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TYPESANDCONSEQUENCESF LAND EFORM

INLATIN MERICA

by

Alain de Janvry nd Lynn Ground*

Since the Mexican revolution nd in particular the Punta del Este charter

of the Organizationof American States

in

1961, the issue of land reformhas

been raging

n Latin America.

Most countries

of

the continenthave

had

at least

some

kind of land

reform,

nd in

many cases

it

has led to significant ocial

change. Yet,

no

literature xists that analyzes systematicallythe process of

land

reform

n terms of the

dynamics of the global social system n which it

occurs. That is one need which this paper seeks to meet. The other s to sys-

tematically lassify

and

reforms n Latin

America accordingto

a

theoretically

consistentmodel based on the concepts of modes of production and social

classes and to discuss

the

consequences

of the

different ypes of reforms ela-

tive

to a

set of

criteriaderived

from he

ogic

of

public

reforms.

The key aspects of the nature of capitalism n Latin America are first peci-

fied. This permitsus to identify ts major economic and social contradictions

and

hence the logic

of state

intervention hroughpublic reforms

n

an

attempt

to counteract

hese

contradictions.

We

focus,

n

particular,

n the

problems

of

stagnation of

food

production relative

to

effectivedemand

and of social ten-

sions associated withrural poverty, or which resolutionby programsof land

reform

as been sought. By identifying hierarchy f factors hat explain stag-

nation and poverty,we then construct a typologyof land reformsbased on

these factors.Seventeen land reform

rograms

n

ten countries

are thus classi-

fied.

Their impacts

on

production

and

poverty can then be

derived fromthe

extent to which different

ypes

of reforms

ffect

he

factors that are the root

causes of these contradictions.

ECONOMIC AND

SOCIAL

PROBLEMS OF LATIN AMERICAN

AGRICULTURE:

THE LOGIC FOR

REFORM

The social-class structure f peripheral capitalism in Latin

America

and

the economic and social contradictions hataccompany theprocess of capital

accumulation provide

a

convenient analytical framework

to determine both

the

ogic

and the imitsof

reformsAmin, 1976;

de

Janvry

nd

Garramon,1977).

Under

domination of the class alliance that includes the dependent bourgeo-

*The

authorsare

respectively

memberof

the

facultyofthe

Departmentof

Agricultural nd Re-

source

Economics

at the

Universityof

California,

Berkeley, nd an

economist

at the

Economic

Commissionfor

Latin

America,

Santiago, Chile.

This article s

a

revised

version

of

Giannini

Foun-

dation

Paper No. 530.

90

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DE JANVRY

AND GROUND:TYPES

AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF LAND REFORM

91

isie, compradorclass,

and

landed elite,

the patternof accumulation

is funda-

mentally"socially disarticulated."

n this case, the marketfor ndustrydevel-

ops principally

either abroad (in export-oriented conomies)

or in the con-

sumptionof the upper classes, originatingn profitsand rents (after mport

substitutionndustrialization) Pinto,

1976:114).

This

impliesthat wages are not

a significant

ource of effective emand and that the logic of capitalist accu-

mulation

requires

cheap

labor and an

increasinglyregressive

distribution f

income.

The

economy

is

also

"sectorally

disarticulated" since backward link-

ages

in raw materials

and

industrialproduction re largely bsent. This implies

that

the

balance of

payments

s an

effective

onstraint

n

the developmentof

the

production

apacity.

Disarticulated

accumulation is marked by serious contradictions and

in

particularby

a

limited domestic market, ow savings capacity,

and foreign x-

change

bottlenecks.

The

objective

for

cheap

labor also

implies that food prices

must be maintained ow. The result s a tendencyfor the productionofwage

foods

to

stagnate.

And the cost of

labor power is also reduced by "functional

dualism"

whereby semiproletarianization

f

large segmentsof the peasantry

allows

for

part

of

subsistence

needs to

be

produced

in

peasant agriculture

nd

hence wages

to

be collapsed below

the cost of maintenanceand reproduction

of

the

households. In this

process, peasant

agriculture

s both functionalized o

the

needs

of the

capitalist

mode

of

production

and

increasinglydestroyedas

producer

of

commodities,

s it is

dispossessed

of

control

of means of produc-

tion

by

transformation

f the social relationsof

precapitalist griculture

nd by

competition

with

capitalist agriculture.

And it

is from

among

these

impover-

ished ruralmasses thatpolitical demands for and and the possibilityof a de-

stabilizingpeasant-worker

lliance

emerges.

Agricultural

tagnation

s

explained

by

a

variety

of factors

hat nclude

the

land-tenure

system

dominated

by large-scale

estates with absentee manage-

ment,

ontrol

of

the

state

by

the

agrarian

oligarchy,

nd

cheap

food associated

with

the

logic

of

cheap

labor under

socially

disarticulated accumulation. For

increased food

production

to

obtain, progressive entrepreneurial

behavior

must

exist

(land tenure), technology

and

public

services must be available

(control

of

the

state),

and

the terms

of trade

must

permitprofitability

f invest-

ment

n

yield-increasing

nnovations

cheap food). Any

of

these factors

s nec-

essary

but

not

sufficient:

ufficiency equires

all three to

obtain

simultaneous-

ly. Yet,there s a hierarchyn the determination f thesefactorson theproduc-

tion

performance

f

agriculture

hat

runs,

n

decreasing

order of

importance,

fromcheap food,

to control of the state

by

its

landed

elites,

and

to the

land-

tenure

system:

cheap

food blocks

productive

nvestments

nd

reproduces

the

need

forcontrol

of the state

by

the traditional lites

in

order to derive

compen-

satory

nstitutional

ents;

and

institutional

ents,

under

cheap food,

nsure

the

superiorprofitability

f the extensive

atifundio

which

also

rests on

functional

dualism

with

peasant

agriculture.

The

impact

of land reforms n food

production

can be derived from

peci-

fying

which of

these

limiting

actors can be relaxed

by

different

ypes

of

re-

forms.

We,

consequently,

construct

n the next section a

typology

of land

re-

formsbased on these factors.

All land reforms

n Latin

America

during

the twentieth entury, xcepting

the

Cuban,

have

had the

purpose

of

fomenting

he

development

of

capitalism

in

agriculture.

n all these

cases,

the

purpose

of and

reforms

was to counteract

some

of the economic

and social contradictions hat

characterized,

t

particu-

lar

points

in

history,

he

development

patterns

of

Latin American

countries

under

the

logic

of social disarticulartion.

et,

the

origins

of

land reforms

nd

the

particular

forms

hey

have

assumed have

varied

enormously

over time

pe-

Latin

American erspectives:

ssue

19,

Fall

1978, Vol.

V,

No. 4







92

LATIN AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES

riods and countries.

The social origin of

land reforms hanged dramatically

n the late 1950s

with the emergence of

surplus labor. Prior to this date, the scarcity of labor

which prevailed in most parts of Latin America conflictedsharply with the

objective need forcheap

labor

in

commercial agriculture.

he resolutionof this

contradiction

equired

that rural abor be

prevented

fromgetting ccess to land

as freeholders

nd from

capturing ts opportunity

ost on labor markets.The

precapitalist

atifundio erved this

purpose ideally

by monopolizingthe bulk of

the land

and

by bonding abor

to the

estates through

debt peonage and extra-

economic

coercion.

As a

result,

the

origins

of

land

reformmovements during

this

period

were found

primarily

n

the exercise of subjective forces by intel-

lectual

and

peasant groups

n reaction to the severe social

contradictions sso-

ciated with the colonato

and aparceria forms of labor

exploitation. All these

reforms

were

initiated

from utside

the

traditional

nstitutional rocess, usual-

ly afterviolent outbursts.This was true of and reforms n Mexico (1917),Gua-

temala

(1952),

Bolivia

(1952),

and to some extentVenezuela

(1959).

By the ate 1950s,

the emergenceof a labor surplusin agriculture roke the

logic

of the

internal ubsistence

economy colonato

and

aparceria)

and

provid-

ed the

objective

basis for

intervention

y

the state

to

eliminate remnants of

precapitalist

social relations

through egal

reforms.The economic

purpose

of

unleashing

the

development

of

capitalism

in

agriculture

was to increase food

production

and

agricultural xports

in order to

meet

the

cheap

food and for-

eign exchange requirements

f

industry.

Reform

was

also

spurred by subjec-

tive

forces

originating

n:

peasant militancy

timulated

by

the

example

of the

Cuban revolution thatgeneratedthreats and fears of agrarian revolutions n

many countries;

he extension of the

social

contradictions ssociated with

sur-

plus rural

labor to the urban sectors under

the form of

rapid migration

nd

extensive

marginality;

nd

in

the nternational

ressures

derived from he Pun-

ta del

Este

charter f the

Organization

ofAmerican States in 1960.

LAND REFORM

IN LATIN

AMERICA

A

Typology

of Land

Reforms

Corresponding

to the

contradictionsof disarticulated

accumulation, land

reforms

have both

political

and

economic

purposes. The political purpose is

fundamentally

o

further

nd

stabilize the social

relations of capitalism by

changing

the

class

structure

n

agriculture o

eliminate the landed elite from

thosegroups controlling hestate,creating pettybourgeoisie from mong the

peasantry,

and

eliminating

emifeudal forms of labor exploitation. The eco-

nomic

purpose

is fundamentally o develop the forces

of production n agricul-

ture

by putting

dle

lands

in

production, ncouraging he reorganization f pre-

capitalist

estates

on

a

capitalist basis, inducing

their

modernization, nd trans-

formingunker

estates

into

medium-size

commercial farms.A typology f and

reformsmust reflect hese varied purposes and means of achieving them t t s

to be useful

for

valuating

their uccess.

It

is

important

o

distinguish,

s

a

first

tep,

between

lands that become

incorporated

n

the

"reform"

nd

"nonreform" ectors

in

the

process

of

land

reform.

The

reform ector

is

composed

of lands

appropriated usually expro-

priated)from heformerandlordsand adjudicated on a variety f nstitutional

bases

(familyfarms,

ooperatives,

and

state

farms)

to

the beneficiaries

of the

reform.

t is in the reform ector

that

peasants

are

given

access to

land

and that

a

petty bourgeoisie

is

eventually

created.

The nonreform

ector

includes the

unexpropriated

ands retained

or sold

privately

by

theirformer

owners,

the

lands

that are

subdivided

by

their owners

to

avoid

expropriation through

a

restriction

n

maximum size

(hijuelas),

and the

"reserves"

which the

former

owners

are allowed to retain

or sell.

The nonreform ector

can

thus

nclude

the







DE JANVRY

AND GROUND:TYPES

AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF LAND REFORM

93

lands of

theprecapitalist anded elite, the

unker anded elite,or the capitalist

farmers, epending

on thetype of reform.

Reform

nd nonreform ectors

play

different conomic

and political roles

in the process of land reform.While land reformshave usually been analyzed

in termsof

the

creation

of a reform

ector

(the more glamorous and visible

aspect

ofreform),

we will

show

this

to be

only one, generally econdary,aspect

of

land reform nd the impact

of

the reformon the nonreform

ector

to be

another mportant,

ftenprincipalaspect of

any reform.

The

typology

f and reforms

n

Table

1

is

based

on the impact of different

reforms

n the two determinants f stagnationthat can be

affectedby a

land

reform:

1)

the and-tenure ystem, haracterized by the dominant

mode ofpro-

duction

in

agriculture precapitalist

or

capitalist)

and typeof farm enterprise

(latifundioor commercial

farms);and (2) the social class

that has hegemonic

control

over the

state (landed

elite or

bourgeoisie).

This gives three categories

of agrariansystemsbefore the inititation f land reform: hose dominatedby

precapitalist atifundios, y

capitalist

atifundios, rby commercial

farms.The

precapitalist

atifundio

s,

of

course,

found in

precapitalist

agriculture

while

the

capitalist

latifundio and commercial farms both correspond

to

capitalist

agriculture.

On the other

hand,

control of the state by

a

landed

elite

obtains

under

a structure

haracterized

by predominance

of

either

the

precapitalist

or

thecapitalist atifundio.

Under

a

structure

n which the commercialfarmpre-

dominates,

he state s controlled

by

the

bourgeoisie

at

large.

Each of these

three

systems

can be transformed hrough

and reform

nto

either

of

the other two. In Table

1,

there

consequently

exist nine

paths

that

relate

the

agrarian systems

before

and

afterreform.'

n

all of these reforms,

reform ector is added to the dominanttypeof farmenterprise hrough and

expropriation

and

redistribution

n the form of collective

or

family

farms.

While some

reforms o so

far

as to change

both the dominant farm type

and

control

of the

state,

the

major

determinant f

stagnation cheap

food

-

re-

mains

in

all

cases

a

given

constant that

they

cannot affect.This

implies

that

functional

dualism

(the

transfer f

cheap

food into

cheap semiproletarian

a-

bor)

also remains

as a derived constant.

Land reforms re thus

severely

con-

strained

n their

mpact

on either

production

by cheap food)

or

poverty

by

functional

dualism)

due

to the

permanence

of

the

logic

of accumulation under

social

disarticulation.

The typologyof reforms ontains threemajor types,all of which are un-

dertaken

with

the

capitalist

mode of

production

dominant in the

country

at

large: (1)

reforms

hat

imply

some redistribution

f land but do not

challenge

the

precapitalist

atifundios'

domination

of

agriculture,2)

reforms hat

pro-

mote the

transition o

capitalism

in

agriculture

oward either

unker

or

farmer

roads

of

development,

and

(3)

reforms

within

capitalist

agriculture,

ither to

induce

a shiftfrom

unker

to farmer

roads of

capitalist

development

or to re-

distribute

he

land within

unker

or farmer oads.2To each

type

of reform

hat

Table

1

is

to

be read

as a

matrix

of

transitions

mong

states

ofthe agrarian

structure

efore

and

after

and reform.

A same

country

can thus

re-enter

he

matrix

more than

once,

as

land

reform

programs

re

redefined

over time,

but

it

must

always

re-enter

he

matrix

n the state

to

which

it

was transformedy theprevious and reform.

2The unker

or Prussian)

and

farmer

oads

correspond

to the

patterns

of

development

of

capital-

ism

in

agriculture

dentified

yLenin 1974).

In

the

unker

road,

the anded

elites

become

the

capi-

talists

nd

hence

maintain

controlover

the state.

The social

relations

of

production

on

their

states

are

redefined

from

nternal

peasant

labor,paying

debit

in labor

services

and

kind

and

subject

to

extra-economic

oercion,

to external

proletarian

abor.

In

thefarmer

oad,

some

peasants

concen-

trate

he

means

of

production,

hire abor

power,

and

become

a rural

bourgeoisie

while the

majority

loses

control

of

themeans

of

production

and

is

increasingly

emiproletarianized

nd

proletarian-

ized.

In this case,

the rural bourgeoisie

hares

control

of the

state

with

the

bourgeoisie

at

large.

LatinAmerican erspectives:

ssue

19,

Fall 1978,

Vol.

V,

No.

4







94

LATIN AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES

implies

either transition mong

modes or a shift mong roads,

there also

cor-

responds

the

possibility

f counterreform.

Undoubtedly,

he classification

of

many

of the reforms

n Table

1

will

be

questioned. Each is based on data and descriptionsof modes of production,

land tenure,

nd the distribution

f

public

resources

and services

among

differ-

ent

farm nterprises nd social

classes (todetermine

ontrolofthe

state)

in

the

pre- and

post-reformeriods.

Empirical

nformation n each reform

s given

n

Table

2. The

specific

allocation of one or more cases

to each

type

of

reform

will be briefly

iscussed.

Redistributive

reforms.The three

types

of

reform

on the diagonal

of

Table

1 leave both

the dominantmode

of

production

n

agriculture

nd

the

classes

in

control of the state

unchanged,

affecting nly quantitatively

the

land-tenure

ystemby changing

the distribution

f land

among

different

ypes

of enterprises.

These

reforms re

thus,

n

essence,

redistributive.

he

reform

itselfdoes not relax any of the fundamentaldeterminants f stagnation.Three

types

can be identified:

edistributive

eforms nder the

preserved

dominance

of

the

(1)

precapitalist

atifundio

Precapitalist

Redistributive

PKR)],

(2) capi-

talist latifundio

[Junker

Redistributive

JR)],

and

(3)

the commercial

farm

[Farmer

Redistributive FR)].

In

every

case a

reform ector

s

created

by

expro-

priating

ither

dle

lands

(PKR),

or lands

already

under

capitalist

unker JR)

or

farmer FR)

use.

An example

of

a

precapitalist

redistributive eform

s the 1962-1967

and

reform

n Chile.

It

was intendedto induce

a more ntensive

pattern

f land

use

on theprecapitalist

atifundioswithout

altering

he social relations

of

produc-

tion

in

agriculture

r

affecting

he

privileged

position

of the

landowning

class.

In fact,no land was expropriatedunderthe 1962 law untilFrei assumed office

in

1965

see

Table

2).

In

the

decades since the expropriation

of the latifundia

class in the

1934-1940

period,

the

land

reform

n

Mexico

has

redistributed

and from

com-

mercial

farms to the

ejidos

and is thus classified as a

farmer redistributive

reform.

Transition

from

precapitalistmode to

unker road. These reforms

nduce a

transition

rom

precapitalist

o

capitalist

agriculture itherby threats

f expro-

priation

f

and

remains underutilized

or by making emifeudal

social relations

illegal.

The internal subsistence economy

is

eliminated,

a reform

sector

is

created,and theprecapitalist atifundio s thustransformedntoa large-scale,

capitalist

"junker") enterprise

hiringwage

laborers

often emiproletarians.

The landed

elite retains controlof

the

state

and,

hence, only the

thirddetermi-

nant of

stagnation,

rchaic land

tenure,

s eliminated.Both the

1968 land re-

form

n Colombia and the 1964 reform

n

Ecuador provide

clear examples of a

reform

which

affects

a transition

from

precapitalist

to

capitalist

relations of

production.

Following

the 1961 redistributive

eform,

he 1968 legislation in

Colombia

prohibited

parceria (rents

n

exchange

for

usufruct

f

and)

and ex-

propriated

the land farmed under

aparceria

and

distributed t to

the

occu-

pants.

The 1964 reform

n

Ecuador

similarly proscribed

huasipungaje (labor

services

n

exchange

for

usufruct

f

and)

and

titled he plots to

the occupants.

The classificationof the 1953 land reformn Bolivia as a transition o the

junkerway (as opposed

to a farmer

way)

is based on the fact

that, with

the

important xception

of the

Cochabamba

region,

most andowners

were

able

to

retain

part

of all

of

their

holdings.

Of the

11,426 properties

ffectedby expro-

priation

proceedings

through 970,only

1,441

were classified

as

latifundios

nd

suffered

partial

or total

expropriation

Ergueta,

1973:68).

The

remaininghold-

ings

were

either lassified as

"medium

properties"

nd

thus

were

entitled

o be

retained

n the amout of 80-350hectares

n

the

Altiplano,

24-200hectares

n

the







DE

JAN

VRY

AND

GROUND:TYPES AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF

LAND

REFORM

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96

LATIN AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES

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98

LATIN

AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Yungas (valleys),

and

180-600

hectares

in

the Oriente;

or classified as "agri-

cultural enterprises" nd

thus entitledto be retainedat 400 to 800 hectares

in

the Altiplano,

80-500hectares n the

Yungas,

and

2,000

hectares

n

the

Oriente.3

Also, cattle

ranches were allowed an exemption

of

50,000 hectares

in

the

Or-

iente.At the same time,most observersagree thatthe colonos (peasants who

provided

rents

nd labor services

to

landlords n exchangeforusufruct f and)

received titlesonly

to

the

plots

they occupied at

the timeof the reformHey-

duck, 1974;Burke,1974; Carter,

1964).

That

is, although

the colonato

was

abol-

ished,

the

productive

resources used by peasants were not generally

ncreased

bythe and

reform.

Also, many

of the

agricultural

policies applied

after

the

reform

ctually

strengthened

he economic

position

of

the landed

elites, particularly

hose

in

the

Oriente.These included

price

supports,

ubsidized creditsand machinery,

and

the construction

f

a

sugar refinery

n

Santa Cruz

(Heath,

Erasmus,

and

Buechler,1969;Clark, 1974).Peasants, by contrast,have receivedonlyminimal

credit

nd access to

public

services

FAO, 1968).

Transition

from precapitalist

mode to farmer road. This type of reform

promotes

a

transition n

both

the

agrarian

mode

of

production

and

the

classes

in

control

of the state.

Agriculture

s

transformed rom

precapitalist o capital-

ist,

thus

changing

the basis of the social relations

of

production

from

nternal

to

external

semiproletarianization.

he

precapitalist

atifundio s

replaced

by

commercial

farms as size limits are

imposed

on

landownership,

and

a reform

sector

is

created. The urban and rural

bourgeoisies displace

the landed elite

from ontrol

of the state.

With

this transfer

f

class

power,

these reforms hus

remove

the

second

(control

of the

state)

as well

as the

third determinant

f

stagnation.Examples ofthistypeof reform re providedby Chile (1967-1973),

Mexico

(1934-1940),

nd Guatemala

(1952-1954).

The 1967

legislation

in

Chile

gave

the state

the

power

to

expropriate

the latifundia

class,

a task

completed

under

the

same law

by

the Allende

government.

At the same

time,precapitalist

relations

of

production

were

prohibited.

Large capitalist

commercial

farms

of

no

more than

80 hectares of basic

irrigated

and

were

thus created. These were

also the salient features

of the ndicated

reforms

n

Mexico and Guatemala.

Shift

from

unker

road

to farmer

road.

These reformsoccur within

the

capitalist

mode of

production

and

bring

about a shiftfrom the

junker

to

the

farmer oad

of

development.

Since

they

are aimed

at

transforming

he basis

of

the

agrarian

structure

rom

apitalist

atifundio o commercial

farms,

ceiling

on landholdings s imposed.The landed elite is eliminated, nd thebourgeoisie

assumes

control of

the

state. The second determinant f

stagnation

s

relaxed.

The

military's

and

reform

n

Peru

(1969) provides

the

only example of this

type

of reform.

Under

the

1964

land

reform, recapitalist

relations of

produc-

tion

(yanaconaje)

had been

prohibited.

The

military ffectively estroyed

the

landed

elite

class

by imposing

and

enforcing

limiton the size of

andholdings

to

50

irrigated

hectares

on the coast and

30

in the

Sierra

or

to

their

productive

equivalent

of rainfed and

(Caballero,

1977).

Transition

from

unker

road to

precapitalist

mode. These counterreforms

induce

a transition rom

apitalistagriculture

ack to

noncapitalist griculture.

There is clearlyno objective basis for such a counterreform hen surplus la-

bor

is

prevalent,

s is the

case in

most

Latin American

countries

oday.

If abor

were

scarce,

such

a

counterreform

ould be

conceivable; indeed,

isolated inci-

dents of such

reversals

can

be uncovered

in

the

history

of

the Bolivian land

reform

Clark,

1974).

Transition from farmerroad to precapitalist mode.

Such counterreforms

3The survivial of the

landowning class has

been treated by Graeff 1974), Heath, Erasmus,

and

Buechler

1969),

and Clark 1974).







DE

JANVRY

AND GROUND:TYPES

AND CONSEQUENCES

OF LAND

REFORM

99

also

induce

a

transition

ut of the capitalist

mode ofproduction

s commercial

farms

are transformed

nto noncapitalist

latifundio.

A concrete

example is

provided

by the

events

in

Guatemala

afterthe

overthrowof

the Arbenz

gov-

ernment nd reversalof the land reform n 1954.At thetime of the counterre-

form,

Guatemala was

not yetcharacterized

by surplus

labor. As a result,

not

only

did the counterreform

eturn ractically

all expropriated

ands but it

also

reinstituted

he

colonato system.

The second

and

thirddeterminants

f

stag-

nation

were thereby estored.

Shift

fromfarmer

oad to unker

road.

These counterreforms

ccur

within

thecapitalist

mode of

production

and create

a shiftbetween

roads of develop-

ment

from

farmer o

junker.

Commercial farms give

way to capitalist

atifun-

dios. This type

of counterreform

ccurred

in

Chile after the

military unta

seized power

in 1973.While the

reform ector ncluded 39 percent

of thetotal

agricultural

and

area in

1973,

it had been reduced

to only

9 percentin

1975

(Fazio, 1978;Fenner,1977).

The typology

presented

here can be contrasted

withalternative

ypologies

of

and

reforms

eveloped

by

Griffin

1974:chapter

),Frank 1969:

chapter17),

Barraclough 1973),

Warriner

1971), Flores

(1972),

and Feder

(1965). None

of

these

typologies

uses the

concepts

of mode

of

production

transitions)

or of

social

class structure

nd

control

of the

state (shifts

mong roads

of develop-

ment).

Redistributive and economic reforms

are

usually

characterized

as

"modernizing"

or

"technocratic"while socio-economic

and social reforms

re

classified

as

"reformist."

n

these

typologies,

he Cuban

experience

is charac-

terized

as

a "radical" reform.This is, in our

view, incorrect:

he Cuban

land

reform

was

executed

in

the context

of a transition

o socialism

and, as such,

was not a reform ince it was not aimed at reproducing he dominantsocial

relations

n the national economy,

those of peripheral

capitalism.Such

typolo-

gies

are,

in

addition,

nsufficient o

explain

the

expected consequences

of

re-

forms

because

the criteria n

which

they

are based are

specified

ad hoc rather

than derived

from theoreticalframework.

hey

also often rroneously

onsi-

der

together

and reforms

hat

occur

in central and

peripheral

countries

al-

though

he

contradictions f accumulation

and

hence the

purpose

ofreformism

are

markedly

different

n the two

cases.

Consequences

of

Land Reforms

The major economic and political impacts of land reforms an be summa-

rized

in the

following

ive observations:

-

Observation

: The

role of land

reforms

n

expanding

the domestic

market

for

the

modern ndustrial

ectorand thus

contributing

o social articulation

via

increased

peasant

consumption

xpenditures

s

insignificant.

This

observation

s

important

ecause land

reformhas

often

been viewed

by

the

national

bourgeoisie

and the

political

forces

promoting

national

bour-

geois

revolution

s

a means

of

transforming

henational

economy

from

ocial-

ly

disarticulated

to

articulated.

For this

to

happen,

however,

the

resulting

m-

ployment

nd

income

effectswould

have

to

be

sufficient

o

permit

benefited

peasants

to have

access to the

consumption

of modern-sector

ndustrial

goods.

Clearly, peasant incomes before and reformswere far below the neces-

sary

evels

to allow

for

nysignificant

onsumption

of

modern-sector

urables.

In Chile

the

average

monthlyper

capita

incomes, ncluding

the

imputed

value

of

wages

in

kind,

of

peasants

and landless

agricultural

workers

prior

to

the

reform

qualled $108

(or $65

cash

per capita

incomes) [CIDA-Chile,

1966].

In

Ecuador the

per

capita

income

forthe same

groups

was

$33.50

CIDA-Ecuador,

1965),

and

in Peru

from

17

to

$47 (CIDA-Peru,

1966).

Land

reform

rograms,

however,

tended

to have a limited

mpact

on

peas-

LatinAmerican

erspectives:

ssue

19, Fall 1978,

Vol.

V,

No.

4







100

LATIN AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES

ant

incomes. First,

hey

produced

a small

net employment

ffect.On

the

one

hand,

fewof those

who

actually

received

land

were landless

or external

peas-

ants,

most

having

been

laborers

on the latifundio.

On the

other hand,

during

and afterthe process of land reform, ome peasants were expelled fromthe

latifundio

as the

number

of

permanent

and seasonal

workers

was

reduced

(Bayer,

1975:33-34,

3).4

And

the

abor

force

was

often lashed when

latifundios

were

privately

ubdivided

to

avoid

expropriation

by

size limitations

Harding,

1973; Barraclough

nd Fernandez,

1974).

The employment

ffect f

the reform

program

n

Ecuador

on

the internal

peasants

-

the

supposed

beneficiaries

of

the reform

illustrates

another

negative

social

impact

of

land

reforms

s

well as

the

objective

logic for

de-

stroying

he

internal

ubsistence

economy

when

surplus

labor

exists.

Because

internal

emiproletarian

abor

was

nearly gratuitous,

t was

overemployed

re-

lativeto

actual

labor requirements

n the

latifundio.

Forthis

reason,

the

inter-

nal peasants were fullyemployed and relativelybetteroffthan the external

peasants.

In commenting

n theeffects

f

the

reform,

IDA

stated:

... the patron

s no longer

obligated

to theworkers.

When

they

were

[internal

easants]

they

enjoyed

habitual

work assignments;

now,

in contrast,

they

must

compete

in the

labormarket,

which

allows

the

patronsto

tailoremployment

o their

abor

requirements

(CIDA-Ecuador,

1965:451).

In other

words,

the

expropriation

of the

internal

subsistence

economy

transformed

abor from

fixedto

a

variable

cost and

thus

made

employment

opportunities

ependent

on

market

conditions.

While

this

may

have

had

a fa-

vorable

impact

on

production,

CIDA

foundthat

twas

notuncommon

for

the

haciendas to reduce employmentby as much as 50 percentafterthe reform

(CIDA-Ecuador,

1965:450).

The Costales

citecases

in

which

employment

f

for-

mer

nternal

peasants

was reduced

by

25 to 50

percent

Costales

and

Costales,

1971:

64

and

282).

The

form

n

which

the reform nterprises

re organized

may

also

create

negative

employment

ffects.

he

cooperatives

established

in

Peru

by

the

mili-

tary's

and

reform

1969-1975)

nd in Chile

underFrei 1967-1973)

provided

real

incentives

to

reduce

or limit

employment.

ndeed,

in the

cooperatives

estab-

lished

on

the

former

ugar

plantations

n

Peru,

members

were extremely

eluc-

tant

to incorporate

new

members,preferring

nstead

to hire temporary

aborers

who

would

not share

in the social

benefits

of the

cooperative

(Horton,

1975).

The same phenomenon was observable in Chile (Zemelman and Petras,

1972:138)

where,

in

addition,

the substitution

f capital

for

abor

on the

land-

reform

ooperatives

was

particularly

ntense.5

On

the other

hand,

the

organization

of the reform

ector

into family

and

subfamily

units,

as

occurred

in Venezuela,

implies

a limited

contribution

o

employment.

n the Venezuelan land-reform

ettlements,

nly

2.1 percent

of

the

total

labor

input

was contracted

from outside

(Wing,

1970:46;

CIDA/

CENDES, 1967).

4The

negative

employment

ffects

f and

reform

re oftenmagnified

by

the reaction

of

landown-

ers to

new

labor

codes

commonly

contained

n

the and

reform aws.

For

instance,

n the

Peruvian

Sierra, andowners expelled the permanentworkersand rehiredthemas temporaryworkersfor

whom

the

minimum

wage

and social securityegislation

did not

apply.

Another

xample

is provid-

ed by

the reaction

of landowners

to the

increase

of

the

minimum

wage

contained

in

the

reform

law

inColombia

(CIDA-Colombia,

1966:

chapter

6 and appendix

5).

"Between

1970and

1972,

the mportation

f

machinery

ncreased

306

percent

while the

mportation

of

fertilizers

eclined

29

percent Barraclough

and

Fernandez,1974:132).

This

strong

rend

of

labor

displacement

n

the

reform

ector

was in great

part

a

consequence

of,

on

the

one

hand,

the

contin-

uing

subsidization

of

capital

and,

on

the

other,

the

policy

of

boosting

the

living

standards

in

the

reform

ector

with

statecredit.







DE JANVRYAND

GROUND:TYPES AND CONSEQUENCES

OF LAND

REFORM

101

The income effectof land

reformhas

been equally ambiguous. Reforms

that induce

a

transition

fromthe precapitalistmode to the

farmerroad have

the argestpotential

ncome effect ecause theyentail the eliminationof abso-

lute rents and unremuneratedabor and providefor the diffusionby the state

of yield-increasing echnologies.

Under a

family/subfamily

rganization

n the

reform

ector,

the

implied

net income effectover time is near zero, although

there

may

be a "one shot" increase. Under commercial

or

cooperativereform

units,

he

pontential

net ncome effect s

greater

ince a surpluscan be generat-

ed. Ultimately,

he

impact

on the marketfordurable

goods

will depend on the

general distribution

f the income effect

mong those directly nd indirectly

benefited nd those directly

nd indirectly armed. Given

the absolute

income

transfer,

he more

unequal

the

distribution f

the

transfer,

he greater hepo-

tential mpact

on the market

for

durable

goods.

A

survey

of direct reform eneficiaries

n Venezuela revealed that

37 per-

cent had lower cash incomes after hereform hanbefore, 8 percentremained

unchanged,

and 35

percent

had

higher

ncomes

(Wing,

1970:50).

The

per capita

incomes

of

reform eneficiaries

veraged $129

of

which

$105

was in

cash.

The

sources

of this

income were: 19

percent, onsumption

of

home

production;

35

percent,

ales

of farm

production;

and 46

percent,

outside employment.

This

high degree

of

semiproletarianization

eflects he subsistence nature of the

re-

form

ector. Data

on the

prereform

ncome levels of the beneficiaries

were not

supplied.

In

any event,

t is

clear

that the absolute income levels attained

were

too low

to

permit

significant urchase

of industrial

goods. Indeed,

according

to

Kirby,

n Venezuela

". .

.

the most serious criticism f the and reform o

far

is that

the settlers

beneficiaries)

have been able

to

increase

their purchasing

power to a very imited xtent" Kirby, 975).

A

study of

several of INCORA's

land-reform

rojects revealed similarly

limited

nd often

negative

ncome effects n beneficiaries.Thus

in

the Atlanti-

co #3

project,

production ctually

declined during he first hree years, and

68

percent

of the

rural families had sufferednegative ncome effects n the

first

five years

of

operation Howard,

1976).

A

1966 study on consumption

habits of land-reform eneficiaries

n theLa

Paz region

of

Bolivia

showed

that,

while

nominal consumptionexpenditures

had increased

substantially

433

percent

n

14

years

-

the absolute level

of

familyexpenditures,

101 (or $17 per capita),

was still

far

too

low

to include

purchase of durables (Clark, 1972). And, yet,the groupsurveyedwas among

the

greatest

beneficiaries

f the reform ue to

its

close

proximity

o the La Paz

market.

The most

privileged

beneficiaries

of

the military's

and

reform n

Peru

the

permanent

workers of the

expropriated

ugar plantations

who

became

the

members

of

cooperatives

-

saw

their annual

nominal

wages (advanced

against year-endprofits)

ncrease from

$377

to

$662

between 1968 and 1972,

representing

n

increase

of 33

percent Horton,

1973:69).Again,

however,

the

absolute

income levels of even these most

privileged

reformbeneficiaries

re-

mained too low

to

permit ignificant articipation

n the marketfor ndustrial

goods.

Land reform oes have an impacton themarketforfood and some nondur-

able industrial

goods,

however.6

Nevertheless,

a

significant

hange

in these

markets

would

require

a substantial increase

in

incomes,

a

development

not

ensured

by any type

of

land

reform

er

se. In

addition,

where rents nd

forced

deliveries

at

semigratuitous

rices

are

eliminated

through

and

reform

e.g.,

Bo-

livia

and

Peru), consumption

of

home-produced

food increases.

Thus,

while

diets

improve,

he marketed

urplus

of

food

may

decline

immediately

fter he

6See

the

data on

Bolivia

discussed above.

LatinAmerican

erspectives:

ssue 19,

Fall

1978,

Vol. V, No. 4







102 LATIN AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES

reform.

And

obtaining ocial articulation n the basis

of this

effective

emand

would

require

transformation

f

the modern industrial sector

away

fromthe

productionof durable goods, a change beyond the reach of

a

land reform.

In the case of land reforms hatestablish the farmer oad, the elimination

of the

landed elites from ontrolof

the

state

opens

the

way to

the

diffusion f

land-saving techniques and infrastructure evelopment. The resultant

in-

creased

demand

for means of

productionmanufacturedby the modern ndus-

trial sector usually dominatedby

transnational

corporations may be im-

portant.

This does

not, however,

ead

to

social

articulation.Sectoral disarticu-

lation further mplies that increased derived demand for capital goods will

largely

be translated nto ncreased

imports.

Observation II:

The

greatest potential impact on production is obtained

from reforms

hat

promote a transitionto the farmerroad, followed in de-

scending

order

by

those

that nduce

a

shiftfrom

unker

to

farmer,

transition

to unker, nd byredistributive eforms.

This theoreticalordering

s

derived from he effect f each type of

reform

on

the

hierarchy

of

determinants

f

stagnation:

reforms hat

induce

a

transi-

tion

to the farmer oad remove the second and third

determinants; eforms hat

induce

a shift

from

unker

to farmer

remove the

second;

while reforms hat

create

a

transition

to the

junker

road

eliminate the third.

Redistributive e-

forms

do not affect

ny

of

the determinants f

stagnation.

Unfortunately,

or

numerous

reasons this

specific ordering annot be verifieddirectly: he initial

land-tenure

ystems

have been

different

rom

country

o

country;

he

land

re-

forms

have occurred

at

different

imes;

several

countries have

experienced

more

than one

type

of land

reform

e.g., Colombia, Chile,

and

Peru);

land re-

formsthatpromotea transition o the farmerroad have more often than not

been reversed

(e.g.,

the counterreforms

n

Guatemala and

Chile). Finally,

the

expected

effectsof

policy changes

in

terms

of

production performancemay

become

apparent only

after

relatively ong period

of time.

However,

it is

possible

to

verify

hat

government olicy aimed

at increas-

ing production changes

under those land reforms hat induce

either a transi-

tion to

farmer

r a shiftfrom

unker

to

farmer,

oth of

which

imply

control

of

the state

passing

to

the

bourgeoisie.

After he

landed elites were

expropriated

n

Mexico

during

the 1934-1940

period,

the

Mexican state embarked

on a

massive

program

of

agricultural

de-

velopment.The primary mphasis of thisprogramwas on extending he agri-

cultural

frontier

hrough rrigation rojects

and

on

the diffusion

f

biochemical

(land-saving) technologies Hertford, 971). Similarly,

n

Peru,

after

xpropria-

tion

of

the

landed

elite,

the

government

nitiated

the

construction f

massive

irrigationworks,

one of which

will

irrigate 50,000

hectares

USDA, 1977:22).

With

respect

to

production performance,

he

contrasting xperiences

of

Bolivia

and

Mexico

-

the

only

two countries which have

undergone

a

long

and

uninterrupted rocess

of and reform do tend to confirm

he

hypothesis

that

the

potentialproductiongains

are

greatest

when both the second and third

determinants

of

stagnation re

relaxed.

In Mexico

betwen

1934-1938

and

1950-1951,

otal

agricultural output

increased 4.3

percent annually;

between

1948 and 1963, t increased at an annual rate of 6.3 percent;and between 1960

and

1970,

5.8

percent.

For

Bolivia,

the

annual

growth

rates after the reform

were

only

1.2

percent 1951-1964)

nd 1.7

percent 1960-1970) FAO).

Observation III:

The

production

effectof

land

reform s

soughtthrough

the

development

of

capitalism principally

n

the nonreform ector. The func-

tion

of

the nonreform ector

is to increase

the marketed

surplus

of both food

and

exportables

n

order

to reduce

pressure

on

wage

costs

and

relieve the defi-

cit

in the balance

of

payments.Conversely,

he

impact

of

land

reforms

n

pro-







DE JANVRY

AND GROUND:TYPES

AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF

LAND

REFORM

103

duction forthemarket

hrough he reform ector s

slight.

This

observation follows

from a study of the provisions of land

reform

laws as well as from the

contrasted productionperformancesof reform

nd

nonreform ectors.

The development of

capitalism in the nonreform ector is

encouraged by

law in a variety f ways:

1)

Patterns f extensive and use are

discouraged through hreatsof

expro-

priation

and

incentives for

adoption of more intensive production

methods.

This

approach is typical of all

land reforms nd is

the primarymethodapplied

under reforms

hat seek to

induce the transition o unker agriculture.

2)

Indirect

formsof farm

management absenteeism) are prohibited

or re-

stricted

to corporateholdings. This encourages

direct management and

pre-

sumably

promotes greater

productivity.This provision is typical of

most

reforms.

3) Many land-reformaws dictate the rental or sale of idle lands, thus

promoting more ntensive

pattern f and use.

4)

Through expropriation of the

internal peasant plots,

prohibition of

bonded

labor,

and

institution f

minimum

wage laws, labor is

transformed

from fixed

to a

variable

cost,

and

the social relations of noncapitalist

atifun-

dio

are

transformed nto those of

a

capitalist

enterprise.This is typicalof the

transition eforms.

5) Landlords affectedby

expropriationunder the clause of farm

size are

allowed to

retain

a land

"reserve"

of

maximum

egal

size on which fixed and

variable

working apital

are

concentrated.

Consequently,the ratio ofcapital to

land increases

substantially

on

these farms.This is

typical of the reforms

hat

aim at establishing farmerroad in the nonreformector. The size of the re-

serves

may

also

vary

with

ntensity

f

land

use, thus encouraging he

develop-

mentof the

productive

forces.

6)

To

escape expropriationunder the clauses

restricting he size of

hold-

ings,

latifundios

are

encouraged, informally

or

officially, o subdivide into

smaller

units with the

objective

of

mproving

arm

management

nd

increasing

the

ntensity

f and

use.

These

provisions

of

the

law and

the manner

in

which the law is

applied

thus aim at

promoting

he

development

of the

productive

forces

n

the nonre-

form sector

while

using

the reform ector as an

instrument or this

purpose

morethanas a locus forproduction ncrease.This can be observedthrough he

following

data:

Exemptions

from

expropriation

on

the

basis

of size

-

the so-called "re-

serves"

-

have

generally

been

quite liberal,

as can

be

seen

fromTable

2,

col-

umn

5,

even

under the

Mexican, Chilean,

and Peruvian reforms hat nduced

a

transition

r

a shift o

the farmerroad. Since landowners were

invariably

al-

lowed to

choose the

location of

reserves, they

were

established

on

the best

lands of

the

former atifundio. n most

cases,

since neither

working

capital

(including ivestock)

nor

water

rights

were affected

by

the

reform

Table

2,

column

6),

the and

incorporated

nto the reform ector had been

decapitalized

and lacked

guaranteed

access

to

water while the

capital/land

ratio

had

in-

creased substantially n thereserves.7 here are also innumerableobstacles to

expropriation

contained

in the land-reform

aw,

and

the

enforcement f the

law

was

usually delayed,

thus

allowing

time

to

decapitalize expropriated

ands

and

capitalize

reserves.

Land

which is

intensively

utilized

was

entirely transition

to

junker)

or

partially transition

nd

shift

o

farmer) xempt

from

xpropriation.

Generous

7For

Chile,see

Barraclough nd

Fernandez

(1974:43);

for

Peru,see

Bayer

1975:9); for

Colombia,

see

INCORA

(1972),Wing

1970:44), nd

Soto

(1973:80).

Latin

American

erspectives:

ssue

19,

Fall

1978,

Vol.

V,

No.

4







104

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

delays were often given

to

allow

for

ntensification

f land use as well as to

subdivide

atifundios nd

escape expropriation

n the basis of size.

The result s that

the effective

uantity

of and under

controlof the landed

elitewas only marginally educedunderprecapitalistredistributive nd transi-

tion to junker reforms.As Table 2, column 3,shows,

the

nonreform ector still

includes

99

percent

of

the

land

in

Ecuador,

90 percent

n

Colombia, 84 percent

in

Venezuela,

and

82

percent

n

Bolivia. Under

reforms hat

create the farmer

road,

the nonreform

ector is reduced to a smaller fraction of total land: 57

percent

n

Mexico,

58

percent

n

Peru,

and 60

percent

in Chile

(1973). These

lands, however,are usually thebest in the country, eceive the bulk of public

services

in

credit, nfrastructure,xtension,

nd

research,

and

produce

most

of

the

commodified

gricultural roduct.

For instance,

n Mexico where the reform

ector

s

proportionally arger

n

termsof

land and

labor force than in

any

other

country,

he

nonreform ector

monopolizes thebulk of institutional ervices. Duringthe 1956-1969period,al-

though

the

private

commercial-farm ector

encompassed

55

percent

of total

agricultural ands,

it received 85

percent

of

public

agricultural

redit.

In Chile under

Allende,

where the reform ector

was

enlarged

to the maxi-

mum

allowed under

the 1967 reform

aw,

the nonreform ector still received 69

percent of state credit n 1971-1972 Barracloughand

Fernaindez,

974: 134-135).

Also

while the 1967 land reform onferredupon the state controlof all irriga-

tion

works, neitherFrei nor Allende exercised that power and, as a result, he

nonreform ector, and, in particular the remaining

arge landholders, retained

control of

77.1 percent of the capacity of the

country's rrigationworks (Bar-

raclough and Fernandez, 1974:39).

In Bolivia, where 18.2 percentof agricultural ands and 39 percentof the

peasantry

have been

incorporated

nto the

reform

ector,

ll

sources

agree

that

the

smallholders,

both withinand without he reform

ector,

have

received

vir-

tually

no credit

FAO, 1968:13).

The

limited

vailable production

data do

suggest

hat the

production ffect

of land

reform

was

obtained

in

the

nonreform

ector,

not the

reform

ector.

Appropriate

data

exist

only

for Bolivia and

Mexico,

the two

countries

with the

longesthistory

f

and

reform

n Latin

America.

In

Bolivia,

the

production

of

potatoes

and cereals

can

be taken

as a

proxy

forthe

performance

f

the

reform ector

and that of

sugar

cane and cottonseed

forthe nonreformector.8 etween 1952-1953 nd 1974,theaverage annual per

capita

increase

in

the

production

of

potatoes

and cereals was 2.3

percent

And

0.5

percent,respectively.

For

sugar

cane and

cottonseed,

the

figures

were

37.1

percent

nd 94.6

percent, espectively.9

In

Mexico,

there

s a

rough equivalence

between

the area

contained

in the

reform

ejido)

and

nonreform ectors.

The

private

commercial farms sector

contains

55

percent

of all cultivable

ands and 49

percent

of all

irrigated

ands.'0

It is however

clear

that

these data

overestimate he

effective ize and contribu-

tion

to

production

of the

nonreform ector as an

important

raction f the

ejido

8Potatoes

nd

cereals

are

produced

mainly

n

the

Altiplano

where

most

ofthe

and

reform

ctivity

tookplace,

while

sugarcane

and

cottonseed

are

produced

mainly

n

the

Santa

Cruz

region

which

was

relatively

unaffected

by the land reform. t is true,of course, thatthe disparate production

performances

n these

commodities

could

be due

to

factors

other

than

a

"plan"

designed

to

favor

the

nonreform

ector.

However,

the

design

of

government

programs

with

respect

to

agricultural

development

did indeed

favor

thenonreform

ector;

see,

for

nstance:

Heath,

Erasmus,

and

Buech-

ler 1969:290),

Antezano

(1970,:157-162),

uhl

(1975),

and

Clark

1974).

9For ottonseed,

he

figures

over

the

1961-1965

o

1974

period;

see FAO

(1961

and

1975).

"'There

re essentially

three

sectors

in

Mexican

agriculture:

he

ejido,

the

private

capitalist

sector,

and

theprivate

mallholder

ector.







DE JANVRY

AND GROUND:TYPES

AND CONSEQUENCES

OF LAND

REFORM

105

land

which is

not

used for

ubsistence production

has been illegally

rented

out

to large

landowners.

According

to NACLA,

"for

most ejidatarios,

whose

in-

come

average

less

than $50

a month,

hemost viable

solution

today

is to

rent

theirplotto a largelandowner and thenwork full timeas a day laborerin the

tomato

or cotton

fields.

In Sonora,

about

70

percent

of

the ejidos

are

rented,

especially

in the rrigated

reas

ofNavajoa

and the Valle del Yaqui,

while

esti-

mates

for

the

percentage

of

rented

ejidos

in

Sinaloa

range

between

40 and

80

percent"

NACLA,

1976:18)

Under precapitalist

redistributive

nd

transition

to

junker

reforms,

he

bulk

of the

and

incorporated

ntothe

reform

ector

s often

found

on the

agri-

cultural

frontier

nd,

consequently,

s not only

of

low

quality

but is

also

hob-

bled by poor

infrastructure

nd limited

access

to

effective

demand.

For

in-

stance,

in Colombia

the

World

Bank

found

that

"the land

resources

[acquired

forthe

reform

ector]

are

largely

those

which

have been

ceded

by

previous

holdersbecause itwould be impossibleforthemtomake thenecessaryinvest-

ments

to

bring

and

into

production.

Consequently,

much

of the

land

held

by

INCORA

[the

land-reform

nstitute]

s marginal

whereas

extensive

good

land

resources

continue

to be underutilized"

(World

Bank,

1972:235).

The

same

problem

characterizes

much

ofthe

lands

distributed

o

peasants

in

Venezuela,

leading

to

poor

economic

conditions

and

a high

rate

of abandonment

and

re-

consolidation

of these lands.

Between

1967

and 1975,

the

contribution

f

the

reform

ector

to

national

crop production

has

declined

from

32

percent

to

20

percent

while that

of ivestock

declined

from

to

3.4

percent

between

1967

and

1972

Cox,

1978:table

27).

Growth

n national

production

has been

achieved

by

a

small

number

of

medium

and

large

commercial

farmers

n

the

nonreform

sector,theemergenceof which has been stimulatedby the threatsand incen-

tives

of

the agrarian

reform

Cox,

1978:54-55).

The

organization

of

the

reform

ector

nto subfamily/family

nits

Table

2,

column

7)

proscribes

access

to cheap

labor

and

thereby

relegates

the reform

sector

to

stagnation,

s it is

unable

to

compete

with

the

nonreform

ector.

The

small

size

of

theunits

n

thereform

ector

often

requires

that

heads

offamilies

seek outside

employment.

Reform-sector

and gradually

becomes

appropriated

by

the nonreform

ector n

spite

of egal

constraints."

The

social

behavior

ofpeasants,

in reflecting

he

productive

operations

at

which they

abored

prior

to land

reform,

s

also

an important

determinant

f

thesuccess orfailureofproduction n thereform ector Lehmann,1976).

When the

preland

reform enure

consists

ofdecentralized

productive

oper-

ations

characteristic f the

latifundio

employing

the aparceria

form

of

labor

exploitation,

he

subsequent

organization

of the

reform

ector nto

cooperative

or collective

farms

s generally

precluded

in the

absence

of

strong

ncentives

that are unlikely

to come

under

domination

of the

capitalist

mode

of

produc-

tion. The consequent

atomistic

organization

of the

reform

ector

implies

little

use

of new technology,

tagnant

production,

nd

a

declining

marketable

sur-

plus (e.g.,

Bolivia

and parts

of the

Peruvian

highlands).

Even

when

thebulk

of

productive

operations

is

centralized

prior

to

the reform,

he

strong

desire for

individual

proprietorship

ends

to

frustrate

he

formation

feffective

oopera-

tivesor collectives e.g.,Chile).

Experience

shows

that,

when

productive

operations

are

completely

cen-

tralized

before

the

reform,

s in plantations,

cooperative

enterprises

e.g.,the

production

cooperatives

created

from

the

expropriated

plantations

in

Peru)

can

be most effective.

Observation

V: Political

stabilization

function

f and

reforms:

"This

problem

has

been

particularly

cute

in Mexico.

See

the CIDA-Mexico

study (CIA/CIDA,

1970)

and

Restrepo

Fernandez

and

Sanchez

Cortes n.d.).

LatinAmerican

erspectives:

ssue

19, FaIl 1978, Vol.

V, No.

4







106


A)

With the

production trategy

f the

land reform entered on the nonre-

form ector,the

primary ole of the reform ector s political. Its function

s to

stimulate the

development

of

a conservative agrarian petty bourgeoisie

and

thus reduce the threat f social instability nthe countryside.

This

observation s clearly illustrated n

the philosophy of the Colombian

Land Reform

nstitute INCORA). In an article it authored for USAID,

IN-

CORA stated that

"INCORA was founded

and its funds and staffwere system-

atically

built

up

to levels which enabled it to invest substantially n

land-tenure

modifications,and

improvements, redit, nd other ervices for new

class of

campesino

landowners. Politically, t [land

reform] ffers he hope ofreducing

the

threat f

nstability

n

the

countryside"

INCORA, 1970).

The

goal of

political stabilization s implementedby a dual strategy:

oop-

tion

and

patronage

of reform

beneficiaries,

nd repression of the

uprisings of

peasants excluded

from

he

reform.

By creatingupward mobility, and reforms an constitutepowerfulpoliti-

cal cooptive forces on the mass of peasants.

However, since land reformsdo

not

reach the

bulk

of

peasants but are usually confinedto the upper

peasantry,

the

generation

of

expectations among those

not benefited s likely to negate

political

stabilization

if

strong peasant organizations exist.12 easant

frustra-

tions

can become

powerful destabilizingfactors, as in Peru during the

last

years

of the

Belaunde

reform

nd

in

Chile

under Frei.

B)

Reforms hat

attempt

to establish the farmerroad are

potentially

the

most

destabilizing

due

to the

political

reaction of

expropraited anded elites

and to the frustrations

f

the

arge

mass

of

peasants

excluded

from

he reform.

Preservation

f the

bulk

of

the

and in

the nonreform

ector imits ccess to

the and to a small fraction f thepeasantry.The frustrations f those excluded

can be

a

destabilizing

force that

pushes

through

trikesand land

seizures

for

an

acceleration,

mplification,

nd

radicalization of the and

reform. his

pres-

sure

is

particularly

cute in reforms

hat

aim

at a farmer

oad since the bour-

geoisie requires

political

allies

to

successfully

xecute

a

land reform

gainst

the

landed

elite.

Thus,

in

an electoral

context,

as in

Chile,

the

peasants

must be

mobilized.

However,

while

over

100,000

Chilean

peasants joined

unions

between 1965 and

1970,only 21,000gained

access to

the

and

by

the

end

of this

period (Chile,

1973:

272).

Frustrated

by

limited

concrete

benefits,

work-

ers'

strikes

n

the latifundios ncreased

from

142

in

1965

to

1,580

n

1970,

and

land invasions

multipliedfrom

7

to

456

(Klein, 1972; Affonso, 1970).

Mean-

while, the landed elite's strongopposition to the land reform nd fear that it

threatened

their

property

n other sectors

of

the

economy

led to

a

rupture

of

the

conservative-liberal lliance which

had

brought

he Christian Democrats

an electoral

victory

n

1964.

n

the 1970

presidential

ampaign,

the combination

of

these

two

forces,

division between liberals and conservatives

and

the

in-

creasing radicalization of thepeasantry,

brought

he left

Unidad

Popular (UP)

to

power.

The

political

destablization unleashed

by

the

land reform

nder

Frei

intensified

under Allende until the

military

ntervened

on

the side

of

the

propertied

lasses.

In

Guatemala, peasants

were

also

mobilized

by

the

government

o

carry

out theexpropriation fthelanded elite.However, theexpropriated andown-

ers,

with

backing

from

he U.S.

government,

egained political control;

he

and

reformwas

completely

reversedafter

Arbenz was

deposed

in 1954.

Observation

V.

With

the

need for

cheap

food

maintained

by

the

objective

2Criteria

for election

of those

to

be benefited

by land reforms

re usually

that

they

were

internal

peasants

and/or

possess

some

education,

"management

kills,"etc.

Internal

peasants

are

generally

the

better-off

egment

of the peasantry

due to

stable

employment

and

access

to

the

resources

(pasturage,

ometimes chools,

medical attention,

indling,

tc.)

of the

atifundio.







DE JANVRY

AND GROUND:TYPES AND

CONSEQUENCES OF LAND REFORM 107

logic of cheap labor under social disarticulation,no land

reform an eliminate

functional

dualism with a

semiproletarianizedpeasantry.Thus, irrespective f

the typeof land reform, he subsistencesector is maintained as the necessary

source of cheap labor.

The proportion f the peasantry benefitedby different

and reforms s giv-

en

in Table

2,

column

4. Even

the most extensive and reform

n Latin Ameri-

can

history,

hat of

Mexico,

after 0

years

still has not incorporatedmore than

50

percent

of

the

peasantry

nto

the

reform ector. Similarly, n Peru as of No-

vember1976,

68

percent

of

the potentialbeneficiaries the

subsistence peasants

and

landless agricultural aborers existing n 1964)

remained outside the reform

sector; and, according

to

government igures, he maximum percentage to be

incorporated

nto the

reform

ector s 39

percent Caballero,

1976:11). n Chile,

during

the

government

f

the

UP,

the

proportion

f

potential

beneficiaries x-

cluded from

he reform ector reached 80

percent.

Thus, although thesocial relations of production re redefinedunder tran-

sition

reforms nd

the argeestates eliminatedunder the reforms hat establish

the

farmer

road,

the minifundio

lways remains;

this

permits

the continued

transfer

f

the

cost

of

cheap

food

and

of

generally

unfavorable

agricultural

prices

to

semiproletarian

abor.

External subsistence peasants seldom gained access to

additional land re-

sources

under

any type

of

reform; nd, despite

the

popularity

of the

slogan,

"consolidaci6n de minifundios,"no serious or even marginal

attempthas ever

been

made to eliminate the minifundio. n

fact,

the

reformed ector is

usually

designed to extend,

rather han

curtail,functionaldualism. This is achieved by

tying

beneficiariesto

subfamily/family

nits

in

the reform

ector where they

become purveyorsof cheap labor to capitalist entrepreneursTable 2, column

7).

In Venezuela, reformbeneficiaries averaged 107 days

laboring in the re-

form sector

and

106

days

outside the reform

sector (Kirby,1975: 207; CI-

DA/CENDES, 1967). Kirby

observed

that:

"Far from

being

the foundationof an

improving

ocial welfare . in

many

cases the land

or

land

reformhas fixed

families in

a

position

where

they

can do little

more than inflate the pool of

cheap

labor"

(Kirby, 1975:209). Elsewhere,

he

adds: "it is . .

.

clear that the

reformhas stabilized

a

pool

of casual

laborers to be called on at the conveni-

ence

of

the

arge

andowners"

(1975:219).

In Colombia the planned distribution f land in the reform ector reprod-

uced

the functional

dualism

prevailing

n

the nonreformed

ector.

n

1968,

for

example, 7,037

families

were

given plots

of

10

hectares or

less, 7,125 received

between

10 and 50

hectares,

906

obtained from50

to 200

hectares,

nd

64 fami-

lies each received n excess of 200 hectares Felstehausen,1971: 173).

The

Mexican

ejido

is

particularly

llustrative of

a

contrived functional

dualism.

Under Cardenas

(1934-1940),

he

ejido

was viewed

as

a

collectivst

l-

ternative o

capitalist agriculture.

Over

time, however,

most

ejido

lands

have,

under

official

or

unofficial

pressures,

been

individuallyappropriated.

Conse-

quently,

he vast

majority

of the

ejidatarios

differ rom

private

peasants today

only

in

that

the

ejido plots may

not be

legally

sold or

transferred

n

any

manner.

Although

these

stipulations

re

ostensiblydesigned

to

avoid

the

reconcen-

tration

f

andholdings

and

protect

he reform

eneficiaries, heyeffectively

ie

them

to

plots

of land

insufficient

or

family

ubsistence.

Thus,

while the

ejido

was

initially"merely

a

response

to

the

political pressures

and land

hunger

of

the

peasants" (Stavenhagen, 1973),

t has

been

an

integral

part

of

agrarian poli-

cy

since

1940

and

serves

as a

purveyor

of

cheap

labor

to commercial

agricul-

ture

n a

regime

of

planned

functional

dualism.

And the

degree

of

semiprole-

LatinAmerican

erspectives:

ssue 19,

Fall

1978, Vol. V, No. 4







108


tarianization

among ejidatarios

has been increasing continuously.

While

in

1950,

only

16

percent

of

ejido

families earned over half

of their ncome

outside

their

and, by

1960

this

percentage

had increased

to 34

percent Rello

and de

Oca, 1974:70). Stavenhagen

concludes:

On the one hand, the peasant

economy small ejido

and private mallholders)provides

a

minimum

ubsistence

ncome

to

its

members t

little

ost to

the national

economy,

nd it

helps to keep

the

process

of

rural to urban

migration

n check.

On the other

hand,

it

is

unable

to

really

ncrease levels of

living

substantially

withthe

poor

resources at

its

dis-

posal,

and thus

necessarily

forces

peasants

to seek complementary

ources of

income

elsewhere.

It constitutes,

hus,

a

reserve

of labour not only

for the

large agricultural

farms but

also for

ndustry, onstruction,

ervices

and so forth.. .

As

long

as labour

does not

constitute

scarce

or

expensive

element

among

the factors

of

production,

t

is

in the nterest f

the

system

to maintain

a

numerous

but unstable

peasantry

from

which

it can

draw

its inexpensive

labour

force for

the

process

of

capitalist

accumulation

(1973:32).

In conclusion,

no land

reform

an

eliminate the primary

determinant

f

stagnation

the

low

price

of food.

Consequently,

no land reform an

elimi-

nate

functionaldualism.

The

subsistencesector

remains the necessary

source

of

cheap

labor for

both

nonreform

nd reform ectors.

And

so, too,

remain

the

fundamental

conomic and social contradictions

f

peripheral

capitalism

n

ag-

riculture: global tendency

toward

stagnation,

harply

uneven

development

of

the

productive

forces,

nd massive ruralpoverty.

Conclusions

Today, theprecapitalist atifundiowith rent n labor serviceshas virtually

disappeared

in

Latin

America. Those

with rent

n kind remainimportant

nly

in

some Central American countries

nd

in partsof Brazil.

Otherwise,

precapi-

talist

social relationshave been

largely

liminated.

This has

resulted from

he incentiveof market

forces, he subjective

pres-

sures

exercised

by

internal

peasants,

and the coercion

of reformist olicies.

Particularly

ffective

were land

reforms

which threatenedprecapitalist

states

with

expropriation

f

they

would not modernize transition

o junker)

and took

control

of

the

state

away

from

he

landed elites to place it

in the hands of the

bourgeoisie transition

o

farmer).

Under

these reforms, romoted

against the

remnantsof feudalism,the conflictbetween production (accumulation) and

distribution

legitimation)

was

presumed

nonexistent.They, consequently,

of-

fered

an

attractive

common

rallying

cause for the national and

dependent

bourgeoisies

and

theirforeign

llies. Such reforms lso appealed

to those

radi-

cal

forces who saw

land

reform s

a step toward the implementation

f a na-

tional

bourgeois

revolution which

they

deemed

a

necessary first tage

in the

transition

o socialism.

As

a

result

of all

this

support,

hese transitional

eforms

were

actively mplemented

beginning

n the ate 1950s. Today,

theycan be con-

sidered

successfully

terminated ven

though

the

publicized

banner of expro-

priation

and redistribution

oward

formation

f a

reform

ectorhas generally

been

held to

a

minimum.

Futureland reforms redistributive nder capitalism and shiftto farmer

road) must,

with the

noted

exceptions,

be directed at capitalist

enterprises.

They are, consequently,

unlikely

to occur underthe hegemonic

domination

of

the

capitalist

mode

of

production

except

after

the most severe social

pressure

such

as Echeverria's 1977 land reform n

the

Valley of Sinaloa in response

to

peasant

invasions,

or under

exceptionally

favorable

fiscal

conditions,

s in the

swap

of

urban

properties

n

Trujillo's

personal

estate

for rice land

in

the Do-

minican

Republic.







DE JANVRYAND

GROUND:TYPES AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF LAND REFORM

109

Not

only

do redistributiveeforms mply questioning

he conceptof private

propertyby taking

and

away

from ome capitalists to distribute

o peasants

and

landless workers,but the conflictbetween

production and distribution s

enhanced. Since large-scalefarms of the commercial sector, withfull backing

of state

services, tend to be highly

fficient withinthe confines of cheap

food

and with

a

consequent

bias

towards

the

production

of exportables,

nputs for

industry,

nd

luxuryfoods),

the family

or

cooperative

farmscreated by expro-

priationswill

generallynot be able to ensure delivery

of an equivalentnet sur-

plus on themarket, t least not

n the shortrun

or without drasticredesignof

agrarian policy

toward

servicingpeasants.

Reforms

that seek to shift the nonreform

ector from unker

to farmer

roads are also unlikely to

occur

even

though some

productiongains could

be

expected

from

this

change

in

tenure. The strongly

ntrenchedpositionof the

capitalist

landed elites as

part

of

the social-class

alliance

that supports

the

model of disarticulated ccumulationtendsto eliminate thepossibilityofsuch

reforms.

In

addition,

both the

problem

of deficient

nd uneven productionperform-

ance in agriculture nd the persistent

problemof rural poverty

ncreasingly

arise

from he first eterminant f

stagnation cheap

food

a

constraint

hat

derives directly

from disarticulated accumulation

and the associated logic of

functional

dualism.

A resolution of these contradictions

ies far

beyond

the

scope

of

and

reform.

For all these reasons,

new land

reforms

re

unlikely to occur

in the near

future

n Latin America,

even

though

and reform emains

an active

political

issue

for the elements

of

the

national

bourgeoisie

and

for radical

forces that

militateforrestructurationf the economic systemtoward a model of articu-

lated accumulation.

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De Janvry and Lynn Ground-Source,Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America(1978)