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Indonesia: Governance Partnership Initial Participant Survey Results and Selected Issues for Discussion Background Handout Prepared by World Bank as input to participatory discussions during October 10th Video-Link and subsequent discussions. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Indonesia: Governance Partnership
Initial Participant Survey Results and Selected Issues for Discussion
Background Handout Prepared by World Bank as input to participatory discussions during October
10th Video-Link and subsequent discussions
The final results of this participant survey (once all entries are in) and further materials on governance can be found at:
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
Corruption can change Over TimeCorruption can change Over Time(Selected Countries; ICRG index, rescaled 0-10)(Selected Countries; ICRG index, rescaled 0-10)
00
22
44
66
88
High High corruptioncorruption
Low Low corruptioncorruption
19921992 19931993 19941994 19951995 19961996 19971997 19981998
IndonesiaIndonesia
IndonesiaIndonesia
FinlandFinland
El SalvadorEl Salvador
1010
El SalvadorEl Salvador
FinlandFinland
RussiaRussia
RussiaRussia
PolandPoland
PolandPoland
1988-921988-927
Government/Jdcl33%
Civil Society32%
Private Sector27%
Int'l Donor Community
8%Respondents’ Occupation
Initial Analysis of Participant Responses from survey (IGOPASU) for
Indonesia Governance Partnership Workshop. Based on 40 responses.
IGOPASU
Governance Partnership Participant Survey Initial Results (IGOPASU; as of October 9th, subtotal of 40 responses)
48%52%
% of contractscorrupt
24%
76%
Bribefee'cut'
Extent and Cost of Corruption
IGOPASU
3%
5%
8%
13%
34%
37%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Police
Military
Budgetinstitutions
Top Executive
Bureaucracy
Judiciary/Courts
Most Vulnerable Institution (misgovernance)
% of respondents
IGOPASU
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Legislature
Budgetinstitutions
Military
Top Executive
Bureaucracy
Judiciary/Courts
Government/Judic.
NGO/Media/Academia
Private Sector
Int'l Org./Donor
Most Vulnerable Institution(by occupation)
IGOPASU
15%
23%
30%
33%
10% 20% 30%
Lack ofMeritocracy
Low Salaries
PoliticalInterference
EconomicVested Interests
Main Obstacle to Transparent Justice
% of respondents
Note: no respondent chose lack of training or job security
IGOPASU
IGOPASU
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Lack ofmeritocracy
Low salaries
Politicalinterference
Economicinterests
Government/Judic.
NGO/Media/Academia
Private Sector
Int'l Org./Donor
Main Obstacle to Transparent Justice (by occupation)
Note: no respondent chose lack of training or job security
IGOPASU
3%
11%
16%
26%
45%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Tax/customs reform
Civil service reform
Government financialaccountability
Increased public oversight
Judiciary reform
Key Focus in Short Term (Likely Early Wins)?
% of respondents
IGOPASU
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Tax/customs reform
Civil service reform
Government financialaccountability
Increased public oversight
Judiciary reform
Government/Judic.
NGO/Media/Academia
Private Sector
Int'l Org./Donor
Most Important Short Term Focus/Measure (by occupation)
IGOPASU
3%
8%
10%
13%
13%
18%
38%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Parliament
Private sector
Donors/IFIs
Judiciary
Government
Press and media
Civil society
Main Governance Partnership Ally?
% of respondents
IGOPASU
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Parliament
Private sector
Government
Donors/IFIs
Judiciary
Press and media
Civil society
Government/Judic.
NGO/Media/Academia
Private Sector
Int'l Org./Donor
Main Ally for Governance Partnership (by occupation)
IGOPASU
3%
3%
8%
40%
48%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Cannothelp/homegrown
Providefinancial/technical
resources
Provideinformation
Stay neutral/workin partnerships
Support civilsociety
Best Role for Donors?
% of respondents
IGOPASU
National Governance: Challenges in Integrating Anti-Corruption Into Institutional Change
A simple Formula synthesizing Governance/Anticorruption:
IG and AC = KI + LE + CA
Improving Governance and Anti-Corruption =
= Knowledge/Info.Data + … ...+ Leadership (incl. Political) + ...
... + Collective Action (change)
Anticorruption: 8 common myths
• Government the ‘driver’ in Anti-Corruption (A-C)• Awareness-Raising and Educating population is key• Need to study the full situation anew before any action• It is perfectly well known what needs to be done• Paramount: A-C Autonomous Agencies/Commissions• High Pay to public service for combating corruption• It is central to fight bureaucratic corruption • Strict Enforcement approach: ‘A-C campaigns’
Complementing previous Survey Results, from other materials...
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Myan
mar
(Bu
rma)
Azerb
aij
an
Ind
on
esia
Pakis
tan
Ru
ssia
Bo
livia
Ban
gla
desh
Th
ail
an
d
Bra
zil
Ko
rea,
So
uth
Co
sta
Ric
a
Belg
ium
Jap
an
Ch
ile
Au
str
ali
a
Sin
gap
ore
New
Zeala
nd
Control of Corruption: Aggregate Research Indicators (Out of 155 worldwide, selected countries, 1998)*
Source: ‘Governance Matters’, PRWP 2196 by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido; based on data from 1998. For details and data, visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance There is a margin of error (thin line); extreme care in interpretation is needed.
POORGOOD
Broadening our Perspective: Assessing Governance
• Control of Corruption (or Graft)
• Rule of Law
• Absence of Regulatory Burden
• Government Effectiveness
• Voice and Accountability (Civil Liberties)
• Political Stability and lack of Violence
Not Free Partly Free Free
Co
rru
pti
on
[an
d A
bse
nce
of
Ru
le o
f L
aw]
Co
rru
pti
on
[an
d A
bse
nce
of
Ru
le o
f L
aw] High
Low
Civil Liberties
Corruption/Absence of Rule of Law & Civil Liberties
Based on averages of data from 160 countries.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Hungary Estonia Russia Azerbaijan
Parliamentary legislation
Decrees Central Bank Influence
Firms Reporting Negative Impact of High Level Corruption‘State Capture’ Source: WBES Survey 1999, 20 transition countries
%of
all
Fir
ms
repo
rt n
egat
ive
impa
ct o
f gr
and
corr
upti
on
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
Adverse Impact of ‘Purchases’ of:
% Firms that pay public procurement kickbacks% Firms that pay public procurement kickbacks(of those that trade with the state)(of those that trade with the state)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
% o
f fi
rms
Enormous Social/Economic costs of state capture: Enormous Social/Economic costs of state capture: Much lower growth in sales and investment in economyMuch lower growth in sales and investment in economy
0
5
10
15
20
25
Ave
rage
rat
e of
gro
wth
'97-
'99
High capture Countries Low capture countries
SalesInvestment
Another bad result: weak property rights
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Est
Uzb Pol Sln
Aze
r
Hu
n
Cro Slk
Geo
Bu
l
Arm
Rom B
el
Cze
Kaz L
it
Kyr
Ru
s
Uk
r
Mol
Firms reporting insecure property and contract rights
% o
f A
ll F
irm
s
%
4.2
2.11.4
0
1
2
3
4
LowIncome
MiddleIncome
HighIncome
Lower Income Households ‘Pay’ Disproportionally
Bribe/Total Income ratio % ( A Latin American Country )
* Average bribe to public officials
In diagnostic in Latin American Country it is found that lower Public Sector Salary does not Increase Bribery
7.7%
15.5%
8.4%
Bribe*=
3MS
Bribe*=
0.2MS
Bribe*=
0.5MS
0%
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
Monthly Salary
Less than 3MS Between 3 & 13 MS More than 13 MS
Monthly SalaryMonthly Salary
Corruption
Public Oversight and Civil Society:Public Oversight and Civil Society:
OmbudsmanOmbudsman in Albania and Bolivia in Albania and Bolivia•• Private Sector CoalitionPrivate Sector Coalition in Bolivia in Bolivia•• Diagnostic Diagnostic Surveys and Surveys and NGO NGO monitoring in Ecuador and others monitoring in Ecuador and others
Governance Improvement in Practice:Differentiated Strategies in Five Countries
Financial Controls:Financial Controls: ProcurementProcurement Reform in Bolivia, Reform in Bolivia, Ecuador and Georgia Ecuador and Georgia
Institutional and Civil ServiceInstitutional and Civil ServiceReform:Reform: TransparentTransparent Privatization Privatization in Ecuador in Ecuador•• SalarySalary Reform in Bolivia Reform in Bolivia•• Disclosure of AssetsDisclosure of Assets in in Bolivia and Georgia Bolivia and Georgia
Legal-Judicial:Legal-Judicial:
Revamp of Revamp of Supreme CourtSupreme Court in Bolivia in Bolivia •• Competency test and firingCompetency test and firing of judgesof judges in Georgia, Albania and Latviain Georgia, Albania and Latvia•• Mediation Mediation in Albania in Albania
Economic Policy:Economic Policy:
Deregulation and Deregulation and DelicensingDelicensing in Bolivia in Bolivia•• Revamping Revamping CustomsCustoms in Ecuador and Latvia in Ecuador and Latvia•• Tax AdministrationTax Administration in Latvia and Ecuador in Latvia and Ecuador•• Tax/CustomsTax/Customs Code Reform in Albania Code Reform in Albania
Implications for Further Participatory Discussion
• Anti-corruption efforts should also focus on ‘grand’ corruption and state capture
• Use Broader Governance framework• Incentives and Systemic Reforms vs. pure enforcement • Collective responsibility and Collective Action• Judiciary part of the problem or the solution?• Build on work already done; no ‘wheel-reinventing’• The ‘power’ of Information and Data-Empirics• Consensus and Coalition-Building is key
For details, survey, and data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
Data Presented for Analysis and informing Policy Advise, not for Precise Rankings
The data contained in this presentation originates from various enterprise surveys (as well as outside expert rating agencies) and are subject to a margin of error. The purpose is therefore not to present precise comparative rankings across countries, but instead to illustrate characteristics of governmental and corporate performance in order to assist in drawing implications for action. No ranking of countries or official endorsement is intended in presenting results from these external sources.
Further details and data, visit: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance