Creativity, Causality, And the Separation of Personality and Cognition. Runco, (1993)

8/19/2019 Creativity, Causality, And the Separation of Personality and Cognition. Runco, (1993).

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COMMENTARIES

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Rothenberg, A. (1983a). Creativity, articulation, and psychotherapy.

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he aulemy of

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Personality andSocial Psychology, 39, 953-961.

Creativity Causality and the Separation o Personality and Cognition

Mark A. Runco

California State University, Fullerton

Eysenck' s argument hinges

on

the distinction be

tween (a) creativity, or originality, as a dispositional

traitor cognitive style, measurable by means

of

psycho

metric tests, normally distributed in the population, and

general in its application and

(b)

creativity defined by

exceptional achievement. Clearly, this distinction is

very important for those studying creativity, and, al

though potential and actual performance have been

conceptually extricated before (e.g., MacKinnon,

1965; Maslow, 1971), Eysenck has done a remarkable

job of

it. I am especially taken by his integration

of

such

varied lines

of

research and

am

particularly grateful that

be has brought biological and genetic research into his

theory. Clearly, the field

of

creativity research is in need

of such integrative efforts.

Difficulties naturally arise when integrations are at

tempted, and several are apparent in Eysenck's work.

In this commentary, I focus on Eysenck's assump

tions-at least those I noted and

question-and

some

research findings he overlooked. I

do

not itemize the

stronger points ofEysenck's argument. He presents his

argument quite well, and there is

of

course no need for

me to reiterate. The most troubling assumptions con

cern causality, the separation ofpersonality and cogni

tion, and the role

of

problem solving in creativity. I also

mention his less significant assumptions about diver

gent thinking, verbal processes, and the distribution

of

creative potential.

Causality

One

of

the most critical

of

Eysenck's assumptions

concerns the direction

of

effect. Consider Eysenck's

suggestion that what may be happening is that high P

[psychoticism] is necessary for high creativity. Later

be writes that it appears to be psychoticism

in

the

absence

of

psychosis that is the vital element in trans

lating the trait of creativity (originality) from potential

into actual achievement, and later still he explicitly

refers to creativity as an outcome. The notion about

affinities with schizophrenia and psychotic disorders

may help explain the oft-cited association between

creativity and psychopathology (e.g., Becker, 1978;

Richards, 1981), but the emphasis on one direction of

effect is disturbing because there are other possibilities

(Richards, 1990). Put very simply, creativity might lead

or contribute to what appears to be a disorder (most

likely a bipolar affective disorder), or the disorder

might somehow allow creative insights. A third possi

bility is that creativity and disorder are associated only

because they both share some underlying tendency.

(This third variable may very well be what Eysenck

refers to as

overinclusive thinking.

I am not suggesting

that Eysenck is wrong about psychoticism but rather

that his theory might not help

us

understand the other

important possibilities, such as when creativity leads to

anxiety, alcoholism, and depression (Richards, 1990;

Rothenberg, 1990).

Eysenck does recognize that there is an optimal level

ofpsychoticism (or, more accurately, that psychoticism

is by definition moderate), beyond which psychopa

thology and creativity are independent. This is entirely

consistent with work by Bowden (in press) and Rich

ards (1990) in that it is Bipolar II and III (not the

schizoaffective Bipolar I) that seem to be associated

with creativity. According to Bowden and Richards,

creativity may be associated with mood swings, but the

disorders are of subclinical levels. In fact, there are

some creative individuals who want

to

avoid clinical

22


2/6

COMMENTARIES

treatment precisely because it may interfere with their

productive periods (Bowden, in press; Rothenberg,

1990).

The Creative Personality

n

several places, Eysenck offers what strikes me as

an either/or description

of

personality and cognition.

For example, he writes how "Spearman (1923, 1927)

suggested that creativity might be a personality charac

teristic rather than a cognitive characteristic [and] H. J.

Eysenck (1983) gave some evidence to support this

notion." The problem is the implication that creativity

is either

a

personality characteristic" or a cognitive

characteristic." Surely it is both What is really needed

to understand creativity is the recognition of an inter

play between cognitive

and

extracognitive factors

(Runco, in press-a; Russ, 1993; Shaw & Runco, in

press).

1

As a matter

of

fact, the extracognitive and cognitive

factors might very well be inextricable. Lazarus (1991)

reviewed evidence for this, but I will give the example

wherein an individual cannot be interested in solving a

problem

or

working productively without recognizing

that there is a

problem-that

is, without a cognitive

appraisal

of

the situation as a problem and deserving

of

his or her effort (Runco, in press-a). Simply put, the

cognitive appraisal is necessary for the affective inter

est. Granted, my example relies on what is usually

called intrinsi

motivation

but that is often included in

descriptions

of

the creative personality (Barron Har

rington, 1981), and my point is that any either/or argu

ment is unrealistic.

A similar oversimplification arises when Eysenck

discusses the importance

of

relevance. I think he is

correct in questioning the blind or stochastic aspects of

the creative process, and

he

argues convincingly that

cognitive searches are directed and selective.

2

Individ

uals usually consider only information they believe to

be in some way relevant or meaningful. My concern is

with the manner in which the concepts of "relevance"

and "horizons" are used to distinguish between creative

1

Eysenck himsel f calls for work on the cognition-affect interac

tions.

n

particular, he notes the need for research

on

"creative

tension," and this assumes a cognitive appraisal (Runco, in press-a).

Moreover, both Eysenck and Runco cite Rutter's (1985) theory of

resilience--Eysenck asking for research on "protective factors,"

Runco using it to explain the steeling of creative individuals.

1'hls is entirely consistent with the appraisals already mentioned.

However, Eysenck does seem to follow the idea

of

relevance into one

dubious alley. I am referring here to his discussion of "delusional

beliefs, thought disorders, hallucinations, and the like ... [which] ...

mightbe considered 'creative.'"This seems at odds with his criticism

of blind factors, for it suggests that purpose is necessary, whereas

hallucinations and delusions surely lack creative intent. Granted,

there is some controversy in

this

regard, with Mednick (1962) recog

nizing serendipitous associations and others discounting any "cre

ativity'' that lacks purpose (Gruber, 1988; Wolf Larson, 1981 ).

and uncreative persons. I suppose Eysenck's idea is

simply that there are individual differences, but at this

point, his discussion seems a bit like a rigid trait

view

that is, one downplaying the impact of situations and

intrapersonal variability.

Eysenck's trait view is even clearer when discussing

psychoticism, for there he is explicit that it was not

psychosis (i.e., a psychopathological state) that was

related to creative genius, but psychoticism (i.e., a

dispositional trait

...

)." Eysenck does definepsy hoti -

ism in terms of susceptibility, but he could bring the

possible variations more clearly into his model. There

is an implied connection between "environmental vari

ables" and "creative achievement," but what about

specific differences between situations and domains

(Csikszentrnihalyi, 1990; Gruber, 1988)? Presumably

an individual can have a wide horizon in one domain

(e.g., music) but a narrow one in another (e.g., chess).

The impact or relevance of specific problem types

might also be recognized, especially those found be

tween verbal and nonverbal tasks. Empirical evidence

suggests that associative patterns differ when an indi

vidual reacts to nonverbal rather than verbal stimuli

(Guilford, 1968; Richardson, 1986; Runco, 1986).

Part

of

the problem may be Eysenck's reliance

on

problem solving. A great deal

of

the work he cites-es

pecially in his discussion

of

intelligence and again

when reviewing the research on overinclusive think

ing-is specifically on problem solving. This may be

misleading; creativity should not be too closely tied to

problem solving. There are several reasons for this,

including (a) the difficulties involved in definingprob

lems

such that artistic creativity

or

everyday creativity

can be explained (Dudek & Cote, in press) and (b) the

separation between problem finding and problem solv

ing. The former is more closely tied to creativity than

the latter (Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, Redmond, in

press; Okuda, Runco, Berger, 1991; Wakefield, in

press).

Verbal Processes

and

Divergent

Thinking

One reason I appreciate Eysenck's argument about

relevance is that it highlights the importance

of

selec

tive and evaluative processes. Just as originali ty does

not guarantee creative performance, so too is creativity

not solely a divergent, intuitive, generative process.

Selective, evaluative, and valuative processes are nec

essary. Here I am only disappointed that Eysenck limits

himself to what he calls linguistic evidence. There is

other evidence. The evaluative process

of

ideational

creativity has been studied in several recent investiga

tions (Runco, 1991b; Runco & Chand, in press; Runco

& Smith, 1992), and although these are just initial and


3/6

COMMENTARIES

perhaps even crude attempts at isolating selective and

evaluative tendencies, at least they are not limited to

verbal stimuli or associations (see Runco Vega,

1990). This inclusion

of

nonverbal material is a virtue,

given what was said earlier about associative tenden

cies differing when elicited by verbal or nonverbal

stimuli and when following familiar or unfamiliar stim

uli (Guilford, 1968; Mednick, 1962; Richardson, 1986;

Runco, 1986; Runco & Albert, 1985). Admittedly, my

own work on evaluative processes bas its limitations,

but the focus on ideational data seems reasonable given

the evidence for the predictive validity

of

such mea

sures (Milgram, 1990; Okuda et al., 1991) and because

there is an extremely large literature (reviewed by

Runco, 1991a, 1992) to assist with interpretations.

In rebuttal, Eysenck might criticize the use of diver

gent-thinking tasks, just as I have criticized his reliance

on verbal data.

As

a matter of fact, he specifically

dismisses divergent thinking in his article (or at least

alludes to deep-sea ted misgivings ). Something

should be said about this because, although he is right

that many researchers have given up on the Guilford

(1968) and Torrance (1974) tests, a careful reading

of

the literature suggests that the dismissal of divergent

thinking is premature (Milgram, 1990; Runco, 1991a,

1992). Most who dismiss divergent thinking have done

so because

of

dated research findings. Little if any

attention is given by the critics to research from the late

1980s or early 1990s. Divergent-thinking tests are now

administered, scored, and interpreted differently from

the way they used to be-or, at least they should be,

given recent research. Eysenck himself cites research

from before 1959 when discussing the intelligence

threshold necessary for creativity. Granted, he cites the

classic work

of

Cox and Terman, but more recent

research should also be considered (see Runco

&

Al

bert, 1986; Simonton, 1984). Eysenck 'sclaim about the

distributions of creativity as approximately normal

might similarly be questioned (Runco Albert, 1985),

as might his unqualified generalizations about the im

pact

of

political unrest (Simonton, 1990).

I am very interested in Eysenck's ideas about rele

vance but cannot help but wonder whether he will

encounter some of the same measurement difficulties I

did,

if

he conducts the actual empirical tests of his

predictions. I am referring here to the difficulties found

early in Runco and Charles's (in press) investigation of

the relation between originality and appropriateness

appropriateness

paralleling

Eysenck s relevance.

Runco and Charles designed a simple Q-sort study to

examine the accuracy of judgments of originality, ap

propriateness, and their interaction as predictors of

creativity. I naively suspected that the appropriateness

of ideas would be relatively easy to operationalize-at

least in the context of divergent thinking, where a

problem can be used as context. I soon discovered my

error and now feel that appropriateness and relevance

are even more subjective than originality. I was naive

to expect an easy operationalization of appropriateness

and have lately found several theories explaining its

subjectivity and elusive qualities (e.g., Gould, 1991;

Maslow, 1971). At least with originality, statistical

infrequency can be used (Hocevar, 1979; Runco

Albert, 1985). Appropriateness and relevance may be

much more difficult measurement targets because

of

their connection with values. Incidentally, Runco and

Charles (in press) found a strong relation between

originality and creativity and indications of an inverse

relation between appropriateness and creativity. The

expected Originality x Appropriateness interaction was

minuscule and statistically insignificant. This last find

ing is contrary to many, many theories that bring appro

priateness, fit, usefulness, and relevance into the

definition

of

creativity (e.g., MacKinnon, 1965; Mum

ford

et

al., in press;

O Quin

Besemer, 1989;

Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976).

3

Conclusion

and

Implications

Eysenck claims that he presents a model with test

able predictions. I hope what I have written will help to

modify some of those predictions. Although I question

some

of

Eysenck's assumptions, I certainly have no

desire to dismiss his model. There is much to be gained

from

it.

Indeed, I wish I had more time to discuss the

strong points

of

Eysenck's theory. As I already men

tioned, it is especially important that Eysenck has

looked to biological and genetic contributions.

t is also important that he mentions practical im

plications, such as when he describes the need for

educating ... teachers in the appreciation of the value

of originality and creativity. Here I only suggest that

his claim be changed such that it too uses the concept

of optima, as in optimal appreciation. I say this

because originality is insufficient for creativity. This is

implied by Eysenck's discussion

of

the optimal levels

of psycboticism, for too much can lead to originality

that has no relevance and that is indubitably uncreative.

Teachers might therefore sacrifice some classroom

3

Another potential measurement problem reflects the fact that

something in addition to relevance might be needed. In particular,

where does the aesthetic component of creativity fit in? I hesitate

raising this issue because it in tum leads to the difficult question,

Where do we stop? f he aesthetic component s included in models

ofcreativity, along with originality

and

relevance, the model beco mes

more complicated. tmay become more accurate with each additional

term

or

dimension, but t will probably

lso

be accurate only in certain

domains. Complicate d models often lose in generality what they gain

in accuracy (Wiggins, 1981).

223


4/6

COMMENTARIES

structure for divergent thinking and spontaneity; but,

given the critical roles

of

knowledge, information, and

selections or evaluations, they should only give some

of the time. I like the concept of optimal appreciation

because educators could

jump

on the creativity band

wagon and go to the extreme, allowing complete spon

taneity and individuality. This kind

of

open education

does not benefit creativity (also see Cropley, 1992;

Runco & Okuda, in press). Educational flexibility

might allow divergent thinking and self-expression, but

judgments

of

relevance require some conventional

thinking

and memorization-and

thus a dose

of

struc

tured education.

Looking back, much

of

what I have written here has

to do with how creativity is treated rather than with

what is included. Consider, for instance, my citing the

very recent research

on

the direction

of

effect between

creativity

and

psychopathology and my gripes about

the older citations for divergent thinking and the thresh

old theory. The integration

of

research is not easy-es

pecially integrations in creativity research, where there

is such a high premium placed

on

originality (Runco,

in press-b). Overall, Eysenck does remarkably well. His

article is a model

of

what needs to be done

to

keep

creativity research moving forward- -that is, to main

tain its own creativity.

Notes

I completed this Commentary while holding a Visit

ing position at the Institute for Cognitive Psychology

of

the University

of

Bergen. I thank the institute and,

in

particular, Geir Kaufmann.

MarkA. Runco, Department

of

Psychology, EC 105,

California State University, Fullerton,

CA

92634.

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Blind Variations Chance Configurations and Creative Genius

Dean Keith Simonton

University

of

California, Davis

Eysenck's target article is an exciting read. As he

points out, for some time creativity studies had shown

signs of entering the stage of a degenerative research

program. Psychoanalytic accounts

of

the creative per

son and Gestalt accounts

of

the creative process now

seem passe. Psychometric approaches to the same phe

nomena, although once the rage, have sunk into de

spondency.

And

the current activity

of

cognitive

psychologists in this area, although often provocative,

fall short

of

a comprehensive theory. Their computer

simulations, for example, concentrate on certain specif

ics

of

the creative process while utterly ignoring per

sonality and social context. What we lack are widely

accepted theoretical approaches that explain all import

ant aspects

of

creativity. Eysenck's proposed theory

tries to fill this sad gap.

As we

should expect

of

any sweeping theory,

Eysenck's model is rich in ideas. He has tried to inte

grate a vast range

of

research findings-work that

spans many decades. Therefore, I cannot possibly pro

vide a critique of

his entire scheme. Instead, I focus

on

a single

issue-the

place

of

chance in creativity. Al

though Eysenck seems to downplay the role

of

chance

in the creative process, I interpret his arguments and

data quite differently.

Let me begin by clearing up a potential source

of

confusion. Campbell (1960) termed his original model

of

creativity the

blind-variation and selective-retention

theory.

My own elaboration

of

this theory I styled the

chance-configuration theory. The rationale for the

name change was a difference in emphasis and com

plexity between the two theories. For one thing, by

introducing the concept

of

configuration, I hoped to

sprinkle a little Gestalt

on

the initial Darwinian frame-

work. The basic idea was that the mind can generate

innumerable combinations

of

concepts, but only a few

of these will coalesce into a structural

whole-a

con

figuration. To offer an everyday illustration, think what

happens when you write a sentence that you hope will

communicate a profound idea. You have at your dis

posal a host

of

words and their synonyms for each

subject, predicate, object, and other sentence compo

nent. You also have access to a variety

of

syntactical

constructions that can adjust the expression to the finest

shades

of

meaning. So, you search for that distinctive

pattern of lexical elements and syntactical structures

that convey precisely what you mean. That just-right

sentence seems to encapsulate better than its more

awkward rivals the meaning that before existed only in

imagery or intuition.

Another reason for the name change was my dissat

isfaction with Campbell's choice

of

the adjective blind.

By claiming that the ideational variations were blind,

he meant that the combinatory process lacked reason or

foresight. The more novel a problem is, the more inad

equate are the received collection

of

algorithms and

heuristics. Having nothing definite to guide the quest

for a solution, the creator must grope in the darkness.

The process is one of

cognitive trial-and-error. It seems

perfectly reasonable to style this process blind.

Unfortunately, this word choice leads to some con

fusion. For those familiar with the problem-solving

literature,

blind

often implies the same thing as

blind

search which almost everybody recognizes as the

heuristic

of

last resort.

As

Eysenck notes, a genuine

blind search very quickly encounters a combinatorial

explosion that makes it most unlikely that the venture

will converge

on

a solution. Moreover, it is evident that

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Documents

Creativity, Causality, And the Separation of Personality and Cognition. Runco, (1993)