Blake Consulting & Training P.O. Box 784, Brentwood Ca. 94513

Phone: 213.298.3517 Email: Dave@Blake-Consulting.com

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Expert Report 7

Human Factors and Use of Force 8

Vallejo Police Department Case #19-1676 9

David M. Blake, MSc. 10

May 17, 2019 11

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

CITY ATTORNEY LETTER ............................................................................................ 4 2

SECTION 1. GENERAL INFORMATION ....................................................................... 5 3

SECTION 2. LEGAL GUIDANCE .................................................................................... 5 4

SECTION 3. HUMAN FACTORS .................................................................................... 7 5

SECTION 4. VIDEO EVIDENCE ................................................................................... 17 6

SECTION 5. FACT PATTERS ........................................................................................ 17 7

SECTION 6. EXPERT OPINIONS .................................................................................. 36 8

SECTION 7. ANNEX ....................................................................................................... 45 9

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May 17, 2019 1

Kelly J. Trujillo 2 Assistant City Attorney 3 City of Vallejo 4 555 Santa Clara St. 5 Vallejo, CA 94590 6 7 Attn: Mrs. Trujillo 8 RE: Expert Consultation Vallejo PD case #19-1676 9 10 Based on the request from your office, I have reviewed the documents, audio 11 and video recordings associated with the officer involved shooting described in 12 case #19-1676. Per your request, my review focused upon both the 13 constitutional aspects of the use of force as well as any human factor 14 psychological aspects which might apply. 15 16 In general, I find the use of deadly force in this case to be reasonable and in line 17 with contemporary training and police practices associated with use of deadly 18 force. 19 20 I expand and support my opinions in the attached report. I reserve the right to 21 add, change and delete any of my opinions based on any provision of 22 additional information not reviewed at the time this report was completed. 23 24 25 Respectfully, 26 27 28 29 30 David M. Blake, M.Sc. 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

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1 1. General Information 2

3 1.1. Charts/Exhibits: I have attached charts, exhibits, and photographs that 4

are intended to support my opinions. Video or single image files listed in 5 this report can be found in an associated work product folder provided to 6 the client. 7

8 1.2. Materials Reviewed: The following is a list of files, documents, digital 9

recordings, photographs, video and other items I reviewed. 10 11 • Vallejo Police Department Report #19-1676 12 • AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2246.avi 13 • AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2246-2.avi 14 • AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2249.avi 15 • AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250.avi 16 • AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250-2.avi 17 • AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250-3.avi 18 • Cano Interview.MP3 19 • Eaton Interview.MP3 20 • Glick Interview.MP3 21 • McMahon Interview.MP3 22 • Patzer Interview.MP3 23 • Thompson Interview.MP3 24

25 2. Legal Guidance 26

The following federal and state legal rulings and definitions were used to assist 27 and guide my opinions in this case: 28

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989) defines objectively reasonable force in 29 situations that are often tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Factors for 30 consideration include; (1) The severity of the crime, (2) The level of resistance, 31 and (3) The threat (to officers/citizens) posed by the suspect’s resistance. (also 32 see; “Reasonable Force”). 33

Reasonable Force is a legal term for how much and what kind of force a peace 34 officer may use in each circumstance. Judgment criteria must include: (1) the 35 perspective of a reasonable officer, (2) applying only information known to the 36 officer at the time force was applied, (3) based on the totality of facts and 37 circumstances confronting the officer without regard to the officer’s underlying 38 intent or motivation, and (4) based on knowledge the officer acted properly 39 under established law at the time. 40

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Totality of Circumstances are the facts and circumstances known to the officer 1 at the time force was used and include: (1) number of officers vs. suspects, (2) 2 prior contacts, (3) age, size, and relative strength, (4) special knowledge/skills, 3 (5) injury/exhaustion, (6) mental illness/intoxication, (7) environmental factors, 4 and (8) proximity to potential weapons. 5

Scott v. Harris (2007) 127S. Ct 1769 provides further guidance toward judging 6 reasonable force which focuses upon weighing the nature and quality of the 7 intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance 8 of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion (e.g., public safety). 9 The court “rejected respondent’s argument that safety could have been 10 assured if the police simply ceased their pursuit.” 11

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. ___ (2014) reaffirms the application of Graham v. 12 Connor 490 U.S. 389 (1989) and while doing so provides some guidance on 13 judgments regarding the number of rounds fired by officers: “It makes sense 14 that, if officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to 15 public safety, they need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.” 16

California Penal Code 196 defines justifiable homicide by public officers as: 17

1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent Court; or, 18 2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the 19 execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other legal duty; or, 20 3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued or 21 have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting persons charged 22 with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest. 23 24 Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions 507 (Justifiable Homicide 25 by Public Officer) states an actual or attempted killing by a public officer is 26 justified if: a) the killing was committed while taking back into custody a 27 convicted felon who escaped from prison, arresting a person charged with a 28 felony who was resisting arrest or fleeing from justice, or overcoming actual 29 resistance to some legal process while performing any legal duty, c) the killing 30 was necessary to accomplish one of these lawful purposes, and d) the officer 31 must have had probable cause to believe the decedent posted a threat of 32 great bodily injury to either the officer or others or had committed a forcible and 33 atrocious crime and threatened the defendant or others with death or GBI. 34 35 A person has probable cause to believe that someone poses a threat of 36 death or great bodily injury when facts known to the person would 37 persuade someone of reasonable caution that the other person is going 38 to cause death or great bodily injury to another. 39 40 Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is 41

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an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm. 1 2 California Penal Code 243(f)(4) defines serious bodily injury as: “a serious 3 impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss 4 of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or impairment of 5 function of any bodily member or organ, a wound requiring extensive suturing 6 and serious disfigurement”. 7

PC834a provides the legal duty for in California for citizens who reasonably 8 should know they are being arrested by a peace officer to refrain from resisting 9 such arrest. 10

PC835(a) states officers may use force to effect a lawful arrest, prevent the 11 escape, or overcome the resistance of a citizen. Officers need not retreat or 12 desist, nor shall the officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to self-13 defense by the use of reasonable force to affect the arrest. 14

Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions 2670 states: A peace 15 officer may legally detain someone if the person consents to the detention or if 16 specific facts known or apparent to the officer lead him or her to suspect that 17 the person to be detained has been, is, or is about to be involved in activity 18 relating to crime and a reasonable officer who knew the same facts would 19 have the same suspicion. I 20

A peace officer may legally arrest someone [either] based on an arrest warrant 21 or if he or she has probable cause to make the arrest. Probable cause exists 22 when the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest would 23 persuade someone of reasonable caution that the person to be arrested has 24 committed a crime. 25

In deciding whether the detention/arrest was lawful, consider evidence of the 26 officer’s training and experience and all the circumstances known by the officer 27 when he or she detained the person. 28

California Police Officers Standards and Training (POST) Learning Domain (LD) 29 #20 is part of the POST Basic Course Training System focused on use of force 30 which every recruit in the state of California is trained and is required to show 31 proficiency in before becoming certified as a peace officer. While not a legal 32 document, its contents reflect the basic training in use of force law provided to 33 all peace officers in the state of California. 34

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3. Definitions & Explanations: Human Factors Psychology 1 2

3.1. Human Factors Defined - Human Factors is a multi-disciplinary field grounded 3 in the behavioral and engineering sciences. Human Factors/Ergonomics 4 considers human physiology, psychology, and behavior in the design, 5 maintenance, and use of a variety of products, equipment, facilities, jobs, 6 tasks and overall organizations. In practice, its methods are applied to 7 maximize human performance as well as determine the causes and means 8 for the prevention of injuries, with emphasis placed on how people interact 9 with their environments. Human Factors science has been established in 10 several industries to include; aviation, transportation, medicine, and the 11 criminal justice system as a whole. 12

13 3.2. Fear and Physiological Arousal 14

“Anxiety is a psychological, physiological, and behavioral state induced in 15 animals and humans by a threat to well-being or survival, either actual or 16 potential. It is characterized by increased arousal, expectancy, autonomic and 17 neuroendocrine activation, and specific behavior patterns.”1 18

Amygdala: The Amygdala has been 19 identified as the most influential structure 20 within the brain for processing threatening 21 stimuli. Below is a simple summary of the 22 amygdala’s influence on human 23 physiology and behavior: 24

Sensory information received by the brain 25 is bifurcated at the Thalamus; moving to 26 other brain areas in ways often described 27 as a fast and slow track. The fast track 28 provides crude information (e.g., recognizing patterns) to the Amygdala which 29 can produce a quick reactive response prior to higher order processing. The 30 slow route sends the sensory information to the cortex where information can be 31 consciously analyzed, and fear is realized. 32

1 Steimer, T. (2002). The biology of fear and anxiety-related behaviors. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 4(3), 231-249.

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• Visual examples of these two processes are 1 provided online by the University of Texas, 2 McGovern Medical School, Department of 3 Neurobiology and Anatomy (Section 6.6; 4 Figure 6.9 and 6.10) 1. 5

• The two variant examples provide a visual 6 construct for how the brain quickly interprets 7 information causing the body to respond to 8 perceived threats in the same manner 9 (initially) as a real-world threat. 10

Once the Amygdala processes a threat (real or perceived), the Hypothalamic- 11 Pituitary-Adrenal (HPA)axis is activated. The HPA axis is commonly referred to as 12 the Fight or Flight response. The Fight or Flight response is summarized by a 13 change in arousal and focus of attention influenced by a myriad of stimulant 14 hormones released in the body. Common physiological changes from increased 15 stimulant hormone production include: increased heart rate, rapid breathing, 16 pupil dilation, sweating, and 17 increased glucose production. The 18 behavioral results of stimulant 19 hormones on the body can be both 20 positive and adverse as 21 demonstrated in the Yerkes/Dodson 22 inverted U Theory. As physiological 23 arousal increases, performance 24 increases, but only to a point. In 25 acute cases, arousal may begin to 26 cause performance deficits.2 27

1 Wright, A. (n.d.). Chapter 6: Limbic System: Amygdala. Retrieved from https://nba.uth.tmc.edu/neuroscience/s4/chapter06.html 2 Schmidt, R. A., & Lee, T. D. (2014). Motor learning and performance: From principles to application. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

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The “inverted-U1 is a simplified visual construct often used to show how arousal 1 will increase performance along a curve until the optimal performance point is 2 passed and deficits begin. The point along the inverted-U where performance 3 degrades is variable for each individual and has multiple influencing factors. 4 Some of those factors include; task difficulty, task novelty, expectedness, stress 5 inoculation, training, and personality traits. The scientific literature directly 6 related to a law enforcement officers’ use of force demonstrates associated 7 performance enhancement and degradation. Such studies exist both from real 8 and simulated environments showing 9 stress-related performance changes 10 primarily within the realm of visual 11 attention, motor skills, cognition, and 12 memory. 13

3.3. Perception and Attention 14

Perception2 can be defined as the moment a person becomes aware of sense 15 information, but it does not describe an individual’s total understanding or 16 analytical judgement of the information. The environment in which a human 17 being functions is rich with complex and constantly flowing information and our 18 ability to attend (e.g., see, hear, process, retain in memory) to all of it is not 19 possible. For instance, Human visual attention requires momentary fixations 20 (approximately 160 to 200ms) to perceive and process specific stimuli – ensuring 21 efficient multitasking is a myth. While rapid shifting of attention between various 22 stimuli may allow for a global perspective, it also limits the ability to perceive, 23 process, react to, and remember specific items during the attentional shifts. The 24 more environmental stimulus requiring attention, the more opportunity for error 25 as attention moves and fixates between stimuli rapidly (divided attention). 26 During these shifts of attention, items not attended to will also not be perceived, 27 processed, or stored in memory.3 28

1 Staal, M.A. (2004) Stress, Cognition, and Human Performance: A Literature Review and Conceptual Framework. NASA/TM-2004-212824 2 Vickers, J.N. (2007) Perception, Cognition, And Decision Training: The Quiet Eye In Action. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.; Goldstein, E.B., (2011). Cognitive Psychology, 3rd edition. Wadsworth, CA. 3 Kanki, B. G. (2018). Cognitive functions and human error. Space Safety and Human Performance, 17–52. doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-101869-9.00002-9

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Perception may lead to focused attention, but focused attention does not 1 mean all information available is continually perceived or processed. Several 2 scientific theories explain this statement. 3

Selective Attention1 - A method of understanding selective visual attention is to 4 compare it to a flashlight beam. The flashlight beam provides a clear central 5 focal point in which items may be viewed very clearly, but its effects are 6 limited. As the flashlight beam dims towards the periphery, the ability to 7 perceive peripheral information diminishes. Information outside the lit area of 8 the flashlight beam are not available for perception (not seen). Selective 9 attention aims the “flashlight beam” toward what is important in the visual 10 field. Extreme cases of selective attention are essentially “tunnel vision”. 11

Inattention Blindness2 is the term in human factors scientific literature defining 12 the human inability to see unexpected items within our field of view while 13 attending to something else. The concept has been widely studied and is 14 easily demonstrated. Inattention blindness can be demonstrated as seen in this 15 video3. 16

Change Blindness4 is the term in human factors scientific literature defining the 17 human inability to see a change in a visual stimulus within their field of view. 18 The change of visual stimulus is usually predicated by a disruption (eye 19 movement, eye blinks). Changes in small and surprisingly large visual stimulus 20 have been shown to go unnoticed. This concept has also been widely studied 21 and is easily demonstrated. Change blindness can be demonstrated as seen 22 in this video.5 23

1 Blake, D. (2015) Body Worn Cameras; Comparing Human and Device to Ensure Unbiased Investigations. Law Enforcement Executive Forum 15(4). 2 Chabris, Christopher F, Adam Weinberger, Matthew Fontaine, and Daniel J Simons. (2011). “You Do Not Talk About Fight Club If You Do Not Notice Fight Club: Inattentional Blindness for a Simulated Real-world Assault.” i-Perception, 2(2): 150–153. doi:10.1068/i0436. 3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9EdIbxZAyE 4 Simons, D.J. & Levin, D.T. (1998). Failure to detect changes to people during a real-world interaction. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 5(4) 644-649. 5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubNF9QNEQLA

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Tunnel Vision or peripheral narrowing1 2 may be 1 experienced in life-threatening/dangerous 2 situations, where vision has been shown to be 3 increasingly narrowed toward the threat while 4 blurring or blocking peripheral information (See 5 diagram). 6

Perceptual distortions3,4 have been reported 7 from real-world events and laboratory study’s associated with critical stress 8 both within and outside of law enforcement. Distortions include tunnel hearing, 9 peripheral narrowing, time speeding up or slowing down, and memory loss for 10 the event. 11

• Ross, Murphy, & Hazlett (2012) exposed police officer participants to three 12 simulations with increasing stress manipulations. Participants completed a 13 memory questionnaire 30 minutes and 48 hours after the experiment. They 14 also provided salivary samples to test for stress biomarkers (e.g., cortisol). In 15 the most stressful setting, participants experienced a myriad of perceptual 16 distortions and memory deficits correlated with increased presence of 17 stimulant hormones.5 18

• Klinger & Brunson (2009)6 conducted questionnaire and live interviews of 19 police officers (n = 74) involved in shootings. The chart below provides 20 results regarding the officer’s perceptual distortions (see Table 1). 21

1 Harada, Y., Hakoda, Y, Kuroki, D, Mitsudo, H. (2015). The Presence of a Weapon Shrinks the Functional Field of View. Applied Cognitive Psychology. doi: 10.10002/acp.3143 2 Godnig, E.C. (2003) Tunnel Vision; It’s Causes and Treatment Strategies. Journal of Behavioral Optometry (14)95-99 3 Ross et al. (2013). Analyzing Perceptions and Misperceptions of Police Officers in Lethal Force Virtual Simulator Scenarios. Law Enforcement Executive Forum. Retrieved from: http://www.aele.org/Ross_Forum_2013-2.pdf 4 Pinizzotto, A.J., Davis, E.F., Miller III, C. (2006) Violent Encounters; A study of felonious assaults on our nation’s law enforcement officers. 5 Ross, D. L., Murphy, R. L., & Hazlett, M. H. (2012). Analyzing perceptions and misperceptions of police officers in lethal force virtual simulator scenarios. Law Enforcement Executive Forum, 12(3), 53-73. 6 Klinger, D. A., & Brunson, R. K. (2009). Police officers’ perceptual distortions during lethal force situations: Informing the reasonableness standard. Criminology & Public Policy,8(1), 117-140. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00537.x

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2 3.4. Total Response Time (TRT) 3

4 Total Response Time1 is what most understand to be reaction time (RT); however, 5 this is an incorrect conceptualization from an academic standpoint. A simple RT 6 interval is the time that elapses following the presentation of a stimulus until the 7 beginning of a response. Therefore, RT is an internal construct and unobservable. 8

9 Total Response Time (TRT) is inclusive of perception, mental processing, 10 movement time, and device time. These steps are applicable to both starting 11 and stopping an action in response to a stimulus. The judgment of how fast a 12 human being “reacts” to a situation requires an understanding of the steps 13 within the framework (See Diagram 3). 14

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Time to Start and Stop an action is of great import in an officer-involved use of 17 force. Human beings do not start and stop actions instantaneously, as one must 18 perceive a change in the environment, processes the information, decide what 19 to do and then move to take the action decided upon. This process repeats 20 when the situation changes (e.g., time to stop an action). Decision making 21 between two different stimuli or choice responses generally doubles increases response 22 time (e.g., Hick’s Law). Adding additional stimuli and response choices 23 exponentially increases response time logarithmically. 24

1 Schmidt, T.D. & Lee, T.D. (2014) Motor Learning and Performance; From principles to application. 5th edition. ISBN 1-4504-4361-3

Diagram 3

Perception Mental Processing

Movement Time

Device Time

Response Time

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It is important to note that the laboratory environments in which most response 1 time studies are conducted lack ecological validity for real world events. Studies 2 are highly controlled, free from distractions, static, low stress, and participants 3 often know what is going to happen in advance. Each of these variables are 4 extremely influential to real-world situations in which the event is determined to 5 be rapidly evolving, tense, and uncertain. 6

While hindsight allows for various subjective judgements of when a threat has 7 ceased, there is often a lack of consideration for the perspective of the actor 8 while considering the many human (attention & perception) and environmental 9 variables (i.e., visibility). While no real-world stop shooting studies exist which 10 include these variables, several studies have explored the topic using controlled 11 conditions. 12

Controlled studies examine: 1) The time it takes to start and stop firing, 2) The split 13 times between rounds during rapid fire, and 3) The time it takes the human body 14 to turn or fall to the ground. 15

Start Shooting: 16

• Bumgarner et al., (2007) found the average time for an officer to pull the 17 trigger on a drawn weapon (finger on trigger) to be .31s from the 18 presentation of a start shooting stimulus. The officer participants were 19 aware of the threat cue, how to react, and attentive to the stimulus prior 20 to the measurement. A secondary experiment using the same methods 21 explored the influence of simple decision making on response time. The 22 average time for an officer to make a simple decision to fire (finger on 23 trigger) based upon a start shooting stimulus was .56s.1 24

• Hontz (1999) conducted a similar experiment with the added requirement 25 of accuracy. Depending on target size, average RTs ranged between 26 1.15s and 1.58s from a low ready position.2 27

• Lewinski et al., (2015) found the average time to fire from the “high-ready” 28 position is .83s (sound stimulus). The minimum time was .44s and the 29 maximum time was 1.46s.3 30

1 Bumgarner, J.B., Lewinski, W.J., Hudson, W., Sapp, C. (2007). An Examination of Police Officer Mental Chronometry. Journal of The Association for Crime Scene Reconstruction. 12(3), 11-26 2 Hontz, T.A. (1999). Justifying the Deadly Force Response. Police Quarterly. 2(4): p462-476. 3 Lewinski, W.J., Dysterheft, J.L., Bushey, J.M., Dicks, N.D. (2015). Ambushes leading cause of officer fatalities – when every second counts: analysis of officer movement from training ready tactical positions. Law Enforcement Executive Forum, 15(1).

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Stop Shooting: 1

Stop shooting research typically asks officer participants to pull the trigger as 2 rapidly as possible and to stop once a visual stimulus (light) ceases to illuminate. 3 In these studies, officer already know they are to stop firing and are attending to 4 the stop shooting stimulus. Therefore, perceiving a change in the environment is 5 much more simplex than the real-world. 6

• Bumgarner et al., (2007) found average stop firing times to be .35s with a 7 range of .10s to .60s. 8

• Tobin & Fackler (2001) found average stop firing times to be .26s with 85% 9 of officers firing one or two shots after the stop firing signal.1 10

• Jason (2010) found 69% of officers fired one to three rounds after the stop 11 firing signal. 12

• Lewinski (2014) found average stop firing times to be .29s with officers firing 13 one to four rounds after the stop firing signal (some took over 1.5s to stop 14 firing).2 15

Split Times/Rounds per second: 16

• Jason (2010) found officers fired an average of 4.44 rounds per second 17 with an average shot interval of .23s.3 18

• Lewinski et al., (2014) found average shot intervals of .28s. 19

It should be noted that laboratory experiments are conducted in a highly 20 controlled environment lacking the dynamics (i.e., stress, complex decision-21 making, and low-light) of a real-world incident. These are but a few aspects 22 which would likely influence TRT. Human Factors expert Marc Green summarizes 23 the forensic application of response time as follows: 24

“Unfortunately, no single study can reproduce the full complexity of human 25 behavior and its sensitivity to environmental variables. Moreover, studies 26 cannot be quantitatively combined because no mathematical formalism 27 can capture the subtle effects of methodology and variable interaction or 28

1 Tobin, E.J. & Fackler, M.L. (2001a). Officer Reaction-Response Time Delay at the End of a Shot Series. Journal of the International Wound Ballistic Association. 5(1): p. 9-12 2 Lewinski, W.J., Hudson, W.B., Dysterheft, J.L. (2014). Police Officer Reaction Time to Start and Stop Shooting: The Influence of Decision-Making and Pattern Recognition. Law Enforcement Executive Forum, 13(2), 1-16. Retrieved from http://www.forcescience.org/articles/reactionshooting.pdf 3 Jason, A. (2010). Shooting dynamics: Elements of time and movement in shooting incidents. Investigative Sciences Journal, 2(1), 1-19.

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incorporate general knowledge from the basic science literature on RT, 1 perception, and cognition. For the time being, RT estimation remains part 2 science and part intuition, that is, part application of a general knowledge 3 about human factors." (Green, 2000). 4

3.5. Decision Making 5

Dual Processing Theory is a widely accepted manner of human processing of 6 information and decision making. It is often referred to as System 1 and System 2. 7 System 1 is fast and intuitive while system 2 is slow and analytical. The concept is 8 best described by Sharlicki and Rupp (2010): 9

According to cognitive– experiential self-theory, the processing system or 10 frame used to interpret events has a marked effect on individuals’ 11 subsequent reactions. The experiential system is characterized as relatively 12 passive and preconscious; individuals automatically interpret, encode, 13 and organize their experience. Information processing is often associated 14 with one’s own experience of emotions that, once engaged, tends to 15 play an important (heuristic) role in the judgment process. The rational 16 system, in contrast, has the properties of conventional and logical systems 17 and tends to operate at a relatively conscious level. Rational evaluations 18 are highly analytical, where people consciously weigh the evidence 19 when deciding whether norms of right and wrong have been violated. 20 Although other labels have been used to describe these processes (e.g., 21 controlled vs. automatic, associative vs. logical; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), 22 considerable support exists for the existence of the two systems. 23

In terms of their origins, the experiential system is thought to have evolved 24 over millions of years and is well suited for rapid assessment of information 25 and for quick, decisive action. As such, experiential systems are oriented 26 toward immediate action rather than prolonged analysis. The rational 27 system, in contrast, is relatively newer in its evolution and is well suited for 28 delayed action and complex, dispassionate analysis. Although the two 29 systems function simultaneously, the experiential system tends to be 30 particularly salient when emotion is activated.1 31

1 Sharlicki, D.P., & Rupp, D.E. (2010). Dual Processing and Organizational Justice: The Role of Rational Versus Experiential Processing in Third-Party Reactions to Workplace Mistreatment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95(5), 944-952. Doi: 10.1037/a0020468

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4. Video Evidence 1

• Care must be taken in interpreting video evidence. Human factors such as 2 vision, perception, attention, and memory will almost ensure differences 3 between the officer’s experience and some part of the impression provided 4 by the video.1 What appears on the video may not be perceived by the 5 officer or perceived in the same way by an observer. 6

• Video can be recorded in various frame rates but commonly provide 30 7 individual photographs per second (30FPS). Significant human movement 8 (e.g., punches, trigger pulls) can occur in approximately a quarter of a 9 second (7.5 frames) indicating visual aspects can be missed when viewing 10 the video at full speed and slow motion. Due to an observer’s selective visual 11 attention and limited working memory, even video reviewed frame by frame 12 could allow for misinterpretation (e.g., change blindness, inattention 13 blindness). 14

NOTE: My analysis consists of what is readily visible on each individual frame 15 and should not be considered forensic video analysis or rendering. 16

5. Fact Patterns 17

5.1. Case Overview. 18

On February 9th, 2019 Vallejo PD dispatch received a 911 call from Mathew 19 Garcia who was an employee of Taco Bell located at 974 Admiral Callaghan 20 Ln., Vallejo. Mathew Garcia reported a silver Mercedes in the drive-thru lane 21 who was “slumped over the wheel” (CAD Incident 1902090192; Long Report 22 p.1)). 23

Officer’s Cano (Unit 4P5) and Patzer (4P6) arrived on the scene at 22:45:48 and 24 22:45:51 respectively. AT 22:47:06 Officer Patzer reports the driver (McCoy) has a 25 gun in his lap and is unconscious (CAD Incident 1902090192). 26

Officers Thompson (4D3), Sloan, and Jones (4A8) arrive at 22:48:24 and 22:49:57 27 respectively. 28

Officer Cano asks for medics to state at 22:51:29 and indicates CPR is being 29 started at 22:52:29 (CAD Incident 1902090192). 30

1 Blake, D. (2015). Body Worn Cameras: Comparing Human and Device to Ensure Unbiased Investigations. Law Enforcement Executive Forum,15(4). doi:10.19151/leef.2015.1504c

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5.2. Officer Eaton Interview 1

Officer Eaton arrived on scene to see Cano, Patzer, and Thompson with their 2 weapons drawn on the window of the Mercedes. As he approached, he heard 3 an officer state the Mercedes was still in “drive” (Rose Report p.2). Eaton said he 4 looked over Thompson’s should and saw a portion of the handgun in McCoy’s 5 lap. Eaton said he took a position at the driver’s side front left A-pillar (Rose 6 Report p.3). Eaton said that officers were discussing how to resolve the situation 7 safely. One portion of the plan was to have police vehicle’s move up to block 8 the Mercedes. He stated that two patrol vehicles did ultimately block the 9 Mercedes from the front and rear (Rose Report p. 3). 10

Officer Eaton said that he saw McCoy begin to wake up. This is the first 11 movement Eaton saw from McCoy which was to reach across and scratch his 12 left chest area with his right hand (Eaton Interview 11:50 – 12:20). McCoy looked 13 around (unknown direction) and ultimately looked directly at Eaton. McCoy 14 then looked down toward his lap (handgun) and made a “sudden jerky 15 movement down” with both hands toward his lap. McCoy then moved his 16 whole body forward at which point Eaton saw the suspect’s left-hand drop 17 suddenly towards where the handgun was located. This occurred as officers 18 were giving commands that were ignored (Rose Report p.3). Eaton clarified this 19 experience in greater detail by stating he knows McCoy’s hands and body 20 movements demonstrated McCoy was moving toward the gun, but that he 21 (Eaton) was too far away to see exactly where the handgun was (Rose Report 22 p.4). 23

Eaton stated he believed McCoy’s actions to be a deadly threat towards 24 himself and other officers which caused him to utilize deadly force (Rose Report 25 p.3 – 4). Eaton said he was “scared” (Eaton Interview 13:50-14:00). Eaton said his 26 fear was that McCoy could grab the gun in his lap and start shooting. Eaton said 27 he believed McCoy was going to shoot at officers and due to the number of 28 officers around the Mercedes – it was likely he would have struck an officer with 29 a bullet. Due to this reason, and the fact the doors were locked and windows up 30 – Eaton believed there were no other force options that could have been used 31 (Rose Report p.6). 32

Eaton described the scene as having some ambient lighting from Taco Bell, but 33 It was not brightly lit. He said an officer was shining a weapon mounted light into 34 the Mercedes and it provided adequate lighting to see into the vehicle (Rose 35 Report p.4). 36

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Eaton said he believed he fired 5 to 6 rounds but later found out during the 1 round count that he fired 14 rounds. Eaton said that immediately upon firing he 2 saw the windshield and driver’s window were damaged from bullets, and he 3 could not see through them. He fired from approximately 4-5 feet away (p. 7). 4 Eaton said he stopped firing when he no longer perceived a threat (Rose Report 5 p.5). 6

5.3. Eaton Body Worn Camera (AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250-3.avi ) 7

I watched the full version of the body camera footage and then created a 8 shortened version proximal to the officer-involved shooting (See Annex). I bullet 9 point my general observations for video occurring before the frame by frame 10 analysis. The frame by frame analysis was conducted utilizing the shortened 11 version and is summarized in the below chart. 12

• Eaton arrives on the scene. Several officers are on the driver’s side of the 13 Mercedes with weapons pointed toward the vehicle. 14

• Eaton than takes a position near the front of McCoy’s driver’s side door 15 (pillar). 16

Frame Time Observation 1-6 0-

.167 McCoy has right hand near left shoulder and head appears to be turned away from officers.

18 .567 Officer commands begin (e.g., hands, etc.). 30- 66

.968-2.169

McCoy leans forward. A significant change in officers voices occur when providing commands. Pitch, tone, and speed all change.

80- 88

2.636- 2.903

It appears as if McCoy’s left arm (elbow visible) moves in a manner consistent with reaching downward. Officer Eaton and the officer to his right (Cano) are in positions which would afford them a FOV down into the car which is inconsistent with the orientation of the BWC.

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107 3.537 McCoy’s head (forehead?) is visible close to the steering wheel. Consistent with leaning forward to reach for an item on the floor board. Eaton began backing away at ~F95

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109 3.604 First visible round penetrates windshield. It is possible officer(s) on the driver’s side have fired at frame 98 as the window changes color and defects are seen when officers back away shortly after. Four rounds are fired after F185.

211 7.007 Last audible round fired. • First commands until 1st audible round: F109 – F18 = 91f x .033s = 3.0s 1 • First visual to last audible round: F211– F109 = 102f x .033s = 3.4s 2

3 5.4. Officer Thompson Interview 4

Thompson responded to the scene after hearing McCoy was unconscious with 5 a gun in his lap (in the drive-thru). He arrived and went to the driver’s side of the 6 Mercedes (next to Cano) and confirmed McCoy did have a gun in his lap. 7 Thompson described McCoy as “passed out” (Thompson Interview 15:00 – 8 15:05). Thompson described the handgun as black and possibly a Glock 9 (Thompson Interview 16:59-17:10). He also saw the Mercedes is in drive and 10 McCoy’s foot is on the brake (Yates, p. 1). 11

Thompson stated he and Cano attempted to coordinate a plan (Thompson 12 Interview 15:00 – 16:00). The result was to place a police vehicle block the 13 Mercedes from the front and back. This was to stop the Mercedes in case 14 McCoy’s foot came off the brake (Thompson Interview 16:00-16:30). After the 15 police vehicles were in place, the plan was to open the Mercedes door to 16 secure the handgun before McCoy wakes up. 17

During the implementation of the plan, Thompson found the door of the 18 Mercedes was locked. He backed away and requested a supervisor (Thompson 19 Interview 17:50-18:00). While awaiting a supervisor, McCoy woke up. Thompson 20 said officers gave commands for McCoy to show his hands and put his hands 21 up. McCoy looked at the officers (pointing weapons at him) and then quickly 22 reached toward the handgun in disobedience of officer commands to show his 23 hands (Thompson Interview 28:50-29:40). Thompson describes McCoy’s hands as 24 down by his side prior to him waking (Thompson Interview 18:30-18:42). 25 Thompson describes McCoy’s hands as moving up and then back down toward 26 the handgun (Thompson Interview 18:10-19:30; 29:00-30:00). Thompson said he 27 believed McCoy was going to use the weapon against him or other officers and 28 fired 5-6 rounds at McCoy (Yates Report p.1). Thompson indicated he began to 29 move backward when McCoy reached for his weapon as he was fearful of 30 being shot by McCoy (Thompson Interview 19:50-20:20). Clarifying this point, 31

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Thompson agreed that he believed McCoy was acting in a manner which 1 could cause him death or great bodily injury (Thompson Interview 30:00 – 31:00). 2

Post-shooting, Thompson said he saw McCoy’s handgun on the driver’s 3 floorboard. 4

5.5. Thompson Body Worn Camera (AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2249.avi) 5

I watched the full version of the body camera footage and then created a 6 shortened version proximal to the officer-involved shooting (See Annex). I bullet 7 point my general observations for video occurring before the frame by frame 8 analysis. The frame by frame analysis was conducted utilizing the shortened 9 version and is summarized in the below chart. 10

• The video begins with Thompson standing at McCoy’s window and asking, 11 “is this unlocked.” There is a discussion heard regarding opening the door 12 and attempting to take the gun from McCoy. An officer points out the 13 vehicle is in drive. The Mercedes door is then discovered to be locked. 14

• Thompson is then heard coordinating the boxing in of the Mercedes. 15

Frame Time Observation 1- 10

.0-

.267 Officer Thompson is holding McCoy at gunpoint. The vehicle window is closed and appears to have a dark tint. As officer Thompson raises his weapon, it is relevant to note the weapons mounted light allows illuminates the interior of the vehicle. It is also important to note that Thompson’s has a field of view which allows him to see down into the car which is not consistent with the BWC.

29 .934 McCoy’s right hand can be seen at his left chest. 92- 104

3.036- 3.437

McCoy’s left hand/arm can be seen moving down.

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105- 112

3.470- 3.704

McCoy begins to sit up in his seat (moving forward). His right-hand moves from his shoulder downward toward his lap and out of view.

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113- 131

3.737- 4.338

Officers begin verbalizing commands (e.g. “hands). During this time, McCoy appears to be facing forward and leans forward in his seat rapidly.

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131- 205

4.338- 6.940

Officer commands become increasingly elevated. The first shot is fired at approximately frame 205.

205- 306

6.807- 10.177

First audible shot to last audible shot. **Only two shots are heard after frame 290

• First commands until 1st audible round: F205 – F113 = 92f x .033s = ~3.0s 1 • McCoy’s first sign of movement moving left hand down until 1st audible 2

round: F205 – F92 = 113f x .033s = 3.7s 3 • McCoy’s first sign of movement forward (in seat) until first round: F205 – F105 = 4

100f x .033s = 3.3s 5 • First to last audible round: F306– F205 = 101f x .033s = ~3.3s 6

7 5.6. Officer Glick Interview 8

Officer Glick stated he responded to the scene of this incident after hearing 9 over the radio that McCoy was passed out with a handgun on his lap. Glick, in 10

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response to Thompson’s request, drove his police vehicle to the front of the 1 Mercedes to block it (Yates, p.1). 2

Glick exited his vehicle and saw McCoy appeared to be sleeping. McCoy then 3 “opened his eyes, looked around, looked forward and looked to the side” prior 4 to officers giving commands to McCoy to show his hands and put his hands up 5 (Glick Interview 10:00-10:40; 15:30-15:50). Glick said McCoy was not complying 6 and would not put his hands up. Glick said he saw that McCoy’s hands “looked 7 to be in his lap area” and he saw McCoy’s shoulders and upper arms moving as 8 McCoy was looking around at the officers (Glick Interview 10:40-11:08). 9

Glick said that he was aware McCoy had a firearm and that he believed the 10 movements he saw indicated McCoy was manipulating his firearm in 11 preparation to shoot at officers. Glick said he could not see the gun but 12 described McCoy’s upper arms coming together and his movements consistent 13 with someone manipulating a firearm. Glick stated that McCoy’s looking around 14 and failing to comply, along with his (Glick’s) knowledge of the firearm and 15 McCoy’s movements, made him (fear) believe McCoy was preparing to shoot 16 at officers (Glick Interview 16:45-19:20). Glick said he was aware of how fast 17 McCoy could bring the gun up and shoot at officers (Thompson Interview 19:00-18 19:15). Glick said, “I knew there was a reason he wasn’t complying when he 19 sees all these officers shouting to put his hands up” (19:15-19:25). The totality of 20 Glick’s knowledge and McCoy’s actions caused Glick to open fire at what he 21 believed to be the same time as everyone else (Glick Interview 11:10-11:32). 22 Glick said he fired 5-7 rounds (Glick Interview 20:25-20:30). 23

Glick is asked how much of McCoy he could see from his position. Glick states 24 he could see from about the about the biceps up (Glick Interview 14:30-14:50). 25

There is a question asked of Glick (possibly from counsel) regarding why he fired 26 that is not listed in Yates report and is not clear in the recording. My 27 interpretation is that Glick is asked why he used deadly force. Glick responds 28 that he wanted his co-workers to go home safely and he was concerned an 29 officer could have been grievously injured or killed (26:10-26:40). 30

5.7. Glick Body Worn Camera (AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250.avi) 31

I watched the full version of the body camera footage and then created a 32 shortened version proximal to the officer-involved shooting (See Annex). I bullet 33 point my general observations for video occurring before the frame by frame 34

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analysis. The frame by frame analysis was conducted utilizing the shortened 1 version and is summarized in the below chart. 2

• Glick arrives and places his police vehicle in front of the Mercedes. 3 • A police vehicle to the left of the frame has emergency lights illuminated. 4

Frame Time Observation 73 2.402 McCoy is visible on the BWC.

93 3.070 Begins of commands to show hands. Multiple officers heard for

several seconds. 157-164

5.205- 5.439

McCoy appears to be seated erect in the driver’s seat. His upper torso moves forward (quickly), and in the last frame, his head appears to have lowered toward the right side of the steering wheel. This movement is consistent with a person reaching down while seated in a vehicle. Multiple commands are still being given during this time. This movement appears simultaneous with officer gunfire (Frames enlarged 50%)

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182 5.973 First audible round(s). 290 9.643 Last audible round. F260 – F290 sounds like 4 independent

rounds from one shooter. • First commands until 1st audible round: F182 – F93 = 89f x .033s = 2.9s 1 • First to last audible round: F290 – F182 = 108f x .033s = 3.6s 2

3 5.8. Officer McMahon’s Interview 4

Officer McMahon responded to this incident after hearing Cano or Patzer 5 advise over the radio that McCoy was unconscious with a firearm in his lap. 6 McMahon arrived on scene and parked his police vehicle behind Glick’s police 7 vehicle. McMahon commented that he had an initial concern over these types 8 of calls as they are often tense and rapidly unfolding (Interview 10:30-10:57). 9 Officer McMahon heard officers yelling commands to McCoy (show hands) and 10 jogged to them (Glick). As he arrived, shots were fired (interview 11:30-11:39). 11 McMahon summarized his belief at this point; a) McCoy was armed, b) officers 12 had given multiple commands, c) and what he was witnessing was a mutual 13 combative shooting (Long Report p.2; Interview p.11:40-12:00). He believed 14 himself, nearby civilians, and other officers were in imminent danger (Interview 15 12:00-12:10). 16

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McMahon saw McCoy in the driver’s seat of the Mercedes moving in a back 1 and forth (side to side) motion. He believed gunshots appearing in the 2 Mercedes windows were projecting outward; meaning McCoy was shooting at 3 officers. McMahon discharged one round toward McCoy as he feared for 4 officer’s lives. He stopped firing as Glick crossed in front of the muzzle of his 5 weapon (Long Report p.3; Interview 12:45-13:00). 6

McMahon said officers are trained to form an L-shape in critical incidents to 7 alleviate the possibility of crossfire (interview 11:00 – 11:30). 8

5.9. McMahon Body Worn Camera (AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250-2.avi) 9

I watched the full version of the body camera footage and then created a 10 shortened version proximal to the officer-involved shooting (See Annex). I bullet 11 point my general observations for video occurring before the frame by frame 12 analysis. The frame by frame analysis was conducted utilizing the shortened 13 version and is summarized in the below chart. 14

• McMahon arrives and tells employees to go inside. 15 • Officers can be heard giving loud commands. 16

17 Frame Time Observation 1- 49

1.602 McMahon is moving quickly forward while officers can be heard giving loud commands

50 1.635 McMahon is approached McCoy’s vehicle and Glick can be seen on the left side of the frame. First shots are heard.

77 1.536 McMahon reaches out and places his hand on Glick’s back.

Glick then moves in front and to the right of McMahon. 137 1.538 McMahon repositions to the left of Glick.

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154 5.539 Last shot heard • First to last audible round: F154 – F50 = 104f x .033s = 3.4s 1

2 5.10. Officer Cano Interview 3

Officer Cano stated he was dispatched to this call involving an unconscious 4 McCoy in the Taco Bell drive-thru. Upon arrival, an employee pointed out the 5 Mercedes. He approached McCoy’s driver’s side door and described him as 6 unconscious or asleep while perceiving the cause being drunk or on drugs. He 7 shined his flashlight into the vehicle and saw a small pistol in McCoy’s lap 8 (Caitham Report p. 2). Officer Cano stated that the firearm was on the McCoy’s 9 left thigh with the barrel facing the suspect's right knee cap. He advised the way 10 it was orientated the suspect could have grabbed it with either hand (Caitham 11 Report p. 5). 12

Cano stated the discovery of the gun heightened his concerns for safety 13 because the weapon was easily accessible by McCoy. Thompson arrived, and 14 he and Cano discussed the fact that McCoy’s foot was on the brake and the 15 Mercedes was in drive. They coordinated the Mercedes being blocked in by 16 responding units (Caitham Report p.3). 17

Cano stated the McCoy’s left hand was down near the firearm, and his right 18 hand was down also. McCoy then began to scratch his chest with his right 19 hand. Cano and other officers gave commands, let me see your hands, let me 20 see your hands, put your hands up, put your hands up! He saw McCoy open his 21 eyes, made eye contact with officers, and lunged forward while dropping his 22 right hand toward the firearm at which point Cano fired his weapon (Caitham 23 Report, p.3; p.6). 24

Cano said he fired 11 rounds. He fired because he believed McCoy was going 25 for the firearm in his lap and he feared for his life and the lives of officers on the 26 scene. When asked how he felt regarding the incident, Cano stated that he was 27 scared when the suspect was waking up, and that is when he gave clear and 28 concise commands. He was hoping McCoy would comply with those orders; 29 however, his hands dropped to the gun. Cano was in fear for the six officers on 30 the scene because they had no cover and were about 2 feet away. Officer 31 Cano indicated he didn’t think McCoy would miss hitting an officer if he had 32 fired (Caitham Report p.4). Cano indicated there were no other alternatives to 33 deadly force. The Mercedes’ doors were locked, and the windows were up 34 (Caitham Report p.5). 35

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5.11. Cano Body Worn Camera (AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2246-2.avi) 1

I watched the full version of the body camera footage and then created a 2 shortened version proximal to the officer-involved shooting (See Annex). I bullet 3 point my general observations for video occurring before the frame by frame 4 analysis. The frame by frame analysis was conducted utilizing the shortened 5 version and is summarized in the below chart. 6

• The video begins with Cano at the Mercedes driver’s window. Cano is calling 7 out “gun” to Officer Thompson (who is walking toward him). 8

Frame Time Observation 1- 84

.0- 2.769

Officer Cano has his weapon and mounted light pointed at McCoy. The light can be seen penetrating the window tint and providing a view inside of McCoy. It should be noted that his positioning more likely than not provided a field of view down into the Mercedes which is inconsistent with the BWC field of view.

85- 217

2.803- 7.207

McCoy brings his right hand up to his left shoulder area and begins scratching. In regard to the ability to see through the windows, the individual detail and movement of McCoy’s

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fingers can be seen.

230- 242

7.641- 8.041

McCoy’s left arm comes down from his head and towards his lap (movement seen – compared to other videos confirms action).

243- 302

8.075- 10.043

McCoy begins leaning forward and continues forward until it appears as he is bent significantly at the waist while seated (reaching under dash or to lap?). Police commands begin at ~ frame 250.

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303- 321

10.077- 10.677

McCoy’s left arm moves forward and downward.

323 10.744 Officer Thompson’s weapon mounted light illuminates. 340 11.311 A shell casing ejects from Cano’s weapon. This is consistent

with the start of audible gunfire. 344 11.445 A muzzle blast is seen from a weapon to the left of Cano

(Eaton). 348 11.578 A second shell casing ejects from Cano’s weapon. 351 11.678 A second muzzle blast from the weapon to the left of Cano

(Eaton). 353 11.745 A third shell casing ejects from Cano’s weapon. 358 11.912 Cano’s weapon cycles. 364 12.112 Cano’s weapon cycles. 370 12.312 Cano’s weapon cycles. 376 12.513 Cano’s weapon cycles. 382 12.713 Cano’s weapon cycles. 387 12.913 Cano’s weapon cycles. 395 13.146 Cano’s weapon cycles. 401 13.347 Cano’s weapon cycles.

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440 14.648 Last audible round (not Cano). • First commands until 1st audible round: F340 – F250 = 90f x .033s = ~3.0s 1 • McCoy’s first sign of movement moving left hand down until 1st audible 2

round: F340 – F230 =110f x .033s = ~3.6s 3 • McCoy’s first sign of movement forward (in seat) until first round: F340 – F243 = 4

97f x .033s = 3.2s 5 • First to last audible round: F440 – F340 = 110f x .033s = ~3.6s 6 • Cano fired 11 rounds: F401 – F340 = 61f x .033s = ~2s (.18s split times). 7

8 5.12. Officer Patzer Interview 9

Officer Patzer self-dispatched to provide cover for Officer Cano on this call. He 10 arrived and parked his police vehicle behind the Mercedes. Officer’s Patzer and 11 Cano both saw that McCoy was either asleep or unconscious with a firearm on 12 his lap. Patzer indicated the firearm had an extended magazine (Caitham 13 Report p.2). 14

His initial thought was to wake McCoy up but then changed his mind due to the 15 severity of the situation, which was the gun on his lap. They decided to wait for 16 more units. Patzer stated that he assumed the gun was loaded and could not 17 tell if it wasn’t. He advised that the gun was on the McCoy’s left thigh with the 18 barrel oriented to the driver door. He stated the grip was facing the suspect’s 19 waistband (Caitham Report p.3). 20

Officer Thompson arrived and noticed the Mercedes was still in drive. The on-21 scene officers decided and had a unit block the Mercedes from the front. 22 Officer Thompson attempted to open the driver’s door and found it locked. At 23 this point, McCoy began to wake up. Officer’s began giving commands. 24 McCoy did not comply with those commands (e.g., show hands, put hands up). 25 McCoy looked left, looked at Patzer, and then looked to his lap. Patzer stated 26 he believed McCoy was looking for his gun. McCoy then dropped both hands 27 down suddenly (like a flinch). Patzer then said McCoy’s shoulders raised and his 28 elbows came up – followed by his hands starting to come up over the dash 29 (Caitham Report p.3). Patzer said that due to the orientation of McCoy’s 30 weapon when he saw it (muzzle toward the door), that McCoy only need to pull 31 the trigger to strike an officer (through the door) (Patzer Interview 18:30 – 18:40). 32

Patzer stated that he believed McCoy’s actions presented an immediate threat 33 and he feared for himself and the other officers on the scene. Patzer believed it 34 was necessary to fire his handgun at McCoy to stop McCoy from killing him or 35

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the other officers on scene. Patzer said he stopped firing when he felt there was 1 no longer a threat (Caitham Report p.4). 2

5.13. Patzer Body Worn Camera (AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2246.avi) 3

Frame Time Observation 1 .0 24-79 .767-

2.603 Movement inside the Mercedes is seen.

80-166

2.636- 5.472

Officer commands begin and continue for the duration of time.

166- 167

5.506- 5.539

It appears Patzer fires a round due to the rapid change in orientation of his gun-wielding hand. This is also consistent with the audible sounds of gunfire. It should be noted that Patzer’s positioning more likely than not provided a view down into the Mercedes which is inconsistent with the BWC field of view.

270 8.976 Last audible round. • First commands until 1st audible round: F166 – F80 = 86f x .033s = ~2.8s 4 • First to last audible round: F270 – F166 = 104f x .033s = ~3.4s 5

6 5.14. Officer Jones Report 7

Indicated he was securing the scene when he heard officers providing 8 commands to McCoy. He then heard multiple gunshots being fired in the area 9 of the Mercedes (p.1). 10

5.15. Officer Sloan Statement 11

Sloan stated he was moving a police vehicle to the rear of McCoy’s vehicle just 12 prior to the shots being fired. As he was getting out of the vehicle he heard the 13 shots fired, but had not seen McCoy’s actions proximal to the shooting 14 (Greenberg Report p.6). 15

5.16. Witness Statements 16

Alyssa Bonoton: Said she saw/heard a Taco Bell employee advise the driver of 17 the car in front of her (drive-thru) that a Mercedes was blocking the drive-thru. 18 Police arrived moments later. She saw an officer approach the Mercedes and 19 then pull his weapon out. She saw other officers position police vehicle to the 20 front and rear of the Mercedes to block it. Bonotan said she heard officers loudly 21 state, “show us your hands” and “put your hands up” prior to shooting. She did 22 not have a clear view inside the Mercedes (Scott Report, p.1) 23

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Nicolas Simi: He saw the Mercedes stopped in the drive through with no vehicles 1 stopped in front of it. He went inside Taco Bell to order food and returned to his 2 vehicle. He saw/heard VPD officers yelling at McCoy to show his hands and then 3 he heard gunshots (Jones Report p.1). Simi was later interviewed by Detective 4 Scott. Simi stated similar details as Bonoton (Scott Report p. 1-2; Jones Report 5 p.1). 6

Mathew Garcia: Is the reporting party and works at the Taco Bell where this 7 incident occurred. Garcia went outside to investigate the issue with the drive-8 thru when he located McCoy’s Mercedes. He could not see inside the car due 9 to heavily tinted front windows (from no closer than 6 feet away). He then went 10 back inside and called 911 (Greenberg Report p.4). He did not witness the 11 shooting but did hear gunshots from inside the restaurant (Greenberg Report 12 p.5). 13

Rolly Gabun: Gabun was with his friend (Gabriel) who recorded part of this 14 incident and posted it on social media. He stated he was 30 to 40 yards away 15 from the incident scene and was not able to see inside McCoy’s vehicle. He 16 only heard the officers yelling and then the shots (Yates Report p. 1). 17

Patrick Gabriel: Gabriel recorded the incident. There is no associated statement. 18 The video was provided to Det. Long. 19

5.17. Round Count 20

Eaton (13 rounds fired) had a 20-round magazine inserted in his weapon (SIG 21 P320 9MM) with 1 round chambered. He believed he fired 5 or 6 rounds, but 22 after a round count, he believed it was 14 rounds (Rose Report p. 2 & 5). 23 According to the property report, 8 rounds remained in the weapon (7 + 1) 24 which indicates Eaton fired 13 rounds (Property report p. 5) (20 round 25 magazine). 26

McMahon (1 round fired) (GLOCK 21, 45CAL) stated he had one round 27 chambered and a fully loaded 13 round magazine inserted in his weapon. He 28 fired a single round (Long Report, p.3). According to the property report, 13 29 rounds remained in the weapon (12 + 1) (13 round magazine). 30

Cano (11 rounds fired) (GLOCK 17) stated he had one round chambered and a 31 fully loaded 17 round magazine inserted in the weapon. Cano states he fired 11 32 rounds. According to the property report, 7 rounds remained in the weapon (6 + 33 1) (17 round magazine) (Property Report). 34

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Thompson (7 rounds fired) (GLOCK 17 9MM) stated he had one round 1 chambered and a fully loaded 17 round magazine inserted in the weapon 2 (Interview 06:00-06:30). He stated he believed he fired 5 to 6 rounds. According 3 to the property report, 11 rounds remained in the weapon (10 + 1) (17 round 4 magazine) (Property Report). 5

Patzer (12 rounds) (GLOCK 17 9MM) stated he had one round in the chamber 6 and a fully loaded 17 round magazine inserted in the weapon. Patzer states he 7 initially thought he fired 6 rounds, but later learned he fired 12. According to the 8 property report, 6 rounds remained in the weapon (5 + 1) (17 round 9 magazine)(Property Report). 10

Glick (11 rounds fired) (SIG SAUER 226) stated he had one round chambered 11 and a fully loaded 20 round magazine inserted in the weapon. According to the 12 property report, 10 rounds remained in the weapon (20 round magazine). 13

5.18. McCoy Weapon. 14

Detective Greenberg reported seeing a black firearm with an extended 15 magazine on the floorboard of McCoy’s Mercedes (Greenberg Report, p.1) 16

S&W 40C 40 CAL S/N HBA4993; 1+14 40 CAL AND MAGAZINE (HBA4993) 17

The weapon was photographed and collected from the scene (Bottello Report 18 p.2). 19

6. OPINIONS 20 21

6.1. Opinion #1: I opine the officers on scene at this incident had reasonable 22 suspicion1 and/or probable cause23 to detain or arrest McCoy for the 23 following violations: a) 25850 PC (Carrying a loaded firearm in public), b) 24 23152 CVC (driving while under the influence of drugs/alcohol) c) 11550 25 (e)(1)(2) (possession of firearm under the influence of a controlled 26 substance) and, 148(a)(1) PC (resist, delay, obstruct peace officer) based 27

1 Alameda County Point of View (2010). Retrieved from: http://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/files/DETENTIONS.pdf 2 Alameda County Point of View (2014a). Retrieved from: http://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/files/SS_14_PC_Reliability.pdf 3 Alameda County Point of View (2014b). Retrieved from: http://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/files/SS_14_PC_Principles.pdf

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upon the collective knowledge doctrine, their own personal observations, or 1 a combination of both1. 2 3

• Officer’s Cano, Thompson, and Patzer respond to a 911 call regarding a 4 silver Mercedes in the drive-thru at Taco Bell (974 Admiral Callaghan Ln.). 5 The reporting party (Garcia) stated the driver of the Mercedes (McCoy) 6 was slumped over the wheel. Upon arrival, the Mercedes was pointed out 7 to officers by a Taco Bell employee. Cano looked in the vehicle and saw 8 McCoy either “unconscious or asleep” and believed he was drunk or on 9 drugs. Cano saw a gun on McCoy’s lap and told officer Patzer and officer 10 Thompson. Both Patzer and Thompson visually confirmed the presence of a 11 handgun in McCoy’s lap. Patzer verbalized the weapon information to 12 other units via radio. Thompson pointed out the Mercedes was still in drive 13 to officers on the scene. Both Thompson and Patzer described McCoy as 14 “passed out.” 15

16 • Officer Eaton stated he heard the original call of a subject asleep in the 17

drive-thru and later heard radio updates concerning McCoy having a 18 handgun in his lap. Upon arrival, he saw officers (Cano, Thompson, & 19 Patzer) pointing their handguns toward McCoy who appeared asleep or 20 unconscious. Eaton said he visually confirmed McCoy had a handgun in 21 his lap. 22

23 • Officer Glick said he responded after hearing radio traffic concerning 24

McCoy being passed out with a handgun in his lap. He arrived and saw 25 McCoy was asleep behind the wheel of the Mercedes. He did not visually 26 confirm the presence of the handgun. 27 28

• Officer McMahon said he responded after hearing radio traffic concerning 29 McCoy being unconscious with a handgun in his lap. He did not visually 30 confirm the presence of the handgun. 31

32 • Officer statements concerning the initial contact and the totality of facts 33

and circumstances known to them at that time are consistent and 34 objectively validated via Cano, Thompson, and Patzer’s body-worn 35 cameras as well as CAD notes. 36

1 California Criminal Jury Instructions 2670. Lawful Performance: Peace Officer. Retrieved from https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrim-2019-edition.pdf

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1 • Officers gave loud verbal commands to McCoy to show his hands for 2

approximately 3 seconds before the first round was fired. McCoy had a 3 fully marked police vehicle parked directly in front of his Mercedes (facing 4 the wrong way), 3 fully uniformed officers within close proximity of his 5 driver’s side (Eaton, Cano & Thompson), one fully uniformed officer directly 6 in front of him (Patzer), and one fully uniformed officer at the front left 7 bumper of his vehicle. During the 3 seconds, McCoy wakes up, looks at 8 officers and failed to comply with the lawful commands of the officers. 9 Instead, McCoy’s behavior was the opposite of the intent of those 10 commands. 11 12

13 6.2. Opinion #2: I opine Officer Eaton had probable cause to believe1 McCoy 14

posed an immediate2 threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself as 15 well as other officers on the scene. His use of deadly force was objectively 16 reasonable and necessary based upon the totality of circumstances known 17 to him which includes: a) McCoy having a handgun in his lap, b) McCoy 18 looking at fully uniformed police officers pointing weapons at him, c) McCoy 19 failing to obey verbal commands from officers to show his hands, and d) 20 McCoy moving in a manner that a reasonable officer under the 21 circumstances would equate with retrieving his firearm. 22

23 • In consideration of the totality of circumstances already presented in 24

Opinion # 1: Eaton saw McCoy awaken and describes him as looking 25 around, looking directly at him (Eaton), and then looking down toward his 26 own lap. McCoy then moved his hands (sudden/jerky movement) and 27 body in a way which made Eaton believe he was reaching for the 28 handgun. Specifically, Eaton saw McCoy moving his left hand toward 29 where the gun was last seen. Eaton said he was fearful that McCoy was 30

1 A person has probable cause to believe that someone poses a threat of death or great bodily injury when facts known to the person would persuade someone of reasonable caution that the other person is going to cause death or great bodily injury to another (California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 505. Retrieved from: https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrim-2019-edition.pdf). 2 Present; at once; without delay; not deferred by any interval of time. In this sense, the word, without any very precise signification, denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time. Immediately does not, in legal proceedings, necessarily import the exclusion of any interval of time, it is a word of no very definite signification, and is much in subjection to its grammatical connections (Black’s Law Dictionary 2nd Edition).

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reaching for the gun to start shooting at officers. Eaton indicated no other 1 force options were available. 2

3 • Eaton’s BWC shows McCoy bring both his left and right arms/hands down 4

toward his lap and then leaning forward. McCoy then moves his left arm 5 forward. 6 7

• Eaton’s BWC does not offer a view of where McCoy is looking between the 8 time he woke up and the shooting. Thompson’s BWC presents McCoy’s 9 head (when visible) as facing up and straight ahead when it is visible. 10 However, McCoy’s head is out of view when he first begins to move and 11 after he moves forward in his seat. Additionally, the head and eyes move 12 independently, and McCoy’s head and eye movements are not provided 13 with enough acuity (or at all in some cases) to determine where he is 14 looking. Most importantly, Eaton states McCoy looked around and directly 15 at him before moving his hands downward. 16

17 6.3. Opinion #3: I opine Officer Thompson had probable cause to believe 18

McCoy posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to 19 himself as well as other officers on the scene. His use of deadly force was 20 objectively reasonable and necessary based upon the totality of 21 circumstances known to him which includes: a) McCoy having a handgun in 22 his lap, b) McCoy looking at fully uniformed police officers pointing weapons 23 at him, c) McCoy failing to obey verbal commands from officers to show his 24 hands, and d) McCoy moving in a manner that a reasonable officer under 25 the circumstances would equate with retrieving his firearm. 26 27

• In consideration of the totality of circumstances already presented in 28 Opinion # 1: Thompson confirmed visually that McCoy had a handgun in 29 his lap. He also noted the Mercedes was in drive and McCoy’s foot was on 30 the brake. After planning to block in the Mercedes and possibly remove 31 McCoy from the vehicle, Thompson learned the door was locked. While 32 waiting for a supervisor, McCoy woke up. Thompson said he gave 33 commands for McCoy to show his hands or put his hands up. McCoy 34 looked at the officers and reached down toward the handgun. Thompson 35 said he believed McCoy was going to arm himself with the handgun and 36 use it to kill or cause great bodily injury to officers. 37

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1 • Thompson’s body-worn camera video shows McCoy’s left, and then right 2

hands moving down as his body begins to move forward in the seat. 3 Officers are heard providing loud commands for McCoy to show his hands 4 and then McCoy leans forward rapidly in his seat. McCoy’s head (when 5 visible) appears oriented straight ahead toward the front windshield as he 6 moves forward. 7

8 6.4. Opinion #4: I opine Officer Glick had probable cause to believe McCoy 9

posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself as well 10 as other officers on the scene. His use of deadly force was objectively 11 reasonable and necessary based upon the totality of circumstances known 12 to him which includes: a) McCoy having a handgun in his lap, b) McCoy 13 looking at fully uniformed police officers pointing weapons at him, c) McCoy 14 failing to obey verbal commands from officers to show his hands, and d) 15 McCoy moving in a manner that a reasonable officer under the 16 circumstances would equate with retrieving his firearm. 17 18

• In consideration of the totality of circumstances already presented in 19 Opinion # 1: Glick said he saw McCoy sleeping in the Mercedes prior to 20 waking up and then looking around. Glick heard officers giving commands 21 to McCoy to show his hands or put his hands up, and he saw that McCoy 22 did not comply. Glick indicated that he saw the upper portion of McCoy’s 23 body (biceps upward) and that his hands were in his lap area. Glick said 24 McCoy’s movements led him to believe McCoy was manipulating the gun 25 in his lap. Glick said he knew how fast McCoy could bring the gun up and 26 fire. Glick perceived McCoy to be preparing to shoot at officers and 27 responded with deadly force to neutralize the perceived threat. 28 29

• Glick’s body-worn camera video is not of a level of acuity (due to distance 30 and contrast) to see McCoy’s upper body movements in detail. Nor can 31 McCoy’s head and eye movements prior to his initial movement forward in 32 the driver’s seat be seen. However, Glick’s BWC does show McCoy moving 33 forward in the driver’s seat while presenting an appearance of reaching 34 downward. This angle (unlike others) presents as if McCoy looks to the right 35 (toward Glick) before reaching downward (unclear). Synthesizing Glick’s 36 BWC with others, I know that McCoy made several other movements just 37

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before and after he moved forward to include his right and left arm 1 moving downward proximal to his lap area, and then his left arm moving 2 forward just prior to the shots. 3 4

6.5. Opinion #5: I opine Officer McMahon had probable cause to believe 5 McCoy posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to 6 himself as well as other officers/citizens on the scene. His use of deadly force 7 was objectively reasonable and necessary based upon the totality of 8 circumstances known to him which includes: a) McCoy having a handgun in 9 his lap, b) McCoy failing to obey verbal commands from officers to show his 10 hands, and d) a perception that rounds were exiting from McCoy’s 11 windshield (officers actively engaged in gunfight). 12 13

• In consideration of the totality of circumstances already presented in 14 Opinion # 1: McMahon said he was already concerned based on his 15 knowledge of these types of incidents (fear). He arrived on the scene and 16 heard officers yelling for McCoy to show his hands. As he jogged toward 17 other officers, shots were fired. McMahon said he perceived the bullet 18 holes appearing in McCoy’s windshield as projecting outward which 19 caused him to fear for his life and the lives of officers on scene. He saw 20 McCoy moving inside the vehicle and fired one round. 21

22 • McMahon’s body-worn camera shows him rapidly approaching the 23

Mercedes with his weapon in an elevated ready position. He orders 24 civilians nearby to go back to the restaurant. As he closes the distance, 25 officers are providing commands for McCoy to show his hands (at 26 gunpoint) and then shots are fired. The smoke and debris around the 27 windshield can be seen from McMahon’s BWC as he approaches. The 28 effect is intensified by weapons mounted lights and could reasonably be 29 perceived as being caused by rounds exiting the windshield (see 30 McMahon’s BWC frames 59 – 86). I am unable to determine when 31 McMahon fired his one round, but Officer Glick moves in front of 32 McMahon’s weapon (frames 80 – 101). 33 34

• In regard to a misperception of shots coming from a vehicle under similar 35 conditions, the issue is not novel: Swann v. City of Richmond, 498 F. Supp. 36 2d 847 (E.D. Va. 2007) 37 38

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6.6. Opinion #6: I opine Officer Cano had probable cause to believe McCoy 1 posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself as well 2 as other officers on the scene. His use of deadly force was objectively 3 reasonable and necessary based upon the totality of circumstances known 4 to him which includes: a) McCoy having a handgun in his lap, b) McCoy 5 looking at fully uniformed police officers pointing weapons at him, c) McCoy 6 failing to obey verbal commands from officers to show his hands, and d) 7 McCoy moving in a manner that a reasonable officer under the 8 circumstances would equate with retrieving his firearm. 9 10

• In consideration of the totality of circumstances already presented in 11 Opinion # 1: Officer Cano visually confirmed McCoy was unconscious with 12 a gun in his left thigh. He saw McCoy move to scratch his chest and begin 13 to wake up. Cano and other officers ordered McCoy to show his hands. 14 McCoy opened his eyes, made eye contact with officers and lunged 15 forward dropping his right hand toward the firearm. Cano fired as he 16 believed McCoy was reaching for the firearm in his lap and feared for his 17 life as well as the lives of officers on the scene. 18

19 • Cano’s body-worn camera shows McCoy scratching his shoulder with his 20

right hand. McCoy’s left arm comes down from his head and toward his 21 lap. His right hand also moves down toward his lap. McCoy leans forward 22 in the driver’s seat while his left arm moves forward and downward. 23 24

6.7. Opinion #7: I opine Officer Patzer had probable cause to believe McCoy 25 posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself as well 26 as other officers on the scene. His use of deadly force was objectively 27 reasonable and necessary based upon the totality of circumstances known 28 to him which includes: a) McCoy having a handgun in his lap, b) McCoy 29 looking at fully uniformed police officers pointing weapons at him, c) McCoy 30 failing to obey verbal commands from officers to show his hands, and d) 31 McCoy moving in a manner that a reasonable officer under the 32 circumstances would equate with retrieving his firearm. 33 34 • In consideration of the totality of circumstances already presented in 35

Opinion # 1: Officer Patzer visually confirmed McCoy was unconscious 36 with a handgun in his lap. Patzer saw McCoy begin to awaken prompting 37 himself and another officer to give commands for McCoy to show his 38

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hands. Patzer stated McCoy looked left, then at him (Patzer), and then 1 down to his lap – which Patzer perceived as McCoy looking for his gun. 2 Patzer described McCoy dropping both hands suddenly (like a flinch), 3 raising his shoulders and elbows, while his hands start to come up over the 4 dash. Patzer knew the barrel of the handgun was already facing officers, 5 and he feared McCoy was going to shoot and kill him or another officer 6 on scene. Patzer said he used deadly force against McCoy to stop the 7 threat of death or serious bodily injury. 8 9

• Patzer’s body worn camera is mostly obscured by his arms and handgun 10 prior to the shooting. Movement is seen inside the Mercedes prior to shots, 11 but it is unclear what exactly the movements are. There is no indication 12 from the available BWC videos that McCoy did or was in the process of 13 bringing his hands upwards. However, the video from various angles 14 makes it clear that McCoy sat up, moved both hands toward his lap and 15 then moved his left arm downward. 16

General information for all opinions on the use of deadly force 17

• Officers were giving loud verbal commands for ~3s before shots are fired. 18 The loud verbal commands began proximal to McCoy’s large movements 19 forward in his seat. There is consistency between officer statements that 20 McCoy’s eyes were open, he looked around at officers before reaching 21 toward the area of the gun. 22 23

• Evidence exists which demonstrates a driver (with a gun in hand) can 24 move the gun from the center console to discharge out the passenger 25 window in as little as .20s1. Early non-peer reviewed work by the Force 26 Science Institute© demonstrated an average time for this movement as 27 .25s. Officers are not required to wait until a weapon is pointed at them to 28 take the necessary steps to save their own lives. 29

30 • The body-worn camera video from each officer is more-likely-than-not an 31

inaccurate field of view concerning key visual information. In each case, 32 the position of the officer relative to the Mercedes should be considered. 33 The BWCs are statically oriented on the chest and are not consistent with 34

1 I conducted a frame by frame analysis of the Napa County Sheriff’s officer OIS (February 17, 2019) in which the driver pulled a gun from the right center console area and fired out the driver’s side window at the officer. From first movement to muzzle blast was .20s.

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the officer’s heads and eyes which are positioned significantly higher. The 1 head and eyes (and body) can orient the visual field of view in ways the 2 BWC will not recreate. For instance, the body camera does not orient 3 downward into the vehicle which differentiates from the higher field of 4 view offered by the officers’ eyes. In lay terms, an officer can look down 5 into a vehicle while a chest mounted BWC cannot unless intentionally 6 angled in that manner (see frame 150 below). 7 8

9

10 11

• There is consistency between all body cameras that McCoy was fired 12 upon ~3 seconds after the first verbalization of commands to show his 13 hands. There is also consistency between Cano & Thompson’s BWC 14 regarding the time from McCoy’s first movement forward in his seat until 15 the first round is fired at ~3.3 seconds. The duration of shooting times is also 16 consistent between BWCS as ~3.5s. 17

18 • Synthesizing the visual data from all BWCs, I observed McCoy lower his left 19

arm down to his left side and then his right arm down to his lap while 20 leaning forward. McCoy appears to lean forward until his with his head 21 almost touches the steering wheel. Just before the shots are fired, McCoy’s 22

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left arm movement indicates he was reaching down toward the 1 floorboard. 2

3 6.8. Opinion #8: I opine the 55 rounds fired by 6 officers in ~3.5 seconds is 4

reasonable based upon my training and experience as a range instructor as 5 well as through applied human factors psychology. 6 7

• While it is not possible to empirically validate after the fact, I opine it is 8 more-likely-than-not that all officers involved in this shooting experienced a 9 significant hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal response. It is unreasonable to 10 think that a life or death situation such as this which involved proximal 11 gunfire would not create such a response. 12

o An HPA axis response is associated with a selective focus of 13 attention to central features (cognitively and visually) which may 14 block out peripheral details (i.e., tunnel vision, auditory 15 exclusion). 16

17 • The duration of shooting times derived from all BWCs is consistent at ~3.5s. 18

19 • There is no way to determine each individual officer’s start and stop 20

shooting time due to overlapping shots and lack of visual references in all 21 but one case (Cano). Officer Cano’s weapon cycling, and shell casing 22 ejections are seen on his BWC. This provided objective measures for timing 23 his 11 rounds which were fired in ~2s (.18s per round average). Cano 24 stopped firing approximately 1 second prior to the cessation of other 25 audible shots. Two muzzle blasts from officer Eaton’s weapon can be seen 26 from Cano’s BWC that are spaced apart by ~.23s. These two officers are 27 firing faster than what has been seen in laboratory experiments. 28 29

• When judging the number of rounds fired, human performance science 30 must be considered. Officers do not generally receive stress-based training 31 specific for a stop firing response or recognition of stop firing patterns. 32 Instead, officers are generally trained to fire until the threat has been 33 neutralized. Recognizing a threat has been neutralized is a cognitive 34 process which often consists of processing objective stimuli (e.g., prone not 35 moving, hands up, dropped the gun, etc.). Under acute stress, this process 36 may become more difficult due to cognitive and perceptual narrowing. 37 38

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o In this case, there is no overt stop shooting stimuli. In fact, the 1 chaos caused by the sounds of gunfire, debris, and weapons 2 mounted lights reflecting off the shattered windshield would 3 likely provide an opposing signal to officers on scene. 4

o Even under the best conditions (controlled laboratory), officers 5 have failed to stop firing for up to 1.5s with up to 4 rounds being 6 fired after a stop stimulus is presented. 7

o No officer expended all ammunition prior to stopping firing which 8 indicates a level of self-control. 9

10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 The aforementioned findings and opinions are based on my initial review of the 28 listed documents as provided to me at this time. I will alter, amend, enhance, or 29 delete my findings and opinions as necessary following my review of any 30 additional discovery in this case. 31 32 33 34 35 36 Signed ________________________________________ Date: May 17th, 2019 37

David M. Blake, M.Sc. 38 39

40 41

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ANNEX 1 2 1. BWC File AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2246.avi (Patzer) 3

4 This file was shortened in VideoMach5.15.1-Professional. The new video file is 5 named: OfficerInFront.avi with a duration of 11.311s. From this video I created 6 a file of 339 frames which were placed in a folder named: Patzer. 7 8 2. AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2246-2.avi (Cano) 9

10

11

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This file was shortened in VideoMach5.15.1-Professional. The new video file is 1 named: Officer2.avi with a duration of 16s. From this video I created a file of 492 2 frames which were placed in a folder named: Cano. 3 4

3. AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2249.avi (Thompson) 5 6

7 8 This file was shortened in VideoMach5.15.1-Professional. The new video file is 9 named: Officer3.avi with a duration of 16.850s. From this video I created a file of 10 505 frames which were placed in a folder named: Thompson. 11 12

4. AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250.avi (Glick) 13

14

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This file was shortened in VideoMach5.15.1-Professional. The new video file is 1 named: Officer4.avi with a duration of 25.392s. From this video I created a file of 2 762 frames which were placed in a folder named: Glick. 3 4

5. AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250-2.avi (McMahon) 5 6

7 8 This file was shortened in VideoMach5.15.1-Professional. The new video file is 9 named: Officer5.avi with a duration of 20.687s. From this video I created a file of 10 620 frames which were placed in a folder named: McMahon. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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6. AXON_Body_2_Video_2019-02-09_2250-3.avi (Eaton) 1

2 3 This file was shortened in VideoMach5.15.1-Professional. The new video file is 4 named: Officer6.avi with a duration of 27.261s. From this video I created a file of 5 817 frames which were placed in a folder named: Eaton. 6 7