David C Kang - Hierarchy, Balancing, Puzzles

7/27/2019 David C Kang - Hierarchy, Balancing, Puzzles

1/17

Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International RelationsAuthor(s): David C. KangSource: International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003/2004), pp. 165-180Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137481.

Accessed: 20/05/2014 17:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The MIT Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toInternational Security.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 89.136.226.172 on Tue, 20 May 2014 17:40:31 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4137481?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4137481?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress


2/17

Hierarchy Balancingn d Empirical u z z l e s

n s i a n InternationalRelations

David C. Kang

In my article entitledGetting Asia Wrong, I make two major arguments.' First, European-derivedtheories in general and realist theories in particular frequently have difficultyexplaining Asian international relations. Second, international relations schol-ars need to be as careful about issues of empirical testing and theoretical rigorwhen studying Asia as they are when studying Europe. In a reply to my arti-cle, Amitav Acharya agrees with both of these claims while also critiquing myessay in arguing that shared norms and institutional linkages mitigate rivalryin Asia and that I am a historical determinist. Acharya, however, has misun-derstood both international relations theory and the role of history. His re-sponse to my article provides me with an opportunity to clarify and brieflyexpand on the major themes in Getting Asia Wrong.As Acharya's reply exemplifies, most scholars not only dismiss the notionthat the Asian experience might force a rethinking or modification of Euro-pean-derived theories, but they also pay little attention to the historical Asianinternational system. Acharya writes, Contrary to Kang's argument, Asia'sfuture will not resemble its past (p. 150). Acharya, however, has misunder-stood my argument: To study the role of history is hardly to predict that it willreplicate itself in the future. My main point is that there are good reasons tothink that Asian states may not function like European states and that thestudy of Asia must begin with a discussion of some of Asia's empirical anoma-lies and what might explain them. Acharya seems to argue that the only goalto which scholars who study Asia can aspire is to unquestioningly apply exist-ing theory. In contrast, my goal is to expand international relations theory sothat scholars can better identify factors that help to explain regional and tem-poral differences in how states think about and achieve security and how theyconduct their international relations.

David C. Kang is AssociateProfessorof Governmentand Adjunct AssociateProfessorat the TuckSchoolofBusiness, Dartmouth College.For their comments and suggestions, the author thanks Amitav Acharya, Thomas Christensen,Stephan Haggard, Victoria Hui, Peter Katzenstein, Jennifer Lind, Richard Little, Randall Schweller,Allan Stam, and William Wohlforth.1. David C. Kang, Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks, InternationalSecurity, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer 2003), pp. 57-85.InternationalSecurity, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 165-180@ 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

165

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/17

InternationalSecurity 28:3 166

In this reply I make three points. First, I show that Acharya's assertion that Iam claiming an exceptional role for Asia is unfounded; I also show that rigor-ous social science demands that scholars be open to the possibility that evi-dence may force theoretical modifications. Second, I demonstrate that thestudy of hierarchy is a well-developed branch of international relations theory,and I explain why balancing should not be the default hypothesis in interna-tional relations. Third, I examine Asia's empirical record to illustrate the im-portance of an increased focus on Asian history for the field of internationalrelations; in addition, I enumerate several current empirical anomalies thatscholars need to address given the challenge that these pose to conventionaltheoretical explanations of Asian international relations.TheoryBuilding and TheoryTestingacross RegionsInternational relations scholars must take seriously the possibility that differ-ent regions of the world might indeed be different. Relatedly, critiques of thisclaim as somehow fundamentally exceptionalist misunderstand the nature ofscholarly inquiry. It is good social science to be open to the possibility thatevidence may not fit a theory, just as it is possible to note difference withoutresorting to caricature-a trap into which Acharya falls when criticizing someof my assertions as having an exceptionalist ring (p. 162). An example ofhow progressive research might occur is perhaps best demonstrated through acomparison of scholarship on Asian development with scholarship on Asianinternational relations. According to a number of criteria-theoretical sophisti-cation, attention to the empirical record, and impact on the wider field of socialscience-the study of Asian international relations lags far behind. A brief re-view of the intellectual history of Asia confirms this observation.

Beginning in the late 1970s, scholars of Asian development challenged theircolleagues in the fields of economics, political science, and sociology to movebeyond the long-standing dichotomy between a neoclassical free market and acentrally planned economy in their study of economic development. ChalmersJohnson, for example, was particularly forceful when arguing that Japan's eco-nomic growth fit into neither category.2 And as Stephan Haggard has written,

Spearheaded by scholars outside the mainstream of North American econom-ics, this work began by underlining empirical anomalies: the myriad ways in2. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and theJapaneseMiracle: The Growthof IndustrialPolicy, 1925-1975 (Stan-ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).



4/17

Hierarchy,Balancing,and EmpiricalPuzzles 167

which the East Asian cases failed to conform to the neoclassical view. 3 In the1980s, as Japan's economic rise continued, and South Korea and Taiwan be-came successful developers (i.e., newly industrialized countries, or NICs), thedebate over the explanation for their success intensified.The dependent variable in all three cases was startlingly clear: Each was ex-periencing economic development that was historically unprecedented byworld standards in both its pace and its depth.4 The issue was how to explainthis growth. The debate began by focusing on whether state intervention wascentral to the NICs' economic success-the state versus the market debate.5In surprisingly little time, it became obvious that the common variable was ex-tensive government intervention into the market. This finding made clear theneed to recast the standard debate between the virtues of a neoclassical freemarket versus a centrally planned economy.

Twenty years later, the study of Asian development and the high theoreticalstandards that this scholarship has established have forced scholars to face amyriad of new ideas and issues. The concept of a developmental state hasbecome part of the canon in political economy.6 New developments in micro-economics, sociology, and anthropology have underscored the role of institu-tions in East Asia's economic performance. Scholars no longer view markets asthe frictionless intersection of supply and demand curves. Instead markets arebeing reinterpreted as complexes of principal-agent relationships in whichproblems of imperfect and asymmetric information, contracting, and credibil-

3. For an overview of the intellectual development of the field, see Stephan Haggard, Institutionsand Growth in East Asia, Studies in Comparative nternational Development,Vol. 38, No. 4 (Spring2004), p. 4. For empirical assessments, see Richard Luedde-Neurath, Import Controls and Export-OrientedDevelopment:A Reassessmentof the South KoreanCase (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986); andRussell Mardon, The State and the Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The Case of South Ko-rea, WorldPolitics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (October 1990), pp. 111-138.4. Robert Wade, East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, ShakyEvidence, WorldPolitics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 270-320.5. For economic perspectives, see Alwyn Young, The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Sta-tistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience, QuarterlyJournalof Economics,Vol. 110, No.3 (August 1995), pp. 641-680; Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia's Miracle, ForeignAffairs,Vol. 73,No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 62-79; and Helen Hughes, ed., Achieving Industrialization inAsia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For discussions of statists, see Robert Wade,Governing the Market (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Alice H. Amsden, Asia'sNext Giant: South Koreaand Late Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989);and Stephan Haggard, Pathwaysfrom thePeriphery:The Politics of Growth in theNewly IndustrializingStates (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).6. Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,1999); and David C. Kang, Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the DevelopmentalState in Korea, International Organization,Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 177-207.



5/17


ity are ubiquitous.7 The smooth functioning of markets requires more than get-ting policies, incentives, and prices right. Also needed are public and privateinstitutions that facilitate market exchange-from the legal system and a cleardelineation of property rights, to the public provision of information, to infor-mal institutions that build trust. Scholars continue to probe the relationshipbetween development and politics, corruption, the international system, andthe role of history.' As Haggard writes, In the 1990s, intellectual develop-ments ... provided earlier insights on government intervention with micro-foundations that made them legitimate to the economics profession. 'The continuing debate over Asian development has generated more than itsshare of controversy. Almost nowhere in this debate, however, do argumentsabout whether or not Asia is exceptional play a role, and most scholars takeAsia's empirical realities on their own terms. They pay close attention to mea-suring the independent and dependent variables, and they are open to the po-tential ramifications of their findings for social science theory. Exploring howinstitutions affect markets, and in particular the impact of Asian governmentsand the organization of Asian business on economic growth, is an ongoingprocess that involves careful attention to both theory and evidence. By com-parison, the study of Asian international relations is still in its initial stages.But if scholars in the field of political economy can do it, so too can scholars inthe field of international relations.

7. Dani Rodrik, Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich, EconomicPolicy,No. 20 (April 1995), pp. 141-193; Masahiko Aoki, Information,Incentives,and Bargainingin theJapaneseEconomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Joseph E. Stiglitz and MarylouUy, Financial Markets, Public Policy, and the East Asian Miracle, WorldBank ResearchObserver,Vol. 11, No. 2 (November 1996), pp. 249-276; and World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: EconomicGrowthand Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).8. David C. Kang, Transaction Costs and Crony Capitalism in East Asia, ComparativePolitics,Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 2003), pp. 439-459; Andrew MacIntyre, Institutions and Investors: The Politicsof the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia, InternationalOrganization, Vol. 55, No. I (Winter 2001),pp. 81-122; and Michael Ross, Indonesia's Puzzling Crisis, University of California at Los An-geles, 2003.9. David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism:Corruptionand Development in South Koreaand the Philippines(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Richard Doner, Bryan Ritchie, and Daniel Slater,System Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia inComparative Perspective, Emory University, 2003; and Mushtaq H. Khan and K.S. Jomo, Rents,Rent-seeking,and EconomicDevelopment:Theoryand Evidence in Asia (New York:Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2000).10. Haggard, Institutions and Growth in East Asia, p. 14.11. One such controversy is over total factory productivity. See Krugman, The Myth of Asia'sMiracle ; and Dani Rodrik, Coordination Failures and Government Policy: A Model with Appli-cations to East Asia and Eastern Europe, Journalof InternationalEconomics,Vol. 40, Nos. 1-2 (Feb-ruary 1996), pp. 1-22.



6/17

Hierarchy, Balancing, and EmpiricalPuzzles 169

Hierarchyand Balancing in International RelationsIn my article, I question whether Asian international relations will be hierar-chic or whether a regional balance of power is more likely. In addition, I criti-cize scholars who automatically assume that balancing will result. Scholarshave no reason to think that balancing behavior is homogeneously distributedacross regions, and that because it occurred in Europe, it will in Asia as well.The issue for Asian international relations is not a theoretical one aboutwhether hierarchy could exist, but rather an empirical one: Does the evidenceshow balancing or bandwagoning behavior in Asia?

Acharya writes that Kang's notion of hierarchy is not grounded in theavailable theoretical literature (p. 154). In making this claim, however,Acharya overlooks at least two well-established schools that examine variousforms of hierarchy and bandwagoning.'2 The hegemonic stability school,which emphasizes the beneficial impact that a dominant power can have onless powerful states, is a prime example. Another is the preponderance ofpower school, which argues that an unequal distribution of power in the inter-national system is more stable than an equal distribution of power. In addi-tion, some scholars have explored ways in which the United States can restrainits own overweening power to mitigate fears of domination and abandon-ment among secondary states in the system.14 In contrast, Acharya falls intothe trap of assuming that balancing is the default hypothesis in international12. Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, Inter-national Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; Robert Powell, In the Shadowof Power:States and Strategiesin InternationalPolitics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); andCharles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, WorldPolitics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997),pp. 171-210.13. On hegemonic stability, see Robert Gilpin, Warand Change in WorldPolitics (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1981); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperationand Discord in theWorld Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and David A. Lake,Power,Protection,and Free Trade: nternational Sourcesof United States CommercialStrategy, 1887-1939(Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1988). On preponderance of power, see A.EK. Organski andJacek Kugler, The WarLedger Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Douglas Lemke, Regionsof War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Henk Houweling and JanSiccama, Power Transitions as a Cause of War, Journalof ConflictResolution, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March1988), pp. 87-102; and Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner, Power Parity, Commitment toChange, and War, InternationalStudies Quarterly,Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 235-260.14. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory:Institutions, StrategicRestraint, and the Rebuilding of OrderafterMajor Wars(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 5; William C. Wohlforth, The Sta-bility of a Unipolar World, InternationalSecurity, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-42; and Jo-seph S. Nye, Bound to Lead:TheChangingNature ofAmerican Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).



7/17

International Security 28:3 1170

relations theory. However, as Robert Powell concludes, Whether states bal-ance, bandwagon, or stand aside while others fight depends in a complicatedway on many different factors .... when these factors are taken into account,states usually bandwagon. '5The balancing proposition that grows out of this literature-Kenneth Waltz'sconfident assertion that hegemony leads to balance and has done so

through all of the centuries we can contemplate '6--is alive and well. And asStuart Kaufman and William Wohlforth note, Criticism of Waltz concernsmainly his theoretical explanation for recurrent balances, not the phenomenonitself. This essay is too short for a full theoretical elaboration of hierarchyand how it existed in the historical Asian context. Instead, the remainder ofthis section aims to show that the theoretical edifice constructed by Waltz isbadly in need of repair.In Theory of InternationalPolitics, Waltz claims that anarchic and hierarchicorders are two ends of a spectrum and that international relations is anarchic.Hence, Waltz defines hierarchy as the opposite of anarchy; in this world, hier-archy and anarchy cannot coexist. The dominant prediction that arises fromthis formulation is that balances occur. Further, Waltz restricts his locus of in-quiry to the great powers, defining away the tremendous diversity that existswithin the international system and thus making his theory fit his evidence.In recent years, however, some international relations scholars have increas-ingly begun to challenge the balancing hypothesis. If twenty years ago the con-ventional wisdom was that balancing was a universal law of internationalrelations, there is now considerable evidence from outside the European con-text-including ancient Assyria, medieval Asia, India, and Latin America-that in systems consisting of one major power, the secondary states often donot balance against it. In one recent project, for example, scholars found thatstable hierarchies are at least as common as balancing or empire.' And asWohlforth and Kaufman point out, Core propositions from many theoriesconcerning balance and hierarchy fall flat when confronted with evidence from15. Powell, In the Shadow of Power, pp. 6, 201.16. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, International Security,Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 77.17. William C. Wohlforth and Stuart Kaufman, Hierarchy and Balance in International Systems,paper prepared for the conference Hierarchy and Balance in Ancient Systems, Dartmouth Col-lege, Hanover, New Hampshire, October 19-21, 2003, p. 2.18. Hierarchy and Balance in Ancient Systems, conference held at Dartmouth College, October19-21, 2003.



8/17


systems other than those comprised of the European states and their contem-porary descendents. 1 Scholars are beginning to explore the theoretical under-pinnings of international systems much more broadly than before.21In developing the balance of power thesis, Waltz understandably focused ona few big things, and in particular on the bipolar confrontation between theUnited States and the Soviet Union and the potential for nuclear holocaust. Atthe time, Waltz argued, The theory of international politics is written in termsof the great powers of an era. It would be ... ridiculous to construct a theory ofinternational politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica.... A general theory ofinternational politics is necessarily based on the great powers. 21 Even within aWaltzian world, however, small and medium powers do exist. This is not to ar-gue for inclusion into his theory of variables such as ideology, nonstate actors,or international institutions, but rather to acknowledge that in accepting thenation-state as the unit of analysis, one must allow for the role of small nation-states. For Waltz, the great powers are all that matter, so again he has chosen aset of cases that fit his theory.In explaining his dependent variable--Cold War stability between two nu-clear superpowers-Waltz was correct to restrict his focus to the great powers.Small powers did not matter in the global struggle between the United Statesand the Soviet Union. A theory designed to explain the Cold War, however,may not explain why Asian states are not necessarily balancing China in thesame way that the United States balanced the Soviet Union. Because the worldis no longer made up of two superpowers and all the rest, scholars who wantto explore other international systems or alternative reasons for state behaviorneed to move away from Waltz's truncated definition of which countries mat-ter and how anarchy interacts with hierarchy. If Thailand can start a global eco-

19. Wohlforth and Kaufman, Hierarchy and Balance in International Systems, p. 11.20. See William C. Wohlforth, Hierarchy, Status, and War, paper prepared for the annual meet-ing of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 29-September 1,2002; David A. Lake, Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations, InternationalOrganization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-33; and Katja Weber, Hierarchy amidst Anarchy:TransactionCosts and Institutional Choice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). TheBritish School has been most active in exploring alternative forms of organization. See Adam Wat-son, The Evolution of InternationalSociety:A ComparativeHistorical Analysis (New York: Routledge,1992); Evan Luard, Conflictand Peace in the Modern International System:A Study of the Principles ofInternationalOrder(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); and Barry Buzan and Rich-ard Little, The Idea of 'International System': Theory Meets History, International Political ScienceReview, Vol. 15 (July 1994), pp. 231-255.21. Kenneth N. Waltz, TheoryofInternationalPolitics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 73.



9/17


nomic crisis, and if war in Afghanistan or Taiwan could have a direct impacton the United States, perhaps we should consider incorporating such countriesand situations into our theories.Indeed, even Waltz allows for the possibility that balancing may not occur,

although he merely asserts this, rather than providing a theory to help explainit. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz's escape clause was to argue that

secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side. 22 Butthis admission is hardly sufficient. Nor is his implicit dismissal of hierarchy ac-ceptable. Is Waltz suggesting that in a system with one dominant state, second-ary states without a balancing option have no choice but to acquiesce andaccommodate? Is this not hierarchy?Sometimes states bandwagon. The issue is not nation-states themselves, butrather the international distribution of power and capabilities. Already schol-ars know that small powers do not necessarily balance. If there is one domi-nant power, even other great powers may not balance, seeing it in theirinterests to accommodate the status quo.23 Bandwagoning-or at least acquies-cence to the status quo-by secondary states is a central feature of hierarchy.24In contrast to realist predictions that secondary states will be fearful of and bal-ance against the dominant state, in hierarchy the secondary states flock to itsside with a view toward gaining benefits.2s This behavior is consistent withRandall Schweller's distinction between balancing for security and band-wagoning for profit.2'One response from realists is that differential power does not constitute a hi-erarchy and that the existence of balancing or bandwagoning behavior provesnothing.27 They argue that just because some states are weaker does not meanthat they will not strive to maintain their independence, which the great pow-

22. Ibid., p. 127.23. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World.24. A challenge for international relations scholars is to define more clearly our basic theoreticalconcepts, such as bandwagoning, balancing, engagement, containment, hegemony, accommoda-tion, hiding, and hedging.25. On balancing, see Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics;Stephen M. Walt, TheOrigins of Alliances(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Eric Labs, Do Weak States Bandwagon? Secu-rity Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 41-61.26. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit.27. According to Waltz, State actions are not determined by structure.... Because states coexistin a self-help system, they are free to do any fool thing they care to, but they are likely to be re-warded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that isnot. Waltz, Evaluating Theories, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December1997), p. 915.



10/17


ers are largely able to achieve. If realism cannot predict state behavior, thenrealists ought to admit as much. Instead, they continue to predict over-whelmingly that states will balance in the face of predominant power. On theother hand, if balancing and bandwagoning are not predictions that derivefrom a Waltzian approach, then that only buttresses my point that scholarsneed to be more careful in explaining Asian state behavior.

Scholarship that ignores Asian states' history and the role of preferences infavor of a purely structural formulation of international relations also ignoresmany of the theoretical advances of the past decade by individuals such asRobert Powell and James Fearon, among others.28The most sophisticated theo-retical treatments of deterrence, spiral models, and power transitions contendthat understanding preferences is vital for drawing any conclusions aboutstate behavior. As Haggard notes, In the absence of information on actors'preferences or a clear sense of the nature of the strategic interaction in ques-tion, we are unlikely to generate defensible expectations about state behavioror the propensity for conflict. 29In sum, the notion of hierarchy is well established in the internationalrelations literature, and balancing should not be the default hypothesis in in-ternational relations theory. Balancing is the expected outcome under certainconditions (i.e., when there is a small number of great powers). Hierarchy andbandwagoning are the expected outcomes when one state is dominant in thesystem. The question then is, What is happening in Asia?

EmpiricalAnomalies and Historical AsiaIn addition to opening theoretical space for consideration of alternative expla-nations of Asian international relations, scholars should consider more care-fully the empirical record of Asian states, including both the historical originsof the Asian international system and present-day empirical anomalies.30 Onecan list dozens of books in the political science mainstream literature that deal28. Powell, In the Shadowof Power;James D. Fearon, Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and The-ories of International Relations, Annual Reviewof Political Science,Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 289-314; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and InternationalImperatives(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992).29. Stephan Haggard, The Balance of Power, Globalization, and Democracy in Northeast Asia:Reflections on Long-Run Forces, paper presented at the conference Peace, Development, andRegionalization in East Asia, Seoul, South Korea, September 2-3, 2003, p. 60.30. This section is drawn from David C. Kang, Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900, paper prepared for the conference Hierarchy and Balancing in Ancient Systems.



11/17


with pre-1945 Europe.3' In contrast, there are only two widely read works ofpolitical science that deal with pre-1945 Asia.32The field of international relations tends to treat the contemporary Asiansystem as if it emerged fully formed from nothingness in the post-World WarII, postcolonial era. But many Asian countries have been geographicallydefined, centrally administered states for far longer than those in Europe. Toignore the evolution of these states is at best an oversight; at worst, it revealsan unwillingness to engage Asia directly. This is especially puzzling given thehuge amount of attention that international relations scholars have paid to thehistorical roots of the European system. If such scholars were dismissive of allhistory, at least that would be consistent. But ignoring Asian history whilestudying European history in essence biases their conclusions in favor of theEuropean experience.

Acharya's article critiques my brief overview of Asian history in GettingAsia Wrong, yet his discussion of Asia's historical record relies almost exclu-sively on a 1968 volume edited by John Fairbank.33 There has been a tremen-dous amount of historical scholarship in the intervening thirty-five years.Below I briefly expand my argument to consider (1) whether other states ac-commodated to China in the past, and (2) the existence of hierarchy in Asianinternational relations historically.First, accommodation of China was the norm in East Asia during the Ming(1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) eras. This did not, however, involve asignificant loss of national independence, as nearby states were largely free toconduct their domestic and foreign policy independent of China. Regardingthe Vietnamese Le dynasty (1427-1787), for example, David Marr writes, This

31. Among many books on historical European international relations, see Henrik Spruyt, The Sov-ereign State and Its Competitors:An Analysis of Systems (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1994);Charles Tilly,ed., TheFormationof National States in WesternEurope(Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1974); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power andPeace,3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960); E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years'Crisis, 1919-1939: AnIntroduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951); and Elizabeth Kier,Imagining War:Frenchand BritishMilitary Doctrine between the Wars(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1997).32. These are lain Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism:StrategicCultureand GrandStrategyin ChineseHistory (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1994), and John King Fairbank, ed., TheChineseWorld Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1968). A third will be Victoria Hui, Warand State Formation in Ancient China and EarlyModern Eu-rope (New York:Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).33. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order.34. Much of this literature is cited in my book-length manuscript. David C. Kang, Hierarchy, Alli-ances, and Stability in Asia, Dartmouth College, 2003.



12/17


reality [China's overwhelming size], together with sincere cultural admiration,led Vietnam's rulers to accept the tributary system. Providing China did notmeddle in Vietnam's internal affairs.... Vietnamese monarchs were quite will-ing to declare themselves vassals of the Celestial Emperor. The subtlety of thisrelationship was evident from the way in which Vietnamese monarchs styledthemselves 'king' (vuong) when communicating with China's rulers, but 'em-peror' (hoangde) when addressing their own subjects or sending messages toother Southeast Asian rulers. 35

Japan also worked within the Chinese-dominated international system. Toeliminate the insecurity caused by fear of a Chinese invasion, the AshikagaShogunate (1333-1573) sought investiture by the Ming emperor. KawazoeShoji writes, Japan had to become part of the Ming tribute system and thuscease to be the 'orphan' of East Asia. For centuries the Japanese had feared at-tack by the Silla (Korea), and the Mongol invasions had provided real groundsfor fearing a Ming attack. 3Even the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-1868) recog-nized China's centrality and Japanese-Korean relations as equal. According toKey-huik Kim, The Tokugawa rulers tacitly acknowledged Chinese suprem-acy and cultural leadership in the East Asian world.... though Tokugawa Ja-pan maintained no formal ties with China ... for all intents and purposes itwas as much a part of the Chinese world as Ashikaga Japan had been. 37Thus, Asian states of varying size and technological capability existed in aninternational system based on rules and norms that revolved around China.From Japan to Siam, and for more than six centuries, this system functioned inessentially the same manner.Second, although economic relations in historical Asia were as vibrant asthose in Europe, conflict was notably rare. Centuries separated major interstateconflict in Asia, which tended to occur when order within the central powerhad begun to break down. As Chinese dynasties began to decay, conflict alongand among the peripheral states would flare up, as the central power turnedits attention inward. Thus in 1274 and 1281, as the Sung and Chin dynastieswere crumbling, the Mongols under Kublai Khan tried unsuccessfully to con-quer Korea and Japan.38Centuries later, as the Ming dynasty began to weaken,35. David Marr, Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 6(July 1981), p. 49.36. Kawazoe Shoji, Japan and East Asia, in Kozo Yamamura, ed, TheCambridgeHistory of Japan,Vol. 3: Medieval Japan,3d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 437.37. Key-hiuk Kim, TheLastPhase of the East Asian World Order:Korea,Japan,and the ChineseEmpire(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 21, 23.38. See Jeremiah Curtin, TheMongols: A History (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972).



13/17


the Japanese general Hideyoshi twice attempted to invade China through Ko-rea (in 1592 and 1598). With the restoration of order in China, however, conflictamong the peripheral states ceased, and intraregional relations remained rela-tively peaceful for several hundred years. The dominant power had no need tofight, and the secondary powers had no desire to fight.

This is not to say that conflict in Asia was totally absent, but rather thatinterstate war was much less common than it was in Europe. Pirates, no-mads, and other nonstate actors existed in the historical Asian system, just asBarbary Coast pirates and similarly powerful actors could be found in Europe.The Chinese, for instance, engaged in long-running border battles with theMongols to the north, at times employing as many as 500,000 troops in aneffort to secure this front.39

That Asian international relations do not conform to the classical Europeanbalancing model has been empirically validated by research that examines theorigins of war over the past 150 years. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam subjectedthe European model to empirical testing across regions and time and foundthat although it works well in Europe, significant differences in preferencesfor conflict exist across regions. They also found no support for the argu-ment that [Asian] behavior will converge on that of Europe. In fact, all of theregions outside of Europe appear to diverge from the European pattern [ofclassical balance of power]. 'There are at least six empirical anomalies in contemporary Asian interna-tional relations that realist interpretations cannot explain. First, the main em-pirical anomaly, and the main problem with a theoretical view based onrealism, is the focus of attention on the most powerful countries. For Asia, thebiggest threats arise not from the most powerful country (the United States) oreven the second most powerful country (Japan), but rather from the region'ssmallest and weakest states (Taiwan and North Korea, respectively).'4 Thisanomaly cannot be explained without first understanding these states' inter-ests and the nature of their interactions with other countries.42 Writing aboutdifferent behavior across regions, Bennett and Stam note It is not that the39. Johnston, Cultural Realism,p. 234. See also Hans J. van de Ven, War and the Making of Mod-ern China, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996), p. 737.40. D. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, The BehavioralOrigins of War(Ann Arbor: University of Mich-igan Press, 2003), pp. 191-195.41. Thomas J. Christensen, China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in EastAsia, International Security, Vol. 23 No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-79.42. Jack L. Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., Coping with Complexityin the InternationalSystem (Boul-der, Colo.: Westview, 1993).



14/17


actors are not rational, even though a universal model may fail. Rather, theysimply are not playing the same game with the same preferences. 43A second empirical anomaly concerns the thorny issue of Taiwanese sover-eignty.44Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state, yet many internationalrelations scholars treat it like one because it acts like one. This not only doesthe field of international relations a disservice, but it is also logically inconsis-tent with the Westphalian view that formal recognition is paramount. Al-though Acharya argues that China uses Westphalian concepts, Chinesescholars point out that when discussing Taiwan, Chinese know exactly whenthey want to use English words and meanings and when they want to use Chi-nese words and meanings, and so do the Taiwanese.45 Scholars need to con-front such realities, especially because of their such ramifications for bothChina and Taiwan. 4A third anomaly is the remarkable staying power of Asia's three Leniniststates: China, Vietnam, and North Korea have survived despite the collapse ofthe European communist bloc more than a decade ago. Although China andVietnam (and, to a lesser extent, North Korea) have engaged in some economicreforms, they remain authoritarian political regimes.47 It also bears mentionthat all three are products of anti-Western, anticolonial movements. North Ko-rea, in particular, has survived much longer than almost anyone predicted.48Although minuscule compared with any of its neighbors, North Korea is thecountry most likely to be at the center of conflict in Northeast Asia.4j43. Bennett and Stam, The BehavioralOrigins of War,p. 174.44. Aihwa Ong, The Chinese Axis: Zoning Technologies and the Logic of Exception in VariegatedSovereignty, paper prepared for the conference Peace, Development, and Regionalization in EastAsia ; and Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,InternationalOrganization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 251-287.45. Personal communication from Peter Katzenstein, September 29, 2003. See also Yun-han Chu,Taiwan's Security Dilemma: Military Rivalry, Economic Dependence, and the Struggle over Na-tional Identity, paper prepared for the conference Peace, Development, and Regionalization inEast Asia.46. Shelley Rigger, Competing Conceptions of Taiwan's Identity, in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Acrossthe Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan,and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1997);Christopher Hughes, Taiwanand Chinese Nationalism: National Identityand Status in International So-ciety (New York:Routledge, 1997); and Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan,New China:Taiwan'sChangingRole in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).47. On North Korean economic reforms, see David C. Kang, The Avoidable Crisis in North Ko-rea, Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 495-510.48. Several years ago, I predicted that North Korea would survive into the foreseeable future. Da-vid C. Kang, Rolling with the Punches: North Korea and Cuba during the 1980s, Journalof EastAsian Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 18-55.49. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea:A Debateon Engagement Strategies (NewYork:Columbia University Press, 2003).



15/17


A fourth anomaly concerns the attitude of South Korea and Japan to the Tai-wan-China conflict. A realist would argue that both countries should havemuch to fear from an aggressive China, and hence they should be eager to helpthe United States and Taiwan contain it, either through more active measurestoday or through promises to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a Chinese at-tack. A liberal would assert that, as democracies, South Korea and Japanshould be eager to defend democratic Taiwan against authoritarian China. Yetbecause of their perception of the Taiwan-China issue as more of an internalthan an international matter, both countries have shown a reluctance to getinvolved.

A fifth anomaly involves the ejection of U.S. bases from the Philippines afterthe Cold War. Given the tremendous security benefits that the Philippines en-joys as a member of the U.S. alliance system in Asia, why would it take such aseemingly self-defeating action?s The standard realist explanation is that itreflected a surge in Filipino nationalism-an explanation that seems ratherexceptionalist. As Yuen Foong Khong writes, By 1989 it became obvious thatthe negotiations had become entangled with a fierce domestic political debatewithin the Philippines. The surge in Filipino nationalism derailed the negotia-tions. ' Realists, however, cannot so easily attribute the ouster of the U.S.bases to domestic politics. A more likely explanation is that the Philippinesdoes not view China as the threat that realists believe it should.

Sixth, despite seemingly every reason to be fully incorporated into the U.S.alliance system, South Korea clearly has a different perspective on the role ofthe United States in Northeast Asia.52 The idea that Seoul might not want tocontinue its close alliance with Washington was unthinkable even two yearsago. But a resurgent Left in South Korea, combined with worries that theUnited States-not North Korea-is the destabilizing force in the the regionhas led many in South Korea to view the U.S. presence with some alarm. This

50. Daniel Okimoto writes, [The U.S. alliances in Asia have] withstood the test of time, lasting forlonger than a half-century; they have also functioned effectively to deter blackmail, coercion,conflict, and war. Okimoto, KASA and JASA:Twin Pillars of Asia's Security Architecture, paperpresented at the conference Peace, Development, and Regionalization in East Asia.51. Khong is not a realist, though here he does offer the standard realist explanation for Manila'sdecision. Yuen Foong Khong, Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and SoftBalancing in Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Strategy, in J.J.Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and AllenCarlson eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency(Stanford, Calif.: Stan-ford University Press, forthcoming).52. CSIS Working Group on U.S.-R.O.K. Relations, Strengthening the U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance: ABlueprint for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,2003).



16/17


has caused much consternation in Washington, which is beginning to take thethreat to the alliance more seriously. Chung-min Lee writes, For the first timesince the bilateral alliance [with the United States] was forged more than ahalf-century ago, more Koreans are at least entertaining the specter of closerpolitical, security, and economic ties with China. 53 here are deep divisions inSouth Korea concerning the utility of a continued alliance with the UnitedStates, U.S. policy toward North Korea, and South Korea's relations with theother powers in the region.54 Although differences over how to deal withNorth Korea are nothing new, in the past these differences were often tactical,resolved in large part because of the common perception that North Korea rep-resented a serious security threat. In recent years, however, South Korean andU.S. security perceptions have begun to significantly diverge.Instead of addressing such anomalies, Acharya chose to emphasize twoother arguments: first, that India is a significant actor in Asian international re-lations and, second, that norms matter in explaining these relations. Neitherargument is sustainable. Although India certainly is an important actor inSouth Asia, the fact that China extends into two regions does not mean thatthe two regions are the same. This would be similar to arguing that because theUnited States is involved in Asia and Europe, both of those regions are thesame. India may matter to South Asia, but it does not figure in East Asian secu-rity issues such as North Korea and Taiwan, or even in Philippine securitydecisionmaking.In addition, the norms and institutions argument has little empirical validity.One recurrent finding is the disparity in attitudes and beliefs on these subjectswithin South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Thesecountries are certainly modern, but a common desire for a security communityis far from a reality. Norms that might influence Asian state behavior are star-tlingly absent, and here Aaron Friedberg's original argument is true: Giventheir vast disparities in wealth, political development, ethnicity, religion, andlanguage, states in East Asia do not share a common bond, beyond the desireto be wealthy and secure. 5 Institutions such as the Association of Southeast

53. Chung-min Lee, Between Alliance and Autonomy: Reconceptualizing South Korea's StrategicChoices and Attendant Consequences, paper presented at the conference Peace, Development,and Regionalization in East Asia, p. 162.54. Chung-in Moon, Between Banmi and Sungmi: Changing Images of the United States in SouthKorea, lecture presented at Georgetown University, August 20, 2003.55. Aaron L. Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar World, InternationalSecurity, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33.



17/17

International Security 28:3 180

Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum remain peripheral to the con-duct of Asian international relations. That these Asian states may have modernaspirations is one thing; to argue that they share deeply held norms and a de-sire for more regional institutions is another.ConclusionAmitav Acharya has made a number of important points regarding the studyof Asian international relations. In addition to focusing on standard realist con-cerns such as material capabilities, international relations scholars need to givegreater consideration to the role of institutions, ideas, and history in Asia, aswell as to definitions of the Asian region and its subsystems. The key questionis whether balancing or bandwagoning best characterizes contemporary Asianrelations. The evidence, although mixed, shows that Asian nations do not feelparticularly threatened by any country and hence are not balancing China.Close examination of mainstream realist theoretical approaches to Asian inter-national relations reveals a number of puzzles, and scholars of Asian interna-tional relations need to pay more attention to the empirical record, bothhistorical and modern. My goal is not to replace one set of unquestioned asser-tions with another, but rather to open up the field for continued progress.

Documents

David C Kang - Hierarchy, Balancing, Puzzles