Davis, M. S. (1971). That's Interesting. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1(2), 309-344. Chicago

Davis, Murray S., That's Interesting: Towards a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology of Phenomenology , 1:4 (1971:Dec.) p.309

Phil. Soc. Sci. I (1971), 309-344 Printed in Great Britain 309

That’s Interesting!

Towards a Phenomenology of Sociologyand a Sociology of Phenomenology

MURRAY S. DAVIS

SUMMARY

QUESTION: How do theories which are generally considered interesting differ fromtheories which are generally considered non-interesting? ANSWER: Interestingtheories are those which deny certain assumptions of their audience, while non-interesting theories are those which afiirrn certain assumptions of their audience.This answer was arrived at through the examination of a number of famous social,and especially sociological, theories. That examination also generated a systematicindex of the variety of propositional forms which interesting and non-interestingtheories may take. The fertility of this approach suggested a new field be estab-lished called the Sociology of the Interesting, which is intended to supplement theSociology of Knowledge. This new field will be phenomenologieally oriented in sofar as it will focus on the movement of the audience’s mind from one acceptedtheory to another. It will be soeiologicoliy oriented in so far as it will focus on thedissimilar base-line theories of the various sociological categories which composethe audience. In addition to its value in interpreting the social impact of theories,the Sociology of the Interesting can contribute to our understanding of both thecommon sense and scientific perspectives on reality.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

It has long been thought that a theorist is considered great because his theoriesare true, but this is false. A theorist is considered great, not because histheories are true, but because they are interesting. Those who carefully andexhaustively verify trivial theories are soon forgotten; whereas those whocursorily and expediently verify interesting theories are long remembered.In fact, the truth of a theory has very little to do with its impact, for a theorycan continue to be found interesting even though its truth is disputed—evenrefuted!

Since this capacity to stimulate interest is a necessary if not suflicientcharacteristic of greatness, then any study of theorists who are consideredgreat must begin by examining why their theories are considered interesting-why, in other words, the theorist is worth studying at all. But before we canattempt even this preliminary task we must understand clearly why sometheories are considered interesting while others are not. In this essay, I will

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning CompanyCopyright (c) Sage Publications, Inc.

310 Murray S. Davis

try to determine what it means for a theory to be considered ‘interesting’ (or,in the extreme, ‘fascinating’).

Students who follow to the letter all of the injunctions ofcurrent text-bookson ‘theory—construction’, but take into account no other criterion in theconstruction of their theories, will turn out work which will be found dullindeed. Their impeccably constructed theories will go unnoted—or, moreprecisely, unfootnoted———by others. But should these students also take intoaccount that criterion, to be detailed below, which distinguishes ‘interesting

- theories’ from ‘uninteresting theories’, they will find that their theories willmake their readers literally ‘sit up and take notice’. Their theories will thenbe discussed among colleagues, examined in journals, confirmed or denied indissertations, and taught to students as the most recent instances of ‘progress’in their profession.

I will confine my inquiry to social theories which have been consideredinteresting, giving special attention to famous sociological theories. I suggest,however, that the level of abstraction of the analysis presented here is highenough for it to be applicable equally well to theories in all areas of socialscience and even to theories in natural science. But this generalization of thefollowing discussion will have to await further investigation.

1. Interesting non-propositionsI will further restrict this paper to analysing the ‘interesting’ component

of those theories which Kant has called ‘synthetic a posteriori propositions’-assertions which refer to the empirical world and are not merely matters ofdefinition. But these propositions, of course, are not the only ingredients ofthe scientific enterprise that may be found interesting, though they are themost important. Space, however, forbids consideration here of the varioustypes ofnon-propositions that are also capable ofevoking interest. Thus I willnot be dealing with (1) ‘Findings’ which confirm or disconfirm hypotheses,(2) ‘Clues’ which indicate the way a problem can be solved, (3) ‘AestheticDescriptions’ which refine perception, (4) ‘Analogies’ which render theunfamiliar in terms of the familiar, and (5) ‘Models’ which simplify theintegration of complex relationships.

2. The interesting and the routineThe interesting is something which affects the attention. Wehsters Third

defines ‘interesting’ as ‘engaging the attention’. The question naturallyarises: ‘Where was the attention before it was engaged by the interesting?’

It is hard to answer this question because, by definition, one is usually notattentive to what one is usually not attentive to. But, for those who wish tounderstand human behaviour, it is very important to answer this question


TIzat’s Interesting! 3 I I

because most people spend most of their lives in this state they are notattentive to. Harold Garfinkel (1967) has called this state of low attention orlow consciousness ‘the routinized taken-for-granted world of everyday life’.Since the interesting, by definition, is that which engages the attention morethan the non-interesting, perhaps the former can be used to make manifestthe latter. I will attempt to use what is found interesting to disclose what isroutinely taken-for-granted.

If the defining characteristic of anything which some audience con-siders interesting is that it stands out in their attention in contrast to theroutinized taken-for-granted world of their everyday life, then the definingcharacteristic of a theory which some audience considers interesting is that itstands out in their attention in contrast to the web of routinely taken-for-granted propositions which make up the theoretical structure of their every-day life. In other words, a new theory will be noticed only when it denies anold truth (proverb, platitude, maxim, adage, saying, common-place, etc.).(The actual process by which a theory comes to be considered interestingtoday is, of course, much more complicated because of the present frag-mentation of the audience who does the considering into lay and professionalgroups. This important complication will be taken up in a later section.)

3. The interesting in theory and in practiceAll interesting theories, at least all interesting social theories, then, con-

stitute an attack on the taken-for-granted world of their audience. Thisaudience will consider any particular proposition to be ‘worth saying’ only ifit denies the truth of some part of their routinely held assumption-ground.If it does not challenge but merely confirms one of their taken-for-grantedbeliefs, they will respond to it by rejecting its value while aflirming its truth.They will declare that the proposition need not be stated because it is alreadypart of their theoretical scheme: ‘Of course’. ‘That’s obvious’. ‘Everybodyknows that’. ‘It goes without saying’.

The ‘taken-for-granted world’ includes not only this theoretical dimensionbut also a practical dimension as well. A theory will be considered trulyinteresting only if it has repercussions on both levels. On the latter level, anaudience will find a theory to be interesting only when it denies the signi-ficance of some part of their present ‘on-going practical activity’ (Garfinkel,1967) and insists that they should be engaged in some new on-going practicalactivity instead. If this practical consequence of a theory is not immediatelyapparent to its audience, they will respond to it by rejecting its value untilsomeone can concretely demonstrate its utility: ‘So what?’ ‘Who cares?’‘Why bother?’ ‘What good is it P’

An analysis of the rhetorical structure of social research reveals how it is


312 Murray S. Davis

made to seem ‘interesting’ on both theoretical and practical levels. The

‘standard form’ of the books and articles in which this research is presented

is the following: (I) The author articulates the taken-for-granted assump-

tions of his imagined audience by reviewing the literature of the particular

sub-tradition in question (‘It has long been thought . . .’), (2) he adduces one

or more propositions which deny what has been traditionally assumed (‘But

this is false . . .’), (3) he spends the body of the work ‘proving’ by various

methodological devices that the old routinely assumed propositions are

.wrong while the new ones he has asserted are right (‘We have seen instead

that . . .’), and finally (4) in conclusion, he suggests the practical conse-

quences of these new propositions for his imagined audience’s on-going

social research, specifically how they ought to deflect it onto new paths

(‘Further investigation is necessary to . . .’).

An analysis of the cognitive content of social research reveals much more

about the nature of that which is interesting and, equally important, that

which is not. Theoretically, it is worth investigating those social theories that

have been considered interesting because of what they reveal about the

common-sense every-day layman’s view of the world, which they are attack-

ing. Practically, it is worth investigating those social theories that have been

considered interesting so that we can learn to assert interesting theories our-

selves. If we come to understand the process by which interesting theories

are generated, we will not have to continue to do what has been done up till

now——-leave the ‘interesting’ to the ‘inspired’.

4. ProcedureIn order to discover what it was that made a social theory ‘interesting’ I

examined a large number of social and especially sociological propositions

which have been considered interesting in the hope of isolating the common

element of ‘interest’ in all of them and of accounting for their differences.

Since my purpose was primarily heuristic, I did not feel it was necessary or

feasible to establish the precise degree of ‘interestability’ of each proposition.

In a later section, I will offer some suggestions about how the study of

interesting propositions can be put on a more rigorous footing. For the

purposes of this investigation, I considered a social theory to be interesting if

it has been in ‘wide circulation’. Wide circulation here is meant to encompass

both those social theories that have been considered interesting in times past

and those which have been considered interesting recently—that is, those

that were and those that are ‘in the air’. (The former are now usually taught

to students in ‘Introductory Courses’; the latter in ‘Substantive Courses’

beyond the introductory level.) I also examined for this investigation some

well-turned propositions of popular sociology which have caught the public’s

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company

Copyright (c) Sage Publications, Inc.

T/zat’s Interesting! 313fancy and have achieved a wide circulation outside the strict limits of thediscipline’s domain.

5. The common element ofall interesting propositionsAll of the interesting propositions I examined were found to involve the

radical distinction between seeming and being, between the subject ofphenomenology and the subject of ontology. An interesting proposition wasone which first articulated a phenomenological presumption about the way aparticular part of the world had looked, and then denied this phenomenologicalpresumption in the name of ‘truth’, that is, in the name of a more profound,more real, more ontological criterion. Put more precisely, an interestingproposition was one which attempted first to expose the ontological claim ofits accredited counterpart as merely phenomenological pretence, and then to

deny this phenomenological pretence with its own claim to ontologicalpriority. In brief, an interesting proposition was always the negation of anaccepted one. All of the interesting propositions I examined were easilytranslatable into the form: ‘What seems to be X is in reality non-X’, or‘What is accepted as X is actually non-X’.

6. The species of interesting propositionsWhile all interesting propositions were found to have in common the same

dialectical relation between the phenomenological and the ontological, theywere found to be distinguished on the logical level. The variety of interestingpropositions fell into twelve logical categories which involved either thecharacterization of a single phenomenon or the relations among multiplephenomena. These twelve logical categories constitute an ‘Index of theInteresting’.

PART II: THE INDEX OF THE INTERESTINGA—-THE CHARACTERIZATION OF A SINGLE PI-IENOMENON

(i) Organizationa. What seems to be a disorganized (unstructured) phenomenon

is in reality an organized (structured) phenomenon.EXAMPLE: Ferdinand Tonnies’ assertion in Community and Society that the relations

among people within all societies were considered at the time he wroteto be manifold and indeterminate, can in fact be organized around twomain types (Gemcinschaft and Gessellschafi‘).

12. What seems to be an organized (structured) phenomenonis in reality a disorganized (unstructured) phenomenon.

EXAMPLE: Karl Marx’s assertion in Capital that the economic processes ofbourgeoissociety, which were considered at the time he wrote to be organized inone way, are in fact not organized in that way (but rather organized inanother way).



314 Murray S. Davis

Comment

The thrust of a younger ripening discipline is to develop OrganizingPropositions of Type (i)a. Perhaps the most fundamental example in socio-

logy is Auguste Compte’s assertion that social phenomena in themselves,which were considered at the time he wrote to be unstructured (unlikenatural phenomena), do in fact possess a coherent structure which can begrasped by science. The major sub-fields of a discipline also begin with the

- assertion of an organization for a particular social phenomenon which was

thought to be unorganized. Thus Gustave LeBon started the field of Collec-tive Behaviour when he managed to structure something so seeminglychaotic as crowds. Organizing Propositions often appear abbreviated as

concepts. Cooley, for example, managed to organize the apparently amor-

phous middle distance between the individual and the society with his notionof the ‘primary group’.

Talcott Parsons, certainly the most famous living organizer of both socialtheories and social processes, acquired his renown mostly for propositionsof Type (i)a. In his early work (The Structure of Social Action), he asserts

that four early twentieth-century social theorists (Marshall, Durkheim,Pareto, and Weber), who were considered at the time he wrote to be dealingwith completely diflerent social phenomena in completely different ways,

are in fact all saying essentially the same thing about the same general socialphenomenon. And in his later work (Economy and Society), he asserts that fourmajor social institutions (familial, cultural, political, and economic), whichwere considered at the time he wrote to be relatively uncoordinated withone another, are in fact all strictly integrated into a coherent social system.

The thrust of an older stagnating discipline in need of rejuvenation is to

develop Disorganizing or Critical Propositions of Type (i)b. Each Dis-organizing Proposition criticizes the adequacy of the previously acceptedOrganizing Proposition (though nearly always calling for the substitution ofa new Organizing Proposition rather than merely claiming the phenomenonis completely incapable of being structured). Classic examples of successfulattempts to disorganize accepted organizations include Ward's critique ofSocial Darwinism and Mead’s critique of Watsonian Behaviourism. Recentcritiques of accepted organizations in modern sociology entailing Type (i)bPropositions include Denis Wrong’s attack on its models, Harold Garfinkel’sattack on its methods, and Alvin Gouldner’s attack on its politics.

Note that not just any Organizing Proposition is interesting: only those that

organize phenomena which had seemed too complex or chaotic to be ordered.And not just any Critical Proposition is interesting: only those that criticizeprevious organizations of phenomena which had become generally accepted.



That’s Interesting.’ 3 I 5

(ii) Composition

ct. What seem to be assorted heterogeneous phenomenaare in reality composed of a single element.

EXAMPLE: Sigmund Freud’s assertion throughout his Collected Worles that thebehaviour of children, primitives, neurotics, and adults in crowds, aswell as dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue and pen, which were con-sidered at the time he wrote to be unassociated in any way with oneanother, are in fact all various manifestations ofthe same instinctual drives.

12. What seems to be a single phenomenonis in reality‘ composed of assorted heterogeneous elements.

EXAMPLE: Max Weber’s assertion in Economy and Society that the stratificationsystem, which was considered at the time he wrote to be monolithic, is infact composed of the three independent variables of economic class,status prestige, and political power.

CommentMany natural and social scientists have made their reputations by pointing

out that the appearance of a natural or social phenomenon is an illusion andthat what the phenomenon really consists of lies ‘below’ its surface. Their‘profound’ insight is considered especially interesting when these theoristsalso assert that the ‘fundamental’ nature (‘depth structure’) of the pheno-menon contradicts the surface impression, as, for xample, the seeminglycontinuous appearance of a table is contradicted by the discrete molecules ofwhich it is actually composed. Usually, these scientists have pointed out asingle factor which underlies what had heretofore seemed heterogeneousphenomena. In the social sciences, such ‘monofactoral’ theorists as Marx,Nietzsche, and McLuhan have reduced a large number of seemingly diversesocial phenomena down to their economic, power, or communicativecomponents. Less ambitious, but nonetheless interesting, reductions havebeen achieved by other social theorists who have observed that a few seeming-ly diverse social phenomena have at least one component in common. ThusSimmel in his Sociology showed that the ‘triadic form’, and the interactionprocesses associated with it, underlay both the three-person family and thethree-class society.

Interesting propositions of the opposite type, (ii)b, occur when a theoristmanages to distinguish several factors which compose a phenomenonpreviously throught to be unitary. Talcott Parsons, who has tried his hand atanalysis as well as synthesis, constructed a Type (ii)b Proposition in TheSocial System when he asserted that Gemeinschoft and Gesselschoft, each ofwhich was considered at the time he wrote to be an indivisible phenomenon,are in fact composed of several independent (‘Pattern’) variables.



6‘

.2:

.m=3§o_E=mowamA3

£o..:a5

.m5aE¢UwfifiaoamE5

=3§Eu£=~aoosdoam

SeaA3

Ewwrgov

.mo_oo_ooo=oE

Booo8:ooowwoo»E

._«ooo>E=55::a

on

8

883onoE..oon»on

uoooflmaoo$3

523.xoEEoU

o:&uoOofi:2:

.¢o..8m.omepem=..

§.5o3.o-33now.5.

Emtooooo.floBoE._o2

gfioioom3_.E25a

doaofiocosm~33o

bzooo5mm

aoaofiaaosmfiooaoma

on8

mfioom53>4‘

oooosoEooo

=o

oooowoooflE

.oo.£o

%...o=.3o5Eco

ooobo8

323onofiuofi

oo

woooflonoo$3

523.§§oaEwsofiwe

comtoummocan

aowoxfiz

_§o282o5:5e.8§bwas

.92835

aocooomoo.Emo£Eo2

EM

E15259

.§5a82a.225»o

bmooo5.mm

:o:oEo:o:m132a

onS

ofiooo3:36

=e.>§u.¢Eo=oU45

doooon=38».mo:

maouoaofixoomofimonooo22E:9?ooofi

aoozzon853:.ofican

mnsaomwofiooocan

§§oo§.2§538:59

uxocoop

.€oo:..owas

8552.23of

5:?Eco

.oo>oz6:.w:_omoooo£

258onE3

conofioaoza....mo

aowoaofixo~8mmo_ono»om.3ooo

<._o>o~

.~8_.m£o:o.$m..Eoom.ooficofioooam

ofioooofifi:5.—o>o_Eoomofi

.8:_o>o_

1:?.Z.cEo5

oofimoaom

25282..58::mo

962$8ofi«Bo

otommo

aofimomooamo

25ofimr

.m:o£oomo..m3.525.ca.»~5525.53

mo

oaomomasooaof

minnow3

ooaomcsomom

omoooofi.8

oomfiotoS

aooaomom

38¢ofE

B33“3282can

aofimomoom:o_ooo.a3<mo259:5<

fiooooofio..5E

wauoflfioE

cowoooozm..8S.E

oooa

cooofloaooo:

533..~o>o3o:Jswsofi

o.8o.:$we

ooooo.850ammo::§.m3

32$o

ozfi3:95

oaofioaonmEoom

>5835

ooomxo8

o:oo€oE<mam

afioomnooocan

casoownaonafismooa8_.ooE<of

wS.8o£o§.:E

cocoooosm

mcoozoco:

ooofioE8

ozoomuodoJmfl

aooooo5

uomoooo#532.;

Joya

8&3omofi

no

30.3?SooomAwsoam.

.m.c:o....w558..._oE<E

oooooofi

wood:38

mooo«b§IJ.mo:Emoo.l.ooooo_8_o2§%a

omofi8

255223

Eoomo=o1o>mo

couoioooMooooom

oco.¢=>3.:

Bo:8

ozoosbofimm5

.9o€._<fiaoooac

.fi=.9...o:=oo.you

uoacmfi_S6_.>6E

cooo>oom%bsonon»3

3:393

coopwaswas

._o>o.83owysmacaw:$58%Eoom

rwfifioomo5

éwaooom

.ooEEoxooofio

osooofisawaofio.8382.5

oéoooomo

ocofioaonmEooo

bmfifioom:25Sm

moooo1BoS.oo£

wfiwsmJaofioaosmEoommo

__§.o2

.2.9§ommofloofimm

.oo:5o.8

dsoom

..EmEowo3oomfloomwflozozmm.

S

,oE_oo_2_%£.3:8

>=a:m=mm

aouaooooooaomoso

wfisow5

osgiooo

a

mo

oaooemomoom3.525.mama:

.ooo:o_omEoooo55

ion?out9.

218€33

£o=E>%S.2:no

Eoomoaofi

»=oBooo_

3055o.8

ragaofi

on8

38.5“ud£>>S5

tommofimfi25.mo

203,335o:o_..§:oc.3m

Sm

_.m§..2§o...§,~

318 Murray S. Davis

Comment

Generalizing Propositions and Localizing Propositions are two of the mostcommon types of propositions in modern social science research. In fact, themain objective of methodology in the social sciences today seems to be toestablish rigorous procedures that will determine the exact degree to whichsome assertion about social life can be generalized.

Although the tendency of the great social theorists of the past was to_ assert some truth about human life which held universally, the common

tendency today of such divergent sociological schools as ethnomethodologyand survey research, as well as Anglo-American anthropology, is to localizeassertions and emphasize sub-group variation. In the past, attempts wouldbe made to show that some behavioural characterization holds for all human-ity; in the present, attempts are made to show that some behaviouralcharacterization holds for some groups and tribes, but not for others.

A theorist makes an interesting generalization when he asserts that someproperty, which everyone knows to characterize one social category, alsocharacterizes another social category where its existence was not suspected.Freud, for example, tried to show that the sexual impulse was a majorinfluence not only on the behaviour of adults (which was fairly obvious), butalso on the behaviour of children (which was not so obvious).

A theorist makes an interesting localization when he asserts that someproperty, which is thought to characterize everybody—to be part of ‘humannature’——belongs merely to one social category and not others. Edward Hall, forexample, tried to show that many problems in inter-cultural contact stem fromthose in one society believing those in all other societies attach the same mean-ing to spatial features as they do; whereas in fact the interpretation of crucialaspects of the spatial dimension varied considerably in different societies.

(v) Stabilizationa. What seems to be a stable and unchanging phenomenon

is in reality an unstable and changing phenomenon.

EXAMPLE: Karl Marx’s assertion in Capital that the social organization of bourgeoissociety, which was considered at the time he wrote to be permanent, is infact about to be suddenly and dramatically transformed.

b. What seems to be an unstable and changing phenomenonis in reality a stable and unchanging phenomenon.

EXAMPLE: Georg Simmel’s assertion in ‘Conflict’ that any conflict-ridden sociaorganization, which was considered at the time he wrote to be on theverge of transformation, may in fact be capable of continuing indefinitelyas it is (in a steady-state of conflict).

4


Documents

Davis, M. S. (1971). That's Interesting. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1(2), 309-344. Chicago