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8/13/2019 Day 1 - The Use of Hazop Techniques in Applied Hazard Processes
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The use of HAZOP Techniques
in Applied Hazard Processes
By
Datuk Ir Ahmad Nordeen SallehLRTS Director/Principal Consultant
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Background
Modern safety legislation places responsibilityon Owners, Operators and Manufacturers toidentify and manage the risks associated with
their operations and products and todemonstrate that they are doing so in aneffective manner.
This has led many of them to appreciate the
benefits of doing formal Risk Assessmentmethods as the starting point in their riskmanaging process.
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Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)Overview
With increased employee, managementand public awareness of Safety, peoplehave become less tolerant of Risks.
This has resulted in increased concernover the Safety, Health and Environmentalimpact of a plant-facility and its activities,
stronger public opinion, higher litigationand stricter Regulations.
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Regulatory Requirements for MajorHazard Installations (MHI)
Factories and Machinery Act (FMA) 1967
- Regular Inspections of Plants and Vessels.
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
1994General Duties of Employers.
Control of Industrial Major Hazard Accident(CIMAH) 1996Safety Case, On and Off-siteERP and Information to Public.
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PHA in PETRONAS
As part of PETRONAS HSE/S MS program,
PHA is now made a mandatory for examplePetrochemical complex facility- to provide a
framework for a structured approach toassessing risks, and
Decisions are based on systematic analysis ofrisks and identification to reduce risks as low as
reasonably practicable.
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Course Objectives
Provide an understanding of Process SafetyManagement (PSM) framework and necessaryProcess Hazard Analysis (PHA) requirements in
Applied Hazard Processes.
Introduce commonly used tools and techniquesavailable for Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment used in conducting HAZOP analysis.
Develop the necessary knowledge to understand whatare the fundamental elements to consider in dealingwith risky activities of Hazardous Installations, by the
review of two major incidents in Oil & Gas Industries.
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Course ObjectivesDay 1
Part 1 - Introduction to hazards, risks, and theirmanagement
Part 2 - Overview of the Process Safety Management(PSM) framework
Part 3Overview of the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)process, in particular HAZOP studies
Part 4 - Linking Controls through the SafetyManagement System (SMS)
Part 5Case Studies
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Part 1
Hazard & Risk, and theirmanagement
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Past Oil and Gas and Processing IndustryAccidents
Flixborough, 1974
Cyclohexane explosion 28 killed
Bophal, 1984
Methyl-isocyanate (MIC)
release More than 2000 killed
Pasadena, 1989
Polyethylene explosion
23 killed Piper Alpha, 1988
Hydrocarbon explosion
167 killed
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Accident Cost Iceberg
From the financialpoint of view, costsresulting fromdeath and injuryare just a fraction
of the overallfinancial impact ona business
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Definitions
HARM - Physical injury or damage to health, damage tothe property or/and damage to the environment
HAZARDA source of harm to human lives
SAFETYFreedom from danger/harm, the inverse of risk
Examples of hazard:
- Ethylene inventory in storage sphere
- High pressure steam
- Heavy vehicle movements onsite
(Note: Loss of containment is the realization of the hazard)
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Examples of NaturalDisasters
Natural DISASTERS
Tsunamis
Earthquakes Windstorms (typhoons, hurricanes, cyclones,
etc.)
Floods
Volcanic Eruptions
Meteor strikes
Man-made DISASTERS can be equallybad.
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Definitions
ACCIDENTSAn event resulting from theactual realisation of a hazard, resulting ininjuries and damages.
They may be due to sudden unintendeddeviations from normal operatingconditions, in which some degree of harm is
caused.
Sometimes a neutral term eventor
incidentis used in place of accident
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Definitions
RISKThe likelihood of a specific undesired event tooccur within a specified period or specified circumstances
Example:
1. Undesired Event: Car breakdown and stranded in remote
area or at nightLikelihood: Once in 5 years
Risk: Stranded in remote area/at night once in 5 years
2. Undesired Event: Gas explosion in congested processing
area and injuryLikelihood: Once in 20 years
Risk: Injury from gas explosion once in 20 years
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Risk - Exercise
Rank the risk(High, Medium or Low) of the following
activities or technologies and compare your ranking withthose of a risk professional
Driving a motor vehicle
Smoking
Driving a motorcycles
Swimming
Working in large construction site
Commercial aviation Fire fighting
Traveling by rail
Working in a nuclear power station
Skiing
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Aspects of Risk
1.Time element involved
2.Two-dimensional (Severity / Likelihood)
3.Ascribed quantity (does not exist as a
measurable quantity)
4.It is a probability and hence associated
with uncertainty
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Understanding Risk Really answering a series of questions:
What can go wrong? (Identification)
How likely is it to go wrong? (Likelihood)
How bad can it get if it does go wrong(Severity)
Do I need to worry about it?
What are my options for the Controlmeasures?
What is my last course of action? ( quickDecision making)
Analysis of actual accidents has shown that oneor more of the questions above had not beenaddressed adequately by an organization.
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How Low is Low Enough?
How do we know that a risk is low enough to beacceptable?
Risk is not an absolute quantity, it is relative. Therefore,we need some measures of risk, so that relative riskscan be compared.
Risk of an event can only be understood in comparisonwith other risks.
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Risk Measurement
Risk measurement can be qualitative, semi-quantitativeor quantitative
Overall process is generally the same, the difference liesin the approaches to frequency and consequenceevaluation
This difference is reflected in how risks are presentedand mitigation measures evaluated
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Objectives of Risk Measurement
To identify and rank risks in the order of importance
To provide an objective comparison of risk
To help decisions about risk acceptability (compareagainst set criteria)
To help capital project decisions.
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Qualitative Risk Representation Risk Matrix Approach
(next slide contains categories)
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Qualitative Risk Representation
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Risk Matrix ManagementPhilosophy
Do not have risks in Very High category.
Reduce to at least High level.
Reduce High risks to lower levels, or at least to
ALARP level.
Reduce Medium risks to Low where possible,
or at least to ALARP level.
Manage residual risk through
effective SMS.
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Part 2
Overview ofProcess SafetyManagement
(PSM)
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Proactive Approach RiskManagement
If you do not manage your risks, theyll
manage you
Need to conduct systematic risk assessment
Need to develop the appropriate risk profile
Need to coordinate and manage a setof activitiesthat control the risks
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Process Safety Management(PSM)
Process Safety Management (PSM) is an OccupationalHealth and Safety Authority (OSHA) standard.
Petronas has implemented a Process SafetyManagement (PSM) framework based upon the OSHAstandard. All Petronas sites are required to comply withand meet the requirements and expectations of thestandard.
The PSM standard contains the requirements for themanagement of hazards associated with processesusing hazardous chemicals to help assure safe and
healthful workplaces.
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Process Safety Management(PSM)
Clarifies the responsibilities of employers andcontractors involved in work that affects or takes placenear processes to ensure the safety of employees,contractors and public
Requires a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) review.The PHA is a thorough, orderly, and systematic reviewof what could go wrong and what safeguards must be
implemented to prevent releasesof hazardouschemicals
The PHA methodology must be appropriate to thecomplexity of the process.
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Process Safety Management (PSM)
Mandates:
1.Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
2.Establishing normal process operating limits -Critical Operating Parameters (COPs) and Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs)3.Procedures for all phases of operation i.e. routine
operation, start-up, maintenance, abnormal andemergency operation and emergency shutdown
4.Employee and contractor selection, training, andcompetency standards
5.Communication and consultation with employees
6.Pre-start-up reviews
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Process Safety Management (PSM)
Mandates (cont.)
7.Management of Change for processes,permit systems, temporary operationprocedures
8.Evaluation of mechanical integrity ofcritical equipment
9.Emergency action planning, drills, andresponse
10.Investigation of incidents involvingreleases or near misses
11.PSM Framework and SMS complianceauditing
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Why Process SafetyManagement (PSM)?
Regulatory requirement
Duty of careto protect the healthand safety of employees and the
public, and the environment from theactivities of the company
Minimise business interruption
Allocate resources in a timely andcost effective manner
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Part 3
Process Hazard Analysis
(PHA) TechniquesTo be considered
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Process Hazard Analysis
A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a thorough, orderly,and systematic review of what could go wrong and whatsafeguards must be implemented to prevent releases ofhazards chemicals
The Process Hazard Analysis is used to manage processsafety by: Identifying hazards and their control relationships;
Characterizing the hazards in terms of potential consequences, theirlikelihood of occurrence;
Gives insight by providing relative risk levels, and their tolerability asindividual hazards or as a collective against common criteria;
Identifying key control measures used to control these hazar
The PHA methodology must be appropriate to the
complexity of the process.
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
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Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)Process
Risk Assessment
Define the context
Hazard Identification
Risk Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Treating Risk
Mon
itor
andReview
Training,Su
pportand
Commun
ication
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Define Context
The PHA Framework requires The context to beframed. This refers to the following activities:
Involving the appropriate people at the appropriatestages (consultation, involvement of designers,
operators, maintainers, contractors, specialistconsultants)
Defining the exact purpose of the study, the generalapproach that will be taken, and how the results will be
used Gathering and preparation of the necessary information,
and
Identification of plant / activity areas to be assessed
The PHA methodology must be appropriate to the
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Define Context
The following information is generally useful / required atsome point in the process:
Safety Management System Information (corporatepolicies, risk criteria, design philosophies, manning
philosophies, training philosophies) Plant design information (design basis, hazard
registers, civil & mechanical, capacity and inventory)
Process technology information (materials,
flammability, toxicity, process chemistry, materials ofconstruction, P&IDs, electrical classifications,operating procedures)
Process Safety Information (interlocks, detection, or
suppression systems and relief system design
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Hazard Identification (HAZID)
A systematic review of the system to identify the type ofinherent hazards that are present, together with theways in which they could be realised (what can gowrong and under what circumstances)
The Hazard Identification (HAZID) identifies ControlMeasures (CM) both on the prevention and protectionside of the Event Sequence
Documentation and knowledge generated in this phase
of the PHA is crucial for effective Risk Assessment.
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Hazard Identification (HAZID)Hazard Identification has the following
objectives:
Determine the type and range of hazardousconsequences
Determine the Event Sequence that could lead toa Major Accident Event
Initial evaluation of the significance of theidentified hazards including consideration of
existing / proposed safeguards Remember: Unidentified hazards may
undermine the effectiveness of the whole PHAprocess
H d Id ifi i I id
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Hazard IdentificationIncidentEvent Sequence
The incident event sequence consists of:
Initiating eventsequipment or componentfailures / human actions
Hazardous incidents - loss of containment / lossof control
Outcome events - fire / explosion / toxic gasrelease
Incident consequences - immediate physicaleffects / ultimate harm to vulnerable targets
(people, property,environment)
Incident escalation
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HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
Databases
Previous work
Experience
Site visits Failure casesand consequences
Safety systems
Assumptions
Plant facilities
INPUT OUTPUTPROCESS
Hazard Identification Methodology
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Site Inspection
Brainstorming
What-if Techniques (SWIFT)
Checklists / Scenario based studies (i.e. HAZID)
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); or
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Hazard Identification (HAZID)Techniques
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HAZOPDefinition & History
It is a design review technique used for hazardidentification and design deficiencies which maygive rise to operability problems.
It is commonly applied where the operationsinvolved can be hazardous and theconsequences of failure to control the hazardsmay be significant in term of damage to life, the
property and the environment
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HAZOPDefinition & History
It was developed in the UK Chemical andPetrochemical industries in 1977, in orderto assess the safety of complex plant and
processes which had significant hazardpotential.
It has been used extensively since then insafety studies for industrial, nuclear andchemical plant, including offshoreinstallations.
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It is a systematic technique for identifying hazards andoperability problems;
Consider various deviations from design intent byapplication of guidewords;
Identifies possible causes of these deviations;
Evaluates existing safeguards;
Recommends actions, if necessary, to overcome theproblems identified; and
Record results, including making recommendations.Note that it is not very effective for mechanical failure or loss
of containment hazards, but more effective for processhazards
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)techniques
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HAZOP Guidewords
NO MORE
LESS
PART OF
AS WELL AS
REVERSE
OTHER THAN
Flow
Temperature
Pressure
Level
Chemical comp.
Physical state
No Less More Reverse
Other
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X X
Type of use: normal
start-up
shutdown
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The HAZOPMethodology
HAZOP Completed
Repeat for all Sub-Systems
Repeat for other Guide Words
Decide on any required Actions
Assess Safeguards
Examine Consequences
Examine Possible Causes
Deviation
Apply a Guide Word
Select a Sub-System of chosenSystem (e.g. feed line to vessel)
Select a System
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Framework for Risk Acceptability
Unacceptable region
Risk cannot be justified
save in extraordinarycircumstances
Tolerable only if riskreduction is
impracticableor if its cost is grosslydisproportionate to theimprovement gained
Necessary to maintain
assurance that riskremains at this level. Thisis also part of ALARP
The ALARPdemonstration
region(Risk is tolerableonly if ALARPdemonstrated)
Broadly Acceptableregion
(No need for detailedworking to demonstrateALARP)
Negligible Risk
DIVERGING LINES
INDICATING
INCREASING RISK
Intolerable Risk
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Part 4
Linking Hazard Control Measuresto the Safety Management
System (SMS)
Awareness
Elements of a Safety Management System
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Elements of a Safety Management System
A number of different SMS models exist. Almost all ofthem use the same set of elements:1. Organisation and responsibility;
2. Employee selection, competency, involvement & communication;
3. Process safety information documentation and informationmanagement;
4. *Risk management (Hazard Identification, risk assessment andcontrols);
5. Safety and integrity in design, construction and commissioning;
6. Operations and maintenance (associated procedures, inspection,testing and monitoring);
7. Management of change;
8. Emergency preparedness and response;
9. Management of third party services (procurement, contractors,others);
10. Incident reporting, investigation and follow-up;
11. Audits and corrective actions, including health surveillance; and
12. Management review for continual improvement.
Implementation of Process Hazard
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Implementation of Process HazardAnalysis (PHA) into the Safety
Management System (SMS) All Hazards identified by the Process Hazard Analysis
(PHA) must be recorded in Hazard Registers that form partof the Safety Management System (SMS).
All control measures identified by the PHA must be
managed by elements of the Safety Management System(SMS).
Essential control measures identified through the PHArequire Performance Standards, Performance Indicators,
Testing regimes etc. The lifecycle risk management process ensures that this
occurs from project conception through to the end ofoperational life / decontamination.
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Implementation of Process Hazard Analysisinto the Safety Management System
Tools / activities commonly comprising parts ofthe Safety Management System (SMS) include:
Training and skills competency management plans Operating / maintenance procedures
Maintenance management systems
Inspection, Verification, Audits
Emergency Response Plans (ERP)
I l i f SMS
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Implementation of SMS Plan
- Ensure procedures are developed- Ensure work instructions are complete
- Develop training modules
Do
- Conduct training
- Start using procedures
- Provide assistance initially in using the
procedures correctly
Check
- Verify that procedures are understood- Verify procedures are used correctly
Act
- Start using procedures routinely
- Hold feedback meetings and takeremedial actions until system is satisfied.
Do
CheckAct
Plan
Some Problems with Implementation into
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pthe SMS
Safety culture conflicts with managementinitiative
Lack of understanding of hazards
Lack of adequate resources
Lack of adequate skills
Poor perception of the importance of SMS,seen as unnecessary extra work
Not understanding the difference betweenProcess Safety and Occupational Safety
Features of a Safety
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Features of a SafetyManagement System*
* Ref: Safety Case Guidelines, NOPSA, Australia, 2004
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Part 5
Case Studies
Examples
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Case Histories of Past Incidents Lessons can be learnt from the following:
- Case histories of past incidents in the companysfacilities
- Case histories of incidents in the offshoreindustry worldwide
- Investigation reports of past incidents Understand the causes of the incidents and relate to
the appropriate SMS element/ procedure
Identify if recommendations from previous
investigations are applicable to ones own system Take action to ensure these gaps areeliminated
BP Refinery Explosion Texas USA
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BP Refinery ExplosionTexas, USA2006 - 1
March 2006Major explosion in a petroleum refinery
operated by BP in Texas City
15 fatalities, 170 injuries, extensive property damage
US Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Boardinvestigation resulted in the Baker Report
Major Areas of Improvement identified in the Baker
Report
Corporate Safety Culture
- Process safety leadership and accountability
- Employee empowerment and communication
- Lack of resources and high overtime rates- Toleration of deviations from safe SOP.
LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY
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LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY23RDMARCH 2005
Baker report findings related to PSM system:
Systemic failures in process risk identification, assessment andanalysis;
Failure in compliance with Safety Standards; Lack of adequate process safety knowledge and competence at all
levels;
Failure to set measurable criteria for process safety management;
Delays in implementation of external good practice.
NOTE: We in LR have global strength as well as localexpertise to help our clients benefit from the lessons ofthe Texas City accident.
LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY
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LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY23RDMARCH 2005
Business impacts:
$21 million in fines for safety breaches byRegulator.
$ 2 billions in CAPEX and OPEX toimplement required changes in the first 2years.
Senior managers ( including RefineryManagers, Country Managers, BusinessStream Managers and CEOs ) are no
longer working at BP.
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Case Study: The Piper Alpha
DisasterWorth Noting
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Background In 1988, Britain suffered one of its worst industrial
disasters when the Piper Alpha oil platform wasdestroyed by fire and explosion, resulting in 167fatalities
The catastrophe caused significant changes to the
manner by which safety was regulated and managed inthe U.K. offshore oil industry
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What Happened?
The Piper Alpha platform was operated by OccidentalPetroleum Ltd.
The platform was linked to the adjacent installationsTartan, Claymore and the MCP01 by sub-sea pipelines
Immediate cause of the accident was due tocommunication problems relating to shift handover andPermit to work procedures. Night shift workers unawareof the safety valve of a condensate pump was removed
An ignition of gas leaking from the blank flange causedfire. Fire spread rapidly and later a major explosionoccurred due to rupturing of pipeline carrying gas to Piperfrom nearby Tartan platform
Off h I t ll ti M (OIM) Pi
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Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) on PiperAlpha
The OIM on Piper Platform did not attempt to call inhelicopters; or to communicate with vessels around theinstallation; or with the shore or other installations; or withpersonnel on the Piper
One survivor said that at one stage people were shoutingat the OIM and asking for instructions and procedures.
Reasons for OIM inadequate leadership and poordecision making:
- The OIM would have been under considerable stressas he was in a situation which he had not been properlytrained.
- Smoke inhalation might had weakened hisability totake decisive action and command.
The Response on the Claymore
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The Response on the ClaymorePlatform
The OIM on Claymore Platform refused the OperatingSuperintendents request to shut down the main oilline, the OIM wanted to maintain production
The OIM was reluctant to take the responsibility forshutting down oil production
The delay in Claymores shutdown was deemed to
have exacerbated the situation on Piper
The Response on the Tartan
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The Response on the TartanPlatform
The Tartan OIM failed to shutdown his oil and gasproduction with sufficient speed.
An explosion on Piper was caused by the gas riser
pipeline from Tartan fracturing and pouring morehydrocarbons onto the already blazing platform.
OIM had not been trained in emergency response for
an event of this magnitude.
Crucial Role of an On Scene
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Crucial Role of an On-SceneCommanders
The ability of site managers of remote, hazardoussites to command of an emergency should be good.
Site managers in high-risk industries may haveseveral hundred staff under their charge and therefore
have to act as the on-scene commander should anemergency arise.
Decisions taken in the opening minutes of a siteincident can prevent an emergency escalating into a
crisis.Note that how crucial it is to train the Site Manager as
the On-scene Commander during the EMERGENCY!
Piper Alpha Accident
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Piper Alpha Accident Re-connected a pump still under maintenance without adequate
checks)condensate release
No blast wallonly firewall, which failed in the explosion in moduleC and damaged fire pumps (firewater pumps could not operate,loss of power, control room failure, alarm failure, radiotelecommunication room failure)
Rupture of firewall between modules B & C, and pipe rupture inmodule B, large crude leak and fire
Smoke and gas into living quarters, no order to evacuate
Escalation continuedriser failure (Tartan to Piper Alphanotshut down)
No alternative escape available except jumping into sea. Most ofthose who jumped survived.
Living quarters collapsed into sea
167 lives lost on platform, and 2 rescuers
Piper Alpha Accident (cont )
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Piper Alpha Accident (cont.) Permit to work failure/ not followed
Ad hoc decision to keep production goingno hazard identificationof decisions
Poor designNo blast wall between modules to prevent escalation
Poor designEmergency systems not protected from incidents
Living quarters was the temporary refugeno integrity assessment
(smoke was allowed to ingress) Emergency equipment did not workdeluge nozzles blocked
Emergency response procedures failure, no order to evacuateplatform
A number of new contractorsnot familiar with procedures Auditing was ineffectivedid not identify deficiencies
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Lessons Learnt from Piper Alpha Most of the Piper Alpha workforce made their way to the
accommodation, according to emergency procedures, wherethey expected someone would be in charge and would leadthem to safetybut they were let down
The Public Inquiry chaired by Lord Cullen criticised theperformance of Piper Alpha OIM, as well as the OIMs on duty on
the adjacent Claymore and Tartan platforms, on the night of thedisaster
The Public Inquiry Report recommended:
Safety Management System should include an operatorscriteria for the selection of OIMs and their command ability
A system of exercises should be used to train OIMs and theirdeputies in decision making during emergency situations
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Concluding Remark
As an experienced engineer, I believe that everysuccessful Organizational Enterprise inbusiness, especially those in hazardous andrisky installations, or even Institution of HigherLearning should be able to demonstrate itsexcellence in SMS practices.
After all, it is now a legal requirement.
And there are so much to be gained byimplementing SMS.
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CONCLUSION
END OF PRESENTATION
(Question & Answer Session)
TERIMA KASIH