Aguilar v Modesto San Pedro

Facts:Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property

7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MeTC denied.

RTC: In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

Issue: WON criminal cases against Ivler should be dismissed on the ground of DJHeld: Yes

Ratio:1. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x xWere criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case.

2. People v. Diaz,25decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, andcan not be split into different crimes and prosecutions

3. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizingnotan act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences

Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? Jurisprudence adopts both approaches

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code;or(2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for aquasi-offenseto stand for (1) a singleactconstituting two or more grave or less gravefelonies; or (2) anoffensewhich is a necessary means for committing another. Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Go-Tan v Spouses Tan

Facts:OnApril 18, 1999,SharicaMari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.[3]Out of this union, two female children were born,KyraDanielle[4]and Kristen Denise.[5]OnJanuary 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6]against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC.She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7]of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[8]otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

OnFebruary 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection OrderAdCautelamand Comment on the Petition,[10]contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. RTC dismissed

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for thesuppletoryapplication of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can besuppletorilyapplied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

Issue: WON case against respondents can be dismissedHeld: No

Ratio:Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolenceagainst women and their children'' as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for thesuppletoryapplication of the RPC, thus: SEC. 47.SuppletoryApplication.- For purposes of this Act, theRevised Penal Codeand other applicablelaws,shall havesuppletoryapplication.(Emphasis supplied)Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:ART. 10.Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.(Emphasis supplied)

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be appliedsuppletorilyto R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be appliedsuppletorily.Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262.For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[23] It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:SEC. 5.Acts of ViolenceAgainstWomen and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personallyor throughanother, thatalarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventingfurtheractsofviolence againstthe womanorher childmayinclude individualsother than the offending husband, thus:SEC. 8.Protection Orders. xxxTheprotection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the followingreliefs:(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally orthrough another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly orindirectly; xxx(Emphasis supplied)Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus: SEC. 4.Construction.- This Act shall beliberally construedto promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)