PEOPLE VS ASUNCIONLOPEZ v CITY JUDGE

18 SCRA 616DIZON, October 29, 1966NATURE

Petition for review on Certiorari and ProhibitionFACTS

-Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez andAurora Mejia Villasor) and other heirs of spousesManue l  Me i j i a

and  G lo r ia  Laza t in  en te red   in to  acontract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for thedevelopment and subdivision of 3 parcels

of landbelonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferredhis rights to Terra Dev’t Co (TDC).-Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC forrescission of said

contract with Lazatin for allegedgross and willful violation of its terms.-Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with

Fiscal’sO f f i c e   o f   C i t y   o f   A n g e l e s   a   c o m p l a i n t   a g a i n s t petitioners for violation of A172 in relation

to A171,par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted.Fiscal filed with Court in Angeles City informationcharging petitioners with

crime of falsification of private document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelinamade   i t   appear tha t they  were   the guard ians  o f  minors

George and Alexander Meijia (sons of thespouses?) when they weren’t the guardians at thedate of the execution of the document, a certainCarolina M. de

Castro was the judicial guardian of thesaid minors).-Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles CityFiscal reinvestigated to give

them opportunity topresent exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation,parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case

mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offensebecause the private document that containedthe alleged false statement of fact was signedby

them outside the territorial limits of saidcity(One in Makati, the other one in QC).-However, the resolution of their motion to

dismisswas delayed and the City Court already set theircriminal case for arraignment. Petitioners securedseveral postponements of the arraignment. But sinceCity Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion todismiss,

petitioners filed a motion to quash instead,o n   t h e   g r o u n d   t h a t   c o u r t   h a d   n o   j u r i s d i c t i o n . Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed anopposition to the motion to quash. Respondent judged e n i e d   m o t i o n   t o   q u a s h ,   s e t   a r r a i g n m e n t .   S o petitioners filed

present action.ISSUE

1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction tot r y   a n d   d e c i d e   t h e   c r i m i n a l   c a s e   f o r   a l l e g e d falsification of a private document allegedly done bythe par t ies named in the in fo even i f the ac ts

o f   falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC,and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court

Other procedural issues2.  WON the  mot ion to  quash was   improper, and should not be allowed since by filing the said motion,the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of theallegation

of the information to the effect that theo f f e n s e   w a s   c o m m i t t e d   w i t h i n   t h e   t e r r i t o r i a l  jurisdiction of Angeles City3 .   W O N   t h e   p r a y e r   f o r   w r i t s   o f   c e r t i o r a r i   a n d prohibition is proper

HELD1. NO.Ratio.

The place where the criminal offensewas committed not only determines the venueof the action but is an essential element

of  jurisdictionReasoning.

Petitioners are charged with havingfalsified a private document, not using a falsifieddocument, so it is essential to determine when

andwhere   the  o f fense  o f   fa l s i f i ca t ion  o f  a  p r i va tedocument is deemed consummated or committed. The crime of falsification of a private document isconsummated  when  such  document   i s  ac tua l l y falsified with the intent

to prejudice a 3rd

person,whether such falsified document is or is not put touse illegally. The improper and illegal use of thedocument is not material or essential element of thecrime of falsification of a private document [US vs. Infante, US vs. Barreto]2.

NORatio.

  The motion to quash now provided for in Rule117 of the Rules of Court is

manifestly broader inscope than   the demur re r,  as i t   i s no t   l im i ted   todefects apparent upon the face of the complaint

orin fo rmat ion  bu t  ex tends   to   i ssues  a r i s ing  ou t  o f  extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that,among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal,extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questionsof fact in

the determination of which a preliminarytrial is required.Reasoning.

The argument of the respondents referto the now obsolete demurrer to an information.3. YES

Ratio. 

 The general rule is that a court of equity willnot issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of alower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue

aw r i t   o f   p r o h i b i t i o n   t o   p r e v e n t   s a i d   c o u r t   f r o m proceeding with the case after such denial, it beingthe rule that upon such denial the defendant

shoulden te r h is p lea o f no t gu i l t y and go to t r ia l and , i f   convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questionscovered by his motion to quash. In this as well as

inother jurisdictions, however, this is no longer thehard and fast rule.-

T h e   w r i t s   o f   c e r t i o r a r i   a n d   p r o h i b i t i o n ,   a s extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimateanalysis, intended to annul

void proceedings; toprevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legalau thor i t y and   to  p rov ide   fo r a   fa i r  and o rder l yadministration of justice.

Reasoning.In several cases, the court already tookcognizance of said writs, overlooking the flaw in thep r o c e d u r e   f o l l o w e d   i n   t h e   i n t e r e s t   o f   a   m o r e en l igh tened  and  

subs tan t ia l   j us t i ce .  The   lack  o f    jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles is patent andit would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners

tou n d e r g o   t r i a l   i n   s a i d   c o u r t   a n d   s u f f e r   a l l   t h e embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.

DispositiveWHEREFORE,   judgment   i s  hereby rendered declaring that the offense

charged in theinformation filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of theC i t y   C o u r t   o f   A n g e l e s   C i t y   i s   n o t   w i t h i n   t h e  jurisdiction

of said court and that, therefore, saidcour t   i s  hereby   res t ra ined  and  p roh ib i ted   f romfurther proceedings

therein. Costs against the privaterespondents.Uy vs Court of Appeals

GR 119000 July 28, 1997Nature:Jurisdiction

FACTS:While Rosa Uy was helping her husband manage their lumber business, she and afriend, Consolacion agreen to form a partnership wherein the latter will contributeadditional capital as industrial partner for the expansion of Rosa’s lumber business.Various sums amounting to P500,000 were claimed to have been given byConsolacion for the business, but no receipt was ever issued. The friendship of thetwo turned sour, thus, Consolacion demanded the return of her investment but thechecks issued by Rosa were all dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Consolacionfiled a complaint for Estafa and for violation of BP 22. The Manila RTC acquitted thepetitioner of Estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP 22. Petitionercontents that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under BP22 and assuming arguendo that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only uponappeal, she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction.ISSUE:Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violation of theBouncing checks law.RULING: Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisidiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein bythe accused. This it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offenseallegedly committed outside that of that limited territory. Jurisdiction of the courtover a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complain or information.Once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if theevidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committedsomewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. In the

case at bar, the crimes of Estafa and violation of BP 22 are two different elementsand necessarily, for the court to acquire jurisdiction, each of the essentialingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. The respondent court is wrong toconclude that inasmuch as the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafacase then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violation of BP 22. No proof has beenoffered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonoured or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessaryfor the Manila court to acquire jurisdiction. BP 22 on the other hand, as a continuingoffense, may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committee.Petitioner also timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court.As provided by jurisprudence, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion toquash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. The general rule isthat the jurisdiction of a court over a subject matter of the action is a matter of lawand may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of  jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal.Howeverm this rules has been qualified in the case of Tijan vs. Sibanghanoywherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court can be held to be barred bylaches. This case however cannot be applied in the case at bar since the accused isnot guilty of laches. RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case.

PEOPLE VS NAVARRO

MANANTAN VS. CA

FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.

ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.

RULING: Decision affirmed.

RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,

the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the

group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and

the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-09, 30 August 1985], also People vs. Sandiganbayan [GRs 71212-13]

En Banc, Cuevas (J): 1 concur, 1 on leave, 8 filed separate concurring opinions, 3 filed separate dissenting opinion, 1 voted to dismiss (thus concur) before leaving for abroad

Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano

one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder — one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self- incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On 3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board.

Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their

consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time

they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.

Issue (2): Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked before the board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Held (2): Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.

On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, the right against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. Said provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine, in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by PD 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness.

SAMSON VS CASTA RITA VS CA

 People vs. DegamoFacts:Complainant Ellen Vertudazo and her children were living in a rented apartment at Barangay Punta,Ormoc City. She was not personally acquainted with the appellant and only came to know him throughher brother in law who stayed with her for a period of time. At one o’clock in the morning on October 1,1994, complainant heard someone calling her name. Thinking that her brother in law had returned, sheunwittingly opened the door. Appellant then forced his way inside the house and poked a knife atcomplainant’s neck.He then laid her on the concrete floor and succeeded in having carnal knowledge ofher. Appellant was holding the knife while having sexual intercourse with complainant. He warned her notto tell anyone about the incident andafter that he left. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant went upstairsand just cried. In the morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to the Barangay Captain

and to the police. On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant withthe crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.On January 17, 1995, before the start ofthe trial proper, the court aquoallowed the complaint to be amended to include the allegation that byreason of the incident of rape, the victim has become insane.The trial court then found complainant guiltybeyond reasonable doubt and imposed a punishment of death penalty upon him.Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the victim by reason or on occasionof the rape committed against complainant should likewise be considered in the imposition of the properpenaltyHeld:Yes.Although the trial court observes that there is no jurisprudence yet which construed theprovision “has become insane,”it is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the duty ofthe court in construing a law to determine legislative intention from its language. The history of eventsthat transpired during the process of enacting a law, from its introduction in the legislature to its finalvalidation has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts turn to construe an ambiguousact.Republic Act No. 2632 is the first law that introduced the qualifying circumstance of insanity byreason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. An examination of thedeliberation of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity,whether permanent or temporary, is not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying circumstancefor as long as the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape

alazar vs People

G.R. No. 15193123 September 2003 Callejo Sr., J.

Doctrine: If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it violates the constitutional right to due process.

Facts:

In 1997, petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Jaucian Timario were charged with estafa before the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court. The estafa case allegedly

stemmed from the payment of a check worth P214,000 to private respondent J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation (JYBMC) through Jerson Yao for the purchase of 300 bags of rice. The check was dishonored by drawee Prudential Bank as it is drawn against a closed account. Salazar replaced said check with a new one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It is again dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD).

The DAUD means that the account to which the check was drawn had sufficient funds. However, the fund cannot be used because it was collected against a deposited check which is yet to be cleared.

Trial ensued. After the prosecution presented its evidence, Salazar filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court, which the trial court granted.

In 2002, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting Salazar, but ordered her to remit to JYBMC P214,000. The trial court ruled that the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, Timario. As a mere endorser of the check, Salazar's breach of warranty was a good one and did not amount to estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Timario remained at large.

As a result, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea to be allowed to present evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Because of the denial of the motion, she filed petition for review on certiorari before the

Supreme Court alleging she was denied due process as the trial court did not give her the opportunity to adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.

ISSUE:Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.

HELD:

Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to present her evidence as regards the civil aspect of the case.

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However,

the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained the demurrer to evidence partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect, but also on the civil aspect of the case of the demurrer is denied by the court.

In addition, the Court said if the demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it violates the constitutional right to due process.

PEOPLE VS LACSON 2002

FACTS: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout with the police, two witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director or Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The nextof- kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel.

On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of theprosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed.

It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate and to file with the RTC. Therespondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedurebans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals denied. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause and an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed and the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000, the cases were dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.

RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the following facts:(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused(2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed(4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period.

The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to the 2-year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence.

PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng casesa. Was express consent given by the respondent?b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?

Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,2) offended party notified,3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been donea. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted