AUGUST 2017

Dealing with Disgrace:Addressing Sexual Exploitation andAbuse in UN Peacekeeping

PROVIDING FOR PEACEKEEPING NO. 15

JENI WHALAN

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JENI WHALAN is a Senior Research Fellow at the

University of Queensland’s School of Political Science and

International Studies and the Asia Pacific Centre for the

Responsibility to Protect, and Deputy Chair of the Centre

for Policy Development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to sincerely thank the many UN

officials, diplomats, civil society leaders, and researchers

who generously contributed their time, insights, and

feedback to this report. I am very grateful to Paul Williams,

Arthur Boutellis, and Alex Bellamy for commissioning the

report and shaping its development, and to the expert

editorial guidance of the IPI team, including Albert Trithart,

Madeline Brennan, and Lesley Connolly. Particular thanks to

Carolyn Evans, who provided outstanding research

assistance.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their

generous support. IPI is particularly grateful to the govern-

ment of Finland and the George Washington University for

making this publication possible.

Cover Photo: Peacekeepers from the

UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

participate in a sexual exploitation

awareness training in Bondoukou, July

22, 2005. UN Photo/Ky Chung.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the author

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Vice President

Albert Trithart, Associate Editor

Madeline Brennan, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Jeni Whalan, “Dealing with Disgrace:

Addressing Sexual Exploitation and

Abuse in UN Peacekeeping,” New York:

International Peace Institute, August

2017.

© by International Peace Institute, 2017

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Genesis of Resolution 2272 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

MOMENTUM TOWARD SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

Resolution 2272’s Approach to Preventionand Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Debates, Gaps, and Controversies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND CRITERIA

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

LEGITIMACY OF THE APPROACH TO MEMBER-STATEACCOUNTABILITY

GAPS IN RESOLUTION 2272

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

LEGITIMIZE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’SDISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY

ENSURE THAT DETERRENTS ARE CREDIBLE

ENABLE MEMBER STATES TO ADOPT THEIR OWNACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES

MAKE INVESTIGATIONS AND RESPONSESTRAUMA-SENSITIVE

PROVIDE TIMELY AND ADEQUATE MEDICAL ANDPSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO SURVIVORS OF ABUSE

INCENTIVIZE STRONGER ACCOUNTABILITY INNON-UN OPERATIONS

STRENGTHEN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CIVILIANPERPETRATORS

ADDRESS UNDERREPORTING AND IMPROVEMONITORING

CREATE THE CONDITIONS TO ENABLE REFORM

Annex: Chronology of Key Reports, Reforms,and Related Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

1

Executive Summary

UN peacekeeping has survived many crisesthroughout its history, but none has provoked suchdistinctive disgrace as peacekeepers committingsexual violence against those they are meant toprotect.

Two decades of incremental reform within the UNsystem have produced a plethora of policy shifts andstructural changes. Advocacy reports have revealedthe scope of the problem and progressively elevatedits moral and political significance. Investigationsand reviews have identified causes, risk factors,and—repeatedly—institutional failings on the partof the UN system. In debates and resolutions, UNmember states have affirmed their commitment toreforms. Management reforms at UN headquartersand in the field have sought to clarify policies,introduce and strengthen response protocols, createnew organizational architectures and responsibili-ties, and allocate resources accordingly.

But these reforms have not stopped sexual abuseby peacekeepers—both UN personnel and non-UNforces operating under a Security Council mandate.Determined rhetoric has not translated intoeffective action, a reality laid bare by the sexualabuse crisis in the Central African Republic, whereallegations of egregious abuse and their grossmishandling by UN staff demonstrated the urgentneed for transformative action across the UNsystem. These allegations coincided with a majorreview of UN peace operations by the High-LevelIndependent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO),which dedicated a section of its report and sevendiscrete recommendations to addressing sexualabuse and enhancing accountability.

Against this backdrop, on March 11, 2016, theUN Security Council adopted Resolution 2272.This resolution recognized that sexual violence bypeacekeepers not only inflicts unconscionableharm on individual victims but also underminesthe effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and themoral authority of the entire United Nations. Italso directed the secretary-general to replace allmilitary or police units from any contributingcountry that had failed to hold perpetratorsaccountable.

Resolution 2272’s approach makes three notablecontributions to the UN’s system-wide reform

efforts:1. It clarifies and reinforces the secretary-general’s

authority to repatriate and replace an entirenational contingent from a peacekeepingoperation if there are sufficient indications of apattern of sexual exploitation and abuse bymembers of that contingent.

2. It targets the part of the accountability chainthat the Secretariat cannot: the obligations ofUN member states to investigate and report onallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, tohold perpetrators accountable, and to informthe secretary-general of the progress of investi-gations and actions taken.

3. It adds new impetus and political support to theUN’s ongoing agenda of administrative reforms,including by prioritizing the needs of survivorsin UN responses and emphasizing the need forexpanded vetting of personnel for past sexualabuse and for broader human rights screening.

Important questions remain, however, abouthow to interpret the resolution’s ambiguouslanguage and how to operationalize its prescrip-tions. At the most practical level, serious doubtsremain about the resolution’s feasibility. Given theperpetual undersupply of UN peacekeepers, can alarge national contingent ever really be subject torepatriation without endangering the entiremission?

In June 2017 the Republic of Congo withdrew itsmilitary peacekeepers from the Central AfricanRepublic, prompted by a UN review that foundallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse againstits personnel indicated systemic problems incommand and control. The repatriation of over600 peacekeepers represents a clear case ofResolution 2272 in action. But lengthy delays inremoving this notorious contingent from the field,despite much earlier credible evidence implicatingthat nation’s troops in systemic abuse, castdamning light on the UN’s inability to take swift,decisive, and necessary action to protect civiliansfrom predatory peacekeepers or deliver justice tosurvivors of abuse.

This report analyzes Resolution 2272’s approachto preventing sexual exploitation and abuse in UNpeacekeeping and examines the key debates andcontroversies that have accompanied it. It identifiesnine implementation requirements flowing from

2 Jeni Whalan

the resolution and makes twenty-one recommen-dations for delivering them, including:• Appointing an independent, impartial ombuds -

person with a mandate to review and oversee UNactions on sexual exploitation and abuse inpeacekeeping;

• Streamlining the UN’s cumbersome reportingprocesses and resourcing to enable easierreporting and more timely action;

• Improving the trauma-sensitivity of investiga-tions and responses to sexual exploitation andabuse, including through training, creating astanding roster of specialist investigators forrapid deployment, improving cooperation withand resourcing of local support groups andservices, and brokering new cooperative modelsof shared investigations between contributingcountries and the UN in order to minimize thetrauma of repeat investigations;

• Addressing underreporting and institutionalopacity by substantially strengthening whistle-blower protections and establishing partnershipswith local and international civil society organiza-tions to promote systematic monitoring of sexualexploitation and abuse in peacekeeping; and

• Requesting reporting on allegations of sexualexploitation and abuse against non-UN forcesoperating under a Security Council mandate.The broader implementation of Resolution 2272

must be supported by champions of change. In2017 the secretary-general outlined an ambitiousnew approach to preventing and responding tosexual exploitation and abuse across the UNsystem. Ensuring that Resolution 2272 is compre-hensively implemented will be one importantcomponent of realizing the transformativepotential of that broader strategy. Within andoutside the UN system, individuals, organizations,and member states must continue to contributepolitical capital, moral leadership, innovativethinking, collaborative partnerships, and tangibleresources to the task of preventing sexual violenceby peacekeepers and improving accountability

when it occurs. Patient, persistent effort is neededto shift the complex organizational dynamics thathave enabled sexual exploitation and abuse toblight the UN system.

Introduction

Peacekeeping is an essential tool of internationalpeace and security. It is also exceedingly difficult toimplement, highly compromised in its design, andtoo often deeply flawed in practice. Nevertheless,peacekeeping has proved to be a remarkablyresilient practice. Throughout its history, UNpeacekeeping has continuously evolved to fit thechanging nature of armed conflicts and meet theescalating demands of UN member states. Near-constant reform efforts have helped to reset and re-legitimize peacekeeping after even its mostnotorious failures.

But of peacekeeping’s many crises, none hasprovoked such disgrace as peacekeepers committingsexual violence against those they are sent to protect.

After two decades of reforms to address sexualexploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, the UNSecurity Council adopted Resolution 2272 onMarch 11, 2016. The resolution recognized thatsexual violence by peacekeepers not only inflictsunconscionable harm on individual victims butalso damages the effectiveness of peacekeepingoperations and undermines the moral authority ofthe entire United Nations. It also directed thesecretary-general to replace all military or policeunits from any contributing country that had failedto hold perpetrators accountable.

Described variously as “ground-breaking”1 and“a significant step”2 offering “hope that survivors ofsuch abuse will receive the support they need,”3

Resolution 2272 marks a point of departure fromthe Security Council’s relative silence on the issue.But the resolution must also be understood as justone among many interventions aiming to improvethe UN system’s ability to prevent sexual abuse bypeacekeepers and strengthen accountability whenit occurs.

1 Kelly Neudorfer, “UNSC Resolution 2272: Progress against Sexual Abuse in UN Peacekeeping?” E-International Relations, April 21, 2016, available at www.e-ir.info/2016/04/21/unsc-resolution-2272-progress-against-sexual-abuse-in-un-peacekeeping/ .

2 UN Secretary-General, “Secretary-General Hails Adoption of Resolution 2272 (2016) as ‘Significant Step’ in Efforts to Combat Sexual Exploitation, Abuse byUnited Nations Peacekeepers,” Press Statement, UN Doc. SG/SM/17589-SC/12278-HR/5294, March 11, 2016, available atwww.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm17589.doc.htm .

3 Annerieke Smaak, “Holding Abusive UN Peacekeepers to Account,” Human Rights Watch, June 8, 2015, available at www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/holding-abusive-un-peacekeepers-account-0 .

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 3

That the Security Council chose to adopt abinding resolution on sexual exploitation andabuse in peacekeeping is significant in itself.Nevertheless, like the various technical andmanagement reforms on the issue underway withinthe UN system, Resolution 2272 largely accepts theexisting political and legal constraints that compro-mise peacekeepers’ accountability. To that extent,the resolution falls well short of the transformativechanges sought by many advocates of strongerjustice for victims.

This report analyzes Resolution 2272’s approachto preventing sexual exploitation and abuse in UNpeacekeeping and identifies the requirements forimplementing it. First, it investigates the origins ofSecurity Council action, particularly the politicaland institutional dynamics in the year precedingthe resolution’s adoption. Second, it outlines thepreventive logic underpinning Resolution 2272 andanalyzes its key provisions. Third, it examines theresolution’s shortcomings and controversial

elements, each of which has significant implica-tions for its effective implementation. Finally, itmakes recommendations to aid the comprehensiveimplementation of Resolution 2272 and realize infull its promise for strengthening accountabilityand preventing sexual abuse by peacekeepers.

The Genesis of Resolution2272

Given the long history of sexual exploitation andabuse committed by peacekeepers against thevulnerable people they are meant to protect (seeFigure 1), it is surprising that the Security Councildid not act sooner to address the issue. After all, itis the Security Council that establishes peaceoperations, delegates authority to them, definestheir scope, regularly renews their mandates, anddetermines when to end them.

But change tends to come slowly at the UN, andthis—tragically—has been true of effective action

Figure 1. Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse reported against UN peacekeepersby year

4 Jeni Whalan

against sexual exploitation and abuse inpeacekeeping. Reform efforts have been stymied bya familiar set of political obstacles. These includethe well-documented accountability problemscreated by peacekeeping’s particular legalstructures, which give member states full jurisdic-tional authority over their military personnel.4More effective reform has also been slowed bytensions between different parts of the UN systemover what drives sexual exploitation and abuse andwho should manage and have responsibility for theissue. Part of the Security Council’s apparentfailure to act sooner, then, was a prevailing viewthat the issue of sexual exploitation and abuseshould not be on its agenda, whether because it didnot pass the threshold of being considered an issueof international peace and security or because itbelonged to the more representative organs of theGeneral Assembly.5

Two decades of incremental reform led by thesecretary-general have produced a plethora ofpolicy shifts and structural changes within the UNsystem both at headquarters and in the field (seeAnnex). Anyone doubting the extent of thenormative change need only consider the infamouscomments of the UN’s head of mission inCambodia Yasushi Akashi twenty-five years agothat “18-year old hot-blooded soldiers enduring therigours of Cambodia had the right to enjoythemselves, drink a few beers and chase beautifulyoung beings of the opposite sex,” which would beunimaginable today.6

Nevertheless, ongoing reform efforts have notstopped sexual abuse in peacekeeping, anddetermined rhetoric has not translated intoeffective action. Symbolic gestures have outpacedserious change, a reality laid bare by the sexualabuse crisis in the Central African Republic.

THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICANREPUBLIC

In 2015 reports emerged publicly of galling sexualviolence committed by peacekeepers—both UNpersonnel and non-UN forces operating under aSecurity Council mandate—in the Central AfricanRepublic. Attracting widespread internationalmedia attention and coinciding with a majorreview of UN peacekeeping by the High-LevelIndependent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO),the allegations of egregious abuse and their grossmishandling by UN staff demonstrated the urgentneed for transformative action across the UNsystem.

The initial allegations concerned the abuse ofchildren by French troops serving under the UN-authorized but French-commanded OperationSangaris. The Independent Review Panel that UNSecretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed in 2015to investigate the abuses described them as“heinous violations of the human rights of some ofthe most vulnerable people on earth—children in adisplaced persons camp in the midst of an armedconflict and humanitarian crisis—by thosemandated to protect them.”7

Besides the appalling nature of the abuse itself,the crisis highlighted serious failures in the UN’saccountability systems. The Independent ReviewPanel found “a gross institutional failure” torespond meaningfully to these allegations, drivenby fragmented responsibilities and a bureaucraticfocus on protocols rather than the welfare ofvictims or accountability of perpetrators.8 Specificfailures included perceived complications relatedto the status of the French troops implicated, whowere operating under UN authorization but notUN command;9 the inadequacy of reporting,including the intentional obscuring and delaying of

4 For an overview of legal issues, see Terry D. Gill, “Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law42 (2011). On jurisdictional issues, see Marco Odello and Róisín Burke, “Between Immunity and Impunity: Peacekeeping and Sexual Abuses and Violence,”International Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 6 (2016).

5 The General Assembly has agreed several resolutions on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, including Resolutions 62/214 and 71/278. Taken on the basisof consensus, these resolutions are not legally binding.

6 Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).7 UN General Assembly, Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic,

UN Doc. A/71/99, June 23, 2016, para. 45.8 Ibid., p. 5.9 In that context, the panel found that “some UN staff take the view that the UN has no obligation, or indeed authority, to address the reported sexual violence,”

which is a “fundamental misperception” in the eyes of the panel. Ibid., p. 4.

reports, driven by a fear of political sensitivity andretaliation by the troop-contributing country; thefailure to conduct adequate investigations; thefailure to protect victims; and the failure to takepreventive steps and intervene to stop the abuses,which “exposed the children (and potentially othervictims) to repeated assaults of the most egregiousnature.” The cumulative effect was to “perpetuate aculture of impunity [which] undermined theintegrity” of the peacekeeping mission in theCentral African Republic.10

The UN has since recorded more than seventyallegations of sexual abuse and exploitation against

military personnel serving in the UN Multi -dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in theCentral African Republic (MINUSCA), as well as anumber of allegations against non-UN forces (seeFigure 2).11 Many involve multiple victims, and amajority involve children.

In addition to attracting widespread mediaattention, due in part to well-organized civil societyadvocacy,12 the abuse scandal in the Central AfricanRepublic prompted two new administrativeresponses by the UN. First, in August 2015 thesecretary-general effectively dismissed his specialrepresentative and head of mission in the Central

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 5

10 Ibid., p. 8.11 Figures cover the period 2015 to May 2017. UN Peacekeeping, “Conduct in UN Field Missions: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” available at

https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-overview . The latest report from the secretary-general also shows that in 2016, forty-eight allegations implicated peace keepersfrom twelve countries: Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Mauritania, Morocco,Niger, Pakistan, and Zambia. In another allegation, the nationality was unknown at the time of reporting. See UN Secretary-General, Special Measures forProtection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach, UN Doc. A/71/818, February 28, 2017, p. 47.

12 Since May 2015, AIDS-Free World’s Code Blue Campaign has provided a focal point and an unprecedented degree of leadership for advocacy for an end toimmunity for sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.

Figure 2. Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse reported against MINUSCApeacekeepers by year

African Republic, Babacar Gaye, noting that this“very strong action” was designed to “show astrong example and message to all the internationalcommunity.”13 Second, alerted to new allegations ofsexual abuse by peacekeepers in the CentralAfrican Republic by mission personnel and HumanRights Watch, in February 2016 the UN repatriatedcontingents from the Republic of the Congo andthe Democratic Republic of the Congo.14 This useof the secretary-general’s existing authority torepatriate peacekeepers was subsequently endorsedby, and became a centerpiece of, Resolution 2272.

With the legitimacy of peacekeeping facinganother crisis, amplified by international mediaattention, the secretary-general launched a range ofother measures to visibly address the scourge ofsexual exploitation and abuse across the UNsystem. These included identifying for the first timethe nationalities of alleged perpetrators15 andappointing a special coordinator for improving theUN response to sexual exploitation and abuse. Thespecial coordinator’s appointment was explicitlytied to the recommendations of the IndependentReview Panel, as was her mandate to reviewexisting procedures and develop a new approach toaddressing sexual exploitation and abusethroughout the organization.16

MOMENTUM TOWARD SECURITYCOUNCIL ACTION

Meanwhile, a series of other events builtmomentum toward the Security Council’sadoption of Resolution 2272. In June 2015 theHigh-Level Independent Panel on PeaceOperations (HIPPO), appointed by the secretary-general in late 2014 to conduct a wide-rangingreview of peacekeeping operations, returned itsreport.17 The report condemned the persistence of“serious deficiencies” in the UN’s approach to

sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers,among them that:• Local communities are frequently uninformed

about how to report abuse;• The responsibilities for prevention and enforce-

ment are dispersed within missions, at headquar-ters, and in national capitals;

• The Secretariat’s follow-up on member states’disciplinary or legal action is weak, and itsrequests often remain unanswered, or insuffi-ciently answered, by member states;

• Internal investigations of UN civilian staff arelengthy, averaging sixteen months between 2008and 2013; and

• There is no adequate program to assist individualvictims or children born as a result of sexualabuse and exploitation by peacekeepers.In addition to supporting a range of measures

already advocated by the secretary-general, theHIPPO report recommended that the secretary-general’s reporting should “name and shame”member states who fail to investigate allegations orreport on those investigations adequately and in atimely manner. The report also prompted thesecretary-general to call specifically for action bythe Security Council to “signal the importance thatit assigns to high standards of accountability.”18 Heargued that “if the Security Council demonstratesthat it will remain engaged in the conduct of amission and actions by its personnel, that can be apowerful performance incentive.”19

In October 2015 Security Council Resolution2242 on women, peace, and security expressed“deep concern over continuing allegations of sexualexploitation and abuse” in peacekeeping. It partic-ularly urged police- and troop-contributingcountries to fulfill their responsibilities to train, vet,

6 Jeni Whalan

13 UN News Centre, “Central African Republic: Ban Vows ‘Decisive Action’ on Allegations of Sexual Abuse by UN peacekeepers,” August 12, 2015, available atwww.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51618#.WRj6HxN97Vo .

14 UN News Centre, “New Allegations of Sexual Abuse Emerge against UN Peacekeepers in Central African Republic,” February 4, 2016, available atwww.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53163#.WT8ktxOGPVo .

15 UN Secretary-General, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, UN Doc. A/70/729, February 16, 2016, p. 33.16 UN News Centre, “Seasoned Official Appointed to Coordinate UN Efforts to Curb Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers,” February 8, 2016, available at

www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53185#.WT8owBN97Vo .17 United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations—Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, UN Doc.

A/70/95-S/2015/446, June 17, 2015.18 UN Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on PeaceOperations, UN Doc. A/70/357-S/2015/682, September 2, 2015, p. 7.

19 UN Security Council, 7564th Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV/7564, November 20, 2015, p. 3.

and investigate their personnel.20

In November 2015 a Security Council presiden-tial statement affirmed that “proper conduct by,and discipline over, all personnel deployed inUnited Nations peace operations are crucial totheir effectiveness” and underscored “that sexualexploitation and abuse by United Nationspeacekeepers is unacceptable.”21 This was followedin December by a presidential statementrecognizing the need for effective three-wayconsultations between the council, troop- andpolice-contributing countries, and the Secretariat,including on allegations of sexual exploitation andabuse by peacekeepers.22

By the time of the March 2016 debate on sexualexploitation and abuse, then, the issue had alreadyreceived substantial attention in the SecurityCouncil. Implicit in the council’s adoption ofResolution 2272 was also the recognition that,though the Secretariat’s administrative reforms hadbeen important, they had patently failed to preventsexual abuse in peacekeeping or to ensure adequateaccountability when it occurs. In particular, thereare inevitable limits to the extent to which adminis-trative reform can hold member states accountable.It is against this backdrop that the SecurityCouncil’s adoption of Resolution 2272 should becast: it builds on, responds to, and addresses gaps inthe UN’s ongoing reform agenda, adding to it theunique authority and symbolic weight of theSecurity Council.

Not only does sexual abuse by peacekeepersinflict unconscionable harm on individual victims,but it also damages the moral authority of theentire UN system. This framing—of the UN’scredibility undermined, reputation tarnished, andintegrity questioned—has increasingly character-ized discussion of sexual exploitation and abusethroughout the UN. Given the profoundimportance of legitimacy to the Security Council’sinfluence, it is not surprising that council membersbecame increasingly concerned about the delegit-imizing effects of continuing sexual abuse inpeacekeeping.

In the debate preceding Resolution 2272’sadoption,23 there was widespread recognition ofthis legitimacy crisis. While all Security Councilmembers condemned the scourge of sexualexploitation and abuse, many also explicitlyconnected it to problems for the UN’s overarchingmoral authority. China noted that sexual exploita-tion and abuse undermines the reputation ofpeacekeeping operations and their basic purposeand “seriously tarnishes the overall image of theUnited Nations.” Calling sexual abuse “the worstabuse of trust imaginable,… a horrifying betrayalof the faith placed in the United Nations…[and] acancer in our system,” the United Kingdomdeclared that “the world is watching.… The reputa-tion of peacekeepers, of the Security Council and ofthe United Nations is at stake.” Uruguay warned of“the systemic damage that such cases cause forUnited Nations peacekeeping efforts”; Malaysiacautioned that sexual exploitation and abusethreaten “to cast a long, dark shadow on theOrganization’s reputation”; Venezuela noted that“such actions contradict and undermine the spiritof the United Nations and the very purpose forwhich its missions are created”; and Senegal, Japan,and Spain all recognized the damaging effects ofsexual abuse by peacekeeping for the image andcredibility of the UN. New Zealand emphasized thepractical effects of this credibility crisis,recognizing that both “the reputation and effective-ness of the Organization are being damaged. Theseallegations…represent a systemic failure that all ofus—the Secretariat, contributing countries andCouncil members—have a responsibility to fix.”

Sponsoring the resolution, the United Statesoffered the most comprehensive account of themultiple levels at which sexual exploitation andabuse damage the United Nations and its effective-ness in the world:

In addition to being a heinous abuse, sexual exploita-tion and abuse erode the discipline of military andpolice units and undermine the confidence of localcommunities in peacekeepers, both of which arecritical to fulfilling Security Council mandates. Morebroadly, when those entrusted with being protectors

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 7

20 UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (October 13, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2242, para. 9. Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers had also been mentionedin a number of previous resolutions, including Resolutions 2106, 1960, 1888, and 1820, and frequently raised in statements in the Security Council, especiallyaround the thematic open debates on women, peace, and security, sexual violence in conflict, and children in armed conflict.

21 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/22, November 25, 2015.22 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/26, December 31, 2015, para 2.23 Over the course of the meetings on March 10 and 11, 2016.

8 Jeni Whalan

become perpetrators, it undermines the credibility ofpeacekeeping missions everywhere, as well as thelegitimacy of the United Nations writ large. Andalong with that, it undermines our ability to addresseffectively the serious threats of our time.24

The successful vote itself was a surprise to manyobservers. The think tank Security Council Report,for example, wrote a day prior to the debate that “itseemed that not enough progress had been made inthe negotiations for the draft text to be adopted attomorrow’s meeting.”25 Intense negotiations overthe preceding week appeared not to have bridgedthe gap between council members that believed theresolution went too far and those that believed itdid not go far enough. There was even a dramaticamendment proposed by Egypt minutes before theresolution was to be adopted, which triggered aprocedural vote on an amendment for the first timein twenty-five years.26 Nevertheless, the unalteredresolution finally passed with fourteen votes infavor and one abstention (Egypt).

Resolution 2272’s Approachto Prevention andAccountability

Explaining their support for Resolution 2272,Security Council members attached both moraland instrumental importance to improving theUN’s measures for preventing sexual exploitationand abuse in peacekeeping and to strengtheningaccountability when it occurs. Resolution 2272’sapproach makes three particularly notable contri-butions to the UN’s efforts at system-wide reform.

First, Resolution 2272 clarifies and reinforces thesecretary-general’s authority to repatriate andreplace an entire national contingent from apeacekeeping operation if there are sufficientindications of a pattern of sexual exploitation andabuse by members of that contingent. Specifically,it:Endorses the decision of the Secretary-General to

repatriate a particular military unit or formed policeunit of a contingent when there is credible evidenceof widespread or systemic sexual exploitation andabuse by that unit and requests the Secretary-Generalto give immediate and ongoing effect to this decision,including by urgently finalising his guidance toUnited Nations peacekeeping operations toimplement this decision.27

Second, Resolution 2272 targets the part of theaccountability chain that the Secretariat cannotenforce: the obligations of UN member states toinvestigate and report on allegations of sexualexploitation and abuse, to hold perpetratorsaccountable, and to inform the secretary-general ofthe progress of investigations and actions taken.When a member state has not met these obliga-tions, Resolution 2272 directs the secretary-generalto repatriate and replace the entire national contin-gent. Specifically, the resolution:Requests the Secretary-General, when a particulartroop-contributing country whose personnel are thesubject of an allegation or allegations of sexualexploitation and abuse has not taken appropriatesteps to investigate the allegation and/or when theparticular troop- or police-contributing country hasnot held the perpetrators accountable or informedthe Secretary-General of the progress of its investiga-tions and/or actions taken, to replace all militaryunits and/or formed police units of the troop- orpolice-contributing country in the United Nationspeacekeeping operation where the allegation orallegations arose with uniformed personnel from adifferent troop- or police-contributing country.28

Furthermore, the resolution requests thesecretary-general to take into account the account-ability record of member states when consideringwhether to accept their contributions of uniformedpersonnel to peacekeeping operations. Specifically,Resolution 2272:Requests the Secretary-General to assess whether aMember State has taken the appropriate steps toinvestigate, hold accountable and inform him of theprogress of its investigations when determiningwhether that Member State should participate in

24 UN Security Council, 7642nd Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7642, March 10, 2016, p. 4.25 Security Council Report, “Briefing and Draft Resolution on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers,” March 9, 2016, available at

www.whatsinblue.org/2016/03/briefing-and-draft-resolution-on-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-by-un-peacekeepers.php .26 See Lorraine Sievers and Sam Daws, “The Procedure of the UN Security Council,” 4th ed., updated March 20, 2016, available at

www.scprocedure.org/chapter-6-section-5 .27 UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2272.28 Ibid.

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 9

29 Ibid. 30 See Jeni Whalan, “Strengthening the Local Accountability of UN Peacekeeping,” in Strengthening the Rule of Law through the UN Security Council, ed. Jeremy

Farrall and Hilary Charlesworth (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 135.31 UN Security Council Resolution 2272, para. 260.32 Resolution 2272 adopted almost verbatim the recommendations of Human Rights Watch on supporting survivors. See Human Rights Watch, “UN: Stop Sexual

Abuse by Peacekeepers: New Report Reveals Lack of Justice, Protection for Victims,” March 4, 2016, available at www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/04/un-stop-sexual-abuse-peacekeepers ; and Smaak, “Holding Abusive UN Peacekeepers to Account,” 2015.

33 UN Security Council Resolution 2272, para. 4.34 Ibid., para. 1.

other current or future United Nations peacekeepingoperations.29

Third, Resolution 2272 adds new impetus andpolitical support to the UN’s ongoing agenda ofadministrative reforms. It particularly emphasizesthe need to prioritize a survivor-centeredapproach. UN peacekeepers are notoriouslyunaccountable to local populations,30 and the UN’sresponses to survivors of sexual abuse have beenwoefully inadequate. As the HIPPO reportrecognized:

There is no comprehensive, systematic andadequately resourced programme to provideassistance to individual victims or the children bornas a result of sexual exploitation and abuse. All ofthese grave shortcomings severely impact the abilityof victims to seek justice and to see it being done bythe United Nations.31

Due in large part to determined and effectiveadvocacy from civil society groups,32 Resolution2272 takes a significant step toward addressing thisinadequate response to survivors. It directs thesecretary-general to ensure that investigationsoccur “with due consideration for the safety,security and confidentiality of victims’” and “toassist victims, including by maintaining confiden-tiality, helping to minimize trauma and facilitatingaccess, as appropriate, to immediate care, medicaland psychological support.”33 Among its otherprovisions, the resolution also calls for betterinvestigations and improved information sharingand system-wide reporting and encouragesimproved vetting and training of peacekeepers.

Debates, Gaps, andControversies

Resolution 2272 treads a fine line betweendemanding the game-changing reforms necessaryto seriously address the challenges of sexualexploitation and abuse in peacekeeping, on the onehand, and the incrementalism and restraint needed

to bring along the UN’s more cautious memberstates, on the other.

For some, the resolution goes too far, an exampleof Security Council overreach that unfairlydemonizes troop-contributing countries and theirpeacekeepers for the crimes and ill-discipline of afew. For others, it does not go far enough:provisions to deal with sexual exploitation andabuse committed by UN civilian personnel areconspicuously absent; the resolution does little tostrengthen the accountability of non-UN personneloperating under Security Council mandates; and itmakes scant progress on justice for victims. Nordoes it remove immunity for UN personnel, call foran independent international court to prosecutecriminal abuses by peacekeepers, or seek to refersuch matters to the International Criminal Court,as many advocates have recommended. The resolu-tion is pragmatic in scope.

Important questions also remain about how tointerpret the resolution’s ambiguous language andhow to operationalize its prescriptions. At the mostpractical level, serious doubts remain about theresolution’s feasibility. Given the perpetualundersupply of UN peacekeepers, can a largenational contingent ever really by subject torepatriation without endangering the entiremission?

This section examines four areas of controversyand debate surrounding Resolution 2272: defini-tional ambiguity; operational problems; the legiti-macy of the approach; and gaps in the resolution.PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION ANDCRITERIA

Resolution 2272 endorses the secretary-general’splan for repatriating a national contingent “whenthere is credible evidence of widespread or systemicsexual exploitation and abuse by that unit.”34 As iscommon in council decisions, however, it leavesopen the definition and interpretation of key terms.

The resolution’s definitional ambiguity raises

10 Jeni Whalan

35 Neudorfer, “UNSC Resolution 2272.”36 UN Security Council Resolution 2272, para. 2.37 See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries,” International Peace Institute,

August 2012, available at www.ipinst.org/2012/08/broadening-the-base-of-united-nations-troop-and-police-contributing-countries .

two problems with implementing it. First, in orderto determine whether repatriation is warranted, thesecretary-general requires some decision-makingthresholds. What does “credible evidence” mean inpractice? Clearly the evidentiary standard will belower than that required to substantiate allegations,which would necessitate lengthy investigations,since prompt action is necessary if further abuse isto be prevented by removing the individuals orcontingents perpetrating abuse. Furthermore, it ishighly likely that the individuals responsible wouldhave concluded their rotation before allegationscan be comprehensively substantiated.35 The UNhas developed internal operational guidance,including on how credible evidence can beestablished in a short timeframe and on whatstandards of fairness and due process the credibilityof evidence should be determined. But consideringthe political stakes of this issue, this guidanceshould be transparent and openly accessible.

Determining whether sexual exploitation andabuse are sufficiently “widespread and systemic” towarrant action will require similar guidance. Whilediscretionary flexibility is required, any decision willinevitably be informed by judgments about whetherit is the absolute number of cases that matters or theproportion of a contingent implicated, given thewide variation in contingent size.

Resolution 2272 also directs the secretary-generalto repatriate a national contingent if “the particulartroop- or police-contributing country has not heldthe perpetrators accountable.”36 Given the primacyof member-state jurisdiction and the likely variationin accountability measures among contributingcountries, establishing standards for what “heldaccountable” means is both a crucial and politicallydifficult task. How rigorous and transparent does aninvestigation need to be? What happens if a processis followed, but the penalty applied is superficial?Finally, determining whether accountabilitystandards have been met will take time, furtherobstructing the prompt action required.

The second problem concerns the legitimacy ofthe secretary-general’s discretion to resolve theresolution’s language ambiguity. The intent of

Resolution 2272 seems to have been to confirm thatthe secretary-general has authority to take actionwhen clear cases of abuse come to light, as in theCentral African Republic and subsequently in SouthSudan. It logically follows that the secretary-generalalso has the authority to determine appropriatethresholds for “credible evidence” and “widespreadand systemic” abuse. Nevertheless, because this is adiscretionary power, there is space for resisting suchdeterminations on the grounds that they are illegit-imate. They could be perceived to be:1. Biased, for example toward protecting the UN’s

institutional interests;2. Unfair, whether for being over- or under-

reactions; or3. Broadly inappropriate, for example in

punishing whistle-blowers.For Resolution 2272 to prevent sexual exploita-

tion and abuse, the implementation of itsprovisions requires some minimum level of legiti-macy.

Work is already underway within the Secretariatto develop operational guidance on these matters,which ought to resolve some of this ambiguity.Transparency and a pragmatic level of clarityaround the interpretation of these thresholds by thesecretary-general will help to assuage concernsabout the extent of discretion. Nevertheless, asrecommended below, additional measures may berequired to reinforce the legitimacy of thesecretary-general’s discretion to determine thresh-olds for “credible evidence,” “widespread andsystemic,” and “held accountable.”OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

Operationalizing Repatriation

The most troubling operational challenge toResolution 2272 goes to the heart of its ability tocredibly deter sexual exploitation and abuse.Notwithstanding the substantial concerns aboutthe appropriateness of collective repatriation(addressed in the next section), is the repatriationof a large national contingent feasible in practice,given the perennial difficulties of recruitingpeacekeeping contributors?37

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 11

38 See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Missions Summary of Military and Police, February 28, 2017, available atwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/feb17_6.pdf . Authorized numbers are from the relevant mission statistics page of the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations.”

39 Derived from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors,” available atwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml ; “Current Peacekeeping Operations,” available atwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml . See also “Strategic Summary 2016: UN Peace Operations by the Numbers,” Global Peace OperationsReview (see second graph under the subheading “Hurry Up and Wait”), available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/strategic-summary-2016-un-peace-operations-by-the-numbers/ .

40 There have also been shortfalls in the civilian police component; of the 2,000 authorized in late 2016, only about 70 percent were in place.41 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “UN Missions Summary of Military and Police,” February 28, 2017, available at

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/feb17_6.pdf . Authorized numbers are from the relevant mission statistics page of the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations.”

42 UN General Assembly, Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic, p. 8.

UN peace operations already regularly facesubstantial deployment gaps. In early 2017, forexample, the number of military and policepersonnel actually deployed to the UN missions inSouth Sudan (UNMISS) and Lebanon (UNIFIL)was only around 70 percent of that authorized; forthe missions in Mali (MINUSMA) and theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO),the numbers were 80 and 85 percent, respectively.38Kenya’s withdrawal of its peacekeepers fromUNMISS in late 2016 illustrates the impact contin-gent repatriation under Resolution 2272 can haveon the overall deployment profile of a mission.UNMISS has had persistent, significant shortfalls:it took more than two years to meet its originalauthorization in 2011 of 8,000 military and policetroops; an increase to 14,000 in 2014 took well overtwo years to meet;39 and in late 2016, no noticeableprogress had been made toward meeting anincrease to 17,000 authorized several monthsearlier. When Kenya’s military contingent droppedfrom some 1,000 troops in October to less than 170in December,40 UNMISS’s total number of militarytroops declined from about 71 percent of author-ized levels to around 68 percent (see Figure 3).

The UN mission in the Central African Republic(MINUSCA), meanwhile, has operated closer to itsfull authorized strength: in February 2017, nearly95 percent of the personnel authorized weredeployed in the field. Further, some fifty UNmember states contribute uniformed personnel(see Figure 4).41 Taken together, these factorsmitigate concerns about the impact of repatriationon the capacity of MINUSCA.

Numbers alone, of course, do not tell the fullstory. The impact of contingent repatriation on amission’s operational readiness depends more onthe particular capabilities of that contingent thanon its size. Repatriating a relatively small national

contingent that provided essential mission supportor enablers such as helicopters or communicationslogistics may have a greater impact on the wideroperation than the number of its personnel mightsuggest.

The prospect of repatriation under Resolution2272 thus raises questions about the trade-offbetween the prevention of sexual exploitation andabuse—whether by directly removing the threat orindirectly deterring it—and the mission’s ability toachieve its comprehensive mandate, particularlythe broader protection of civilians. If credibleevidence exists of widespread or systemic abuse,should repatriation occur immediately or bedelayed until a replacement for that capability befound? Is it worse to leave a known gap in themission or to leave (potential) abusers in place?

A short-term delay in repatriation may notadversely impact the effect of repatriation as anindirect deterrent: the relevant member state willstill incur the associated reputational and financialpenalties. Delaying repatriation until a replacementcontingent can be found can enable mission-critical tasks to continue. Retaining an implicatedcontingent in the short term might even enable thecontinuation of some civilian protection activitiesthat would otherwise be suspended.

But delaying repatriation even under suchconditions is deeply compromising on ethical andinstrumental grounds. It would continue to putcivilians at risk of abuse and further undermine theUN’s already toxic reputation on dealing withsexual exploitation and abuse. The report of theIndependent Review Panel in the Central AfricanRepublic clearly demonstrates this, finding that“the failure to take preventative steps and tointervene to stop the abuses exposed the children(and potentially other victims) to repeated assaultsof the most egregious nature.”42 The longer the time

12 Jeni Whalan

that implicated personnel are allowed to remain inthe field, the more the UN is complicit in, and evenultimately responsible for, any continuing abuse.Ethically, such a delay would in effect accept that“doing harm” in the form of sexual abuse is accept-able if it is traded off against other mission benefits.It would also contradict the UN’s zero-tolerancepolicy and its Human Rights Up Front framework.

Navigating these fraught dynamics will requiredeep pragmatism. Of course, the reality is thatrepatriation should be considered a last resort,invoked only when other preventive and discipli-nary measures have patently failed. Regardless ofthe specific thresholds established, credibleevidence of abuse will be collected over time,during which leadership both in the mission and at

Figure 3. Troop and police contributions to UNMISS

Figure 4. Troop and police contributions to MINUSCA

headquarters can develop contingency plans forreplacing an implicated contingent. In other words,decision making must be contextual: theappropriate course of action will by necessity bespecific to the particular mission, its priorities, andits operating environment. But in order to establishand safeguard their legitimacy, decisions regardingthe scope and timing of repatriation must be clearlyand publicly justified.

In June 2017 the Republic of the Congo withdrewits military peacekeepers from the Central AfricanRepublic, prompted by a UN review finding thatallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse againstits personnel “point to systemic problems incommand and control.”43 The repatriation of over600 peacekeepers represents a clear case ofResolution 2272 in action. But lengthy delays inremoving this notorious contingent from the field,despite much earlier credible evidence implicatingthat nation’s troops in systemic abuse, castdamning light on the UN’s ability to take swift,decisive, and necessary action to protect civiliansfrom predatory peacekeepers.44

A further operational problem of repatriationrelates to its effect on investigations. In thepresence of credible evidence of widespread andsystemic abuse, the imperative of immediaterepatriation—of removing perpetrators from thefield—seems clear. But at the same time, repatria-tion before an investigation is complete is likely toobstruct the ability of investigators to properly andthoroughly investigate. In many cases, the absenceof alleged perpetrators and other members of theirnational contingent (who may have witnessed orbeen implicated in the abuse) may be fatal to aninvestigation. Even for the most well-intentionedmember state, the logistical difficulties of cross-border investigations complicate the task ofholding perpetrators to account.Operationalizing Victim Support

The UN has been slow to orient its efforts on sexualabuse toward the people peacekeepers are meant toserve. Resolution 2272 offers little to advance the

larger cause of justice for victims, whether throughlegal means, reparations, or improved measures toaddress paternity claims. But it does make notableprogress on victim support, building on previousUN reforms,45 by including provisions to consider“the safety, security and confidentiality of victims”and “to assist victims, including by maintainingconfidentiality, helping to minimize trauma andfacilitating access, as appropriate, to immediatecare, medical and psychological support.”46

Operationalizing this focus on survivors of abuseis not easy, particularly for a peacekeeping systemthat has not traditionally been adept at people-centric approaches. Thoroughly implementingResolution 2272 will require the UN to find betterways of protecting survivors during investigations,including from the re-traumatizing effects of repeatinterviews through multiple investigations. It isessential to ensure that the needs of survivors are notovershadowed by the demands for accountability.

To this end, the secretary-general’s report onspecial measures for protection from sexualexploitation and abuse recommends significantinstitutional changes intended to cut across the UNsystem.47 The creation of a victims’ rights advocateat the level of assistant secretary-generaldemonstrates the seriousness with which theseissues are being considered. The implementation ofResolution 2272’s provisions on victim assistancewould need a direct interface with that office.

Operationally, while there has been some recentprogress in equipping missions to provide supportservices,48 full implementation of Resolution 2272requires more. Facilitating access to immediatecare and medical and psychological support, ascalled for in the resolution, first requires theavailability of adequate, time-sensitive services.

The failure of support services in the CentralAfrican Republic again illustrates the challenges theUN must overcome: it is not enough for apeacekeeping mission simply to refer victims tohumanitarian agencies, or for those humanitarianagencies to refer them to local organizations. Given

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 13

43 UN Secretary-General, “Note to Correspondents on MINUSCA,” June 21, 2017.44 See Paula Donovan and Stephen Lewis, “Code Blue Statement on Withdrawal of Congo/Brazzaville Battalion from CAR,” Code Blue Campaign, June 20, 2017,

available at www.codebluecampaign.com/press-releases/2017/6/20 .45 See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 62/214 (December 21, 2007).46 UN Security Council Resolution 2272.47 UN Secretary-General, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach, UN Doc. A/71/818, February 28, 2017.48 Ibid., Annex III.

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the wider likelihood of sexual violence in theconflict environments to which peacekeepersdeploy, building adequate support services shouldbe a priority integrated into the peacebuildingmandates of missions. In the Central AfricanRepublic, sexual violence, including the systematictargeting of women and girls, has been a tactic usedby all conflict parties “to subjugate and humiliateopponents,” including through “rape perpetratedto terrorize civilians, with many victims beingassaulted in their homes, during door-to-doorsearches and while sheltering in fields or thebush.”49 The inadequacy, and in many areascomplete lack, of basic medical services forsurvivors of sexual violence was well-known earlyin MINUSCA’s deployment.50

It is important to acknowledge that thisrecommendation to transform access to medicaland psychological support services is one morepriority in the ever-expanding scope of UN peaceoperations. Implementing it will require not onlybudgetary resources but also human resources ofthe kind often difficult to embed in peacekeepingoperations. Peacekeeping operations have beenrepeatedly constrained by a lack of funding tosupport gender-related activities in particular,which limits the effectiveness of their engagementwith local women and girls.51 At a time of unprece-dented demand for international humanitarianfunding, adequately resourcing medical andpsychological services for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence will remain a challenge.

Yet these services are essential not only for thefulfillment of the broader civilian protectionmandates of peacekeeping operations; they are alsonecessary for the implementation of Resolution2272’s directive to assist victims.52 Establishinggood working relationships between a mission andcommunity support groups should also be priori-tized as a matter of course. Importantly, suchoutreach should not wait for cases of sexualexploitation and abuse to be reported, as thesegroups will be crucial interlocutors for the mission

in identifying abuse and facilitating investigations.When local support services are insufficient,missions could rapidly deploy services by using astanding roster or sharing services with othermissions in the region.

Prioritizing support to these survivors will facethe same challenges that have stymied the broaderpeople-centric agenda in peacekeeping.Comprehensively implementing Resolution 2272will both depend upon and contribute to the moreprofound reorientation of peacekeeping missionsaway from the political and bureaucratic dynamicsof the UN and toward the people they are designedto protect and serve. As the HIPPO report puts it,UN peace operations must become more people-centered,53 a goal that will require widespreadtransformation of the culture, values, and practicesof peace operations. At the same time, looking atthat goal through the lens of sexual abusedemonstrates its fraught implications, as efforts toprevent this abuse aim to limit contact betweenpeacekeepers and local populations.LEGITIMACY OF THE APPROACH TOMEMBER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY

If there was any doubt that sexual abuse inpeacekeeping posed a grave challenge to the UN’sbroader legitimacy, it was dispelled by the globalmedia response to the scandals in the CentralAfrican Republic. While many dynamics were atplay, the outcome of Resolution 2272 cannot beunderstood without reference to broader efforts todefend the UN’s legitimacy following the widelypublicized Central African crisis.

But the legitimacy of Resolution 2272’sapproach—to prevent sexual exploitation andabuse by strengthening member states’ accounta-bility for abuse perpetrated by their nationals—hasitself come under fire. For some UN member states,particularly many large troop- and police-contributing countries, the resolution overreaches.For example, speaking in opposition to the resolu-tion during the Security Council debate, Egypt

49 UN Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UN Doc. S/2015/203, March 23, 2015, p. 5.50 For example, “There are almost no protection mechanisms in place and basic services such as medical assistance and counselling are limited in the spontaneous

sites where displaced women and girls have gathered.” See “Little Help for CAR Rape Survivors,” IRIN, July 15, 2014, available atwww.irinnews.org/news/2014/07/15/little-help-car-rape-survivors .

51 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace.52 Security Council Resolution 2272.53 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace.

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 15

54 Egypt abstained from voting on the resolution, which was adopted with fourteen votes in favor. UN Security Council, 7642nd Meeting, statement of Egypt (p. 1). 55 For example, see UN General Assembly 70th Session, 115th Plenary Meeting, UN Doc. A/70/PV.155, September 7, 2016, statements of Bangladesh (p. 30), Morocco

(p. 6), and Pakistan (p. 8).56 It is nevertheless worth noting that all but two of the council’s fifteen members were active contributors of uniformed personnel at the time of debate and that the

council included three of the top fifteen contributors (Senegal, ranked seventh; China, ranked eighth; and Egypt, ranked thirteenth). Taken collectively, councilmembers contributed 14 percent of total UN peacekeeping forces in March 2016. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Ranking of Military andPolice Contributions to UN Operations,” March 31, 2016, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/mar16_2.pdf .

57 UN Security Council, 7642nd Meeting, p. 25.58 Ibid., p. 23.59 Ibid., p. 19.

emphasized that the appropriate response wouldtreat cases of sexual exploitation and abuse asindividual and isolated. It also warned that theoccurrence of sexual abuse “should not be used as atool to attack troop-contributing countries or theirreputation, or to undermine the significantsacrifice they are undertaking to re-establish peaceand security for civilians.”54 Other UN memberstates have made similar arguments againstResolution 2272’s approach of collective punish-ment.55

It is important to note the extensive qualifiersincluded in Resolution 2272’s endorsement ofcollective repatriation. Repatriation of a contingentrather than just individuals who were specificallyimplicated occurs only when the problem is, bydefinition, larger than those individuals. It occurseither when the abuse in question is widespread orsystemic—that is, when there is credible evidencethat the abuse is not individual and isolated—orwhen the particular police- or troop-contributingcountry has failed to meet its obligations forholding perpetrators accountable. Notwith -standing the lack of definitional clarity previouslydiscussed, this suggests that collective repatriationis intended to be a last resort.

But it is also important to note the particularcontext of accountability in UN peacekeeping.Collective repatriation is a measure that respondsto the legal framework and political reality thatgives a police- or troop-contributing country fulljurisdiction over its personnel, and thus primaryresponsibility for holding perpetrators to account.The deterrent mechanism in Resolution 2272 isthus not so much punishing the many for thecrimes of the few as providing clear and targetedincentives for member states to strengthen theirrole as crucial links in the peacekeeping accounta-bility chain.

The Security Council has also been criticized foroverreaching from its appropriate role in passing

Resolution 2272 and encroaching on the role of theGeneral Assembly’s Fifth Committee and SpecialCommittee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34).Resolution 2272 has further fueled longstandingconcerns by police- and troop-contributingcountries that, because the Security Council isunrepresentative, its decisions will not adequatelyreflect their views.56 For example, during thecouncil debate, Pakistan’s representative—partici-pating under Rule 37 of the council’s provisionalrules of procedure—stated that “we firmly believethat the Special Committee on PeacekeepingOperations of the General Assembly...is the forumin which to discuss issues relating to the conductand discipline of peacekeepers.”57 As the sponsor ofthe draft resolution, the United States addressedthese concerns but rejected their implication,instead justifying the council’s legitimate role onsuch matters:

We would welcome constructive action by theGeneral Assembly, but the General Assembly has had11 years since our last open security meeting on thistopic (see S/PV.5191) to take more aggressive andconstructive steps that might have made more of adent in this problem. What we in the GeneralAssembly have done has not yet worked.... We, theSecurity Council, see ourselves as responsible whennon-State actors and militias rape women and kids,or men, for that matter. Again, we see ourselves asresponsible when terrorists, who pose a grave threatto international peace and security, rape women andkids. How is it possible that we can argue that whenour own peacekeepers, the people we have sent intothe field, rape women and children, the SecurityCouncil does not have responsibility? How can wesay that? This is our problem, our responsibility.58

Similarly, while New Zealand expressed respectfor the competence and role of the C-34 and FifthCommittee, it noted that “we strongly disagreewith the suggestion that the Council is not respon-sible for the consequences of the mandate itapproves or for the actions of personnel itdeploys.”59

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Amid this contestation, which arguably reflectsmuch broader struggles within the UN member-ship about the legitimate authority of the institu-tion’s different fora,60 it is important to note thatthere is little in Resolution 2272 that does notaccord with the standards previously agreed to oracknowledged by the C-34 and Fifth Committee.61Indeed, the adoption of Resolution 2272 isunthinkable without the progressively moresubstantive measures considered in these fora onprotection from sexual exploitation and abuse.GAPS IN RESOLUTION 2272

Non-UN Forces

A grey area across much of peacekeeping policy isthe extent to which UN doctrine and guidanceapplies to non-UN forces operating under a UNmandate. The problem of sexual abuse committedby non-UN forces was plainly evident as thescandal in the Central African Republic unfolded:among the most controversial dimensions of theUN’s mishandling of the crisis—and one of themost disturbing cases of abuse—involved Frenchtroops in Operation Sangaris, a Security Council–authorized French mission deployed alongside theUN operation MINUSCA.

The principal distinction between UNpeacekeeping missions and non-UN forcesoperating under a Security Council mandate is thatthey are authorized under different parts of the UNCharter. UN missions are conventionallyunderstood to be authorized by the SecurityCouncil using its wide-ranging powers underArticle 29, which allow the council to “establishsuch subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for theperformance of its functions.” UN responsibility isextended to these subsidiary organs, which include

Security Council committees, courts and tribunals,and peacekeeping missions.62 Other arrangementsare approved under Article 52(1) in Chapter VIII,which allows for regional arrangements providedthat “their activities are consistent with thePurposes and Principles of the United Nations.”63

Whereas forces authorized as subsidiary organs arepresumed to be under at least some degree of UNcontrol and therefore subject to UN policies andregulations, those authorized under regionalarrangements are not under UN control.64

Regardless of their particular institutionalcharacter and authorization mechanisms, however,the UN’s human rights mandate arguably gives theorganization broader responsibility to addresssexual exploitation and abuse by UN and non-UNpeacekeepers alike. This was among the mostsignificant conclusions of the Independent ReviewPanel in the Central African Republic, whichconcluded in its report that “the UN mustrecognize that sexual violence by peacekeeperstriggers its human rights mandate to protectvictims, investigate, report and follow up onhuman rights violations, and to take measures tohold perpetrators accountable.”65

Early drafts of Resolution 2272 did not makereference to non-UN forces operating underSecurity Council authorization.66 It appears that theresolution’s approach to this issue was substan-tively shaped through consultation prior to thecouncil vote. As a result, Resolution 2272recognizes the problem of non-UN forces, urging“all non-United Nations forces authorised under aSecurity Council mandate to take adequatemeasures to prevent and combat impunity forsexual exploitation and abuse by their personnel.”67

That is, it calls on UN member states to repatriate

60 Since the adoption of Resolution 2272, debate has continued on the transparency and inclusiveness of member states’ initiatives to address sexual exploitation andabuse, as well as on which UN forum is the most appropriate for dealing with it. See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 71/278 (March 20, 2017), onUnited Nations action on sexual exploitation and abuse, and UN General Assembly, 71st Session, 71st Plenary Meeting, UN Doc. A/71/PV.71, March 10, 2017.

61 See, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution 70/286 on crosscutting issues (June 17, 2016); UN General Assembly, 71st Session, 71st Plenary Meeting, UNDoc. A/71/PV.71, March 10, 2017; UN General Assembly, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:Report of the Fifth Committee, UN Doc. A/70/943, June 14, 2016.

62 See Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus, eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2012), vol. 1, p. 1,012; United Nations, “Subsidiary Organs: Overview,” in Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, available atwww.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/overview.shtml .

63 Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations, vol. 2, p. 1,446.64 Article 52(1) simply recognizes that the operation is not incompatible with the UN Charter. See, for example, UN Secretary-General, Administrative andBudgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/51/389, September 20, 1996, p. 4; Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck,The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 126.

65 UN General Assembly, Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic, p. 3.

66 See Security Council Report, “Briefing and Draft Resolution on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers.” 67 Security Council Resolution 2272.

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their own units from non-UN missions, on theirown initiative, when there is credible evidence ofwidespread or systemic sexual exploitation orabuse by those units. It also calls on contributors tonon-UN mission to appropriately investigateallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and tohold perpetrators accountable.

Nevertheless, accountability measures for thesemissions are substantially weaker than for UNmissions. Unlike in the UN forces that Resolution2272 primarily addressed, personnel or contingentsin non-UN forces do not face compulsory repatria-tion, their repatriation is not directed by thesecretary-general or even the Security Council, andthey face no penalties regarding future participa-tion in such forces for inadequate investigations oraccountability measures. Resolution 2272 merely“urges” non-UN forces, in effect, to holdthemselves accountable.

But there are other means by which the UNsystem can strengthen the accountability of non-UN forces. One is to increase transparency byreporting sexual exploitation and abuse allegationsinvolving non-UN personnel serving under aSecurity Council mandate. The General Assemblyhas already requested such reporting from thesecretary-general in Resolution 70/286. As a result,data relating to non-UN forces is included in thesecretary-general’s 2017 report on sexual exploita-tion and abuse.

The Security Council also has more scope to act.When there is credible evidence of widespread orsystemic abuse on which non-UN forces havefailed to act appropriately, the Security Councilcould revoke its authorization of those forces.Indeed, Russia suggested as much in the councildebate: impunity for non-UN forces wouldultimately mean that “the Security Council willsooner or later have to consider the issue ofwithdrawing such authority from them.”68 This hassymbolic and operational implications, since suchaction could mean the complete withdrawal of UNlegitimacy from an operation previously deemednecessary for the maintenance of international

peace and security. But revoking authorization isavailable to the Security Council as a preventivemechanism in the case of egregious violations ofstandards that apply to UN operations.CIVILIAN PERPETRATORS

Attention to the problem of sexual abuse inpeacekeeping—whether from media, scholars, orwithin the UN system—has overwhelminglyfocused on uniformed personnel as its perpetra-tors. Sexual exploitation and abuse committed byUN civilian personnel have received far lessattention. Yet civilian personnel were implicated in32 percent of allegations recorded between 2007and 2016, compared to 50 percent for militarypersonnel and 15 percent for police.69

While its preamble expresses concern aboutabuse perpetrated by civilians as well as militaryand police personnel, Resolution 2272’s accounta-bility provisions primarily focus on uniformedpersonnel and the particular accountability obliga-tions of police- and troop-contributing countries.In other words, the resolution’s gap vis-a-viscivilian personnel reveals where it sits in thebroader spectrum of measures to address sexualexploitation and abuse throughout the UN system.

The need for better measures to prevent andrespond to allegations of sexual abuse by UNcivilian personnel is on the broader UN agenda.For example, the secretary-general’s 2017 reportSpecial Measures for Protection from SexualExploitation and Abuse: A New Approach refersthroughout to “both civilian and uniformedpersonnel” and emphasizes the need for a system-wide approach that unifies and standardizes effortsacross not only peace operations but also UNprograms and agencies.70 Indeed, Resolution 2272requested the secretary-general, “where applicable,to continue to take steps to enhance measures inUnited Nations peace operations against all formsof abuse and exploitation of civilians by anymember of the United Nations peace operation”(emphasis added).71

Yet as the Security Council debate on the draft

68 UN Security Council, 7642nd Meeting, p. 9.69 In 3 percent of recorded cases the category of implicated personnel was unknown. See UN Peacekeeping, “Conduct in UN Field Missions: Sexual Exploitation and

Abuse,” available at https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-subjects .70 UN Secretary-General, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach, UN Doc. A/71/818, February 28, 2017.71 UN Security Council Resolution 2272.

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72 UN Security Council, 7642nd Meeting, p. 15.73 In the council debate, Russia noted that “the draft resolution that has been circulated is far from ideal. It proposes a selective approach by excluding from the

proposed measures both United Nations civilian personnel and non-United Nations personnel.” Ibid., p. 9. 74 Ibid., p. 4.75 Keith Kaufman and Marcus Erooga, “Risk Profiles for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse: A Literature Review,” Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to

Child Sexual Abuse, October 2016, available at www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/22087ecf-373b-4de4-b134-5c9633e5430b/Risk-profiles-for-institutional-child-sexual-abuse .

76 UN Security Council, 7642nd Meeting.

resolution reflects, its focus on uniformedpersonnel to the near-exclusion of civilianpersonnel was not lost on member states.Venezuela, for example, referred to the proportionof allegations concerning non-uniformedpersonnel to note that “those numbers should tellthe United Nations, and the Security Councilspecifically, that any binding action that could betaken should involve sanctions and action tocombat impunity for all categories of personnel,whether civilian, military, volunteers, police orsupport staff.”72

In addition to excluding a large number ofpeacekeepers serving with Security Council author-ization from accountability measures, perceptionsof selectivity and inconsistency between categoriesof peacekeeping personnel threaten to underminethe resolution’s legitimacy.73 It appears that this wasrecognized with regard to non-UN forces, whichmakes the omission of more specific reference tocivilian perpetrators a surprising oversight. As theresolution’s sponsor, the United States explainedthat the Security Council was the appropriate UNforum to pursue such action because “it is theCouncil that sends peacekeepers into conflictareas.… We deem it our responsibility as a Councilto oversee every part of their missions.”74 Since thisis as true for civilian peacekeepers as for uniformedpersonnel, it is curious that the resolution does not,for example, direct the secretary-general tostrengthen accountability measures for respondingto allegations against civilian staff of UN missions.

Recommendations

Twenty years of UN reforms have seen the organi-zation pursue numerous approaches to preventingsexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping.Awareness-raising advocacy reports have revealedthe scope of the problem and progressively elevatedits moral and political significance. Investigationsand reviews have identified causes, risk factors,and—repeatedly—institutional failings within the

UN system. In debates and resolutions, UNmember states have affirmed their commitment toreforms. Management reforms at UN headquartersand in the field have sought to clarify policies,introduce and strengthen response protocols,create new organizational architectures andresponsibilities, and allocate resources accordingly.

Of these reforms, two preventive measures havebeen particularly embraced: vetting and training.Vetting would-be peacekeepers for past humanrights abuses, including sexual abuse, however, isproblematic: while there is scant justification not tohave a single comprehensive system that keepsknown perpetrators from being deployed, theexperience of sexual abuse prevention in otherinstitutional contexts suggests that pre-screening isnot as effective as widely believed.75

Improvements to universal training forpeacekeepers on sexual exploitation and abuse havebeen among the most widely embraced andcomprehensively implemented UN reforms. Whiletraining may be the low-hanging fruit ofpeacekeeping reform, it is undoubtedly animportant instrument of prevention, an essentialtransmitter of organizational culture and values,and a means for clarifying the policies on andindividual responsibilities for sexual exploitationand abuse. In particular, effective training canstrengthen the vigilance of all peacekeepers torecognize the risks and occurrence of sexual abuseand take appropriate action.

Important as those reforms are, such preventivemeasures must be embedded in a broaderfunctional system of accountability. Speaking in theSecurity Council before the resolution’s adoption,US Ambassador Samantha Power clarified the logicof its key provisions: “We have long known thatone of the most effective ways to prevent sexualexploitation and abuse is to send a clear messagethat perpetrators will be held accountable.”76

It is this task of strengthening accountability thatResolution 2272 primarily aims to fulfill. This final

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 19

77 On the long and complex reporting chain, see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/images/SEA_infographic_v10-02.jpg .

section identifies nine requirements forimplementing the resolution and makes twenty-one recommendations for delivering on them.Combined, they outline the measures required toimplement Resolution 2272 so that it fulfills itspromise to strengthen accountability for sexualexploitation and abuse perpetrated bypeacekeepers and thereby prevent the continuingabuse of vulnerable people.LEGITIMIZE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S DISCRETIONARYAUTHORITY

Decisions about whether to repatriate nationalcontingents or decline peacekeeping contributionsfrom certain member states in accordance withResolution 2272 require operationalizing theresolution’s ambiguous language. Specifically, anysuch decision will be based on determining whatconstitutes “credible evidence,” the threshold for“widespread or systemic” abuse, and the standardsby which member states will be deemed to have“held accountable” perpetrators of abuse.Operational guidance to this end has already beendeveloped within the UN, but it is not yet publiclyavailable.

While any such determinations must ultimatelybe context-specific and pragmatic, not fomulaic,reliance on the secretary-general’s ad hoc discre-tion for each case creates its own accountabilityproblem. In order to build and safeguard the legiti-macy of the secretary-general’s discretionaryauthority, minimum levels of clarity on rules andtransparency will be required. More importantly,decisions taken under Resolution 2272 should besubject to the appropriate checks and balances.1. The secretary-general should issue transparent,

publicly available guidance clarifying how hewill interpret the ambiguous language ofResolution 2272.

2. The secretary-general should ensure that heexercises discretionary authority transparentlyby publicly justifying decisions to repatriatecertain national contingents or to allow themto participate in missions.

3. The Security Council should direct thesecretary-general to appoint an independent

and impartial ombudsperson with a mandateto review and oversee UN actions on sexualexploitation and abuse in peacekeeping. Theombudsperson should assist the secretary-general by making independent, timelyrecommendations on specific cases, includingby clarifying decision-making thresholds andreviewing the appropriateness of actions taken.

ENSURE THAT DETERRENTS ARECREDIBLE

Given long-standing deployment gaps inpeacekeeping, the credibility of Resolution 2272’sdeterrence—whether through repatriating nationalcontingents or declining peacekeeping contribu-tions—largely depends on the availability ofreplacement forces. Even a hint that some contin-gents may be too mission-critical to repatriate infull will directly undermine the logic behind theresolution’s approach to accountability. Continuedforce-generation efforts will strengthen thesecretary-general’s ability to respond promptly anddecisively when repatriation thresholds are met.4. UN member states should continue efforts to

broaden the base of UN troop- and police-contributing countries, subject to human rightsscreening, including vetting for past sexualexploitation and abuse.

ENABLE MEMBER STATES TO ADOPTTHEIR OWN ACCOUNTABILITYMEASURES

The particular value added by Resolution 2272 tothe UN system’s wider reforms on sexual exploita-tion and abuse is to incentivize member states toput in place stronger accountability measures. Theresolution imposes penalties on member states thatfail not only to hold their personnel accountablebut also to adequately report on the progress ofinvestigations and accountability measures.Implementing this provision of Resolution 2272will require substantial improvements to thereceipt and processing of reports by the UNSecretariat.77

5. The UN Secretariat should streamline memberstates’ cumbersome reporting processes to theUN to make it easier for them to fulfill theirobligations and for the secretary-general to

identify member states that have failed to doso.

6. The UN should adequately resource a singlereporting point in the Secretariat to ensure thatreporting is processed quickly and madepublicly accessible in a timely manner.

MAKE INVESTIGATIONS ANDRESPONSES TRAUMA-SENSITIVE

Resolution 2272 directs the secretary-general toensure that investigations of and responses toallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse priori-tize the needs of survivors. But operationalizingthis much-needed provision will requirepeacekeeping operations to significantly shift theirways of doing business. It implies new talentrequirements for peacekeeping missions, as well asthe need for better relations with local supportgroups and stronger, more trusting cooperationbetween investigations by police- and troop-contributing countries and the UN system.7. Specialist training in trauma-sensitive methods

for taking reports of sexual exploitation andabuse should be mandatory for allpeacekeepers.

8. The leadership of peacekeeping operationsshould be able to draw on expert investigatorsspecializing in sexual violence, especially incases of widespread or particularly egregiousabuse. These capabilities should be embeddedin missions where the risk of sexual exploita-tion and abuse is high, shared among regionaloperations, or be rapidly deployable through astanding roster of specialist investigators.

9. Peacekeeping operations should establish earlycooperation with and resourcing for localsupport groups, including women’s groups andtrauma- and abuse-survivor networks,recognizing their importance as interlocutorsfor investigations, as sites of ongoing support,and often as the first point of contact forvictims reporting abuse.

10. UN member states, ideally through the GeneralAssembly and in conjunction with theSecretariat, should broker new cooperativemodels of shared investigations to minimizethe trauma associated with repeat investiga-tions.

PROVIDE TIMELY AND ADEQUATEMEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICALSUPPORT TO SURVIVORS OF ABUSE

Although it falls well short of calls to make the UNand its peacekeepers accountable to survivors ofsexual exploitation and abuse and their broadercommunity, Resolution 2272 nevertheless makeswelcome progress by directing the secretary-general to prioritize the needs of, and support for,survivors of such abuse. Importantly, peacekeepingoperations cannot take for granted the availabilityor adequacy of such medical and psychologicalservices; support for survivors of sexual violence islikely to be woefully inadequate. Nor can the UNwait for allegations of sexual exploitation and abuseto emerge before investing in support services.Investing in medical and psychological services inorder to ensure that Resolution 2272 can beimplemented will also improve the ability of UNpeacekeeping operations to fulfill their broaderprotection mandates, given the likelihood thatabuses by peacekeepers will occur in the context ofmore widespread conflict-related sexual violence.An integrated approach that connects the protec-tion mandates of peacekeeping with the humani-tarian and peacebuilding mandates of UN agenciesis needed.11. In coordination with peacebuilding partners,

peacekeeping operations should prioritizeefforts to work with, support, or establishorganizations that can provide adequatemedical and psychological services forsurvivors of sexual exploitation and abuse.

12. In coordination with humanitarian agencies,the UN should establish rapidly deployablesupport services when local services are not yetable to cope with demand, especially in cases ofwidespread abuse.

INCENTIVIZE STRONGERACCOUNTABILITY IN NON-UNOPERATIONS

While Resolution 2272 recognizes the need formore accountability from non-UN forces operatingunder Security Council authorization, it does littleto create the conditions or incentives to make suchforces more attuned to prevention or moreaccountable for abuse when it occurs.

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DEALING WITH DISGRACE 21

13. The UN Security Council should requestreporting from the secretary-general on allega-tions of sexual exploitation and abuse againstnon-UN forces operating under a SecurityCouncil mandate.

14. The Security Council should signal its willing-ness to revoke authorization for non-UNforces as a last resort where there is credibleevidence of widespread or systemic abuse, orwhere contributing countries have failed tofulfill expectations to adequately investigateabuses and hold perpetrators accountable.

STRENGTHEN ACCOUNTABILITY FORCIVILIAN PERPETRATORS

Although Resolution 2272 largely overlooks theneed for stronger accountability in the case ofsexual exploitation and abuse committed by UNcivilians in peacekeeping operations, it doesrequest the secretary-general to continue efforts toimprove responses to abuse by all peacekeepingpersonnel. Nevertheless, as with non-UN forces,there is a discernible gap in Resolution 2272 whenit comes to holding UN civilian staff accountablefor sexual exploitation and abuse. The inconsis-tency and selectivity of this oversight underminesthe legitimacy of the resolution’s broader approach.Comprehensive implementation of Resolution2272 requires further action on civilian perpetra-tors of sexual violence in peacekeeping.15. The secretary-general should continue efforts

to unify and coordinate reporting of andapproaches to sexual exploitation and abuseacross the UN system, in accordance with his2017 report on special measures for protectionfrom sexual exploitation and abuse.

16. The secretary-general should be required tonotify a UN member state whose civiliannational is implicated in allegations of sexualexploitation and abuse and should request thatthe member state initiate criminal proceedings,as appropriate within national jurisdiction.

ADDRESS UNDERREPORTING ANDIMPROVE MONITORING

Sexual violence is notoriously underreported, nomatter in what institution or geographical locationit was committed. If the preventive effects ofResolution 2272’s accountability measures are to berealized, its implementation needs to be accompa-nied by other game-changing reforms to improve

transparency throughout the UN peacekeepingsystem. In accordance with the UN’s HumanRights Up Front initiative and the secretary-general’s 2017 report on special measures forprotection from sexual exploitation and abuse,these reforms need to enable all UN personnel toreport not only sexual exploitation and abuse, butalso shortcomings in the accountability process,including on the part of their superiors. Further,relying on an institution—even one as multifacetedas the UN—to monitor and report on itself is aflawed approach to accountability.

While more fundamental reform of the legaljurisdiction in which peacekeepers operate, ascalled for by many advocates for stronger account-ability, is beyond the scope of Resolution 2272 andthus this report, there are other means tostrengthen the resolution’s provisions on account-ability. Given the crucial role civil society organiza-tions have historically played in bringing reports ofsexual violence in peacekeeping to light, formal-izing cooperation with relevant NGOs would gosome way to addressing the opacity of fieldoperations and help to give voice to those mademost vulnerable by violent conflict.17. The secretary-general should substantially

strengthen whistle-blower protection beyondthe January 2017 policy to ensure that bodiescharged with investigation and review aregenuinely independent from those they aresupposed to hold to account.

18. Recognizing that even the most carefullydesigned internal reforms will have limits, theUN—aided by funding and support from UNmember states—should build pragmaticpartnerships with local and international civilsociety organizations, in the field and atheadquarters, to promote systematic civilsociety monitoring of sexual exploitation andabuse in peacekeeping.

CREATE THE CONDITIONS TO ENABLEREFORM

Additional measures to prevent and respond tosexual exploitation and abuse are likely to beimperfect, compromised, to some extentimprovised, and undertaken amid a multitude ofconflicting priorities and grave constraints on whatcan be accomplished. Peacekeeping operationstoday are constantly asked to do more—to

implement ever-more ambitious mandates in moredangerous environments and under greaterscrutiny. Three further conditions are necessary toactivate and enable the preceding recommenda-tions.

First, Resolution 2272 asks more of field missionsand their management structures in UN headquar-ters. This has resourcing implications that must betaken seriously. But while reforms carry costs, thepersistent threats of defunding associated withsexual exploitation and abuse scandals means thatinsufficient action may cost more. Second, seriousimpact on preventing sexual violence bypeacekeepers will require patient, persistent effortto shift the complex organizational dynamics thathave enabled sexual exploitation and abuse toblight the UN system. Consistent leadership andadvocacy of difficult reforms will be necessary.Third, as the secretary-general’s 2017 report onsexual exploitation and abuse recognizes, it iscritically important that more women be elevatedinto senior positions in UN peacekeeping, in bothfield missions and headquarters.19. Recognizing that budgetary pressures will

continue to compromise the UN’s efforts toaddress the scourge of sexual violencecommitted by its personnel, UN member statesmust back their expressions of moral outrageand determination with tangible resourcingcontributions.

20. Champions of change must support the

implementation of Resolution 2272. Withinand outside the UN system, individuals,organizations, and member states mustcontinue to contribute political capital, moralleadership, innovative thinking, collaborativepartnerships, and tangible resources to the taskof preventing sexual violence by peacekeepersand improving accountability when it occurs.At the field level, this must be embedded in thelarger shift to truly integrated, people-centricmissions that understand their approach tosexual exploitation and abuse (as well ashuman rights more broadly) not as peripheralbut as central to peacekeeping’s effectiveness.At headquarters, recognizing the long-termprocess of transformative reform required tomeaningfully address the scourge of sexualexploitation and abuse, the secretary-generalshould institutionalize the position of thespecial coordinator for improving the organi-zation’s response to sexual exploitation andabuse, including to prioritize justice forsurvivors.

21. Member states, UN leaders, and civil societymust actively support the secretary-general’sobjective of increasing the participation ofwomen in peacekeeping, and specifically ofelevating more women into senior leadershippositions in peacekeeping, including byholding UN leaders to account for theirperformance on this measure.

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DEALING WITH DISGRACE 23

Annex: Chronology of Key Reports, Reforms, and RelatedEvents

Year UN Report/reform Reference

1996 Secretary-General Links uniformed peacekeepers Promotion and Protection of theto child prostitution in Machel Rights of Children: Impact ofReport Armed Conflict on Children, UN

Doc. A/51/306, August 26, 1996

1998 Department of Institutes code of conduct for Ten Rules: Code of Personal Peacekeeping uniformed peacekeepers Conduct for Blue HelmetsOperations (Rule 4 on sexual exploitation

and abuse)

2000 Security Council Adopts focus on gender Resolution 1325 (October 31, mainstreaming 2000)

2003 Security Council Requests contributing countries Resolution 1460 (January 30,to develop codes of conduct for 2003)peacekeeping personnel

General Assembly Requests secretary-general to Resolution 57/306 (May 22, 2003)issue bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse and to maintain data on all investigations

Secretary-General Issues bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13, October 9, 2003, p. 2

Secretary-General Issues first special report Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, UN Doc. A/58/559,November 10, 2003

2004 Secretary-General Inaugurates position of special Appointee: Prince Zeid Ra’adadviser on sexual exploitation Zeid al-Hussein of Jordanand abuse

2005 Secretary-General Issues Zeid Report A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN. Doc A/59/710, Addendum 1, March 25, 2005

Year UN Report/reform Reference

Security Council Holds open meeting on Zeid 5191st Meeting, UN DocReport S/PV.5191, May 31, 2005

Security Council Announces it will consider sexual Statement by the President of theexploitation and abuse provisions Security Council, UN Docin mission mandates and requests S/PRST/2005/21, May 31, 2005regular reporting

General Assembly Endorses Zeid Report Resolution 59/300 (June 30, 2005)

Secretary-General Notes investigations of sexual Report of the Secretary-Generalexploitation and abuse in annual on the Work of the Organization,report UN Doc. A/60/1, Supplement 1,

August 5, 2005, p. 52

Department of Directs eight missions to create “UN Establishes PeacekeepingPeacekeeping conduct and discipline units for Conduct and Discipline Units:Operations prevention and compliance Latest Move in Reforms to Tackle

Sexual Exploitation, Abuse,” PressRelease PKO/120, August 3, 2005

2006 Department of Starts keeping records and “Conduct in UN Field Missions:Peacekeeping tracking data on allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,”Operations misconduct and subsequent available at

actions https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-data-introduction

2007 General Assembly Includes new definitions of sexual Report of the Special Committeeexploitation and abuse in revised on Peacekeeping Operations anddraft model memorandum of Its Working Group on the 2007understanding Resumed Session, UN Doc.

A/61/19, Part 3, June 12, 2007, p. 6

2008 Department of Develops communication strategy “Conduct in UN Field Missions: Peacekeeping for missions on sexual exploitation Timeline on Conduct andOperations and abuse Discipline,” January 2008, avail-

able at https://conduct.unmissions.org/timeline

Secretary-General Issues new model memorandum Comprehensive Report ofof understanding for troop Conduct and Disciplinecontributions, requiring that all Including Full Justification of Allmembers of national contingents Posts, UN Doc. A/62/758, Marchcomply with UN conduct standards 20, 2008, p. 6

Department of Launches misconduct tracking “Conduct in UN Field Missions:Field Support system Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,”

available at

24 Jeni Whalan

Year UN Report/reform Reference

https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-data-introduction

2009 Department of Includes module on prohibition “Conduct in UN Field Missions:Peacekeeping of sexual exploitation and abuse Timeline on Conduct andOperations in redeployment training materials Discipline,” January 2009,

available at https://conduct.unmissions.org/timeline

Department of Includes conduct and discipline Special Measures for ProtectionPeacekeeping teams in most peacekeeping from Sexual Exploitation andOperations missions Sexual Abuse, UN Doc. A/64/669,

February 18, 2010

2012 Secretary-General Moots concept for an integrated Special Measures for Protectionconduct and discipline framework from Sexual Exploitation and

Sexual Abuse, UN Doc. A/66/699,February 17, 2012, p. 14

General Assembly Notes integrated framework Resolution 66/264 (June 21, 2012), p. 49

Department of Begins deliberately promoting “Conduct in UN Field Missions:Peacekeeping public awareness of UN conduct Our Approach—Public OutreachOperations standards and increasing visibility and Awareness Raising,”

of reporting mechanisms available at https://conduct.unmissions.org/prevention-outreach

2014 Secretary-General Appoints High-Level Independent “Secretary-General’s Statement onPanel on Peace Operations Appointment of High-Level(HIPPO) to conduct wide-ranging Independent Panel on Peacereview of peacekeeping operations Operations,” October 31, 2014

2015March Secretary-General Notes sexual violence as a tactic in Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,

armed conflict UN Doc. S/2015/203, March 23, 2015

June Secretary-General Receives HIPPO report, which Uniting Our Strengths for Peace:says “immunity must not mean Politics, Partnership andimpunity” People—Report of the High-Level

Independent Panel on Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, June 17, 2015

Secretary-General Appoints external Independent “Statement Attributable to theReview Panel on UN response to Spokesman for the Secretary-allegations of sexual exploitation General,” June 22, 2015, available

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 25

Year UN Report/reform Reference

and abuse in the Central African at www.un.org/sg/en/content/Republic sg/statement/2015-06-

22/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-appointment-panel

September Secretary-General Responds to the HIPPO report, The Future of United Nationscalling on the Security Council to Peace Operations:send a signal about high standards Implementation of theof accountability Recommendations of the High-

Level Independent Panel on PeaceOperations, UN Doc. A/70/357-S/2015/682, September 2, 2015

October Security Council Passes resolution on women, Resolution 2242 (October 13,peace, and security, urging 2015)“robust pre-deployment training on sexual exploitation and abuse and vetting of their peacekeeping personnel”

November Security Council Meets on HIPPO report 7564th Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.7564, November 20, 2015

Security Council Notes “sexual exploitation and Statement by the President of theabuse by United Nations peace - Security Council, UN Doc.keepers is unacceptable” S/PRST/2015/22, November 25,

2015

December Security Council Notes HIPPO report Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.S/PRST/2015/26, December 31, 2015

2016February Secretary-General Inaugurates position of special Appointee: Jane Holl Lute

coordinator on improving UN response to sexual exploitation and abuse

Secretary-General For the first time, identifies Special Measures for Protectionnationalities of alleged perpe- from Sexual Exploitation andtrators of sexual exploitation Sexual Abuse, UN Doc.and abuse A/70/729, February 16, 2016,

p. 33

March Secretary-General For the first time, repatriates an 7642nd Meeting, UN Doc.entire contingent for sexual S/PV.7642, March 10, 2016exploitation and abuse

26 Jeni Whalan

Year UN Report/reform Reference

Security Council Endorses secretary-general’s plan Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016)to repatriate national contingents

June Secretary-General Releases an external independent Report of an Independentreview on allegations of sexual Review on Sexual Exploitationexploitation and abuse in the and Abuse by InternationalCentral African Republic Peacekeeping Forces in the recommending new measures to Central African Republic, UNensure prompt and effective Doc. A/71/99, June 23, 2016investigation, prosecution, transparency, and screening oftroops

General Assembly Issues general standards based on Resolution 70/286 (June 17,Fifth Committee report 2016); Administrative and

Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/70/943, June 14, 2016

2017January Secretary-General Broadens remit for special “The Secretary-General

coordinator to include convening Announces Task Force on UN a high-level task force Response to Sexual Exploitation

and Abuse,” January 6, 2017, available at www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2017-01-06/secretary-general-announces-task-force-un-response

February Secretary-General Identifies new initiatives on sexual Special Measures forexploitation and abuse, including Protection from Sexualon victim support and Exploitation and Abuse: A Newinvestigations Approach, UN Doc. A/71/818,

February 28, 2017

DEALING WITH DISGRACE 27

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