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Corporate Mobility and the Costs of Regulation. Marco Becht ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles and ECGI Colin Mayer Saïd Business School, University of Oxford and ECGI Hannes Wagner Saïd Business School, University of Oxford. Motivation. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Corporate Mobility and the Costs of Regulation
Marco BechtECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles and ECGI
Colin MayerSaïd Business School, University of Oxford and
ECGI
Hannes Wagner Saïd Business School, University of Oxford
Motivation
• Rulings by European Court of Justice (ECJ) establish freedom of incorporation in EU
• Deregulation of access to company law
Situation Pre-ECJ Rulings
• Most Member States enjoyed “monopoly” in the production of company law
• Entrepreneur with a project forced to purchase corporate contract of country (countries) where real activity takes place (= real seat principle)
• Member States regulate new company formation (minimum capital, procedures)
• Member States set fees (registration, notary)
Situation Post-ECJ Rulings
• Entrepreneur with a project can freely choose from EU15 (EU25) corporate contracts irrespective of where real activity takes place (= incorporation principle)
• Entrepreneur can choose regulation of new company formation (minimum capital, procedures)
• Entrepreneur can seek lowest fee (registration, notary)
Limitations
• “Lock-in” : Transfer of seat often requires winding up “old” company– BRITE S.E. pilot– planned 14th Directive
• Branching can be difficult and costly– BRITE branching pilot– (possibly) reform of 11th Directive– Registration agents offer partial solutions
Results
• Substantial mobility post-Centros
• Only observed for private Ltd not public companies
• Reason is to avoid minimum capital and cost of incorporation
• Countries are responding by adopting U.K. standard
Outline
• Empirical Methodology
• Mobility Rates– Pre- and post Centros– EU to UK, rest of the world to UK
• Robustness : clustering and agents
• Drivers of mobility
• What next?
German GmbH vs. German Ltd
• German GmbH– Directors live in Germany (majority, all)– Real activities conducted from Germany– GmbH under German company law
• German Limited– Directors live in Germany (majority, all)– Real activities conducted from Germany– Private Ltd under U.K. company law
Examples
Aktivplus Limited
Aktivplus Ltd in Germany
German Trading Address
German CEO
Foreign Company Registration Number
Munich Company Register
German VAT Number
Aktivplus Ltd
UK Address of German
Go-Ahead Limited
formation agent8000+
German Ltd companies at this address
Aktivplus Ltd
Winterthaler Sonnenschutz und Rolladenbau Ltd
Winterthaler Sonnenschutz und Rolladenbau Ltd
UK Address of German
Limited24.deformation
agent
1200+ German Ltd
companies at this address
Winterthaler Sonnenschutz und Rolladenbau Ltd
Freebike Ltd
Freebike Ltd
UK Address of HJC.nl
formation agent
3600+ Dutch Ltd
companies at this address
Example 3 : Freebike Ltd
Example 4 : Aloft Ltd
Example 4 : Aloft Ltd
UK Trading Address of Hare Wilson AssociatesChartered
Accountants and Auditors
146+ companies at this
address
Example 4 : Aloft Ltd
Definition of Foreign Ltd
• Majority or all directors reside outside the United Kingdom– German Ltd (or Plc) : Majority or all
directors reside in Germany– Dutch Ltd (or Plc) : Majority or all directors
reside in the Netherlands
• All new firms with limited liability in the UK between 1997 and 2005
• Data from Companies House via FAME– 1.96 million new companies– 3.74 million directors
• Compile database with incorporation dates, company type, registered office addresses, identity of directors and company secretaries and their home addresses
Data
The ECJ Decisions
• Centros Ltd. : March 1999– Danish company register refuses to register
Danish Limited (branch of UK Ltd with real seat in Denmark)
• Überseering B.V. : November 2002– German court refuses to deal with German B.V.
(Dutch B.V. with real seat in Germany)
• Inspire Art Ltd. : September 2003– Dutch register seeks to impose foreign company
conditions on Dutch Limited company (branch of UK Ltd with real seat in the Netherlands)
Timeline
Pre-CentrosPeriod
InterimPeriod
Post-Überseering
Period
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Centros Überseering Inspire Art
New Private Limited Companies Sum EU25
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
SUM EU 25
New Private Limited Companies – Average EU25 countries
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average EU25
New Private Limited Companies By Country – Ratio Post / Pre
3.65.5 5.6 6.5 6.9 7.2 7.8
10.814.8
29.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Post/Pre
EU25 Average Poland Latvia Slovenia Lithuania
Hungary Denmark Austria Estonia Germany
New Private Limited Companies By Country – Sum Post
1861 1005 1059 1072 1084 1341 13492764
4277 4334
23595
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
SUM Post
EU25 Average Austria Ireland Spain
Belgium Italy Denmark Cyprus
France Netherlands Germany
EU-Rest of the World
Formal Test
• “Differences-in-Differences”– Centros & EU : +92%
Why are companies incorporating in the UK?
• Minimum capital– capital constraints, risk aversion
• Time
• Number of Formalities
• Direct cost of incorporation
Robustness of Method
• Do we measure Aktivplus type mobility or more UK subsidiaries of EU firms?
• Robustness of Method : address clustering– Subsidiaries with real activities in U.K. have
physical U.K. address– Most Foreign Limited companies have a “virtual
address”
Percentage of EU Ltds registered by a known Agent
12.90%
22.30%
39.10%
51.30%
64.80%
11.70%
62.90%
41.40%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Known Agent Excluding Go-Ahead
Branching Red-Tape
• Current branch registration requirements discourage use of Limited– official translation requirements etc.
• For large countries local agents are solving the problem– standard articles and standard translations
• No local agents for small countries– Market not large enough in small countries– De facto discrimination against small entrepreneurs
in small countries wanting to use the Limited
Example
Caveats
• No evidence (yet) on survival for foreign Limited companies (requires Companies House data)
• Cannot rule out some “fly by night” motivation, using cross-border loopholes or information asymmetries in some cases for some countries
Open Questions
• Temporary phenomenon or here to stay?
• Is there a “branching gap”?
• Is the U.K. the only “recipient” of such mobility?
Certain Conclusion
• Much work to do for Registers, EBR, BRITE, Member States and the European Commission