Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors

8/10/2019 Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors

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Global Engagement Advantage

1AC

Advantage 1 is Global Engagement

The rise of global competitors is inevitable-bolstering relations withnon-democratic powers is key to maintaining peaceful relations withrising powers and preventing great-power conictu!imoto" #$1#(Kevin, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, Preserving U.S. National Seurity!nterests "#roug# a Li$eral %orl& Construt,'#tt)**+++.strategistu&iesinstitute.army.mil*in&e.-m*artiles*PreservingUSNationalSeurity!nterestsLi$eral

%orl&Construt*2012*1*11/"#e emergene o- eer ometitors , not terrorism, resents t#e greatest longterm t#reat toour national seurity. ver t#e ast &ea&e, +#ile t#e Unite& States onentrate& its geoolitial -ous ong#ting t+o lan& +ars in !ra an& A-g#anistan, C#ina #as uietly $egun imlementing a strategy toemerge as t#e &ominant imerial o+er +it#in Sout#east Asia an& t#e !n&ian ean. %it#in t#e net2 &ea&es, C#ina +ill li3ely relae t#e Unite& States as t#e AsiaPai regional #egemonio+er, i- not relae us as t#e glo$al suero+er.1 Alt#oug# C#ina resents its rise as eae-ul an& non#egemoni, its onstrution o- naval $ases in neig#$oring ountries an& military eansion in t#e region ontra&it

t#at argument. %it# a re&i$le t#reat to its lea&ing osition in a uniolar glo$al or&er, t#eUnite& States s#oul& a&ot a gran& strategy o- investment,' $uil&ing legitimay an&aaity in t#e very institutions t#at +ill rotet our interests in a li$eral glo$al onstrut o-t#e -uture+#en +e are no longer t#e &ominant imerial o+er. Similar to t#e Clinton era4s gran& strategy o-enlargement,'2 investment suorts a +orl& or&er re&iate& uon a system o- $asi rules

an& riniles, #o+ever, it &i5ers in t#at t#e Unite& States s#oul& onentrate on t#e institutions(i.e., Unite& Nations, %orl& "ra&e rgani6ation, AS7AN, allianes, et./ that support a world order" as opposedto e%panding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. 8esite its laims o- a$enevolent eansion, C#ina is alrea&y eeuting a strategy o- eansion similar to t#at o- !merial Jaan4s9an#u3uo oliy &uring t#e 1:;0s.; "#is t#reeart strategy involves) (i/ (rovi&ing/ signiant investments ineonomi in-rastruture -or etrating natural resoures< (ii/ (on&uting/ military interventions (to/ rotet

eonomi interests< an&, (iii/ . . . (anneing/ via installation o- uet governments.'= C#ina #as alrea&ysoli&ie& its ontrol over neig#$oring Nort# Korea an& >urma, an& #as similarly $egun moream$itious engagements in A-ria an& Central Asia+#ere it see3s to ean& its -rontier.? Note& olitialsientist Samuel P. @untington rovi&es -urt#er analysis o- t#e motives $e#in& C#ina4s imerial asirations. @e

onten&s t#at China (has )#istorially oneive& itsel- as enomassing a Sini Bone4. . . (+it#/ two goals: tobecome the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, +#i# it lost in t#e nineteent#entury, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.' Durt#ermore, C#ina #ol&s one uarter o- t#e +orl&4s oulation,an& rai& eonomi gro+t# +ill inrease its &eman& -or natural resoures -rom outsi&e its $or&ers as its eole see3

a stan&ar& o- living omara$le to t#at o- %estern ivili6ation."#e rise o- eer ometitors #as#istorially resulte& in regional insta$ility an& one s#oul& omare t#e emergene o- C#inato t#e rise o-. . . Eermany as t#e &ominant o+er in 7uroe in t#e late nineteent# entury.'FDurt#ermore, t#e rise o- anot#er eer ometitor on t#e level o- t#e Soviet Union o- t#e Col& %ar ultimatelyt#reatens U.S. glo$al inGuene, #allenging its onets o- #uman rig#ts, li$eralism, an& &emoray< as +ell as its

a$ility to oot ot#er nations to aet t#em.H"#is &eline in inGuene , +#ile initially limite& to t#eAsiaPai region, t#reatens to result in signiant onGit i- it ultimately lea&s to aara&igm s#i-t in t#e i&eas an& riniles t#at govern t#e eisting +orl& or&er. A gran& strategyo- investment to a&&ress t#e t#reat o- C#ina reuires investing in institutions, a&&ressing ungoverne& states, an&$uil&ing legitimay t#roug# multilateralism. he !nited "tates must build capacity in the e#isting institutions and alliances accepted

globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world$s governments. %or true legitimacy& t#e Unite& States must suort
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11


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t#ese institutions, not only +#en onvenient, in or&er to avoi& t#e aearane o-unilateralism, +#i# +oul& ultimately un&ermine t#e very organi6ations uon +#om it +illrely +#en it is no longer t#e glo$al #egemon."#e Unite& States must also a&&ressungoverne& states, not only as $ree&ing groun&s -or terrorism, $ut as onGits t#at t#reaten to srea& intoregional insta$ility, t#ere$y &ra+ing in suero+ers +it# ometing interests. @untington rooses t#at t#egreatest soure o- onGit +ill ome -rom +#at #e &enes as one ore' nation4s involvement in a onGit $et+eenanot#er ore nation an& a minor state +it#in its imme&iate s#ere o- inGuene.: Dor eamle, regional insta$ility in

Sout# Asia10 t#reatens to involve om$atants -rom t#e Unite& States, !n&ia, C#ina, an& t#e surroun&ing nations.Aroriately, t#e Unite& States, as a glo$al o+er, must aly all elements o- its nationalo+er no+ to a&&ress t#e ro$lem o- +ea3 an& -ailing states, +#i# t#reaten to serve as t#erinial atalysts o- -uture glo$al onGits.11 A&mitte&ly, t#e aliation o- Amerian o+er in t#einternal a5airs o- a sovereign nation raises issues. 7erts #ave ose& t#e uestion o- +#et#er t#e Unite& Statess#oul& at as t#e +orl&4s en-orer o- sta$ility, imosing its onets o- #uman rig#ts on ot#er states. !n resonse tot#is onern, "#e !nternational Commission on !ntervention an& State Sovereignty aut#ore& a stu&y title&, "#eIesonsi$ility to Protet,12 alling -or revisions to t#e un&erstan&ing o- sovereignty +it#in t#e Unite& Nations (UN/#arter. "#is ommission laes t#e resonsi$ility to rotet eoles o- sovereign nations on $ot# t#e state itsel-

an&, more imortantly, on t#e international ommunity.1; !- arove&, t#is revision +ill esta$lis# aree&ent +#ere$y t#e Unite& States #as not only t#e aut#ority an& resonsi$ility to at+it#in t#e internal a5airs o- a reressive government, $ut &oes so +it# glo$al legitimay i-&one un&er t#e ausies o- a UN man&ate. Any effort to legitimi'e and support a liberal world constructreuires the !nited "tates to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous

administration & 'preemptive war" democrati(ation" and )*+* primacy ofunilateralism,'1= +#i# #ave resulte& in t#e alienation o- -ormer allies +orl&+i&e. Pre&ominantly 9uslimnations, +#ose iti6ens #a& reviously loo3e& to t#e Unite& States as an eamle o- reresentative governane,

vie+e& t#e !ra invasion as t#e seminal &ivi&ing ation $et+een t#e %estern an& t#e !slami +orl&. Aroriately &any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first see to establishconsensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion& and must re*ect military unilateralism asat#reat to t#at governing $o&y4s legitimay. 8esite t#e longstan&ing U.S. tra&ition o- a li$eral -oreign oliy sinet#e start o- t#e Col& %ar, t#e -amous li$eral leviat#an, Jo#n !3en$erry, argues t#at t#e ost:*11 &otrine o-national seurity strategy . . . #as $een $ase& on . . . Amerian glo$al &ominane, t#e reventative use o- -ore,

oalitions o- t#e +illing, an& t#e struggle $et+een li$erty an& evil.'1? Amerian -oreign oliy #asmisgui&e&ly -ouse& on srea&ing &emoray, as oose& to $uil&ing a li$eral internationalor&er $ase& on universally aete& rinilest#at atually set t#e on&itions -or in&ivi&ual nationstates to selet t#eir o+n system o- governane. Anne9arie Slaug#ter, t#e -ormer 8ean o- t#e %oo&ro+ %ilson

S#ool o- Pu$li an& !nternational A5airs, argues t#at true %ilsonian i&ealists suort li$eral

&emoray, $ut reet t#e ossi$ility o- &emorati6ing eoles. . .'1

an& reet militaryrimay in -avor o- suorting a rules$ase& system o- or&er.!nvestment in a li$eral +orl& or&er+oul& also set t#e on&itions -or t#e Unite& States to garner suort -rom nonommitte& regional o+ers (i.e.,Iussia, !n&ia, Jaan, et./, or s+ing ivili6ations,' in ountering C#ina4s inreasing #egemoni inGuene.1F "#esestates resi&e +it#in lose roimity to t#e !n&ian ean, +#i# +ill li3ely emerge as t#e geoolitial -ous o- t#eAmerian -oreign oliy &uring t#e 21st entury, an& aroriately #ave t#e a$ility to o5set C#ina4s imerial&ominane in t#e region.1H Critis o- a li$eral +orl& onstrut argue t#at i&ealism is not neessary, $ase& on t#eassumtion t#at nations t#at tra&e toget#er +ill not go to +ar +it# ea# ot#er.1: !n resonse, -oreign a5airsolumnist "#omas L. Drie&man re$u3es t#eir arguments, a3no+le&ging t#e re&iate o- ommerialinter&een&ene as a -ator only in t#e &eision to go to +ar, an& argues t#at +#ile glo$ali6ation is reating a ne+international or&er, &i5erenes $et+een ivili6ations still reate -rition t#at may overome all ot#er -ators an&lea& to onGit.20 8etrators also +arn t#at as C#ina gro+s in o+er, it +ill no longer o$serve t#e $asi rules an&riniles o- a li$eral international or&er,' +#i# largely result -rom %estern onets o- -oreign relations. !3en$erry

a&&resses t#is ris3, iting t#at C#ina4s lea&ers alrea&y reogni6e t#at t#ey +ill gain more aut#ority+it#in t#e eisting li$eral or&er , as oose& to ontesting it. C#ina4s lea&ers +ant t#erotetion an& rig#ts t#at ome -rom t#e international or&er4s . . . &e-ense o- sovereignty,'21-rom +#i# t#ey #ave $enette& &uring t#eir reent #istory o- eonomi gro+t# an& international eansion. 7ven i-C#ina eeutes a eae-ul rise an& t#e Unite& States overestimates a Sini t#reat to its national seurity interest,t#e emergene o- a ne+ imerial o+er +ill #allenge Amerian lea&ers#i in t#e !n&ian ean an& AsiaPai

region. "#at $eing sai&, it is more li3ely t#at C#ina, as evi&ene& $y its military an& eonomieansion, +ill &islae t#e Unite& States as t#e regional #egemoni o+er. Ieogni6ing t#ist#reat no+, the )nited +tates must prepare for the eventual transition andimmediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules thatwill protect its interests later when we are no longer the world,s only superpower.


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The embargo is the symbol of failed American democratization- a full repeal is key to send

an international signal of willingness to engage non-democratic states

Hinderdael, 2011(+laas& M.A. candidate at "A," -ologna Center& concentrating in American %oreign olicy and Energy& /esources&and Environment& 0-reaing the 1og*am: 2bama$s Cuba olicy and a 3uideline for ,mproved 1eadership4& 567768977&http:66bc*ournal.org6volume7;6breaingthelog*am.html histories have long been intertwined& particularly after the Monroe ?octrine of 7@8 gave rise to the American

belief that it would become the hemisphere>s protector. !ntil the immediate aftermath of %idel Castro>s revolution& Cuba provided a testingground for the promotion of American ideals& social beliefs& and foreign policies. ,n the conte#t of /aBl shifting course inCuba& the 2bama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and aforeign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the !nited "tates is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms& itslegitimacy and influence will grow. erhaps future political leaders& in ,ran or orth +orea for e#ample& will be morewilling to mae concessions nowing that the ! nited "t ates will return in ind. The nited ! tates should not waitfor e"tensi#e democratizationbefore further engaging Cuba& however. 2ne legacy of the Cold Dar is that Communism hassucceeded only where it grew out of its own& often nationalistic& revolutions. As it has with China and ietnam& the !nited "tates should looclosely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. -y improving relations& America can enhance its own influence on theisland>s political structure and human rights policies . At home& with the trade deficit and national debt rising& the economic costs ofthe embargo are amplified. /ecent studies estimate that the !" economy foregoes up to F;.@; billion a year and the Cubaneconomy up to F5@G million a year.G9 Dhile !"Cuban economic interests align&political considerations inside Americahave shifted & as 0commerce seems to be trumping antiCommunismand %lorida ideologues.4G7 Clearly& public opinion alsofavors a new Cuba policy& with 5G percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country>s approach to its neighboring island.G8 At this

particular moment in the history of !"Cuban relations& there is tremendous promise for a breathrough in relations .,n a postCold Dar world& Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united "tates& but instead provides it with economic potential.American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo& combined with diplomatic isolation& has failed to bringdemocracy to Cuba for over G9 years . American policymaers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the

political& economic& and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. -y ending the economicembargo and normali'ing diplomatic relations with the island& resident 2bama would indicate that he is trulywilling to e"tend his hand once America>s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

And" diplomatic commitment to Cuba without them having metdemocrati(ation reuirements sends a vast international signal ofthe )+ commitment to global engagementColvin" #$$.(Ja3e, -ello+ +it# t#e Ne+ !&eas Dun&, a grou t#at see3s ne+ aroa#es an& ara&igms -orU.S. national seurity an& -oreign oliy. @e is also ie Presi&ent -or Elo$al "ra&e !ssues at t#e National Doreign"ra&e Counil (ND"C/ an& oversees t#e Cu$a initiative o- USA7ngage, "#e Case -or a Ne+ Cu$a Poliy',12*2;*200H, #tt)**+e$.ar#ive.org*+e$*20120:0=201F=;*#tt)**+++.ne+i&eas-un&.org*roosals*ColvinM20M20Cu$aM20M209aster.&-/

A signal to the world -eyond the domestic political benefit of acnowledging a changing Cuban American community&a newapproach to Cuba would send an important signal to the world. %#ile omle -oreignoliy issues -rom 8ar-ur to !ra +ill ta3e years to resolve in ooeration +it# t#e international ommunity, +it#reset to Cu$a it +oul& $e relatively easy to &emonstrate lear, rogressive #angeimme&iatelyt#roug# a simle De&eral Iegister notie an& a ne+ &ilomati aroa#. 7ven small #anges tooliy an& r#etori +oul& sen& a strong message to U.S. allies, artiularly in 7uroe an& t#e%estern @emis#ere , +#o +ill $e loo3ing -or early signs -rom t#e net a&ministration."#eUnite& States reutation in t#e +orl& #as sli& &ramatially over t#e ast eig#t years. Largemaorities in 3ey alliessu# as Cana&a (FF erent/, Drane (F? erent/, 9eio ( erent/, an& t#e Unite&King&om (F erent/ say t#at t#eir oinion o- t#e Unite& States #as gotten +orse sine t#e start o-t#e >us# resi&eny. Less t#an one#al- o- reson&ents in Cana&a an& t#e Unite& King&om t#in3 t#at t#e

relations#i +it# t#e Unite& States is a -rien&s#i.=0 A trou$ling num$er t#in3 t#at >us# an& t#e U.S.resene in !ra are greater t#reats to +orl& eae t#an Kim Jong!l an& t#e !ranian nulearrogram, an& vie+ >eiing more -avora$ly t#an %as#ington.=1 !n or&er -or t#e Unite& States to imrove its imagein t#e +orl&, t#e net resi&ent +ill #ave to o5er ne+ oliies t#at &emonstrate a ommitmentto +or3ing +it# allies an& a ragmati, engagementoriente& aroa# to -oreign oliy#allenges. Cuba policy o/ers this opportunity. 7m$argo olitis #ave 3et t#e Unite&States -rom ursuing easily attaina$le #anges to oliy.%it# t#e stro3e o- a en, t#e netresi&ent oul& unilaterally &emonstrate t#at #e is +illing to try a &i5erent aroa# $yallo+ing greater -ree&omo- travel -or U.S. iti6ens to Cu$a. A &ilomati aroa# to Cu$a +oul&


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signal t#at t#e resi&ent is +illing to ursue eae-ul solutions to &iult ro$lems, even i-t#ose initial e5orts &o not $ear -ruit imme&iately. 9ultilaterally, overtures to U.S. allies to romote rule o- la+,eonomi &eveloment, an& #uman rig#ts in Cu$a +oul& $e a +elome #ange -rom t#e unro&utive ritiism t#at

#as $eome t#e #allmar3 o- reent U.S. oliy. Comare& +it# &iult #allenges su# as sta$ili6ingA-g#anistan or ontaining !ran, Cu$a is an easy lae to s#o+ase #ange. O"#e neta&ministration nee&s to #ave an early +in, says -ormer Assistant Seretary o- State -or %estern @emis#ere A5airsPeter Iomero. =2 Iomero, +#o +as a 3ey layer in t#e Clinton a&ministrations seon&term e5orts to inrease

eoletoeole e#anges, a&&s, O%eve $een on a losing strea3 -or so long, something that breaksthe paradigm and shows bold strokes would have an enormous impact* 0 think youcan do that with Cuba *

And" the plan2s embrace of political diversity promotes )*+*interests more e/ectively in the multilateral international orderthan promoting a narrow democratic model3upchan and 4ount" #$$5(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n Universityan& senior -ello+ at t#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, an& A&am, &otoral an&i&ate in t#e 8eartment o-Eovernment at Eeorgeto+n University, "#e Autonomy Iule,' 8emoray) A Journal o- !&eas, Sring 200:,#tt)**+++.&emorayournal.org*&-*12*Ku#an.&-/

9any Amerian strategists reogni6e t#e inevita$ility o- a more level glo$al laying el& , $utt#ey #ave arrive& at an illusory resonse) t#at t#e Unite& States an& its &emorati alliess#oul& &e&iate t#e t+ilig#t #ours o- t#eir rimay to universali6ing t#e %estern or&er.Aor&ing to E. Jo#n !3en$erry, a olitial sientist at Prineton University, "#e Unite& StatesQ glo$al osition may$e +ea3ening, $ut t#e international system t#e Unite& States lea&s an remain t#e &ominant or&er o- t#e t+entyrst entury.' "#e %est s#oul& sin3 t#e roots o- t#is or&er as &eely as ossi$le' to ensure t#at t#e +orl&

ontinues to lay $y its rules even as its material reon&erane +anes. +uch con6dence in theuniversality of the 7estern order is" however" based on wishful thinking about thelikely tra!ectory of ascending powers, +#i# t#roug#out #istory #ave soug#t to a&ust t#e revailingor&er in +ays t#at -avor t#eir o+n interests* 8resuming that rising states will readily take theirseats at the 7est2s table is unrealistic and even dangerous" promising to alienateemerging powers that will be pivotal to global stabilityin t#e years a#ea&. !nstea&, t#e%est +ill #ave to ma3e room -or t#e ometing visions o- rising o+ers an& reare -or aninternational system in +#i# its riniles no longer serve as t#e rimary an#or. Sin3ing

t#e roots o- t#e %est, -oun&ing a league o- &emoraies,' an& turning NA" into a glo$alalliane o- &emorati states +oul& $e a&mira$le visions in a olitially #omogeneous +orl&.>ut the 7estern model does not command widespread acceptance. !- t#e netinternational system is to $e #arateri6e& $y normgoverne& or&er rat#er t#an ometitive anar#y, it +ill #aveto $e $ase& on greato+er onsensus an& toleration o- olitial &iversity rat#er t#an%estern rimay an& t#e singlemin&e& ursuit o- universal &emoray. "o t#at en&, t#e Unite&States s#oul& ta3e t#e lea& in -as#ioning a more &iverse an& inlusive glo$al or&er. Call it t#eAutonomy Iule') t#e terms o- t#e net or&er s#oul& $e negotiate& among all states" be theydemocratic or not, t#at rovi&e resonsi$le governane an& $roa&ly romote t#eautonomy an& +el-are o- t#eir iti6ens. "#e %est +ill #ave to give as mu# as it gets in s#aing t#e +orl&t#at omes net. "#is aroa# &oes not onstitute auiesene to illi$eralism, $ut rat#er a more rogressive

un&erstan&ing o- AmeriaQs li$eral tra&ition. Just as it &oes at #ome, t#e Unite& States s#oul& +elome&iversity a$roa&, aeting t#at li$eral &emoray must omete reset-ully in t#e

mar3etlae o- i&eas +it# ot#er tyes o- regimes. !n&ee&, toleration o- reasona$ly ustalternative olitial systems +ill romote U.S. interests -ar more e5etively t#an t#e #u$ris o-neoonservatism or t#e narro+ i&ealism o- t#e urrent li$eral onsensus. Ieset -or resonsi$le governments,toleration o- olitial an& ultural &iversity, $alane $et+een glo$al governane an& &evolution to regional

aut#orities, an& a more mo&est $ran& o- glo$ali6ationRt#ese are t#e riniles aroun& +#i# t#e netor&er is most li3ely to ta3e s#ae.
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdfhttp://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf


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And" cooperation with a plurality of governance models preventsgreat power war--- democracy promotion will cause unstablemultipolarity" crush )*+* leadership" and prevent global solutions towarming and terrorism3upchan" #$1#(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n University an& senior -ello+ att#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, No ne4s %orl&) "#e %est, t#e Iising Iest, an& t#e Coming Elo$al "urn', Kin&lee&ition (no age num$ers/Alt#oug# %estern #egemony is in its +aning &ays, it still rovi&es a signiant level o- glo$al sta$ility. "eam+or3$et+een t#e Unite& States an& t#e 7U ontinues to reresent t#e +orl&4s most imortant artners#i. "#e 7U4s

aggregate +ealt# rivals Ameria4s, an& t#e U.S. eonomy +ill remain num$er one into t#e net &ea&e."#eAmerian military +ill maintain its rimay +ell $eyon& t#e net &ea&e, an& %as#ington4s&ilomati lout +ill $e seon& to none -or t#e -oreseea$le -uture. Nonet#eless, t#e sta$ilitya5or&e& $y %estern re&ominane +ill sli a+ay in ste +it# its material an& i&eologialrimay. Aor&ingly, the 7est must work with emerging powers to take advantage ofthe current window of opportunityto ma out t#e rules t#at +ill govern t#e net +orl&. t#er+ise,multiolarity oule& +it# i&eologial &issensus +ill ensure $alaneo-o+er ometitionan& un-ettere& o3eying -or o+er, osition, an& restige. !t is -ar re-era$le to arrive at a ne+ rules$ase& or&er $y &esign rat#er t#an #ea& to+ar& a ne+ anar#y $y &e-ault."#e goal s#oul& $e to -orge aonsensus among maor states a$out t#e -oun&ational riniles o- t#e net +orl&. "#e %est+ill #ave to $e rea&y -or omromise< t#e rules must $e aeta$le to o+ers t#at aere to very &i5erentonetions o- +#at onstitutes a ust an& aeta$le or&er. "#e olitial &iversity t#at +ill #arateri6e t#e net+orl& suggests t#at aiming lo+ an& ra-ting a rules$ase& or&er t#at en&ures is +iser t#an aiming #ig# an& oming

a+ay emty#an&e&. %#at -ollo+s is a s3et# o- +#at t#e rules o- t#e net or&er mig#t loo3 li3eRa set o-riniles on +#i# t#e %est an& t#e rising rest may +ell $e a$le to n& ommon groun&. 8ening Legitimay Un&er Amerian lea&ers#i, t#e %est #as roagate& a onetion o- or&er t#ateuates olitial legitimay +it# li$eral &emoray. !- a ne+ rules$ase& or&er is to emerge,t#e %est +ill #ave to em$rae olitial &iversity rat#er t#an insist t#at li$eral &emoray ist#e only legitimate -orm o- government. "o $e sure, non&emoraies urrently #ave t#eir say in glo$alinstitutions, su# as t#e Unite& Nations, t#e %orl& >an3, an& t#e E20. >ut even as t#e %est &oes $usiness+it# autoraies in t#ese an& ot#er settings, it also &elegitimates t#em in +or& an& ation.

"#e Unite& States lea&s t#e #arge on t#is -ront. !n #is seon& inaugural a&&ress, Eeorge %. >us#state& t#at, Ameria4s vital interests an& our &eeest $elie-s are no+ one.... So it is t#e oliy o- t#e Unite& Statesto see3 an& suort t#e gro+t# o- &emorati movements an& institutions in every nation an& ulture. Alt#oug# o-&i5erent olitial stries, >ara3 $ama tol& t#e UN Eeneral Assem$ly in 2010 t#at eeriene s#o+s us t#at#istory is on t#e si&e o- li$erty< t#at t#e strongest -oun&ation -or #uman rogress lies in oen eonomies, oensoieties, an& oen governments. "o ut it simly, &emoray, more t#an any ot#er -orm o- government, &elivers

-or our iti6ens. $ama also ma&e lear #is ommitment to &emoray romotion in outliningt#e U.S. resonse to t#e Ara$ Sring) "#e Unite& States suorts a set o- universal rig#ts. An& t#ese rig#tsinlu&e -ree see#, t#e -ree&om o- eae-ul assem$ly, t#e -ree&om o- religion, euality -or men an& +omen un&er

t#e rule o- la+, an& t#e rig#t to #oose your o+n lea&ers.... ur suort -or t#ese riniles is not aseon&ary interest... it is a to riority t#at must $e translate& into onrete ations, an& suorte& $y all o-t#e &ilomati, eonomi an& strategi tools at our &isosal.2 7uroe generally s#ares t#is outloo3. Cat#erine

As#ton, t#e 7U4s -oreign oliy #ie-,&elare&in 2010 t#at, &emoray, #uman rig#ts,seurity, governane an& sustaina$le &eveloment are intrinsially lin3e&. 8emorati riniles#ave t#eir roots in universal norms an& values. Su# statements arm Io$ert Kagan4s o$servation t#at elites int#e %est #ave oerate& on t#e i&eologial onvition t#at li$eral &emoray is t#e only legitimate -orm o-

government an& t#at ot#er -orms o- government are not only illegitimate $ut transitory.44"#is stane ismorally omelling an& onsistent +it# values &eely #el& among t#e Atlanti &emoraies.

>ut t#e euation o- legitimay +it# &emoray un&ermines t#e %est4s inGuene amongemerging o+ers. 7ven ountries li3e >ra6il an& !n&ia, $ot# o- +#i# are sta$le &emoraies,ten& to vie+ t#e %est4s o$session +it# &emoray romotion as little more t#an uninvite&me&&ling in t#e a5airs o- ot#ers. The backlash is of course considerably harsher inautocracies such as China and 9ussia " which regularly warn the )nited +tates andthe E) to stay out of the domestic a/airs of other countries. !n Putin4s +or&s, %e are aller-etly a+are o- t#e realities o- &omesti olitial li-e. ! &o not t#in3 it is really neessary to elain anyt#ing toany$o&y. %e are not going to inter-ere in &omesti olitis, ust as +e &o not t#in3 t#at t#ey s#oul& reventratial relations ... -rom &eveloing. 8omesti olitis are &omesti olitis. Dor t#e %est to sea3 out against

olitial reression an& overt violations o- t#e rule o- la+ is not only +arrante& $ut o$ligatory. >ut to re&iate


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onstrutive relations +it# rising o+ers on t#eir rea&iness to em$rae a %estern notion o-legitimay is anot#er matter altoget#er. Senator Jo#n 9Cain is o5 ourse in insisting t#at !t is t#e&emoraies o- t#e +orl& t#at +ill rovi&e t#e illars uon +#i# +e an an& must $uil& an en&uring eae.R n

t#e ontrary, only i- t#e %est +or3s ooeratively +it# all regimes +illing to reiroate R&emoraies an& non&emoraies ali3eR+ill it $e a$le to $uil& an en&uring eae.Terrorism" nuclear proliferation" climate change" energy security" water and foodsecurity" 6nancial crisis:these challenges are global in nature and can bee/ectively addressed only in partnership with a wide array of countries. !t ma3eslittle sense -or t#e %est to &enigrate an& ostrai6e regimes +#ose ooeration it nee&s to-as#ion a seure ne+ or&er< t#e sta3es are too #ig#. %estern ountries only #arm t#eir o+ninterests +#en t#ey la$el as illegitimate governments t#at are not li$eral &emoraies.Ieogni6ing t#e net +orl&4s inevita$le olitial &iversity an& t#ere$y onsoli&atingooeration +it# rising o+ers o- &iverse regime tye is -ar more sensi$le t#an insisting ont#e universality o- %estern onetions o- legitimayRan& alienating otential artners."#e%est an& rising rest must arrive at ane+, more inlusive, notion o- legitimayi- t#ey are to agreeon an i&eologial -oun&ation -or t#e net +orl&.

And, warming leads to e"tinction

;eibel" #$$


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2ver the long run& it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. ,t is a threat not only to the security andprosperity of the !nited "tates& but potentially to the continued e#istence of life on this planet.

And $ %uclear terrorism in#okes a massi#e nuclear superpower war that can only

culminate in e"tinction

Ayson, 2010(/obert& rofessor of "trategic "tudies at the ictoria !niversity of Dellington& 0After a errorist uclear Attac: Envisaging

Catalytic Effects4& "tudies in Conflict O errorism& ol. ,ss. L& Puly)-ut these two nuclear worldsQa nonstate actor nuclear attac and a catastrophic interstate nuclear e#changeQare notnecessarily separable. ,t is *ust possible that some sort of terrorist attac& and especially an act of nuclear terrorism & could precipitatea chain of events leading to a massive e#change of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possessthem. ,n this conte#t& today>s and tomorrow>s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold Dar years to new state

possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the riss of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowersstarted by third parties. hese riss were considered in the late 7HG9s and early 7H59s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation& the socalled nR7 problem. ,t may reuire a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclearterrorism could lead to such a massive interstate nuclear war. %or e#ample& in the event of a terrorist nuclear attacon the !nited "tates& it might well be wondered *ust how /ussia and6or China could plausibly be brought into the picture& not least becausethey seem unliely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. hey would seem far too responsible to

be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could *ust as easily threaten them as well. "ome possibilities& however remote& dosuggest themselves. %or e#ample& how might the !nited "tates react if itwas thought or discovered that the fissile material usedin the act of nuclear terrorism had come from /ussian stocs&;9 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for

nuclear la#ity< he correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observationby Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear e#plosionwould be 0spread over a wide area in tiny fragments& itsradioactivity maes it detectable& identifiable and collectable& and a wealth of information can be obtained from itsanalysis: the efficiency of the e#plosion& the materials used and& most important S some indication of where the nuclear material camefrom.4;7 Alternatively& if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise& and American officials refused to

believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible(or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to statepossessors ./uling out Destern ally countries lie the !nited +ingdom and %rance& and probably ,srael and ,ndia as well& authorities inDashington would be left with a very short list consisting of orth +orea& perhaps ,ranif its program continues& and

possibly aistan. -ut at what stage would /ussia and China be definitely ruled out in this high staes game of nuclear Cluedo< ,n particular&if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a bacdrop of e#isting tension in Dashington>s relations with /ussiaand6or China& and at a time when threats had already been traded between these ma*or powers& would officials and political leadersnot be tempted to assume the worst< 2f course& the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the !nited "tates wasalready involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with /ussia and6or China& or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a

pro#y war& as unliely as these developments may seem at the present time. he reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attac

occur in /ussia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the !nited "tates& could Moscow and -ei*ingresist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the !nited "tates as apossibleperpetratoror encourager of theattac< Dashington>s early respons e to aterrorist nuclear attac on its own soil might also raise the possibility of anunwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with /ussia and 6or China. %or e#ample& in thenoise and confusion during theimmediate aftermath of theterrorist nuclear attac& the !.". president might be e#pected to place the country>s armedforces& including its nuclear arsenal& on a higher stage of alert. ,n such a tense environment& when careful planning runs upagainst the friction of reality& it is*ustpossible that Moscow and6or China might mistaenly read this as a sign of !.".intentions to useforce (and possibly nuclear force ) against them. ,n that situation& the temptations to preemptsuch actionsmight grow& although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initialresponse to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) D ashington might decide to order a significant conventional (ornuclear) retaliatory or disarming attac against the leadership of the terrorist group and6or states seen to support thatgroup .?epending on the identity and especially the location of these targets& /ussia and6or China might interpret such action as

being far too close for their comfort & and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influenceand even on their

sovereignty. 2ne farfetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a *udgment in Dashington that some of the main aiders andabetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya& perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the 0Chechen insurgents>S longstanding interest in all things nuclear.4;8 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow thatmight reuire a degree of advanced consultation from Dashington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. here is also theuestion of how other nucleararmed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. ,t could reasonably bee#pected that following a nuclear terrorist attac on the !nited "tates& both /ussia and China would e#tend immediate sympathy and support toDashington and would wor alongside the !nited "tates in the "ecurity Council. -ut there is *ust a chance& albeit a slim one& where the supportof /ussia and6or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. %or e#ample& what would happen if the !nited "tates wished to discuss its

right to retaliate against groups based in their territory< ,f& for some reason& Dashington found the responses of /ussia and Chinadeeply underwhelming& (neither 0for us or against us4) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with thegroup& increasing(again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a ma*or e#change. ,f the terrorist group had some


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connections to groups in /ussia and China& or e#isted in areas of the world over which /ussia and China held sway &and if Dashington felt that Moscow or -ei*ing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them& what conclusions might it then drawabout their culpability< ,f Dashington decided to use& or decided to threaten the use of& nuclear weapons& the responses of /ussia and Chinawould be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear e#change. hey might surmise& for e#ample& that while the act of nuclearterrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response& the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. ,t would beone thing for a nonstate actor to have broen the nuclear use taboo& but an entirely different thing for a state actor& and indeed the leading state inthe international system& to do so. ,f /ussia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect& there is then the uestion of what optionswould lie open to them to dissuade the !nited "tates from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades& the central dissuader of

the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. ,f some readers find this simply too fanciful& and perhaps evenoffensive to contemplate& it may be informative to reverse the tables. /ussia& which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads andthat has been one of the two most important trustees of the nonuse taboo& is sub*ected to an attac of nuclear terrorism. ,n response& Moscow

places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the groupand any of its state supporters. ow would Dashington view such a possibility< Dould it really be een to support /ussia>s use of nuclearweapons& including outside /ussia>s traditional sphere of influence< And if not& which seems uite plausible& what options would Dashingtonhave to communicate that displeasure< ,f China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed liely to retaliate in ind& would the!nited "tates and /ussia be happy to sit bac and let this occur< ,n the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attac& howwould the attaced country respond to pressure from other ma*or nuclear powers not to respond in ind< he phrase 0how dare they tell us whatto do4 immediately springs to mind. "ome might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for theterrorists. his might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

And" accepting political diversity2s more likely to resolve every

impact than aggressive democracy promotion---the currentdemocrati(ation strategy can only back6re and strengthen theresolve of the non-democratic states it attempts to isolate3upchan and 4ount" #$$5(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n Universityan& senior -ello+ at t#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, an& A&am, &otoral an&i&ate in t#e 8eartment o-Eovernment at Eeorgeto+n University, "#e Autonomy Iule,' 8emoray) A Journal o- !&eas, Sring 200:,#tt)**+++.&emorayournal.org*&-*12*Ku#an.&-/

Critis -rom t#e rig#t +ill see t#is all -or toleration o- olitial &iversity as moral relativism,+#ile ritis on t#e le-t +ill la$el it as a$an&onment o- a rogressive agen&a. Dorneoonservatives, non&emoraies must $e &e-eate&< -or li$erals, t#ey must $e se&ue&. >ot# $elieve t#at%estern values s#oul& $e universal valuesRan& t#at t#eir &isersal reresents t#e most imortant -orm o-

rogress. 8olicies of impatient democrati(ation" however" will do much more toimpede than impel history2s advance. Drom t#e >al3ans to !ra to t#e Palestinianterritories, a rus# to t#e $allot $o #as un&erut mo&erates an& sto3e& setarian an&i&eologial leavages, not -urt#ere& t#e ause o- olitial sta$ility .%as#ington s#oul& ontinue toromote &emoray $y eamle an& inentive. >ut i- t#e Unite& States insists on universal aereneto t#e %estern or&er it oversees, it +ill only omromise its ersuasive aeal an& its a$ilityto #el ensure t#at li$eral &emoray ultimately +ins t#e long struggle against alternativesystems o- government. !nstea&, t#e Unite& States s#oul& ta3e t#e lea& in onstruting a moreluralist international or&er. %ere %as#ington to or#estrate t#e arrival o- t#is net or&er, it +oul& not&enigrate t#e aomlis#ments o- &emoray, $ut rat#er &emonstrate an a$i&ing on&ene in t#e values t#e %est#ol&s &ear an& in t#e a$ility o- li$eral -orms o- government to outer-orm an& ultimately revail against

aut#oritarian alternatives. Cultivating ne+ sta3e#ol&ers, are-ully &evolving internationalresonsi$ility to regional ators, an& laing t#e international eonomy on a more sta$le-ooting +ill also allo+ t#e Unite& States t#e resite nee&e& to -ous on re$uil&ing t#e-oun&ations o- its o+n roserity. "#e Unite& States +ill $e $etter o5 i- it gets a#ea& o- t#e urve an& #elsra-t a ne+ or&er t#at is sustaina$le t#an i- it g#ts a losing $attle against tetoni s#i-ts in glo$al olitis. As

Kissinger o$serves, America needs to learn to discipline itself into a strategy ofgradualism that seeks greatness in the accumulation of the attainable.' "#e Unite&States an ste+ar& t#e onset o- t#is more &iverse an& inlusive +orl& in a manner t#at remains onsonant +it# t#e

&eeest Amerian values. 8oing so +oul& #el restore AmeriaQs moral aut#ority as a lea&ingmem$er o- t#e ommunity o- nations, in t#e en& ma3ing it more li3ely t#at ot#er nations +oul&$e as reset-ul o- AmeriaQs re-erenes as Ameria s#oul& $e o- t#eirs.


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#AC

E%t* Engagement 7= >on-dems* key

Cross-regime-type cooperation causes broad global normativeconsensus---makes every power a stakeholder with an incentive tomaintain stability3upchan and 4ount" #$$5(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n Universityan& senior -ello+ at t#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, an& A&am, &otoral an&i&ate in t#e 8eartment o-Eovernment at Eeorgeto+n University, "#e Autonomy Iule,' 8emoray) A Journal o- !&eas, Sring 200:,#tt)**+++.&emorayournal.org*&-*12*Ku#an.&-/

An order that welcomes political diversity would constitute a stark departure -romt#e norms an& raties t#at #ave governe& international olitis sine %orl& %ar !!. %esternnorms +oul& no longer enoy ri&e o- lae< aut#ority +oul& not $e onentrate& in %as#ington , norlegitimay &erive& solely -rom a transatlanti onsensus. !nstea&, %estern onets o-legitimay +oul& om$ine +it# t#ose o- ot#er ountries an& ultures, &istri$uting resonsi$ility toa +i&er array o- states. >y asting t#e net +i&ely, a more inlusive or&er +oul& enouragesta$ility $y $roa&ening onsensus, ro&uing ne+ sta3e#ol&ers, an& -urt#er marginali6ing statest#at are re&atory at #ome or a$roa&.

American cooperation with rising non-democratic countries is key tobolster international credibility and stability3upchan" #$11(C#arles, ro-essor o- international a5airs at Eeorgeto+n University an& %#itneyS#ear&son Senior Dello+ at t#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, June 2011, "#e -alse romise o- uniolarity)onstraints on t#e eerise o- Amerian o+er,' Cam$ri&ge Ievie+ o- !nternational A5airs, ol. 2=, No. 2, . 1?1F;/"#ese eamles asi&e, >roo3s an& %o#l-ort# also -ail to a&&ress anot#er imortant at#+ay t#roug# +#i# norms

an& rules onstrain t#e eerise o- US o+er."#ey -ous elusively on t#e osts to t#e Unite& Stateso- its o+n -ailure to omly +it# t#e institutions an& rules t#at %as#ington too3 t#e lea& inra-ting a-ter t#e lose o- %orl& %ar !!. >ut in t#e a-termat# o- t#e glo$al nanial risis t#at $egan in 200Han& ami& t#e ongoing asent o- C#ina, !n&ia, >ra6il, an& ot#er rising states, #ange in or&ering norms may +ell $e

&riven $y t#e re-erenes an& oliies o- emerging o+ers, not $y t#ose o- t#e Unite& States. 9oreover, t#e

imressive eonomi er-ormane an& olitial staying o+er o- regimes t#at ratie non&emorati $ran&s o- aitalismRsu# as C#ina, Iussia, an& Sau&i Ara$iaRall into uestiont#e &ura$ility o- t#e normative or&er erete&&uring AmeriaQs +at#. %ell $e-ore emerging o+ersat# u +it# AmeriaQs material resoures, t#ey +ill $e #allenging t#e normative ommitment tooen mar3ets an& li$eral &emorayt#at #as &ene& t#e %estern or&er. "#e su$stantive ga $et+een t#enorms o- t#e %estern or&er an& t#ose t#at in-orm t#e &omesti an& -oreign oliies o- rising o+ers #as not gone

unnotie& (Ku#an an& 9ount 200:/. Nonet#eless, many s#olars #ave o5ere& an illusory resonse)t#at t#e Unite& States an& its &emorati allies s#oul& &e&iate t#e t+ilig#t #ours o- t#eirrimay to universali6ing %estern norms. Aor&ing to E Jo#n !3en$erry (200H, ;F, 2?/, t#e Unite&StatesQ glo$al osition may $e +ea3ening, $ut t#e international system t#e Unite& States lea&s an remain t#e

&ominant or&er o- t#e t+entyrst enturyQ."#e %est s#oul& sin3 t#e roots o- t#is or&er as &eely asossi$leQ to ensure t#at t#e +orl& ontinues to lay $y its rules even as its materialreon&erane +anes. Su# on&ene in t#e universality o- t#e %estern or&er is, #o+ever, $ase& on+is#-ul t#in3inga$out t#e li3ely traetory o- asen&ing o+ers, +#i# t#roug#out #istory #ave soug#t to a&ustt#e revailing or&er in +ays t#at a&vantage t#eir o+n interests. Presuming t#at rising states +ill rea&ilyem$rae %estern norms is not only unrealisti, $ut also &angerous, romising to alienateemerging o+ers t#at +ill $e ivotal to glo$al sta$ilityin t#e years a#ea& (Eat 200F/. >roo3s an&%o#l-ort# &o not a&&ress t#is issueRresuma$ly $eause t#ey $elieve t#at US reon&erane is so &ura$le t#att#ey nee& not onern t#emselves +it# t#e normative orientations o- rising o+ers. >ut -ats on t#e groun&

suggest ot#er+ise. C#ina is, as o- 2010, t#e +orl&Qs seon& largest eonomy, #ol&s massive amountso- US &e$t, an& is strengt#ening its eonomi an& strategi resene in many uarters o- t#e glo$e< t#e EH #asgiven +ay to t#e E20< t#e rime minister o- &emorati !n&ia #as alle& -or ne+ glo$al rules o- t#e game'Qan& t#e re-orm an& revitali6ationQ o- international institutions (9a#$u$ane 200H, 2;?/< t#e !nternational


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9onetary Dun& an& t#e %orl& >an3 #ave inrease& t#e voting +eig#t o- &eveloingountries< an& t#e Unite& Nations Seurity Counil is oming un&er gro+ing ressure to enlarge t#e voies o-emerging o+ers. All o- t#ese &eveloments ome at t#e eense o- t#e inGuene an&normative re-erenes o- t#e Unite& States an& its %estern allies . >y t#e num$ers, >roo3s an&%o#l-ort# are orret t#at uniolarity ersists. >ut rising o+ers are alrea&y #allenging t#e e3ing or&er an&

gui&ing norms o- t#e international system. 0f the ne%t international system is to becharacteri(ed by norm-governed order rather than competitive anarchy" the 7estwill have to make room for the competing visions of rising powers* A new orderwill have to be based on great-power consensus and toleration of politicaldiversity rather than the normative hegemony of the 7est.

The global distribution of power is shifting too fast fordemocrati(ation to keep pace-the only chance to preventtransitional conict is to embrace political diversity3upchan and 4ount" #$$5(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n Universityan& senior -ello+ at t#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, an& A&am, &otoral an&i&ate in t#e 8eartment o-Eovernment at Eeorgeto+n University, "#e Autonomy Iule,' 8emoray) A Journal o- !&eas, Sring 200:,#tt)**+++.&emorayournal.org*&-*12*Ku#an.&-/

"#e Prineton Proet on National Seurity envisages a +orl& o- li$erty un&er la+' in +#i#t#e srea& o- &emoray an& oen mar3ets om$ines +it# t#e re-orm o- internationalinstitutions to glo$ali6e t#e %estern or&er. "#is vision is an attrative one. An& it may +ell $e t#atC#ina, Iussia, Sau&i Ara$ia, an& ot#er inGuential non&emoraies +ill -ollo+ t#e %estQsmo&el o- &eveloment an& sign u to its notion o- international or&er. As t#eir mi&&le lasses gro+in si6e an& +ealt#, t#eir material aTuene oul& +ell romt t#em to &eman& a greater olitial voie. >ut even i-

t#is is t#e ase, t#e transition to li$eral &emoray +ill $e a gra&ual one. Dor no+, t#eseountries are suee&ing in onsoli&ating aa$le aut#oritarian systems +#i#, +#ile not&emorati, &o enoy onsi&era$le oular suort. A oll on&ute& last year, -or eamle, reveale&t#at over H0 erent o- C#inaQs iti6ens are ontent +it# t#eir ountyQs &iretion. Aor&ing to $ot# neoonservativean& li$eral roonents o- a league o- &emoraiesRsu# as Io$ert Kagan an& !vo 8aal&erRautoraies s#oul& $e

e5etively si&eline& until t#ey em$rae &emoray an& ta3e t#eir lae in t#e urrent international or&er. >ut theglobal distribution of power is changing far more uickly than the nature ofgovernance in rising non-democracies. 7onomi, &emogra#i, an& military tren&s

-avor asen&ing aut#oritarian states, an& t#ese tren&s rovi&e t#eir lea&ers -e+ inentivesto gam$le on olitial li$erali6ation."#e glo$al nanial risis not+it#stan&ing, gro+t# rates in C#inas#oul& outae t#ose o- mature &emoraies -or years to ome. An& &esite t#e reent &ro in oil ries, Iussia,t#e Persian Eul- s#ei3&oms, !ran, an& ot#er states ri# in oil an& gas reserves +ill ontinue to use t#eir energyrevenues to strengt#en t#eir &omesti ontrol an& un&er+rite t#eir #allenge to t#e %estQs vision o- international

or&er. As rising states see3 inGuene ommensurate +it# t#eir +ealt# an& o+er, t#ey +illreast, rat#er t#an em$rae, t#e %estern or&er. 9aintaining a onsensus on t#e terms o- or&er is&iult enoug# among great o+ers t#at s#are a ommitment to &emoray at #ome. 9anmo#an Sing#, Prime9inister o- a &emorati !n&ia, reently alle& -or ne+ glo$al rules o- t#e gameQ' an& t#ere-orm an& revitali6ation' o- international institutions. 8isor& eists even +it#in t#e %est< t#e Unite&States an& many o- its 7uroean allies #ave o- late arte& +ays over t#e role o- international institutions, issues o-international ustie, an& t#e rules &etermining +#en t#e use o- -ore is neessary an& legitimate. Su# &i5erenes

+ill $e mute&, $ut $y no means eliminate&, $y ne+ lea&ers#i in %as#ington. 8ivergent aroa#es to t#eon&ut o- statera-t ten& to $e even more ronoune& among great o+ers t#at artomany on matters o- &omesti governane. %as#ington an& 9oso+ #ave lo3e& #orns o-late over a long list o- issues, inlu&ing t#e enlargement o- NA", missile &e-ense, t#e in&een&ene o-Kosovo, an& t#e onGit in Eeorgia."#ese &i5erenes stem notust -romnarro+ onGits o- interest, $ut-rom ontrasting onetions o- sovereignty, seurity, an& ot#er institutions o- or&er. Politial&iversity among t#e +orl&Qs maor layers &oes not mean t#at a sta$le international or&er +ill roveunattaina$le. >ut it &oes mean t#at i- a sta$le or&er is to emerge, its terms +ill #ave to $e t#ero&ut o- onsensus, not %estern 6at. As @enry Kissinger autions, Ameria +ill #ave to learnt#at +orl& or&er &een&s on a struture t#at artiiants suort $eause t#ey #ele& $ringit a$out.' Poliyma3ersin %as#ington +ill #ave toret#in3 t#e -oun&ations o- U.S. statera-t an& generateriniles t#at an groun& a more &iverse, tolerant, an& sustaina$le or&er.


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Elevating democracy instead of accepting diverse regimes causespolicy failure and backlash against every )*+* priority

?ones" #$11(>rue, 8iretor o- t#e Center on !nternational Cooeration at Ne+ or3 University, &iretor o-t#e 9anaging Elo$al r&er roet an& a senior -ello+ in Doreign Poliy at "#e >roo3ings !nstitution, senior eternala&visor -or t#e %orl& >an34s %orl& 8eveloment Ieort 2011 on ConGit, Seurity, an& 8eveloment, onsultingro-essor at t#e Center -or !nternational Seurity an& Cooeration at Stan-or& University, 9anaging a C#anging%orl&,' Doreign Poliy, 9ar# 1=, 2011,#tt)**+++.-oreignoliy.om*artiles*2011*0;*1=*$uil&ingVt#eVne+V+orl&Vor&erWageX-ull/Dinally, it is imortant to tou# on +#at may $e t#e most ontentious o- issues $et+een t#e Unite& States an& t#eemerging o+ers, namely #uman rig#ts. n $asi #uman rig#ts issues, t#e 3ey &ynami +ill $e $et+een t#e %est

an& C#ina. Neit#er &omesti reality, nor goo& strategy, +ill allo+ t#e Unite& States to ignoret#e #uman rig#ts issues +it# C#ina. >ut U.S. &ilomay on t#e issue s#oul& $e ogni6ant o-t#e relatively limite& imat t#at outsi&e ressure +ill #aveon C#ina4s evolution an& t#e $roa&erontet to t#e relations#ia $alane a&mira$ly stru3 $y Presi&ent $ama &uring Presi&ent @u Jintao4s January2011 visit to %as#ington. Presi&ent @u4s a3no+le&gment t#at C#ina #a& issues +it# #uman rig#ts +as a mil&

oening, $ut ertainly one +ort# ursuing. 9ore $roa&ly, using #uman rig#ts stan&ar&s or issues o-&emoray romotion as a yar&sti3 -or ooeration +ill $a3re. n $ot# issues, emergingo+er $e#avior om$ines a &e-ense o- sovereignty(-un&amental to t#eir seurity/ +it# a tra&itiono- resisting +estern interventionism. 8emorati !n&ia, >ra6il an& Sout# A-ria routinely vote +it# t#eir

NA9 -rien&s an& against t#e %est in t#e @uman Iig#ts Counil. 9oreover, +#ile issues li3e t#eresonsi$ility to rotet are resume& to &ivi&e t#e %est -rom t#e rest, an& &o so inr#etori, reality is more omle. !n&ia an& Sout# A-ria so3e out strongly against NA"4s ation in Kosovo,+#i# +as suorte& $y t#e rgani6ation o- !slami Countries< Drane, Iussia an& Eermany $an&e&toget#er to $lo3 U.S. ation in !ra. So, ontentious, yes< neatly &ivi&ing t#e +est -rom t#e rest, no. "#ereis omleity not leavage #ere. An& an e5ort to use #uman rig#ts or &emorati riteria to &rive#ar& leavages in t#e international system +oul& li3ely rovo3e more serious $an&ingtoget#er $y t#e emerging o+ersagainst, not in -avor o-, our strategy.CNCLUS!N Ameria #asre$oun&e& -rom &is in its inGuene $e-ore. An oil rie rise $e-ore eonomi &o+nturn, a $re+ing risis in !ran, arising ometitor, &omesti &ivi&es an& a 8emorati resi&ent -aing a resurgent rig#t+elome to 1:FH. Still,

a$sent &ramati #ange, an eonomi s#i-t to t#e rest +ill ontinue, an& olitial inGuene+ill -ollo+. !- +e -oster ooeration +#ere interests allo+, an& &evote serious resoures toglo$al eonomi an& energy &ilomay, +e an $alane t#e ontentious &ynamis o-regional seurity an& #uman rig#ts. Prearing -or rises $y investing in management toolsan #el &eesalate t#em +#en t#ey arrive.

The plan signals )*+* acceptance of alternate forms of governance---key to global cooperation across regime type and )*+* credibility3upchan" #$1#(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n University an& senior -ello+ att#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, No ne4s %orl&) "#e %est, t#e Iising Iest, an& t#e Coming Elo$al "urn', Kin&lee&ition (no age num$ers/

As a starting oint, resonsi$le governane, rat#er t#an li$eral &emoray, s#oul& $e a&ote&as t#e stan&ar& -or &etermining +#i# states are legitimate an& in goo& stan&ingRan& t#ussta3e#ol&ers in t#e net or&er.R Put simly, a state +oul& $e in goo& international stan&ing i- itis &e&iate& to imroving t#e lives o- its iti6ensan& ena$les t#em to ursue t#eir asirations in amanner $roa&ly onsistent +it# t#eir re-erenes. States t#at -all s#ort o- t#is stan&ar& +oul& $e t#ose t#at aimrimarily to etrat resoures -rom t#eir iti6ens, +antonly eose t#em to +i&esrea& rivation an& &isease, or

arry out or ena$le t#e systemati erseution or #ysial a$use o- minorities. >eyon& t#ese stritro#i$itions, #o+ever, soieties s#oul& #ave onsi&era$le latitu&e in #o+ t#ey organi6e t#eirinstitutions o- government an& go a$out meeting t#e nee&s o- t#eir iti6ens. As long as t#eyare ommitte& to imroving t#e +el-are an& &ignity o- t#eir eole, states s#oul& enoy t#erig#ts o- goo& stan&ing. !t is true t#at euating goo& stan&ing +it# resonsi$le governane+oul& $e to a3no+le&ge t#e legitimay o- states t#at &o not aere to %estern onetionso- rig#ts an& li$erties. >ut t#e glo$e4s inesaa$le olitial &iversity neessitates t#isrelaation in stan&ar&s< &i5erent 3in&s o- olities ta3e &i5erent aroa#es to -urt#ering t#e material an&emotional nee&s o- t#eir eoles. !n li$eral states, iti6ens ursue t#eir asirations in&ivi&ually an& rivately. t#ertyes o- olitiesRC#ina, Iussia, t#e Unite& Ara$ 7mirates, an& Singaore, -or eamleRut less em#asis on


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in&ivi&ual li$erties in -avor o- a more olletive aroa# to romoting t#e +el-are o- t#eir iti6ens. Peoles +it#ommunitarian olitial ultures or a long #istory o- &erivation may re-er a statele& $ran&o- governane to a laisse6-aire onet#at ris3s eosing t#em to olitial stri-e an& overty. 9uslimsoieties may vie+ a searate& mosue an& state as alien, an& &eem a -usion o- t#e sare& an& seular as not onlyaeta$le, $ut o$ligatory. !n atrimonial ultures, loyalty to tri$e, lan, an& -amily regularly ta3e ree&ene over

in&ivi&ual rig#ts."o a3no+le&ge t#at &i5erent 3in&s o- olities an ratie &i5erent -orms o-resonsi$le governane is to reset &iversity. !n ontrast, to omel ot#er soieties to

em$rae a ertain -orm o- government +oul& $e to imose a tye o- un -ree&om. Clearingt#e +ay -or a more inlusive glo$al or&er entails reogni6ing t#at t#ere is no single -orm o-resonsi$le government< t#e %est &oes not #ave a monooly on t#e olitial institutionsan&raties t#at ena$le ountries to romote t#e +el-are o- t#eir iti6ens. As long as ot#er ountries aereto reasona$le stan&ar&s o- resonsi$le governane, t#e %est s#oul& reset t#eir olitial#oiesas a matter o- national &isretion an& as a reGetion o- t#e intrinsi &iversity o- olitial li-e."#ese same stan&ar&s s#oul& also aly to t#e on&ut o- -oreign oliy. States in goo& stan&ing must sa-eguar&

not only t#e +el-are o- t#eir o+n iti6ens, $ut also t#ose o- ot#er ountries."#ey must reset t#esovereignty an& olitial re-erenes o- ot#er states in goo& stan&ing, an& t#ey must re-rain-rom ations t#at omromise t#e seurity an& +ell$eing o- ot#er statesan& t#eir iti6ens.Countries t#at ommit aggression or engage in ro#i$ite& ations, su# as systematiallysonsoring terrorism or eorting +eaons o- mass &estrution, s#oul& not $e onsi&ere& ingoo& stan&ing an& s#oul& $e &enie& t#e rig#ts enoye& $y resonsi$le states. Consistently

a$i&ing $y t#ese stan&ar&s -or inlusionRin r#etori as +ell as in oliyR+oul& inrease t#e num$er o-sta3e#ol&ers in t#e international system. !t +oul& also allo+ -or t#e lear &emaration o- t#osestates t#at &o not &eserve su# rig#ts, an& t#ere-ore -ailitate t#e &elegitimation an&isolation o- t#e +orl&4s most &angerous ators."#e %est +oul& enoy t#e $a3ing o-&emoraies an& non&emoraiesali3e in ta3ing a rinile& stan& against regimes t#at rey on t#eir o+niti6ensRsu# as Su&an, Nort# Korea, an& Bim$a$+e. So too +oul& a $roa& oalition li3ely -orm toon-ront any state or nonstate ator t#at onsistently $rea#es international norms an&ommits ats o- aggression against ot#er states. %it# mem$ers#i in t#e ommunity o- nationsinlusively &ene&, a onsensus mig#t +ell emerge on #o+ to &eal +it# states t#at are re&atory at #ome an&a$roa&, rovi&ing legitimay an& +i&esrea& suort -or #umanitarian an& reventive intervention. So too +oul&t#is reasting o- t#e notion o- legitimay enourage t#e Unite& States to mo&erate its over 6ealous romotion o-&emoray. Ius#ing to t#e $allot $o in laes li3e >osnia, !ra, an& A-g#anistan #as &one more #arm t#an goo&. !n

soieties t#at la3 eeriene +it# onstitutional rule, ee&ite& transitions to &emoray o-tenro&ue ivil +ar. !n immature &emoraies, +inners usually ta3e all, lea&ing to t#e

maority4s eloitation an& erseution o- t#e minority. !t is +ort# 3eeing in min& t#at t#e%est4s o+n transition to &emoray +as long an& $loo&y. Promoting resonsi$le an&resonsive governane romises to yiel& $etter results t#an insisting on a #urrie& transitionto &emoray. "o $e sure, some +ill legitimately uestion +#et#er t#e moral aut#ority o- li$eral &emoraies+oul& $e tarnis#e& $y t#is more ragmati aroa#. >ut t#e osts o- moral omromise +oul& $e moret#an o5set $y t#e li3ely gains in international seurity. 9oreover, t#e %est nee& not a$an&on e5ortsto romote &emoray as it em$raes a $roa&er &enition o- legitimay. n t#e ontrary, it s#oul& ontinue tosea3 out against reression an& use olitial an& eonomi inentives to enourage&emorati6ation. Citi6ens in &emorati soieties #ave every reason to $e on&ent t#at li$eral &emoray,-rom $ot# a moral an& material ersetive, is suerior to t#e alternatives. Nonet#eless, the spread ofdemocracy should be one component of a long-term vision rather than serve as ade6ning ob!ective* 0f the 7est is right about the strengths of liberal democracy" itwill spread of its own accord as a conseuence of its appeal and e/ectiveness. !n

t#e meantime, romoting resonsi$le governane an& reset -or alternative aroa#es torovi&ing it o5ers t#e most romise o- a&vaning t#e international sta$ility nee&e& -or&emoray to &emonstrate its virtues."#is re&enition o- international legitimay &oes not violate%estern values, $ut instea& &ra+s #eavily on t#e %est4s o+n eeriene. Comromise, tolerane, an&luralism +ere all vital to t#e %est4s rise. Along t#e +ay, regimes o- &i5ering tyes live&si&e$ysi&e, more o-ten t#an not reseting ea# ot#er4s olitial, religious, an& i&eologial #oies."#e %est#as long ele$rate& an& $enete& -rom luralism at #ome, an& s#oul& &o t#e same inaroa#ing t#e rest o- t#e +orl&.As Steven %e$er an& >rue Jentleson reogni6e, a3no+le&ging t#e#eterogeneity o- olitial li-e ta3es #ol& o- t#e great &iversity o- #uman eeriene to turn itinto a virtue not a vie, a soure o- ne+ an& reom$inant i&eas, not -ear an& #atre&.1 !t is also


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t#e ase t#at -ousing more on era&iating tyranny t#an srea&ing &emoray is entirely onsistent +it# t#e%estern eeriene. As Jo#n Ea&&is notes, t#e o$etive o- en&ing tyranny ... is as &eely roote& in Amerian

#istory as it is ossi$le to imagine.... Srea&ing &emoray suggests 3no+ing t#e ans+er to #o+eole s#oul& live t#eir lives. 7n&ing tyranny suggests -reeing t#em to n& t#eir o+nans+ers. in s#ort, t#e %est4s o+n li$eral tra&ition reogni6es t#e &iverse at#+ays availa$le -or romoting#uman &ignity an& +ell$eing. As t#e +orl&4s &ominant o+er, t#e Unite& States s#oul& ta3e t#e lea& inonstruting t#is more luralist aroa# to legitimay. "#e Unite& States +ill $e $etter o5 i- it getsa#ea& o- t#e urve an& #els ra-t a ne+ or&er t#at enoys suort in most uarters o- t#e glo$e t#an i- it lings toan outmo&e& vision $a3e& rimarily $y its tra&itional %estern allies. 7orking with states that governresponsibly rather than haranguing those who fail to govern democratically wouldultimately elevate America,s moral authority and enhance its credibility abroad,imortant assets as it +or3s +it# rising o+ers to manage t#e glo$al turn.

@iberal democracy shouldn2t de6ne state legitimacy---many culturesprefer a governance model that elevates communal concerns ratherthan political rights of individuals---the plan recogni(es that liberaldemocracy doesn2t have a monopoly on legitimate governance3upchan and 4ount" #$$5(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n Universityan& senior -ello+ at t#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, an& A&am, &otoral an&i&ate in t#e 8eartment o-Eovernment at Eeorgeto+n University, "#e Autonomy Iule,' 8emoray) A Journal o- !&eas, Sring 200:,#tt)**+++.&emorayournal.org*&-*12*Ku#an.&-/

"#e starting oint -or -ormulating t#e -oun&ational riniles o- t#e net or&er is to seletaroriate riteria -or &etermining +#i# are t#ose states in goo& stan&ingRan& t#ussta3e#ol&ers in t#e ne+ or&er. 9em$ers#i in t#e ommunity o- nations' s#oul& reuire t#at a statein goo& stan&ing see3 to imrove t#e lives o- its iti6ensin a manner onsistent +it# t#eirre-erenes, an& in so &oing, romote t#e autonomy o- t#ose iti6ens to ursue t#eir asirations. !n a li$eral olity,

t#e state allo+s its iti6ens to ursue t#eir asirations in&ivi&ually an& rivately. @o+ever, ot#er tyes o-resonsi$le olities ut less em#asis on in&ivi&ual li$erties an& instea& romote t#e +el-areo- t#eir iti6ens t#roug# more olletive an& aternalisti means. "#e Autonomy Iulea3no+le&ges t#at #ealt#, roserity, seurity, an& &ignity reresent t#e universal &esires o-all eoles, $ut it simultaneously recogni(es that liberal democracy does notrepresent the only vehicle for furthering these ob!ectives. "#e i&ea t#at government s#oul&$e &e&iate& to imroving t#e lives o- its iti6ens is #ar&ly -oreign to t#e Amerian eeriment. !n&ee&, t#e

Doun&ing Dat#ers ma&e lear t#at one o- t#e &ening uroses o- union +as to ena$le t#e state to en#ane t#e+el-are o- its iti6ens. "#e Amerian solution to attaining t#ese en&s +as t#e omoun& reu$li. >y en&o+ing-e&eral institutions +it# t#e o+er to govern +#ile also limiting t#eir aut#ority t#roug# #e3s an& $alanes, t#eiti6enry oul& $e rotete& against t#reats -rom +it#out an& -rom tyranny +it#in. "#e omoun& reu$li +oul&rovi&e -or t#e seurity an& material nee&s o- its iti6ens +#ile leaving t#e states onsi&era$le &isretion over

soial oliy an& t#e in&ivi&ual $roa& latitu&e -or rivay an& ersonal asiration . 7ven +it#in t#e %est,#o+ever, t#ere is &isagreement a$out #o+ $est to onstrue t#is li$eral tra&ition. Classialli$erals, su# asDrie&ri# @aye3, maintain t#at autonomy is $est ensure& $y -ree&om -romgovernment ation. "#is s#ool o- t#oug#t mani-ests itsel- in a strong li$ertarian tra&ition, +#i# #ol&s t#atminimal government most e5etively allo+s iti6ens to &etermine t#eir o+n &estiny. !n ontrast, le-tleaningli$erals li3eKarl Polanyi an&Amartya Sen reogni6e t#at &erivation in t#e material aa$ilitieso- eole reresents a maor onstraint on autonomy. Sen, -or eamle, sees e&uation, soial+el-are, an& ot#er governmentsonsore& rograms as t#e $est +ay to enourage autonomy< overty reresents a

-orm o- un-ree&om t#at is at least as oressive as tyranny. !n s#ort, t#ere is no single olitial -ormula -orromoting #uman autonomy. Clearing t#e +ay -or a more inlusive glo$al or&er entailsreogni6ing t#at AmeriaQs $ran& o- li$eral &emoray &oes not e#aust t#e mo&es o-governane t#at satis-y t#e Autonomy Iule. Just as t#ere is no universal -orm o- &emoray, t#ere isno universal -orm o- resonsi$le government. Peoles +it# ommunitarian olitial ulturesor a ast o- eonomi &erivation may re-er soial &emoray to a laisse6-aire eonomyt#at ris3s again eosing t#em to insta$ility, ineuality, an& overty. A &eely religious soiety may vie+ asearate& #ur# an& state as alien, an& &eem seular e&uation $y itsel- insuient to instill in #il&ren t#e valuest#at ommunity #ol&s &ear. A atrimonial ulture may rivilege lan or -amilial ties over in&ivi&ual rig#ts. Put

simly, t#e reuirements o- #uman autonomy vary -or &i5erent eoles, an& t#e t#reats toautonomy vary $y irumstane. !n some ases, ersonal autonomy reuires negative rotetionR-or


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eamle, against oerionR+#ile in ot#ers it reuires ositive u$li e5ortRagainst rivation, -or instane."oa3no+le&ge t#at autonomy ta3es &i5erent -orms in &i5erent soieties is to reset&iversity< to us# a ertain -orm o- government on ot#er soieties +oul& $e to imose a tyeo- un-ree&om. All soieties #ave +inners an& losers, an& minority oulations o-ten -are less +ell t#an t#emaority. >ut as long as a government ats to romote t#e general +el-are o- its iti6ens in a+ay $roa&ly ommensurate +it# t#eir asirations, reseting t#e Autonomy Iule means

treating t#at ountry as a mem$er o- international soiety in goo& stan&ing. - ourse, anyountry t#at eretrates or tolerates genoi&e, ena$les or allo+s t#e systemati erseution an& #ysial a$use o-minorities, or eoses its iti6ens to +i&esrea& rivation an& &isease +ill -all +ell s#ort o- meeting t#e Autonomy

Iule. >ut $eyon& su# o$vious ro#i$itions, soieties s#oul& #ave onsi&era$le latitu&e in #o+ t#eyorgani6e t#eir institutions o- government.!mlementation o- t#e Autonomy Iule a&mitte&ly meansinlu&ing some states t#at, t#oug# t#ey govern resonsi$ly, &o not sa-eguar& t#e -ull olitial rig#ts o- all t#eir

iti6ens. @o+ever, su# a rig#ts$ase& aroa# to governane is uniue to li$eral &emoraies. Countries su#as Singaore, C#ina, an& Iussia maintain t#at -orgoing -ull in&ivi&ual rig#ts allo+s -oralternative means o- national rogress an& en#anes ersonal +el-are -or t#e greatestnum$er o- t#eir iti6ens. "o treat t#ese ountries as states in goo& stan&ing is not to on&one su#in-ringements on in&ivi&ual rig#ts. !t isinstea& to a3no+le&ge t#e reality o- olitial &iversity an& toreogni6e t#at no ountry or system #as a monooly on rovi&ing goo& governane.

E%t* Cuba 3ey

And" the embargo is the symbol of America2s attempt todemocrati(e- accepting political diversity now through Cuba is keyto successful reform of American policy9atli/" #$1(%illiam, resear# -ello+ an& -ormer urator o- t#e Amerias Colletion at t#e @oover!nstitution, #e is also a resear# -ello+ o- t#e !n&een&ent !nstitute, an eert on Latin Ameria, C#ina, an& US-oreign oliy, Cu$a4s "orture& "ransition', 1*;0*201;, #tt)**+++.#oover.org*u$liations*&eningi&eas*artile*1;:2H10/

A Ne+ Poliy to Cu$a Sine t#e early 1::0s U.S. roative' oliies #ave &one more to sto3et#an re&ue &omesti tensions in Cu$a, t#oug# +e ro-ess to see3 a eae-ul transition.' 9ost U.S.legislators #ave suorte& roem$argo Cu$anAmerians even t#oug# Eallu olls #ave long s#o+n t#at most

Amerians -avor &ilomati relations +it# @avana an& li-ting t#e em$argo. n $alane, olitiians &onQt t#in3 Cu$aoliy is imortant enoug# to $e +ort# stirring u t#e #ornets in t#e still -airly militant an& +ellnane& ro

em$argo lo$$y. Not only #ave all resi&ential an&i&ates inlu&ing $ama suorte& t#eem$argo, most #ave resiste& even seriously &isussing it. "#is U.S. ommitment to a -aile&oliy #as given %as#ington a seial sta3e' in t#e islan&Qs soalle& in&een&ent' setor +#ose goalsaeal to Amerians. >ut tragially, ara#rasing ournalist Sotty Ieston, Amerians +ill &o anyt#ing -or t#ese&issi&ents eet listen to t#em. 9y tal3s +it# many in Cu$a an& a$roa& suggest t#at most oose t#e em$argoan& t#ree #ave oaut#ore& artiles +it# me saying so. !- t#ese &issi&ents ome un&er -ouse& government re int#e years a#ea&, many Amerians +ill -eel omelle& to intervene even more &iretlyRer#as militarilyRon t#eir

$e#al-. "+o oints stan& out) Cuba is not the security threat that our current policy treatsit asB and our sanctions do not advance the desirable political" economic" andhumanitarian improvements that we say we seek on the island. "#e $ottom line is t#at+e must $ase our oliy on national seurity interests an& realities, not unattaina$le&reams, #o+ever no$le t#ose &reams may seem. 8uring #is seon& an& nal term, an& a-ter #aving

&ra+n unree&ente& eletoral suort as a 8emorat -rom Cu$anAmerians in 9iami, 8resident bama isin a position to make serious reforms" if he has the will to do so *@e mig#t $egin $yresurreting a 1::H:: roosalRt#en en&orse& $y -ormer seretaries o- state Kissinger an& Eeorge S#ult6, $ut3ille& $y Presi&ent ClintonR-or onvening a Presi&ential >iartisan Commission on Cu$a to seriously eamine t#e

ros an& ons o- t#e oliy. !t +oul& ertainly see t#e nee& -or #ange an& its n&ings +oul& give$ama over -or ation. 9any signiant #anges an $e ma&e no+ +it#out t#e suort o- Congress, t#oug#sine 1:: t#e latterQs $a3ing #as $een neessary to -ully li-t t#e em$argo. !mme&iate re-orms s#oul&inlu&e) seuring t#e release o- Alan Eross, t#e Amerian ontrator arreste& in 200: -or &oing #is roative'U.S. government-un&e& o$< en&ing rovoative roative' rograms< allo+ing more visits toCu$a $y all Amerians, not ust largely Cu$anAmerians< ean&ing tra&e $eyon& t#e -oo&s


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an& me&iines no+ allo+e&< $ringing our Cu$a immigration oliy into line +it# our oliiesto+ar& immigrants -rom ot#er ountries< inreasing &isussions +it# Cu$aQs olitial an& military lea&erson a5airs o- mutual interest< an& loo3ing o$etively at t#e re-orms un&er +ay to&ay an& &ei&ing #o+ %as#ingtonan romote #ange +#ile &e-using rat#er t#an sto3ing &omesti onGit an& tensions.

;iplomatic relations with autocratic countries like Cuba are key tomaintaining international peace3upchan" #$11(C#arles, ro-essor o- !nternational A5airs at Eeorgeto+n University an& senior -ello+ att#e Counil on Doreign Ielations, 7nmity into Amity) @o+ Peae >rea3s ut , Aril 2011, #tt)**li$rary.-es.&e*&-les*ie6*0F:FF.&-/

7ngagementQs oonents laim t#at ursuing raro#ement +it# a non&emoratia&versary means a$an&oning #oet#at its government +ill #ange. n t#e ontrary, &oing$usiness +it# autoraies #as t#e otential to $ring a$out a #ange o- lea&ers#i t#roug#t#e $a3&oorY $y +ea3ening #ar&liners an& emo+ering re-ormers. 7ngagement+it# !ran, -or eamle,oul& un&ermine a government t#at relies on on-rontation +it# t#e Unite& States to rallyoular suortan& &isarm t#e oosition. Un&er su# irumstanes, olitial li$erali6ation is Z#omegro+n,[an& t#us more li3ely to rove &ura$le. >elligerent governments #ave -reuently $een t#e vitims o-raro#ement. "#e o+er o- S+e&enQs aristoray an& military +ane& in ste +it# t#e a&vane o-raro#ement +it# Nor+ay. "#e anien regimeQs militarism +as o- &iminis#ing relevane an& t#e a&vane o-integration +it# Nor+ay an& ot#er &emoraies strengt#ene& S+e&is# li$erals. "#e military untas t#at governe&

>ra6il an& Argentina +#en reoniliation $egan in 1:F: &i& not survive t#e onset o- raro#ement. @ar&liners in$ot# ountries +ere un&ermine& $y reoniliation, learing t#e +ay -or t#e asent o-li$erali6ing oalitions) >ra6il an& Argentina +ere &emoraies $y 1:H?. !n none o- t#ese ases +asraro#ement t#e only -ator t#at #ele& $ring a$out a #ange o- government, $ut t#e more $enign strategi

environment t#at aomanie& reoniliation ertainly strengt#ene& t#e #an& o- re-ormers. ver t#e long run,+or3ing +it# realitrant autorats may un&ermine t#em -ar more e5etively t#anontainment an& on-rontation.=.; 8ilomay, Not 7onomi !nter&een&ene, !s t#eCurreny o- Peae"#ir&, an& again ontrary to onventional +is&om, &ilomay, not eonomiinter&een&ene, is t#e urreny o- eae. !n only one o- t#e t+enty #istorial aseseamine&in @o+ 7nemies >eome Drien&s Y t#e gra&ual uniation o- Eermany $et+een 1H1? an& 1HF1 Y &i&eonomi integration lear t#e +ay -or olitial integration. !n all t#e ot#er ases, only a-terolitial elites suee&e& in taming strategi ometition &i& t#e ai-ying e5ets o-eonomi inter&een&enema3e a maor ontri$ution to t#e onset o- sta$le eae. Dlo+s o- tra&e an&investment #ave onseuenes, $ut t#e &ilomats must rst lay t#e groun&+or3 t#roug#negotiations an& t#e ratie o- reiroal restraint. Drom t#is ersetive, only a-ter t#e &ilomats#ave resolve& t#e $ul3 o- t#e &isutes at issue an eonomi integration $et+een rivals Y Jaan an& C#ina,

Palestinians an& !sraelis, >osniaQs Ser$s an& 9uslims Y #el onsoli&ate raro#ement. !n similar -as#ion, t#einternational ommunity an +iel& imortant olitial leverage $y loosening eonomisantions on !ran, Syria, or Cu$a. >ut t#e main $enet o- su# ation +oul& $e t#e olitial signal it sen&s,not t#e urorte&ly ai-ying e5ets o- ommerial integration. Ero+ing eonomi ties an #el lo3 inraro#ement, $ut only a-ter a olitial settlement is at #an&.

The embargo2s attempt to forcefully democrati(e has failed-Americamust reali(e that only through broader cooperation with Cuba willdemocracy ourish0nkeles" #$1(!saa, regular ontri$utor to t#e @arvar& !nternational Ievie+ >log, n Cu$a', "#e @arvar&!nternational Ievie+, ;*1*201;, #tt)**#ir.#arvar&.e&u*$log*isaain3eles*onu$a/

!- one +ere to stu&y t#e #istory o- Amerian santions emirially, #e +oul& onlu&e, uitereasona$ly, t#at t#ey #ave -aile&."#e em$argo $egan in earnest in 1:2 +it# t#e urose-oring Cu$a to li$erali6ean& move a+ay -rom Communism. As t#e Cu$an 8emoray At, +#i# o&ie& t#eem$argo in 1::2, uts it, Ameria +ill maintain its santions until Cu$a moves to+ar&s&emorati6ationan& greater reset -or #uman rig#ts.' Sityone years o- restrite& tra&e an&&ilomati relations +it# t#e +orl&Qs greatesteonomi, olitial, an& military o+er, an& Cu$a #asre-use& to #ange. !t is $ot# ommunist an& reressive. Cu$a is virtually t#e only nation le-t in Latin Ameria+#ere t#ere is violent, statesantione& olitial reression. "#e state #as a me&iamonooly, restrits aess to

in-ormation, an& su$ets nonstate ournalists an& $loggers to ar$itrary, s#ortterm arrest. The embargo has


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more than failed. !- t#e urose o- t#e em$argo is to #el t#e Cu$an eole, it is sel-&e-eating$eause it #as ma&e li-e +orse -or t#em. ne eamle is -oo& s#ortages. "#e state -arms are terri$lyineient an& some years ro&ue only 20M o- t#e -oo& neessary -or t#e Cu$an eole. "#us, Cu$a must imort a

large uantity o- its -oo&. >ut $eause o- t#e Amerian em$argo, imorts are etremelyeensive, ma3ing li-e unneessarily &iult -or t#e Cu$an eole.Su# is t#e ase +it# allem$argos t#oug#. "#ey rarely a5et t#e eole in o+er an& instea&, t#eir +eig#t is asse& &o+n to t#e every&aymen an& +omen, +#om t#e santions are ut in lae to #el. Santions, t#ere-ore, are not orretive $ut unitive,

an& unitive only to+ar&s t#e eole. %#y 3ee t#e santionsWSome +ill argue t#at removing t#em +illre+ar& Cu$an intransigene on &emorati6ation an& #uman rig#ts. >ut s#oul& +e om$at intransigene +it#

o$stinayW !nstea&, t#e Unite& States s#oul& #ange ourse an& not only oen u relations an&tra&e +it# Cu$a, $ut em$rae t#e Cu$an eole.Ameria must $e are-ul to &istinguis# $et+een t#eCu$an eole an& t#e Cu$an state. !t +oul& $e easy -or t#e Cu$an government to sin any #ange in Amerianoliy as a sign o- aroval. Ameria, t#en, s#oul& eliitly elain t#at its s#i-te& osture is t#e result o- its &esireto #el t#e Cu$an eole. !t aims to ease t#e strain on t#e -oo&mar3et an& $ring in ne+ te#nology, te#nology

t#at t#e Cu$an eole an use to s#are in-ormation an& rotest t#e government. Ne+ relations +it# t#eUnite& States +ill also ataly6e an& ultural*olitial s#i-ts a+ay -rom ommunism, an&reiitate ne+ ones. !n ot#er +or&s, rene+e& relations +it# Cu$a +ill 1/ #el t#e Cu$aneole, +#i# in t#e roess +ill 2/ imrove AmeriaQs stan&ing, $ot# in Cu$a an& Latin Ameria,an& ;/ suort &emorats. ! #ar$or no allusions t#at en&ing santions imme&iately tole ommunism inCu$a, $ut in t#e long run, it may turn out to $e t#e nee&e& silver $ullet.

Engaging with Cuba diplomatically is key to prove the Americancommitment to working with politically diverse countriesColvin" #$$.(Ja3e, -ello+ +it# t#e Ne+ !&eas Dun&, a grou t#at see3s ne+ aroa#es an& ara&igms -orU.S. national seurity an& -oreign oliy. @e is also ie Presi&ent -or Elo$al "ra&e !ssues at t#e National Doreign"ra&e Counil (ND"C/ an& oversees t#e Cu$a initiative o- USA7ngage, "#e Case -or a Ne+ Cu$a Poliy',12*2;*200H, #tt)**+e$.ar#ive.org*+e$*20120:0=201F=;*#tt)**+++.ne+i&eas-un&.org*roosals*ColvinM20M20Cu$aM20M209aster.&-/

;. A&vane U.S. interests t#roug# rinile& &ilomay. %it# t#e rig#t team in lae to manage U.S.Cu$an a5airs, t#e net resi&ent s#oul& engage Cu$a &ilomatiallyan& lae t#e $ur&en on t#eCastro government to at onstrutively. Alt#oug# t#e Cu$an government may $e relutant to em$rae s+eeing

e5orts to #ange t#e relations#i +it# t#e Unite& States, U.S. &ilomats s#oul& engage -reuentlyt#roug# alrea&y esta$lis#e& #annelsto &eal +it# ounternarotis, migration, an& military issues.Ieinvigorating &ialogue t#roug# t#ese regular, lo+erlevel #annels, +#i# t#e >us# a&ministration #as allo+e& to

atro#y, +oul& set t#e stage -or #ig#er level &isussions &o+n t#e roa&."#e Unite& States oul& also Goat

&isreet roosals to gauge t#e reation o- t#e Cu$an government in a $etter relations#i.ne easy lae to $egin is to o5er to allo+ Cu$an &ilomats to travel -reely +#ile oste& to %as#ington i- @avana+oul& agree to &o t#e same -or U.S. Doreign Servie oers. 9ore sensitive issues oul& also $e &isusse& in#yot#etial terms si&e$ysi&e, -or eamle t#e +illingness o- t#e Cu$an government to release &issi&ents -rom ailan& t#e +illingness o- t#e Unite& States to remove Cu$a -rom its list o- ountries t#at suort terrorism. "#e Cu$angovernment, +#i# #as a #istory o- surning U.S. outrea#, may not reat ui3ly or -avora$ly to &ilomatiovertures. "#is year, t#e Cu$an government initially reete& #urriane relie- roose& not only $y t#e Unite& States$ut $y t#e 7U as +ell. OProess in Cu$a is slo+, aor&ing to a -ormer >ritis# &ilomat +#o serve& in Cu$a, +#oa&&s, O"#ere is a #uge &et# o- susiion a$out everyt#ing.:? ne Cana&ian oial +arns t#at, +#en negotiating

+it# t#e Cu$an government over normal &eveloment assistane, Oyou nee& to roll +it# t#e un#es. !t an $e-rustrating.: Eiven t#e #e3ere& #istory o- U.S.Cu$an relations, unertainty surroun&ingCu$as eonomy in t#e +a3e o- reent #urrianes, an& t#e governments resistane tosu&&en #ange, @avana may not $e in a rus#to engage vigorously +it# t#e Unite& States. Pi3eringseulates t#at Oa &ramati s#i-t +oul& $e resiste& $y Ia\l, +#o +ants to 3ee any #anges gra&ual.:F Still,resi&ents -rom Jo#n D. Kenne&y to Ieagan #ave &emonstrate& a +illingness to engage +it# t#e Cu$an government

even at times o- immense tension. Ereat resi&ents reogni6e t#at tal3ing to t#e Unite& Statesenemies is not aeasement. O8art of Da diplomatsF !ob is to maintain contact withpeople you wouldnt want to invite to dinner, a&vises 8avi&o+.:H"#e Unite& Statess#oul& reengage to suort its interests on issues su# as migration an& ounternarotis+#ile laying t#e groun&+or3 -or more su$stantial &isussions later. 7ven i- a $rea3t#roug# is not ossi$le to&ay,

reesta$lis#ing regular #annels o- ommuniation +ill ma3e gra&ual imrovement moreli3ely &o+n t#e roa&.


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Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors