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15th April 2019
AFAC Review
GPO Box 1526
HOBART TAS 7001
Dear Dr. Felicity Novy,
Cronstedt Review
The Management of Bushfires during the 2018-2019 fire season
Please find enclosed my submission to the above review into the recent fire
season.
Attached with the submission is a brief review of my previous experience working
with aircraft and in aerial fire operations both in Canada and here in Tasmania.
I would be quite happy to meet with members of the committee to explain and
answer any questions arising from the submission.
Yours sincerely,
Brian Hodgson
0417 541466
1
Cronstedt Review
The Management of Bushfires during the 2018-2019 fire season
This is a private citizen submission to the above enquiry.
Some of the issues raised in discussion in the media on the 2019 fires were
also raised over 50 years ago in the formal reports of the 1967 fires.
An editorial in the Austral ian newspaper, dated 9th February 1967, a few
days after the Hobart fires spoke of the need for more specialists in fire
control in localised areas. See attachment.
Fire Behaviour
To understand the methods of control of a fire requires a good understanding
of fire behaviour and the factors affecting fire behaviour. It is not my role to
write a thesis for the committee on the subject. However a brief introduction
may be helpful.
Fire behaviour has three factors that relate to fire starting and continuing -
fuel, heat and air.
Fire suppression involves interrupting the three components of the fire
triangle.
The one component that man can control is that of reducing the fuel load by
strategic fuel reduction burning, or making the fuel unavailable by the use of
water, foam, fire retardants, or mechanical removal with machinery.
Strategic fuel reduction involves large scale planning of forest blocks,
utilising boundaries that can be 'held' when lighting the areas with low
intensity fire.
Boundaries will by necessity include incorporating private property and
Crown land of various agencies, therefore it must be a co-operative
programme. With planning by committee, it is difficult to achieve an end
objective easily.
2
Use specialist land managers who solicit information and advice from other
stake holders and then compile a draft plan for consideration.
Once a large area plan is approved then it is vital the sequence of burns be
undertaken.
Burning cannot be done based on a date on a calendar. It has to be flexible
and undertaken under the correct weather conditions. Unfortunately there
are too many examples of fuel reduction burning that have resulted in high
scorch and an immediate dropping of dead foliage and leaves onto the
ground, negating the original proposal to reduce the fuel load.
Regrettably history shows that fuel reduction burning is one of the first items
delayed or eliminated in a works operation review over budget cuts.
Any large scale plans must have community ownership to achieve success.
2019 fires.
Yes it appears there was delay in dealing with some of the more remote
fires. So what might have been a nice nature-caused fuel reduction burn of
button grass areas has resulted in fire entering more susceptible forest and
being harder to extinguish.
Better meteorological awareness and mechanisms on lighting strikes would
appear to indicate a greater number of strikes in recent times but I would
think it is because of better detection devices available to the relevant
authorities.
In Canada, even as far back as the 1960's forest officers would fly the path
taken by a lightning storm, about one or two days after the event and look
for visible signs of smoke. Tasmania needs to consider this option more
often for the more susceptible areas.
It must be remembered that lightning can occur without rain - the so called
dry lightning that is responsible for fires starting Fig15,16.
In the South West with peat soils a lighting strike can ignite the peat.
Undetected it will burn underground giving off little smoke for a day or so
before possibly surfacing.
3
Authorities need to distinguish between peat and button grass fires. Peat
fires are notoriously difficult to extinguish and requires thousands of litres of
water and detergent to penetrate down into the peat.
Button grass fires are more surface orientated, quick moving and under
many circumstances are stopped when they enter into a wooded area of
differing moisture content.
Media reporting
The magnitude of the media coverage and warnings during the 2019 fires
became excessive, very much akin to "the boy crying wolf'. After a time
people switched off. Basic action required of residents was repeated ad
nauseum for each fire rather than reporting fires and then include a generic
warning for residents that would apply to all fires. The broadcasting went on
for day after day.
Some of the radio announcers in the manner in which they gave the
warning, gave the impression of panic in their minds. It was not reassuring.
Messages should be given out clearly, slowly and without emotion.
They should inform - not alarm.
The media has a lot to answer for when they use such terms as "residents
forced to flee" when in fact it was an orderly, voluntary evacuation, or to say
a fire is "out of control" when in fact the fire was " not contained within fire
lines". This is where TFS can do a bit more to educate the public with easy
to read and comprehend media articles on fire and fire fighting.
Shutting the main southern highway south of Huonville caused a large
amount of stress. Consideration of leading convoys of residents led by TFS
personnel through the road at regular intervals would have gone a long way
to alleviate concern to residents.
Fire fighting
Fire fighting is a very arduous task and continued work day after day has
reduced productivity. Short sharp action and then pull out for a complete rest.
4
Use of out-of-area and interstate crews is well justified particularly in giving
relief to the locals and to give experience to the new comers. The local
brigades have put in many hundreds of hours of volunteer manpower during
these fires and fatigue is a big factor in performance. There is considerable
literature available about the decline in productivity with hours worked and
fatigue.
Replacement fire crew should not be placed in a situation for which they are
not trained or familiar. Keep the incoming crew together with a local team
leader to give guidance.
People work better as teams and groups should not be split up. Always use
the most experienced person for the task rather than the most senior person
for leadership on the fire line.
Working out priority of attack on fires is akin to triage in hospitals or at
accident locations. It does mean some fires will not be attended as early as
would be liked either by the authorities or lay persons with special interest in
an area. That is the hard call for the fire bosses and planners.
Smokejumpers
The origin of smoke jumping started when there were limited helicopters
around and parachuting fire crews into a fire area was a good solution to the
problem of access i.e. for fires in large tracts of forest with limited or nil
ground access.
The media and Letters-to the-Editor have proposed setting up a core of
smoke jumpers. The role and use of smoke jumpers makes for high visual
good media film coverage. The forest types here in Austral ia are not
conducive to the concept of parachuting fire fighters. In the USA, in Montana
and Idaho in particular, even after parachuting into a fire, the smoke jumpers
are helicoptered out back to their base, and then relief mop-up crew are
helicoptered in. There was a degree of public outcry whenever the
authorities decided the system was to be dismantled.
Canada used to have trained smoke jumpers in Saskatchewan but gave
them up as expensive to train and maintain. Again they have reverted more
to helicopters and float planes for access.
5
Unfortunately with the forthcoming elections there is a report in the media
that the Labor party, if they win the Federal election, would establish in
Australia an elite team of smokejumpers. I would caution against such a
promise being enacted.
New technology
The story goes that when bull dozers were first introduced into the fire scene,
the crew on the ground making hand lines considered the situation required
a bull dozer, so the word went back to head quarters for a bulldozer. The
men slackened off work knowing a bulldozer was on the way. By the time
the bull dozer arrived, the magnitude of the fire was such that two bulldozers
were needed and so the cycle blossoms out. The same can apply to the use
of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.
Airtankers
Ever since aircraft have been modified to drop water the public relations
value has been great. To see an aircraft fly over the fire and leave a trail of
water/retardant is spectacular, BUT is it effective?
There is a history of World War II aircraft and Vietnam helicopters being
modified with water tanks. These aircraft were obtained very cheaply
generally with a huge supply of spare parts.
Little time was spent working out the most effective way of exiting water from
the aircraft. Multiple doors, single square doors, circular plugs all have been
used. The huge Martin Mars seaplane has 22 drop doors on the bottom of
its internal tanks.
How much or percentage of the load is lost by exposing the load to an
immediate wind of 150 -200 kmh when the water exits the tank?
How much of the load is held up by the foliage of the tree?
What is the final percentage of the load that reaches the ground?
What is the pattern ( footprint ) and depth profile for the water on the ground?
What is the effective length of fire line constructed by the aircraft?
6
We have yet to consider factors relating to the fire intensity.
• Fuel type? Button grass, peat, open Euc forest, rain forest, alpine
vegetation?
• Fuel density and stocking?
• Topography?
• Weather conditions?
• Visibility due to smoke?
The final question we need to ask is in relation to the intensity of the fire . _
What is the rainfall equivalent needed to suppress the fire? Or are we "buying
time" for alternative means of fire control to take over.
Even the Canadians cannot answer those questions outlined above.
Water drop trials
The work undertaken at the Forest Fire Research Institute and the National
Aeronautical Establishment, part of the National Research Council of
Canada in the mid 1960's, was aimed at determining the efficiency of
discharge of water from an aircraft and its passage through the air to the
ground.
The National Aeronautical Establishment had it's headquarters at the
Ottawa International airport , so it was arranged that an area of land adjacent
to the main runway 25 be used. A grid of catchers comprising a stake and
a cup holder were laid out and each identified by an alphabet A-Z across
and number 1-38 along, delineating its position in the grid. 988 cups. The
grid was 570 feet long and 202 feet wide. The grid was later increased to
675 ft x 201.5 feet with 1163 catcher cups. Metrication had not been
introduced in Canada at that stage. Fig 1.
Into the cup holder a coffee cup was placed, with the stake numbering
marked on the side of the cup for retrieval. Fig 2,3.
A complete meteorological station was set up to record wind speed, wind
direction, temperature and humidity. A high speed cine camera used
7
originally for aeronautical research during the war was used to determine
aircraft speed and height above the ground.
The aircraft with its load would come flying over the plot and drops its load
of water. Figs 5 - 10.
Immediately after the drop, a group of people would go to each cup
systematically and cap the cup and place it in a collecting carrier which would
be taken to a laboratory and weighed to determine the amount of water in
that particular cup. Fig 3.
From the data a contour graph of water depth and area coverage could be
drawn, and from the information we could determine the actual amount of
water recovered and the percentage of evaporation. The shape of the
footprint was determined by wind direction. A side wind would destroy the
elliptical pattern, and a head wind would lengthen the pattern, whereas a tail
wind would shorten the pattern. Fig 11,12.
This trial was replicated with the same aircraft several times for different
weather conditions, drop heights etc. Being at the international airport, the
operations were very dependent upon the arrivar and departure of
commercial aircraft and fighter aircraft.
Once we were satisfied with the basic footprint for that aircraft, we repeated
the whole exercise for other aircraft types. We used Beavers, Otters, Twin
Otters, Catalina, TBM Avenger, together with the new Canadair CL215 that
had just been manufactured. Some of these aircraft had internal tanks and
the float planes had water contained in the floats. Most were what we
commonly call water scoopers.
I divert for a moment to tell you how they filled up. Land based were filled
up from hydrants or water trucks and the amphibians and float planes utilised
retractable snorkels or scoops.
Retractable scoop are hydraulically operated. The aircraft would come
down and prepared to land on the water (salt or fresh) and the scoop was
extended and water rushed into the plane. Obviously, the plane would
become heavier as the water entered and so the pilot then had to
simultaneously apply full power to take off again. The scoop was retracted
and the plane flown to the fire scene.
8
For example, with the CL415 the total distance required to scoop water from
a height of 15 metre on the approach to 15 metre during the climb out is
1300m. Water borne distance is 630 metre. Scoop time of about 10
seconds. Scooping has been made from significantly smaller water areas.
Normal speed for scooping is 130kmh and scooping time about 10 seconds.
Scooping can be performed under almost all conditions in wave heights up
to about 1.2m. Safe water depth is 2 metre.
Two drop doors are hydraulically closed and doors are released from the
cockpit. Doors can be opened simultaneously (salvo) to produce a
concentrated drop pattern, consecutively (train) for a longer pattern or
individually for completely separate drops. Fig 9,10.
The drop pattern is controlled by varying speed, altitude and release
sequence of the tanks. The drop speeds can be between 175kmh and
240kmh. Thus the wind speed that would hit the load as it exited the tanks
and that breaks up the compactness of the volume of water resulting in
increased evaporative loss of water.
I am not aware of such drop tests being done fully for modern aircraft such
as the Hercules C130 and Boeing 737.
Linking drop pattern footprints to fire intensity has been a difficulty.
A lot of work was being done in the late 1960's attempting to relate
application rates of water to fire intensity. All this work ceased mid to late
1970's when the Forest Fire Research Institute was disbanded after the
Petawawa Forest Research Station was closed as a political money cutting
exercise.
Airtanker Techniques
The actual method of using aircraft needs to be considered. Are you
attacking the fire edge directly or are you taking advantage of vegetation
9
changes and topography differences to "bomb the green' and allow the fire
to burn into a prelaid retardant line (Fig 17).
Bigger is not necessarily better. Larger aircraft have higher stall speeds,
need to drop their load at higher speed and higher altitude above the ground.
The range of aircraft available range from small agricultural aircraft, e.g.
Dromader to purpose built airtankers such as the Canadair CL215T and the
CL415 turbo to commercial passenger aircraft fully modified to carry water.
Aircraft need to be manoeuvrable, able to slow down considerably with low
stall speeds to minimise the massive breakup of the load by the induced
relative wind as the water is dropped. Aircraft such as the Boeing 737 used
in the recent fires are considered a huge waste of funds. Dropping from a
height, at speed, what percentage of the load actually reached the ground.
In relation to cost of water reaching the ground the price is considerable.
Other aircraft could do better (albeit with smaller volume of water
discharged).
The Premier claimed in the media each drop from the Boeing 737 cost
$73,000. Is this true? For an aircraft that has a capacity of 15000 litres that
equates to nearly $4.90 per litre assuming every litre reached the ground. If
the drop was made with retardant the cost would again be higher. Add to
this the loss by evaporation and hang-up, the quantity of retardant actually
reaching the ground is much less and the unit cost therefore is higher.
Military aircraft such as the Hercules, rely on a large pressurised tank being
installed into the aircraft so as not to disallow other functions of the aircraft.
True the Hercules is designed for slow speed and higher mavoeuverability
than the Boeing 737. Its system of pressurised tanks to increase the
discharge rate of the water requires additional equipment to function
correctly. The two nozzle system for discharge contributes to load breakup.
The CL215 and CL41o were specifically designed with the inbuilt tanks below
the cargo floor, so the aircraft can be utilised for other purposes and then
quickly configured for fire fighting operations.
Looking at the availability of agricultural aircraft such as the Dromader (2500
litre) that are designed for low altitude, low speed and operating of
improvised runways would seem a better alternative.
10
Nowadays there are a great abundance of types of helicopters. These can
be adapted to carry sling loads. Their high accuracy and ability to move
slowly over a particular target makes them useful for dumping a relatively
large amount of water onto a small target. Their ability to create a trail line
is rather limited due to small volume of water carried in the buckets, and their
drop door mechanism. The larger Skycrane type helicopters can 'snorkel'
up a load of water from a hover position or by dragging a lowered probe
whilst travelling at a forward speed over water, like the water scoopers. This
later method is fraught with problems and several of these helicopters have
been in accidents using this technique.
The Future
A Prevention
Solve the problem before it starts.
Implement large scale planning for strategic fuel reduction burning.
The programme of strategic fuel reduction burning has to be increased. It is
the main factor in the fire triangle that man can control.
Involve local community in deciding the most vulnerable areas in the district
that require logistic planning. If they own the problem there is a greater
chance of successful fuel reduction burning programmes being undertaken
and continued.
Small defensible areas, probably to the northwest, adjacent to communities,
should be burnt in a predetermined sequence. The size of the area is such
that it could be undertaken by the local volunteer fire brigade.
For larger areas and more remote areas the use of specialist crews
operating with helicopters may be necessary.
Depth in area burnt when undertaking strategic fuel reduction burns and
when reinforcing fire lines is necessary to counter the problem of spot fires
ahead of the main fire. Some of the edge work undertaken by volunteer fire
11
brigades walking along a track edge does not give that depth of coverage to
mitigate against forward spotting of the fire, so again the use of helicopters
with suitable equipment such as the aerial drip torch or the ping-pong
machine dropping ethylene glycol injected into Condys crystals inside plastic
capsules is a very valuable tool for the fire management crew.
We have the equipment, we do not have adequate planning of suitable fuel
reduceable areas to undertake worthwhile operations. Considerable
planning of large scale areas for fuel reduction burning has been done
previously by Forestry Tasmania.
B Control
Most Australian Forest Services have been absorbed into mega land
management departments. The expert forest knowledge and wildfire
fighting knowledge has been greatly reduced especially with retirements in
the older generation of bush workers.
A more structured approach for fire operations officers and aerial fire control
officers needs to be examined for Tasmania. A review of NSW, Victoria and
Western Austral ia would give some background to a suitable structure.
In a disaster emergency Tasmania Police are the lead authority. They need
to integrate into the fire control structure. Integration of the relative fire
organisations may need review considering the downsizing of the forestry
organisations. Currently we have the three main organisations, Sustainable
Timbers Tasmania, Parks and Wildlife and Tasmanian Fire Service. I am
not sure what role the old HEC has nowadays in relation to land management
responsibilities, fire prevention works and fire fighting.
With technological increases and developments the number of specialist
aerial managers needs to be reviewed.
These specialist officers need to keep abreast of international developments
and techniques. They need hands on experience in the other countries so
the international exchange of fire crews is well worthwhile. Going to a
country and watching a staged display of equipment is not necessarily the
best way to evaluate equipment. You need to see it in operation in its correct
12
environment. This may mean the specialist operator works in that country for
a period of time.
The committee should consider the use of shot crews helicoptered in to a
location, with rapid action - in fast, and then out. Relieved by regular crews
then take over.
On the ground consider creating special hot-shot crews trained for rapid
response deployment into designated high action areas. This will require
the designation of areas around the state for which it is deemed a rapid
approach to fire containment is required. Members of this elite group need
not be employed year round. They could be University students on
summer vacation pre trained for the task.
There is a group of global aerial firefighting professionals that meet regularly.
The latest meeting was in Nimes, France in March, 2019. One of the
papers was "Emergency Preparedness and Response: Fire and
Emergency Aviation in Western Austral ia" by Derek Parkes, Director
Aviation Services, Department of Fire and Emergency Services, Western
Australia.
C Training
To counter the problem of slackening off on a task on the basis of incoming
airtankers or helicopters the regular fire fighting crews need some
introductory training of how to work with aerial operations.
I wonder what training in fire behaviour, fire science and fire suppression
techniques and tactics is given to some of the pilots operating agricultural
aircraft and helicopters, both here in Tasmania and the other Austral ian
states.
The Ontario Lands and Forests department in Ontario, Canada used to
run a week long training school for all its pilots both for new comers and to
13
refresh the other pilots. Not sure whether they still do, but it could easily be
checked. Included were operational issues relating to engineering and
flight safety of their aircraft, but also sessions on air attack techniques and
also on fire behaviour of the Ontario forests.
An understanding of how to use an aircraft to place water/retardant on a
fire is important for both the crew on the ground and the pilot who is
attempting the task.
Is he aiming for a direct hit, or trying to construct a fire line, by sequencing
his tank drops. It he trying to build a fire line outside the fire edge, ie,
bombing the green. What is the effect on fire behaviour of all that moisture
raising the humidity in the vicinity of the fire?
These people must understand what they are trying to achieve. If they
don't they are wasting taxpayers money and delaying the control of the fire.
Although more expensive, the use of retardants needs greater
consideration. By using good topographical features and trailing the load,
suitable construction of retardant lines can be achieved. Yes, it is true,
some of the older retardants were based on fertil izers and their use would
promote growth of the regenerating vegetation. I am aware of some
restrictions being placed on the use of retardants in some World Heritage
Areas and National Parks.
I believe the fire boss, in evaluating the strategic nature of using aircraft
and retardants, should be able to make that decision as to whether to use
water or retardant in those circumstances without reference to another
authority.
Again this poses the question of whether the State has adequate stock of
retardants and retardant loading equipment available.
The community should take on the ownership of the problem of fuel
reduction burning and also the need for prompt and effective fire control
action.
This also means that the authorities have to keep abreast of techniques
developed elsewhere and evaluate them for adoption in the Tasmanian
environment.
14
The University of Tasmania has a fire science unit. Much of their work is
academic but there may be instances where they can contribute to the art
and science of fire fighting, or assist with brain-storming an issue.
Keep in mind that there is the mnemonic of the 6P's.
Proper Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance
Brian Hodgson
April 2019
15
T
Fire tragedy
in Tasntania HE BUSHFIRES in Tasmania are a catamity for the
State and for the nation. At this stage the damage and destruction can hardly be gu at. but already it is clear that large sec:Uons of property, industry and agriculture have been wiped out. If the situation proves as bad as it seems the State's very livelihood mav be in jeopardy.
For the moment. however, it is the awful tragedy of so many deaths, casualties am\ lost homes which stuns the mind. ·
The Federal Govemment has moved rapidl)·to send in the services and promise financial aid. and Australians evel')'Where will be able to assist by contributing generously to the various collections that uill be arranged and by offering direct personal help wherever the opportun\ly arises. Sympathy and something more is needed from all of us.
The oft.vaunted Australian mateship can now be seen to show what it means. This is a lime· to show that we are a nation In the fullest sense of the word. · Let there also be praise for the magnificent efforts -slt1t continuing -of the firemen and volunteers.
Perhaps not even the best-equipped firemen in the world could have hailed the terrible swiftness of the fires near Hobart. There is not much anyone can do when nature conspires to fan 70 mph winds across bone-dry woodland
This is not the time to carp. bul is appropriate to mention that. despite some impro\•ements In recent years. particularly in Victoria. Australia·s fire-lighting methods are still not up to the job they are liable for year in, year out.
Other counthes have earthquakes or bµnicanes or blizzards. Our particular menace is the bushfire.
It has been rej>catedly sho\\·n that speed is the remedy. and this demands aerilft fire.fighting techniques-air tankers. hose-laying and chemical· spraying heliropters. parachutists. These techniques. though studied in the U.S. b.» some Australian fire officers. are still virtually unknown here, except for a few spotter planes.
If the ·money can't be found for these just yet fand
this takes some explaining considering the size and regularity of the ptobleml there ought to be no obstacles to reorganising our present sen-ices on a more effecth·e basis.
A team of hard-core professionals, mobile and well· cqulpp. could be given responsibility for an area of, sa., 200 miles. With properly co-ordinated help from \·olunteers and allied fire-fighting services, such teams might provide a speed and efficiency often missing at present.
0
Venting recurrence 9f tH. . '
Tasm"a\,
nian bushfire --d- - i-s-- a- st- e.r. ·
··-
SIR-The Government !s ·- -- · well known for ,its actions --· in "bolting the stable door after the horse has gone."
This .I the case with the recent . Tasmanian bushfire disaster.
Now that the fire has done Its great damage we take into
' ·account the tangible damage done.
This has been conservatively estimated at more · than $10 mllllon, but how do we put &.
value on the misery caused by · the loss ot property and liCe, the resu!Ung unemployment, the losa of potential cl'ops, the gi·cat imbalance to nature's ecosygU!m?
Australia Is one of the o- , called educated couob·les, yet the . lntest statistics available show that more than 90 per cent of all foresl fires can be Attributed to human agencie . 4& Pl!r c.enl o! the fires resultillg direcUy from the burnf rig.ott of rubbish and bush.
Under the severe meteorolo ilcal condltiona of a bad fire period,- as occurred in southeQL Tasmania, the organi sations are strained to the utmost;
It iR these severe fire periods and lhe consequent disaslel's, which bring forth critics who comment on the inadequacies oC ex!spng fire-suppression method1n111d equipment.
They then IJIUtgest !mpmve ments wfth such teclmlquea as aerial bomblnl w!th water and chemicals, aerial boee·laYing, smoke-jupa, ·belltack c"rews anct guided mlssl11!3.
Most of .tbtiie techniqu es have bee(! uied In North America and have proved thcil' effecUveneu . because of thei1· 11reat mOblliti and ability to get to a fire .when it is still
Where are we going to t these profeasionals? &e • There are ·only 13 profes 10 people dealing actively
10 tire research, and about another 20 or 80 concerned with fire-control oreanlsatlon Althin .the fot"e$t servJces £
ustralia. . . None as yet deals BJ)eclally
with aspects of aerial" OPl!ll'ation ot fire control · · , . ·
If we are to set up .ii :aerlal branh ot fire control we require men s in
. aircraf t operation .and . tire control .
... e Possible way to achieve ...,,.. ls to send potential officers to work Jn America and Canada, at the Government'• expon_se, to l!ain the necessary e!'per1ence in the use of aircraft Jn fire control and ID85S fire behavior.
U we bring 011t men from overseas, there Will be the added problem of teaching them the fire-control problems aSIOClated with the euca1ypt lype fuels. . It the Oovern.ment will not
!monce such a scheme, .:hen it can at least take steps . to educii.te the people.
Education to counteract the apathy and indifference ot the general public to the damaging effe,ct of tire, and the great economic 10!!8 It cawies (bQ.th tangible and intangible) to tie national ls one ot the essentlalli to tlie basic problem ot any .fire.control organlsa· t1on. .- BBIAN HODGSON Channel Blghwa:r Taroona• Tasmania. ' •
small and in. their ftduetion of non-productive travel time for fire fighters.
It Is all VfW7 well sugge8ting these methods, hut they are specialised methods requiring the technical know-how and ability of qualified personnel.
The edftorllll , in . , The Auatrallan on February 9 advocates a . W&m of. hard-core profeS11lonal.! to be given responslbllty over a defined
I .J!r,_ -·-··- .-
.._J.!..Jlcu..:.(. j . on_ ·'
In t he Lette rs-to-E ditor c olumn t he Aust ra lian newspa per Fe b 16 1967
16
17
Project FF-X -9 : A procedur e to eva luate ground distribution pattern
for wa ter dropping a ircraft.
I
Fig 4 Cups collected
18
Fig 1 Drop site at Ottawa Fig 2 Stake-cup collector unit
Fig 3 Labelling and inserting cups
19
-
.. -· _.. .l;C..
Fig 5 Load breakup, forward edge
'
. :'--' ' • 1 ,l l '• • ' • : I • : ' 1 ' • , ' •l ' '
Fig 6 Load split due to tank structure
------ ·- - - ---- . . .... - :--: T>; ·-<r.;
Fig 7 Split load for trail Fig 8 Twin tanks coalescing for single drop
20
••'
Fig 9 Single lob drop
FEET
300
O KT
Fig 10 Split load line making
200
00;45 EDT
88%
77'
&5KT
705%
:UKT
50 100 150 FEET
150
IOO
50
MAY 18, 1')67 09'!5 EDT
lUIPffl.\TtJRt ,,..
ll. HVWIDITY SJ%
.f.UITUDl •1'
AllliSPUO 78 !If
GAOIJl\O $f'(Ell NIA
rtECOVEfllY 12%
O't t.ITE: 'titlkO 2 lllT
GtuDlcs CIROPPm 220 IMP (V.L
50 100 150 200 FEET
Fig 11 Single tank lob Fig 12 Tank sequenced for trail
G) OPENING l'OlNT
21
. .
Fig 13 Snow Commander test drop Fig 14 Impact on trees
Fig 15 Lighting
, . ' .
strike down tree
Fig 16 Lightning strike enters ground
'
Fig 17 Borate fire lines in Alaska
Fig 19 Gel immediately after drop
Fig 18 Fresh Gelgard in ag aircraft hopper
Fig 20 Retardant on fire edge covers fuel
22
Fig 21 Canso - probe up Fig 22 Canso - probe down
Fig 23 Canadair CL 215 Turbo, scoop loading and about to take off. Water is flowing out of the
overflow at the top of the internal tanks.
23
24
Resume of the author:
Graduate forester with post graduate degree. Thesis dealt with the role of
aircraft in forestry with particular reference to fire fighting.
Holder of a pilot's licence.
Head hunted and offered a job heading up a research team in Canada
investigating the effectiveness of aircraft dropping water or chemical
retardants on fires.
In Canada teamed with the National Aeronautical Establishment to
undertake practical sampling of dropped loads to determine effective foot
print of water that reached the ground. Determined the parameters that
affected the ability of the load of water to reach the ground with minimum
breakup and minimum loss. Factors such as drop height, drop speed, wind
speed and direction, relative to the aircraft flight path, temperature, and in
the case of dropping water in forested areas the current state of the fire,
was it big, small, burning fast or slow and the amount of vegetation that
might intercept the water.
Extensive time spent in outback Canada and Alaska observing aircraft on
fire suppression operations on the ground, directing the aircraft where to
drop their loads and hours spent in aircraft on practical operations.
Prior to leaving Canada set up the guidelines for future research in
determining the relationship of fire intensity and water quantity required for
suppression.
Back in Tasmania in position of Deputy Fire Management Officer and then
field appointments as District Forester, and then Operations and Executive
Forester position in Head Office involved with state-wide operational
control.
During time with Forestry Tasmania involved with many other aspects of
the use of aircraft including:
• Establishing fire spotter flights NE Tas,
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• Introduction of aerial low intensity fuel reduction fires initially in the
button grass plains of the NorthWest - Dempster and Horton plains in
1969 were the first major operation
• Introduced aerial ignition of high intensity fires to reduce logging
residue with a helicopter drip torch
• Upgraded aerial seeding mechanism for re-seeding logged areas
• Managed the operational aspects of major programme of aerial
fertilizing of pine plantations,
• Recommended the appointment of an Air Operations Officer to the
organisation, and
• Gradually the introduction of agricultural light aircraft for fire fighting.
Finished my working career with co-authoring the development of the
Environmental Management System for Forestry Tasmania.
Since retiring have kept abreast with fire control issues in Canada and
followed media coverage of fire fighting in Australia.
26
Useful references.
Note: On my retirement many documents and training manuals on aerial
fire fighting and pilots training notes on fire behaviour together with slides
and photographs were loaned to a library and "lost".
I hold copies of the below listed documents:
1967 fire reports
Chambers and Brettingham-Moore : The bush fire disaster of 7th
February 1967
Bond, Mackinnon and Noar : Report on the meteorological aspects
of the catastrophic bushfires in south-eastern Tasmania on 7
February 1967
McArthur and Cheney : Preliminary report on the southern
Tasmanian fires of 7th February 1967
McArthur : The Tasmanian bushfires of 7th February 1967 and
associated fire behaviour characteristics
Keogh, Dale and Vines : Hobart Fire Investigation
1989 fires
Green et al : A report on the escaped regeneration burns at Clear Hill
and in the Southern Forest: Feb 1989
Airtanker evaluation
Hodgson: A procedure to evaluate ground distribution pattern for
water dropping aircraft.
Hodgson and Little: Airtanker evaluation in three Canadian provinces
1965-1967.
Hodgson: Airtanker drop simulator - Progress report on measurement
of the effectiveness of water as a fire suppressant.
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Stechishen and Little: Water application depths required for
extinguishment of low intensity fires in forest fuels.
Macpherson: Ground distribution contour measurements for five fire
bombers currently used in Canada.
Gould: Aerial forest fire control
Other
Canadair's firefighting aircraft for Australia
Linkewich: Pilot's notes for fire bombing.