“Culture and Anarchy” by Matthew Arnold

Herbert Spencer

What Arnold meant by "culture" and "anarchy" is not what his contemporaries meant by those words, or what we mean by them. His culture is not the genteel culture of "belles lettres" and "dead languages" that his critics mocked. Nor is it popular culture, as we now understand that term. Although it is rooted in classical culture, Arnold's culture looks forward rather than backward; it is a prescription for a common, progressive, universal culture that would elevate and unify all classes. This culture is nothing less than the study and pursuit of "total perfection," "the best which has been thought and said in the world." It is inspired not by reason alone but by "right reason," the reason that comes from the "best self" rather than the "ordinary self." It seeks to cultivate the "free play" of thought, the "sheer desire to see things as they are." It is what Jonathan Swift, in the Battle of the Books, calls "sweetness and light," beauty and intelligence, the "two noblest of things" that together constitute "human perfection."

If this idea of culture seems to us today (as it did to many of Arnold's contemporaries) almost unbearably high-minded, his idea of anarchy is only a little less so. Anarchy is "doing as one likes." Although John Stuart Mill is never mentioned by name, the allusion could not have escaped his readers, for it was only a few years earlier that Mill had defined liberty in precisely those terms. Arnold finds evidence of the insidious spirit of "social anarchy" in the Hyde Park riot of July 1866, a demonstration for electoral reform that turned disorderly when access to the park was prohibited. The mob, affirming "an Englishman's best and most blissful right of doing what he likes," proceeded to rob and beat bystanders, while the Alderman of the City of London, reluctant to assert his authority, ordered the militia not to interfere.

This image of social anarchy is so dramatic that it may overshadow the more important sense of anarchy as Arnold understands it--cultural anarchy, not only doing as one likes but thinking and speaking as one likes. In contrast to the "free play" of thought that Arnold identifies with culture.

Matthew Arnold's view of culture is focused heavily on the ideal that culture was "contact with the best which has been thought and said in the world. Accordingly, culture was the creation of "beauty", "intelligence", and "perfection" in which only the best could be labeled such. rited, attained and taught from a people like a "storehouse of pooled learning. " Moreover, Arnold assigned characteristics to culture. With a century spanning the two, the drift from "Arnoldian conception of culture" to Geertz's view of culture displays the shift in what culture really was. On the other hand, someone of beauty and perfection was cultured in Arnold's eyes. Arnold saw culture as a compilation of beauty, intelligence, and perfection. While Arnold focused culture to be a specific thing that only few attained, Geertz claimed

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that culture can be found in each and every person. " As an anthropologist, Geertz sought not to prove what culture was, but to explain what culture is. More importantly, the two explained culture to be completely different. Culture has never held any permanent meaning and has therefore shifted and changed through centuries. One whom mastered a language such a Greek was certainly not cultured to the opinions of Arnold. Culture as explained by Clifford Geertz and Matthew Arnold shows the ever changing view of culture.

In his social essays, of which the most important form the volume entitled 'Culture and Anarchy,' he continues in his own way the attacks of Carlyle and Ruskin. Contemporary English life seems to him a moral chaos of physical misery and of the selfish, unenlightened, violent expression of untrained wills. He too looks with pitying contempt on the material achievements of science and the Liberal party as being mere 'machinery,' means to an end, which men mistakenly worship as though it possessed a real value in itself. He divides English society into three classes:

1. The Aristocracy, whom he nick-names 'The Barbarians,' because, like the Germanic tribes who overthrew the Roman Empire, they vigorously assert their own privileges and live in the external life rather than in the life of the spirit.

2. The Middle Class, which includes the bulk of the nation. For them he borrows from German criticism the name 'Philistines,' enemies of the chosen people, and he finds their prevailing traits to be intellectual and spiritual narrowness and a fatal and superficial satisfaction with mere activity and material prosperity.

3. 'The Populace,' the 'vast raw and half-developed residuum.' For them Arnold had sincere theoretical sympathy (though his temperament made it impossible for him to enter into the same sort of personal sympathy with them as did Ruskin); but their whole environment and conception of life seemed to him hideous. With his usual uncomplimentary frankness Arnold summarily described the three groups as 'a materialized upper class, a vulgarized middle class, and a brutalized lower class.'

For the cure of these evils Arnold's proposed remedy was Culture, which he defined as a knowledge of “the best that has been thought and done in the world and a desire to make the best ideas prevail”. Evidently this Culture is not a mere knowledge of books, unrelated to the rest of life. It has indeed for its basis a very wide range of knowledge, acquired by intellectual processes, but this knowledge alone Arnold readily admitted to be 'machinery.' The real purpose and main part of Culture is the training, broadening, and refining of the whole spirit, including the emotions as well as the intellect, into sympathy with all the highest ideals, and therefore into inward peace and satisfaction. Thus Culture is not indolently selfish, but is forever exerting itself to 'make the best ideas'--which Arnold also defined as 'reason and the will, of God'--'prevail.'

Arnold felt strongly that a main obstacle to Culture was religious narrowness. He held that the English people had been too much occupied with the 'Hebraic' ideal of the Old Testament, the interest in morality or right conduct, and though he agreed that this properly makes three quarters of life, he insisted that it should be joined with the Hellenic (Greek) ideal of a perfectly rounded nature. He found the essence of Hellenism expressed in a phrase which he took from Swift, 'Sweetness and Light,' interpreting Sweetness to mean the love of Beauty, material and spiritual, and Light, unbiased intelligence; and he urged that these forces be allowed to have the freest play. He vigorously attacked the Dissenting denominations, because he believed

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them to be a conspicuous embodiment of Philistine lack of Sweetness and Light, with an unlovely insistence on unimportant external details and a fatal blindness to the meaning of real beauty and real spirituality. Though he himself was without a theological creed, he was, and held that every Englishman should be, a devoted adherent of the English Church, as a beautiful, dignified, and national expression of essential religion, and therefore a very important influence for Culture.

Toward democracy Arnold took, not Carlyle's attitude of definite opposition, but one of questioning scrutiny. He found that one actual tendency of modern democracy was to 'let people do as they liked,' which, given the crude violence of the Populace, naturally resulted in lawlessness and therefore threatened anarchy. Culture, on the other hand, includes the strict discipline of the will and the sacrifice of one's own impulses for the good of all, which means respect for Law and devotion to the State. Existing democracy, therefore, he attacked with unsparing irony, but he did not condemn its principle. One critic has said that 'his ideal of a State can best be described as an Educated Democracy, working by Collectivism in Government, Religion and Social Order.' But in his own writings he scarcely gives expression to so definite a conception.

Arnold's doctrine, of course, was not perfectly comprehensive nor free from prejudices; but none could be essentially more useful for his generation or ours. We may readily grant that it is, in one sense or another, a doctrine for chosen spirits, but if history makes anything clear it is that chosen spirits are the necessary instruments of all progress and therefore the chief hope of society.

The differences between Arnold's teaching and that of his two great contemporaries are probably now clear. All three are occupied with the pressing necessity of regenerating society. Carlyle would accomplish this end by means of great individual characters inspired by confidence in the spiritual life and dominating their times by moral strength; Ruskin would accomplish it by humanizing social conditions and spiritualizing and refining all men's natures through devotion to the principles of moral Right and esthetic Beauty; Arnold would leaven the crude mass of society, so far as possible, by permeating it with all the myriad influences of spiritual, moral, and esthetic culture. All three, of course, like every enlightened reformer, are aiming at ideal conditions which can be actually realized only in the distant future.

Arnold's style is one of the most charming features of his work. Clear, direct, and elegant, it reflects most attractively his own high breeding; but it is also eminently forceful, and marked by very skilful emphasis and reiteration. One of his favorite devices is a pretense of great humility, which is only a shelter from which he shoots forth incessant and pitiless volleys of ironical raillery, light and innocent in appearance, but irresistible in aim and penetrating power. He has none of the gorgeousness of Ruskin or the titanic strength of Carlyle, but he can be finely eloquent, and he is certainly one of the masters of polished effectiveness.

Arnold was the apostle of a new culture, one that would pursue perfection through a knowledge and understanding of the best that has been thought and said in the world. He attacked the taste and manners of 19th-century English society, particularly as displayed by the "Philistines," the narrow and provincial middle class. Strongly believing that the welfare of a nation is contingent upon its intellectual life, he proclaimed that intellectual life is best served by an unrestricted, objective criticism that is free from personal, political, and practical considerations.

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Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism Matthew Arnold

The following entry presents criticism of Arnold's essay, Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism (1869). See also Matthew Arnold Criticism.

INTRODUCTION

Culture and Anarchy is a controversial philosophical work written by the celebrated Victorian poet and critic Matthew Arnold. Composed during a time of unprecedented social and political change, the essay argues for a restructuring of England's social ideology. It reflects Arnold's passionate conviction that the uneducated English masses could be molded into conscientious individuals who strive for human perfection through the harmonious cultivation of all of their skills and talents. A crucial condition of Arnold's thesis is that a state-administered system of education must replace the ecclesiastical program which emphasized rigid individual moral conduct at the expense of free thinking and devotion to community. Much more than a mere treatise on the state of education in England, Culture and Anarchy is, in the words of J. Dover Wilson, “at once a masterpiece of vivacious prose, a great poet's great defence of poetry, a profoundly religious book, and the finest apology for education in the English language.”

Biographical Information

Apart from his occupation as a poet and critic, Arnold earned a reputation during his lifetime as one of his age's most knowledgeable and influential advocates for educational reform in England. Born the eldest son of Dr. Thomas Arnold, a headmaster of Rugby and generally acknowledged as the innovator of the modern public school system in England, Arnold was inculcated with a liberal attitude toward education from an early age. During his formative years and as a student at Oxford, he embraced the reform-minded ideas of social thinker John Henry Newman. In 1851 at the age of thirty, Arnold was appointed Her Majesty's Inspector of Schools, a post he held for the next thirty-five years. In his role as inspector, Arnold became intimately familiar with the disadvantages and inequalities inherent in the educational system from the favored aristocratic upper class to the ignored and impoverished lower class. Moreover, in his official capacity Arnold toured numerous schools and universities on the Continent which had already undergone extensive educational reforms. His comparative experiences at home and abroad yielded such essays as The Popular Education of France, with Notices of That of Holland and Switzerland (1861), A French Eton, or Middle-Class Education and the State (1864), and Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868), all of which influenced the ideas which found expression in Culture and Anarchy. Despite his best efforts to influence Parliament to initiate sweeping educational reform, it was not until Arnold appealed to the altruistic intellectual members of the English middle class with Culture and Anarchy that he began to gain a groundswell of support for his cause. Ultimately, Arnold's proposals and arguments contributed to the passage of the

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Elementary Education Act of 1870 which mandated that a state-run public educational program should replace the current private system of learning in England.

Plot and Major Characters

Although Arnold does not create specific fictional characters to express his ideas in Culture and Anarchy, he does infuse his essays with a narrative persona that can best be described as a Socratic figure. This sagacious mentor serves as a thematic link between each of the chapters, underscoring the importance of self-knowledge in order to fully engage the concept of pursuing human perfection. This mentor also identifies and classifies three groups of people who comprise contemporary English society. The first group is the Barbarians, or the aristocratic segment of society who are so involved with their archaic traditions and gluttony that they have lost touch with the rest of society for which they were once responsible. The second group—for whom Arnold's persona reserves his most scornful criticism—is the Philistines, or the selfish and materialistic middle class who have been gulled into a torpid state of puritanical self-centeredness by nonconforming religious sects. The third group is the Populace, or the disenfranchised, poverty-stricken lower class who have been let down by the negligent Barbarians and greedy Philistines. For Arnold, the Populace represents the most malleable, and the most deserving, social class to be elevated out of anarchy through the pursuit of culture.

Major Themes

Arnold introduces the principal themes of Culture and Anarchy directly in the essay's title. Culture involves an active personal quest to forsake egocentricity, prejudice, and narrow-mindedness and to embrace an equally balanced development of all human talents in the pursuit of flawlessness. It is a process of self-discipline which initiates a metamorphosis from self-interest to conscientiousness and an enlightened understanding of one's singular obligation to an all-inclusive utopian society. According to Stefan Collini, culture is “an ideal of human life, a standard of excellence and fullness for the development of our capacities, aesthetic, intellectual, and moral.” By contrast, anarchy represents the absence of a guiding principle in one's life which prevents one from striving to attain perfection. This lack of purpose manifests itself in such social and religious defects as laissez faire commercialism and puritanical hypocrisy. For Arnold, the myopic emphasis on egocentric self-assertion has a devastating impact on providing for the needs of the community; indeed, it can only lead to a future of increased anarchy as the rapidly evolving modern democracy secures the enfranchisement of the middle and lower classes without instilling in them the need for culture. Inherent in Arnold's argument is the idea of Hebraism versus Hellenism. Hebraism represents the actions of people who are either ignorant or resistant to the idea of culture. Hebraists subscribe to a strict, narrow-minded method of moral conduct and self-control which does not allow them to visualize a utopian future of belonging to an enlightened community. Conversely, Hellenism signifies the open-minded, spontaneous exploration of classical ideas and their application to contemporary society. Indeed, Arnold believes that the ideals promulgated by such philosophers as Plato and Socrates can help resolve the moral and ethical problems resulting from the bitter conflict between society, politics, and religion in

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Victorian England. As serious as Arnold's message is, he elects to employ the device of irony to reveal his philosophical points to his readers. Through irony, satire, and urbane humor, the author deftly entertains his readers with examples of educational travesties, he wittily exposes the enemies of reform and culture, and he beguiles his readers with self-deprecating humor in order to endear them to his ideas.

Critical Reception

Since its publication in 1869, literary scholars have generally regarded Culture and Anarchy as a masterpiece of social criticism. While it is true that Arnold wrote his essay in response to specific Victorian issues, commentators have since examined the work for its relevance to universal ethical questions and social issues in subsequent generations. Several twentieth-century critics have analyzed how Arnold employed the device of social criticism to advocate his particular brand of humanism. William E. Buckler has discussed Arnold's role as a classical moralist who believes that a truly conscious approach to life is its own reward while also facilitating personal growth. Other late-twentieth-century commentators such as Steven Marcus, John Gross, and Samuel Lipman have all endorsed Arnold's relevance to modern society with varying degrees of support. Marcus has asserted that the philosophical ideas in Culture and Anarchy resonate with modern concerns about culture and education just as they did during the author's time, pointing out that it is important to remember that a universal standard of excellence exists to which all reformers, philosophers, and critical thinkers should aspire. Lipman has added that “[there] can be little doubt that Arnold's great value to us today is not as a philosopher of community or of society, let alone of the state; his great value to us is as a lonely spokesman for the individual's search for an inward culture.” Other critics have challenged the claim that there is a timeless quality to Arnold's humanistic philosophy. Maurice Cowling has questioned the ability of Arnold's ideas to translate from the Victorian age to the modern day, particularly noting that the religious politics are strikingly different between the two periods. Vincent P. Pecora has examined Culture and Anarchy in light of Arnold's conspicuously absent thoughts on race relations as a factor in elevating one's level of culture, concluding that it is a fundamental flaw that cannot be ignored. Surveying the critical controversy surrounding Culture and Anarchy, Linda Ray Pratt has suggested that it stems from misunderstanding Arnold. According to Pratt, “[the] tension between Arnold's vocabulary, which has often taken on different connotations for today's readers, and the basic humaneness of his of his social vision is one reason for the confusion about his ideas.”

In the first chapter of Culture and Anarchy, Sweetness and Light Arnold describes culture as being responsible for the progress of politics and society and as “the best knowledge and thought of the time” Matthew Arnold’s culture is based on two main aspects, religion and education. Karl Marx, however, strongly contrasts Arnold’s ideas.

Matthew Arnold’s definition of culture comes from a mid-nineteenth-century Germanic notion of culture which is founded upon his study of Goethe and Schiller. He believed many other cultures are based on the thought of curiosity and on scientific expansion. Arnold believed culture wasbased on the expansion of the individual’s mind; only through education can a perfect culture be reached. In his writings, Arnold stated that for a man to be cultured he has to be versed in both

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religion and classic literature. Although Arnold’s culture sought the advancement of the human mind;he did not want people to get wrapped up in technology. “Faith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this machinery” . Arnold believes his culture is “more interesting and more far-reaching than that other, which is founded solely on the scientific passion for knowing”. Arnold believed thatculture dealt with perfection; as he stated “Culture is then properly describe not as having its origin in curiosity, but as having its origin in the love of perfection; it is a study of perfection”. Arnold also says that culture is the endeavor to make the moral and social characteristics of individuals prevail. Because culture is a study of perfection, then it is also an “inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of circumstances”. Arnold states that, “In thus making sweetness and light to be characters of perfection, culture is of like spirit with poetry”Matthew Arnold felt that religion was an important aspect of culture. Arnold felt that when the reason of God prevailed all society will be cultured. As Arnold states,”;Now, then, is the moment for culture to be of service, culture which believes in making reason and the will of God prevail, believes in perfection, is the study of perfection

Viata si opera lui HERBERT SPENCER - Evolutionismul, Sociologia, Etica evolutionista

HERBERT SPENCER

(1820-1903)

Viata si opera

Herbert Spencer s-a nascut in 1820 la Derby.Era fiul unui invatator.Dupa studii matematice si stiintifice, facute sub indrumarea tatalui sau, Spencer a devenit inginer de cai ferate.A renuntat in scurt timp la aceasta meserie pentru a se consacra preocuparilor sale sociologice si filosofice.Intre 1848 si 1853 a fost redactor al renumitei reviste « The Economist », castigandu-si venitul in primul rand de pe urma articolelor stiintifice publicate in reviste.A refuzat mai multe titluri academice.Ca autodidact s-a simtit ca si J.St.Mill, apropiat multa vreme de Comte, de la care a preluat stilul enciclopedic characteristic pozitivsmului.

Principala scriere a lui Spencer este lucrarea in zece volume “Sistem de filosofie sintetica”, care trateaza asupra principiilor biologiei, psihologiei, sociologiei si eticii.Bazele acestea formeaza un volum separat, intitulat « Primele principii »(1862-1896).In afara de aceasta opera monumentala si greu de citit chiar si in ziua de azi, au mai aparut ca scrieri de sine statatoare : « Statica sociala » (1850), « Educatia » (1861) si « Studiul sociologiei »(1873), « Problemele eticii » (1879) si « Dreptatea »(1891), care s-au bucurat de o popularitate extraordinara.Spencer trebuie privit ca reprezentantul cel mai

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de seama al pozitivismului englez, care a transformat filosofia istoriei al lui Comte intr-o teorie a evolutiei.

Evolutionismul

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Numele lui Spencer este strans legat de conceptul de evolutionism.Preluand modelul biologiei, el a elaborat un principiu universal al revolutiei, conform caruia toate evenimentele din lume se desfasoara dupa o lege unitara a evolutiei.Spencer a fost convins ca din legile indestructibilitatii materiei si conservarii energiei se poate obtine pe cale deductiva conceptul evolutiei universale.Principiul evolutiei spune ca toate evenimentele din natura, inclusiv dezvoltarea culturala, parcurg drumul de la simplu la complex.In cuvintele lui Spencer :

Dezvoltarea, in cea mai simpla si mai generala forma a sa, inseamna integrarea materiei si , implicit, risipirea miscarii.Disolutia este, dinpotriva, acceptarea miscarii si , implicit, dezintegrarea materiei.(SPI,289)

Principiul evolutiei pe care-l sustine Spencer isi poate mentine pretentia de universalitate numai in masura in care ii dam o formulare suficient de generala.El e adecvat in masura in care multe sisteme raman stabile numai intr-un echilibru dinamic, stiinta moderna situandu-se mult mai aproape de Heraclit decat de Parmenide.Insa de aici nu se poate deduce nici o schema a ordinii, utilizabila din punct de vedere stiintific, care sa acopere toate sistemele, de la aparitia sistemului planetar pana la dezvoltarea sociala si culturala.Eroarea constitutiva a evolutionismului lui Spencer consta in faptul ca el nu are nici o conceptie clara ascupra biologiei, de la care preia modelul evolutiei.Urmandul pe zoologul francez Lamarck, el considera dezvoltarea embrionara ca prototip al dezvoltarii popoarelor si rateaza intelegerea ideii lui Darwin, care spune ca dezvoltarea indivizilor este un fenomen fundamental diferit de fenomenul dezvoltarii popoarelor.

Slabiciunea teoretica a evoltionismului nu ne poate insa face sa nesocotim insemnatatea pe care acesta a avut-o in epoca.Evolutia a fost prezentata ca o metafora pentru existenta, care poate fi utila pentru imbinarea intr-o conceptie unitara a credintei pozitiviste in progres cu liberalismul si cu teza libertatii nelimitiate a indivizilor.Dealtfel, la Spencer se poate constata o interesanta revizuire a opiniilor.Initial el a fost insufletit de un oprimism exaltat, fiind convins ca evolutia tinde spre un maximum de satisfactie si de fericire, gratie concilierii individului cu statul.Intre timp, descoperirea celei de a doua legi a termodinamicii a facut sa planeze spectrul mortii termice.Ca urmare, si reflectiile lui Spencer asupra starii finale a evolutiei au inceput sa devina mai sumbre.El nu exclude posibiliatea ca disolutia sa obtina pe termen lung suprematia asupra evolutiei.Astfel, « omniprezenta mortii » , tempereaza optimismul progresist, anticipand atmosfera pesimista de fin-de-siecle

Sociologia

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Filosofia sociala a lui Spencer este, ca si aceea a lui Comte, clar orientat spre filozofia istoriei.Spencer distinge intre doua tipuri de societati : cea militara si cea industriala.Primul tip de societati, care reprezinta cel mai redus grad de dezvoltare sociala, este denumit despotism ; aici indivizii sunt tinuti sub disciplina de fier a autoritatii statale.Tipul industrial de societate, a carui aparitie Spencer o constata in epoca sa, este caracterizat de faptul ca lupta pentru existenta imbraca forme din ce in ce mai umane, datorita unei satisfaceri crescande a nevoilor oamenilor, astfel incat nu mai este nevoie ca statul sa joace un rol regulativ.Oamenii invata sa se conformeze de buna voie autodisciplinei legilor pietei.Statului ii revine functia de a garanta contractele si de a impiedica incalcarea legilor.In conceptia lui Spencer, legislatia sociala impiedica aplanarea naturala a intereselor si formarea unor indivizi apti sa se impuna.El contesta statului in primul rand dreptul de a fii actionar, pentru ca tot ceea ce este facut de stat este prost facut.Spencer ajunge chiar sa acorde actionarului dreptul de a tiparii bancnota proprie.

 

Etica evolutionista

Spencer considera ca etica este partea cea mai importanta din intregul sau sistem.In acest domeniu , sub influenta lui J.St.Mill , el adopta un punct de vedere utilitarist.Dar , distantandu-se de Mill , Spencer nu considera ca fericirea deplina, ca scop al actiunilor umane, ar putea fii atinsa pur si simplu , printr-o maximizare a placerii :

Punctul de vedere pe care il sustin este acela ca etica, in adevaratul ei sens – stiinta actiunii bune –, are ca obiect stabilirea modului in care si a motivului din care anumite moduri de a actiona sunt periculoase, iar altele benefice.Aceste rezultate bune si rele nu pot fii intamplatoare, ci trebuie sa aiba consecinte necesare ale ordiniii lucrurilor ; punctul meu de vedere este ca problema de baza a stiintelor morale este aceea de a deduce din legile vietii si din conditiile existentei care tipuri de actiuni conduc in mod necesar la fericire, respectiv la nefericire.Daca reuseste sa ofere raspunsul la aceasta intrebare, atunci deductiile sale vor fii recunoscute ca legi a actiunii si trebuie urmate fara nici o referire directa la aprecierea fericirii sau a suferintei(SP X, pp.64)

Din aceasta remarca la adresa lui Mill, reiese ca Spencer pune etica in legatura nu cu actiunile, ci cu evenimentele.Sentimentul moral judeca felul in care ar trebuii sa se petreaca lucrurile in lume, astfel incat placerea de a trai sa fie mai puterinica decat durerea.Aspiratia catre placere este pusa in serviciul scopului conservarii vietii, care, dupa Spencer, prevaleaza ascupra tuturor celorlalte scopuri.Urmand aceasta linie de gandire , el confera eticii o fundamentare biologica, fara a cadea insa in biologism.Scopul este o etica evolutionista care interogheaza inainte de toate asupra aparitiei simtului moral in constitutia naturala a umanitatii si asupra formei in care acesta este legat de dezvoltarea sociala.

 

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Scrieri : The Works of Herbert Spencer, editia din 1889-1994, 21 vol., Osnabruck 1966 – 1967. Social statics : Or The conditions Essential to Human Happiness specified and the First of them Develop, London 1851 (SP).System der syntethischen Philosophie, traducere de B.Vetter, Stuttgart 1875.Eine Autobiographie, editat de I. u. H. Stein , Sttutgart 1905.Die Kunst der Erziehung.Die giestige, moralische und koperliche Erziehung, editat de P.E.Marheimer, traducere de K.H. Ronde, Wiesbaden 1947.

 

Bibliografie : Istoria filosofiei in secolul al XIX-lea.Pozitivismul, Hegelianismul de stanga, Filosofia exitentei, Neokantianismul, Filosofia vietii.Editor Ferdinand Fellmann, Editura Anthropos

3. Human Nature

In the first volume of A System of Synthetic Philosophy, entitled First Principles (1862), Spencer argued that all phenomena could be explained in terms of a lengthy process of evolution in things. This ‘principle of continuity’ was that homogeneous organisms are unstable, that organisms develop from simple to more complex and heterogeneous forms, and that such evolution constituted a norm of progress. This account of evolution provided a complete and ‘predetermined’ structure for the kind of variation noted by Darwin–and Darwin’s respect for Spencer was significant.

But while Spencer held that progress was a necessity, it was ‘necessary’ only overall, and there is no teleological element in his account of this process. In fact, it was Spencer, and not Darwin, who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest,” though Darwin came to employ the expression in later editions of the Origin of Species. (That this view was both ambiguous –for it was not clear whether one had in mind the ‘fittest’ individual or species–and far from universal was something that both figures, however, failed to address.)

Spencer’s understanding of evolution included the Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and emphasized the direct influence of external agencies on the organism’s development. He denied (as Darwin had argued) that evolution was based on the characteristics and development of the organism itself and on a simple principle of natural selection.

Spencer held that he had evidence for this evolutionary account from the study of biology (see Principles of Biology, 2 vols. [1864-7]). He argued that there is a gradual specialization in things–beginning with biological organisms–towards self-sufficiency and individuation. Because human nature can be said to improve and change, then, scientific–including moral and political– views that rested on the assumption of a stable human nature (such as that presupposed by many utilitarians) had to be rejected. ‘Human nature’ was simply “the aggregate of men’s instincts and sentiments” which, over time, would become adapted to social existence. Spencer still recognized the importance of understanding individuals in terms of the ‘whole’ of which they were ‘parts,’ but these

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parts were mutually dependent, not subordinate to the organism as a whole. They had an identity and value on which the whole depended–unlike, Spencer thought, that portrayed by Hobbes.

For Spencer, then, human life was not only on a continuum with, but was also the culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution. Even though he allowed that there was a parallel development of mind and body, without reducing the former to the latter, he was opposed to dualism and his account of mind and of the functioning of the central nervous system and the brain was mechanistic.

Although what characterized the development of organisms was the ‘tendency to individuation’ (Social Statics [1851], p. 436), this was coupled with a natural inclination in beings to pursue whatever would preserve their lives. When one examines human beings, this natural inclination was reflected in the characteristic of rational self-interest. Indeed, this tendency to pursue one’s individual interests is such that, in primitive societies, at least, Spencer believed that a prime motivating factor in human beings coming together was the threat of violence and war.

Paradoxically, perhaps, Spencer held an ‘organic’ view of society. Starting with the characteristics of individual entities, one could deduce, using laws of nature, what would promote or provide life and human happiness. He believed that social life was an extension of the life of a natural body, and that social ‘organisms’ reflected the same (Lamarckian) evolutionary principles or laws as biological entities did. The existence of such ‘laws,’ then, provides a basis for moral science and for determining how individuals ought to act and what would constitute human happiness.

4. Religion

As a result of his view that knowledge about phenomena required empirical demonstration, Spencer held that we cannot know the nature of reality in itself and that there was, therefore, something that was fundamentally “unknowable.” (This included the complete knowledge of the nature of space, time, force, motion, and substance.)

Since, Spencer claimed, we cannot know anything non-empirical, we cannot know whether there is a God or what its character might be. Though Spencer was a severe critic of religion and religious doctrine and practice–these being the appropriate objects of empirical investigation and assessment–his general position on religion was agnostic. Theism, he argued, cannot be adopted because there is no means to acquire knowledge of the divine, and there would be no way of testing it. But while we cannot know whether religious beliefs are true, neither can we know that (fundamental) religious beliefs are false.

5. Moral Philosophy

Spencer saw human life on a continuum with, but also as the culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution, and he held that human society reflects the same evolutionary

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principles as biological organisms do in their development. Society–and social institutions such as the economy–can, he believed, function without external control, just as the digestive system or a lower organism does (though, in arguing this, Spencer failed to see the fundamental differences between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ levels of social organization). For Spencer, all natural and social development reflected ‘the universality of law’. Beginning with the ‘laws of life’, the conditions of social existence, and the recognition of life as a fundamental value, moral science can deduce what kinds of laws promote life and produce happiness. Spencer’s ethics and political philosophy, then, depends on a theory of ‘natural law,’ and it is because of this that, he maintained, evolutionary theory could provide a basis for a comprehensive political and even philosophical theory.

Given the variations in temperament and character among individuals, Spencer recognized that there were differences in what happiness specifically consists in (Social Statics [1851], p. 5). In general, however, ‘happiness’ is the surplus of pleasure over pain, and ‘the good’ is what contributes to the life and development of the organism, or–what is much the same–what provides this surplus of pleasure over pain. Happiness, therefore, reflects the complete adaptation of an individual organism to its environment–or, in other words, ‘happiness’ is that which an individual human being naturally seeks.

For human beings to flourish and develop, Spencer held that there must be as few artificial restrictions as possible, and it is primarily freedom that he, contra Bentham, saw as promoting human happiness. While progress was an inevitable characteristic of evolution, it was something to be achieved only through the free exercise of human faculties (see Social Statics).

Society, however, is (by definition, for Spencer) an aggregate of individuals, and change in society could take place only once the individual members of that society had changed and developed (The Study of Sociology, pp. 366-367). Individuals are, therefore, ‘primary,’ individual development was ‘egoistic,’ and associations with others largely instrumental and contractual.

Still, Spencer thought that human beings exhibited a natural sympathy and concern for one another; there is a common character and there are common interests among human beings that they eventually come to recognize as necessary not only for general, but for individual development. (This reflects, to an extent, Spencer’s organicism.) Nevertheless, Spencer held that ‘altruism’ and compassion beyond the family unit were sentiments that came to exist only recently in human beings.

Spencer maintained that there was a natural mechanism–an ‘innate moral sense’–in human beings by which they come to arrive at certain moral intuitions and from which laws of conduct might be deduced (The Principles of Ethics, I [1892], p. 26). Thus one might say that Spencer held a kind of ‘moral sense theory’ (Social Statics, pp. 23, 19).  (Later in his life, Spencer described these ‘principles’ of moral sense and of sympathy as the ‘accumulated effects of instinctual or inherited experiences.’) Such a mechanism of moral feeling was, Spencer believed, a manifestation of his general idea of the

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‘persistence of force.’ As this persistence of force was a principle of nature, and could not be created artificially, Spencer held that no state or government could promote moral feeling any more than it could promote the existence of physical force. But while Spencer insisted that freedom was the power to do what one desired, he also held that what one desired and willed was wholly determined by “an infinitude of previous experiences” (The Principles of Psychology, pp. 500-502.) Spencer saw this analysis of ethics as culminating in an ‘Absolute Ethics,’ the standard for which was the production of pure pleasure–and he held that the application of this standard would produce, so far as possible, the greatest amount of pleasure over pain in the long run.

Spencer’s views here were rejected by Mill and Hartley. Their principal objection was that Spencer’s account of natural ‘desires’ was inadequate because it failed to provide any reason why one ought to have the feelings or preferences one did.

There is, however, more to Spencer’s ethics than this. As individuals become increasingly aware of their individuality, they also become aware of the individuality of others and, thereby, of the law of equal freedom. This ‘first principle’ is that ‘Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man’ (Social Statics, p. 103). One’s ‘moral sense,’ then, led to the recognition of the existence of individual rights, and one can identify strains of a rights-based ethic in Spencer’s writings.

Spencer’s views clearly reflect a fundamentally ‘egoist’ ethic, but he held that rational egoists would, in the pursuit of their own self interest, not conflict with one another. Still, to care for someone who has no direct relation to oneself–such as supporting the un- and under employed–is, therefore, not only not in one’s self interest, but encourages laziness and works against evolution. In this sense, at least, social inequity was explained, if not justified, by evolutionary principles.

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