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Corruption Risks and the Management of the Ministerial Bureaucracy in PolandPaul Heywood, University of NottinghamJan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, University of Nottingham & European University Institute, Florence
June 2008
Page 212.06.2008
Question & Relevance
Question ► What has been the relation between the political management of the
ministerial bureaucracy and high-level corruption risks in Poland? Debates► Causes of corruption► Corruption in Poland ► Other, e.g. EU integration
Page 312.06.2008
Main argument
Argument► Risks of high-level corruption have increased in Poland► Link between ‘corruption risks’ and ‘actual corruption’ is uncertain► Personnel politicisation leads to the de-institutionalisation of the policy-
making processOverview► Our approach to the analysis of corruption risks ► Assessment of corruption risks in Poland
Personnel management Management of policy-making process
► Conclusion & implications
Page 412.06.2008
Analysing corruption
Problems of defining corruption► Generic: ‘misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (TI), distinguished
between ‘according to’ and ‘against’ the rule - but difficult to apply in practice.
Different types of corruption► High-level (political) versus low-level (petty, routine); ‘state capture’► ‘Corruption risks’ versus ‘actual corruption’
Our focus► Risks of high-level corruption & state capture – particularly as related to
the ministerial bureaucracy.
Page 512.06.2008
Analysing the management of the ministerial bureaucracy
Two dimensions of management► Personnel management► Management of the policy-making processIdentify ‘danger zones’ of corruption► Unpack each dimension along mechanisms that can create corruptionExamine causal relationships► Impact of personnel management on policy-making ► Impact of patterns of managing the ministerial bureaucracy on
► Corruption risks► Actual corruption
Page 612.06.2008
Danger zones of corruption: Personnel policy
►Practice of dismissals – time in office►Careers after departure from the ministries
Incentive to build reputation of honesty and competence
►Professional standards, examination system and competition for senior positions
Screening capacity of personnel system
►Career background of senior officials►Selection process
Multiple dependencies of senior officials
►Depth and degree of politicisation►Formal-legal basis and practice of personnel
policy
Personalisation of personnel policy
Evaluation strategyDanger zone of corruption
Page 712.06.2008
Danger zones of corruption: Policy-making process
►Officials’ access to expertise in policy-making ►Use of impact assessments
Insufficient access to expertise and use of quality management tools
►Relations of senior officials to private interests ► Approach of officials to transparency
Lack of ‘fire-alarms’ that could provide external monitoring
►Mechanisms of vertical and horizontal coordination within ministries
Personalised internal control and coordination of policy-making
►Governmental political coordination needs of officials
Multiple dependencies of senior officials in policy-making
► Formalisation and specification of officials’responsibilities
►Officials’ perception of autonomy
Vague formalisation of roles & broad autonomy of officials
Evaluation strategyDanger zone of corruption
Page 812.06.2008
Research Strategy
Poland as case study► ‘Most likely case’ among new member states from ECE► Reforms undertaken by PiS-led governmentsComparison over time► ‘2005 – 2007’ versus ‘pre-2005’Research methods► Documentary analysis to examine legal changes ► 50+ interviews to identify patterns of personnel management and policy-
making
Page 912.06.2008
Empirical findings: Overview
Persisted at high levels Access to expertise and use of quality management tools
Decreased slightly but still significant‘Fire-alarms’ to provide for external monitoring
Persisted at high levelsInternal control and coordination of policy-making
Persisted at high levelsMultiple dependencies of officials in policy-making
Persisted at high levels Formalisation of roles & autonomy of officials
Increased Incentive to build long-term reputation of honesty and competence
IncreasedScreening capacity of personnel system
Persisted at high levelMultiple loyalties of senior officials
IncreasedPersonalisation of personnel policy
Corruption risks in Poland: ‘2005-2007’vs. ‘pre-2005’
Danger zone
Page 1012.06.2008
1.1. Personalisation of personnel policy
Evaluation strategy► Examine depth and degree of politicisation► Examine formal-legal basis and practice of personnel managementFindings ► Since 2005, risks have increased due to growth of politicisation► Evident at the formal-legal level (esp. since 2006)► Evident in practice, as political intervention reaches down to director
position and beyond► But considerable differences across ministries► In practice, continuous re-politicisation since early 1990s
Page 1112.06.2008
Figure 2. Number of appointments to the position of Deputy Minister
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
All DM within 6 months after Government formation
All DM within 12 months afterGovernment formation
N BuzekMiller Marcinkiewicz
Page 1212.06.2008
1.2. Multiple dependencies of senior officials
Evaluation strategy ► Career background of senior officials► Selection processFindings ► Overall, potential for divided loyalties has largely persistedCareers► After reform of 2006, fewer formal-legal constraints on choice of recruitment
channels, but ► Growing recruitment from wider public sector► High proportion of promotions below the level of deputy minister► KSAP alumni as professional backbone of government operationsSelection process ► Selection of deputy ministers as part of coalition bargaining ► After reform of 2006, growing autonomy of deputy ministers and directors over
staff appointments
Page 1312.06.2008
1.3. Screening capacity of the personnel system
Evaluation strategy► Professional standards, examination system and competition for senior
positionsFindings ► After reform of 2006, virtual collapse of the screening system for senior
positions ► Very light screening before admission to state staffing pool (while in
operation), especially compared to 1999 competition procedure todirector posts
► Circumvention of screening system by the Kaczynski government in 2006But ► competition for senior positions and candidate screening has been under
pressure since 2001
Page 1412.06.2008
1.4. Reputation-building incentives
Evaluation strategy► Practice of dismissals – time in office► Careers after departure from the ministriesFindings ► After 2006 reform, increased risks due to growing insecurity of tenure for
senior officials► Before 2006 reform, tenure of directors could only be cut short by means
of re-organisations (but this led to structural instability) ► Problems created when directors without civil service status are
dismissed ► Difficult/uncertain career prospects for politicians
Page 1512.06.2008
2.1. Formalisation of roles & ‘perceptions of autonomy’
Evaluation strategy► Formalisation and specification of responsibilities► Officials’ perception of autonomy over their jobFindings ► Overall, risks persist from high levels of ‘perceived autonomy’ despite
existence of routine formalisation.Great elasticity of formal rules.
► Considerable variation/inconsistencies across government► Emphasis on ‘operational autonomy’► Policy activism at the top tends to crowd out policy initiatives at the
bottom
Page 1612.06.2008
2.2. Multiple dependencies in policy-making
Evaluation strategy► Governmental and political coordination needs of senior officials in the
policy-making processFindings ► Potential for government fragmentation has remained high due to:► Competing coordination centres inside government► Political imperatives of coalition government► (to lesser extent) constitutional semi-presidentialism
Page 1712.06.2008
2.3. Internal ministerial control and coordination
Evaluation strategy ► Mechanisms of vertical and horizontal coordination inside ministriesFindings ► Overall, large degree of inconsistency and structural instability across
government ► Risks persist from preference for personalised modes of control and
coordination and lack of effective horizontal coordination► Vertical coordination by means of small-group, open-door meetings with
direct subordinates► Many attempts to improve horizontal coordination and ‘joining-up’ inside
ministries, but few success stories► Staff (including lower ranking managers) tend to perceive a lack of
effective ‘steer’ from the political leadership of the ministries
Page 1812.06.2008
2.4. ‘Fire-alarms’ and external monitoring
Evaluation strategy ► Relations between senior officials and private interests ► Approach of officials towards transparency in policy-makingFindings ► Overall, persistence of significant risks due to ineffective legal frameworkBut ► Changing attitudes of officials towards lobbying and transparency provide
grounds for optimism ► Complex legal basis and several attempts to regulate the area ► But no basis for effective competition between groups
► Different ministerial approaches to dealing with private interests► Senior officials’ attitudes, effects of media coverage and government
policy
Page 1912.06.2008
2.5. Expertise and information management
Evaluation ► Basis of officials’ policy-making expertise ► Use of impact assessments in policy-makingFindings ► Overall, risks have largely persisted ► Emphasis on personal expertise or access to personal networks of
expertise► Few regulations for access to outside expertise► Regulations for the use of impact assessments are largely ineffective.
Little uptake of methodology
Page 2012.06.2008
Discussion & Conclusions
► Corruption risks have increased along most dimensions of personnel management and policy-making► Contradicts intention of PiS-led governments
► Impact of personnel management on policy-making► Personnel politicisation has prevented institutionalisation of ministerial policy-
making in Poland, including ► Creation of structural instability and inconsistency across government► Preference for personalised, ad hoc modes of control and coordination ► Loss of expertise for policy-making ► Inability to apply impact assessment methodologies
► Unintended consequence of anti-corruption strategy during PiS-led governments?
► Relation between patterns of managing the ministerial bureaucracy and actual corruption ► Impact on actual corruption is uncertain► But striking correlation between governance indicators and corruption record in
Poland
Page 2112.06.2008
Corruption & Civil Service Governance in Poland(Source: World Bank Governance Indicators)
50556065707580859095
100
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Wor
ld B
ank
Gov
erna
nce
Indi
cato
rs
Quality of the Civil Service Control of Corruption
Page 2212.06.2008
Implications & Outlook
Implications ► Analysis of ‘danger zones of corruption’ can be replicated for different
government levels and individual agencies► Obstacles for the development of government capacity► Current reform plansFuture research agenda