Crim Pro Rule 111

8/11/2019 Crim Pro Rule 111

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G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,vs.MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution1dated December 28, 1999dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2dated August 24, 2000 denying the motionfor reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in SpecialCivil Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other

owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner AvelinoCasupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed withthe Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal caseagainst Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as CriminalCase No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya forquasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Orderof March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separatecivil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion forreconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch66,3assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari forlack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final orderwhich disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. TheCapas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing thecivil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same inthe Resolution of August 24, 2000.

Hence, this petition.

The Issu e


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The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believethat the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himselfto be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against thesecond party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing

themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delictagainst the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case." 4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudencecan validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against theprivate complainant in the criminal case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the groundof forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo arguethat if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file

the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused ina criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. Theymaintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independentlyof the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed theindependent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,who was not a party in the criminal case.

In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the realantecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question theorder of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that thereis no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition forcertiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whetherthere is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delictagainst Laroya.

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delicton the ground of forum-shopping underSupreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order ofdismissal5that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order ofdismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly statesit is with prejudice.6Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed

without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal withoutprejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 417provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party mayfile an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing thepetition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.


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Forum-Shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the samecause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.8Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights ofaction and reliefs sought.9However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law

and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently ofthe criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on theRevised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on

Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, theyhave different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under theRevised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no

pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governedby the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirelyseparate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. Butthe plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the privatecomplainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing inthe law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules"for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, towit:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in thecriminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may belitigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separatecivil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amendedin 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided theoffended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civilaction before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, al lcivil actions arising from thesame act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions


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referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and therecovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.

Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, theoffended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, suchcivil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985

Rules provided as follows:

"Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted, thecivil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, orinstitutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civi l act ion includes recovery of indemni ty un der the Revised Penal Code, and

damages u nder A rticles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civi l Code of the Phil ipp ines arising

from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the

reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before theprosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offendedparty a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission ofthe accused.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as

follows:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action isinstituted, the civi l act ion forthe recovery of civ i l l iabi l i ty aris ing from the offensecharged shal l be deemed inst i tuted wi th the c riminal act ionunless the offended partywaives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil actionprior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before theprosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offendedparty a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

x x x

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, itmay be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the lattercase. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance withsection 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasissupplied)


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Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is onlythe action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under

Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filedseparately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Thefailure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate andindependent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil

actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminalaction. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct andindependent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil actionto recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecutionpresents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files aseparate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delictois filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidatedwith the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actionsarising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. 11

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in thecriminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If theseparate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if stillpending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered inthe criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 ofthe Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.

The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:

"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.After the criminal action has been

commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until finaljudgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is fi led after the said civi l action has already been insti tu ted, the

latter shal l be suspended in wh atever stage i t may be found before judgment on the

meri ts. The susp ension sh al l last unti l f inal judgment is rendered in the criminal

action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the samemay, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the courttrying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civilaction shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice tothe right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended partyin the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated

criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of thecivil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspendedshall be tolled.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)


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Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 ofthe present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of aseparate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.

When civil action may proceed independently

The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties inthe criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case.Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may bebrought by the offendedparty. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action andshall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended partyrecover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."(Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allowsthe "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of theCivil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceedindependently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged inthe criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil actionfor quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the"offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twicefor the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers tothe offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12where the Court heldthat the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delictagainst theprivate complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his

Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence ofclear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessaryconsequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confineitself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Courtfurther ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after thecriminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated."The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect willonly unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.

Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely toaddress the lacunamentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing acounterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provisionstates that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claimor third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandatesthe accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently ofthe criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.

Conclusion


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Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by theoffended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does notsuspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. Thesuspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime,if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminalcase where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delictois deemed instituted, and the other acivil case for quasi-delict- without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases canproceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of thecriminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offendedparty cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases,the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damagestwice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delictfor the same act or omission he isaccused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the presentRule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be li t igated in a separate civi lact ion." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up anycounterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused istherefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accuseddoes not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since theperiod continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delictis filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminalaction. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing torecognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to thecourts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delictfiled separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping iserroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal casemay vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility hasalways been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independentcivil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of theCode, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of thecriminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azuc ena vs. Potenciano,13theCourt declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civilaction contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether itbe conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civilaction and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of thecriminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil actionseparate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission.


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The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trialcourts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear ofconflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there aresufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while

the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of therules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering thewell-settled rule that -

"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actionspending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive inthat sense and to that extent."14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions datedDecember 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED andCivil Case No. 2089 isREINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez*, JJ., concur.


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G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES,respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the followingissues:

WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVILACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULYDISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN ACRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSEDPURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKERESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSEDBEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURTWHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BEPERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVERIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.1

The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:

On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), acomplaint for damages2for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by therespondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.3In answer thereto, respondent

contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for SeriousPhysical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,4had already beenprovisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due topetitioners lack of interest;5and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civilliabilities of respondent.6

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that thecivil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled todamages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes topay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medicalexpenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as

Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees andcosts.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal,8the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, 9reversed and setaside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.


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According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute aseparate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissalof the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact thatthe dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication onthe merits. 10

Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case ofAbellana v. Marave11should be observed, i.e., a civilaction for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even withoutreservation to file the same has been made;12and that the requirement of reservation, as provided inRule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.13

The petition must be denied.

Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,14is the prevailing and governing law in thiscase, viz.:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted, thecivil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, anddamages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising fromthe same act or omission of the accused.

. . .

Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and underArticles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with thecriminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.

Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damagesunder the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should bedismissed;16and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat substantiverights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure.17

In the Maniagocase, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by HerminioAndaya that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado.The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for damages filed againsthim in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage toproperty and multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal case,did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver. Thecriminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal,the Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damagesdespite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it thedismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement is substantive in characterand beyond the rule-making power of the Court.18


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The Court expounded:

. . . 1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civilactions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been institutedwith the criminal case. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately forthe recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict

under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed institutedwith the criminal action.

. . .

Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civilaction may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantiverights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirementis merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art.100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right tobring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action mustbe reserved before it may be brought separately.19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the ruleexplicitly requires reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua nonbefore any of these independent civilactions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from orsimultaneous with the criminal action.

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrowthe words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":

. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent

delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, theattainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.20

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil actionfor damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damagessubsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal ofCriminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedlyinstituted therein was likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, andthe decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,concur.


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G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC.,Petitioner,vs.CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J .:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1in SCANo. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmedthe Orders dated October 16, 20072and March 12, 20083in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued bythe Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-Presidentfor Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,20044for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S.Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No.04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 againstprivate respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61,entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaintagainst petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065for the rescission of an allegedconstruction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the

RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, thechecks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of theconstruction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July24, 20076in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved factsand issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, theguilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, privaterespondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undatedComment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on PrejudicialQuestion7on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of thecontract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issueof whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Courtstates that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil actioninvolves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action";thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to SuspendProceedings, and reasoned that:
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Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued asthe same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from thecorrectness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any timebefore the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9

the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration datedNovember 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTCissued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of theexistence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intendedmerely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidenceof any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in theirinitial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after thecriminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in

character.

10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTERRULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Courts Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions datedJune 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question.The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question

are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in thecriminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal actionmay proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12that the elements of a prejudicial question, as statedin the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It hastwo essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
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raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not thecriminal action may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and theabove provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) thepreviously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised inthe subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not thecriminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial questionand, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previousto the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situationwherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in orderto delay the proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may beinstituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shallpromulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or mayproceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filedeither before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action.Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules ofCourt and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicialquestion even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendmentof a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that itoriginally had."14In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify thenature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. Thisinterpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminalaction. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship ofthe civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15that:

Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we holdthat Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction indenying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in CivilCase No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminalaction based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office ofthe prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
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been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at anytime before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) thepreviously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised inthe subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the

criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede thecriminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminalaction with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to theinstitution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayanahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160.Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only tobe consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to forma complete, coherent and intelligible system."16This principle is consistent with the maxim,

interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be soconstrued and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171av vphi l

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only whenharmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court aresusceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previouslyinstituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternativeinterpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in

Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend thecriminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or courtconducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules ofCourt but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when themotion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may befiled. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminalaction based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office ofthe prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action hasbeen filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at anytime before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Codethat should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of thecivil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presenceof a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specificperformance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of
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the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. Inresolving the case, we said:

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil casewas a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three yearsafter the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as

an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from thetime that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worthnoting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time thatprivate respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. Moreimportantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack ofconsideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here showthat the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent andinterposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111

of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is NotDeterminative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, noprejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminalcase.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Courtare: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issueraised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether ornot the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the partiesis declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of suchcontract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are nosufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full uponits presentment; and
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(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds orcredit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, orderedthe bank to stop payment.20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of thecheck/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of

the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21

that the agreement surrounding theissuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v.People,22we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. Thepurpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or anyagreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance,will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks ascurrency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of theframers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals

23

is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack ofvaluable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficientfunds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence ofevidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration.Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing tothe party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, toact, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, ornot to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject checkincluded, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from saidaccount. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither apre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject checkwas given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longerconnected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlierdiscussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista orUnlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This isbecause the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into

circulation.24

(Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between theparties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent inthe criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which weresubsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP22.lawphil.net
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Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, thatthe resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action mayproceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it areinapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26,

2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders datedOctober 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 inLas Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice


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G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,vs.MODESTO CALAUNAN,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmedin toto the decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-

478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeepwith plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by MarceloMendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together withMarcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. ThePhilippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximatelyKilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the twovehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeepcausing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting tofurther extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point ofcollision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment tothe Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of thePhilippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, chargingpetitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with PhysicalInjuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondentfiled a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of DagupanCity, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.

Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza andFernando Ramos.

In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:

1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venueand the identities of the vehicles involved;

2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;

3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
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4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of themedical certificate;

5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;

6. That the

weatherwas fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the rightside where the jeep fell into.3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographicnotes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramosin the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are notavailable to testify in the civil case.

Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime inNovember, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his

brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that herhusband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought herhusband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. Shewent to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there. 1awphil.net

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court whereCriminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondentCalaunan,5Marcelo Mendoza6and Fernando Ramos7in said case, together with other documentaryevidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara,Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-namedwitnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.8Counsel for respondent wanted to markother TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but sincethe same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs anddocuments could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.

For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN 9of thetestimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was markedand allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.

Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs10of thetestimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.

The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute insaying it was the former who caused the smash up.

The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers perhour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and inthe process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
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At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words,the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramoscorroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another

jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. Hesaid, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by thePhilippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was

riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on agrassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the PhilippineRabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine RabbitBus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by thePhilippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumpedthe jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to goto the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtakeanother jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal caseand before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how thecollision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers wasnegligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a familyin the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and againstpetitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering thesaid defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages forthe towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep inquestion; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damagesand P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the

defendants are also to pay costs.12

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in thedecision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court ofAppeals. They assign as errors the following:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIALCOURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHERDOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

II
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIALCOURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENTSUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIALCOURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OFDUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIALCOURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court,we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda.De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko

Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15

In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16of the Courtof Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17of Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.

On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondentCalaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19and Fernando Ramos20should not be admitted in evidence for failureof respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

For Section 47, Rule 13021to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is deador unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial

or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the formercase involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the presentcase; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the formercase.22

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules fora testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsayrule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity tocross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively againstpetitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability ofemployers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal casesinstituted against their employees.23

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimoniesof the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on theiradmissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible documentis offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object ismerely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it
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does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratiaargumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure toobject thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts thereinasserted.24Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when noobjection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance itdeserves.25

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies ofrespondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the samewere offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan andMendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidencethe TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI arguesthat the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted inthe instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in thecriminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot arguethat the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should notbe admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accusedbe admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies ofCalaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of thetestimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when theTSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal caseare to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process inrelation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility ofthe TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did notcomply with Section 47.

In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28admitted inevidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertionthat he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial

of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting tothe admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right toobject based on said ground.

Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in theinstant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We findsuch contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, itdoes not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Saiddocuments can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.

Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.29

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how

the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention onthe fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of RecklessImprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, orbased on, quasi-delict.30Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence incausing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
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good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. Theallegations read:

"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expresswayheading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving

the same;

"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-describedmotor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No.353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and hadapparently lost control of his vehicle;

"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle wasforced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers sideon a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybevalued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck

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