DE GAULLE'S CONCEPT OF A MOBILE,PROFESSIONAL ARMY: GENESIS OF

FRENCH DEFEAT?

by

CAPTAIN ROBERT A. DOUGHTY, USA

The fall of France to the Germanblitzkrieg in June 1940 has generated agreat deal of literature that attempts to

pinpoint the causes of France's rapidcollapse. Among the important immediatecauses identified is the French failure tomass armored forces for use against theattacking German thrusts. It is clear thatthe French error ensued from an inabilityto recognize the potential of mechanizedwarfare, not from a shortage of armoredvehicles. By May 1940, France andGermany were approximately equal in thenumber of tanks available for combat onthe western front, France having 2,43 Iland Germany 2,439 (not countingcommand vehicles).2 The Germans massedtheir ten armored divisions into an armoredgroup, two separate corps, and one separatedivision, while France haphazardly scatteredher three armored divisions, threemechanized divisions, and her remainingtwenty-seven non-divisional tank battalionsamong the eight French armies. 3 While theGermans recognized the potential of massedarmored forces in conducting rapid, mobileoperations, French armored units werecommitted to battle in a piecemeal fashion,resulting in their "melting away one afterthe other like snow flakes in the sun,without having any appreciable effect onthe course of the battle."4

One might validly conclude that theGermans had learned more than the Frenchfrom the First World War, and that theGerman commanders were more innovativethan the French. There are numerousstatements by prominent French militaryleaders supporting these views. For example,Marshal Petain admitted in 1947 his early lackof familiarity with combat involving tanks: "Ihad never worked with them. In the course of

*****

(Editor's Note: In the J 930's, the militaryand political leaders of France rejected DeGaulle's plan for the creation of aprofessional army with a separate armoredcorps. As a result of her failure to acceptthe potential of a strong armored forcemanned by professional soldiers, Franceentered World War II with anon-professional, citizen-soldier armytrained primarily as a defensive force.French reliance on the nation in armsconcept, the citizen-soldier, and thestrategy of defense-the "Mag/not Linecomplex"-contributed significantly toqUick defeat of the French army in J 940.The French experience, related here, mayhave particular relevance for us defenseplanners who are now coping with themilitary, political, and social problems oftoday's professional army,}

Captain Robert A. Doughty, Armor, graduatedfrom the United States Military Academy in 1965 andreceived his M.A. in History from the University ofCalifornia at Los Angeles in1972. He commanded a tankcompany and was a battalionoperations officer in Germany,and served in Vietnam as anadviser to a Vietnamesearmored cavalry troop. He ispresently an AssistantProfessor in the Departmentof History at the United StatesMilitary Academy.

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the War of 1914, I did not have armoreddivisions. This caused me to be somewhatdisinterested in them."s But the problem ofFrench employment of armor is morecomplex than this, since their considerationof armor was greatly influenced by thetraditional French approach to nationaldefense, which called for the entire nation tospring to arms during times of nationalemergency. This defense concept has beencalled "the nation in arms."6 Many militaryand political leaders believed that an ArmorCorps (Le. a separate armor command havinglarge homogeneous tank units)-because of itsinherent offensive capabilities, its needs for abetter-trained and longer-serving soldier, andits frequent association with elitism andprofessionalism-was not consistent with thebasic tenets of the nation in arms. Thisnegative view of armor became even moreprevalent when General Charles De Gaulleoffered his famous plan for the formation of ahighly mobile army, insisting that it beformed with professional rather thancitizen-soldiers. The question of armoredunits subsequently became subsumed by thecontroversy over professionalism, leadingFrance to reject the creation of a highlyprofessional mechanized force withoutadequately considering the potential ofannored units. This crucial decision wasbrought about more by a belief that theAnnored Corps violated the "republican"approach to national defense than by aconsideration of the capability of a spearheadof tank forces.

THE NATION IN ARMS VERSUS THEPROFESSIONAL ARMY

The concept of the nation in arms hadoriginated in the French Revolution with the"cannonade of Valmy" in 1792 and the levieen masse in 1793. Its true spirit was reflectedin the decree establishing the levie en masse:

Henceforth, until the enemies have beendriven from the territory of the Republic,the French people are in permanentrequisition for army semce.... Theyoung men shail go to battle; the married

24

men shall forge arms and transportprovisions; the women shall make tentsand clothes, and shall serve in thehospitals; the children shail turn old lineninto lint; the old men shall repair to thepublic places, to stimulate the courage ofthe warriors and preach the unity of theRepublic and the hatred of kings.7

This reliance on the military potential of thecitizenry became an important part of Frenchrepublican tradition. Many Frenchmen cameto believe that when the country was indanger, a mass of patriotic volunteers wouldrise and destroy the invading armies. Theconcentration of all national energies againstan enemy would be morally and militarilysufficient to defend France. Even though shemoved away from the armed nation to aprofessional army for a time after theNapoleonic Wars, the total commitment ofthe entire nation remained the theoreticalbasis of the French nation in arms.

The nation in anns was not reinstituted bythe French until after the War of 1870-71,during which Germany dramatically remindedthem that wars were no longer simply quarrelsbetween governments of ruling families,fought by relatively small armies ofprofessional soldiers. s Wars were nowconducted between entire peoples, fought byarmies of completely mobilized nations. Fromthe time of that defeat, the foundation of theFrench national defenses rested on anunswerving faith in the massive mobilizationof the citizenry in times of national peril. Theresulting symbiotic bond between army andnation was well characterized in a 1904 reportby a Chamber of Deputies Commission: "Themodern concept of the army is that ... it isidentical with the nation, draws from it all itsresources, and has no separate and distinctexistence outside the nation."9 After theFirst World War, the principle of the citizenryin arms was expanded to include the notionof complete mobilization of every possiblemateriel resource. The concept came to beone of total war. France was convinced thather best defense lay in committing all herresources, both men and materiel, against anattacking enemy. The completely committed

fortifications on the northeast frontier wouldprotect France or at least give her time tomobilize and commit the nation in arms. AsMarshal Petain envisioned, "The active

..metropolitan army will act as the coveringforce; under its protection, the principal massbfour forces will be mobilized." I 0

And with regard to the citizen-soldier,.!trance had learned yet another importantJesson from the First World War; in it thereservist demonstrated that he could performadmirably in battle. Since republican Francetraditionally feared the conservatism of theprofessional soldier, she possessed a naturalbias in behalf of reliance upon citizen soldiers.Accordingly, France maintained short-termservice for the conscript and held the size ofthe professional component to acomparatively low figure. The term of service

, 'for the conscript was reduced from three totwo years in 1921, to 18 months in 1923, andt§ one year in 1928 (though later increased tot"fo years in 1935). During the same periodthe permanent component was graduallyre4uced to the point where it could be sparedorily for a few priority roles, e.g. in thefr?rtier fortifications, the conscript traininggerlters, and the planning staffs. Theprofessional army thus became the cadre fortr~ining the citizen-soldier before returning

.iti1U to civilian life; it also provided theu1U~rella of protection under which thearmed nation would be mobilized. "France

;h<l&no army in peacetime in the old sense ofthlfiword," according to Irving M. Gibson.

":'Shyhad only a permanent frontier guard and~1q,900 recruits under training. "11 The;t<;tiy~ army was described even in French lawa~attaining rather than fighting force. I 2 This

. s)(sty1U was to last through 1939 and thebeginning of World War II.

In addition to the firm belief in thepotential of a completely armed Frenchriation, this predominant emphasis on thecitizen-soldier was based on the beliefs thatsuch an army would be totally loyal to therepublican regime, that it could not be used ini~itiating an aggressive war. According to therepublican view, there was little likelihoodtil;ttt!le~rmy could be persuaded to actagainsgthyuepublican regime if it consisted

"WITHOUT A PROFESSIONALARMY, THERE CAN BE NOFRENCH DEFENSE." .

Lieutenant Colonel ' ',' .Charles De Gaulle, 1934 .

and mobilized nation, since it w'aspeace-loving, came to emphasize as well 'tile'defense as opposed to the offense, and the'citizen-soldier as opposed to professional. Formany Frenchmen the three-nation, in arms;defense, and citizen-soldier-becamesynonymous. .

There was little doubt that the nation inarms was based essentially on'. a . defensive.principle. An army composed, of' citiz~ns

performing their patriotic duty would b~ veryreluctant to aggressively attack another stat.e;however, they would willingly defend to thedeath their sacred French soil. The exampleof World War I also contributed to a'continued belief in this defensive principle.,French commanders-almost to aman-accepted the popular perception of the·Great War as a heroic defensive effort by anarmed nation. An aroused France hadsucceeded in 1914 in turning back the'invading German forces; why shouldn't sheagain succeed in the future? They had learnedtoo well the lessons of the First World Warand could visualize only a war similar to theprevious. Their vision rarely ranged above thetrenches of that war, which had validated theprinciple of the armed nation. As a result ofsuch outmoded thought, the offensive wasde-emphasized, and France's strategy betweenwars became one. of the armed· nationgloriously defending its borders. Francewould wait for Germany to strike the firstblow; then, after the initial attack had beenrepelled, she would undertake limited,methodical attacks of massed infantry, armor,and artillery. Armor would be used in theseattacks, but its purpose would be to supportthe infantry, not to conduct rapid,independent maneuvers. The ultimate resultof this thinking was the "Maginot LineComplex": the delusory belief that the

25

mostly of conscripts. Those who supportedthis view had only to look back to theprofessional army of Napoleon III to see themenace of such a military force. As for aprofessional army's being more prone toundertake international ventures, manyFrenchmen agreed with their countrymenwho asserted, "When one has such fine arms,there are always fools who are burning to trythem out, [for] ... soldiers, like iron, rust intimes of peace." I 3 In contrast, an armednation would fight only in defense of its ownterritory or for essential national needs. Sincethe nation in arms was composed ofcitizen-soldiers, it would be impossible forFrance to fight an aggressive war undesired bythe citizenry. Furthermore, the political leftbelieved that a professional army was notnecessarily a more effective fighting force.One leftist observer opined that "aprofessional army increases, in time of peace,the chances of war, and in times ofwar, ... diminishes the chances ofvictory."14 After all, a professional Frencharmy had lost the Franco-Prussian War of187Q.71, but a nation in arms had won theFirst World War.

The French, then, firmly believed in theprinciple of an aroused nation valiantlydefending itself, this belief reaching its zenithduring the 1930's when the political leftacquired its greatest power. The principleaccorded with their republican sentiments,furnished a means of controlling thepotentially reactionary military, and providedwhat they considered to be the most effectivenational defense strategy. The army thusbecame a deterrent or defensive force, ratherthan an aggressive war-making institution. Theclose relationship between the nation in armsand the army, and its consequences, werenoted in an army manual, ProvisionalInstructions for the Tactical Employment ofLarge Units. published by the French GeneralStaff from 1921 to 1936 and often referredto as the "Gospel of the Army": "The verylife of the citizenry is associated in anintimate fashion with that of the army, andthus the formula for the nation in arms isrealized in every aspect.... [This] greatlyinfluences the eventualities of war andconsequently the formation of strategy."15

26

T his common French perception ofnational defense strategy had a decisiveinfluence upon the manner in which theFrench army organized its armor forces. Sincearmored units were more capable than footsoldiers of offensive action, many thoughtthat lack of emphasis on large armoredformations would reduce the possibility ofFrance's starting a war. As one militaryobserver noted, "The Germans, who arenaturally aggressive and who prepare theirarmy for the attack, must naturally havearmored divisions. But France, being pacificand defensive, is bound to beanti-motorization."16 Important politicalleaders also adopted this attitude toward largearmored formations. For example, LeonBlum, leader of the Socialist Party and PrimeMinister from 1936-37, was convinced thatDe Gaulle and the High Command wereconspiring to create an aggressive army of"shock and speed." He felt that such aconception was a "menace to peace."17 Tomeet the threat of German invasion, even byarmored divisions, France would rely on afull-scale mobilization of French infantrymento defend the northeast frontier, therebyavoiding the possibility of French armor-ledaggression. The anti-tank gun, rather than thetank, was most accordant with France'sapproach to national defense, since it was lessexpensive, was primarily a defensive weapon,and could easily be handled by thecitizen-soldier.

DE GAULLE'S PROFESSIONAL ARMY

There were some early attempts in Franceto create a modern armored corps. The mostinfluential individual during the initial periodwas Colonel (later General) J. E. Estienne,now known as the "father of Frencharmor."18 An artillery officer, he conceivedthe idea of an armored fighting vehicle duringthe First World War and dubbed the Frenchtank units as the Artillerie d'Assaut, or assaultartillery. Yet, he clearly recognized the widerpossibility of tanks and in 1922. called for aprimitive type of armored division. His ideasfell on the deaf ears of the French HighCommand, and the separate headquarters ofthe armor command established during the

General J.E. Est/enne

war was soon abolished. In a decision thatreflected France's future approach to theemployment of tanks, questions regardingarmor were placed under the purview of theinfantry command. There were others whorecognized the potential of mechanizedwarfare. In July 1927, General Andre"Doumenc, who had served as GeneralEstienne's chief of staff in the Great War andwho was to serve in World WarII as the chiefof staff of the Armies of the Field underGeneral Alphonse Georges, called for theformation of large armored units. Also, acontinual trickle of articles and booksemphasizing the need for Frenchmechanization appeared in the interimbetween the wars.

One of the best known of these was Versl'armee de metier by Lieutenant Colonel(later General) Charles De Gaulle. This work,calling for the creation of a separate armoredcorps, first appeared in 1934. The thrust ofthe author's argument is suggested by his title.While the English translation of 1941 isentitled The Army of the Future, a bettertranslation would be Toward the Professional

27

Army. In this work, De Gaulle assertedessentially that quality is better thanquantity. A professional army is superior tothe nation in arms, and France shouldconstruct a strongly armored, professionalarmy. The fundamental assumption of theFrench national defense, that is, thesuperiority of the nation in arms over othermodes of defense, is fallacious.

De Gaulle observed several weaknesses inthe theory of the nation in arms. First, herecognized that the geographical nature ofFrance made it particularly vulnerable toattack. If converging attacks were made fromFlanders, the Ardennes, Alsace, or Lorraine,and one attack broke through the defenses, itcould "strike straight at the heart ofFrance"-Paris. The armed nation wasparticularly vulnerable in this situation, sinceits slowness to mobilize made it more likelythat a break could swiftly be made in thedefenses along France's frontiers. De Gaullealso believed that the nation in arms could bemobilized only during periods of the greatestdanger. Because commitment of the nation inarms to battle would necessarily entail heavylosses, he recognized that national securitywould have to be gravely imperiled beforeFrance would go to war. Vet, De Gaulle couldenvision instances when France would wantto "seize the coveted prize as swiftly aspossible, thus offering the adversary thealternative either of resigning himself to thefait accompli, or of assuming the risk and

"THE LAST WAR SAW THEPOWER OF MACHINERY REACHAN UNHEARD·OF DEGREE, BUTIT WAS BRUTAL ANDUNSTABLE. BY ADDING TO ITSPEED, IN THE HANDS OF ASELECT BODY OF MEN, THEFUTURE WILL RESTORE TO ITSOME OF ITS FORMERCHARACTER."

Lieutenant ColonelCharles DeGaulle, 1934

odium of a war of extermination."19 Hefirmly believed there were instances whenFrance would want to attack outside her ownborders. Therefore, he rejected the defensivenature of the nation in arms and, in effect,called for the creation of an army that couldlaunch a "preventive strike" or initiate animmediate offensive upon the declaration ofhostilities.

De Gaulle also attacked the fightingcapability of the citizen-soldier, and assertedthat too much stress was being placed onnumbers of personnel. With the increasingcomplexity of war machines, there existed a"latent opposition between mechanizationand the exclusive system of numericalstrength." Since war was becoming more andmore technical, he could not believe amassively armed populace would have greatmilitary power simply because it was armed.He was particularly disturbed by theinadequate training the conscript received:"Soon, someone will set up as a principle thatthe less military training a nation has had, thebetter it fights, as Emile acquired learningthrough not having studied."2 0 The increasein the technical level of warfare, in his view,demanded more highly trained troops, notsimply more troops.

Thus, De Gaulle attacked the efficacy ofthe entire concept of the nation in arms. Heasserted that "No form of battle is morebloody than that of nations in arms." Thesolution was to establish a professional army."Without a professional army, there can be noFrench defense."21 A professional armywould have both an offensive and a defensivecapability, could be used immediatelywithout wasting precious time mobilizing,would compel economy in both personneland in materiel, and could be highly trained inthe use of modern weapons of war. Francewould still require a system of reserves, sincethis elite force could not possibly destroy allthe forces of the enemy in an all-out war. Butthe "picked troops" of a professional armywould be the foundation of France's defensesand would be the "vanguard of the mobilizednation."22

As for mechanized forces, De Gaulle'sprofessional army would consist primarily of

28

French B-1 Tank.

armored units. It would be composed of100,000 volunteers, composing six divisions.Each division would have three brigades (oneeach of armor, infantry and artillery) withsupporting engineer, signal, reconnaissance,and aerial units. The army would also have alight armored division for scouting purposes, abrigade of heavy tanks for attackingpermanent fortifications, and assorted othersupport units. This professional army, then,would be a powerfully armed, swiftly movingbody employing all the potential of armoredforces. To use De Gaulle's descriptiveterminology, "the aristocrats of war" wouldbecome "the chief element of maneuver."2 3

But De Gaulle had unfortunately linked thegrowth of French armored forces to theappearance of a professional army. Thislinkage required a rejection of the tradition ofthe nation in arms and was a direct affront tomuch French republican sentiment.Additionally, he had committed heresy bysuggesting that France itself could initiate awar, and by intimating that expansion of herfrontiers could be in her general interests.Thus, De Gaulle, by suggesting the possibleuse of armored forces in an aggressive role,corroborated many of the fears of those whoopposed armored forces for France. In thedebate over mechanization, his proposalshifted attention to the demand for aprofessional army, rather than to the meritsof large armored formations.

>~•<•,

THE POLITICAL REACTION

There is little doubt that De Gaulle'sargument aroused the suspicion andopposition of important political leaders.L~on Blum expressed the complaint that DeGaulle had "combined two ideas, which in myopinion should not be associated in anydegree: one was the strategic employment oflarge armored units and the other was thereturn of the professional army. I wastempted by the first idea; I was a resoluteadversary of the other."2 4 Such sentimentson the part of the political left becameincreasingly apparent, for it considered itselfthe true heir and defender of Frenchrevolutionary and republican ideals. To theleftists, the shibboleth of the nation in armswas sacred. Many members of the politicalleft would have preferred a militia rather thanan active army, and nothing was morecontradictory to their beliefs than aprofessional army. De Gaulle's book couldnot have been published at a moreinopportune moment, for when it appearedFrance was attempting to amend the law of1928 and convert from one-year to two-yearservice in the army. On March 15, 1935 (theeve of Hitler's denunciation of the clauses ofthe Versailles treaty providing for Germandisarmament), Blum cited the book asevidence in the Chamber of Deputies thatwhile the High Command was apparentlyseeking two-year service it ultimately wantedto create a professional army.25 Nothingcould have been further from the militaryhierarchy's intentions.

Because of their controversial nature, DeGaulle's theories received little support fromthe War Ministers. Edouard Daladier, WarMinister from December 1932 throughJanuary 1934 and from June 1936 throughMay 1940, asserted: "General De Gaullesystematized the [armored] doctrine with anincomparable brilliance, but, in my opinion,was mistaken to tie his concept to aprofessional army. For as much... as Iunderstand the need for armored divisions, Isay that I am hostile to the creation of aprofessional corps of 100,000 men that risksbeing engaged in an offensive

29

adventure....26 Jean Fabry, War Minister inthree different cabinets between 1934 and1936, felt that it was unnecessary to create aspecial mechanized corps that could not byitself protect the national territory. Such anelite unit would detract from overall defenseneeds; besides, such an organization hadprecisely the same objective as France'sexisten t covering forces. 2 7 GeneralJoseph-Leon-Marie Maurin, also War Ministerin three different cabinets during the period1934-36, also perceived as inappropriate DeGaulle's ideas: "How could anyone believethat we can still contemplate an offensive,when we have spent billions to establish afortified barrier? Would we be foolish enoughto go beyond this barrier, to I do not knowwhat kind of adventure?"28 With theaddition of Marshal Petain, War Minister fromFebruary through November 1934, to theopposition, every individual who hadoccupied or was to occupy the War Officefrom 1932 through May 1940 attacked DeGaulle's scheme, with their public objectionsconcentrated on the professional andaggressive nature of his mechanized force.

Nonetheless, certain political leaderssupported De Gaulle's ideas, chief amongthem being Paul Reynaud, who became theparliamentary champion of the armoredcorps. Reynaud was convinced France wasagain preparing for the war that had just beenfought, while the Germans were preparing forthe war of the future. He earnestly believed

Reynaud and POiain

the key to a successful defense for France layin mechanization, and he asserted thatarmored units "should be the gauntlet of steelwith which you strike the adversary thedecisive blow."2 9 Reynaud saw a need for theFrench armored force to be an elite unit thatwould spearhead the national army, anddescribed it as "the steel head of the lancewhile the national army would be the wood."He also accepted the idea that soldiers servingwith armored units required additionaltraining and expertise, and thus lengthierservice in the army. As he described it,putting the complex, fragile, and expensivetank in the hands of short-term conscriptswould be the same as "putting torpedo boatsin the hands of neophytes."3 0 Reynaudeven tually offered legislation for theformation of an "elite corps" barelydistinguishable from De Gaulle's professionalarmy, but it proved impossible to disassociatearmored units from the politically explosiveissue of professionalism. De Gaulle's armoredmodel could not be reshaped to fit the moldof the French nation in arms; it had been tooclosely linked to the b~e noire of Frenchpolitics, the professional army.

DE GAULLE AND THE MILITARY HIERARCHY

All of the foregoing is in no way to claimcivilian responsibility for French failure torecognize the potential of large armored units.Four generals-Henri-Philippe Petain,Marie-Eugene Debeney, Maxime Weygand,and Maurice-Gamelin-held the positions ofVice President of the Superior War Counciland Chief of the General Staff of the Frencharmy from the early 1920's through 1940.Each of them openly opposed the ideas of DeGaulle. Though apparently recognizing thatthe political climate was not propitious forthe formation of a professional armoredforce, they chose to reject that force on itsown merits. Not surprisingly, their objectionsalso revolved around the questions ofprofessional army and the nation in armsinstead of the value of mechanization. 31 Ineach case, they emphasized the special linkbetween army and nation, frequently morevigorously than their civilian counterparts.

30

They felt a national army was the mosteffective mode of defense, and that aprofessional army would actually detractfrom France's ability to defend herself.Marshal Petain asserted, "Since modernstruggles naturally involve putting to work thetotality of the people's resources, our nationaldefense should be established on the principleof the armed nation. This conceptioncorresponds exactly to the political and socialstate of a nation lacking all territorialambition and having no objection other thanthe safeguarding of its soil."3 2 The nationaldefense system existent in France in 1935 hadbeen established by the organization law of1927 and the recruitment law of 1928; thesehad firmly institutionalized-more than in anyother period-France's tradition of the nationin arms. As General Debeney stated in 1930,"The metropolitan army, the army of theFrench territory, organized by the laws of1927-1928 is entirely oriented toward arealization as complete as possible of thenation in arms."33 In the period after 1930,there was little or no questioning of thissituation by the military.

If there were any questions regardingFrance's approach to national defense, theyrevolved around whether Germany's armywould remain small and whether a sufficientnumber of conscripts would be available tomaintain the French army's strength at anappropriate level. With the rearming ofGermany in March 1935 and the appearanceof a number of lean recruiting years from1935 to 1939 because of the low birth rate inWorld War I, these questions became critical.The predicament brought on a bitter period inFrench civil-military relations,34 but therewas still no concerted attack on the principleof the nation in arms. What the militarysought was an increase in the term of servicefrom one year to two years, not a change inthe basic principle of the national defense. AsMarshal Petain asserted, "It is not necessaryto change the principles upon which ourmilitary system rests."35 When the term ofservice was increased in 1935, themobilization system established in 1927-28was retained. The armed nation remained thefirm basis of the French military philosophy.

Once the military leaders had accepted this professional army is above all an offensivereality, their other decisions and views on instrument."38national defense followed from that Military leaders also attacked De Gaulle'sacceptance. First, there was no doubt that the concept of a professional army for tending tonational army would have to be defensive. split the national army into two armies,The active army was too small for initiating thereby causing the second-line army toan offensive; further, it had been designed as a suffer. This was not a theory solelycovering force for the mobilization of the constructed to counter De Gaulle. Generalentire nation. There was also some Debeney had offered the objection as early asquestioning of the ability of any national 1930, when he described the problems andarmy to launch an offensive immediately limitations of a professional army for France.upon mobilization, since in comparison to the After De Gaulle offered his theory, Debeney'sdefense the offensive required a greater degree argument resurfaced39 and was a continualof training and discipline on the part of the theme in the works of the military hierarchyindividual, as well as greater unit cohesiveness, attacking De Gaulle. Essentially, these soldierstraining, and efficiency. In sum, the military viewed the professional army as a siphon thathierarchy doubted that short-term conscripts would progressively act to drain resourcescould acquire sufficient skills in their brief. from the legitimate needs of national defense.period of service to be prepared for the.. Even though the division into a professionaloffensive. For example, General . and non-professional component might workNarcisse-Alfred-Gabriel-Louis Chauvineau, . initially, the second force would eventuallyknown as the "high priest of the defense," suffer in peacetime when the question ofsaw the nation in arms. as eminently' finance'S became difficult. The needs of theappropriate for the national defense.' But professional force would probably be met atwhen he entertained the possibility of an . the expense of the remainder of the army,offensive immediately .upon the beginning of: . and the best personnel would also tend tohostilities, he suggested the creation of a: gravitate toward the professional army. The"small, special army," specifically trained for defense of France would thus rest on anthe offensive. This "special army" would rely insufficiently prepared second-line force if theon servicemen with an obligation of no less professional component did not prove equalthan four years, rather than on conscripts of to the task. General Debeney graphicallyshort-term service. 36 In the absence of the predicted the armored corps' fate against astiffening afforded by long-term service, mass' German army: "We will have a brilliantFrench military leaders werereluetant to communique at the beginning, then silence,commit their army to an early offensive. / and after a few days, a useless S.O.S."4 0

This is not to say that emphasis onllie With respect to the question of qualitydefensive was due solely to the armed nation' versus quantity, which De Gaulle hadprinciple, for the military view of the broached, General Weygand commented:citizen-soldier and the defensive was "The question is not of opposing quality toobviously reinforced by other factors such as quantity, this is a simple play on words, butthe great lethality of modern weapons, which of disposing at all times of quality inenabled the defender to inflict heavy sufficient quantity, and very rapidlycasualties on an attacker. It was normally afterwards, of quantity provided withassumed that the attacker required a massive quality." France most of all had to "fear ansuperiority of "three times as much infantry, abrupt attack, unleashed without asix times the artillery, and fifteen times the declaration of war." She had to have an armyammunition."37 In view then of the with enough strength in manpower andprevailing army predilection for the defense, materiel to stop the initial attack, and enoughDe Gaulle's attack on the nation in arms potential to expand its size for the long war.gained him little support among the military A professional army, it was argued, detractedcommunity, which firmly believed "The from both these capabilities. It could possibly

31

be checked and shattered in its initialaggressive assault, leaving France ill-defendedduring national mobilization; furthermore,resources allocated to it would seriouslydetract from the potential for molding aneffective national army. As General Weygandasserted, the second-line army would quickly"fall to the state of a resigned militia, withoutpride, without life."41 Only a national army,supported by all the resources of the nation,could meet French defense requirements.Modern warfare was simply too vast anenterprise for an elite force alone to fight anation's battles. As Marshal Petain noted,"War ... today is no longer only that ofprofessional armies, but that of entirepeoples, abundant with all their resources andwith all their faith."4 2, ,

General Emile Allehaut, one of the mostperceptive French officers of his day and onewho labelled the argument for a purelydefensive army as "abominable sophism," alsoopposed De Gaulle's conclusions. AIltlhautwas a strong advocate of mechanization andrecognized that there was some agreementbetween his ideas and those of De Gaulle, forexample, recognition of the need for a strongcovering force based on maneuver and armor.But he could not accept De Gaulle's insistenceupon a professional army. The republicans,according to Allehaut, "are distrustful, rightlyor wrongly, a professional army will beconsidered a praetorian army, an army for acoup d'etat.... Hence, of what use is asystem based on an institution that domesticpolitics will not allow?" Allehaut expressedhis confidence in a national army as the"generator of the spirit of sacrifice and ofabnegation which has permitted the Writing ofnever-to-be-forgotten pages [of history]: theMarne, Verdun, the Somme, Champagne, andmany others...."4 3 Thus, in the views ofmany soldiers, a professional army was athreat to a triumphant national martial spirit,for it would create an elite force apart fromthe populace. Only a national army respondedto the French national spirit and to theegalitarian principle giving rise to this spirit.

THE ECLIPSE OF THE ARMORED CORPS

The French military hierarchy thus rejected

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De Gaulle's highly mobile, professional armywithout adequately studying the merits oflarge armored formations. At the same timethey opted for the continued application ofthe methods learned from World War I. Theintroduction to the 1937 edition ofInstructions for the Tactical Employment ofLarge Units stated: "The mass of doctrinethat was objectively fixed, on the morrow ofvictory, by eminent leaders who had butrecen tly exercised high command ...remain[s] the authorized guide for thetactical employment of large units."4 4Implicit in the retention of the old preceptswas the rejection of the newly proposed largearmored units, even though the approach toarmor was more realistic in the 1937 than inthe 1921 manual. The French High Commandstill seriously questioned the potential of thetank, observing, "At the present time, theanti-tank weapon confronts the tank as,during. the last war, the machine gunconfronted the infantry."45 Many officersconsidered the terrain on the Franco-Germanfrontier to be unsuitable for armoredformations, and the example of the SpanishCivil War was often cited to refute thosepraising the potential of mechanized warfare.Until the beginning of World War II, the HighCommand's answer to armor proponents wasthat armor "needed further study," and theoperations bureau concluded that no changein French tactics was necessary despitePoland's frightening experience with theGerman armored blitzkrieg. The first Frencharmored division was not created untilOctober 1939, and when Germany attackedin May 1940 France had only three armoreddivisions in being with a fourth (commandedby De Gaulle) being formed.

France's consideration of armor had beenfar from zealous because of its perceivedthreat to the basic republican tenets of thenation in arms. De Gaulle's equation of aprofessional army with an armored corps, andhis attack upon nation in arms, served only tosolidify opposition to separate armoredforces. While he may have been the Frenchprophet of armor, his linking of a mobilearmy to professionalism was a major reasonfor the French failure to recognize the valueof large armored forces. Others such as Blum,

Armored Commander De Gaulle, 1940

Daladier, Petain and Gamelin failed tounderstand the true potential of armor, butDe Gaulle committed an equally grave errorby associating armored units withprofessionalism and thus making it politicallyuntenable for France to acquire large armoredforces until the beginning of the war, when itwas too late to gain sufficient experience intheir use. Had he been more politic, seekinginstead the creation of an armored force in amanner not directly challenging widely heldFrench views on national defense, or more inagreement with the tradition of the nation inarms, the chances for the earlier creation oflarge armored units would have beenmaterially enhanced. Political considerationsand military traditions, not advances inmilitary doctrine, had determined the shapeof France's defenses, and ultimately herfuture.

NOTES

1. The number of French tanks is calculated byadding the 2,285 battle tanks given by LieutenantCoionel Charles de Cosse-Brissac in "Combien de

33

chars Francais contre combien de chars Allemands Ie10 Mai 1940?" Revue de Defense Nationale (July1947), 81, to the 146 automitrailleuses de combatmentioned by General Maurice Gamelin in Servir(Paris, 1946), I, 157.

2. Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten(Heidelberg, 1951), p. 429.

3. Commission d'enquete parlementaire: Lesevenements survenus en France de 1933 iz 1945:Rapport, (Paris, 1952), II, 306. (Hereafterabbreviated as Commission d'enquete: Rapport.); andGamelin, pp. 157-9.

4. A Goutard, 1940: La guerre des occasionsperdues (Paris, 1956), p. 84.

5. France, Assemble"e Nationale (1947),Commission d 1enqU'ete parlementaire: LeseVenements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945:Temoignages (Paris, 1951), I, 169-70. (Hereaftera b b rev i ate d as Commission d 'enql1ete:Temoignages. )

6. On the entire question of the nation in arms,see Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of theNation in Arms, 1866-1939 (New York: Russell &Russell, 1965). His work is fundamental for anunderstanding of French military institutions.

7. David B. Ralston, ed., Soldiers and States:Ovil-Military Relations in Modern Europe (Boston:Heath, 1966), p. 66.

8. See J. Monteilhet, Les Institutions Militairesde la France, 1814-1932 (Paris, 1932), pp. 110-53.

9. Journal Officiel de la R,(publique Francaise:Documents Parlementaires (1904), p. 148.

10. Marechal Philippe Potain, "La securite de laFrance aux cours des annees efeuses," Revue desDeux Mondes, 26 (1935), i.

11. Irving M. Gibson, "Maginot and Liddell Hart:The Doctrine of Defense," Makers of ModernStrategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 369-70.

12. Philip C. F. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand andCivil-Military Relations in Modern France(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), p. 41.

13. Jules Simon, La politique radicale (Paris,1868), p. 181.

14. Monteilhet, p. xvi.15. France, Ministere de la Guerre, Instructions

provisoire sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unitEs(Paris, 1922), p. 11.

16. Gene'ral X (anonymous), "L'annee de metier,"Mercure de France, 267 (1936), 14-15.

17. Le'on Blum, "A bas l'armee de m~tier!" LePopulaire, December 1, 1934, p. 1.

18. See General P. A. Bourget, Le generalEstienne, penseur, ingenieur et soidat (Paris, 1956);and Colonel Georges Ferre, Le de[aut de l'armure;Nos chars pouvaient-ils vaincre en1940?-Enseignements et perspectives nouvelles(Paris, 1948).

19. Charles De Gaulle, The Army of the Future,trans. Walter Millis (Phllade1phia: Lippincott, 1941),p.77.

20. Ibid., pp. 58,60.21. Ibid., pp. 43, 89.22. Charles De Gaulle, "Comment faire une armee

de metier," in Trois Etudes, ed. L Nachin (Paris,1945), p. 122.

23. De Gaulle, Army of the Future, p. 69.24. Commission d'enquete: Temoignages, 1, 223.25. Journal Offidel de la RepubUque Francaise:

Chambre Debats (1935), p. 1025. (Hereafterabbreviated as J. O. Ch. Deb.)

26. Commission d'enqu'ete: Te'moignages, 1,22.27. J. O. Ch. Deb. (1935), p. 2776.28. Ibid, p. 1045.29. Commission d'enqu'7Jte: Temoignages, 1,97.30. J. O. Ch. Deb. (1937), p. 297; (1935), p.

1041. See also Commission d'enqUete: Te'moignages,1,103.

31. The High Command demonstrated itsintolerance of any more "new" ideas in 1935, statingthat only the High Command was qualified to definemilitary doctrine. Thenceforth, military writings didlittle more than mirror official doctrine. See GeneralAndre Beaufre, "Liddell Hart and the French Army,1919-1939," in The Theory and Practice of War, ed.Michael Howard (New York: Praeger, 1966), p.140.

32. Petain, "La securite de la France, "p. VII.33. General Debeney, Surla securit!miUtaire de la

France (Paris, 1930), p. 28.34. Some of the resistance of the military leaders

to De Gaulle was undoubtedly due to their awarenessof the reaction his ideas were producing in thepolitical community. See Bankwitz, pp. 83-115,151-67.

35. Petain, "La securU!de la France," p. VII.36. General Chauvineau, Une invasion: Est-elle

encore possible? (Paris, 1939), pp. 149·50.37. Ibid., p. 122.38. Petain, "Preface" to Chauvineau, p. XIII.39. Debeney, Sur la securite militarie de la France;

"Encore ranne'e de me'tier," Revue des Deux Mondes,28 (1935), 279·95.

40. Debeney, "Encore," p. 283.41. Gent;ral Weygand, "L'etat militaire de la

France," Revue des Deux Mondes, 35 (1936), 724;and "L'unite de l'armee," Revue Militaire General, 1(1937), 16, 18·19. Interestingly enough, Weygandopposed De Gaulle's ideas even though he had.provided for the motorization of five infantrydivisions and for the transformation of a cavalrydivision into a light mechanized division.

42. Marechal Petain, Hpreface" to Colonel P.Vauthier, La doctrine de guerre de General Douhet(Paris, 1935), p. XI.

43. General Emile Allehaut, Etre Prets (Paris,1935), pp. 145, 179.

44. France, Ministry of War, Instructions for theTactical Employment of Large Units, trans.Lieutenant Colonel Richard U. Nicholas (1937 ed.;Fort Leavenworth, 1938), p. 1.

45. Ibid., p. 4.

French tank destroyed by the Wehrmacht, 1940.

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