24
CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde. IPv6 Security Aspects. Agenda Introduction to IPv6 IPv4 and IPv6 Comparison Current issues in IPv4 IPv6 solutions for IPv4 issues New issues of new protocol Hacking Tools Conclusion. Introduction to IPv6. Why IPv6 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Citation preview

Page 1: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

CS 265 – ProjectIPv6 Security Aspects

Surekha Shinde

Page 2: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

IPv6 Security Aspects

Agenda

• Introduction to IPv6• IPv4 and IPv6 Comparison• Current issues in IPv4• IPv6 solutions for IPv4 issues• New issues of new protocol• Hacking Tools• Conclusion

Page 3: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Introduction to IPv6

• Why IPv6

• IPv6 Important features : Wish-list• Faster Packet Processing

• Enhanced QOS

• Improved Security

• Greater protocol Flexibility

• Dual-Stack approach

Page 4: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

0 31

Version Class Flow Label

Payload Length Next Header Hop Limit

128 bit Source Address

128 bit Destination Address

4 12 2416

The IPv6 Header 40 Octets, 8 fields

Page 5: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

0 31

Ver IHL Total Length

Identifier Flags Fragment Offset

32 bit Source Address

32 bit Destination Address

4 8 2416

Service Type

Options and Padding

Time to Live Header Checksum Protocol

Shaded fields are absent from IPv6 header

The IPv4 Header 20 octets + options : 13 fields, including 3 flag bits

Page 6: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

IPv6 Addressing

IPv6 Addressing rules are covered by multiples RFC’s

Architecture defined by RFC 2373 Address Types are :

Unicast : One to One Anycast : One to Nearest Multicast : One to Many Reserved

A single interface may be assigned multiple IPv6 addresses of any type (unicast, anycast, multicast)

No Broadcast Address -> IPv6 Use Multicast

Page 7: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Notation & Abbreviation

Notation

1111110111101100 1111111111111111

128 Bits = 16 bytes = 32 Hex digits

: 7654 3210:: ADBF : BBFF 2922 FFFF:::FDEC BA98

FDEC : BA98 : 0074 : 3210 : 000F : BBFF : 0000 : FFFF

FDEC : BA98 : 74 : 3210 : F : BBFF : 0 : FFFF

Abbreviation

Unabbreviated

Abbreviated

FDEC : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : BBFF : 0 : FFFF

FDEC : 00 : BBFF : 0 : FFFF

Abbreviated

More Abbreviated

Page 8: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

IPv6 Addressing for IPv4

IPv4-Compatible IPv6 Address format

IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Address format

0 IPv4 Address

96 Bits 32 Bits

0:0:0:0:0:0 192.168.10.10

IPv4 Compatible Address = 0:0:0:0:0:0:192.168.10.10

= ::192.168.10.10

0 IPv4 Address

80 Bits 32 Bits

0:0:0:0:0:0 192.168.10.10

FFFF

16 Bits

IPv4-Mapped Address = 0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:192.168.10.10

Page 9: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

IPv6 over IPv4 Tunnels

Tunneling is encapsulating the IPv6 packet in the IPv4 packet Tunneling can be used by routers and hosts

IPv4IPv6 Network

IPv6 Network

Tunnel: IPv6 in IPv4 packet

IPv6 HostA

Dual-Stack RouterB

Dual-Stack RouterA

IPv6 HostB

IPv6 HeaderIPv6 HeaderIPv4 HeaderIPv4 Header

IPv6 HeaderIPv6 Header Transport Header

Transport Header DataData

DataDataTransport Header

Transport Header

Page 10: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Dual Stack Approach & DNS

In a dual stack case, an application that: Is IPv4 and IPv6-enabled Asks the DNS for all types of addresses Chooses one address and, for example, connects to the IPv6 address

DNS Server

IPv4

IPv6

www.sjsu.com = * ?

3ffe:b00::1

3ffe:b00::110.1.1.1

Page 11: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Security Advantages ofIPv6 Over IPv4

IPv4 - NAT breaks end-to-end network security

IPv6 - Huge address range – No need of NAT

IPv4 – IPSEC is Optional

IPv6 - Mandatory in v6

IPv4 - Security extension headers(AH,ESP) – Back ported

IPv6 - Built-in Security extension headers

IPv4 - External Firewalls introduce performance bottlenecks

IPv6 - Confidentiality and data integrity without need for additional firewalls

Page 12: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Security Advantages ofIPv6 Over IPv4 (2)

IPv4 - Security issues related to ICMPV4.

IPv6 - ICMPV6 uses IPSEC authentication and encryption.

IPv4 - No mechanism for resistance to scanning

IPv6 - RTS possible only in IPV6

IPV4 - Doesn’t support Auto configuration

IPv6 - Built in Auto configuration support

Ignorance of network administrator to IPV6 But, Thanks to the transitional efforts of IETF

Page 13: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

• IPV4 - Security option field and Optional IPSEC

• IPV6 - IPSEC part of protocol suite-mandatory IPSEC provides network-level security 

• IPSEC uses:- AH ( Authentication Header) ESP( Encapsulating Security Payload) Header

Important Security fields in IPv6

Page 14: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

 Authentication Header(AH)

• Data integrity• Data authentication• Anti-replay protection

Next Header Hdr Ext Len

Security Parameters Index (SPI)

Reserved

Sequence Number

Authentication Data

  Fig.- Authentication Header(AH) Packet Format

Page 15: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Authentication Header fields

• SPI:-Security parameter index• Sequence number field :- Anti-replay protection• Authentication data :- ICV-authentication and data integrity• HMAC(Hash message authentication code)+MD5 & HMAC+SHA-1• AH supports several authentication algorithms• Prevents IP spoofing attacks• Prevents DOS attacks 

Page 16: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

• Data confidentiality • Data integrity• Data authentication• Anti-replay protection• Authentication applied only to data being encrypted• Optional services-select at least one

Page 17: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Payload

Next Header

Security Parameters Index (SPI)Sequence Number

Authentication Data

Padding LengthPadding

ESP Packet Header Format

Page 18: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

ESP Packet Header

• ESP header with confidentiality service –

prevents sniffing Ex.TCP dump & Windump

• ESP - symmetric key algorithms like DES, 3DES

and AES

 ESP Header Fields:

• SPI:-Security parameter index

• Sequence number field :- Anti-replay protection

Page 19: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Security issues in IPV6:

• IPSEC Relies on PKI , Not yet fully Standardized

• Scanning possible – If poorly designed

• No protection against all denial of service attack (DoS attacks difficult to prevent in most cases)

• No many firewalls in market with V6 capable

But ??????

Page 20: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

By The Way…IPv6 Hacking Tools

•Sniffer/packet capture Analyzer

Snort TCP dump

EtherealWindumpWinPcap

•ScannersIPV6 security scannerHalfscan6 Nmap

 

•DOS Tools6tunneldos

4to6DDOS Imps6-tools

•Packet forgersSendIP

Packit Spak6

•WormsSlapper

RealSecure & Proventia Tools

Page 21: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Conclusion

‘Black Hats’ Vs ‘White Hats’

Time for ignoring IPV6…..PAST

Time for understanding,recognizing

and deploying it……NOW 

Page 22: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

References

• http://www.ipv6.org

• http://www.cisco.com/ipv6/

• http://netscreen.com

• http://www.sans.org

• Computer Networks By Larry Peterson

and Bruce Davie

Page 23: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde

Questions ?

Page 24: CS 265 – Project IPv6 Security Aspects Surekha Shinde