Jennifer Jackson Wealth & Power Paper

CUBA

It is apparent that the four decades old sanctions that the U.S. has had against

Cuba has not affected Cuba as the U.S. had hoped it would (Brookings 2009, Congress

2009, and Suchlicki 2000). The U.S. neo-realism approach of using “sticks” to force

Cuba’s reform of human rights violations and adoption of democratic economic values

should either be totally replaced by or enhanced with the neo-liberalism “carrots”

approach. This paper will review the historical background of the U.S. and Cuba

relationship starting from the 1950s through the present while comparing the current

(neo-realism) “sticks” initiatives that are in place along with suggested (neo-liberalism)

“carrots” approaches to assist in facilitating the U.S. objectives in regards to Cuba’s

(sanctions) humanitarian rights violations and socialist values.

The “sticks” (punishment sanctions) approach has been used by the U.S.

extensively thus far against Cuba with the hopes of Cuban reform or complete Cuban

economic collapse, neither of which has occurred. Even though Cuba has recently

denounced negotiation attempts with the use of either carrots or sticks being used as

acceptable tools (Azel 2009, Brookings 2009, Piccone June & Oct 2009), the U.S. must

inevitably utilize one or the other, as it cannot ultimately initiate unilateral concessions

while requiring nothing from Cuba in return (Azel 2009).

During the 1950s, American businesses flourished throughout Cuba, as did the

American Mafia and ordinary U.S. citizens, who traveled there to utilize the beaches (and

prostitutes/gambling). In 1959, Cuba experienced a revolution, which brought Fidel

Castro (a Marxist) to power. This led to thousands of Cubans fleeing to Florida, while

the U.S. fretted about this new communist regime’s leadership. Castro immediately

began repressing the Cuban people by enacting The Cuban Land Reform Act, which

restricted Cuban citizens’ ownership of farms and annexed U.S. citizens’ owned land for

Cuban Government use. At the same time Castro tighten his relationship with the Soviet

Union by beginning an oil and sugar trade as well as borrowing funds and technology

information from the Soviet Union. The U.S. began using the “stick” with Cuba by

restricting imports of Cuban sugar (70% of Cuba’s export) by creating the Sugar Bill in

1960. Cuba finally took all land that was owned by Americans (and companies), totaling

$1.2 billion and this prompted more use of the stick by passing the U.S. Economic

Embargo in 1960 (excluding food/medicine) (Thompson 2005).

In 1961, U.S. supported the “Bay of Pigs” (a failed attempt to oust Castro) and

then the U.S. passed the Foreign Assistance Act (total trade embargo with Cuba including

food and medicine). In 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) ousted Cuba

from membership and the U.S. once again took action against Cuba with the stick by

enacting the “Trading with the Enemy Act”, which was full economic sanctions in the

hopes that Cuba would reform or that their economy would soon collapse (Thompson

2005).

However, in 1963, the Soviet Missile Crisis began and by 1972 Cuba was a

member of the Mutual Economic Assistance with the Soviet Union. The 1980s proved to

be just as tense between U.S. and Cuba and in the mid 1990s the U.S. enacted the Helms-

Burton Act (more stick theory), which restricted foreign investment, restricted issuances

of visas, entitled U.S. Cuban property owners to file law suits against Cuba, restricted

chartered flights between Cuba and the United States, restricted Cuba Diplomats

movement within the U.S., and expanded Marti (a broadcasting network). All this has

been implemented again, with the intentions of forcing reform or crumbling the Cuban

economy but it has all thus far failed (Thompson 2005).

According to the One Hundred Eleventh Congress Report (2009), there are four

weaknesses of the current U.S. “stick” policy toward Cuba: 1. Regional countries are

currently engaging with Cuba while the European Union and the United Nations support

ending all sanctions. 2. U.S. could experience a gain in national security if it would

cooperate with Cuba on issues of common interest such as migration,

environmental/natural disasters, and counter-narcotics. 3. U.S. policy toward Cuba gives

Cuba someone to blame for its economic difficulties. 4. The U.S. has lost its ability to

influence Cuba policy or to even understand what is going on in Cuba at any given

moment.

If the U.S. chooses to lift sanctions without expected concessions from Cuba then

Cuba will absolutely continue on its current socialist path, Cuba state enterprises

(Government owned businesses) will be strengthened, greater repression on the Cuban

people will ensue due to fear of U.S. influence, Cuba will have access to borrow funds

from the World Bank, it will facilitate support for more Mafia groups, and above all it

will send a clear message to the enemies of the U.S. that a country can seize property

from the U.S., allow nukes to be stationed in its borders while pointed at the U.S., that it

can support terrorism/anti-Americanism, and that the U.S. will not stand steadfast against

it all but simply “turn the other cheek” after a while (Suchlicki 2000).

Consequently, a better plan might be to keep the embargo as “a ‘carrot’ to be

lifted when Cuba changes its current system and develops a democratic economic system.

The embargo is not an anachronism but a legitimate instrument of U.S. policy for

achieving the goal of a free Cuba.” (Suchlicki 2000:3). The U.S. should set its policy to

meet the U.S. interests and not as dictated by Cuba’s behavior and interests (Brookings

2009).

Another “carrot” that could be used right away is to allow family travel and

family remittance of allowances to resume as free flow between the U.S. and Cuba. This

would help establish the beginnings of “grass-roots” democratic initiatives in Cuba

(Brookings 2009, Congress 2009, Peters 2006, Piccone June & Oct 2009). Also, Calling

on Cuba to once again join the OAS may be incentive enough to entice Cuba to begin

reform. If Cuba joins the OAS then it would be required to follow the Inter-American

Democratic Charter while renouncing its Marxist values (Brookings 2009, Congress

2009, Piccone June 2009). If, however, Cuba continues to be stubborn and avoids all

carrots/reform then the U.S. should at least try to begin dialog with Cuba on issues of

common concern such as mutual counter-narcotics, environmental/natural disasters

mutual aid, and migration (Brookings 2009, Congress 2009, Piccone Oct 2009).

Since it has been proved that the U.S. sanctions has not realized the U.S.

objectives in regards to a democratic Cuban economy and human rights reform then it

stands to reason that “carrots” offered to Cuba in exchange for reform is at least worth a

shot. Though, due to the reasons listed in this paper the embargo should not be removed

unless it can indeed be used as a major incentive for Cuba change. The family travel and

allowance remittance restrictions are a direct target aimed at the Cuban families’ welfare

and thus should be lifted without concern of the Cuban Government’s concessions, but

the remaining sanctions seem to be a better choice morally compared to other choices

such as war (Peters 2006).

As Suchlicki (2000) contends in his testimony at the International Trade

Commission Hearings on “The Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions with Respect to

Cuba” in Washington D.C., “Not all differences and problems in international affairs can

be solved through negotiations or can be solved at all. There are disputes that are not

negotiable and can only be solved either through the use of force or through prolonged

patience until the leadership disappears or situations change (4).

REFERENCES

Azel, J. (2009, April 6). In Defense of "Carrots and Sticks". University of Miami.

Retrieved November 14, 2009, from

http://www.6.miami.edu/iccas/Docs/Cuba_Brief.pdf

Brookings. (2009, April 1). Cuba: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive

Engagement - Brookings Institution. Brookings - Quality. Independence. Impact..

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http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/04_cuba.aspx

Congress. (2009, February 23). Changing Cuba Policy --In the United States’ National

Interest. U.S. Government Printing Office Home Page. Retrieved November 14,

2009, from http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/Cuba.pdf

Peters, P. (2006). U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba: A Just War Perspective. Association for

the Study of the Cuban Economy, 16, 389-393.

Piccone, T. (2009, June 1). Crossroads on Cuba: Will Democracy or Sovereignty Prevail?

- Brookings Institution. Brookings - Quality. Independence. Impact. Retrieved

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Cuba… Again. - Brookings Institution. Brookings - Quality. Independence.

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http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1027_cuba_un_vote_piccone.aspx?p=1

Suchlicki, J. (2000, September 19). Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel

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http://www.lanuevacuba.com/archivo/jaime02.htm

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Sanctions Working? . United States Army War College. Retrieved November 14,

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