Crimea, the conflict that did not (yet) happenmbaudier.eu/papers/crimea-paper-baudier-090613-lowres.pdf · 2014-02-21 · Mathieu Baudier MAIS2 – Diplomatic Academy of Vienna April

Mathieu Baudier

MAIS2 – Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

April 2009

Paper for the Developments in South Eastern Europe seminar with Prof. Neuhold.

Crimea, the conflict that did not (yet) happen

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in

good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Table of Contents

Introduction.............................................................................................................................2

Crimea: complex by definition................................................................................................2

Historical geography..........................................................................................................2

Socio-economical factors.................................................................................................10

The myths and perceptions of Crimea.............................................................................15

The evolution of the Crimean institutional settings..............................................................17

Soviet times.....................................................................................................................17

The rise of separatism.....................................................................................................19

The Crimean autonomy within the Ukrainian state..........................................................21

Challenges to watch.............................................................................................................23

Ukraine's instability..........................................................................................................24

Post-sovietism..................................................................................................................24

Russia / Sevastopol.........................................................................................................26

The Crimean Tatar question............................................................................................28

Conclusion............................................................................................................................30

Acknowledgement................................................................................................................31

Annex 1: Map of the study trip.............................................................................................31

Annex 2: Photography index................................................................................................31

1

Introduction

During the 1990's the peninsula of Crimea, in the south of Ukraine, showed many

characteristics typical of instability in the making: a regional majority (Russians) somehow

artificially integrated in another state, the return of the Crimean Tatars who had been

deported to Central Asia by Stalin, and a strategic position at the heart of the Black Sea,

an area which was undergoing massive changes. At the beginning of this decade,

inter-ethnic tensions and unresolved security issues between the new states of Russia and

Ukraine did not bode well for the region.

However, no conflict happened, and constitutional arrangements were found which

provided autonomy to Crimea, and struck a balance between the aspirations of various

regional groups and the unity of the Ukrainian state in transition.

The goal of this paper is first to analyse why these risks did not materialize into instability,

and then to assess whether recent developments in Ukraine and Russia may jeopardize

the current equilibrium.

Crimea: complex by definition

Historical geography

The peculiarity of Crimea has been above all determined by its geography, throughout

history and still today. Crimea is a peninsula in the middle of the Black Sea. Since

Classical Antiquity this position has given the peninsula a strategic position, commercially

and militarily.

The next page shows a map of the Black Sea region illustrating this position (followed by a

map of Crimea itself that will be commented on afterwards).

The westernmost point of Crimea is around 230 km from the closest point of today´s

Romania, the nearest point of the European Union. As we will see in much more detail,

Sevastopol is a strategic sea harbour in the south of the peninsula. It is around 540 km

away from the straits near Istanbul, 320 km from Sinop, the northernmost point of today´s

Turkey, a NATO member and 720 km away from Poti, the main port on the eastern shore

of the Black Sea (in today´s Georgia). The strait of Kerch at the eastern end of Crimea

commands the entry to the Sea of Azov and the mouth of the Don (around 320 km away

from Rostov on the Don). Finally, Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, is around 660 km away

from Kiev, the capital of Ukraine.

2

Mountain range

Steppe and hills

Swamps

Kerch peninsula(steppe)

The previous map, of the Crimean peninsula itself, shows its main natural features. From a

geographical point of view, Crimea is mainly a continuation of the Kuban steppe (the

region north of the Caucasus mountains, around the Russian city of Krasnodar). Its

southern coast is a very steep mountain range, culminating above the sea until around

1500 meters high1. The north eastern coast, bordering the Azov sea with the Arabat spit,

and the connection to the main land are mainly salty swamps. Finally, the Kerch peninsula

is a very low and flat steppe.

These geographical features explain one of the paradoxes of Crimea: it always was a

crossroad of civilizations and migrating peoples, while remaining relatively isolated and

thus developing a specific identity. As we will see, this paradox is still the key to the

understanding of today's dynamics in this region.

The steppe structure and its continuity with the mainland explain why many migrating

peoples (e.g. the Scythes, the Mongolians) settled in its central part. On the other hand,

commercially oriented people, such as the Ancient Greeks or the Genoese, were mostly

interested by its southern coast, due to its central position. They therefore settled behind

the mountain range, with rather few contacts with the mainland. Finally, the swamp areas

in the north explain why independent or autonomous political structures such as the

Crimean Tatar Khanates could defend their position.

This paper is not an history paper and we won't go into too many details about the history

of the Crimean peninsula, although this is a fascinating topic. With the geographical

perspective that we have just exposed we will just underline the main phases of this

history, to the extent that they are useful to understand Crimea today, and the perceptions

around it2.

During Classical Antiquity the Crimean steppe was settled by nomadic Scythes while the

Ancient Greeks created trading posts (the region was called Tauris or Tauride).

During the great waves of invasions various peoples settled in Crimea: Goths, Huns,

1 Krim / Crimea, 2006, 1:340 000 map, World Mapping Project

2 These historical details are based on various sources, primarily Neal Ascherson, “Black Sea - Chapter 1”

(1995), Hill and Wang, and Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition and Conflict”

(2007), Harvard University Press, plus other common historical sources such as Ronal Finlay and Kevin

O'Rourke, “Power and Plenty – Trade, war and the world economy in the second millennium” (2007),

Princeton University Press, cross-checked with http://www.wikipedia.org

5

Bulgars and Khazars. Interestingly, some Khazars converted to Judaism around the 9 th

century and their descendants constituted the Karaïm community with a significant

presence until the Second World war3.

In the 10th and 11th centuries, Crimea was under the control of Kievan Rus, the

predecessor of the Russian Empire. The great king Vladimir converted to Christianism

after taking the important Greek trading post of Korsun (or Chersonesos). His baptism may

even have taken place in Chersonesos4.

In the 13th century the Mongol invasions destroy Kievan Rus and Crimea becomes part of

the Golden Horde, one of the Mongolian kingdoms, created after Genghis Khan.

Between 1441 and 1783, Crimea is an independent sovereign country, the Crimean

Khanate dominated by the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars origin is not completely

clear. They are definitely descendants of the Mongols, just as the Tatars of the Volga

(around Kazan) , but mixed with the various peoples which were already settled in Crimea.

The Crimean Khanate was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, without formally

belonging to it.

At the end of the 18th century, the push to the south of the Russian Empire put it into

confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-39, Russian

troops first penetrated into Crimea. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the

Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74, the Ottoman Empire has to give up its suzerainty on

Crimea, where the Russian influence increased during the following years. In 1783, the

empress Catherine II annexed Crimea to the Russian empire.

Crimea was instrumental in the Russian strategy to gain access to the “warm seas” and its

push to the Turkish straits. It is in this context that the military port of Sevastopol was

created (it is even argued that Crimea was conquered mainly in order to found

Sevastopol!5) and that the only major international war of the 19 th century took place in

Crimea between 1853 and 1856.

During the Civil War following the Bolshevik revolution, Crimea was a battlefield between

Bolshevik and Tsarist troops. It was briefly independent, as the Crimean People's Republic

(between December 1917 and January 1918) under Tatar leadership, one of the first

attempts ever of a democratic regime in the Muslim world, but was defeated by the

pro-Bolshevik forces of the Black Sea fleet.

3 Finlay and O'Rourke, “Power and Plenty”, p. 29

4 Or alternatively in Kiev

5 Sasse, “The Crimea Question”, p. 47

6

In 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was created within

the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). We will go into detail in the

next part looking at the evolution of the institutional setting of Crimea within the Soviet

Union.

In May 1944, after having taken back Crimea from Nazi Germany, Josef Stalin ordered the

complete deportation to Central Asia (primarily Uzbekistan) of the Crimean Tatars, who

were accused of collaboration with the enemy.

After the Second World War, Crimea was the preferred resort or retirement destination in

the Soviet Union, especially for the elites.

7

Illustration 1: Hilly landscape near Bakhchysarai in central Crimea

8

Illustration 2: Sea and mountains on the southern coast

9

Illustration 4: Ships through the strait of KerchIllustration 5: Swamps near the Arabat spit

Illustration 3: Landscape typical of the Kerch peninsula

Socio-economical factors

The broad picture of the ethnic composition of Crimea is as follows: a clear Russian

majority (1.18 Mio, 58.5%), a significant Ukrainian population (0.49 Mio, 24.4%, especially

in the north of the region) and a resurgent Crimean Tatar minority (0.24 Mio, 12.1%).

Between the Russian annexation at the end of the 18th century and the end of the 19th

century, the share of the Crimean Tatar population fell from 80% to 34%6. This was mostly

due to a massive and state-sponsored Russian immigration in the sparsely populated

peninsula.

As in many other places the Second World War caused major shifts in the ethnic

composition of Crimea. First and foremost, the deportation of the around 200,000

Crimean Tatars to Central Asia within a few days around May 17 th 1944 (with probably a

tenth of them dying during this deportation), caused their complete disappearance from the

region. The Tatars had been stripped off their constitutional rights which were given back

to them only in the late 1960's, but it is only at the end of the 1980's that they were allowed

free movement and thus were able to resettle in Crimea. It is important to note that these

dynamics of Tatar resettlement started when the Soviet Union still existed, albeit in its

dying days. Therefore it was not a post-soviet decision taken by successor states (in that

case Ukraine and Uzbekistan). This movement greatly intensified after the collapse of the

Soviet Union because the Tatars wanted to leverage this freedom and create a matter of

fact on the ground before borders would be shut again between the new sovereign states.

Before the Second World War, Crimea was still showing a stunning diversity of ethnic

groups and cultures with significant Jewish and German population (respectively 7.4% and

5.7% of the population according to Soviet census7), who disappeared completely, the

former during and the latter in the aftermath of the Nazi occupation.

Although the northern parts of Crimea always had Ukrainian communities, the Ukrainian

settlement in Crimea mostly started after the Second World War and was politically driven.

It increased after the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 19548. The two main reasons for this

6 Doris Wydra, “Autonomie auf der Halbinsel Krim – Eine völker- und verfassungsrechtliche Analyse”

(“Autonomy on the Crimean Peninsula – An international and constitutional law analysis”) (2008),

Braumüller, p. 154



10

policy were on the one hand the need to compensate for the labour shortage caused by

the deportation of the Tatars and on the other hand to weaken nationalist feelings in

western Ukraine by transferring some of its population to Crimea.

The evolution of the main ethnic groups of Crimea throughout the 20 th century9 are

enumerated and visualized in the table and graph below10:

1897 1921 1939 1979 1989 2001Rus + Ukr 274,724 370,888Russians 558,481 1,460,980 1,629,542 1,180,400Ukrainians 154,123 547,336 625,919 492,200Tatars 186,212 184,568 218,879 5,422 38,365 243,400

9 Ukrainian census of 2001, cited by Sasse, “The Crimea Question”, p. 275

10 The value around 1944 have been interpolated in order to better illustrate the deportation of the Tatars

11

1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

1,800,000

Crimean Population 1897 - 2001

Slavs Russians Ukrainians Tatars

From an economical point of view the situation in Crimea since the fall of the Soviet Union

is rather gloomy.

One of the main activities during soviet times were the heavy industries and naval yards in

Kerch and Feodosiia. After the fall of the Soviet Union they lost their natural markets and

fell in dereliction. For all the talks of Crimea being part of Russia (see next section) the

connection between Crimea and Russia is much less natural than for other Ukrainian

regions bordering Russia such as the Kharkivska and Zaporizka oblasts. The volume of

trade of industrial goods with Russia threefold fell between 1990 and 199511.

The other main industry is the tourism industry. It is still bustling with clients mostly coming

from Russia and mainland Ukraine, as the building activity around Yalta testifies. However,

when looking closer12, the public infrastructure is crumbling in the main resort areas (the

southern coast between Balaklava and Alushta): the resorts are basically Russian islands

of luxury, isolated from the surrounding area and with little positive spillovers. Moreover as

David Chabin, owner of the travel and event agency Euro Crimea points out, Crimea as a

resort place is not attractive for westerners: “Hard to reach, with poor infrastructure and

twice as expensive as similar resorts in Spain, Turkey or North Africa.” Except for special

events such as the giant techno music festival of Kazantip13, Mr. Chabin, who targets

specifically these western markets rather tries to promote eco-tourism, cultural trips around

the Jewish or Soviet heritage14.

The only exception to this depressed economy is the city of Sevastopol, which is very

prosperous thanks to the Russian naval base. Unemployment is much lower in Sevastopol

and the atmosphere and state of the infrastructure in the city contrasts greatly with the one

in other Crimean cities.

11 Viacheslav Pikhovshek, “Will the Crimean crisis explode?”, in “Crimea – Dynamics, Challenges and

Prospects” (1995), Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p. 60

12 Study trip by the author in February 2009

13 http://www.kazantip.com/ , last accessed April 2009

14 Interview with David Chabin, owner of the travel and event agency Euro Crimea in Simferopol on

February 10th 2009.

12

http://www.kazantip.com/

13

Illustration 6: Karaim graves near Bakhchysarai

Illustration 8: Industrial area near Kerch

Illustration 7: Crimean Tatar family

14

Illustration 9: Yalta sea side

The myths and perceptions of Crimea

In order to conclude this presentation of the peculiarities of the Crimean peninsula it is

important to underline the conflicting myths and perception around Crimea since they

structured to a great extent the autonomy debate of the 1990's.

First we take into consideration the perception of the Crimean Tatars of Crimea as their

national homeland. As we have seen this perception is rooted in a few centuries of

sovereignty on this territory and of a national feelings which developed like among many

peoples in Europe at the end of the 19 th century. The great catastrophe of the deportation

(called Sugrün in the Crimean Tatar language, similarly to the Shoah of the European

Jews), reinforced this feeling and the Crimean Tatar community was very well organized

and politically aware during its exile in central Asia. As soon as they came back to Crimea

they quickly set up parallel representative structures: a parliament, the Kurultay, was

organized in June 1991 which elected a core body with legislative and executive powers,

the Mejlis15.

The Russians in Crimea think of themselves clearly as Russians16, but this belonging is

more cultural than nationalist. As we will see, the Russian Movement of the 1990's could

base its initial success on these belongings but never really succeeded in stirring

nationalism among the local population or irredentism in Russia.

Once again, the place of Sevastopol is particular in this regard. Twice in its history

Sevastopol experienced a devastating siege and fought heroically against invaders (during

the Crimean War and the Second World War). It is with Kerch and Kiev one of the only

three Ukrainian cities which were granted the title of Heroic City of the Soviet Union after

the Second World War. You just have to walk a little bit through the city to see that this is a

major component of its identity17. It is therefore unthinkable to consider Sevastopol not

being a Russian city, for Russians in Crimea as well as in Russia itself.

Finally, the perception of Crimea as a part of Ukraine is complex and less conflictual than

one may think. First, it should be underlined that the distinction between Russians and


16 Interview with Mrs. Krychavtseva, journalist at the Crimean Regional TV, on February 6 th 2009 in

Simferopol

17 Study trip of February 2009

15

Ukrainians is based on debatable ethnic or national reasons, which were used in Soviet

times and are still considered today (such as family names etc.). The overwhelming

majority of the Slav population in Crimea (Russians and Ukrainians) uses Russian as its

daily language. Although some nationalists tried to stir a Russian-Ukrainian cleavage

within the society it never really succeeded (while an anti-Tatar sentiment among the Slav

population definitely exists)18. The opposition was to the Ukrainian state as a hindrance

against closer links to Russia, not at a nationalistic level.

The general policy of linguistic “ukrainization” pursued by the Ukrainian state since

independence can be felt, but somehow strangely (if not ridiculously) since the Russian

language is omnipresent in all aspects of the public and private life.


16

Illustration 10: Monumental war memorial in Sevastopol

The evolution of the Crimean institutional settings

In the previous part we have described Crimea and underlined its main peculiarities and

potential challenges. In this part we will analyse how the institutional and constitutional

settings for this region tried to address these peculiarities and with which success.

Soviet times

As we have seen, when the Bolsheviks finally established control on Crimea in 1921, it

became the Crimean Autonomous Republic Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian

Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

It is important to quickly describe the complex institutional definition of autonomous entities

within the Soviet Union, since it was an important tool of nationality management and that

it had a strong influence on legal claims and perceptions in the 1990's.

The first level is constituted by the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), the Russian one

being the only one with an explicitly federal structure.

17

Illustration 11: Road sign in Ukrainian (big) and Russian (small)

Within these republics three types of autonomous entities can be found, besides the

regular administrative districts (oblasts): autonomous republics, autonomous regions and

autonomous districts, with decreasing levels of self rule. Important for our analysis, is that

almost all of these autonomous entities where related to a “titular” ethnic group or

nationality. In theory, the titular group within a unit was preferred for administrative posts

and had the right to conduct administrative affairs in its language (except for the districts

which were for small indigenous groups in the north of the RSFSR). Autonomous republics

had their own constitutions, flags, coats of arms, etc19.

In the case of Crimea, no titular ethnic group was defined and the autonomous republic

was related to a geographical entity (the Crimean peninsula). It had two official languages,

Russian and Crimean Tatar. There is therefore a debate on whether the Crimean Tatars

were recognized as the indigenous group of Crimea, a status that they claimed for obvious

reasons, whereas supporters of strong links with Russia insit on the multi-ethnic,

multi-national nature of the Crimean ASSR.

During the 1920's, the Crimean Tatars clearly enjoyed a cultural and national revival in the

framework of the ASSR and were present at the main levels of power in Crimea. But after

Stalin had consolidated their grip on power in the 30's, they were marginalized in favour of

a policy of “russification” (as in many other places in the Soviet Union at this time).

Interestingly, after the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944, Crimea lost its status of

Autonomous Republic and became a regular oblast (still within the Russian SFSR), which

tends to prove that the previous autonomous status was indeed related to the presence of

this non-Russian ethnic group.

The next important institutional change happened in 1954 with the transfer of Crimea from

the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). Much has been

said and written about this “gift” of Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine, we will here review the

likely root causes of this transfer, its rationale and the debate about its legality20.

This transfer happened in the context of the celebrations of the 300 years of the Pereislav

Treaty which bound Ukraine and Russia together. The Soviet leadership put a great

emphasis on these celebrations, since it was promoting a slav-dominated USSR, based on


20 For an in-depth analysis of the 1954 transfer please refer to Sasse, “The Crimea Question”, p.95-126

18

an everlasting union and friendship between Russia and Ukraine. The “gift” of Crimea was

presented in this light. More realistically, this transfer must rather be seen in the context of

the ongoing power struggles after Stalin's death (in 1953). At the time, Khrushchev had

not yet consolidated its power and was a rather weak figure among the top leadership. It is

therefore likely that the transfer of Crimea was a mean to gain support of the Ukrainian

leadership, that he knew well being himself of Ukrainian ascent and having made his early

career in Ukraine.

This transfer is widely criticized by Russian nationalists, and, as we have seen, from an

ethnic point of view there is indeed not much sense in attaching Crimea to Ukraine rather

than to Russia. But it should also be considered that from an infrastructural point of view

(especially for transportation), Crimea is much more naturally integrated with the Ukrainian

main land. Although it is very close to Russia through the strait of Kerch, in the absence of

a bridge, Crimea was a part of the RSFR without any direct link to it. In this light the

transfer of it to the UkSSR looks much less irrational than is often pictured.

Finally, there have been a lot of debates around the legality of this transfer, proponents of

a reattachment to Russia pointing to some procedural aspects which would not have been

respected as the transfer was rushed through the highest organs of the USSR. Such

claims are not taken seriously by specialists, first because the overall constitutional rules

were respected, second because the USSR was not the prime example of respect for the

rule of law anyhow and third and most importantly, a change of internal which was in force

uncontested during more than 35 years definitely qualifies for the uti possdetis juris

principle that the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus decided to apply for the breakup

of the Soviet Union in the frame of the Belavezha Accords of December 1991.

The rise of separatism

In the beginning of 1991, the Soviet Union was in turmoil but still existed. Leonid Kravchuk

then chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet agreed with Mykolav Bakhrov, first

secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to give

Crimea an autonomous status, as a division of power and spheres of influence between

them. On February 12th 1991, the Supreme Soviet decided of “the restoration of the

Crimean ASSR within the borders of the territory of the Crimean oblast of the Ukrainian

SSR”, decision which became binding on June 6th 199121.

There is another legal debate around this decisions, related to the 1954 transfer: since

21 Viacheslav Pikhovshek, “Will the Crimean crisis explode?”, p. 40

19

Crimea never was an Autonomous SSR of the UkrSSR, its autonomy could not be

restored! With the Soviet Union collapsing a few months later and Ukraine becoming an

independent state, the autonomy status of Crimea within Ukraine became a contentious

issue and a major and potentially explosive power struggle followed between the Ukrainian

central government and the regional political elites.

Ukraine declared independence on August 24th 1991, which was confirmed by a

referendum on December 1st 1991 (along with a presidential election, which made

Kravchuk the first president of Ukraine). The results of the referendum were the closest in

Crimea (54.2% for independence, 42% against with a 90.3% turnout)22, but were still

positive. On April 29nd 1992, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a draft law “On the

Delimitation of Power between Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea” which very vaguely

and restrictively defined the autonomous status and did not address the expectations of

the growing separatist movement.

On May 5th 1992, the Crimean Supreme Soviet (that is, the parliament of the autonomous

republic) adopted the Act on the State Independence of Crimea23 and passed a

constitution on May 6th . From this point on, the Crimean Republic and the central

Ukrainian state were on a collision course and the constitutional status of Crimea stayed

disputed and ambiguous until 1998.

The main points of this self-declared status were:

• A presidential regime

• A regional Supreme Soviet as parliamentary body (with reserved seats for the

minorities: 14 for the Tatars, one each for Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and

Greeks24)

• An independent foreign policy

• The establishment of regional security forces

• A right for secession from Ukraine

This was of course unacceptable for the Ukrainian parliament which rejected it. But under

Bahrov leadership the Crimean Supreme Soviet had a moderate approach and was rather

seeking compromise with the central Ukrainian state. To a large extent, Bahrov had

pushed for the Declaration of State Interdependence in order to strengthen his hands in its


23 Please note that it was not a declaration of independence as such, even if the name of this act would

seem to imply it.


20

dealing with Kiev.

But this strategy backfired, since Yuriy Meshkov succeeded in uniting the rather

amorphous Russian separatist movement into a political movement called the Russian

Bloc. He built a separatist platform based on the resentment of the Russian population at

the economic hardship following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the compromising

stance of Bahrov.

At combined presidential and parliamentary elections in January 1994, the Russian Bloc

won by a landslide: Meshkov was elected president with 72.92% in the run-off against

Bahrov25 and the Russian Bloc gained 67% of the popular vote and a clear majority of 54

seats in the 92 seats parliament26.

There was therefore a clear popular mandate for the nationalist and separatist platform of

the Russian Bloc while there still wasn't any constitutional agreement between the

Ukrainian central state and the regional institutions. Many observers believed at the time

that the stage was set for a violent conflict just as in Yugoslavia.

The Crimean autonomy within the Ukrainian state

The separatist movement collapsed as quickly as it had arisen. A political platform

exclusively based on separatism and ethnic cleavage could not address the pressing

needs of the population, which were rather economical and social. It became quickly clear

that the Russian Bloc neither had a program nor the competences to address these

issues. Within 200 the first hundred days of his presidency the popularity of Meshkov had

collapsed under 30%27. The traditional Crimean elite, consisting of former members of the

soviet nomenklatura and of business people regrouped and succeeded in taking control of

the Crimean Supreme Soviet exploiting dissensions within the Russian Bloc who quickly

fractured into rival fractions. As Viacheslav Pikhovshek argues at the time, these elites

were not really interested in a secession from Ukraine and reattachment to Russia28. They

just wanted autonomy from the central state, especially in economical matters and the

separatist feeling was no more than a tool to exert pressure on the Ukrainian central state.

During this period, significant changes occurred in the Ukrainian leadership with the

presidential election of June/July 1994. Leonid Kuchma won the run-off against the





21

incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk. Although over-simplifying, the opposition between both men

at the time can be summarized as Kuchma representing a pro-Russian stance and

Kravchuk a Ukrainian-nationalist one. This perception was the strongest in Crimea: in the

second round of voting, only 8.9% of the participating electorate voted for Kravchuk (6.5%

in Sevastopol) and 89.7% for Kuchma (91.9% in Sevastopol)!29 With the regional politics

becoming more and more chaotic, Kuchma leveraged this legitimacy and the dissensions

in Crimea to skilfully reassert control over the region30. As we have already noted, Crimea

is dependent from Ukraine for its infrastructure especially in the fields of transportation and

water supplies. The Ukrainian central state used this dependency to exert pressure on

Crimea just as Russia often uses the dependency of Ukraine to its gas supply31.

In March 1995, the Ukrainian parliament and presidency acted together to break the

separatist movement. The Ukrainian parliament abolished the office of the Crimean

president and the president reasserted direct central control on the presidency via decree.

Meshkow flew to Moscow and tried to gather support there, but Russia was embroiled at

the time in the first war Chechnya, and was not willing to get involved in such matters32.

A moderate if rather incoherent group of deputies with strong business links took control of

the Crimean Supreme Soviet and started to negotiate in earnest with the central state over

an autonomy status.

It took more than two years to reach a compromise with an “incomplete” regional

constitution being more or less in force between 1996 and 1998, leaving aside the articles

upon which the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments had not yet agreed, taht is those on

the most controversial issues suche as teh control of security of forces or the foreign

relations of the autonomous region33. In January 1998, Kuchma put pressure on the

Crimean Supreme Soviet to reach a compromise by implicitly threatening it of dissolution.

In February 1998 the Ukrainian law “On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” was finally

adopted, with the most contentious provisions (regarding an independent foreign policy

and the control of security forces) completely watered down34.


30 See the detailed analysis of the numerous elections of 1994 in Ukraine and Crimea by Andrew Wilson,

“Presidential and Parliamentary Election in Ukraine” in in “Crimea – Dynamics, Challenges and

Prospects”, p. 128





22

The institutional setting defined through this complex and chaotic process is the one in

force today, it is therefore important to summarize its main characteristics and to which

extent it covers factors for stability or instability in the future.

First, it should be noted that the various parties always stayed within the law and

(sometimes dubious) legal arguments. Neither the separatist movement, nor the Ukrainian

state ever tried or even seriously threatened to resort to violence. This lack of violent and

inflammatory rhetoric is in our opinion, one of the main differences with other similar

situations which then spiralled into armed conflict (such as in Yugoslavia, in the Caucasus

or in Lebanon).

Then, the compromise finally reached is a compromise between elites. The population was

(and still is) mostly concerned with socio-economic matters. When it realized that

separatism was going nowhere, it was ready to give the power back to the traditional

political and economical elite, which then arranged a deal to its own advantage.

These first two factors tend to support the idea that this autonomy status should prove

relatively stable. But there are two other points of risk that we will analyse in more detail in

the next section.

The first negative point is that, as we have seen, at a critical point in March 1995, Russia

was too busy with other matters. Even if Russia behaved in general very responsibly with

regard to Crimean separatism, it is clear that it could easily have stirred trouble if it would

have judged it in its interest.

The second worrying point, is that the Crimean Tatars were barely involved in these

debates and their electoral transcriptions. Although most of the Crimean Tatars had

returned to Crimea by the mid-nineties, citizenship issues with Uzbekistan (from where

most were coming) caused that the vast majority of them had no Ukrainian citizenship and

no right to vote until 1998. The Crimean Tatars are among the most ambivalent nationals

with regard to the autonomy status. While the most idealistic belief that it is the first steps

towards a national homeland, most of them rather see it as another Russian domination

upon which they have little control.

Challenges to watch

In this part, we will review current challenges faced by Crimea in the light of the general

and institutional facts that we analysed in the first two parts.

23

Ukraine's instability

As we have seen, the unity and decisiveness of the Ukrainian central leadership was

instrumental in stabilizing the situation in Crimea between 1994 and 1998. Not only did it

act decisively at various critical points (March 1995 and January 1998) but maybe more

importantly, it did not feel the need to exploit the situation in the region for other internal

and external political purposes.

The period of instability in Ukrainian politics which opened in 2004 until today may

therefore theoretically be a threat to the stability in Crimea by encouraging centrifugal

forces in the region.

So far this fear has not materialized. In the presidential elections of 2004 and the

parliamentary elections of 2006, Crimea followed the usual pattern of “pro-russian”

orientation by being one of the major strongholds of Viktor Yanukovych and his party of the

region. No resurgence of separatism has been observed so far.

Presidential election of 2004 in Crimea (Sevastopol)35:

1st round Run-off (rigged) 2nd run-off

Viktor Yanukovych 69.17% (73.54%) 81.99% (88.97%) 81.26% (88.83%)

Viktor Yushchenko 12.79% (5.97%) 14.59% (7.61%) 15.41% (7.96%)

Parliamentary election of 2006 in Crimea (Sevastopol)36:

Party of the Regions (Yanukovich) 58.01% (64.26%)

Our Ukraine (Yushchenko) 7.62% (2.4%)

Ioulia Tymoshenko's bloc 6.54% (4.53%)

Post-sovietism

What struck us most during our study trip was the almost caricatural “post-soviet”

atmosphere in Crimea. By since we mean:

• poor infrastructure not in the process of being fixed

• visible inequalities with spots of flashy wealth and widespread poverty everywhere

• symbols and behaviours (typically in hotels and restaurant) reminiscent of the soviet

times

Since 2003, we have travelled through many places in the former Soviet Union, from the



24

Baltic States to Uzbekistan through Ukraine, Russia (north- and south-west) and Georgia

and are therefore used to that kind of “rough” environment.

What surprised us though, is that we would have expected Crimea to be more dynamic,

through its proximity to Europe and Turkey, but also because of its position as one of the

main resort for the Russian elites, which in Soviet times prevented provincialism over

there. Crimea has such an obvious economic potential, as a crossroad or simply because

of its potential in tourism that it seems surprising to see it in such a state of dereliction

(which is less surprising in, say, Nukus, the city south of the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan,

although infrastructure is definitely better there than in most parts of Crimea).

It should be noted that these observations were not made in Sevastopol and the city of

Kerch, which looked much better run and dynamical.

Considering, as we have seen, how the compromise on autonomy was primarily an elite

compromise, plus some usual visible signs, we can suspect that well connected elites are

controlling the economy, not necessarily in the most legal ways (we are always reluctant to

use the word “mafia” in the post-soviet context, since it covers very different realities than

the organizations in the south of Italy).

Mr. Chabin, owner of the travel and event agency Euro Crimea, confirmed us these

observations. His assessment is that, like in many places, the bureaucratic burden is such

that you have to work around it in order to do business, but that it is more like a parallel

organizational and tax system, not optimal but definitely more efficient than the legal one.

He considered that developing small to middle-sized businesses was not impossible in

Crimea as soon as you knew how to deal with this environment. But he also insisted, that

starting with a certain size of business, you had to deal with “some people” with whom you

had better not to played fool, and that for himself he preferred to leave some activities

aside rather than having to deal with these big fishes37.

As we have seen economical woes were one of the most important factors behind the rise

of separatism. The tight elite control on the political and economical fields in Crimea may

have been a factor for stability in its dealing with the central government, but if it hold back

the development of the region it could breed frustration and the rise of the same kind of

populist movement as the Russia Bloc led by Meshkov in the first part of the nineties.

37 Interview with David Chabin, owner of the travel and event agency Euro Crimea in Simferopol on

February 10th 2009.

25

Russia / Sevastopol

When considering the issues around Crimea, the possible Russian irredentism seems the

most obvious factor of risk and instability. As we have seen, Russia never really played this

game even during phases of tension with the central Ukrainian government. A Russian

claim on the whole of Crimea seems rather unlikely, not least because it is not necessarily

in Russia's interest to put into question the principles of border recognitions which based

its relationships with Belarus and Ukraine after the fall of Soviet Union (not least because

Ukraine may be in position to claim part of the Kuban region of Russia38).

The status of Sevastopol is a much more difficult question. As we have seen, the city is of

foremost importance for Russia, from a strategical but also mythical point of view. During

the nineties, this was actually the matter where Russian authorities did intervene. On July

9th 1993, the Russian Duma (parliament) passed a resolution after which Sevastopol would

38 Doris Wydra, “Autonomie auf der Halbinsel Krim” (“Autonomy on the Crimean Peninsula”), p. 49

26

Illustration 12: Poor Russian village on the Kerch peninsula

be “part of the Russian Federation” and “the headquarters of the Black Sea fleet” 39 while

the Sevastopol city council recognized Russia's legal jurisdiction over the city on August

23rd 1994. It took the whole 1990's for Russia and Ukraine to negotiate an agreement and

a treaty was ratified only in February 1999 only after the Russian President Boris Yeltsin

exerted major pressure on the upper house of the parliament40.

Under this status, Sevastopol is leased to Russia until 2017. Under President Yushchenko,

Ukraine decided not to renew the lease. Russia may wait that the deadline comes closer

expecting to renegotiate it with a new leadership, which would be more pro-Russian41.

Losing Sevastopol would definitely be a major strategic setback for Russia, especially in a

context where Ukraine and Georgia are getting closer to NATO. In May 2006, street

protests in Crimea prevented US Marines to take part in a joint Ukraine-NATO exercise42.

This might be a taste of what is to come as the deadline for leaving Sevastopol draws

closer. Under the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits of

193643, only the states bordering the Black Sea can have heavy military vessels crossing

the straits (although with restrictions, Turkey having basically full control on them). During

the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, Russia objected to US Military ships crossing the

straits in order to bring “humanitarian” help to Georgia.

There is definitely a big risk that Russia considers the weakening of its position in the

Black Sea as a red line that should not be crossed, especially due to the sensitivity of the

issue among Russian nationalists.



41 New York Times citing Associated Press, October 24th 2008, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?

res=9A03E0DF103CF937A15753C1A96E9C8B63&sec=&spon=, last accessed April 2009


43 US Navy, http://www.ntip.navy.mil/montreux_convention.shtml, last accessed April 2009

27

http://www.ntip.navy.mil/montreux_convention.shtml

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E0DF103CF937A15753C1A96E9C8B63&sec=&spon

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E0DF103CF937A15753C1A96E9C8B63&sec=&spon

The Crimean Tatar question

Gwendolyne Sasse considers the Crimean Tatar issue as the single most serious

challenge to the political stability in Crimea44. Tensions between the Russian and Tatar

population can be observed at two levels.

First, a socio-economical level. As we have seen, the economical situation is very difficult

in Crimea and actually even worse for the Tatars. But Russians fear that the Tatars will

compete with them for the scarce jobs and resources available.

This tension is most obviously visible in the issue of the Tatar settlements. On the one

hand, the regional and central government didn´t do much to address the issue of settling

the hundreds of thousands of Tatars who came back at the beginning of the nineties. In the

general uncertainty over land rights following the fall of Communism, Tatar simply grabbed

available land, often just constructing skeletons of houses in order to claim the land. When

we visited a big Tatar settlement on the edge of Bakhshisaray in February 2009, we could

see that there were no paved roads, and a Tatar family we met told us that they had


28

Illustration 13: Russian warships in Sevastopol

electricity for just four years and gas for just around three years although they were a few

hundred families settled there since the mid-nineties. We could make similar observations

in another Tatar settlement in Stariy Krim.

The second level is around identity and perception of the other. Although nobody seriously

denied the Tatars the right to come back to Crimea, Russians say they fear a rampant

“islamisation” and Turkish and Saudi influence. Foreign financing can clearly be felt in the

shiny new mosques popping up everywhere (observers used to the Islamic world can even

recognize by their architecture whether they are Turkish or Saudi funded). On the other

hand, Crimean Tatars are very secular and it is hard to see anything else than ignorance

behind an Islamic risk among them.

Violent clashes sometimes happen between Tatars and Russian over provocative symbols

on both sides45, but the general impression is rather of two societies ignoring each other

and trying to lead separate paths, one looking toward Russia and the other toward Turkey

and the Islamic world, without trying to be a bridge between them.


29

Illustration 14: Poor infrastructure in a Tatar settlement near Bakhchysarai

Conclusion

In this paper we have described the complexity of Crimea, analysed how a potentially

explosive situation was stabilized through an institutional compromise and which

challenges this stability is now facing.

As Roman Solchanyk already summed up in 1995: “There is little basis for viewing the

separatist drive in Crimea as a ramification of Russian-Ukrainian interethnic conflict.

Crimea is, above all, a political problem.46” If we would try to sum up the nature of this

political problem, we would say that this is a question of regionalism, not nationalism.

Many people that we met during our study trip defined themselves first as Russian or

Tatar, but going further, most of them acknowledged that their true belonging was to

Crimea. For a region with such a particular geography, history and ethnic setting the

question is not so much to which state it belongs but how it will manage to leverage the

opportunities related to its position and mitigate their risks. Autonomy should be seen in

46 Roman Solchanyk, “Crimea: Between Ukraine and Russia” in in “Crimea – Dynamics, Challenges and

Prospects”, p. 5

30

Illustration 15: Tatar settlement in Stary Krim

this light, not as a pre-independence or a way for local elites to consolidate their hold on

power and resources.

In other words, proximities of Crimea with Russia through its Russian population, with

Turkey through its Tatar population and with the European Union through its position and

various policies of the Ukrainian state, do not have to be conflicting and problematic.

To the contrary, they are probably the way to go for Crimea.

Acknowledgement

Many thanks to Luc Hermann for joining me during the study trip and feeding my reflection

with his observations and experience of eastern Europe.

Annex 1: Map of the study trip

Annex 2: Photography index

Illustration 1: Hilly landscape near Bakhchysarai in central Crimea......................................7

Illustration 2: Sea and mountains on the southern coast.......................................................8

Illustration 3: Landscape typical of the Kerch peninsula........................................................8

31

Illustration 4: Ships through the strait of Kerch......................................................................9

Illustration 5: Swamps near the Arabat spit...........................................................................9

Illustration 6: Karaim graves near Bakhchysarai.................................................................13

Illustration 7: Crimean Tatar family.......................................................................................13

Illustration 8: Industrial area near Kerch..............................................................................14

Illustration 9: Yalta sea side.................................................................................................14

Illustration 10: Monumental war memorial in Sevastopol....................................................16

Illustration 11: Road sign in Ukrainian (big) and Russian (small)........................................17

Illustration 12: Poor Russian village on the Kerch peninsula...............................................26

Illustration 13: Russian warships in Sevastopol...................................................................28

Illustration 14: Poor infrastructure in a Tatar settlement near Bakhchysarai.......................29

Illustration 15: Tatar settlement in Stary Krim......................................................................30

32

Documents

Crimea, the conflict that did not (yet) happenmbaudier.eu/papers/crimea-paper-baudier-090613-lowres.pdf · 2014-02-21 · Mathieu Baudier MAIS2 – Diplomatic Academy of Vienna April