413 28,708 30,773



14/35

1988 1989 1990 1991Total 1,676 1,626 1,659 1,613Company agreements 379 352 348 331Provincial 194 191 187 182

Regional 781 482 691 536Interregional 1,740 1,624 1,569 1,452Otheragreements 4,562 4,613 4,841 4,855Companies group 604 423 388 400Localindustry 447 552 370 319Provincial ndustry 3,341 3,352 3,540 3,642Interprovincialndustry 4,560 7,551 9,805 10,120Regional 5,526 9,586 10,730 9,943Interregional 2,415 1,734 8,123 10,535Nationalindustry 31,737 30,053 29,700 30,135



15/35

Table 3(Continued)

1995 1996 1997 1998Total 1,576 1,617 1,660 1,719Company agreements 302 290 272 277Provincial 159 154 153 154

Regional 630 668 648 583Interregional 1,366 1,330 1,169 1,271Otheragreements 4,803 5,170 5,373 5,517Companies group 419 499 512 720Local industry 430 4,410 445 432Provincial ndustry 3,626 3,678 3,753 3,864Interprovincialndustry 6,729 10,163 10,356 9,897Regional 7,418 11,586 11,201 10,314Interregional 3,057 2,642 1,276 2,818Nationalindustry 27,163 29,719 31,680 31,709Source:Anuariode EstadisticasLaborales deAsuntosSociales,MinisteriodeTrabajo ndAsunto

* provisional ata.



16/35

DECENTRALIZEDERSUSCENTRALIZEDOLLECTIVEARGAINING09Table4 showsrealwagegrowth greedncollectivebargaining.2hesecondrow showstheaverage ealwagegrowth.Threeperiods anbe

differentiated.he irstperiod1981-86)reflects heeffectsof the mple-mentationf the ncomespolicieswithageneralizedegative ealwagegrowth. nthe secondperiod 1987-92),there s generalized ageex-pansionwithsignificant aygrowth espitehehigh evelsofunemploy-ment ecordeduringhisperiod. inally,ince1993,astrongmoderationinpaygrowthsclear,despiteheexpansionf salariedmploymentndthedrop ntherateof unemploymentince 1995.Thesedatashow thedifficulties f proposing clearlydefinedrela-tionship etween hedegreeof (de)centralizationf collectivebargain-ing and the realwage growth.Theresultsvaryconsiderablyver theperiod.Althoughhewagegrowthn thecompany-levelgreementsslower han heaverage rowth f the other ollectivebargaininggree-ments, nycomparisonetween ompany-levelnd herestof theagree-mentshidesthe factthatvarious unctionalevelsoperaten Spanishcollectivebargaining,s well as the factthat,even withincompany-levelagreements,here xist variousunctionalevels.Itis notfound nprovincialompany greements here owerpayrisesarerecorded utin regional nd nterregionalompany-levelgreements.However, l-though rovincialompany-levelgreementsorrespondo thegreatestdegreeof decentralizationncollectivebargaining,endingoplant-by-plantorworkplace-levelegotiations,hehigher ompany-levelgree-mentsseem to internalizeetter henegative ffectsderived rompayincreases,husbeingmoreefficient.

Furthermore,omeagreementst a higherevelthancompany-basedonesalso recordpayincreasesower han henational verage, shap-penswithgroupsof companies,nterprovincialnterregionalndustrylevelagreements,r nationalndustry-levelgreementssince1991 orthelatter). nanycase,the intermediate-levelgreements,hoseat theprovincial ndustryevel, are thosewithhigherpay increases,whichwouldpoint oa lowermacroeconomicfficiencyn thistypeof agree-mentand husarguesnfavorof company- ndnationalndustry-levelagreements.Nonetheless, e cannot etect linear elationshipithapositive lopeorthe traditionalinverted-U r hump-shapedurvewherecentral-

2We calculatedrealwage growthdiscountingtheyearlyinflation rate(consumerpriceindex [CPI])from thenominalwage growth.



17/35

Table 4Real wage growth passed in collective bargaining1981 1982 1983 1984

Total -1.44 -2.38 -0.75 -3.49Company agreements -2.68 -3.25 -0.51 -4.28Provincialcompany -2.47 -3.58 -0.82 -3.88Regional company -0.68 -1.03 0.35 -3.71Interregionalcompany -2.98 -3.06 -0.29 -4.64Companies group -0.4 -2.15 -1.04 -3.86Otheragreements -1.12 -2.21 -0.80 -3.33Local industry -2.39 -3.32 -2.22 -4.75Provincial ndustry -1.33 -2.45 -0.99 -3.49Interprovincial egionalindustry -9.27 -3.39 - -1.65Interprovincialnterregionalindustry -2.18 -1.94 1.33 -3.29Nationalindustry -0.77 -1.77 -0.68 -3.03



18/35

1988 1989 1990 1991Total 1.58 0.97 1.63 2.06Company agreements 0.89 0.54 1.35 1.91Provincialcompany 1.09 0.72 1.5 2.05Regional company 0.7 1.95 1.9 1.87Interregional ompany 0.73 0.73 1.17 1.77Companies group 1.4 0.79 1.48 1.07Otheragreements 1.70 1.04 1.67 2.09Local industry 1.86 0.24 1.49 1.8Provincial ndustry 1.6 1.06 1.65 2.15Interprovincialegionalindustry 2.99 0.47 1.61 1.75Interprovincialnterregionalindustry 1.47 -0.01 1.12 1.31Nationalindustry 1.83 1.08 1.76 2.04



19/35

Table 4(Continued)

1995 1996 1997 1998Total -0.76 0.22 0.87 0.76Company agreements -1.01 -0.13 0.31 0.76Provincialcompany -0.67 0.04 0.55 0.64

Regional company -0.52 -0.03 -1.02 0.42Interregional ompany -1.38 -0.32 0.28 0.18Companies group -0.87 -0.36 0.13 0.39Otheragreements -0.72 0.27 0.95 0.80Local industry -0.72 0.34 1.18 0.72Provincial ndustry -0.66 0.34 0.96 0.86Interprovincialegionalindustry -0.83 1.14 1.55 1.11Interprovincialnterregionalindustry -0.57 -0.41 0.9 1.12Nationalindustry -0.84 -0.02 0.83 0.65Source:Author's alculations.* provisionaldata.



20/35

DECENTRALIZEDVERSUS CENTRALIZEDCOLLECTIVEBARGAINING 713Table5Maximumand minimum real wage growthfor collective bargainingstructures

Lowest eal Highest ealwage growth wagegrowthProvincialompany 1982Regional ompany 1985, 1987,1988, 1982, 1985,1989,1992,1993,1997, 19951999,2001Interregionalompany 1995Group fcompanies 1986,1994,1998 1981Local ndustry 1983,1984 1987,1994Provincialndustry 1991,1992,1993Interprovincialegional 1981 1984, 1986, 1988,industry 1996,1997,1999Interprovincialnterregional 1989,1990,1991, 1983,1998, 2001industry 1996,2000Nationalndustry 1985,1990, 2000

ized and decentralizedcollective bargainingagreementsreach similaroutcomesntermsofwagegrowth,with hehighest rowth eingregis-terednintermediategreements. ctually,hedistributionf themini-mumandmaximumealpay ncreasesnreal ermson ayearlybasis svery irregular see Table5). Therefore, t is difficultto statethatthereexists a functional evel thatcould beconsidered roma macroeconomicperspectiveas the most efficientone ( in termsof wage flexibility).

Withthe aim of solvingtheproblemsby analyzingpay increaseson ayearlybasis, we havecalculated he accumulated rowthof collectivelybargainedagreedpay over the 1981-2000 period.In aggregateterms,the accumulatedgrowthof realwages is 0.79 percent.A moredetailedcalculation,broken down accordingto each functional evel of collec-tive bargaining, s shown in Figure 1. In accumulated erms,the rela-tionshipbetweenwagerises andthedegreeof centralization f collectivebargainingacquireswhatwe couldname a J-form :hose agreementsthatrepresent he most decentralizedcollective bargainingprocedureshaveexperiencedan accumulation f drops nrealtermsof agreedwages.Only the provincial industryand national industryagreementsshowpositive accumulatedwage growth n real terms.Macroeconomic consequences of collective bargaining in SpainIn therest of thepaper,we testwhethercollectivebargainingn Spainisadeterminant f theratesof unemployment nd nflation.Althoughsince



21/35


Figure 1 Accumulatedrowth f realwagespassedncollectivebargaining(1981-2000)2.38~~~2----- -----------,,X- -1.84

.2O 1 ' I }I . W' -0.26I -3.99 '-2 2.96

-4.56 ,-6 - *6.-8-

Source: Author'salculates.Source:Author's alculations.

the mid-1970sFigure ), therateof inflation asbeenfalling, he cur-rentrateof inflation3.5percentn 2002)is higher han hose n mostmembers f theEuropeanMonetary nion.Besides, heratesof unem-ployment re hehighestn theEuropean nion 11.4percentn2002).Ourobjective s twofold.First,we will testwhether hecoverageofcollectivebargainings a determinantf the macroeconomicutcomesof theSpanish conomy,nflation ndunemployment.econd,we willtestwhetherhe structuref collectivebargaining,hat s, thedegreeof(de)centralizationf collectivebargaining,ffects hoseoutcomes.Thelogicthat iesbehindheserelationss that hecoverageandthe struc-tureof collectivebargainingnfluences hewage growth passing x-cessivesalaries) nd,hence, heratesof inflation ndunemployment.We have estimated ifferentunctions or fourdifferentdependentvariables:herateof growth f realwagespassed ncollectivebargain-ing,3 herateofgrowth fsalariedmployment,herateofgrowth f therateof unemployment,nd,finally,the rateof growthof the rateofinflation.We use asexplanatorylements ariables elated othemac-roeconomicoutcomes grossdomesticproduct GDP],employment,unemployment),ndto institutionalspects nfluencinghewage-set-tingprocess incomespolicyand abormarketeforms) nd, inally, o

3Wage growthincludescost-of-livingclauses.



22/35

DECENTRALIZEDERSUSCENTRALIZEDOLLECTIVEARGAINING15Figure 2 Ratesof inflation ndunemploymentnSpain percent)26-2422 - ----.20 -/-18-16 ----14 -12-10 -86 q--. .

-----O----------------'--- -oi2--o------- _ , -0----Xo--o-x : ---_

P t Po65ceaS as o > f oho oo oo go o 9 , 9too9 g 03 8|-*- Unemployment - Inflation

Source:NationalInstituteof Statistics(www.ine.es).

thecoverageandstructuref collectivebargainingnSpain.Thefunc-tionsestimated singordinaryeastsquaresOLS) ortheperiod1983-2000 includeasexplanatoryariableshefollowing:4GDP:rateof growth f realGDP.Incomes olicy:dummy ariabledoptinghevalueonefor heyears

when ncomespolicieswere mplemented1983,1985,1986)andzerofortheremaining ears.LMR84: ummy ariablehatshows heconsequencesf the abormarket eform assedn 1984, akinghevalueonesince heyear1984,zerofortheremaining ears.LMR94: ummy ariablehatshows heconsequencesf thelabormarket eform assedn 1994, akinghevalueone since heyear1994,zerofor theremaining ears.LMR97: ummy ariablehatshows heconsequencesf thelabormarket eform assedn 1997, akinghevalueone since heyear1997,zerofortheremainingears.Employment:ateof growth f salariedmployment.Unemployment:ateof growth f therateof unemployment.

4 Regressions have been calculated using the program SPSS 11.0.



23/35

716 JOURNAL F POSTKEYNESIANCONOMICS

Coverage:ateof growthof the rateof coverageof collectivebar-gaining workers overedby collectivebargainings a percent-ageof totalsalariedworkers).COVC: ateofgrowth fcoverage fcompany-levelollectivebar-gaining greementsworkersoveredby companyollectivebar-gainingagreementss a percentagef totalworkers overedbycollectivebargaining).COVNI: ateof growthof coverageof nationalndustry-levelol-lectivebargaininggreementsworkers overedby nationaln-dustry ollectivebargaininggreementss a percentagef totalworkers overedbycollectivebargaining).COVCNI:ateof growthof coverage f company ndnationaln-dustry-levelollectivebargaininggreementsworkers overedbycompanyndnationalndustryollective argaininggreementsasapercentageftotalworkersovered ycollective argaining).COVPI: ateof growth fcoverage fprovincialndustry-levelol-lectivebargaininggreementsworkersoveredby provincialn-dustry ollectivebargaining greementss a percentagef totalworkers overedbycollectivebargaining).

Thelast four variables re related o thestructuref collectivebar-gaining.Thehypothesisf the hump-shapedurvemeanshat he ow-est ratesof unemploymentnd nflation reregisteredwhencollectivebargainings moredecentralizedrcentralized. xtrapolatinghishy-pothesis o Spain, hiswould nvolveanequivalence etweena collec-tivebargainingtructure ithonlycompany-levelgreements,structurewithonly ndustryational-levelgreements,nd, inally,a mixed itu-ationwhere hereonlyexistbothkindsof agreements.fthishypothesisweretrue, hekeyelementwouldnotbe therateof coverageof com-panycollectivebargaining greementsr the rateof coverageof na-tionalndustrygreementsut he ointrateofcoverage f bothkindsofagreements.An increase n thisjointrateof coverage hould ead tobettermacroeconomicutcomes.On hecontrary,f thehypothesiswerenot true,the individualatesof coverageof everykind of collectivebargaining greements ouldbe therightexplanatoryariables f in-flationandunemployment.Weexpect hatan ncreasenCOVPIomeswithhigher atesof infla-tionandunemployment,inceall the theoreticaltudiesagree hatanintermediatetructuref collectivebargainingeads oexcessivewagegrowth nd,hence,higher atesof inflation ndunemployment.or hisreason, heexpected onsequencef COVCs thata riseinthisrateofcoverageeads o lower nflation ndunemployment.heconsequence



24/35

DECENTRALIZEDVERSUSCENTRALIZEDCOLLECTIVEBARGAINING 717

of a higherCONVI s indeterminate,incethehypothesis f a hump-shaped elationshiptates hata higher ate eads o lower nflation ndunemployment,utthehypothesis f apositive-slopedelationshipe-tweencentralizationndwagegrowth laims ortheopposite utcomes.Table6 shows heresults or realwagegrowth.Column 2,includingasexplanatoryariableshegrowth f GDP, ncomespolicies, he abormarketeforms,hecreation femployment,nd hecoverage f collec-tivebargaining,howsthebestoutcomes. urprisingly,hesignof realGDPgrowthsnegative:neconomic xpansionomeswitha fall nrealwages.Anexplanationf thisrelationships that,as we will see later,theres a positive elationshipetween conomic rowth nd nflation.Spanishnflation s mostlyexplained y the behavior f themarkups,which ncrease uringconomic xpansionsEstradandLopez-Salido,2001;Ferreiro ndSerrano 001b).Theaccelerationn inflationmorethanoffsetsanyeffectthateconomic rowthoremploymentreation)cangenerate nwagegrowth,eadingo a fallinrealwages.Theonlyvariableshatarestatisticallyignificantre ncomespolicy,thecreation f employment,he rateof unemploymentwith owerex-planatory ower hanemployment),he labormarket eformpassed n1994,andthe rateof coverageof collectivebargaining. hefirst hreevariables avetheexpected ign:positive ortheemploymentreationandnegativeor ncomespolicies,1994 abormarketeform, ndunem-ployment.Thevariableselatedo the 1984and 1997 abormarkete-forms renotstatisticallyignificant,lthoughhesignof thecoefficientsare theexpected positiveandnegligible or thereformof 1984 andnegativeandhighfor the reforms f 1994and1997).5Thesignof thevariable1994labormarket eforms in accordancewiththeobjectiveandcontent f thisreform,mainly f we analyze his in lightof the in-sider-outsidermodel andif we assume hatcollectivebargaininge-flectsthe interests f theinsiders,hat s,permanent orkers.While he irst eform romotedixed-termmploymentontracts,iv-ingriseto aboom ntemporarymploymenthat ncreasedhebargain-ingpowerofthepermanentorkers,nd he hird eformocusedon theobjectiveof reducinghehighratesof temporary orkerspeaking t

5Thefirst abormarketeform romotedhefixed-termmploymentontracts.tsdirect bjectivewasnottoreducewagegrowth ut opromotehecreationf employ-ment.The wolastreforms, ithin classicnsider-outsiderodel, ried ofosterpermanentmploymentyreducinghebargainingower fpermanentinsiders)workers.Whereashefirst eform epressedhewagesof thetemporaryorkers,he1994and1997reformsworked gainsthepermanentorkers'ay, husaffectinghewagegrowth assedncollective argainingFerreirondSerrano,001a).



25/35

Table 6Wages-dependent variable: rate of growth of real wages passed in collectiv(1) (2) (3) (4)

Constant 0.369 1.140 3.056*** 1.4(0.208) (0.740) (1.701) (0.87GDP 0.190 -0.641***(0.906) (1.748)Incomes policy -1.540*** -1.650*** -1.783** -1.59(1.450) (1.735) (2.022) (1.62LMR84 -0.115 -0.594 -1.069 -0.42(0.070) (0.396) (0.756) (0.27LMR94 -1.271 *** -1.513** -2.003** -1.58(1.394) (1.852) (2.487) (1.86LMR97 0.864 -0.343 0.084 0.50(0.807) (0.343) (0.090) (0.49Employment 0. 197** 0.491**(2.013) (2.569)Unemployment -0.06(1.73Coverage

COVCNICOVCCOVNICOVPIAdjusted R2 0.003 0.204 0.321 0.14Standard error 1.342 1.200 1.108 1.2F-statistic 1.012 1.872 2.337*** 1.59Durbin-Watson 1.699 1.672 2.226 1.73



26/35

(7) (8) (9) (10)Constant 0.161 1.824 2.179 2.07(0.109) (0.948) (1.014) (1.06GDP -0.496*** -0.559 -0.468

(1.396) (1.377) (1.26Incomes policy -2.158** -2.168** -2.298** -1.978(2.405) (2.518) (2.389) (2.10LMR84 0.934 0.286 0.141 -0.181(0.595) (0.182) (0.084) (0.10LMR94 -1.896** -2.205* -2.443** -2.089(2.484) (2.882) (2.411) (2.57LMR97 0.429 0.213 0.403 0.14(0.476) (0.242) (0.385) (0.15Employment 0.090 0.338*** 0.364*** 0.32(0.873) (1.663) (1.632) (1.55

UnemploymentCoverage -0.146** -0.119*** -0.112*** -0.124(1.933) (1.590) (1.397) (1.59COVCNI 0.026

(0.383)COVC -0.050(0.61COVNI

COVPIAdjusted R2 0.352 0.403 0.348 0.36Standard error 1.082 1.039 1.086 1.07F-statistic 2.539*** 2.643*** 2.133 2.21Durbin-Watson 1.668 2.144 2.335 2.21Notes:Absolute -values re nparentheses;significantt the1percentevel;**significantt the5



27/35


34.8 percentn 1995), he 1994reformworkedagainst hebargainingpowerof permanentorkers,hanginghewage-setting rocess, ivingmore mportanceo thevariable omponentf earnings, ndallowingtheopting-outlauses allowing hat ower-level ollectivebargainingagreementsouldpass owerwagegrowthhanupper-levelgreements)(FerreirondSerrano,001b). n thissense, heestimatesignof labormarketeform s theexpected ne.The rateof coverageof collectivebargainings statisticallyignifi-cant,but tssign snegative.Anincreasentherateof coverageeads oa fall inrealwagespassed.Therefore,we cannot onclude hatcollec-tivebargainingnSpainworksasamechanismo reach xcessivewagegrowths.Thehighrateofcoverage75percent f total alariedmploy-ment,higherf weexcludepublic mployment)means hatworkersn-ternalize he negativeconsequencesof wage growth,mainly f weconsider helow dispersion f thewage growthandthecoordination,formaland nformal, f collectivebargaininggreementsnSpain.Inanycase,consideringhe valuesof the standardizedoefficients,theorder f importancef theexplanatoryariablesncludedncolumn8 (Table6) is thefollowing: alaried mployment, 994labormarketreform,ncomespolicies,GDPgrowth,1984 abormarketeform, ov-erageof collectivebargaining,nd, inally,1997and1984 abormarketreforms.Theminormportancef thecoverage fcollectivebargainingis clear f we considerhat,other hingsbeingequal,a fallgreaterhan15.3percentsneededn thecoverage f collectivebargainingmovingfroma rateof 75.1 percento 63.6 percent)o generatenegativerealwagesgrowth.nthecaseof thecollectivebargainingtructure,hedif-ferent oefficients renotstatisticallyignificant,nd, herefore,tcan-notbeconcluded hat hedegreeof centralizationnddecentralizationof collectivebargainings a determinantf thewagetrendnSpain.Table7 shows hefunctionsstimatednthecaseof inflation.Amongtheexplanatoryariables,we have ncluded wages, epresentingealwagegrowthpassed n collectivebargaining. xceptcolumn9, all oftheestimatesare not statistically ignificant, ndeven in thecase ofcolumn9, itssignificancemustbetakenwithcaveats.Thisoutcome snotsurprisingf we consider hat heoriginof Spanishnflationmustbefound n themarkupsf the servicesectorclosedto thedomesticandforeign ompetition. nly herateof coverage f company greementsis statisticallyignificant, ut,contraryoexpectations, itha positivesign:a movemento a moredecentralizedollectivebargainingtruc-turewouldcreatemore nflationwhileanincreasentheweightof thenationalndustry greements ouldreduce he rateof inflation.nthis



28/35

Table 7Inflation-dependent variable: rate of growth of rate of inflation

(1) (2) (3) (4)Constant -14.430 -12.617 -15.431 -6.41(1.180) (0.968) (0.421) (0.1GDP 3.213 3.054 2.340(0.890) (0.822) (0.539)Incomes policy -8.024 -5.043 -6.22(0.502) (0.229) (0.2LMR84 2.617 -2.48

(0.077) (0.0LMR94 -0.026 -2.77(0.001) (0.1LMR97 8.938 3.5(0.403) (0.1Employment 2.1(0.9Unemployment

WagesCoverageCOVCNICOVCCOVNICOVPIAdjusted R2 -0.012 -0.062 -0.298 -0.23Standard error 24.574 25.169 27.821 27.0F-statistic 0.791 0.503 0.220 0.3Durbin-Watson 1.381 1.456 1.507 1.4



29/35

Table 7(Continued)

(7) (8) (9) (10Constant -21.877 -29.058 -54.228** -41.93(0.637) (0.798) (1.907) (1.1GDPIncomes policy -13.270 -8.007 -30.818*** -5.8(0.615) (0.346) (1.758) (0.2LMR84 21.772 25.979 68.538** 38.6(0.632) (0.729) (2.241) (1.0LMR94 -7.840 0.578 -16.951 7.0(0.426) (0.026) (1.172) (0.3LMR97 7.321 -1.164 14.812** -7.9(0.360) (0.049) (0.938) (0.3EmploymentUnemploymentWagesCoverage -2.134*** -2.376*** -1.794*** -2.6(1.380) (1.474) (1.504) (1.7COVCNI -1.117(0.732)COVC 4.638*(3.056)COVNI -1.4(1.3COVPIAdjustedR2 -0.147 -0.193 0.323 -0.0Standard error 26.157 26.678 20.092 25.2F-statistic 0.564 0.541 2.353 0.8Durbin-Watson 1.668 1.928 2.036 2.2Notes:Absolute-values re nparentheses;significantt the1percentevel;**significantt the5



30/35

DECENTRALIZEDVERSUSCENTRALIZEDCOLLECTIVEBARGAINING 723

sense, the corporatistview accordingto which a centralizedcollectivebargaininggeneratesbetteroutcomes would be reinforced.Tables8 and 9 test the consequencesof collective bargainingn termsof creationof salariedemploymentand rate of unemployment.Mostempiricalstudiesonly test the consequenceof collective bargainingontherateof unemployment.However,we believe thatthisanalysiswouldbe wrong, since in Spain unemployment s not only explained by theevolutionof employmentbut also by the massive incorporationnto thelabormarketduringthe 1980s of the female population.Besides, the

highjob loss in theearly 1980s waspartiallyoffsetby theintense use oftheearlyretirements, nd,therefore,heemployment oss notonlymeantan increasein unemployment igures but also a departureof affectedworkers romthe labormarket o the retirementnonactive)population.The estimations or salariedemploymentarebetterthan those for therateof unemployment.Forsalariedemployment,all the equationsesti-matedarestatisticallysignificant.In bothcases, we have not includedamongthe explanatoryvariablesthe implementationof incomes poli-cies, since in all equationsthe coefficients estimated were not signifi-cant.Compared o the rateof inflation andwage growth,the incomespolices were a useful tool to reduce inflationrates and moderatewagegrowthand increasecorporateprofits,but not to create employment.Theoppositeeffects canhelpto explaintherefusalto use incomespoli-cies sincethemid-1980s,whenthestrategyof theeconomicpolicygavemore mportanceothereductionof theratesof unemploymentFerreiroandSerrano,2001a).

GDPgrowth, coverageof collective bargaining,andlabor marketre-formsarestatisticallysignificantdeterminants f the evolution of sala-ried employment. GDP growth and the 1984 labor market reformcontributepositively to the creationof employment.Accordingto col-umn4 (Table9), ceterisparibus, urrentlyalaried mploymentncreaseswitha rate of growthof GDPhigherthan0.2 percent.The coverageofcollectivebargaininghas,on the contrary, negative,even small,effecton theemploymentcreation.According o column 2 (Table9), that s, ifwe do notconsiderthe consequencesof the labormarketreforms,a fallhigherthan22.3 percent n the rateof coverageof collective bargaining(whichwould mean to move from the 75.1 percentregistered n 2000 toa rate of 58.3 percent) s needed to createemployment.Accordingto the standardized oefficients in column4 (Table9), themost important xplanatoryvariablesof employmentcreationare GDPgrowth,the rateof coverageof collective bargaining, he 1984 reform,and, inally, he 1997 and1994reforms.Comparinghe resultsof columns



31/35

Table 8Rate of unemployment-dependent variable: rate of growth of rate of unemploymen(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Constant 15.855* 14.945* 19.999* 22.302* 22.377*(5.538) (5.070) (4.223) (4.434) (4.202)GDP -5.385* -5.075* -4.792* -4.479* -4.497*(6.371) (5.761) (6.865) (6.107) (5.669)Coverage 0.314 0.322 0.327(1.136) (1.208) (1.152)LMR84 -3.190 -7.049 -7.037

(0.677) (1.253) (1.197)LMR94 -5.554** -4.638*** -4.790(1.878) (1.544) (1.327)LMR97 -3.334 -3.031 -2.839(0.934) (0.862) (0.658)COVCNI 0.021

(0.085)COVPICOVCCOVNIAdjustedFR 0.700 0.705 0.818 0.824 0.808Standard error 5.751 5.699 4.474 4.397 4.591F-statistic 40.584* 21.307* 20.115* 16.953* 12.960*Durbin-Watson 0.772 0.757 1.809 1.657 1.658Notes:Absolute -values re nparentheses;significantt the1percentevel;**significanttthe 5 percen



32/35

Table 9Salaried employment-dependent variable: rate of growth of salaried employment(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Constant -3.290* -2.911* -4.978* -6.195* -6.486*(3.314) (2.904) (2.908) (3.670) (3.795)GDP 1.915* 1.786* 1.693* 1.528* 1.595*(6.534) (5.962) (6.707) (6.205) (6.268)Coverage -0.131*** -0.170** -0.188**(1.393) (1.902) (2.065)LMR84 1.544 3.583** 3.535**

(0.906) (1.897) (1.874)LMR94 1.391 0.907 1.493(1.301) (0.899) (1.289)

LMR97 1.585 1.425 0.683(1.229) (1.208) (0.494)COVCNI -0.084(1.022)COVPICOVCCOVNIAdjustedRf 0.71 0.726 0.809 0.841 0.842Standarderror 1.994 1.938 1.617 1.476 1.473F-statistic 42.693* 23.571 * 19.039* 19.020* 16.083*Durbin-Watson 1.047 1.004 2.306 2.230 2.170Notes:Absolute-values re nparentheses;significanttthe1percentevel;**significantt the5 perce



33/35

726 JOURNAL F POSTKEYNESIANCONOMICS2 and4 (Table9), it can be concludedhat heflexibilityof thelabormarket fter he 1984reformand thesubsequentoomof temporaryemployment as raised he sensitivity f employmentreationo thecoverage f collectivebargaining.hisreasonsto befound n thewagegapbetweenpermanentndtemporary orkersin 1995,a temporaryworker arned 4.8percent f a permanentne).Although, s seeninTable1,an ncreasen thecoverage f collectivebargainingeduceshewage growthpassed n collectivebargainingwhichwe assume s thewagegrowthorpermanent orkers),he increasentemporary ork-ershasdramaticallyeduced heearnings f theseworkers. ermanentworkers'wageswouldhaverisen n relativeerms,makinghemmorecostly,andaffectingo the creation f employment.Withregardo theconsequencesf thedegreeof (de)centralizationfcollectivebargaining,henegative oefficients or allthe variables renot significant.Thiswouldmeanthat t is the coverageof collectivebargaining,utnot itsstructure,hat s determinantor theevolution f(un)employment.othforemploymentndunemployment,t is eco-nomicallysignificantthat the intermediate tructureof collectivebargaining,heprovincialndustryollective argaininggreements,asthegreatest egativempact f allthesekindsof variables.Althoughwecannotpose anyconclusive tatement boutwhether entralized nddecentralizedollectivebargaininggreementsre, n termsof macro-economic utcomes,imilar rnot,both eem o haveanegativempactonemployment.ConclusionsThisstudyallowsone to conclude hat ollectivebargainingroceduresinSpain annot eriously econsideredesponsibleormacroeconomicoutcomesnterms f inflation ndunemployment.s wehaveseen, heinfluence f collectivebargainingninflations statisticallyignificantand owbutnegative, n obvious onclusionf we take ntoaccount helow influence f the variables elatedocollectivebargainingnwagegrowthand he factthat,duringheperiodunder onsideration,he ac-cumulatedgreedwage ncreasenreal ermshardly ame o 0.79per-cent.The nfluencesgreatern thecaseof theevolution femploymentandunemployment:he rateof coverageof collectivebargainingas asignificant, utsmall,negativempact nemploymentreation nd herateof unemployment.Thestructuref collectivebargaining,owever,s, in allthecases,notsignificant.We cannotconcludewhether centralized ollectivebar-



34/35

DECENTRALIZEDERSUSCENTRALIZEDOLLECTIVEARGAINING27

gainings moreefficient,nmacroeconomicerms,hana decentralizedorviceversa,or whether othareequivalent.Inanycase,theseconclusionsnlytake ntoaccount heresults fpayincreaseshroughheSpanish ollectivebargainingrocedures. ctu-ally,the economic ffects of thewage-setting rocess hould ake ntoaccountnotonlythecollectivelyagreedpayratesbut alsowagedrift.Besides, hemicro-andmacroeconomicffectsofcollectivebargainingarenotonly nfluenced yresultsnwagegrowthbutalsobytherestofthe contents f thecollectivebargaininggreementsndbyanothern-stitutionallements f labormarket.Alltheseaspects,nevertheless,reoutside hescopeof thispaper.REFERENCESBentolila, ., andJimeno, .F. La eforma e lanegociaci6nolectiva nEspania[TheReform f CollectiveBargainingnSpain].Documentos eTrabajo EDEA,Madrid,002.Bruno,M., andSachs,J. Economicsof WorldwideStagflation.Cambridge:HarvardUniversity ress,1985.Calmfors, .,andDrifill,J. Centralizationf WageBargainingndMacroeconomicPerformance. conomic olicy,April1988,6, 13-61.Estrada, ., andLopez-Salido,.D. UnderstandingpanishDualInflation.Documentos eTrabajo ancodeEspafiaNo.0205, Madrid,001.Ferreiro,.,andSerrano, . TheEconomic olicyof theSpanish ocialistGovern-ments. InP. Arestis andM. Sawyer(eds.), The Economicsof the ThirdWay.Cheltenham,K:Edward lgar, 001a,pp.155-169.. TheSpanishLabourMarket: eforms ndConsequences.nternationalReviewof AppliedEconomics, 2001b, 15 (1), pp. 31-53.Fina, L.; GonzdlezLena, F., de; andPerez,J.I.Negociacioncolectivay salarios enEspana CollectiveBargainingndWagesnSpain].Madrid: onsejoEcon6micoSocial,2001.Layard, .R.G.;Nickell,S.J.;andJackman, .A.Unemployment:acroeconomicPerformanceand theLabour Market.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1991.Martin,A. WageBargaining nderEMU:Europeanization,e-NationalizationrAmericanization?WP99.01.03,CenterorEuropeantudies,Harvard niversity,Cambridge,999.Millard, .P.,andMortensen, .T. TheUnemploymentndWelfareEffectsofLabourMarket olicy:A Comparisonf theUSAand heUK. nD.J.Snower ndG. de la Dehesa(eds.), Unemployment olicy: GovernmentOptions or theLabourMarket.Cambridge:ambridgeniversity ress,1997,pp.545-572.Milner, . Las elacionesaboralesnEspafia laevoluci6nmacroecon6mica[LaborRelationsnSpainand heMacroeconomicituation].n J.J.DoladoandJ.F.Jimeno(eds.), Estudiossobre elfuncionamientodel mercadode trabajoespanol[Studies ntheWorkingf theSpanishLaborMarket].Madrid:edea,1995,pp.197-244.Ministeriode Trabajoand AsuntosSociales.Anuariode EstadisticasLaboralesy deAsuntos ociales Yearbookf Labor ndSocialAffairsStatistics].MinisterioeTrabajo AsuntosSociales,Madrid,ariousssues.



35/35

728 JOURNALOF POST KEYNESIANCONOMICSNickell, S. ProductMarketsandLabourMarkets. LabourEconomics,1999, 6 (1),1-20.Nickell, S., andvanOurs,J. The Netherlandsandthe UnitedKingdom:A EuropeanUnemploymentMiracle? EconomicPolicy,April2000, 30, 137-180.Revenga,A. Aspectosmicroecon6micosdel mercadode trabajo spafiol[MicroeconomicAspectsof the SpanishLaborMarket].In O. Blanchardand J.F.Jimeno(eds.), El paro en Espana: i tiene solucion? [TheUnemploymentn Spain:IsThere a Solution?].Madrid:Consejo Superiorde Cimarasde Comercio,IndustriaNavegaci6nde Espafiay CEPR, 1994, pp. 133-156.Soskice, D. WageDetermination:The ChangingRole of Institutionsn AdvancedIndustrializedCountries. OxfordReviewof EconomicPolicy,1990, 6 (4), 36-61.

Documents

Decentralized Versus Centralized Collective Bargaining is the Collective Bargaining Structure in Spain Effecient