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1 FINAL CAUSALITY Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014. Final Cause The final cause 1 is defined as that for the sake of which something is done, that is, that which determines the agent to act or the goal towards which it tends through its operations. The term final comes from the Latin noun finis, 2 meaning end, and the Latin adjective finalis, meaning having reference or relation to an end. End here means the end in view, goal, purpose or aim. A final cause, which is an extrinsic cause, is an end to be achieved which moves the 1 Studies on final causality: P. JANET, Les causes finales, Paris, 1882 ; P. JANET, Final Causes, Scribner’s, New York, 1892 ; E. A. PACE, The Teleology of St. Thomas, “The New Scholasticism,” (1927), pp. 213-231 ; R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, Le Réalisme du Principe de Finalité, Descleé, Paris, 1932 ; C. HOLLENCAMP, Causa Causarum, “Laval Théologique et Philosophique,” 4 (1948), pp. 77-109; 311-328 ; R. COLLINS, Finality and Being, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 23 (1949), pp. 36-46 ; A. MAIER, Das Problem der Finalkausalität um 1320, in Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Rome, 1955, pp. 273-299 ; J. WARREN, Nature and Purpose, “The New Scholasticism,” 31 (1957), pp. 364-397 ; G. P. KLUBERTANZ, St. Thomas’ Treatment of the Axiom “Omne Agens Agit Propter Finem,” in An Etienne Gilson Tribute, edited by C. J. O’Neil, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959, pp. 101-117 ; J. M. RIST, Some Aspects of Aristotelian Teleology, “Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association,” 96 (1965), pp. 337-349 ; J. OWENS, Teleology of Nature in Aristotle, “The Monist,” 52 (1968), pp. 159-173 ; A. GOTTHELF, Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality, “Review of Metaphysics,” 30 (1976), pp. 226-254 ; A. WOODFIELD, Teleology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976 ; R. ALVIRA, La noción de finalidad, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1978 ; G. VICENTE BURGOA, Omne agens agit propter finem. El principio de finalidad en Santo Tomàs de Aquino, in Atti del VIII Congresso tomistico internazionale (V), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1982, pp. 329-341 ; G. LEIBOLD, Zum Problem der Finalität bei Wilhelm von Ockham, “Philosophisches Jahrbuch,” 89 (1982), pp. 347-383 ; S. F. BROWN, Ockham and Final Causality, in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, edited by J. F. Wippel, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 249-272 ; D. GALLOP, Aristotle on Sleep, Dreams, and Final Causes, “Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,” 4 (1988), pp. 257-290 ; A. GOTTHELF, The Place of the Good in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology, “Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,” 4 (1988), pp. 113-139 ; F. A. LEWIS, Teleology and Material/Efficient Causes in Aristotle, “Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,” 69 (1988), pp. 54-98 ; A. GOTTHELF, Teleology and Spontaneous Generation in Aristotle: A Discussion, “Apeiron,” 22 (1989), pp. 181-193 ; H. S. LANG, Aristotelian Physics: Teleological Procedure in Aristotle, Thomas, and Buridan, “Review of Metaphysics,” 42 (1989), pp. 569-591 ; D. SEDLEY, Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?, “Phronesis,” 36 (1991), pp. 179-196 ; M. OSLER, The Reinterpretation of Final Causes in Seventeenth-Century Natural Philosophy, “The Monist,” 79 (1996), pp. 388-407 ; R. F. HASSING (ed.), Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1997 ; D. GARRETT, Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism, in New Essays on the Rationalists, edited by R. J. Gennaro and C. Huenemann, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999 ; M. ADAMS, Final Causality and Explanation in Scotus’s De Primo Principio, in Nature in Medieval Thought, edited by C. Koyama, Brill, Leiden, 2000 ; R. M. AUGROS, Nature Acts for an End, “The Thomist,” 66 (2002), pp. 535-575 ; C. F. J. MARTIN, Aristotle and Aquinas on the Teleology of Parts and Wholes, “Tópicos,” 27 (2004), pp. 61-72 ; J. CARRIERO, Spinoza on Final Causality, in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, vol. 2, edited by D. Garber and S. Nadler, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 105-147 ; M. R. JOHNSON, Aristotle on Teleology, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005 ; L. CARLIN, Leibniz on Final Causes, “Journal of the History of Philosophy,” 44.2 (2006), pp. 217-233 ; E. GILSON, From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species and Evolution, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2009. 2 Finis in Greek is telos and so we say that the science of final causes is called teleology, and any explanation or argument which looks at something with reference to its end, purpose or goal is called teleological. The Fifth Way (Quinta via) a posteriori demonstration of the existence of God has been called the teleological argument.

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FINAL CAUSALITY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Final Cause

The final cause1 is defined as that for the sake of which something is done, that is, that

which determines the agent to act or the goal towards which it tends through its operations. The

term final comes from the Latin noun finis,2 meaning end, and the Latin adjective finalis,

meaning having reference or relation to an end. End here means the end in view, goal, purpose

or aim. A final cause, which is an extrinsic cause, is an end to be achieved which moves the

1 Studies on final causality: P. JANET, Les causes finales, Paris, 1882 ; P. JANET, Final Causes, Scribner’s, New

York, 1892 ; E. A. PACE, The Teleology of St. Thomas, “The New Scholasticism,” (1927), pp. 213-231 ; R.

GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, Le Réalisme du Principe de Finalité, Descleé, Paris, 1932 ; C. HOLLENCAMP, Causa

Causarum, “Laval Théologique et Philosophique,” 4 (1948), pp. 77-109; 311-328 ; R. COLLINS, Finality and

Being, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 23 (1949), pp. 36-46 ; A. MAIER, Das

Problem der Finalkausalität um 1320, in Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie,

Rome, 1955, pp. 273-299 ; J. WARREN, Nature and Purpose, “The New Scholasticism,” 31 (1957), pp. 364-397 ;

G. P. KLUBERTANZ, St. Thomas’ Treatment of the Axiom “Omne Agens Agit Propter Finem,” in An Etienne

Gilson Tribute, edited by C. J. O’Neil, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959, pp. 101-117 ; J. M. RIST, Some Aspects of

Aristotelian Teleology, “Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association,” 96 (1965), pp.

337-349 ; J. OWENS, Teleology of Nature in Aristotle, “The Monist,” 52 (1968), pp. 159-173 ; A. GOTTHELF,

Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality, “Review of Metaphysics,” 30 (1976), pp. 226-254 ; A. WOODFIELD,

Teleology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976 ; R. ALVIRA, La noción de finalidad, EUNSA,

Pamplona, 1978 ; G. VICENTE BURGOA, Omne agens agit propter finem. El principio de finalidad en Santo

Tomàs de Aquino, in Atti del VIII Congresso tomistico internazionale (V), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City,

1982, pp. 329-341 ; G. LEIBOLD, Zum Problem der Finalität bei Wilhelm von Ockham, “Philosophisches

Jahrbuch,” 89 (1982), pp. 347-383 ; S. F. BROWN, Ockham and Final Causality, in Studies in Medieval

Philosophy, edited by J. F. Wippel, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 249-272 ; D.

GALLOP, Aristotle on Sleep, Dreams, and Final Causes, “Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient

Philosophy,” 4 (1988), pp. 257-290 ; A. GOTTHELF, The Place of the Good in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology,

“Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,” 4 (1988), pp. 113-139 ; F. A. LEWIS,

Teleology and Material/Efficient Causes in Aristotle, “Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,” 69 (1988), pp. 54-98 ; A.

GOTTHELF, Teleology and Spontaneous Generation in Aristotle: A Discussion, “Apeiron,” 22 (1989), pp. 181-193

; H. S. LANG, Aristotelian Physics: Teleological Procedure in Aristotle, Thomas, and Buridan, “Review of

Metaphysics,” 42 (1989), pp. 569-591 ; D. SEDLEY, Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?, “Phronesis,” 36

(1991), pp. 179-196 ; M. OSLER, The Reinterpretation of Final Causes in Seventeenth-Century Natural Philosophy,

“The Monist,” 79 (1996), pp. 388-407 ; R. F. HASSING (ed.), Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs,

Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1997 ; D. GARRETT, Teleology in Spinoza and Early

Modern Rationalism, in New Essays on the Rationalists, edited by R. J. Gennaro and C. Huenemann, Oxford

University Press, Oxford, 1999 ; M. ADAMS, Final Causality and Explanation in Scotus’s De Primo Principio, in

Nature in Medieval Thought, edited by C. Koyama, Brill, Leiden, 2000 ; R. M. AUGROS, Nature Acts for an End,

“The Thomist,” 66 (2002), pp. 535-575 ; C. F. J. MARTIN, Aristotle and Aquinas on the Teleology of Parts and

Wholes, “Tópicos,” 27 (2004), pp. 61-72 ; J. CARRIERO, Spinoza on Final Causality, in Oxford Studies in Early

Modern Philosophy, vol. 2, edited by D. Garber and S. Nadler, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 105-147

; M. R. JOHNSON, Aristotle on Teleology, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005 ; L. CARLIN, Leibniz on Final

Causes, “Journal of the History of Philosophy,” 44.2 (2006), pp. 217-233 ; E. GILSON, From Aristotle to Darwin

and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species and Evolution, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2009. 2 Finis in Greek is telos and so we say that the science of final causes is called teleology, and any explanation or

argument which looks at something with reference to its end, purpose or goal is called teleological. The Fifth Way

(Quinta via) a posteriori demonstration of the existence of God has been called the teleological argument.

2

efficient cause to act to achieve it. That which makes the production of an effect desirable is the

final cause of that effect.

Cause of the Causes (Causa Causarum)

The final cause is called the “cause of the causes” (causa causarum) for it is the end

which draws the efficient or agent cause into action, sets the goal, indicates suitable instrumental

and exemplar causes to aid the efficient or agent cause in its work, and brings the agent subject

to the task of utilizing the material cause and in the determination of the formal cause of the

effect. St. Thomas writes that “the first cause of all causes is the final cause. The reason is that

matter does not get its form unless it is moved by the agent, for nothing reduces itself from

potency to act. But the agent does not move except for the sake of the end.”3 The final cause is a

true cause for it exercises a positive (though mediate) influence over the being of a thing, moving

the agent to act. The final cause does not exercise its causality in the way the efficient or agent

cause does, for the latter operates through physical influence in the order of execution, while the

former operates through a moral influence in the intentional order. Explaining how the end is the

cause of the other causes, the cause of the causes (causa causarum), Alvira, Clavell, and

Melendo write: “The end is the first of the four causes, or the necessary prerequisite for the other

types of causality. As we have already seen, ‘the end is the cause of the causality of the agent,

since it enables the latter to produce its effect. Similarly, it makes matter a material cause and

form a formal cause, since matter does not receive the form except for the sake of the end (i.e.,

so as to produce a new being or a new accidental perfection), and form affects matter for the

same purpose. This explains why the end is called the cause of the causes (causa causarum), for

it is the cause of the causality of all causes.’4 If, for instance, an architect decides to build a house

(final cause), it is by virtue of this motive that he begins to act (efficient causality) and makes a

design of the new construction (formal cause), and in view of the structure of the building he

chooses certain materials (material cause). Houses are not a protection against bad weather

because they have walls and a roof. Rather, they have walls and a roof in order to give protection

from heat and cold. The same thing is true in natural affairs and phenomena. Human bones, for

instance, do not support the body because they ‘happen’ to be solid; rather, bones are solid

precisely because they are meant to support the body.

“Even though the end is what is reached last in the accomplished effect, it is what causes

first in the order of intention. Thus, it is usually said that the end is what is ‘last in execution and

first in intention.’ Nothing will begin to act unless it is inclined towards the end either by its own

natural form (through its appetite or desire) or by an intellectual apprehension of the end. This

inclination becomes actualized and attains its goal, however, only after the efficient cause has

acted and the material and formal causes (as the case may require) have played their respective

roles. A person will not begin his studies unless he is moved by the natural desire to know and

secure for himself a decent living (first in intention). The result of this activity, namely, scientific

knowledge, is attained only after several years of study (last in execution).”5

3 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

4 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, De principiis naturae, ch. 4. 5 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 228-229.

3

Omne Agens Agit Propter Finem

Omne agens agit propter finem,6 that is, every agent acts for an end, for “were an agent

not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent

to many effects does not produce one rather than another: wherefore, from that which is

indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one

of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore, every agent tends to some definite

effect, which is called its end.”7 Renard comments on this passage from the Summa Contra

Gentiles, writing: “In this penetrating analysis, the nature of the agent as such is considered. The

argument is applicable, therefore, to all agents, intellectual or not. An action is necessarily

ordered to a definite effect, for the effect must be determined to be this effect and not another.

But what is it that determines the agent to this particular action? Certainly not the agent as agent,

for in that case all agents would always be ordered to this particular action, to this particular

effect. Consequently, the agent as agent is indifferent to any particular action. Therefore, it must

be determined by something else. This something else is what we call the end or final cause. In

this case we shall find it to be a tendency, an intention, an appetite.”8

The axiom omne agens agit propter finem is again explained by Aquinas in the Summa

Theologiae: “Every agent of necessity acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to

one another, the first be removed, the others must of necessity be removed also. Now the first of

all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so

far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potency to act. But an agent does

not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some

particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently, in order that it

produce a determinate effect, it must of necessity be determined to some certain one, which has

the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected in the rational nature by the

rational appetite, which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural

inclination, which is called the natural appetite.”9 We see here in this passage that if the agent

were not determined to a definite effect it could not act and produce this effect and not another.

Thus, it would not act at all. It is this determination of the agent to a determinate effect is what is

meant by the end.

An agent tends to its end by its action or movement in two ways says Aquinas: “First, as

a thing moving itself to the end – man, for example. Secondly, as a thing moved by another to

6 The axiom stated explicitly in the works of Aquinas: De Veritate, q. 22, a. 1, sed contra 3; De Potentia Dei, q. 1, a.

5; In II Phys. lect. 5 (Pirotta, 379); In II Phys. lect 8 (Pirotta, 420); De Malo, q. 1, a .1; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 22,

a. 2; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 44, a. 4; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 2; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 6, a. 1; Summa

Theologiae, I-II, q. 9, a. 1; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 28, a. 6; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2; Summa

Theologiae, I-II, q. 109, a. 6; Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 45, a. 1, ad 1; In libros posteriorum Analyticorum

Expositio I, lect. 16, II, lect. 8. The axiom stated explicitly but in a slightly modified form: In I Sent., d. 35, a. 1, a. 1;

In II Sent., d. 37, a. 3, a. 2; In II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 30; Summa Contra Gentiles, III,

162; De Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 15; In II Phys., lect. 11; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 23, a. 7; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q.

17, a. 8; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 90, a. 1. The axiom expressed in the form of a double negative: Summa Contra

Gentiles, III, 17; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 107; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 7,

a. 4. 7 Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 2.

8 H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, p. 145. 9 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

4

the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer, who directs

his action to the end. Therefore, those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an

end; because they have dominion over their actions, through their free will (liberum arbitrium)

which is the faculty of will and reason. But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by

natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they do not know

the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be

ordained to an end by another. Consequently, it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end,

as directing (agens) and leading itself to the end; whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to

tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end (by sense faculties), as

do irrational animals, or do not, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of

knowledge.”10

The inclination which an agent has to attain the end, to act because of the end, is called an

appetite. Now such a tendency to act for an end is obvious in the case of man. But what about

other creatures, animate and inanimate? Do plants have tendencies? What about rocks and

chemical elements? Do all things, insofar as they are agents, have appetite, that is, an orientation

to act in a definite and determined manner? The Angelic Doctor explains that this indeed is the

case: “There is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the

appetite, but in some other: and that is called the natural appetite. This is because natural things

seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not

in them, but in the Author of their nature. And there is another appetite arising from an

apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from free will. Such is in

irrational animals, the sensitive appetite. Again, there is still another appetite following freely

from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual

appetite, which is called the will.”11

“Every agent tends to some effect which is the end,”12

writes Aquinas. The end,

therefore, is the effect as intended and not as produced, that in which the intellect tends. The end

cannot be a physical determination, for the end which determines the action of an agent is not yet

produced but intended. The end, consequently, is in the intentional order, the order of reason. But

how can an irrational being, a plant for example, have a tendency determined by an effect not yet

actuated? A plant is devoid of reason and therefore we are unable to postulate a final cause

formally present and actually desired in the intentional order, the order of reason. But the plant

acts for a determinate end, it has been finalized. The answer is that if a being acts for a definite

end it acts intelligently. “Every work of nature,” writes the Angelic Doctor, “is the work of

intelligence,”13

because nature acts for a definite end and since our rock is devoid of intellect,

this inclination, this tendency to a determined end must have been impressed on it by an

intelligent cause: “Therefore, things which can in no way know, can nevertheless have desire;

that is, in so far as they are directed to a definite thing which exists in the material order. For

appetite does not of necessity argue a spiritual existence as does cognition. Wherefore, there can

be a natural appetite without a natural cognition. Nor yet is the truth of this hindered by the fact

10 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 2. 11

Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 26, a. 1, c. 12 Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 2. 13

De Veritate, q. 5, a. 2, ad 5.

5

that in all cases appetite follows upon cognition; for this cognition does not belong to these

appetitive beings themselves, but to Him who ordains them to their end.”14

“Since a material being is determined in its own material existence, and has but one

tendency to a determined thing, for this reason no knowledge is required whereby it would

distinguish according to the norm of appetibility what is appetible from what is not. But this

knowledge is prerequisite in the One who forms the nature, and who has given each nature its

proper and befitting tendency.”15

We find that the natural appetite, the natural tendency drawing our non-rational natural

being (the plant, for example) to its end can only be explained in the final analysis by God, the

Ipsum Esse Subsistens, Author of nature, the Giver of finality, and the End of all beings. Aquinas

writes in the Summa Theologiae that “the natural necessity inherent in those beings which are

determined to a particular thing is a kind of impression from God…that which creatures receive

from God is their nature.”16

Elements of Final Causality

Three elements are to be distinguished in final causality, namely, goodness, desirability,

and knowledge of the good: “In the first place, we may ask what makes a thing a potential final

cause? The answer is that a thing can be a potential final cause if it can be desired. Now nothing

can be desired except what is able to move an agent to strive for it. But an agent strives only for

that which is suitable for it. Hence goodness is what makes a thing a potential final cause.17

“Secondly, we may ask what makes a potential final cause become an actual final cause?

A thing is an actual final cause when it actually moves an agent to strive for it. Now an agent

strives for a good by desiring it. Hence being desired makes a potential final cause an actual final

cause.18

“Thirdly, is there any necessary condition for the actualization of a potential final cause?

The answer is that the good must be proposed to the appetite of the agent and become existent in

the agent’s intention. For the final cause does not move physically as an efficient cause, but

intentionally; hence the good must become existent in the agent in the order of intention. This

existence, however, presupposes knowledge of the good. Hence knowledge of the good or end is

a necessary condition for the actualization of the potential final cause. However, this knowledge

may exist either in the agent which acts for the end or in another agent which makes an agent act

for the end.”19

14

De Veritate, q. 22, a. 3 ad 5. 15

De Veritate, q. 15, a. 1. 16 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 103, a. 1. 17

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 3. 18 Cf. De Veritate, q. 22, a. 2. 19

H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 260-261.

6

Characteristics of Final Causality

There are a number of characteristic features of the final cause, namely: 1. it causes by

way of attraction; 2. that this cause of causes attracts insofar as it is something good; and 3. that

the end is a true causal principle. “a) First of all, a final cause causes by way of attraction. This

is precisely what differentiates final causality from other types of causality. Matter and form

exercise their causality by their corresponding union as potency and act; an agent does so by

conferring a new form on matter. A final cause or end carries out its causality by attracting an

agent towards itself, setting in motion some sort of appetite or natural propensity, and thereby

actualizing the operative powers of the efficient cause. What is therefore proper to the final

cause is to attract.

“b) Furthermore, a final cause attracts insofar as it is something good. An end is

something which sets an appetitive power at rest, or satisfies a particular inclination. The desire

of knowing, for instance, is set at rest when knowledge is acquired, since this is its end. The

terminus of any tendency is a perfection for the subject, since it is an act to which the subject is

in potency; for this reason, it is something good. An end attracts precisely because it is good and

as such, it can perfect others. This is the root of its desirability, which sets in motion the activity

of an agent, as it seeks its own perfection. In other words, an end, or ‘that towards which an

agent tends is necessarily something suitable to it, since it would only move to obtain it when it

is something appropriate. Since that which is suitable for someone is his good, it follows that

every agent acts for the sake of the good.’20

“c) Lastly, an end is a true causal principle. Anything that positively influences the being

of something else is a cause. Moreover, the effect is undoubtedly truly dependent on the end,

since the agent would not act without the final cause, and consequently there would be no effect

without it.”21

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Finality

As regards intrinsic finality and extrinsic finality, Glenn writes: “Intrinsic finality is in

things themselves and gives them a bent or bias or influence towards their end. Such is the

finality observable in fire as it tends to consume dry wood; such is the tendency in a plant to

grow to maturity. But extrinsic finality is something that affects things from outside. The

tendency of the billiard ball to reach the pocket towards which it is driven is extrinsic; there is

nothing in the ball itself which makes it tend to roll into that pocket. Intrinsic finality is an inner

tendency of things; extrinsic finality is a direction given them by forces outside themselves,

forces which do not meet any natural requirement of the things directed.”22

Coffey explains that “an intrinsic final cause is an end or object which perfects the nature

itself of the agent which tends towards it: nourishment, for instance, is an intrinsic end in relation

to the living organism. An extrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent

immediately tends, but one which, intended by some other agent, is de facto realized by the

20

Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 3. 21 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 220. 22

P. GLENN, Ontology, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1957, p. 321.

7

tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic end. Thus, the general order of the universe is

an extrinsic end in relation to each individual agency in the universe: it is an end intended by the

Creator and de facto realized by each individual agency acting in accordance with its own

particular nature.”23

Kinds of Final Causes

Since an end can take various forms depending on the aspect from which it is viewed,

there is a great variety among final causes; thus we distinguish between: 1. Intrinsic end and

transcendental end (also called respectively, the finis operis and the finis operantis, that is, the

end of the act and the end of the agent); 2. Last or ultimate end and proximate end; 3. The end

which and the end for which (or whom); 4. Primary end and secondary end; 5. Produced end and

possessed end; and 6. Natural end and supernatural end.

1. Finis Operis and Finis Operantis. The finis operis is the end necessarily and de facto

realized by the act itself, by its very nature, independently of any other end the agent may have

expressly intended to attain by means of it. The finis operantis, on the other hand, is the end

expressly intended by the agent, and which may vary for one and the same act. For example, the

finis operis of the giving of a donation to a soup kitchen for homeless people is the actual aiding

of homeless people, but the finis operantis could be charity, self-denial, penance, vanity or

whatever other motive that influences the giver. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo call the finis operis

and the finis operantis the intrinsic end and transcendental end respectively: “The natural result

of an action is the intrinsic end of that action. In this sense, an increase in temperature of

adjacent materials is the end of the heating action of fire. The end of reproduction in animals is

the new substantial form which is educed by means of it; the end of a carpenter’s work is the

table which is produced through that work. The intrinsic end is also called the finis operis, or end

of the deed itself, since it is the product of the action performed.

“The objective towards which an action is directed is its transcendent end. A dog goes to

a particular place, for instance, because it senses that it can spend the night there or receive the

food it needs; in this case, rest or nourishment is the transcendent end of the dog’s motions.

“In the case of free intelligent agents, the transcendent end is often the consequence of

the agent’s free choice. A man, for instance, can seek fame or greater prestige as the goal of his

everyday work. In Ethics, this end is called finis operantis, or end of the agent, in contrast to the

intrinsic end of the action, i.e., finis operis.”24

Bittle calls the finis operis and finis operantis the end of the act and the end of the agent

respectively, and explains that “by the end of the act we understand the purpose which is present

in the act itself and which the act tends to realize because it is this particular kind of act. Thus,

the ‘end of the act’ of healing on the part of the physician is the restoration of the ‘health’ of the

patient; and on the part of the builder it is the ‘house’ being built. By the end of the agent we

mean the purpose which the agent itself (himself) has in performing this particular act. For

instance, the ‘end of the agent’ for the physician in healing his patient may be the fulfilment of

23 P. COFFEY, Ontology, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1926, pp. 409-410. 24

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 221.

8

his duty, or money, or fame, etc.; the ‘end of the agent’ for the builder may be his own comfort,

or the comfort of his own family, etc.”25

2. Last or Ultimate End and Proximate End. An end is said to be ultimate or last when it

is that on account of which a whole series is produced or that beyond which the actions of the

agent of the series do not seek. A proximate end, on the other hand, is an end which is

immediately intended by an agent in a series. With regard to the whole series it is merely a

means or intermediary end towards the attainment of the ultimate or last end. Now, an ultimate

or last end can either be relative or absolute: relative if ultimate relative to a given series but not

ultimate relative to every series; absolute if it is the end of all ends, the end of every series. God

is the absolutely ultimate last end of all beings. “In the absolute sense, the last end of all creation

is God, since He alone is Esse by essence and Infinite Goodness. Since things have the power to

attract (or to be ends) to the extent that they are good, only that which is totally good by itself

can be the last End, on which all other ends depend.”26

3. The End Which and the End For Which (or Whom). “The former is the good itself

which is striven for as the end to be realized through the action. When a man, for instance, goes

about building a house, it is the house itself which is the end he has in view as the result of his

efforts in building. When a physician treats a patient, so as to restore his health, this health of the

patient is the ‘end which’ he intends as the effect of the treatment. The end for which (or whom)

is the thing or person that is to benefit by the acquisition or realization of the ‘end which’ is

acquired or realized. When a man builds a house, he may build it as a home for his own family or

he may build it to sell at a profit; both purposes are the ‘ends for which’ the house is built. The

physician may have as his ‘end for which’ he cures the patient the payment of a fee or the

increase of his medical reputation.”27

4. Primary End and Secondary End. “An end is said to be the primary or principal end,

when it is the main one among two or more which actuate an agent and is sufficient of itself to

make the agent act. Thus, the fulfillment of his social duty may be the principal end a physician

has in view in his medical practice; the primary end for a man building a house may be the

comfort of his family. An end is said to be secondary or accessory, when it is intended together

with a primary end, without, however, exerting the same potent influence on the action of the

agent. For example, the physician may also strive for fame and money besides the fulfillment of

his social duty; and the builder may also intend the personal enjoyment of the lake view which

his house affords.” 28

5. Produced End and Possessed End. “Some actions result in the production of an object

which did not exist beforehand; they ‘produce their end’ (factivae finis). Others, however, do not

produce some new thing, but only relate the agent to a pre-existent reality (adeptivae finis).

When an artist fashions his work in a certain medium, he actualizes an end which he had in

mind; he is the author of that particular end. When a man loves another person, however, he does

not produce the person loved, but only unites himself to that person by an act of the will.

25 C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, p. 360. 26

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 221-222. 27 C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 358-359. 28

C. BITTLE, op. cit., p. 360.

9

“In the former case, the production of the end reveals the perfection of the agent

imparting to another a perfection of its own. For instance, in loving creatures, God creates them

and gives them their goodness. In the latter case, however, the opposite is true. A person who

wishes to possess material goods reveals his own incompleteness, or his need to be perfected by

something external, and thus, reveals his own imperfection. Creatures tend towards God in order

to fulfill the desire for happiness inherent in their nature. They tend towards Him not as an end

produced by them, but as something more perfect which they ought to reach through their own

operations.

“Usually an agent is said to desire the end which he does not possess and which supplies

for his incompleteness, whereas he is said to love the end he seeks solely for the sake of

imparting his perfection out of sheer goodness or generosity. In this sense, God acts by love and

not by desire. Creatures, in contrast, act for the sake of desired goods, even though they also

impart their goodness to others and do not always seek their own perfection alone. When they act

in a disinterested fashion, they become more like God.”29

6. Natural End and Supernatural End. “We speak of a natural end, if it lies within the

tendencies and powers of the nature of an agent to strive for this end and to realize it. The

physician working for the cure of his patient and the builder constructing his house have a

natural end in view. An end is supernatural, if it lies beyond the tendencies and powers of the

nature of an agent to strive for this end and to realize it. For instance, that the physician and

builder strive for divine grace in their labors, in order to obtain eternal happiness, is a

supernatural end of their efforts.”30

Axioms Concerning Final Causes

Bittle lists a number of axioms with regard to final causality, namely; 1. the end or

purpose is the cause of all causes; 2. every agent acts for an end (omne agens agit propter

finem); 3. who intends the end must intend the means; 4. the end is first in intention, last in

execution; 5. the end is, in itself, nobler than the means; and 6. end and means must be

proportionate.

“1. The end or purpose is the cause of all causes. The material cause is determined by the

formal cause; the formal cause is determined by the efficient cause; and the efficient cause is

determined in its action by the end or purpose in view, i.e., by the final cause. Hence, the final

cause determines the other causes and is thus the cause of all causes.

“2. Every agent acts for an end. Man acts because his will strives for some apprehended

good. Animals, plants, and inorganic beings strive for things in virtue of the tendencies inherent

in their nature. Consequently, all beings act, consciously or unconsciously, for an end or purpose.

“3. Who intends the end must intend the means. Whoever effectively intends an end, must

strive to realize it. But if one cannot realize it except through the use of certain means, one must

evidently also intend these means; otherwise one would not effectively intend the end itself. It

29 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 222-223. 30

C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 360-361.

10

follows from this, that whoever uses certain means in order to attain the end, is responsible for

the means which he uses in the attainment of this end. Hence, a good end will not justify

immoral means.

“4. The end is first in intention, last in execution. The end or purpose is the result to be

achieved through the productive action in the future; and when it is achieved, the action ceases.

But in order that the action can tend to produce this result, the action must be determined from

the very beginning by this effect held in view as an end or purpose. Hence, the end is first in

intention and last in execution.

“5. The end is, in itself, nobler than the means. It is the end which determines the means

to be used; the means do not determine the end. The means are used to acquire the end. Hence,

the means are not striven for on account of their own goodness, but rather for the possession of

the goodness present in the end.

“6. End and means must be proportionate. Obviously. It would not do to attempt to stem

a flood with a twig, nor to let loose a deluge in order to drown a fly. Major purposes demand

major means, and minor purposes demand minor means. This refers as well to the importance as

to the magnitude of the end in view; both demand a corresponding use of means, so as to insure

the achievement of the result intended.”31

Critique of Spinoza’s Rejection of Final Causality

The rationalist and monist pantheist Baruch Spinoza rejected final causality in the world,

maintaining that it was a simple anthropomorphism, a projection of man’s experiences onto the

physical world of nature. Nature, Spinoza believes, has no ends and therefore finality in nature is

a sheer human invention. Spinoza repeatedly attacks final causes in an entire Appendix in his

work Ethics Geometrically Demonstrated. Barrow and Tippler describe Spinoza’s arguments,

writing: “Such (teleological) notions, he claims, have only arisen because of our ignorance of

mechanical laws of Nature and our gullibility regarding the prejudices of anthropocentric

philosophy. Far from being in a position to determine the causes and effects of most things we

tend to react in amazement, thinking that however these things have come out, they cannot but be

for our benefit…Those who employ finalistic reasoning simply confuse causes with

effects…Also, if the doctrine of final causes is correct, he argues, then those most perfect things

we are seeking as irrefutable evidences of the ‘perfect principle’ must, by definition, lie in the

observable future…Spinoza claims that our deductions of final causes are probably nothing more

than mere wish-fulfillment; expressing, not the nature of the real world, but the nature we hope it

has.”32

Maritain traces the roots of Spinoza’s denial of final causality in Spinoza’s erroneous

rationalist mathematization of metaphysics: “Where there is no action, there is no final cause.

Because there is no action in mathematics there is no final cause in this sphere any more than

there is any efficient cause. In mathematics there is but a formal cause. This is what Aristotle

31

C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 367-368. 32 J. D. BARROW and F. J. TIPPLER, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986,

p. 139.

11

meant by the very important remark on which the Thomists comment, that mathematics ‘are not

good.’ Good, that is an end, has no place in mathematical explanation. You will understand from

this that a philosopher such as Spinoza, who envisages the nature of metaphysics from the

mathematical standpoint, must inevitably confuse the agent’s relation to its action with that of

the essence to its properties and thus reject final causality. Finality is as impossible in Spinoza’s

world, as in the world of mathematics.

“…We do not say that the essence of the triangle is made for its properties, which would

be meaningless. Nor is this essence really distinct from its properties. This attempt to conceive

the relation of the agent to its action on the model of the relation of the geometrical essence to its

properties, though it is in fact impossible to eliminate completely the relation of agent to action,

may help us to grasp Spinoza’s conception of an immanent cause, in which there is no real

distinction between the cause and that which is caused by it. Why is this? Because there is no

real distinction between the essence of the triangle and its properties. Nevertheless this Spinozist

cause retains the term cause and the idea of a production, an emanation. For this immanent

cause, conceived on the model of the relation of the geometrical essence to its properties retains

something of the datum it is sought to reduce, namely the agent’s relation to its action and effect.

But in the latter case the cause is in fact distinct from the effect as it cannot be in Spinoza’s

immanent cause with which it is therefore incompatible. It is primarily because Spinoza failed to

grasp the real distinction between the agent and its action that at the same time and with equal

vehemence he denied the principle of finality and the possibility of miracles. Both alike are

rejected, because you cannot deprive a triangle of its geometrical properties. If you conceive the

agent’s relation to its action in this geometrical fashion it becomes absurd to hold that an agent

can be miraculously deprived of its operation, that the youths in the fiery furnace could fail to be

burned by the fire.”33

In his God: His Existence and Nature, Garrigou-Lagrange had this to say about the

reasons behind Spinoza’s rejection of final causality: “Spinoza admitted only an immanent cause

for the origin of the world, because of his theory of absolute realism by which he maintained that

universal being exists as such apart from spirit. Thus he confuses being as such with the divine

Being, at the same time admitting both the univocity and unicity of being. Another reason for

this view held by Spinoza was that he unjustly applied to metaphysics that process of reasoning

which belongs to mathematics.

“This latter science, which is concerned only with quantity, rightly abstracts from

sensible qualities, as well as from efficient and final causality. This cannot be the case with that

science which is concerned only with being and which considers individual things in so far as

they have being, and in so far as they come into existence and are kept in existence. This science

must seek for the efficient and final cause of these beings.”34

Proof of the Existence of Final Causality

Final causality is a fact operating in the world. We find final causality working in

intellectually conscious beings, in sentiently conscious beings, as well as in inanimate beings

33 J. MARITAIN, A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being, Sheed and Ward, London, 1948, pp. 128-129. 34

R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, God: His Existence and Nature, vol. 2, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1946, p. 25.

12

(like rocks and chemical compounds). Bittle writes: “We find final causes at work in

intellectually conscious beings. Such a being is man. It takes but a little reflection to see the truth

of the statement that man acts under the direction of ends and purposes. When a farmer plows his

field and plants seeds in the springtime, he does his work with a definite end in view: he wishes

to harvest an abundant crop in the future, and this intention determines the time, place, manner,

and duration of his labor, etc.

“In fact, it is the exception that man acts without a definite end in view. The entire

structure and operation of industry, business, commerce, art, invention, labor, governments, etc.,

is the result of a host of actions, all of which are directed and dominated by definite ends and

purposes. All the activities of peace and war are based upon final causes. It is only the

somnambulist, or the insane, or the idiot, who acts without a conscious rational end in view.

Intellectually conscious beings, therefore, act in consequence of final causes or purposes, and

this happens from morning until night throughout the length of their life. That this is really the

case, is evidenced by the direct testimony of our own consciousness; and the validity of this

testimony cannot be denied or impunged without destroying the foundations of all knowledge,

science, and philosophy.

“That these ends and purposes actually influence our productive actions in a positive

manner, is obvious. The examples mentioned above show this conclusively. Nothing more is

required as a proof for the existence of finality and final causes in some form. It proves that the

concept of ends and purposes as ‘final causes’ is valid and legitimate and not merely a fiction of

the mind. For the sake of completeness, however, we will extend the argument to the remaining

two groups of beings.

“We also find final causes at work among sentiently conscious beings. Brute animals are

such beings. Their actions manifest finality. When a cat watches at the hole in the floor with

unswerving eyes, crouches with tensed muscles, chases the mouse that unwisely comes forth,

pounces upon it with exposed claws, and then devours it, is this not done for the purpose of

catching her prey? When a bird flies about, seeks bits of string, feathers, straw, and twigs, brings

them together to a certain tree, and then shapes them with a co-ordinated sequence of apt

motions into a nest, is this not done for the purpose of fashioning a nest? Animals may not (and

for that matter, do not) understand the ‘rationality’ of their actions, but they certainly perceive

things, desire them, and strive for them. This is finality, or purposive action, pure and simple.

Hence, sentiently conscious beings also act in consequence of final causes determining their

productive actions.

“Finally, there are final causes at work among unconscious beings. Such are the chemical

compounds and physical bodies in the world at large. Here, naturally, the existence of final

causes is not so obvious. It is quite evident, of course, that inorganic beings can have no

knowledge of any good and in consequence of this knowledge strive for it. The question is not,

however, whether they ‘knowingly’ strive for ends, but whether they do, as a matter of fact, tend

to realize definite results in the future as the effects of their activities, so that these activities have

a definite direction given to them in virtue of the effects striven for. This, we contend, is actually

the case.

13

“Inorganic beings are governed by natural and necessary laws, to which they are subject

at all times. Chemical affinity, for instance, is a selective attraction existing between different

kinds of elements and it controls the activity of the elements and their compounds throughout all

chemical changes. This affinity, however we may conceive it in its nature and operation, is the

expression of a natural law. But what is a natural law, if not the expression of the inner

tendencies of the nature of such things? Chemical affinity is not a fortuitous event, occurring

sporadically here and there and now and then, but a constant and regular occurrence which takes

place without exception, provided the conditions are the same. Hence, elements tend to form

specific compounds by means of a selective tendency, and this selective tendency runs through a

set series of changes, until it realizes the compound as the end-result of its activity; this done, its

activity ceases.

“The finality existing in unconscious beings is observed more clearly in the tendencies of

vegetant beings, as manifested in the growth and development of their structural forms.

Attention has already been called to the ‘intrinsic finality’ existing in the human ovum. This

applies with equal force to every organism, whether man or brute or plant, in the vegetative

functions of its growth, beginning with one original cell and developing into a completely mature

individual. Growth is an unconscious operation of living tissue. Notwithstanding the

unconsciousness of the process, there is a very distinct tendency and direction in it toward a

specific result. Somehow, the germ-cell contains within itself the design of the mature individual

of a particular specific type, and it tends to develop this type under all conditions. The individuals

vary in height, size, weight, and characteristics within certain limits; but they develop according

to a well-defined plan, so as to carry out the pattern of the type. The development of the germ-

cell into an individual of a specific type is constant, regular, natural; it is the result of an internal

driving power present in the germ-cell and prolonged through the whole life history of the

organism.

“As the result of this internal principle of development, billions of cells are formed,

combine together into various kinds of structural members, tissues, and organs, placed in mutual

relationship as to position and function. These members, tissues, and organs have their own

individual kind of activity, but they are co-ordinated and interdependent in such a manner that

the well-being of the organism as a whole is the evident purpose and tendency of all combined.

This tendency to produce and maintain the type-individual is an immense fact of nature which

can be adequately explained only through finality and final causes, because the original cell has

the positive tendency to produce a definite effect in the future.”35

Final Causality and the Existence of God

The A Posteriori Demonstration of the Existence of God from Finalized Non-Intelligent

Natural Beings to the Supreme Ordering Intelligence (The Fifth Way or Quinta Via).36

The fifth

35

C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 362-365. 36

Studies on the Fifth Way: P. PARENTE, La quinta via di s. Tommaso, “Doctor Communis,” 7 (1954), pp. 110-

130 ; R. L. FARICY, The Establishment of the Basic Principle of the Fifth Way, “The New Scholasticism,” 31

(1957), pp. 189-208 ; F. DE VIANA, La “quinta via” de Santo Tomás para demostrar la existencia de Dios,

“Estudios filosoficos,” 8 (1959), pp. 37-99 ; L. VICENTE-BURGOA, Los problemas de la “quinta via” para

demostrar la existencia de Dios, “Divus Thomas,” 84 (1981), pp. 3-37.

14

way demonstration starts from the experience of finalized order in the non-intelligent natural

things of the cosmos and concludes with an affirmation of the existence of God as the Supreme

Intelligent Orderer of the universe: “The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We

see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident

from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence

it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks

knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with

knowledge and intelligence, as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent

being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and this being we call God.”37

The point of departure of the quinta via is the experience of the fact that the natural

things in the world which lack intelligence are ordered towards an end. We observe that non-

intelligent beings are finalized, acting for definite and determined ends. A determined manner of

acting reveals a determined order or relation between an agent, its activity, and the effect

produced by this activity. Such a determined order (between agent, its activity, and effect

produced by this activity) is called finality. A particular agent is finalized to a certain activity,

and the activity in turn is finalized to a certain effect that it produces. We observe, for example,

that dogs always give birth to dogs (and not cats, mice or horses), and that mango trees always

produce mangoes (and not tomatoes, apples or oranges). Fire always produces heat and ice

always produces cold. Thus, we conclude from such regular and uniform activity that these

beings are in fact ordered to these ends, to the production of these determined effects.

The only possible explanation for the constancy and regularity which is present in non-

intelligent beings is finality. A determined effect would not be produced unless that effect was

somehow already present in the being before it acted. Now, the effect to be produced cannot be

pre-contained in its cause according to the real existence of that effect, since as an effect yet to

be produced it has no real existence. Thus, the effect to be produced must pre-exist in the being

according to some intentional (not real or ontological) existence, and according to this mode of

existence it orders the agent towards the production of a determined action, and thus moves the

being to act. Such an influx of the form of the end to be produced as influencing the production

of the real or ontological end is called the causality of the end. But non-intelligent beings are not

endowed with intellects capable of knowing the end as end.

The fact that an agent acts for an end presupposes the existence of an intellect that knows

that end. Sub-rational finalism requires a Being gifted with intelligence who produces it. Things

which lack intelligence tend to their finalized end by the direction of an intelligent Being who

orders them to their ends. “We are in a world in which by far the greatest number of events and

of activities exhibit a regularity that cannot be the result of chance. On the other hand, an

immense number of these events and operations originate with beings that are not endowed with

knowledge. Consequently, the cause of the regularity, order, and purposiveness present in the

world is not to be found within these beings themselves. There must therefore be, outside and

above the domain of these beings, some being ‘endowed with knowledge and intelligence’ by

which they are directed toward their ends, ‘as the arrow is directed by the archer.’”38

37 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3. 38

E. GILSON, Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, 1963, p. 85.

15

The proportion of means to end indicates that among the varied possible means those

were chosen that were fitting for the end. This fittingness and proportion were known. Now, this

selection of means to end can be but the proper work of an intelligence, for to apprehend an

object as an end is to know it as something to which other things are ordered, and this means to

view the object under a certain universality of condition or aspect. And this is done by the

abstracting of the object from its concrete material conditions and to view it simply as an entity

to which other things are ordered. But abstraction from the concrete conditions of matter requires

an immaterial operative power, namely, the intellect. It therefore belongs to an immaterial

intellect to contain within itself the forms of things and their proportions and relations, which

would be prior to the actual order of the non-intelligent beings coming into being.

Holloway explains that “we see that to order either oneself to an end or to order

something else to an end can be done only by an agent that possesses an intellect. Natural beings

that have no intellect tend by a natural inclination toward their end. Some of these, like brute

animals, tend naturally (that is to say, by the inclination or orientation of their very nature)

toward an end that they apprehend. But a brute animal does not apprehend the end as end, but

simply as this concrete sensible thing. Other natural beings, that have no cognition whatsoever,

tend naturally toward an end they in no wise apprehend. In all these cases the end is either not

known or not known as such. Therefore, such beings do not order either themselves nor any

other thing to their end. Instead, they are ordered, they are directed to their end. If, therefore, this

determinate ordering of an agent to its end is to be rendered intelligible, if this order is to have

any reason for existing, we must arrive at some agent that has within itself the idea of the term to

be produced. We must arrive at an agent that knows the end as such. This agent will be really

distinct from these natural things that are ordered to their end, as one having an intellect is really

distinct from that which does not have an intellect, or as the one who orders is distinct from the

one who is ordered. Natural things which are destitute of an intellect cannot possibly direct

themselves to their end. These beings cannot establish for themselves their end since they do not

know the end. Thus this end must be established for them by another; namely, by the one who

has given them their natures. Nor could he establish this end for a nature unless he possessed

understanding.”39

We naturally conclude to the existence of a Supreme Orderer, God, the Intelligent Being

who orders all natural things to their ends: “It is ultimately necessary to come at last to an

intellect which has the intention of the ends to which things and their natures tend, and which

brings that intention into being, not only at the origin of the world, but incessantly, without itself

depending, either for existence or for the activation of things and natures towards their ends, on

another intellect which precedes it in being. In other words, it is necessary to come at last to a

transcendent First Cause, the existing of which is its very intellection, and which directs things

toward their ends – without itself being subject to the causality of any end – through the very act

by which it wills its own goodness, which is its very being.”40

If the very order and finality of the non-intelligent beings in the corporeal world is to be

rendered intelligible, one must posit an intellect that is the very first cause and source of this

order. Holloway notes that “it is quite impossible for any finite intellect to be the cause of the

39 M. HOLLOWAY, An Introduction to Natural Theology, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1959, pp. 140-141. 40

J. MARITAIN, Approaches to God, Macmillan, New York, 1954, p. 58.

16

order that exists in natural things. It would be metaphysically impossible for God to be the first

cause of the nature of a being and for some finite intelligence below God to be the first cause that

orders this nature to its end. For what the nature of a being is, is determined by the end to which

it is ordered. The nature and the end of that nature are inseparable in their being. It is because

God wished to create beings that could think that he endowed them with rational natures and the

power of understanding. It must necessarily be the creator of this universe that pre-established

the end of the universe, as well as the particular ends of all the natures that people this universe.

It is impossible for God, say, to cause fire, and then for some finite intellect to direct this nature

to its end, which is to exercise the act of heating and by so doing to produce heat in other bodies.

For it is the nature of fire to exercise the act of heating and thus to generate heat in other bodies.

It is because the creator wanted to produce a being that could exercise this act, that he has caused

such a nature as fire to exist.”41

What about the objection to the fifth way posited by evolutionist materialism, namely,

that, given a sufficient amount of time, the world could have been the effect of chance? The

answer to this objection would be that chance presupposes order, so that, far from vitiating the

quinta via, occasional chance occurrences in nature actually validate the proof from finality.

Maritain gives us an explanation: “Should one insist that according to the mathematical

computation of chances, the world could be the effect of chance, however slight the probability,

just as the Iliad could, however slight the probability, result from the fortuitous juxtaposition of

letters thrown down at random, there is an answer. All arguments of this sort drawn from the

calculation of probabilities are based on a double sophism or a double illusion.

“(1). An effect can be due to chance only if some datum aside from chance is

presupposed at the origin. To cast letters at random presupposes letters and presupposes the hand

which casts them with this intention, or an instrument constructed for that purpose. The

predictions made by the actuaries presuppose the innumerable causal lines on whose mutual

interference the duration of a human organism depends. Statistical laws presuppose the existence

of causal laws which can be unknown but according to which the things and the energies of

nature operate in certain given fields – without which, indeed, the great number of fortuitous

occurences on which the certainty of statistical laws depends simply could not happen.

“(2). By the very fact that one applies the calculation of chances to a given case (for

instance…what is the probability that a given number will come forth from among all the

numbers in a lottery?), one adopts from the outset a perspective in which the possibility of the

event in question has been admitted from the start. (I ask what a given number will issue from

the lottery, only because I know to begin with that any number at all can come forth from among

those in a lottery.) To say – and this makes sense only on the hypothesis in which it would be

legitimate to apply the calculation of chances to the case – that, however slight the probability,

there is still one chance in the incalculable myriads of chances that the world is the effect of

chance, implies that one has admitted from the outset that the world can be the effect of chance.

To attempt to demonstrate that the world can be the effect of chance by beginning with the

presupposition of this very possibility is to become the victim of a patent sophism or a gross

illusion. In order to have the right to apply the calculus of probability to the case of the formation

41

M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

17

of the world, it would be necessary first to have established that the world can be the effect of

chance. And it is the same in regard to the Iliad.42

”43

Holloway is equally right in observing that chance is intelligible only on the supposition

of the existence of an established order at the outset: “For example, if all truths were doubtful,

you would not know they were doubtful, since you would not know they were certain. Just as

doubt presupposes certitude, so chance presupposes order. For chance is a privation of order, just

as doubt is a privation of certitude; and so chance is intelligible only in terms of the order which

it lacks. Therefore, chance can no more give rise to order than blindness can give rise to sight or

doubt can give rise to certitude. A perfection cannot be caused by the very privation of that

perfection. A thousand blind men will never add up to one instance of real order. Recall from

metaphysics how chance arises. Being “A” acts according to its nature, that is, for a determined

end; being “B” also acts according to its nature; again, for a determined end. The two actions

intervene and an effect is produced which is not the end of either of these agents or of either of

their actions. We say the effect took place by chance. This effect or term is not ordered, at least

not from the viewpoints of the immediate agents involved. But this term does presuppose order.

So the occasional presence of chance events in our world, like monsters and floods and

earthquakes, far from disproving finality, actually proves it, for it presupposes it. It presupposes

an order which in this particular instance is lacking.”44

Critique of Kant’s Position on the Teleological Proof of the Existence of God

Regarding the question of the capacity of man’s reason to demonstrate the existence of

God, Kant replies that, since all our experience is limited to what is in our sensibility and if the

categories of the human understanding can operate only on the objects given to our

understanding in and through the forms of sensibility, then all theoretical knowledge of God is

rendered impossible. God, who is supra-sensible, is not given in the mass of sense impressions

that we receive and is incapable of being an object of theoretical knowledge to the human mind.

He “applies to God the conditions required of all objects of experience and hence of all knowable

realities. The judgments constitutive of philosophical knowledge are only possible ‘when we

relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination and the necessary

unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception, to a possible empirical knowledge in

general.’45

Those things alone are knowable which are temporal, subject to some finite, concrete

pattern of imagination, included within the order of appearances, and given through empirical,

sensuous intuition. On all four counts, God (as conceived by Western theists) lies patently

outside the scope of speculative knowledge. He is eternal and not temporal; His being is infinite

and unimaginable; He is not an appearance but the supreme intelligible reality or thing-in-itself;

He lies beyond all sensuous intuition, and man is endowed with no intellectual intuition for

grasping His intelligible reality. Not only His existence but also His nature and causal relation

42

Maritain notes: “Some letter case by chance can form a group which appears to the mind as a word, but this group

is not in reality a sign, a bearer of meaning. As soon as the function of signification is real, the assemblage cannot

result by chance.” 43

J. MARITAIN, op. cit., pp. 59-61. 44 M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 145. 45

I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, A 158 ; B 197, 2nd

ed., trans. N. K. Smith, Macmillan, London, 1933, p. 194.

18

with the world remain intrinsically impenetrable to our speculative gaze. Natural theology has no

possibility of providing us with true knowledge about God and should be abandoned.”46

Kant maintained that there were only three possible ways of demonstrating the existence

of God with speculative reason, namely, the ontological argument or proof, the cosmological

proof, and the physico-theological proof (the teleological proof). In his Critique of Pure Reason,

he writes: “There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the grounds of

speculative reason. All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate experience

and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and rise, according to the law of causality,

from it to the highest cause existing apart from the world – or from a purely indeterminate

experience, that is, some empirical experience – or abstraction is made of all experience, and the

existence of a supreme cause is concluded from à priori conceptions alone. The first is the

physio-theological argument, the second the cosmological, and the third the ontological. More

there are not and more there cannot be.”47

Kant the transcendental idealist agnostic holds that all

three proofs (the ontological argument, the cosmological proof, and the teleological proof) are

invalid, the latter two, in the final analysis, being reduced to the invalid ontological argument,

which entails an illicit jump from the conceptual (or logical) order to the existential (or real)

order.

Kant is correct in maintaining that the ontological argument is an invalid proof, But he is

in serious error in maintaining that the cosmological proof from generation and corruption to the

Absolutely Necessary Being (the third way) and the teleological demonstration from finalized

non-intelligent beings to the Supreme Intelligent Orderer (the fifth way), as they are correctly

understood in Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, are both nothing but reductions to the

invalid ontological argument, lumping them with the rationalist versions of the cosmological and

teleological proofs. Kant is also in error in maintaining that there are only three possible

demonstrations for the existence of God, since the history of philosophy preceding Kant has

shown that other ways of demonstrating God’s existence (different from the ontological [which

is an invalid demonstration], the ‘cosmological’ [which, for Kant, is reduced to the proof from

contingency to the Absolutely Necessary Being] and teleological proofs) have been given, such

as Aquinas’s prima via ex parte motus demonstration, the secunda via demonstration from

secondary efficient causes, and the quarta via demonstration from pure transcendental

perfections. And these ways, like the tertia via and quinta via of St. Thomas, are in fact

successful, unlike the invalid ontological argument which the Angelic Doctor himself has refuted

many times.

Kant on the Teleological Proof (Physico-Theological Proof). With regard to the physico-

theological argument for the existence of God (also called the teleological proof), Kant has

respect for it, and says that, among all the proofs, it has the most persuasiveness: “The physico-

theological proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and

46

J. COLLINS, God in Modern Philosophy, Regnery Gateway, Chicago, 1967, pp. 182-183. Collins notes that “the

coercive force of the Kantian critique of natural theology depends upon acceptance of his view that the requirements

for the knowledge proper to classical physics are the requirements for all knowledge, that the conditions of the

object of physics are therefore the same as the conditions for all knowable experience, that experience is confined to

sensible appearances and their formal conditions, that the general, formal factors in knowledge derive entirely from

the nature of consciousness, and that man has only sensuous intuition”(J. COLLINS, op. cit., p. 183). 47

I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Macmillan, New York, 1900, p. 331.

19

the most accordant with the common reason of mankind.”48

Nevertheless it is invalid, he asserts,

since it, in the final analysis, needs the cosmological argument for it to be completed, and the

cosmological argument is nothing but the invalid ontological argument in disguise. Kant writes

in his Critique of Pure Reason: “After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the

power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we can advance no

further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the contingency of the

world from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we

infer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely

necessary; and, still advancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first

cause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof – the conception of an all-

embracing reality. Thus, the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking, recurs in its

embarrassment to the cosmological argument; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in

disguise, it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to

have no connection with this faculty, and to base its entire procedure upon experience alone.”49

Describing Kant’s physico-theological argument, Copleston writes: “The chief steps in

the physico-theological argument are these. First, we observe in the world manifest signs of

purposeful arrangement; that is, of adaptation of means to ends. Secondly, this adaptation of

means to ends is contingent, in the sense that it does not belong to the nature of things. Thirdly,

there must exist, therefore, at least one cause of this adaptation, and this cause or these causes

must be intelligent and free. Fourthly, the reciprocal relations existing between the different parts

of the world, relations which produce an harmonious system analogous to a work of art, justify

our inferring that there is one, and only one, such cause.

“Kant thus interprets the proof of God’s existence from finality as based on an analogy

from human constructive adaptation of means to ends. And the proof had indeed been presented

in this way in the eighteenth century. But, quite apart from any objections which can be raised on

this score, Kant remarks that ‘the proof could at most establish the existence of an architect of

the world, whose activity would be limited by the capacity of the material on which he works,

and not of a creator of the world…’50

…The idea of design brings us, by itself, to the idea of a

designer, and not immediately to the conclusion that this designer is also creator of finite sensible

things according to their substance. Kant argues, therefore, that to prove the existence of God in

the proper sense the physico-theological proof must summon the aid of the cosmological proof.

And this, on Kant’s view, relapses into the ontological argument. Thus even the physico-

theological proof is dependent, even though indirectly, on the a priori or ontological argument.

In other words, apart from any other considerations God’s existence cannot be proved without

the use of the ontological argument, and this is fallacious. All three proofs, therefore, have some

fallacies in common; and each has also its own fallacies. Natural theology or, as Kant often calls

it, ‘transcendental theology’ is, therefore, worthless when it is regarded…as an attempt to

demonstrate God’s existence by means of transcendental ideas or of theoretical principles which

have no application outside the field of experience.”51

48 I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, N. K. Smith ed., Macmillan, New York, 1933, B 651, p. 520. 49

I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Macmillan, New York, 1900, p. 352. 50 B 655. 51

F. COPLESTON, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

20

Criticizing Kant’s skepticism of the principle of finality found in his teleological proof,

Renard writes: “Kant himself, despite his goodwill, is not able to find certitude in the principle of

finality. Consequently, according to him, we cannot come to a certain knowledge of the

existence of a supreme architect by the demonstration from finality. He argues from analogy to

accuse us of attaining unwarranted conclusions. Just as we see that an architect has a definite

purpose in building a house, and that from a consideration of the house we come to the

knowledge that there must have been an intellect and will determining its end; so from a study of

the world we conclude that the order in the world must be due to a superior intellect. Such an

analogy, however, says the philosopher of Koenigsberg, in no way gives us certitude but

probability merely – ‘inferring from the analogy of certain products of nature with the works of

human art…houses…and inferring from this that a similar causality, namely, understanding and

will, must be at the bottom of nature.’52

“Evidently Kant either did not know or did not understand the argument from finality as

presented by St. Thomas. We do not argue from an analogy, which may or may not give

certitude, but we argue from a metaphysical necessity which we discover from an analysis of

‘being,’ and which ultimately must lead us to the affirmation of a Pure Intellect.”53

Holloway criticizes Kant on the teleological proof as follows: “Kant and the Kantians see

in the fifth way of St. Thomas a simple and naïve anthropomorphism. Man sees that he acts for

an end and has a purpose in what he does. He washes because he wants to clean his face, he

studies because he wants to become a philosopher. And then man transfers this notion of purpose

to non-human beings and asserts that they also, when they act, must be acting for an end or

purpose. But it is highly arbitrary to transfer finality found in man to finality in the universe.

“As is quite clear from our solution, St. Thomas in his fifth way makes no such transfer.

We did not start with any analysis of human activity but with the regular and constant activity of

things that have no intellect. And we did not conclude to the presence of an intellect ordering

natural things by way of an analogy with our own human intellect, but by way of necessity, to

explain the existence of the very order present in such activity. Furthermore, our own human

intellect is itself a natural power that is ordered to its proper end. For man does not order his

intellect to the truth; he finds that of its very nature it is already ordered to the truth. And man

finds that his will is naturally finalized toward good. While man can order himself in many of his

actions for ends that he sets up for himself, he nevertheless finds his powers initially finalized

toward ends that he has not established, but toward which these powers tend of their very nature.

“But if natural things are ordered by their very nature to their proper end, such ordering is

intrinsic and from within, and so they need not be ordered from without by an intellect distinct

from these natural beings. The answer to such an objection should be obvious. A natural being is

ordered to its proper end both by its nature and by an intellect. Immediately and intrinsically, it is

ordered by its nature, but ultimately and extrinsically, it is so ordered by the divine intellect who

has established the end and created the nature.”54

52

I. KANT, op. cit., Transcendental Dialectics, Book II, chapter 3, section 6. 53 H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 155. 54

M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

21

Kant criticizes the cosmological and teleological demonstrations of the existence of God,

as formulated by certain rationalists, and concludes that they are reducible to the invalid

ontological argument and should be rejected. But these are not the tertia via and quinta via a

posteriori demonstrations of St. Thomas, which are by no means reducible to the ontological

argument, a type of argumentation which Aquinas himself refutes many times in his writings.

Rather, Aquinas’s tertia via and quinta via are valid effect to cause quia metaphysical

demonstrations that have their starting points in the sensible, corporeal beings of extra-mental

reality, first given to us in sensible experience, but which are then interpreted metaphysically,

considered in a metaphysical perspective. And by the application of transcendental metaphysical

causality to the starting points (the quinta via having a final causality-exemplar causality-

efficient causality causal structure55

) and by applying the impossibility of infinite regress in a per

se series of subordinated efficient causes, one successfully arrives at valid a posteriori quia

effect to cause metaphysical demonstrations of the existence of God. From real starting points

one concludes to a real Supreme Being. There is no question here of an illegitimate transfer from

the logical order to the existential order of being (which is what the ontological argument does).

Why does the transcendental idealist Kant erroneously dismiss the a posteriori

demonstrations of God’s existence? It is because he is operating within the framework of his

immanentist theory of experience and theory of existence, which excludes a realist point of

departure, as Collins explains: “The Kantian explanation of the three stages in any a posteriori

demonstration of God’s existence rests upon his theory of experience and his conception of

existence. The steps in the process impose themselves upon human intelligence not through any

necessity inherent in the human intellect itself or in God’s own being but only on condition that

the intellect is operating within the framework of the Kantian view of experience and existence.

What has been described, then, is the way an a posteriori inference to God must adapt itself to

the exigencies of this view, not the way in which such an inference must always develop. Thus

the analysis has a sharply limited scope. Kant’s four empirical criteria (temporality, synthesis in

imagination, limitation to appearances, and presence through sensuous intuition) are

determinants of the objects studied in classical physics. It does not follow that they are the

defining marks which characterize everything we can either know experientially or infer from

experience. They constitute the empirical principle operative within Newtonian physics, but they

are not identical with the experiential principle operative within our ordinary acquaintance with

the existing world and our metaphysical analysis of this world. Human experience and its

existentially based causal inferences are not restricted to the factors required for the construction

of the physical object of Newtonian mechanics. Kant’s fourfold empirical principle is a univocal

rule for testing the validity of scientific reasoning. By its nature, it can extend only to objects

which already belong to the world of the physicist’s investigation. Hence it cannot be used to

answer the question of whether experience contains causal implications, leading to the existence

of a being distinct from the world of physics. It can settle nothing about whether our inferences,

which start with the sensible world, must also terminate with this world and its immanent formal

conditions. Hence, Kant’s use of the empirical principle to rule out the a posteriori

demonstration of God’s existence is unwarranted. Granted that the starting point is found in

sensible things, it cannot be concluded, by the deductive application of such a principle, that

these objects are the only things we can know from causal analysis of experience…It is because

55 Cf. J. MITCHELL, The Method of Resolutio and the Structure of the Five Ways, “Alpha Omega,” 15.3 (2012), p.

380.

22

Kant failed to grasp the precise starting point of the realistic argument from changing and

composite sensible existents that his account of the general procedure of a posteriori

demonstration is inapplicable to the realistically ordered inference.”56

56

J. COLLINS, op. cit., pp. 184-185.