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Corporate Evaluation of
CIDA’s Humanitarian
Assistance
2005 – 2011
SYNTHESIS REPORT
AUGUST 2012
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 200 Promenade du Portage Gatineau, Québec K1A 0G4 Canada
Telephone: 819-997-5006 / 1-800-230-6349 (toll-free) For the hearing- and speech-impaired: 819-953-5023 / 1-800-331-5018 (toll-free) Fax: 819-953-6088
Website: www.cida.gc.ca/evaluations-e E-mail: [email protected]
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2011 Cette publication est aussi disponible en français : Évaluation corporative de l’aide humanitaire de l'ACDI.
Printed in Canada
Corporate Evaluation of
CIDA’s Humanitarian
Assistance
2005 – 2011
SYNTHESIS REPORT
AUGUST 2012
i Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Acknowledgments
Humanitarian assistance is a complex undertaking, involving a wide range of local, national and
international organizations. The context for humanitarian assistance is also constantly changing,
bringing new challenges to which humanitarian actors must constantly adapt. CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance is part of this complex and shifting environment. Based on this reality,
and the fact that CIDA has spent nearly $2.7 billion over five years in humanitarian assistance,
an evaluation of the Agency’s humanitarian assistance is timely, as both an exercise in
accountability and an opportunity for institutional learning.
This evaluation was undertaken by a team that included CIDA evaluation officers (Denis
Marcheterre, Pamela Nibishaka and Vivek Prakash), consultants from Goss Gilroy Inc. (Sheila
Dohoo Faure, Louise Mailloux and Chris Khng) and an expert in humanitarian assistance
(Hunter McGill). The Evaluation Directorate would like to thank all team members for their hard
work and diligence and their professionalism as members of a joint team undertaking this
challenging assignment.
We would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the many individuals who made
meaningful contributions to the evaluation. This includes our colleagues within CIDA, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence,
representatives from various United Nations organisations, non-governmental organisations and
bilateral aid agencies from many countries. Their experience, opinions and knowledge of
humanitarian matters were essential to the data collection and analysis and contributed to the
quality of this evaluation.
We would specifically like to recognize the contributions of the internal Evaluation Advisory
Committee, which provided oversight for this evaluation, and the external peer reviewers (John
Cosgrave, Ted Kliest, Mikael Lindvall, John Mitchell), whose insights on both the work plan and
the draft report contributed to the success of this evaluation.
Our capacity to assess and learn does matter in seeking improvements to our humanitarian
responses. For millions of people, a responsive, innovative and appropriate international
humanitarian system is very much needed. We hope this evaluation will contribute to the
Agency’s assessment and learning process.
Caroline Leclerc Director General Strategic Planning, Performance and Evaluation Directorate
ii Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... vi
1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Context for Humanitarian Assistance .................................................................................. 1
1.2 Overview of Evaluation Approach and Methodology ........................................................... 4
2.0 Profile of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance ........................................................................ 9
2.1 Description of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance Delivery.................................................... 9
2.2 Financial Overview of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance ................................................... 12
3.0 Relevance of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance ............................................................... 15
3.1 Alignment of Humanitarian Assistance with GoC and CIDA Strategic Priorities ............... 15
3.2 Continuing Need for Humanitarian Assistance .................................................................. 17
3.3 Priority of Humanitarian Assistance at CIDA ..................................................................... 17
3.4 Alignment with Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship .............. 18
3.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 20
4.0 Design and Delivery of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance............................................... 20
4.1 Policy Framework and Scope of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance ................................... 21
4.2 Gender Equality ................................................................................................................. 33
4.3 IHA Management of Humanitarian Assistance .................................................................. 34
4.4 Coordination and Integration of Humanitarian and Development Programming ............... 55
4.5 Public Information and Communications ........................................................................... 61
4.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 62
5.0 CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance Performance ............................................................... 65
5.1 Humanitarian Assistance Results to Support Global Capacity .......................................... 66
5.2 Country-level Results ........................................................................................................ 72
5.3 Efficiency of CIDA’s Programming .................................................................................... 79
5.4 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 80
6.0 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 82
6.1 Relevance ......................................................................................................................... 82
6.2 Design and Delivery .......................................................................................................... 82
6.3 Performance ...................................................................................................................... 84
7.0 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 85
Annex 1: Management Response 2005-11 ............................................................................. 88
Figures Figure 1: CIDA’s Core Funding and Funding to CERF, 2005/06 – 2010/11 (in $ millions) ........................ 25 Figure 2: Humanitarian Assistance Expenditures, by Sector, by Branch, 2005/06 - 2010/11 .................... 28 Figure 3: Range of Humanitarian Programming, by CIDA Branch ............................................................. 29 Figure 4: Comparable donor goals/objectives of humanitarian assistance ................................................ 32 Figure 5: Timelines for Approval of IHA Funding for 4 Case Study Countries, 2009/10 – 2010/11 ........... 39 Figure 6: IHA Program Initial Budget, Net Transfers and Final Expenditures, 2006/07 to 2010/11 ........... 44 Figure 7: IHA Program Expenditures, by Sector, 2006/07 to 2010/11 ....................................................... 45
iii Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 8: IHA Operational Expenditures, 2006/07 – 2010/11 ..................................................................... 46 Figure 9: IHA Program and Operational Expenditures, 2006/07 – 2010/11 ............................................... 47 Figure 10: Profile of Sources of Funding and Disbursements for Five Matching Funds, 2005 to 2010 (in $
CAD millions) .............................................................................................................................................. 51
Boxes Box 1: CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance Objectives ................................................................ 9 Box 2: Bilateral Agency Humanitarian Policy Frameworks ......................................................................... 22 Box 3: Views from Humanitarian and Development Communities on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and
Development ............................................................................................................................................... 31 Box 4: Examples of Delays in Signing Project Agreements ....................................................................... 38 Box 5: IHA Performance Measurement Mechanisms ................................................................................. 41 Box 6: Advantages and Disadvantages of Matching Funds as Identified by Stakeholders ........................ 53 Box 7: Examples of Successes and Challenges with Integration in the Field ............................................ 56 Box 8: Example of Strong HQ Coordination ............................................................................................... 59 Box 9: Example of Strong HQ Coordination ............................................................................................... 61 Box 10: Challenge of Relying on Partner Information ................................................................................. 65 Box 11: Capacity Building at UNHCR ......................................................................................................... 68 Box 12: Added Value of IHA’s Support for CANADEM and CRCS’ Overseas Delegates Program ........... 69 Box 13: Policy Dialogue in Sudan ............................................................................................................... 71 Box 14: Impact of Cuts to UNRWA Core Funding ...................................................................................... 72
iv Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
List of Abbreviations
AAR After-action Review
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CAP Consolidated Appeal Process
CBO Community-based organization
CDPF Country Development Program Framework
CERF Central Emergency Relief Fund
CFGB Canadian Food Grains Bank
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CRCS Canadian Red Cross Society
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DRR Disaster risk reduction
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
FTE Full-time equivalent
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship
GoC Government of Canada
GPB Geographic Program Branch
GPSF Global Peace and Security Fund
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HQ Headquarters
IAE International Assistance Envelope
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHA International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate
INCAF International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IOM International Organization for Migration
LRRD Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
M&E Monitoring and evaluation
MGPB Multilateral and Global Programs Branch
MOPAN Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
NGO Non-governmental organization
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGD Other government department
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAA Program Activity Architecture
PAD Project Approval Document
PAGER Policy and Advocacy Group for Emergency Relief
RBM Results-based management
RC Red Cross
v Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
RPP Report on Plans and Priorities
TB Treasury Board
Ts&Cs Terms and Conditions
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WATSAN Water and sanitation
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
vi Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Executive Summary
Introduction
This report presents the results of an evaluation of the humanitarian assistance programming
(both through multilateral and bilateral channels) of the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) from April 2005 to April 2011. It was designed as both an exercise in
accountability, as required by the Government of Canada Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation,
as well as an opportunity for institutional learning. It covers issues of relevance, design and
delivery and performance.
The methodology included a literature and document review; review of CIDA’s administrative
data and global humanitarian funding information; extensive interviews with CIDA staff,
representatives of United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners,
other government departments (OGDs) and think tanks; case studies of programming in five
countries (Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Sudan and West Bank and Gaza) and a comparison with
three other bilateral donors (Australia, Denmark and Sweden).
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is governed by CIDA’s “Terms and Conditions for International
Development Assistance” (Ts&Cs). It is managed primarily by the International Humanitarian
Assistance Directorate (IHA) of the Multilateral and Global Programs Branch (MGPB), with
some programming also managed by the Geographic Program Branch (GPB). GPB
humanitarian programming is managed by bilateral desks that have full responsibility for both
humanitarian and development programming in the country/region (currently West Bank and
Gaza and Afghanistan).1 In addition, some bilateral desks manage programming that, according
to the definitions of humanitarian programming used in CIDA’s financial information systems,2 is
humanitarian assistance. This includes activities related to disaster risk reduction, early
recovery and transition programming as elements of the country’s development program
Over the period 2005/06 to 2010/11, CIDA provided just over $2.7 billion in humanitarian
assistance: 83% managed by MGPB and 17% by GPB. Most MGPB funding goes to complex
emergencies and to emergency food aid, material relief assistance and services, and relief
coordination, protection and support services. GPB’s funding goes principally to two major
programme countries for which GPB manages Canada’s humanitarian assistance, West Bank &
Gaza and Afghanistan, with a significant component devoted to relief, reconstruction and
rehabilitation. CIDA implements its humanitarian programming through UN, Red Cross
Movement and NGO partners. The top eight partner organizations are the World Food
Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Canadian Foodgrains Bank,
International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations Relief and Works Agency, United
1 IHA funds the ICRC work in West Bank and Gaza.
2 The definitions used in CIDA’s financial information systems are based on the Development Assistance
Committee’s definition of humanitarian assistance.
vii Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Nations Children’s Fund, and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies.
Key Findings
Relevance
CIDA’s humanitarian response is consistent with Government of Canada (GoC) priorities and
CIDA’s overall strategic priorities as reflected in public statements, CIDA’s documents and in its
level of funding for humanitarian crises. CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming is also
generally consistent with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), with some
reservations about the timeliness of funding decisions, the use of matching funds, and concerns
about lack of transparency.
The literature reflects that there is likely to be a growing number of people affected, over
prolonged periods, by both natural disasters and protracted conflicts. At the same time,
humanitarian costs are increasing and countries are facing budgetary constraints. As a result,
there is a continuing need for Canada, including CIDA, to respond to humanitarian crises.
To ensure CIDA’s assistance is relevant to the needs of its target population, the Agency has
appropriate tools for collecting and analyzing needs-based data to inform decision-making, that
is deciding on the level of CIDA’s humanitarian response and choosing among the programming
proposals provided by its partners.
Design and Delivery
Design: There is no Canadian whole-of-government humanitarian policy. CIDA is in the process
of developing a strategy for its humanitarian assistance activities. However, while intended to be
a whole-of-Agency document, interviews suggest that the document largely focuses on the
activities of the IHA Directorate, which primarily funds immediate life saving activities, as
outlined in the Ts&Cs. The Ts&Cs for CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming include a
broader range of activities than are generally being implemented by IHA. CIDA’s bilateral
programming implements activities related to disaster-risk reduction, early recovery and
transition from humanitarian to development programming – although these transition activities
only represent a small proportion of CIDA’s humanitarian funding. The three other donor
agencies reviewed have humanitarian policies and strategies that include programming in
emergency preparedness, early recovery and transition from humanitarian to development
programming.
Approval: The project approval processes take into account a range of factors and build on the
experience of IHA’s headquarters (HQ) staff and field staff. While the decision-making with
respect to funding for UN appeals is timely, there are delays in the approval of some NGO
project funding. However, interviews suggest that IHA is proposing to address these process
issues under its new draft strategy. It has also implemented a number of mechanisms to
facilitate quick responses (see efficiency section below).
viii Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Monitoring and Evaluation: IHA has a number of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating
its humanitarian assistance programming, which do not impose a heavy reporting burden on
partner organizations. However, there are no adequate systematic mechanisms for collecting,
integrating and sharing lessons learned.
Efficiency: IHA’s initial annual budget is supplemented with significant amounts of money that
are transferred to the Directorate during the year. Much of this additional funding is used to fulfill
Canada’s commitments when matching funds are set up. The IHA operational costs for
management of its humanitarian funding are less than 1% of its total humanitarian funding and
the percentage has declined in the last six years.
The evaluation found mixed results with respect to the efficiency of IHA’s management of its
funding. Generally, the management of IHA’s funding is efficient, but efficiency is hampered by
a lack of timeliness for decision-making (only on some NGO projects). In terms of project
selection and implementation, and management of its relations with its partners, IHA is seen as
generally effective. It has also improved efficiency by increasing its multi-year and core funding
to key partners, providing significant funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
and developing rapid response mechanisms with some partners. These actions allow IHA to
manage a larger volume of humanitarian assistance funding with a lower administrative burden
on its staff.
Matching Funds: IHA has set up processes for efficiently managing the increasingly frequent
use of matching funds. However, there are, as yet, no public criteria for determining when to
launch a matching fund and there are transparency concerns regarding the use of matched
resources, and the extent to which matching funds may distort humanitarian funding.
Expertise and coordination: CIDA’s humanitarian assistance expertise in IHA is robust and
relevant, while more limited in geographic programs, and notably in the field. Field staff do not
have a clear mandate with respect to humanitarian programming. While some contribute to
project-level discussions, for the most part, there are few CIDA resources dedicated to
addressing humanitarian issues in the field. In addition, field staff do not tend to contribute to the
discussion of humanitarian issues beyond the project level.
The lack of corporate mechanisms for coordination and integration limits the opportunities for
linking humanitarian and development programming. Yet, the need to link relief and
development in an integrated package of humanitarian actions, to be implemented by both
humanitarian and development actors, is clearly documented in the literature.
Communication: Humanitarian assistance is clearly a facet of CIDA’s programming that is of
interest to Canadians. CIDA frequently publishes press releases that address humanitarian
response. Nevertheless, CIDA misses other opportunities to clearly communicate, in both
Canada and partner countries, the achievements of its humanitarian programming. An annual
report on CIDA’s humanitarian assistance, and stories from the field to highlight what CIDA is
doing in response to humanitarian crises, could be relevant options.
ix Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Performance
Performance is reported at two levels: results in supporting global humanitarian capacity; and
results at the country level. Measurement and attribution of results are a challenge in
humanitarian assistance, given the many actors – funders and implementing partners –
engaged in emergency response.
At the global level, Canada has been seen in the humanitarian community as an honest broker
while also promoting, in its policy dialogue, key issues such as results-based management
(RBM) and gender equality. While it has played a leadership role for many years, there is a
general sense that it does not have as strong a presence in the global humanitarian community
as it did in the past. Canada makes significant contributions to building the capacity of its
humanitarian partners, through core and multi-year funding and support for coordination. It
supports primarily the multilateral system, the Canadian Red Cross Society, and NGO partners,
such as the Policy and Advocacy Group for Emergency Relief (PAGER), the Humanitarian
Coalition and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian
Action (ALNAP).
At the country level, this evaluation reports only on CIDA’s contributions and measures its
performance by the performance of its partners. CIDA’s programming is contributing to
achieving results in the field with respect to all expected outcomes of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance, including improvements in the preparedness for humanitarian responses,
strengthening the capacity of the humanitarian system and improved results for beneficiaries.
The ultimate goal of CIDA’s efforts is to increase lives saved, alleviate suffering, and maintain
human dignity in communities experiencing a humanitarian emergency or food insecurity. Some
concrete results for beneficiaries include improving access to food and non-food items, re-
establishing livelihoods, reducing vulnerability and providing protection. Examples of these
results are:
As part of its humanitarian response to the earthquake in January 2010, CIDA contributed to
the provision of emergency food aid to 4.3 million Haitians, water and sanitation services to
1.3 million Haitians, emergency and temporary housing to 370,000 households, and relief
items following the earthquake;
With CIDA support, the WFP is helping the Ethiopian government to reach 3.7 million
people, including 240,000 refugees, with emergency food assistance. A further 3.4 million
people are receiving assistance through non-emergency programs; and
In Darfur, Sudan, there are indications that, between 2005 and 2009, WFP programming
has contributed to decreases in acute malnutrition rates, severe malnutrition rates, and
mortality rates.
Implementing partners are generally seen as effective and, given that results are being
achieved in all areas of CIDA’s outcomes, CIDA’s programming can be seen as largely effective
in meeting its objectives.
x Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Conclusion
Analysis of various lines of evidence indicates that CIDA is directing its funding to address
relevant needs and is making, through its partners, a valued contribution to saving lives and
alleviating suffering. Canada has played an important role in the international humanitarian
community in the past, and continues to contribute significantly to global coordination and
capacity while promoting results-based management and gender equality. CIDA’s
contributions, together with those of other donors, continue to make a difference and help save
lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. However, some areas for attention have
been noted, and these are addressed in the recommendations below.
Recommendations
It is recommended that CIDA:
1. Develop a whole-of-agency humanitarian assistance strategy.
Many issues in this evaluation are related, to some extent, to the absence of a whole-of-
agency humanitarian assistance strategy. The development of such a strategy would be a
critical first step toward addressing the design of an integrated corporate approach to
supporting prevention and risk reduction, and recovery and transition to development,
particularly if it is developed in a participatory fashion that engages all CIDA’s key
stakeholders. A DFAIT-led humanitarian policy would help the Agency situate its
humanitarian assistance, in the context of whole-of-government responses.
Such a strategy should be used to strengthen the management of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance by outlining clear expectations with respect to the integration of humanitarian and
development programming. The Strategy would provide the framework for the development
of Standard Operating Procedures for responses to natural disasters in developing
countries. It would contribute to better defined roles and responsibilities of headquarters
and field staff in humanitarian program delivery and policy engagement (i.e. mandate,
direction and, support) and provide a strengthened framework for accountability and
reporting.
2. Develop a systematic, integrated approach to supporting a) prevention and risk
reduction and b) recovery and transition to development.
IHA implements humanitarian assistance that focuses on immediate life-saving activities,
with some emergency preparedness. Humanitarian assistance programming, under the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) definition, also includes activities related to
prevention, risk reduction, recovery and transition to development. The integration of these
activities is an issue with which all humanitarian donors struggle. CIDA should create, at a
corporate level, opportunities for synergies and complementarity between humanitarian and
development activities in countries in which Canada has a development program. This is
particularly relevant in those countries that are prone to humanitarian emergencies, where
CIDA’s programming should better support both development and humanitarian objectives.
xi Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Integration may require that an institutional mechanism be set up within CIDA to ensure
linkage and integration of humanitarian and development programming, and a shift in the
mindset of staff to reduce the tendency to work in silos.
3. Intensify efforts to improve the timeliness of humanitarian response decision-making.
While operational partners (multilateral and NGO) can quickly prepare and submit funding
proposals for humanitarian response, considerable delay can occur before project approval
is received, particularly for NGO funding. This can necessitate proposal re-design as a result
of evolving conditions in the affected country and delay Canada’s response. The CERF and
multi-year funding arrangements and quicker Crisis Pool access are helping, but given the
importance of timeliness to effective humanitarian responses, CIDA must continue its work
on this issue.
4. Review the use of matching funds.
Most other humanitarian donors do not use matching funds and these funds are not seen by
other donors as key programming or public engagement mechanisms. The Agency should
assess the extent to which the matching funds could potentially distort humanitarian funding.
The Agency needs to address the absence of appropriate criteria for the establishment of
these funds.
5. Improve accountability and reporting through the use of monitoring and evaluation to
identify lessons learned and ensuring adequate dissemination and implementation of
these lessons.
Strengthening accountability and reporting might include additional activities such as after-
action reviews for humanitarian responses (addressing processes as well as impact issues),
participation in multi-donor or inter-agency evaluations, strengthening monitoring by CIDA
HQ and field staff, and the systematic integration of monitoring information into reporting
and lessons learned for sharing with other CIDA staff (particularly in the field) and partners.
6. Improve the information available to the Canadian public about humanitarian
assistance activities.
Humanitarian assistance, particularly activities related to immediate life-saving, is probably
the facet of CIDA’s programming that is most easily understood and valued by the Canadian
public. CIDA needs to build on Canadians’ engagement, as reflected in the response to
matching fund appeals, and increase the information available to Canadians. This would be
in line with a number of recent CIDA commitments, including the commitment to the
International Aid Transparency Initiative and the Open Data Project and should include
providing more readily accessible information about the use of matching funds and
increased opportunities for CIDA to be visible in humanitarian responses.
1 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
1.0 Introduction
This report presents the results of an evaluation of the humanitarian assistance programming
(through both multilateral and bilateral channels) of the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) from 2005 to 2011.3 It was designed as both an exercise in accountability, as
required by the Government of Canada Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation,4 as well as an
opportunity for institutional learning.
The report begins with an overview of the context of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance and the
evaluation approach. The findings of the evaluation are organized to address the key issues
identified in the Government of Canada Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Evaluation:
Relevance (Section 3.0 “Relevance of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance”);
Design (Section 4.0 “Design and Delivery of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance”); and
Performance (Section 5.0 “CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance Performance”).
As well, this evaluation takes into consideration the evaluation criteria of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
1.1 Context for Humanitarian Assistance
The number, scale and intensity of humanitarian crises is increasing and so is people’s
vulnerability.
During the period covered by this evaluation, the scale, frequency and intensity of natural
disaster-related emergencies have risen dramatically. The number of people affected by these
events has also increased. These increasing demands and the constant level of protracted,
often conflict-related crises, have intensified the challenges faced by humanitarian response
organizations and donors. Canadians’ expectations that their government will respond in a
timely and effective way to alleviate suffering, consistent with their values of compassion and
humanity, have also grown, heightening the pressure on CIDA, given its lead role to deliver
humanitarian aid for Canada. Less visible to the public, but no less important from a
humanitarian perspective, are the many emergencies which do not attract the intense media
attention that surrounded the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Burmese cyclone, the Haiti earthquake
or the 2011 Horn of Africa drought and famine. Regardless of the dimensions of the
humanitarian emergency, based on the response to matching funds and Canadians’ comments
in the media following natural disasters, it is clear that Canadians expect their government to act
on their behalf.
3 This evaluation does not cover CIDA’s Afghanistan program. A separate country program evaluation is
planned for 2012 and will include humanitarian assistance. 4 Government of Canada Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation, April 2009.
2 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Populations around the world are increasingly vulnerable, particularly to natural disasters. As
populations grow, people move and settle in regions prone to floods and other major weather
events. In developing countries, poor rural populations move to large urban areas where they
often settle in highly vulnerable areas that are less resilient to new risks. Climate change will
accentuate these risks, whether caused by sudden onset emergencies such as violent storms,
or slow onset events such as droughts, creating immediate threats to lives, but intensifying food
insecurity as well. In 2006, there were 427 natural disasters around the world, affecting 142
million people, at a cost of US$34.5 billion. In 2010, the number of natural disasters dropped
slightly to 406 though the population affected rose to 304 million. In that year the major events
were earthquakes in Chile and Haiti and floods in China and Pakistan, and the global cost was
calculated at US$123.9 billion.5 While the incidence of conflict-related humanitarian
emergencies appears to have stabilized, the number of people affected by these crises, which
are often prolonged, grows year by year. In 2010, there were over 27 million internally-displaced
persons in the world, on the move in an attempt to flee conflict or persecution.6 Conflict-related
humanitarian emergencies often pose significant challenges of accessing affected populations,
and threats to the safety of humanitarian workers.
… which has required the international community to adjust…
There is recognition that human development and sustainable achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals will be hindered by the consequences of climate change and environmental
deterioration, in particular a rise in natural disasters. A “…10 percent increase in the number of
people affected by an extreme weather event reduces a country’s Human Development Index
(HDI) by almost 2 percent, with larger effects on incomes and in medium HDI countries. The
burden is not borne equally: the risk of injury and death from floods, high winds and landslides is
higher among children, women and the elderly, especially the poor.”7
Future humanitarian emergencies will likely be more frequent and more complex, as well as
larger in scale. This will increase pressures on the global humanitarian system, in which
Canada is an active participant. To date, the system has coped with large scale – or very large
scale – emergencies, although there have been organisational and funding challenges
associated with some of these events. The global system has not yet been tested, however, by
having to deal with simultaneous major events, a likelihood which cannot be ruled out.
Since 2005, a number of shifts have occurred in humanitarian response. The Principles and
Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) were adopted by the major bilateral
humanitarian donors, in consultation with lead agencies such as the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the International Red
5 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Reports, 2007 and
2011. 6 Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009 – Internal Displacement. IDMC/NRC.
7 UNDP, Human Development Report 2011, p.7.
3 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Cross (RC) Movement.8 They were endorsed by the Development Assistance Committee in
2005. These principles draw on international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights
law and build on the internationally-recognised principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and
independence, as well as the Code of Conduct for Humanitarian Response. This framework of
legally binding conventions, consensus-based agreements and generally-accepted good
practice provides the backdrop for humanitarian activities in over 100 countries. Other existing
important groups and initiatives grew in scope and influence over the same period, including the
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP),
the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), as a component of the broader Humanitarian
Reform process, and the Sphere Project (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Disaster Response). Canada has actively supported these and other parallel activities aimed at
improving the quality and timeliness of humanitarian aid.
At the same time as the GHD Principles were developed and adopted, the pace of change and
evolution of humanitarian response continued. From the core activities of the provision of
shelter, food, water and sanitation facilities and basic health services, humanitarian aid has
expanded to include education, infrastructure, agriculture, income-generating activities,
protection and human-rights advocacy. “New” or non-traditional donors of humanitarian aid have
also become more active, among them China, India, Russia and Brazil. Some vulnerable
countries have been able to invest in risk reduction measures with positive results – for
example, Haiti and Mozambique.9 Donor countries’ militaries have played a more prominent role
in the delivery of humanitarian aid, beginning in the Balkans in the late 1990s, and most notably
in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2005 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010. In some
emergency situations the affected country’s diaspora has been an important factor in the
humanitarian response. In several of the very large scale crises the phenomenon of mini
“instant non-governmental organizations (NGOs)” has complicated the relief efforts of
experienced agencies. Social media now allow those affected by an emergency to communicate
directly with individuals funding the response. The total funding of the global humanitarian
system in 2009 is estimated at US $15.1 billion.10
… yet challenges remain significant...
Despite the considerable financial resources committed to humanitarian aid and the tens of
thousands of staff deployed to assist the populations affected by emergencies, needs are not
being fully met. Funding remains less than the amounts required to meet basic, internationally-
8 Red Cross Movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. 9 In 2004, Haiti was struck by one major hurricane, resulting in 5000 deaths. In 2008, four major
hurricanes struck the country resulting in 800 deaths. The drop in fatalities was linked, in part, to investments, however modest, in disaster risk reduction measures such as awareness, early-warning, training and evacuation systems. ALNAP website. Haiti Learning and Accountability Portal, Context Analysis, p14, accessed January 2012. 10
Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2010.
4 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
recognized norms. Inconsistent response results in problems of proportionality, where certain
crises attract a much higher level of support, per capita, than do others, in part due to the
influence of broadcast media.
There remains a major problem of effective leadership in the global humanitarian system. For
certain slow-onset disasters, such as droughts, early-warning data are not acted upon in a
timely way. Problems of coordination, and role and responsibility definition among the many
actors in the system, result in delayed and incomplete responses. This situation leaves
vulnerable populations, often mainly women and children, un- or under-served. The linkage
between relief, recovery and development continues to pose funding and mandate challenges.
Investment in strengthening the resilience of vulnerable countries and regions, through disaster
risk reduction investments, has never received the support required. Recent surveys of
humanitarian response have underlined the tension caused by the arbitrary divisions between
humanitarian and development aid, especially in terms of engaging local aid-agencies.11 In
some regions of the world, donor government concerns about counter-terrorism places
restrictions on the scope of humanitarian agencies to work impartially and neutrally to reach
populations in need of assistance.
Challenges facing donors include ensuring humanitarian aid is timely, responsive to needs,
accountable, transparent, anticipatory and partnership-based. As more people in vulnerable
countries live in urban areas, relief efforts must also take into consideration the different needs
and resources of these populations, including how to use the urban informal sector in affected
areas to support humanitarian activities. The 2010 Haiti earthquake offered useful experience in
this respect. The analysis to support these changes should include learning with, and from,
affected populations. The 2006 multi-party evaluation of the international response to the Indian
Ocean tsunami provided a valuable model of a learning exercise aimed at improving how the
global system and individual donors can perform better.
… but Canada does not face these challenges alone...
Canada/CIDA is an active but not an independent actor in humanitarian assistance. The
success of its efforts depends substantially on how they are coordinated with the actions of
other donors and with organisations delivering aid. This broader context and Canada’s role
within the humanitarian community was an important consideration in the conduct of this
evaluation.
1.2 Overview of Evaluation Approach and Methodology
Evaluation Scope
The evaluation covers the humanitarian programming delivered by the International
Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (IHA), as well as humanitarian assistance provided
11 State of the Humanitarian System, ALNAP, London, 2010, p 31.
5 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
through CIDA’s bilateral programs. This includes humanitarian assistance provided exclusively
by a bilateral desk (relevant programs include the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian Refugees
and for Afghanistan),12 as well as other bilateral programming that addresses needs beyond
immediate relief, such as emergency preparedness and early recovery, that are delivered
through bilateral channels. This evaluation does not cover CIDA’s Afghanistan program, as a
separate country program evaluation is planned for 2012/13 and will include humanitarian
assistance in that country.13
This report covers CIDA’s whole-of-Agency humanitarian response when assessing CIDA’s
policies, strategies and the overall allocation of humanitarian assistance funding. It is a
corporate evaluation and the references to “CIDA” and “IHA” are made deliberately to
distinguish between corporate and Directorate-specific findings.
It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to address the management of humanitarian
assistance, according to CIDA’s definition of humanitarian programming, implemented by the
various bilateral programs. As a result, the management section (Section 4.3) focuses solely on
IHA’s management of the bulk of CIDA’s humanitarian programming.
The evaluation team recognizes that CIDA does not act alone in humanitarian response
contexts. Other government departments (OGDs), including the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade (DFAIT), Department of National Defence, Citizenship and Immigration
Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, have a role to play. However, it was beyond
the scope of this evaluation to address the roles of these OGDs. It was also beyond the scope
of the evaluation to examine how CIDA is addressing a number of key humanitarian issues that
are identified in the literature including, for example, civil-military cooperation, the security of
humanitarian workers or advocating for humanitarian space.
The evaluation was based on the expected outcomes identified in the logic model for CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance. (See the detailed methodology in Background Report A.)
Evaluation Data Collection and Analysis
The evaluation methodology included:
Literature and document review that included, among other things, CIDA’s policies and
procedures and evaluations of, and reports on, recent humanitarian assistance provided by
12 In the past, humanitarian assistance in other geographic areas was also managed by the bilateral
desks – for example, Iraq until 2010. 13
However, funding to Afghanistan is included in the data on CIDA’s humanitarian programming. Similarly, although the activities of the Peace and Security Unit that was part of the Humanitarian Assistance Peace and Security (HAPS) Directorate – the precursor to IHA – are beyond the scope of this evaluation, the funding managed by the unit is still included in figures for CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming. It was not possible, given the financial data available, to separate this funding from other CIDA humanitarian funding.
6 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
other bilateral donors, global responses to specific crises and literature from NGO think
tanks;
Review of CIDA’s administrative data and global financial information on humanitarian
funding and allocations;
Interviews with 122 stakeholders, including:
1. Internal stakeholders: CIDA staff (27), and
2. External stakeholders: staff of United Nations agencies (UN) (51), NGOs (35),
other government departments (OGDs) (7), and think tank groups (2);
Case studies in five countries – three involving site visits (Colombia, Sudan and West Bank
and Gaza) and two conducted as desk reviews (Ethiopia and Haiti). These case studies
were not real-time evaluations designed to assess CIDA’s humanitarian programming in
these countries. They provided opportunities to gain the perceptions of key stakeholders in
the field (either in-person or by telephone) on CIDA’s programming as illustrations of the
Agency’s response. 73 stakeholders were interviewed, mainly Canadian government staff
(internal stakeholders) and staff of international and NGO partners (external stakeholders).
The case studies also involved a review of documents and data; and
Comparison with three other bilateral donors (Australia, Denmark and Sweden), based on a
review of donor documents and interviews with donor government staff (9 stakeholders
interviewed).14
The literature review was carried out prior to the finalization of the work plan and informed the
development of the evaluation approach (although not the evaluation issues). The data
collection interviews were carried out using a structured interview guide for each major
respondent group (e.g. CIDA staff, OGDs, partners etc.) and interview results were documented
using an evaluation template, based on the common lines of enquiry from the various interview
guides. Documents identified during the course of the evaluation were reviewed and relevant
information summarized in a grid based on the common lines of enquiry.
During the course of the data collection, the team developed syntheses of the findings from
different components of the data collection (e.g. a case study, interviews with UN partners in
14 The selection took into account the level of humanitarian assistance provided, channels used for the
delivery of humanitarian assistance, amount of humanitarian assistance channelled through pooled funds,
and the quality of humanitarian assistance, based on the Humanitarian Response Index. It was important
to include donors that were similar to Canada, particularly in terms of humanitarian assistance delivery
channels, while, at the same time, including donors that are recognized as excelling in the provision of
humanitarian assistance. There are limitations to choosing only three countries, but the choice, approved
by the evaluation Advisory Committee, was intended to provide interesting lessons learned for the
evaluation.
7 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
New York and Geneva, NGO partners in Toronto and Montreal etc.). These syntheses were
also structured around the common lines of enquiry.
In the latter half of the data collection, a team workshop was held to synthesize the information
from the various data collection exercises and develop preliminary findings for each evaluation
issue and to identify outstanding data requirements. A second team workshop was held to
review a first draft of the report and assign responsibilities for addressing outstanding data
collection, analysis and reporting requirements. Subsequent drafts of the report were reviewed
by the Evaluation Directorate and the Evaluation Advisory Committee.
Evaluation Governance
The evaluation was conducted for CIDA’s Evaluation Directorate by a seven-person team that
included CIDA staff and external consultants. An Evaluation Advisory Committee reviewed draft
reports to ensure the accuracy of the evaluation in terms of facts and context, and provided
advice on CIDA’s needs in terms of information and analysis. This Committee was composed of
representatives from CIDA’s IHA, the Evaluation Directorate, the geographic programs, and
DFAIT. A peer review group, that included Canadian and international humanitarian assistance
and evaluation experts, provided advice on the evaluation’s work plan and draft report.
Evaluation Limitations
As with any evaluation, methodological limitations result in caveats that need to be put on the
findings. This evaluation is no exception. Limitations include:
CIDA’s response in any given humanitarian situation is provided through partner
organizations, not directly by CIDA. In addition, much of CIDA’s funding for humanitarian
crises is combined with funding from other donors, and it is often not possible to report
specifically on results that are directly attributable to CIDA’s humanitarian funding. Partners
also work together in the implementation of humanitarian activities, so often the inputs and
activities are combined and difficult to separate for any one partner. To assess the results of
CIDA humanitarian funding, the evaluation drew from results reported by humanitarian
partners as well as any reviews, studies or evaluations undertaken on specific responses.
Nevertheless, it is often not possible to report specifically on results that are directly
attributable to CIDA’s humanitarian funding;
Data on CIDA’s humanitarian and development activities and funding was only available
according to CIDA’s coding structures, which are based on the Development Assistance
Committee’s definitions of humanitarian assistance. The classification of the data relies on
the judgement of individual officers who code project information. While CIDA provides
direction, to the extent possible, to ensure that coding is accurate, the subjectivity of coding
posed a challenge for the evaluation. It was difficult to develop an accurate profile of
humanitarian assistance projects and funding across the Agency. Furthermore, figures
provided by different corporate and programming branches often differed. The evaluation
attempted to address this issue by comparing and reconciling project lists and figures
8 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
obtained through corporate channels (e.g. Chief Financial Officer Branch) and information
from IHA;
The evaluation team did not have timely access to important information for this evaluation.
A key CIDA document – a new CIDA humanitarian strategy – was only in draft format and
not available to the evaluation team. As a result, references to the draft document in this
evaluation reflect information gathered in interviews and may not reflect fully the content of
the draft document. In addition, the team added to the methodology a review of a selection
of IHA project files to explore further the issue of the timeliness of project approvals that was
raised in the interviews. There were gaps in the information that could be collected from the
IHA project files, particularly for submission dates for multilateral organization proposals.
However, the late delivery of IHA’s project files meant that it was not possible to fill in gaps
in the project data available in the files. Finally, although IHA conducts periodic audits and
partner evaluations, very little evaluative information was available for this review.
The evaluation relied heavily on qualitative information from interview respondents. Given
that the respondents were not selected on the basis of a random sample and the interviews
were based on guides, not questionnaires, it was not appropriate to quantify the number of
respondents presenting any particular point of view. There are challenges with this
methodology, since it relies on the team to synthesize a wide range of information.
Structured approaches to documenting and synthesizing the interview results were put in
place to provide as much rigour as possible to this process. All team members were
involved in drafting early versions of the report. However, the limited time that the team had
to finalize the analysis and the reporting, compared to the time that had been given to
planning, limited the analysis and the options for triangulating the interview information with
documentary evidence. This meant that, in some cases, data has not been fully triangulated.
The team has attempted to give a sense of the significance of findings by using the terms
“most”, “some” and “few” throughout the report. “Most” is used when the team’s perception
is that the comment was made by about two-thirds or more of relevant respondents; “some”
when it was made by between one-third and two-thirds; and “few” when it was made by less
than one-third of relevant respondents.15 16
15 “Relevant respondents” refers to those who would be expected to comment on the issue. In some
cases, this might be a very small group – possibly of two or three. 16
Note that all figures are in Canadian dollars, unless otherwise specified.
9 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
2.0 Profile of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance
2.1 Description of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance Delivery
DFAIT has the policy dialogue lead for Canada’s international humanitarian assistance. CIDA is
the operational lead agency for humanitarian assistance programming, while also contributing to
the formulation of Canadian humanitarian policy. Humanitarian assistance at CIDA, as covered
in this evaluation, is delivered through the Multilateral and Global Programs Branch, Geographic
Programs Branch, and the Partnership with Canadians Branch.
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming is delivered through both multilateral and bilateral channels.
CIDA’s international humanitarian assistance mandate is defined in CIDA’s “Terms and
Conditions for International Development Assistance,” approved in February 2009. “The
objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human
dignity during and in the aftermath of complex emergencies and natural disasters, as well as to
prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.”17 Specific
objectives outlined in the Terms and Conditions (Ts&Cs) are shown in Box 1.
The Ts&Cs define humanitarian action as “the protection of civilians and those no longer taking
part in hostilities, the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services, and other
items of assistance, as well as mine action, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to
facilitate the return to normal life and livelihood.”18
Box 1: CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance Objectives
The main program objectives are:
i) to fund the provision of humanitarian action in response to natural disasters and complex
emergencies, including the protection of civilians and assistance to refugees and internally
displaced persons;
ii) to fund disaster risk reduction activities;
iii) to deploy relief supplies and experts based on needs and in support of key humanitarian
partners;
iv) to fund programming related to the provision of basic foodstuffs, seeds and tools or
commodities, aimed to increase food security in developing countries and territories;
v) to provide and/or fund the provision of goods and services related to the efficient
programming, procurement, handling, storage, transportation, distribution, monitoring and
end use of said foodstuffs, commodities, seeds and tools;
17 “Terms and Conditions for International Humanitarian Assistance”, CIDA, February 2009, p. 28
18 “Terms and Conditions for International Humanitarian Assistance”, CIDA, February 2009, p. 29
10 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
vi) to promote humanitarian effectiveness through, inter alia, support to policy development,
research and learning, and accountability initiatives;
vii) to promote Canadian policy priorities vis-à-vis our multilateral humanitarian partners and the
broader humanitarian system, including strengthening effective coordination, results-based
management, gender equality, and Good Humanitarian Donorship; and
viii) to assess the capacity of partners to provide humanitarian assistance and enhance that
capacity where needed.
“Terms and Conditions for International Development Assistance”, CIDA, February 2009, p. 28
Multilateral and Global Programs Branch
Humanitarian assistance programmed through the Multilateral and Global Programs Branch is
managed by the IHA Directorate.19 It is responsible for the delivery of the International
Humanitarian Assistance Program.20
IHA, as the primary implementer of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming, focuses on
meeting the food, water, health, sanitation, shelter and physical security needs of populations
affected by humanitarian emergencies. IHA’s funding is responsive – that is, it responds to the
needs identified by affected countries and multilateral and NGO partners. IHA has three
components to its work:
Providing responsive funding to multilateral organizations, the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement and NGOs, and deploying CIDA relief supplies and technical
experts to address humanitarian needs arising as a result of natural disasters and complex
humanitarian situations;
Providing core funding and managing institutional relationships with key humanitarian
partners in order to build institutional capacity, support field operations, and advocate for
improved performance, cost-effectiveness, and accountability; and
Strengthening the international humanitarian system through support for key humanitarian
reforms, emergency preparedness, and the evidence-base for humanitarian action,
including the development and use of new tools, best practices and lessons learned.
19 In the early part of the period covered by this evaluation, CIDA’s multilateral humanitarian assistance
programming was managed by the Humanitarian Assistance, Peace and Security (HAPS) Division. This Division included a unit responsible for peace and security issues and funding for disaster risk reduction and mine action. As HAPS was restructured to become IHA, engagement with certain partners was discontinued. The work of this unit is not included in the scope of this evaluation. 20
International Humanitarian Assistance website. http://acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/JUD-
24132427-PLC Accessed November 2011
11 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
While IHA operates under the provisions for humanitarian assistance as described in the
Ts&Cs, it is not, in reality, implementing all components of the humanitarian assistance as
defined in the Ts&Cs. With the exception of funding emergency preparedness activities to
develop the capacity of the humanitarian system through partner organizations, IHA’s support
for a broader range of DRR activities has been more limited.
Understanding the scope of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is complicated by the fact that
CIDA’s project coding system is structured around the DAC definitions of humanitarian
assistance, reflecting a broader range of humanitarian assistance activities than are currently
funded, in any significant way, by IHA. It includes three components:
Emergency Response (Material relief assistance and services, Emergency food aid and
Relief co-ordination; protection and support services);
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation; and
Disaster prevention and preparedness.
As will be seen throughout this report, this requires careful wording with respect to the activities
that are funded by IHA (and, therefore, typically referred to within CIDA as humanitarian
assistance) and those funded through the bilateral channel that, although not referred to as
humanitarian assistance within the Agency are, in fact, humanitarian assistance under the DAC
definition.
Geographic Programs Branch
Humanitarian assistance is also delivered through the bilateral channel by geographic program
desks. This occurs in two ways. Humanitarian assistance programming in two geographic
areas (West Bank and Gaza and Afghanistan) is currently delivered mainly by the relevant
geographic desks.21 22 In addition, a number of bilateral country programs also include activities
related to humanitarian assistance.23 While the mandate of IHA is to focus on immediate relief,
some bilateral programs also include activities related to DRR, early recovery and transition
programming as elements of the country’s development program. This can occur in any country
in which CIDA has a program – whether it is a country of focus or a country of modest presence.
Although these activities are coded as humanitarian assistance in CIDA’s project coding system
(and are consistent with CIDA’s Ts&Cs for humanitarian assistance), internally they are
considered to be development programming.24 . In addition, under the DAC definition, they are
humanitarian assistance and contribute to the alignment of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance with
the DAC definition.
21 As noted, in the past, humanitarian assistance in other geographic areas was also managed by the
bilateral desks. 22
IHA funds the ICRC work in West Bank & Gaza. 23
This is reflected in data from CIDA’s project coding system, which is based on the DAC definition of humanitarian assistance. 24
IHA indicates that the problem is exacerbated by inaccurate coding resulting from the misinterpretation of DAC humanitarian coding rules.
12 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Partnership with Canadians Branch
Partnership with Canadians Branch (PWCB) does not have the mandate to provide
humanitarian assistance. However, given the anticipated level of interest from Canadian
organizations to assist in Haiti and PWCB’s shift to different funding processes in the aftermath
of Haiti’s earthquake, PWCB launched a $30 million call for proposals to NGOs in October 2010
to address recovery and reconstruction needs, and livelihood improvement in Haiti. In March
2011, PWCB announced funding for 15 projects worth $29.9 million to support Haiti’s disaster
readiness, education, health and agricultural sectors.25 During the 2005/06 to 2010/11 time
period, PWCB accounted for only $2.2M (0.1%) of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance.
2.2 Financial Overview of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance
This section provides a short financial overview of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance. The
information is based on information from CIDA’s project-coding system. CIDA staff have
indicated that there is a lack of consistency in project-coding across the Agency. Current coding
does not provide a complete picture of all humanitarian assistance operations.
Overall humanitarian funding
The levels and nature of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance remained relatively stable over the
past six years, with the majority of the funding channeled through multilateral organizations. . .
Over the six-year period covered by the evaluation, CIDA has provided just over $2.7 billion
in humanitarian assistance. Canada was the twelfth largest humanitarian donor globally
between 2000 – 2009.26
Most (83%) of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is programmed by MGPB – primarily by IHA.
This consists of purely responsive funding (61% of overall funding) and long-term
institutional (or core) funding (22% of overall).
Approximately one-sixth (17%) of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is programmed by the
Geographic Program Branch (GPB). The majority of the GPB funding (59% of all GPB
humanitarian funding or 10% of all CIDA’s humanitarian funding) is programmed by the two
geographic programs that currently have sole responsibility for programming humanitarian
assistance in their country/region – Afghanistan and West Bank and Gaza. Without these
two programs, GPB programming drops to $187.7M (7% of the total humanitarian
assistance).
25 Press release “Minister Oda announces Canada's continued support for Haiti “ http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAD-329207-JTN Accessed December 2011. 26
GHA Report 2011, Global Humanitarian Assistance, p. 14.
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf
13 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Canada’s total humanitarian assistance funding, compared to that of the three donors
chosen for the donor comparisons, has been on average second to Sweden over the past
six years (2005 – 2009). (Background Report C, Figure C.1) Canada’s humanitarian
funding, as a percentage of Official Development Assistance (ODA), has been higher than
the average for all DAC member countries, but generally below that of the comparison
donors. Canada’s humanitarian assistance as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) has also generally been lower than the DAC average. Over the same period,
Canada’s ODA, as a percent of GDP, has been well below the target commitment of 0.7%
and in the bottom half of DAC donors.27
Sectors and types of humanitarian funding
… and to a) protracted emergencies and emergency food aid, b) material relief assistance and
services, and c) relief coordination, projection and support services.
The largest portion of IHA’s humanitarian funding goes to complex emergencies (42%). Just
over one-quarter of IHA’s funding (27%) goes to core funding and institutional support.
Seventeen percent (17%) goes to natural disasters. A very small proportion of IHA’s funding
goes to preparedness and surge capacity (2%). The remaining 12% goes to “Other
food/non-food.”
Three emergency response sectors (emergency food aid, material relief assistance and
services, and relief coordination, projection and support services) account for the vast
majority of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance (91%). Only a small amount has been spent in
other sectors – disaster prevention and preparedness (2%) and reconstruction, relief and
rehabilitation (7%).28
Over the years, the allocation by sector has remained fairly stable. Food aid has been in the
31% to 50% range, and material relief in the 38% to 50% range. Canada’s food aid has
been fully untied since 2008.
In addition to sector-specific funding, core funding has been provided in the past six years to
four humanitarian UN agencies (OCHA, WFP, UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and
UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and one NGO (Canadian
Foodgrains Bank (CFGB). The largest recipients of core funding are WFP, CFGB, and
UNHCR.
Core funding has declined slightly in the past five years, dropping from $90.7M in 2005/06 to
$70.0M in 2010/11, with a low of $53.0M in 2008/09. At the same time, CIDA has made a
27 Millennium Development Goals Indicators http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=568.
Analysis by evaluation team. 28
CIDA staff have indicated that coding of CIDA projects is reportedly inconsistent and projects with components of emergency preparedness and/or reconstruction are almost always coded as material relief assistance and supplies.
14 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
substantial commitment to the CERF with a five-year $192 million grant agreement.
Disbursements to CERF vary by year due to internal cash management practices, but in
2008/09, funding to CERF ($50.2M) was just below the total amount of core funding.
Preliminary 2010/11 data indicates that CERF funding ($69.4M) nearly equalled CIDA’s total
core funding.29
IHA has also gradually increased the predictability of its funding. It has introduced more
multi-year funding arrangements for its core funding. It currently provides multi-year core
funding to OCHA, CFGB, ICRC, CERF, and WFP.30 It also provides multi-year funding to
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) and the Canadian Red
Cross Society (CRCS).
Emergency food aid (36%) and material relief assistance and services (26%), account for
significant amounts of GPB’s humanitarian aid. However, in contrast to MGPB, the
reconstruction relief and rehabilitation sector accounts for another 26% of GPB’s
humanitarian assistance, but a small percentage of MGPB funding.
Humanitarian partners
CIDA works with a wide range of humanitarian partners.
Most of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance (71%) is delivered through multilateral partner
organizations. The vast majority (93%) of this is delivered through UN agencies, with the
remainder delivered by international financial institutions (5%) and regional or other
multilateral organizations (3%). An approximately equal amount of funding was provided to
the Red Cross Movement (including the ICRC, IFRC and CRCS) and NGOs (14% each).
The top seven partner organizations receiving humanitarian funding from CIDA are WFP,
UNHCR, CFGB, ICRC, UNRWA, UNICEF, and IFRC.31 The organization receiving the most
CIDA humanitarian assistance funding is WFP. It has received over the last six years nearly
four times as much funding as the next closest UN agency, UNHCR.32
IHA provides funding to a range of Canadian and international NGOs – from large NGOs,
such as World Vision, CARE Canada, Save the Children Canada, Médecins Sans
Frontières – to smaller, niche organizations dedicated to strengthening the humanitarian
system, such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
29 It should be noted that the analysis is based on fiscal years, as per the Government's expenditure
management system. However, some humanitarian organisations manage their financials on a calendar year basis. 30
CIDA provides funding for WFP’s school feeding program (through development food assistance), in addition to the multi-year core funding it provides to WFP. 31
Includes core funding. 32
Food aid often constitutes up to 50% of humanitarian needs and only one UN agency, the WFP, is responsible for the vast majority of this work.
15 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas
Development Institute (ODI).
The largest Canadian NGO recipient of humanitarian assistance funding is the CFGB, as a
result of the large amount of core funding it receives. After the CFGB, the two top NGOs are
World Vision Canada ($51M) and Care Canada ($38M).
Over the past six years, the percentage of CIDA’s humanitarian funding programmed
through NGOs has risen from 15% in 2005/06 to 20% in 2010/11. Over the same period
funding through multilateral organizations (not including CERF) fell from 78% to 56%.
Funding to the Red Cross Movement remained steady at about 12%.
The increase in global food needs linked to the 2008 global food crisis, the occurrence of
major humanitarian crises (e.g. Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods, as well as heightened
food insecurity linked to drought situations), and the increasing costs of responding to large-
scale food insecurity (because of rising food and fuel /transportation costs) all contributed to
increased funding for food aid to both WFP and CFGB.
3.0 Relevance of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance
This section assesses the relevance of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance to the Government of
Canada’s (GoC) and CIDA’s priorities, and the continuing need for humanitarian assistance.
3.1 Alignment of Humanitarian Assistance with GoC and
CIDA Strategic Priorities
3.1.1 Alignment with GoC Policies
Despite the lack of a documented federal policy, CIDA’s humanitarian response is consistent
with GoC priorities and CIDA’s overall strategic priorities.
The GoC does not have a documented humanitarian policy or strategy. It is therefore difficult to
demonstrate that CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is consistent with GoC humanitarian priorities.
Few recent Speeches from the Throne reflect on Canada’s commitment to humanitarian
assistance, while those that do focus particularly on the GoC role in Afghanistan and Haiti.33
Recent statements on humanitarian assistance by the Minister of International Cooperation
have been funding announcements.34 A recent statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to
33 “Speech from the Throne”, Government of Canada, 3 March 2010,
http://www.speech.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1390 Accessed December 2011. 34
“Minister Oda announces Canada’s response to the humanitarian crisis in East Africa”, 22 July 2011 http://acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-72211442-LG3; “Government of Canada Increases Humanitarian Assistance for Haitians Affected by the Devastating Earthquake” January 19, 2010 http://acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-11992614-JXG. Accessed December 2011.
16 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
the UN General Assembly reflected on Canada’s role in providing humanitarian assistance in
the Sudans and Canada’s relationship with the UN – “Canada has been a consistently reliable
and responsible participant in U.N. initiatives around the world.”35
Based on these limited public announcements, CIDA’s humanitarian response is consistent with
GoC priorities. In addition, CIDA’s humanitarian assistance activities are consistent with
Canada’s policy on human rights36 and its commitment to gender equality.37 Also, CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance activities are in line with DFAIT activities, which provide leadership and
coordination for whole-of-government responses to both natural disasters and conflict-related
emergencies.38
3.1.2 Alignment with CIDA’s Strategic Priorities
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is aligned with the Agency’s Program Activity Architecture and,
although not required in all cases, also aligns with the Agency’s priority development themes.
Humanitarian assistance programming is aligned with three of five components of the Agency’s
Program Activity Architecture (PAA):39
The first is the “Fragile countries and crisis-affected communities” program activity. IHA
programming addresses the first of the two expected results: enhanced responsiveness of
humanitarian assistance to address the immediate needs of populations affected by
humanitarian emergencies. The bilateral humanitarian programming contributes to both
expected results, including increased effectiveness in responding to basic needs and
providing better access to key services.
The second is the “Global engagement and strategic policy” program activity. IHA, through
its management of partnerships with multilateral humanitarian agencies, contributes to
increased global policy influence and increased effectiveness of Canadian development
cooperation.
35 “Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General
Assembly”, New York City, 16 September 2011 http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2011/2011-030.aspx?lang=eng&view=d 36
“Canada's International Human Rights Policy” http://www.international.gc.ca/rights-droits/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng&view=d Accessed December 2011. 37
“Canada's commitment to gender equality and the advancement of women's rights internationally” http://www.international.gc.ca/rights-droits/women-femmes/equality-egalite.aspx?lang=eng&view=d, Accessed December 2011. 38
“Humanitarian Affairs”, DFAIT, http://www.international.gc.ca/humanitarian-humanitaire/index.aspx?view=d Accessed December 2011. 39
CIDA's Strategic Planning and Reporting Framework website. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NAT-911133132-NK9 Accessed November 2011.
17 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
The third is the “Canadian engagement” activity, in which IHA and bilateral programming
contribute to improved effectiveness of civil society organization’s participation in
international development and humanitarian assistance activities.40
In addition, CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is aligned with the Agency’s Policy Suite through
program activities related to fragile states and communities affected by humanitarian
emergencies, and activities related to global engagement and strategic policy.41 Furthermore,
humanitarian assistance is generally consistent with the Agency’s three priority themes.42
Although humanitarian assistance programming is not expected to align with these themes,
there are interesting examples of ways in which it does: food security (through food aid and
nutrition activities); children and youth (through child survival and maternal health activities) and
stimulating sustainable economic growth (through the provision of food assistance that supports
local markets).
3.2 Continuing Need for Humanitarian Assistance
There is a continuing need for Canada to respond to humanitarian crises.
As noted in Section 1.1, in the past six years, there has been a significant increase in the scale,
frequency and intensity of natural disaster-related emergencies and in the number of people
affected by these events. Although the incidence of conflict-related humanitarian emergencies
appears to have stabilized, their duration and the number of people affected by these crises are
increasing. The success of recent public matching-fund appeals suggests that Canadians
continue to expect that their government will respond in a timely and effective way to these
crises. (See Section 4.2.2.)
In spite of increasing needs, the 2011 Global Humanitarian Assistance report notes that
“humanitarian aid is being stretched.”43 There is an increasing need for humanitarian funding,
not only because of increases in vulnerable populations, but also because of escalating costs
and budgetary constraints. Canada is recognized as a key player by the international
community and, with the increasing call for humanitarian resources, there will be a continuing
need for Canadian humanitarian assistance.
3.3 Priority of Humanitarian Assistance at CIDA
Canada has given priority to humanitarian assistance programming…
40 Even though IHA indicates that it is not required to report on this PAA component, the evaluation
determined that CIDA’s humanitarian programming does contribute to this component. 41
CIDA Strategic Overview: http://acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NAT-911133132-NK9, accessed December 2011. 42
CIDA’s Priority Themes http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/FRA-1015144121-PWW Accessed December 2011. 43
GHA Report 2011, Global Humanitarian Assistance, p. 6, http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf
18 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Humanitarian assistance is a key priority for CIDA. The Agency’s funding for humanitarian
assistance increased, in constant dollars, by 83% from 2005 to 2010. Over the same period,
funding from all bilateral donors declined slightly. 44
The priority of humanitarian assistance was reflected in CIDA’s 2011/12 Report on Plans and
Priorities (RPP), which notes:
Establishment of increasing food security, which includes food aid, is one of CIDA’s three
thematic priorities;
An increase of $50 million to CIDA’s budgetary spending for the establishment of a Quick
Release Mechanism from the existing Crisis Pool to facilitate quick responses to major
unforeseen humanitarian crises;
CIDA’s continuing support for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) – DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile
States as well as the principles and practices of GHD; and
The commitment of multiyear funding to the ICRC and the CERF.45
The RPP also reflects the increasing need for humanitarian assistance in light of the greater
frequency and impact of weather-related natural disasters and complex humanitarian
situations.46
Canada is a major donor to global humanitarian assistance. Canada was the twelfth largest
humanitarian donor globally over the ten years, 2000 – 2009.47 It is among the top ten donors to
the two largest UN humanitarian agencies – WFP and UNHCR.48
3.4 Alignment with Principles and Good Practice of Good
Humanitarian Donorship
… and, with a few concerns, CIDA’s humanitarian programming is generally aligned with GHD.
44 GHA calculation – Total Humanitarian Aid http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/gha-datastore-official-HA-donors-1990-2009.xls Accessed December 2011. 45
Canadian International Development Agency Report on Plans and Priorities for the period ending
March 31, 2012 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2011-2012/inst/ida/ida-eng.pdf Accessed November 2011, p.
7, 9 and 12. 46
Ibid., p. 12. 47
GHA Report 2011, Global Humanitarian Assistance, p. 14.
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf 48
Canada has been the third largest donor to WFP, based on the total donations over the past five years
(2007 – 2011) http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/research/wfp232961.pdf
Accessed November 2011. Canada was the tenth largest government donor to UNHCR and the eighth
largest unrestricted donor in 2010. http://www.unhcr.org/4dfdbf400.html Accessed November 2011.
19 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
CIDA was a key proponent in the development of the GHD principles and good practices – a
key international performance framework for humanitarian assistance programming – and it is
important to assess the extent to which CIDA’s humanitarian programming is aligned with GHD.
The evidence to support the team’s assessment of this alignment is found in subsequent
sections of the report (as noted in brackets).
CIDA is generally aligned with the GHD. Specifically:
CIDA respects basic humanitarian principles by focusing on immediate life-saving activities
from a needs-based perspective (Section 4.1.2);
IHA has adequate needs-based information for making decisions on its humanitarian
funding and provides funding to a wide range of crises (Section 4.3.1);
Although the percentage of CIDA’s humanitarian funding that is core funding has declined
over the past five years, it has been increasing the level of multi-year funding and has been
a significant contributor to CERF (Section 2.2);
CIDA’s food aid budget was completely untied in 2008. CIDA is also broadening its support
to include both food aid and food assistance and supports WFP’s innovative approaches to
food assistance (Section 2.2);
IHA’s grant agreements and its ability to modify agreements based on reasonable
justification provide flexibility to partner organizations (Section 4.3.1);
CIDA is a major supporter of the UN system and provides support for coordination within the
humanitarian system (through funding OCHA) and for capacity building with its multilateral
partners. CIDA is also a key supporter of the pooled funding mechanism of the CERF
(Section 2.2); and
IHA programming is guided by the application of international humanitarian law and other
humanitarian guidelines (Section 5.2.1).
On the other hand, there are areas in which the alignment of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance
with GHD is less clear:
CIDA’s humanitarian funding, primarily channelled through IHA, focuses on immediate relief.
Although some funding for prevention, risk reduction and recovery is provided through
bilateral programming, it represents about seven percent of all CIDA’s humanitarian funding
in the period 2005/06 to 2010/11. In addition, there is limited linking of relief, rehabilitation
and development programming (Section 4.1.2);
There are delays in making and implementing funding decisions, particularly with NGOs.
However, interviews indicated that improving these processes is one element included in the
humanitarian strategy document currently being developed by IHA (Section 4.3.2);
The use of matching funds has the potential to distort humanitarian funding away from being
needs-based (Section 4.3.2); and
20 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
IHA has a number of mechanisms in place to monitor its humanitarian funding. It conducts
multilateral due diligence assessments (about every two years),49 participates on executive
boards and donor support groups for its multilateral partner organizations, and conducts
gender equality assessments, audits and periodic partner evaluations. While it is a good
humanitarian donor, to the extent that it does not impose excessive reporting burdens on its
partners, IHA does not have accountability mechanisms for systematically monitoring and
evaluating the processes and results of its humanitarian assistance. Specifically, CIDA does
not provide readily accessible public information on its allocation of matching funds (Section
4.3.1).
3.5 Conclusion
Humanitarian assistance is a priority for the GoC and CIDA. This is reflected in both CIDA’s
documents and in its level of funding for humanitarian crises. Its humanitarian response is
consistent both with GoC priorities, as reflected in public statements, and CIDA’s overall
strategic priorities, including CIDA’s PAA. The literature reflects that there is likely to be a
growing number of people affected, over prolonged periods, by both natural disasters and
protracted conflicts and, at the same time, increasing humanitarian costs and budgetary
constraints. As a result, there is a continuing need for Canada, including CIDA, to respond to
humanitarian crises.
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming is generally consistent with the GHD principles
and good practice. However, there are some areas in which the alignment is less clear. These
include limited funding for activities beyond immediate relief and limited integration of
humanitarian and development programming. There are also issues related to the timeliness of
funding decisions, the use of matching funds, and some concerns about lack of transparency.
4.0 Design and Delivery of CIDA’s Humanitarian
Assistance
This section addresses the design of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance, focusing on two aspects:
Policy framework and scope of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance for both CIDA’s multilateral
and bilateral programming; and
Management of humanitarian assistance which, given that the primary unit responsible for
programming humanitarian assistance is IHA, addresses the activities managed by that
Directorate.
49
are mandatory for all IHA programming.
21 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
4.1 Policy Framework and Scope of CIDA’s Humanitarian
Assistance
This section provides greater detail on the policy framework for CIDA’s humanitarian assistance
and the scope of the activities carried out in both multilateral and bilateral programming
branches.
4.1.1 Humanitarian Policy
The policy framework for CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is provided in a range of international
and Canadian documents.
The current framework for humanitarian assistance at CIDA is made up of a range of related
policies and guidelines. Some were developed internationally; others were developed by DFAIT
and CIDA. These include:
Humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence
(international);50
Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship (international);51
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations
(international);52
CIDA’s Terms and Conditions for International Development Assistance;53
Guidelines from CIDA’s Policy Branch on programming in fragile states;54
IHA’s Performance Management Strategy;55
DFAIT’s “Government of Canada Standard Operating Procedures in Response to Natural
Disasters Abroad”;56
“Gender Equality and Humanitarian Assistance: A Guide to the Issues;” and
50 http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx, accessed
December 20111. 51
Ibid. 52
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf 53
“Canadian International Development Agency Terms and Conditions for International Development Assistance”, February 2009 54
“An Internal Guide for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States”, January 2008 and “CIDA Operational Guidelines for Program Management in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations”, October 2009 55
“International Humanitarian Assistance Program: Performance Measurement Strategy (PM Strategy) 2009-2013”, CIDA, September 2009 56
“Government of Canada Standard Operating Procedures in Response to Natural Disasters Abroad: Abridged Version”, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 21 July 2011
22 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
“Guidelines for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Project Proposals and Reports.”
There is no government-wide humanitarian policy to set the framework for CIDA’s humanitarian
programming, although CIDA is in the process of developing a corporate strategy. Other donors
have humanitarian policies and strategies.
All these documents guide the decision-making and implementation of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance. Unlike many bilateral donors, Canada neither has an overall whole-of-government
humanitarian policy, nor a specific humanitarian strategy for CIDA. The three comparison donor
countries do have such policies (see Box 2), as do other donor countries, such as the United
Kingdom (UK). A recent review of lessons learned from DAC peer reviews noted that “a cross-
government policy and/or strategy for humanitarian assistance is a critical first step towards
ensuring consistent humanitarian responses that respect the GHD principles and highlight
important areas such as gender equality. This must be anchored in relevant legislation and
accompanied by a realistic implementation plan.”57
A whole-of-government policy was drafted a few years ago by DFAIT, but was never approved.
This policy was reportedly based on the GHD principles, reflected the role of OGDs58 and
addressed issues such as the integration of humanitarian and development programming and
civil-military cooperation. The draft policy identified emergency preparedness and risk reduction
as priorities for Canadian humanitarian assistance.
Box 2: Bilateral Agency Humanitarian Policy Frameworks
Australia
Australia’s humanitarian policy (Humanitarian Action Policy, December 2011) has been revised
to be more explicit about humanitarian assistance. The revisions were undertaken in
consultation with key humanitarian partners. The policy will be accompanied by the
Implementation Plan, which will be time-bound. The Plan will identify specific staff
responsibilities for implementation.
Denmark
Demark has a strategy (Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015: Addressing
Vulnerability, Climate Change and Protection Challenges) which outlines Denmark’s
commitment, in collaboration with its partners, to reach out to the most vulnerable people in
crisis situations. Through this commitment, Denmark seeks to meet the immediate and early
recovery needs of those affected by natural disasters, promote disaster-risk reduction, respond
to the needs of people affected by armed conflict, and support prevention, resilience and early
recovery efforts.
57 “Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship: Twelve Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews” (draft), OECD,
November 2011, p 6. 58
Including DFAIT, CIDA, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of Public Safety.
23 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Sweden
Sweden recently revised its policy framework. It has an overall humanitarian policy (Saving lives
and alleviating suffering: Policy for Sweden’s Humanitarian Assistance 2010–2016, Department
for Development Policy and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) which guides the humanitarian
actions of all Government of Sweden humanitarian actors (including the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Sida, and Ministry of Defence). The policy sets out broad goals and directions of
Sweden’s humanitarian interventions. Based on the overarching policy, Sida, in consultation
with its partners, developed a multi-year strategy that governs Sida’s humanitarian assistance
(Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (Sida) 2011 – 2014, Ministry for Foreign Affairs). This Strategy is
structured around the GHD principles.
IHA has recently drafted a humanitarian strategy that is being discussed by senior management
and, as such, was not available for review.59 Although described as a whole-of-agency strategy,
the text reportedly documents the current humanitarian operations of IHA and identifies four key
priorities for IHA:
Improving the way IHA responds to crises;
Strengthening the humanitarian system;
Strengthening partnerships; and
Building the evidence-base for humanitarian action.
IHA staff indicated that the draft Strategy does not yet cover the whole of CIDA’s humanitarian
response (see Section 4.1.2), focusing on activities that are included solely in IHA’s mandate.
The Strategy was developed on the basis of extensive internal consultations, but it is expected
that external consultation with CIDA’s humanitarian partners will be conducted before the
finalization of the Strategy.
While perceived to be of limited value to internal stakeholders, a corporate strategy would make
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance more understandable and transparent for external
stakeholders.
59 A distinction is made between a “policy” and a “strategy.” A policy would provide the overall framework
for humanitarian assistance at a government-wide level. It would not describe what is to be done, but rather the overall objectives and reflect how each relevant department contributes to these overall objectives. A strategy, on the other hand, would define the specific means that CIDA would use to achieve the overall objectives. It would provide the framework for CIDA’s programming and identify specific objectives and approaches to programming. The Swedish government has adopted a similar structure. It has a policy that “establishes the Government’s overall goal for Swedish humanitarian assistance. It sets out the basic premises and principles that are to guide the preparation and implementation of this assistance, and specifies the direction that work in this area is to take.” (Saving lives and alleviating suffering: Policy for Sweden’s Humanitarian Assistance 2010–2016, Department for Development Policy and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) Sida applies this policy in the implementation of its strategy.
24 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Internal and external stakeholders had mixed views with respect to the value of a humanitarian
assistance policy or strategy. For the most part, IHA and some bilateral program stakeholders
did not think that a policy or strategy would assist them in their work. They felt that the existing
framework of external principles and guidelines, as well as internal operating procedures,
provide sufficient direction for the effective day-to-day management of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance. However, they did recognize the importance of a formal document for
communicating CIDA’s approach to humanitarian assistance both within CIDA and with OGDs
and other partners.
On the other hand, most NGO stakeholders felt that a strategy would make CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance more transparent and predictable. Some expressed concerns about
the possibility that the development of a framework would mean that CIDA would micro-manage
its funding – NGO partners appreciate the current flexibility of IHA and the lack of micro-
management. Both internal and external stakeholders recognized that the process of developing
a framework that guides humanitarian activities would be beneficial in terms of providing space
for the discussion of fundamental humanitarian assistance issues, such as the scope of CIDA’s
assistance and its integration with development assistance, as well as CIDA’s engagement with
its humanitarian partners.
4.1.2 Scope of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming focuses on immediate life saving activities. Other
donors give more attention to activities related to emergency preparedness and early
recovery…
The Ts&Cs for CIDA’s international development assistance include a fairly broad range of
humanitarian assistance activities. However, IHA, as the primary implementer of CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance, focuses on immediate life saving activities, with limited funding for
emergency preparedness and early recovery.
CIDA’s definition is consistent with the basic elements of the definitions used in many
international humanitarian organizations. Descriptions tend to refer to saving lives, alleviating
suffering and maintaining and protecting human dignity.60 However, other humanitarian
organizations also include other components of humanitarian assistance that contribute to
broader objectives. The OECD-DAC suggests that this definition include “disaster prevention
and preparedness, reconstruction relief, relief coordination, protection and support services,
emergency food aid and other emergency/distress relief.”61 While not all these components are
included in IHA’s mandate, the scope of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is in fact broader, if
both IHA and bilateral programming are included.
60 See the definitions used by the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA), the DAC, Good Humanitarian
Donorship (GHD) etc. www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/humanitarian-aid-in-the-dac-context-
570.html Accessed November 2011. Definitions used in this report are provided in Annex C. 61
Ibid
25 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
… however, a review of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance suggests that the scope is, in fact,
broader, if both IHA and bilateral programming are included...
IHA programming
The scope of humanitarian activities at CIDA varies by Branch: MGPB (IHA), GPB and PWCB.
IHA’s current mandate focuses on immediate relief – addressing the food, water, health,
sanitation, shelter and physical security needs of populations affected by conflicts and natural
disasters in the short-term – and relations with other humanitarian agencies. These activities fall
within the DAC category of “emergency food assistance” and “material relief assistance and
services”, and accounted for 45% and 49% of MGPB’s humanitarian spending respectively over
the past six years.
Core funding
IHA was a lead promoter of the CERF and has provided substantial funding to the CERF since it
replaced the Central Emergency Revolving Fund in 2006. Since 2006, IHA has contributed
$182.6 million to the Fund. Preliminary 2010/11 data indicates that amounts provided to CERF
($69.4M) nearly equalled core funding to key organizations. This contributes to ensuring that the
CERF has rapidly available funding for emergency responses (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: CIDA’s Core Funding and Funding to CERF, 2005/06 – 2010/1162 (in $ millions)63
Source: Evaluation Team calculations on basis of CIDA Agency Information System (AIS), Statistical Analysis and Reporting, CFO Branch (2011/10/27 and 2011/12/14)
Note: 2010/11 figures are preliminary, and may differ following quality assurance.
62 Annual fluctuations in CERF funding are due to the cash management of an initial five-year
commitment. 63
IHA’s core funding is allocated by calendar year. This analysis is based on fiscal year as per figures provided by CIDA’s corporate database. Therefore, it may not provide a 100% accurate picture of annual core funding levels.
26 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Emergency preparedness
Currently IHA’s primary focus for emergency preparedness is on developing the capacity of the
humanitarian system, through partner organizations, including:64
Maintaining a stockpile of humanitarian relief supplies;
Funding the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) to maintain a roster of Canadian experts
for deployment as RC delegates and the training of these delegates;
Funding the CRCS First Responder Initiative for the establishment and deployment of an
emergency field hospital and reinforcing the response capacity of National Red Cross
Societies in the Americas by developing and improving contingency planning and early
warning systems;
Funding CANADEM to contribute to the maintenance of Canadian humanitarian experts,
including the costs of their short-term assignments; and
Funding to the Pan American Health Organization’s Emergency Preparedness and Disaster
Relief Programme.
Early recovery
Current IHA programming also includes some activities in the area of early recovery if they are
directly associated with the provision of immediate relief. Examples from the case studies
include:
Removal of rubble in Haiti, which facilitated humanitarian access but also contributed to
early recovery for those affected by the earthquake; and
Food-for-work and asset scheme activities in Sudan, as part of WFP’s emergency
operations. They aim to help households improve their ability to secure food, while
conserving community-based livelihoods assets such as water or grazing lands.
IHA may also cover a broader range of humanitarian activities as a result of its core funding to
multilateral organizations. If the partner organization has a mandate that includes early
recovery, then IHA’s core funding supports these activities as well. For example, in the late
1990s, WFP – IHA’s largest humanitarian assistance partner – began to explore ways to blend
immediate relief with longer-term development activities. In 1998, it replaced its programming
category of Protracted Relief Operation with Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation category
in “a clear acknowledgement that recovery and development objectives should be integrated
64 This section describes IHA activities. For a discussion of results, see Section 5.0.
27 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
into the design of relief operations at a very early stage.”65 CIDA participates in this through its
core funding to WFP.
West Bank and Gaza programming
CIDA’s funding in West Bank and Gaza is channelled primarily through the UN’s Consolidated
Appeal Process (CAP),66 which focuses on large-scale, sustained humanitarian action, efficient
and effective life saving and protection and promotion of livelihoods.67 As such, CIDA’s funding
covers a wide range of activities, including immediate relief activities, emergency preparedness
and early recovery:
Support to UNRWA for the provision of food assistance and health and education services
to Palestinian refugees;
Support to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to protect the livelihoods of small
farmers, and prevent them from falling into an emergency case load; and
Support to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for the removal of unexploded
ordnance and rubble in the Gaza Strip.
Other bilateral programming
Other geographic programs also fund humanitarian assistance (as defined by the DAC). As
shown in Figure 2, about one-quarter ($117M) of bilateral programming is in “reconstruction
relief and rehabilitation” and another 6% ($26M) in “disaster prevention and preparedness.” This
accounts for about seven percent of CIDA’s total humanitarian funding in the six-year period.
However, these figures include the humanitarian assistance programming implemented by the
two bilateral desks that have sole responsibility for humanitarian assistance in their
region/country (Afghanistan and West Bank and Gaza).68 If this funding is removed, the bilateral
funding for “reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation” and “disaster prevention and preparedness”
combined accounts for $118M. Examples of bilateral funding for prevention and recovery were
identified in the case studies.
65 “Looking Forward: Humanitarian Policy Concerns for WFP”, World Food Programme, General
WFP/EB.3/99/9-B, 16 September 1999, p. 5 66
IHA also provides funding to the ICRC in the West Bank and Gaza. 67
Consolidated Appeal Process, http://unocha.org/cap/about-the-cap/about-process. Accessed January 2012. 68
With the exception of the funding provided by IHA to the ICRC in the West Bank and Gaza.
28 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 2: Humanitarian Assistance Expenditures, by Sector, by Branch, 2005/06 - 2010/11
Source: Source: CFOB Projects list. Analysis by evaluation team
Note: Humanitarian assistance and the specific categories are based on DAC Humanitarian Aid
coding. Spending by PWCB included under Geographic programs (0.1% of total HA spending
during 2005-06 to 2010-11).
In South Sudan’s Western and Central Equatoria states, CIDA supported mine clearance
and restoration of over 350,000m2 previously unusable land to support agricultural
production; and
CIDA strengthened the capacity of the government and civil society in Colombia to respond
to the needs of internally displaced people, including displaced children and youth, and to
prevent displacement.
...yet confusion remains, internally and externally, about the scope of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance.
Interviews with CIDA multilateral and bilateral staff clearly indicate that the role of the
geographic programs in providing humanitarian assistance is not widely recognized within
CIDA. It is generally understood that, with the exception of Afghanistan and West Bank and
Gaza, humanitarian assistance is delivered by IHA and the bilateral programs do development.
Figure 3 attempts to present visually the range humanitarian programming at CIDA, by Branch.
The darker sections represent the areas of the most funding. This is, by necessity, only an
approximation of the scope and level of CIDA’s programming.
29 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 3: Range of Humanitarian Programming, by CIDA Branch
DAC criteria
CIDA channel
MGPB IHA
GPB Specific desks*
GPB Other desk
Disaster
prevention and
preparedness
Reconstruction
relief and
rehabilitation
Emergency
response
* Currently West Bank/Gaza and Afghanistan
To the extent that it is not funding a broader range of DRR activities, CIDA is not taking
advantage of the full scope of activities in its mandate, as defined in the section on international
humanitarian assistance in CIDA’s Ts&Cs for development assistance. The Ts&Cs specify that
international humanitarian assistance includes disaster risk reduction.
Moreover, the confusion about what is included in humanitarian assistance at CIDA may be
compounded by some CIDA communications. CIDA’s humanitarian assistance website69
includes a rubric “CIDA’s Humanitarian Response to Crises”, which links the reader to a page
on “Reducing the Impact of Natural Disasters” which outlines CIDA’s commitment to DRR and
supporting global initiatives.70 However, in spite of being included in the links for CIDA’s
humanitarian response, this commitment is part of its development programming, not
humanitarian assistance. 71
69 http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-24132427-PLC
70 “Reducing the Impact of Natural Disasters”, CIDA http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-
CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-218113033-MD6 Accessed December 2011 71
DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) gives Canada one of its lowest ratings in the area of funding for post-emergency reconstruction and prevention: Humanitarian Response Index, DARA, 2010, Donor profile http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Canada-Donor-Assessment_HRI-2010.pdf. The HRI is a tool used by DARA for measuring the individual performance of government donors against Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. While the DARA rating provides an interesting summary of donor performance, IHA has indicated that many donors, including Canada, have raised concerns over the methodology and the significance of the results. The main criticism is that both the quantitative and qualitative information gathered by DARA are susceptible to error and interpretation and do not fully capture or accurately reflect donor activities. It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess these concerns. DARA is one source among many that have been used, with the caveats identified in this
30 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
The humanitarian community, including some IHA staff, recognizes the need to implement, and
the challenge of implementing, humanitarian assistance from a broader perspective…
Although most stakeholders (UN, NGOs and CIDA staff) were critical of CIDA’s lack of formal
emphasis on activities in the areas of prevention, preparedness, reconstruction and
rehabilitation, it was recognized that this is a challenge being faced by other donors in the
humanitarian community. Stakeholders’ perceptions are evolving because the humanitarian
world is changing. There is increasing dialogue in the humanitarian and development
communities, including UN agencies, NGOs and academics, about the importance of adopting a
broader definition of humanitarian assistance, linking relief, rehabilitation and development
(LRRD) programming and mainstreaming DRR into development assistance. (See Box 3 for
examples of the perception of various communities.)
The gap between relief and development has been debated for many years. In the past, relief
and development were thought to be part of a continuum. The thinking has evolved in recent
years. The literature identified that relief and development are best implemented
simultaneously. The UK’s Humanitarian Emergency Response Review called for funding
recovery activities from the onset of the emergency, recommending that “recovery and
livelihoods funding is considered during and immediately after the Critical Period (of
humanitarian assistance).”72
In rapid onset disasters, activities in early recovery are critical to an effective humanitarian
response, an important bridge between humanitarian and development programming and a
means to empower populations affected by humanitarian emergencies to take responsibility for
their own recovery. In protracted emergencies, activities in emergency preparedness are
important to provide the necessary local capacity and help reduce the need for future
humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian actors now tend to recognise that disasters induce
protracted situations, and that protracted situations induce disasters.
The importance of transition financing in protracted emergencies is also highlighted in the
literature.73 For instance, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), in which
CIDA is participating (primarily through Policy Branch), recommended the following in a
presentation at the Busan High-Level Forum in November 2011: strengthen overall engagement
in transition; develop greater agreement on priority needs during transition; identify the
appropriate instrument to respond to these priority needs; and improve collective engagement
through transition compacts. In the end, “there is a need for serious and significant reform to
footnote. 72
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, 2011, p. 60 73
“Transition financing covers a broad spectrum of activities that traditionally fall between the “humanitarian” and “development” categories, including recovery and reconstruction activities and security-related and peacebuilding activities (often referred to as stablisation).” Conflict and Fragility Transitioning Financing: Building a Better Response, OECD, 2010, p. 15
31 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
create faster, more flexible and predictable financing against a more coherent and prioritised
strategy.”74
Box 3: Views from Humanitarian and Development Communities on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles
#1 The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity
during and the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen
preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
#8 Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate
and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities
are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
#9 Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development,
striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods
and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities. (“23 Principles and Good
Practice of Humanitarian Donorship” http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-
practice-ghd/overview.aspx (Accessed November 2011))
UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition
“During and immediately after a crisis, national actors and the international community focus primarily on
meeting immediate life-saving needs. Human lives are at risk and quick action is required to minimize
damage and restore order. From the very beginning, however, there is a need for more than life-saving
measures. The foundations for sustainable recovery and a return to longer-term development should be
planned from the outset of a humanitarian emergency. The focus should be on restoring national
capacities to provide a secure environment, offer services, restore livelihoods, coordinate activities,
prevent the recurrence of crisis, and create conditions for future development.” (Guidance note on Early
Recovery, Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, in cooperation with the UNDG-ECHA Working
Group on Transition, April 2008, p. 6)
Linking Relief and Recovery
“Agencies need to focus on the recovery phase even from the start of the operation as there is no gap
between relief and recovery, and recovery is the biggest challenge in sudden-onset natural disasters. The
distinction between relief and recovery is an artificial one. For a household after an earthquake, relief
actions to save the lives or reduce the suffering of household members or neighbours may be
accompanied by efforts to protect livelihoods by rescuing assets such as livestock and tools. The
distinction between relief and recovery at the donor level is clear in terms of how funding applications are
dealt with, but making the distinction in the field is far more difficult – and irrelevant to affected
households.” (“Responding to earthquakes 2008: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery
operations”, ProVention Consortium/ALNAP, 2008, p. 3)
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development (LRRD)
74 “Supporting Coherent and Sustainable Transition from Conflict to Peace: Draft Guidance”, DAC,
DCD/DAC(2011)41, 4 November 2011, p. 42
32 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Koddenbrock notes that “… practice and research have shown that LRRD is best pursued if rehabilitation
and (return- to) development measures are implemented immediately after the start of and alongside
relief activities.” (The Will to Bridge? European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking Relief,
Rehabilitation, and Development. Kai Koddenbrock in Humanitarian Assistance: Improving U.S.-
European Cooperation. Julia Steets and Daniel S. Hamilton (eds), Center for Transatlantic Relations, The
Johns Hopkins University/Global Public Policy Institute, 2009. Section 8, p. 121)
However, it is also recognized in the literature that funding for activities beyond immediate relief,
and linking humanitarian assistance to development, are challenges faced by the humanitarian
community at large. The summary of lessons learned from DAC Peer Reviews notes that
donors continue to struggle to deliver on the ninth GHD principle: “deliver humanitarian
assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery.” The summary suggests that donors need to
“go further, to support humanitarian funding to support spontaneous community-led recovery
initiatives and focusing on strengthening the reliance of vulnerable communities, including the
central role of women, to likely future crises and shocks.”75 The 2011 Global Humanitarian
Assistance (GHA) report notes “Expenditure on preparedness and prevention has not been a
significant priority for any of the top humanitarian recipients in the past five years.”76
… but other donors and the humanitarian community provide examples of this approach...
All three bilateral donors selected for the comparison conducted for this evaluation have taken a
broader definition of humanitarian assistance (see Figure 4). The recent evaluation of Sweden’s
humanitarian assistance noted that Sida is unlike other donors in its capacity to provide flexible
funding for recovery activities.77 In fact, disaster prevention and recovery are two cross-cutting
themes in Sida’s humanitarian assistance strategy.78
Figure 4: Comparable donor goals/objectives of humanitarian assistance
Bilateral donor Goal/objective of humanitarian assistance
Australia To protect lives, alleviate suffering, maintain human dignity and assist
recovery from conflict, natural and other disasters, through effective
response, prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.
Denmark The objectives of Denmark’s humanitarian action are to save and protect
lives, alleviate suffering and promote the dignity and rights of civilians in crisis
situations; as well as to initiate recovery, build resilience to and prevent future
crises by breaking the cycle between crises and vulnerability.
Sweden To save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of
75 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review., p. 7
76 GHA Report 2011, Global Humanitarian Assistance, p. 80
77 Evaluation of Sida’s Humanitarian Assistance: Final Synthesis Report, Tasneem Mowjee and Judith
Randel, April 2010, p. 65 78
Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 2011 – 2014, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, p. 2
33 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Bilateral donor Goal/objective of humanitarian assistance
people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed
conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations. Disaster prevention
and recovery are two cross-cutting perspectives for humanitarian assistance.
Source: AusAID, “Humanitarian Action Policy”, December 2011; “Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015”; SIDA, “Saving Lives and Alleviating Suffering, Policy for Sweden’s Humanitarian Assistance, 2010 – 2016”
The need for a broad definition of humanitarian assistance is also identified in other evaluations.
A recent review of humanitarian assistance evaluations carried out for the National Audit Office
of Finland, identified, as the primary area for donor recommendations, the need for “increasing
investments for disaster prevention, preparedness and disaster risk reduction and the need to
link relief, rehabilitation and development, in order to build resilience and reduce
vulnerabilities.”79
… and some CIDA discourse reflects this approach
IHA staff are aware of and appreciate the issues associated with a broader definition of
humanitarian assistance. The extent to which the broader range of activities is being discussed
at CIDA is reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding that Canada recently signed with
Australia to strengthen international development efforts, including humanitarian assistance.80
This MoU recognizes the broader scope of humanitarian assistance by identifying the following
as “areas of common interest for AusAID and CIDA cooperation”:
Humanitarian and disaster response: improved disaster management, preparedness and
response capability of developing countries and regional/international partners; and
Reconstruction and stabilization, peace and security: enhanced peace and stability within
fragile and conflict-affected countries.81
4.2 Gender Equality
IHA has a Gender Equality Action Plan and the Agency has begun to assess its humanitarian
partners’ capacity to deliver gender equality results.
79 “International Humanitarian Aid 2007–2010 – An Evaluation Synthesis”, International publications of the
National Audit Office of Finland, 2011, p. 7. This review was one component of a performance audit on the effectiveness of Finnish-funded humanitarian aid. The report presents findings from 35 evaluations, reviews and analytical reports on humanitarian aid. 80
“Memorandum of Understanding on International Development Cooperation between the Australian
Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA)”, 29 November 2011. 81
Ibid, Annex A.
34 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Gender equality is a cross-cutting theme for CIDA’s programming. The Agency has been seen
by some stakeholders as a leader in promoting gender equality through its policy dialogue and
humanitarian programming. IHA relies on a gender equality-related policy, guidelines and action
plan:
CIDA’s Policy on gender equality;
Gender Equality and Humanitarian Assistance Guide; and
Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.
Gender equality remains a relatively new concept in humanitarian assistance, and the capacity
within IHA to undertake gender equality analysis varies from one officer to another.
Nonetheless, the Agency is pro-active in designing better tools and is increasingly requesting
more information from partners regarding their gender equality approaches and plans. Gender
specialists from MGPB provide input for policy dialogue with multilateral organizations. Gender
equality related statements are often negotiated with other donor countries as joint statements
and, as a result, usually have more influence. IHA recently developed a Gender Equality Action
Plan and MGPB is undertaking gender equality institutional assessments of IHA NGO partners
(e.g. Oxfam Canada, Oxfam Quebec, Plan, Care, MSF, World Vision, Save the Children) and
multilateral organizations (e.g. WFP, OCHA and UNHCR) partners. The assessment tool for
multilaterals focuses on the capacity of the organizations to plan for, achieve, and report on,
gender equality development results. However, the assessments also include information on
humanitarian assistance programming related to gender equality, and to some extent, results -
particularly in the case of UNHCR, which focuses entirely on emergencies.
The evaluation did not assess the overall results of gender equality in humanitarian
programming, but two geographic programs have made notable steps in integrating gender
equality in their operations. The first is the Pakistan Program, which engaged the Pakistan
military in integrating gender equality in its Earthquake, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
program. The second is the Thai-Burma Border Consortium. Through its Canadian partner,
Interpares, TBBS provides shelter, food and services, and runs a number of refugee camps
along the Thai-Burma border. The bilateral program officer routinely involves the Gender
Equality Specialist in reviewing project proposals and reports, formulating policy dialogue lines
and monitoring the project (including site visits). These activities are based on CIDA's Gender
Equality Policy guidelines and have been supported by tools and approaches commonly used
by bilateral specialists. For both programs, the bilateral desk has ensured support for consistent
and strong gender equality integration. While these programs are good examples of integration
of gender equality considerations in humanitarian assistance programming, consistent
integration across all humanitarian programs is reportedly not always systematic.
4.3 IHA Management of Humanitarian Assistance
This section focuses on IHA’s management of humanitarian assistance, given that the majority
of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is managed by this directorate.
35 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
4.3.1 Management of Responsive Funding
IHA has, over the years, developed both formal and informal approaches to the management of
its responsive programming. This section assesses its approaches to assessing humanitarian
needs, selecting implementing partners and projects, and approving projects; the timeliness of
funding; and monitoring and evaluating its humanitarian funding.
Needs Assessment and Partner and Project Selection for Specific
Humanitarian Crises
IHA has appropriate tools for collecting and analyzing needs-based information for decision-
making …
IHA does not gather needs-related data directly, but rather collects information on needs from a
variety of sources, including emergency appeals, Canada’s diplomatic missions abroad, its
multilateral and NGO partners and donor networks. IHA is a major supporter of the UN appeal
system, in part because of the UN’s systematic approach to assessing needs and its capacity to
provide coordination mechanisms, primarily through OCHA and the cluster system. Canada,
with other donors, has worked with the UN system to strengthen the CAP, with the goal of
ensuring that the identification of funding requirements is based on the accurate assessment of
needs at the country level. The UN appeal processes provide key information for IHA’s
assessment of needs, and also provide a benchmark for measuring the level of CIDA’s
response. As a result, most CIDA, UN agency and NGO stakeholders reported that IHA had
relevant information from its partners for determining the needs for any given humanitarian
response. IHA’s decision-making involves choosing among a number of options proposed by its
partners for programming in a given country. This task can be undertaken with more general
information than would be required to assess basic needs and design programs to address
them, which is the task of IHA’s partners.
There are a number of key considerations in the identification of IHA’s funding for any
humanitarian emergency, including the extent of the emergency, the capacity of local
responders, availability of credible needs assessment information and appropriate programming
options, access and security constraints, as well as the availability of resources. IHA also takes
into consideration Canada’s share of the international response burden – expected to be about
3% – 5% of the collective response of DAC members.82 In fact, over the period covered by the
evaluation, Canada’s contribution to all Consolidated and Flash appeals has ranged from 2.6%
to 3.6% of total funding for the appeal.83
82 “CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance”, undated, p.8.
Although the purpose for which this paper was written
is not known, it provides an outline of humanitarian assistance — what it is, recent trends affecting international humanitarian action, and the scale and scope of Canada’s humanitarian programming. Looking forward, it also identifies a number of areas on which CIDA could focus its attention in order to enhance its leadership role in responding to humanitarian crises.
83 Note that this includes all donors, not just the DAC donors.
36 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
IHA staff indicated that it had been a leader in the development of needs assessment tools and
that these tools laid the foundation for similar tools developed by other agencies. IHA has
developed two tools for the analysis of information used to determine the level of need:
A calibration tool to assess CIDA’s contribution to natural disasters, which “links a defined
CIDA response to the scale of an event/emergency and serves as a standard way of
comparing the severity of different natural disasters;”84 and
A Humanitarian Needs Index (HNI) that is used for comparing the relative severity of
complex emergencies in order to inform the allocation of humanitarian resources.
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is delivered primarily through partnerships with multilateral
organizations and NGOs, and implemented through grant agreements and arrangements.85 IHA
programs with a limited number of partners that are deemed to have the most experience,
operational capacity, and best performance track-records and, therefore, best placed to provide
a more timely, efficient, and effective response. Funding for food assistance is provided
primarily through WFP and the Canadian FoodGrains Bank (CFGB) since these organizations
have adequate logistics capacity, and provide economies of scale in the delivery of food aid.
Occasionally food assistance is provided through the ICRC in regions of the world where WFP
access is limited. Non-food aid is provided through both multilateral organizations (e.g. UNHCR
and UNICEF), the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs (e.g. World Vision,
CARE Canada, Save the Children Canada, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam). Funding for
humanitarian coordination is provided primarily through OCHA.
Since IHA funding is responsive, there is no formal process of calls for proposals from partners.
However, guidelines for NGO partners are on the IHA website and are currently being reviewed.
In order for IHA to be able to assess proposals from partners in a timely way, partners who
contact IHA are notified about whether IHA will be making funding recommendations for a given
response by a specific date, should they be interested in submitting a funding proposal.86 Most
partners reported that the proposal process is straight-forward and does not place a heavy
burden on them.
Once IHA confirms that the conditions for a humanitarian response are met, it assesses whether
the partner organization meets institutional and programming criteria, such as: minimum
conditions of humanitarian experience, experience in the affected country, capacity to respond,
and whether the proposed response will contribute towards meeting the basic needs of affected
84 “CIDA’S Humanitarian Assistance”, p.10
85 IHA has a few contribution agreements for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, but the majority of
its agreements are grant agreements and grant arrangements. 86
A few years ago, IHA provided NGOs with the opportunity to become eligible to submit an abridged proposal form during the first two weeks of a rapid onset disaster. While this did not preclude other organizations from submitting proposals, it was designed to simplify the process for its NGO partners by allowing them to present shorter funding proposals. However, the current situation with respect to the acceptability of these shorter proposals is not well understood across Canadian NGOs. IHA is currently in the process of reviewing its NGO proposal guidelines.
37 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
populations in a timely, effective and appropriate manner, while meeting the criteria of efficiency
and value for money and meeting IHA’s criteria of being immediate life-saving.87
Based on the resulting short-list of partners, recommendations are prepared by IHA staff for
funding. These recommendations are not based on a structured point-based system, but rather
on the experience of staff (including those in the field), their knowledge of the countries and the
partners, as well as the match with identified needs. Documentation on the recommended
projects is sent for comment to CIDA headquarters (HQ) geographic desks, CIDA staff at the
post and DFAIT. Once comments have been received, IHA staff prepare a Project Approval
Document for approval by senior management and the Minister, depending on delegated
authorities. Typically, projects are approved in packages. This allows IHA staff to compare
proposals for the delivery of comparable services for the same response. It also allows for a
more efficient and flexible approval process with senior management and the Minister.
The process for CAP funding is different. CAPs are developed for most protracted emergencies
in the last three months of the calendar year. Once the funding envelope has been determined,
CIDA staff review the CAP components and make recommendations on funding for activities
that fall within its mandate.
… and flexible mechanisms for responding to humanitarian emergencies
IHA funds those partners that are best placed to meet the needs of the target population.
Typically, this results in a balance between multilateral and NGO partners. Funding for NGOs
may be higher following rapid onset disasters in instances where NGOs have better access to
affected populations or are able to mobilize their resources more quickly. On the other hand,
multilateral organizations may receive a higher proportion of IHA funding for protracted
emergencies because, in the view of IHA staff, they are better able to provide a long-term,
stable response. The assessment of the most appropriate partner always includes an analysis
of the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the partners.
Canada’s 2008 decision to untie its food aid budget has increased flexibility for its partners so
that they can procure food locally, which has reportedly helped reduce associated purchase and
transportation costs and promoted more timely responses.
However, how decisions are made is not transparent to all partner stakeholders. NGOs that do
not receive regular funding, reported that it is not clear what CIDA will fund in any given context.
However, most NGOs appreciate the fact that IHA staff are open to responding to questions, to
the extent that they can within the context of a responsive program. On the other hand, the core
NGOs that receive regular funding from CIDA generally appear to understand how decisions are
made.
87 It also conducts due diligence procedures, using a “Due Diligence Assessment” template.
38 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
During project implementation, most IHA partner stakeholders were in agreement that CIDA is a
flexible donor, in terms of managing signed agreements. IHA is very responsive, open to making
programming changes with a minimum of administrative burden and open to no-cost project
extensions. While IHA staff do not have delegated authority to approve these changes, the
flexibility in being able to discuss them with partners is both appreciated by partners and
important, given the changing nature of humanitarian responses.
Timeliness of Project Approval
There are delays in the approval of some NGO project funding …
There are no documented service standards for IHA’s required procedures and approvals of
humanitarian funding. Views on the timeliness of humanitarian funding are mixed and vary
depending on the type of funding. UN agencies receiving funding under the CAP, i.e. for
protracted emergencies, are generally satisfied with the timeliness because CIDA’s funding
approvals are usually made before the end of the government fiscal year (31 March) and,
hence, in the first three months of the partner agency’s financial year.
However, views on the timeliness of funding for NGOs are also mixed. On the one hand, NGOs
that also do development programming recognize that IHA’s decisions are much timelier than
those of the geographic desks. On the other hand, most NGOs noted that although they are
often asked, in the case of rapid onset disasters, to submit proposals very quickly, they do not
get rapid funding decisions from CIDA. Some NGOs reported examples of extraordinarily long
time frames for finalizing IHA funding (Box 4), particularly for protracted emergencies – delays
that were significant enough that the NGO was required to redesign the programming proposal
because needs of the affected populations had changed significantly. There is, of course, a
balance to be achieved between speed and high quality decision-making, including ensuring
due diligence.
Box 4: Examples of Delays in Signing Project Agreements
NGO respondents identified particular challenges with delays in approvals for three specific humanitarian
responses. Data is available for two of these:
Cholera outbreak in Haiti – average time from the submission of the proposal to a signed agreement
for six NGO partner projects was five weeks;
Response to cyclone in Burma (data was not reviewed by the team); and
Humanitarian emergency in Sudan – average time from submission of the proposal to a signed
agreement for five NGO partner projects in 2010 and 2011 was 34 weeks.
An analysis of the timeliness of approval processes on projects funded in the last two years in
the four case study countries managed by IHA (Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti and Sudan) provides a
clearer understanding of the timing issues. On average, it took 15 weeks from the receipt of a
proposal to a signed agreement with the partner (Figure 5).
39 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 5: Timelines for Approval of IHA Funding for 4 Case Study Countries, 2009/10 –
2010/1188
Timeline All projects (average weeks)
Time from receipt of proposal to development of Project Approval Document (PAD) 6.5 (n = 29)
Time from preparation of PAD to approval of PAD 5.4 (n = 54)
Time from approval of PAD to signed agreement with partner 4.3 (n = 86)
Summary: Time from receipt of proposal to signed agreement 15.0 (n = 47)
Source: Review of IHA project files by evaluation team (n = 98)89
However, there are differences by type of partner, and type of emergency:
The average time to approve the project is comparable for both types of organizations (5.9
weeks, on average, for multilateral organizations and 5.1 weeks for NGOs). However, the
time from approval of the PAD to a signed agreement is longer for multilateral organizations
than NGOs, 6.5 weeks and 2.0 weeks, respectively.
The timeframes appear to be, on average, shorter for rapid onset disasters than protracted
emergencies. This is particularly the case for the time required to approve the project – on
average, 2.3 weeks for rapid onset disasters and 10 weeks for protracted emergencies.
There is less difference in the time to prepare the partner agreements between the two
types of emergencies. It takes, on average, 3.9 weeks to prepare agreements(from the time
of project approval) for rapid onset disasters, and 4.9 weeks for protracted emergencies.
Delays are introduced, at least in part, because CIDA is not always able to exercise its
delegated authority for funding. Consequently, elements of flexibility and timeliness, which are
key to effectiveness in humanitarian assistance, may be lost.
... but IHA has implemented other mechanisms to facilitate quick responses and is planning to
give priority to addressing these processes in its humanitarian assistance strategy.
Although there are delays in approving and signing agreements, particularly for NGO projects,
IHA is addressing the rapidity of its overall response in innovative ways:
88 As noted in the evaluation limitations, there were gaps in the information that could be collected from
the IHA project files, particularly for submission dates for multilateral organization proposals. This detracts from the reliability of this data. As such, these timelines should be taken as illustrative of the issue of delays in funding approval that were identified strongly in interviews and case studies. 89
The “n” does not equal 98 in all cases, because there were dates not available in some files. The team also removed some cases where the time between events was either a negative number or so large as to suggest that there was an error in the dates.
40 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Moving to more multi-year and flexible funding for partner organizations;
Building a Quick Release Mechanism into the Crisis Pool. The Crisis Pool allows CIDA to
access additional funding from the GoC International Assistance Envelope (IAE) for new
crises. The Quick Release Mechanism simplifies procedures for accessing this funding by
providing a frozen allotment of $50M in CIDA’s Reference Levels;
Considerable funding for the CERF;
Setting up rapid response mechanisms with the CRCS;90 and
Improving response mechanisms has been identified as a key priority in CIDA’s draft
humanitarian assistance strategy.
In addition, IHA staff indicated that they are often able to advise partners of the approval of their
funding before the official signing of agreements, allowing them to begin implementing their
projects in advance. But, this only addresses delays that occur after the project has been
approved (e.g. in the preparation of agreements) – not delays in project approval. Moreover,
partners can include all activities/expenditures from the date that the proposal was submitted to
CIDA under the project budget. The extent to which partners are able to take advantage of this
depends on their ability to pre-finance their response.
90 IHA has set up the Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF) with the Canadian Red Cross. This
fund allows the CRCS to draw down funding, up to a maximum of $200,000, for humanitarian responses for which the IFRC has issued an appeal.
41 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Monitoring and Evaluation
IHA has a number of monitoring mechanisms in place and does not impose a heavy reporting
burden on partner organizations …
In 2009, IHA developed a Performance Measurement Strategy that identifies the planned
results for IHA’s programming, outlines mechanisms in place for measuring performance and
identifies the challenges of measuring humanitarian results.91 Recognizing the challenges of
measurement in the humanitarian system, the Strategy proposed a number of mechanisms for
collecting and reporting on performance that focus on components of the humanitarian system,
rather than impacts on beneficiaries (see Box 5). The Strategy made the “…assumption that an
effective humanitarian system will produce more positive humanitarian outputs, which are
difficult to measure …. For example, it is impossible to get an accurate number of lives saved by
a humanitarian operation, as there are simply too many variables involved in such a calculation.
However, it would be fair to say that a more timely and appropriate humanitarian response
(elements of the humanitarian reform that are more measurable) would contribute to save more
lives.”92
Box 5: IHA Performance Measurement Mechanisms
IHA’s Performance Measurement Strategy identifies a number of mechanisms in which it engages for
measuring the performance of CIDA, its partners, the Government of Canada and the humanitarian
system;
Corporate focus: This includes corporate evaluations, DAC Peer Reviews (a review is currently
underway) and information from external performance indexes, such as the GHA analyses of
humanitarian funding;
Partner focus: This includes multi-donor evaluations, engagement in the Multilateral Organisation
Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) and periodic independent evaluations of IHA’s NGOs
partners’ programs;
Government of Canada focus: This includes participation in DFAIT-led After-Action Reviews (in addition,
IHA conducted its own AAR after the response to the Haiti earthquake); and
Humanitarian system focus: This includes external evaluations of the humanitarian system’s performance
(such as the review of the CERF’s first year operations commissioned and funded by CIDA in 2007) and
monitoring the progress and quality of the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance by international
NGOs (for example, SPHERE and ALNAP), some of which received IHA funding.
91 “International Humanitarian Assistance Program Performance Measurement Strategy (Pm Strategy)
2009-2013”, CIDA, September 2009 92
Ibid, p. 5
42 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
IHA has two key sources of information to assess the performance of its funding – partner
narrative and financial or initiative-specific reports, as well annual reports and monitoring
information from IHA and post staff.
Most NGO and UN agency stakeholders consider that CIDA’s reporting requirements are
flexible and less of a burden in comparison to some other aid agencies (such as the European
Commission and USAID) and comparable to others (such as Australia, Denmark and Sweden).
Multilateral organization stakeholders appreciate CIDA’s willingness to accept their report format
and standards. This is consistent with the GHD good practice related to the use of common
reporting formats. While NGO partners are comfortable with the requirement to use the standard
reports that are prescribed in the CIDA funding guidelines, they do question the differences in
the level of reporting required from NGOs versus multilateral partners. Since the latter can use
their standard reports to donors, the information provided is much less focused on CIDA’s
funding than is the case for NGO reporting. Some partners did express the view that reporting
should become an instrument for sustained dialogue with CIDA, including getting more regular
feedback about reports they provide, in an attempt to strengthen the quality of the partnership
between CIDA and its partners.
CIDA also has a number of dynamic approaches to monitoring its partners and their
performance as humanitarian organizations, including its engagement on advisory boards,
donor support groups, executive committees and its participation in various high-level and
bilateral meetings field missions (both bilateral and jointly with other donors). CIDA uses
meetings of multilateral organization’s governing bodies for monitoring and it systematically
pushes for greater transparency and stronger monitoring within these organizations.
As a general rule, CIDA’s monitoring includes at least an annual mission from HQ officers to the
field. IHA staff have guidelines and templates for field monitoring.93 However, it is not clear how,
or if, information from IHA monitoring missions is aggregated.
With increasing pressure to show results for beneficiaries, and not necessarily more resources
to do monitoring, locally engaged staff and CIDA field representatives are being called upon to
play a greater role in monitoring. This already happens as some field staff (for example, in
Colombia, Haiti, West Bank and Gaza and Sudan) have experience in humanitarian assistance
and provide valuable analysis to HQ. However, this is reportedly not generally the case and
systematic monitoring is hampered by the limited humanitarian assistance experience of field
staff. Field staff also do not have adequate guidance on expectations with respect to monitoring
humanitarian assistance funding. It was also suggested by some field staff that they often do not
get feedback from IHA on information that they provide.
93 See IHA Field/Monitoring Mission Guidance Sheet; IHA Field Mission Checklist; and IHA Mission
Report Template
43 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
… but there is no annual report on humanitarian assistance programming nor do there appear
to be adequate systematic mechanisms for collecting, integrating and sharing lessons learned.
There is no evidence that the information IHA collects on program performance is pulled
together. There is no annual report on CIDA’s humanitarian assistance. There is also no
systematic approach to reviewing IHA’s (or CIDA’s) performance after a major humanitarian
response, or gathering and integrating information from the various reports and meetings and
disseminating it within the Agency. Information from the case studies suggests that this is
particularly the case for information from field staff.
However, both IHA and CIDA’s corporate evaluation function have conducted reviews of the
effectiveness of its partner organizations. The Evaluation Directorate has, over the years,
contributed to multi-donor evaluations of multilateral organizations but they are costly and
require a long time to complete. As a result, it has recently initiated, in collaboration with the
DAC-EVALNET, a new review process that builds on the MOPAN approach. MOPAN focuses
on organizational effectiveness, whereas this new initiative focuses on development or
humanitarian effectiveness, based on a meta-evaluation of the agency’s own evaluations. IHA
also conducts institutional assessments of its NGO implementing partners. Ensuring the
effectiveness of its partner organizations contributes to ensuring the effectiveness of the
humanitarian funding they receive.
IHA currently regularly conducts due diligence and Gender Equality Institutional Assessments
for both multilateral and NGO partner organizations. Strategic environmental assessments are
also conducted for multilateral organizations. It has, in the past, also conducted institutional
assessments of its partner organizations, but only one such assessment or evaluation was
identified for this evaluation.94
4.3.2 CIDA’s Humanitarian Funding and Human Resources
IHA’s budget increased significantly over the course of a year with transfers of additional funds
from both CIDA and external sources.
IHA Program Funding and Operational Expenditures
IHA’s initial budget for humanitarian programming in 2010/11 was $323 million. The initial
budgets have been generally increasing since 2006/07 (Figure 6). IHA’s initial budget has
increased by 92% since 2006/07. This overall increase is, in part, attributable to an increase in
the food aid budget in 2009/10 that resulted from an allocation of $70 million from the IAE to IHA
in response to the global food and fuel crisis in 2008 (funding that has continued over the last
three fiscal years). In addition, there has also been an increase in non-food programming funds
94 For example, “Evaluation of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank Program (2006/07- 2009/10): Final
Report”, IHA CIDA, May 2010; “Operation Review of the CANADEM Expert Deployment Phase II Project 2008 – 2010: Final Report, Universalia Management Group, September 2010; “Overseas Delegates Program Review: Final Report”, Goss Gilroy Inc., May 2010.
44 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
for new initiatives managed by IHA, including multi-year funding for the CERF, Sudan, and
additional allocations from the Crisis Pool.
During the course of a fiscal year, additional funds are transferred to IHA for humanitarian
programming from within the Agency, but also from the Crisis Pool and other sources. The GoC
Crisis Pool is part of the IAE that was reserved for funding large and unforeseen crises that
require resources above CIDA’s pre-approved budget. It provides flexibility to the GoC and
CIDA to allocate additional funding without affecting funding allocated for other emergencies.95
The Crisis Pool funding has been used to provide the additional funding promised by the
government when matching funds are launched by the Minister of International Cooperation or
the Prime Minister.
Figure 6: IHA Program Initial Budget, Net Transfers and Final Expenditures, 2006/07 to
2010/11
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
$ m
illio
ns
Initial budget Net transfers Final budget
Source: IHA, Analysis by evaluation team
In some years (2006/07 and 2008/09) the net transfers have been larger than the initial IHA
budget. The value of net transfer has declined in the past two years, although the initial budget
was higher in those two years. However, the increase in IHA’s total program budget was not as
great in 2010/11 and, in fact, there was a reduction of 11% in the total budget for 2010/11
compared to the previous year.
In most years, the non-food aid budget is larger than the food aid budget (Figure 7).
95 Until recently, CIDA had to prepare a Treasury Board submission and wait for Supplementary
Estimates to access Crisis Pool. In 2010/11, a Quick Release Mechanism was set up, under which $50M
from the Crisis Pool is included as a frozen allotment in CIDA’s Reference Levels. This money can be
released with either a Memorandum to Cabinet or a letter to the Prime Minister. This can make it easier
and faster for CIDA to access Crisis Pool money.
45 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 7: IHA Program Expenditures, by Sector, 2006/07 to 2010/11
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
$ m
illio
ns
Food aid Non-food aid Peace and security Mine action
Source: IHA, Analysis by evaluation team96
The food aid budget has been increasing steadily since 2007/08, when it represented just over
one-third (38%) of IHA’s program budget. In 2010/11 the food aid budget represented more than
half (58%) of IHA’s program budget.
IHA’s total operational expenditures have risen by 7% since 2006/07. This small increase masks
a large increase in salaries expenditures (18%), which was offset by a decrease (22%) in other
operational expenditures (Figure 8). This was attributable to a significant decrease (74%) in
expenditures on professional services, which IHA attributes to an increase in indeterminate
staff.
96 Note that although the peace and security and mine action funding is included in this and other IHA
financial tables for completeness, this funding was not included in the scope of the evaluation.
46 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 8: IHA Operational Expenditures, 2006/07 – 2010/11
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
$ t
ho
usa
nd
s
Salaries Other O&M Total operational expenditures
Source: IHA, Analysis by evaluation team97
IHA operational costs for managing its humanitarian programming represents a very small
percentage of the program costs and has declined in the last five years.
The operational costs of managing IHA’s humanitarian funding represents a very small
percentage of the program costs. Operational expenditures represent less than one percent
(0.57%) of program expenditures. This has decreased since 2006/07, when it was 0.74%.
Notably, IHA is managing 39% more humanitarian funding than it did in 2006/07 with only 7%
more operational expenditures (Figure 9). This is one indicator of efficient IHA operations.
97 Note operational expenditures include salary and overtime costs, as well as other operational costs,
such as travel, professional services, communications etc.
47 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 9: IHA Program and Operational Expenditures, 2006/07 – 2010/11
Source: IHA, Analysis by evaluation team
Matching Funds
The increasing reliance on matching funds raises issues about transparency and the potential
for distorting humanitarian funding.
The matching fund concept was first launched after the Indian Ocean tsunami at the end of
2004, whereby every dollar contributed to a Canadian NGO by the Canadian public for tsunami
relief would be matched by a dollar from the GoC.98 For the tsunami fund, the additional
government funding was allocated to the NGO that raised the money. After the first use of the
matching fund, CIDA changed the approach to the implementation of matching funds prior to
launching the matching fund for the Pakistan earthquake (2005). A review of the use of
matching funds conducted in 2006 compared the two approaches.99 Under the first approach,
NGOs first had to be assessed as eligible, based on standardized selection criteria. They then
had to raise funds during a fixed period of time. The funds raised by these NGOs (that were
confirmed through an independent audit) were matched by the GoC. These funds were then
made available for programming by the same eligible NGOs. They were able to present
98 Note that there were precedents for the use of a matching fund concept by Canada. CIDA’s response
to Hurricane Gilbert in 1989, which inflicted about $US 900 million in damages, included $1.2 million to match cash contributions made by the Jamaica-Canada Association and sponsored by the Jamaican High Commissioner. (“Matching Fund Mechanism Discussion Paper: Key Questions Emerging from the Identification of Stakeholder Issues”, Bob Vandenberg, June 2006, p. 1) 99
“Matching Fund Mechanism Discussion Paper: Key Questions Emerging from the Identification of Stakeholder Issues”, Bob Vandenberg, June 2006
48 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
humanitarian project proposals to use these funds and expected budget support as grants
and/or contributions equal to the amount that they had raised.100 However, this approach gave
IHA little control over how the funds were programmed and was very demanding on staff time in
determining the eligibility of recipient organizations.
In the new approach, any registered charity was eligible to raise funds during a fixed period. As
with the previous matching fund, NGOs had to attest that the money raised was eligible based
on a list of criteria. Unlike the previous approach, the matched funds were put into a fund by
CIDA that was equivalent in size to the level of eligible donations raised by registered charities.
Then eligible NGOs that had proven capacity to design and implement a humanitarian project
were able to access this fund by presenting high quality eligible proposals to CIDA. These
NGOs were not necessarily the same NGOs that had raised the funds.101 The review confirmed
that most respondents preferred the revised approach to that used for the Tsunami response. “It
invites engagement of a wider range of Canadian civil society organizations. This better
addresses diaspora calls for direct involvement in natural disaster response and government
desire to engage as many Canadians as possible. The second model also has the potential of
fundraising larger sums of money since more organizations are empowered to use the
mechanism. ... [It] better enables CIDA to tie funds matched to high quality proposals that meet
the most up-to-date available needs assessments and specific requirements ... [and] an
organization’s particular skill set and expertise.”102 However, the revised approach “is disliked
by the organizations with the most effective fundraising machinery since they see “their”
matched funds being pooled and then accessed by other competitor organizations.”103
The matching fund approach has been used five times since – for Cyclone Nargis in Burma
(2008); earthquake in Sichuan Province in China (2008); Haiti earthquake (2010); Pakistan
floods (2010); and, drought in the Horn of Africa (2011). Following the implementation of the
matching funds for humanitarian responses in Burma and China, IHA conducted a lessons
learned exercise and identified the following key lessons with respect to the management of
these funds:104
Ensuring appropriate timeframes for fundraising;
Ensuring timely communication with the Canadian public;
Clarifying for both the NGOs and the public the disbursement of the matched funds (to
address confusion resulting from the change in approach after the Tsunami matched fund
established in 2005); and
100 Ibid., p. 1
101 Ibid., p. 1 - 2
102 Ibid, p. 8 - 9
103 Ibid., p. 9
104 “Lessons Learned For Attestation Process: Matching Fund Mechanism”, CIDA, undated, p. 1 - 2
49 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Tightening the technical provisions with respect to the attestation and source of the
donations.
While matching funds are a part of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming, their primary
objective is to increase public engagement in humanitarian response. However, the distinction
between their use as a public engagement, as opposed to a humanitarian programming tool is
not clear to many external stakeholders.
However, external stakeholders appear to concur that it is not an appropriate programming
approach. As noted in the 2006 review of CIDA’s first two matching funds, “With the exception
of representatives from the largest NGOs, a clear majority of respondents, and especially those
individuals interviewed who had longer experience working with the GoC and CIDA, believe that
the [matching fund, even under the revised approach] ... is not the ideal way for CIDA to build
effective, long-term relationships with Canadian NGOs engaged in humanitarian work. A
number of NGO respondents, when pressed on this issue, argued that rather than adding the
[matching fund mechanism] as a natural disaster response programming option, a better way
forward is for Canada, as a caring nation, to work towards the long-established UN goal of
contributing at least 0.7 percent of national income as aid. These respondents believe that
increasing Canada’s International Assistance Envelope (IAE) and increasing the amount within
this envelope for humanitarian response, would go far in making more funds available for
Canada to respond in a predictable and proportional manner to humanitarian disasters be they
natural or human-made, rapid onset or complex, longstanding crises. It could also open the
possibility of a greater role for Canadian NGOs to deliver the expanded humanitarian response
budget.”105
The review noted that the use of this mechanism did not explicitly conflict with GHD principles or
the Paris Declaration commitments, but that there was a risk of distorting the proportionality of
CIDA’s humanitarian funding.106 Nonetheless, it concluded that matching funds should “only be
used in very limited and unique circumstances, if at all.”107 Yet, the matching fund mechanism
has been used five times since the review. The report also noted that, if matching funds are to
be used, the decision to use them “should be guided by established and transparent criteria to
avoid the present widespread perception that politics is the primary consideration.”108 The report
went on to propose possible criteria, yet such criteria have not yet been publicly released or
reviewed by the evaluation team.
Resources from matching funds are intended to address ongoing needs, as they develop in the
later phases of an emergency; whereas IHA’s disbursement is intended to address immediate
life-saving needs. The profile of the sources of funds and disbursement of matching funds from
five funds (Figure 9) leads to a number of observations:
105 “Matching Fund Mechanism Discussion Paper: Key Questions Emerging from the Identification of
Stakeholder Issues”, p. 10 106
Ibid., p. 7 107
Ibid., p. 12 108
Ibid.
50 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
The Haiti earthquake matching-fund ($220 million) was significantly larger than any of the
other five matching funds. It was even larger than the Tsunami matching fund in 2005, to
which Canadians donated $213 million.
In most cases, the matching funding comes from outside CIDA’s regular humanitarian
funding – from either, the Crisis Pool, the IAE or from internal reallocation. In the case of the
Haiti response, given the scope of the humanitarian emergency and the impact that it had
had on the implementation of the development program, bilateral program funds were
reallocated to humanitarian assistance and, in the case of the Pakistan floods, funds were
reallocated from the Agency holdback.109 This suggests that, at least for these two funds,
the matching funds are new resources for humanitarian programming that came from the
Crisis Pool or reallocation of CIDA’s bilateral programming.
In most responses, IHA's non-matching response was roughly equivalent to or greater than
the matching funds. However, for the Sichuan earthquake, IHA had only disbursed $1.0
million prior to the launch of the matching fund and the only other funds disbursed for that
response came from the matching fund. The initial $1 million allocation was made to meet
immediate life-saving needs. It was difficult to determine CIDA’s overall response, given that
the earthquake response was somewhat atypical, in that there was no formal UN appeal
process to serve as the standard framework for determining and prioritizing needs.
However, in the following weeks, CIDA continued to work with partners to develop a
programming package that was appropriate to the evolution of needs. Ultimately, the
matching fund money was used to support earthquake-affected populations in the areas of
temporary shelter (tents/school shelters), health, water, sanitation, hygiene, child protection,
and for the provision of non-food items (e.g. blankets, cooking kits, hygiene kits, etc.). It is
not clear how much funding CIDA would have provided in the absence of a matching fund.
There were a limited number of international organizations on the ground and the Chinese
government and the Chinese Red Cross Society played a strong role in the response. While
this does not distort humanitarian funding from IHA’s reference levels, it has potentially
distorted funding from the Crisis Pool, if the funding was beyond what CIDA normally have
funded in such a context.
In Haiti, half the matching funds have been, or will be disbursed by GPB in early recovery
and reconstruction activities. About half the funds for the 2005 Pakistan earthquake were
also disbursed by GPB.
109 Note that the breakdown of the source of funds within CIDA for the Pakistan earthquake was not
available.
51 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Figure 10: Profile of Sources of Funding and Disbursements for Five Matching Funds, 2005 to
2010 (in $ CAD millions)
A. Funds available
Item Pakistan
earthquake (2005)
Burma cyclone
(2008)
Sichuan earthquake
(2008)
Haiti earthquake
(2010)
Pakistan floods
(2010)
Amount
contributed
by
Canadians
to qualified
NGOs
$28.0 $11.6 $30.0 $220.0 $46.8
Matching
funding from
CIDA:
$25.6 $11.6 $30.0 $220.0 $46.8
From CIDA
funding $28.0
110 $65.0 $16.8
111
From Crisis
Pool n/a $11.6 $30.0 $70.0 $30.0
Other (IAE) $85.0
Total $28.0 $11.6 $30.0 $220.0 $46.8
B. Disbursement of matching funds
Item Pakistan earthquake
(2005)
Burma cyclone
(2008)
Sichuan earthquake
(2008)
Haiti earthquake
(2010)
Pakistan floods
(2010)
UN agencies $3.2 $7.0 $8.2 $28.85
Red Cross
Movement $2.0 $6.58 $40.9 $242
Canadian
NGOs $13.6 $4.97 $16.35 $27.0 $13.75
Other $1.45
IHA Total $13.6 $11.6 $29.9 $76.1112
$46.8
These amounts may have been expended in multiple years 110
The breakdown of the source of funds within CIDA was not available. 111
This funding came from the Agency holdback. In recent years, the government has required that lead departments programming funds from the IAE – principally CIDA and DFAIT – hold back 5% of their budgets for specific needs identified by the government throughout the year. Any unused funds are released to the department the following year. 112
As of the end of 2010/11. Approximately $80M to be disbursed by the end of 2011/12
52 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Item Pakistan earthquake
(2005)
Burma cyclone
(2008)
Sichuan earthquake
(2008)
Haiti earthquake
(2010)
Pakistan floods
(2010)
GPB
disbursements $12.0
113
Total matched
funds
disbursed
$25.6 $11.6 $29.9 152.2 $46.8
C. Disbursement of non-matching funds by IHA
Item Pakistan earthquake
(2005) Burma cyclone (2008)
Sichuan earthquake
(2008)
Haiti earthquake
(2010)
Pakistan
floods
(2010)
Disbursement
of non-matching
funds by IHA
$23.0 $13.8 $1.0114
$85.0 $25.0
Total IHA
disbursements $36.6
115 $25.4 $30.9 $161.0 $71.8
Source: IHA, CIDA. Data was provided between early December 2011 and early February 2012.
26.5% of the funds disbursed by IHA were channelled through UN agencies. Just under
one-third (30.2%) were channeled through the Red Cross Movement and under half (42.5%)
through Canadian NGOs.
It was a concern of many NGOs which participate in the matching fund arrangements that
not all the money is channelled to the NGO response to the emergency, when Canadian
NGOs had raised the money which the government subsequently matched. IHA (and, in the
case of the Haiti response, the bilateral desk) makes the allocation based on the
organizations best able to program the funds to meet the needs of target populations. The
percent disbursed to NGOs is higher than the percent of IHA funding disbursed through
NGOs generally, which is 14%. This pattern varies by crises with the funding channeled
through NGOs ranging from 30% to 100%, depending on the emergency.
It is difficult to tell whether the matching funds have introduced distortion in humanitarian
funding. Even though a significant portion of the money used to match the donations of
Canadians comes from outside the IHA budget (and, therefore, could be deemed to be
“new” money), in most years IHA also benefits from considerable transfers of additional
money for its humanitarian programming. The distortion question is then whether the
allocation of new money to crises with matching funds takes away from funding to other
113 By the end of 2011/12, approximately $110M remains to be disbursed by GPB and $30M by PWCB.
114 Disbursed prior to the matching fund
115 Including $23M disbursed by IHA to UN agencies, but not included in the matching funds. Not
including the $12M disbursed by GPB.
53 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
crises. Like other donors, Canada tends to support underfunded appeals less than other
appeals. However, in 2010, the year in which CIDA had matching funds for both Haiti and
Pakistan, Canada had its lowest performance in supporting underfunded appeals. It
provided less than 1% of the global response for underfunded appeals; where in previous
years, it had funded between 2.4% and 3.0% of underfunded appeals. While it is difficult to
draw strong conclusions based on data from one year – particularly in a year with the
exceptionally large appeal for Haiti – this suggests that finding the funds to match
Canadians’ donations may have put a strain on CIDA’s funding for other appeals in 2010.
Since there is considerable variation across the crises in terms of where the matched funds are
obtained and how they are disbursed, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of
matching funds on CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming. Yet, as suggested in Box 6,
matching funds have a significant impact on the NGOs which raise the donations from
Canadians. This evaluation did not assess the broader impact of the matching funds as a public
engagement tool. Further examination of these issues may provide useful lessons for CIDA.
In spite of the potential disadvantages identified by stakeholders (see Box 6), given the number
of times that it has been used since 2005, it appears that the use of the matching fund
mechanism may be embedded as a regular feature of CIDA’s response to catastrophic natural
disasters. IHA has found a way to manage two disadvantages of the matching funds. It has
changed the approach to the allocation of the matched funds and has developed internal criteria
for fund implementation. However, some stakeholders still have concerns about the potential
lack of transparency (including the lack of criteria for the launching of matching funds), as well
as the extent to which matching funds may distort humanitarian expenditures and may result in
donor fatigue.
Box 6: Advantages and Disadvantages of Matching Funds as Identified by Stakeholders
Advantages of matching funds Disadvantages of matching funds
NGOs note that matching funds increase public engagement in humanitarian response and increase donations. Daily online donations increased considerably following the announcement of the matching fund on 22 July 2011, peaked again just before the closing date of 16 September and then dropped off significantly afterwards.
Initially the administration of the matching funds was a considerable burden for IHA. However, over the past few years, IHA has developed procedures and tools such that the use of matching funds is now less of a burden.
The matching fund is difficult to communicate to the public, given the erroneous assumption that all additional government funding goes to the Canadian NGOs which raised the initial funds.
There are no criteria for launching a matching fund and a lack of transparency in the disbursal of monies from the pool of matched funds.
There is a risk that matching funds will benefit only those humanitarian crises for which there is already a considerable level of public attention – normally as a result of significant media attention. This risks distorting IHA’s humanitarian funding.
There is also a risk that, with an increased use of matching
54 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Advantages of matching funds Disadvantages of matching funds
funds, there will be public fatigue over time and matching funds will eventually fail to attract the attention that they currently do.
Of the three comparative donor case study countries, only Australia has used the matching fund
mechanism and this was for the recent Horn of Africa appeal. There is no formal way to tie the
use of matching funds into CIDA’s humanitarian response mechanisms and to identify the
triggers for launching the matching fund mechanism as one element of Canada’s humanitarian
response. This makes it difficult to ensure that funding is needs-based and that funding of crises
with a matching fund does not adversely affect meeting needs in ongoing crises or addressing
other crises.
There is also no readily available clear public reporting of how matching funds have been
disbursed (beyond a list of CIDA-funded projects). While information is available on CIDA’s web
site about programming in all countries that had matching funds, it is difficult to piece together
the full story of the use of the matching funds, separately from other IHA and bilateral
programming. Yet this is a distinction that is of interest to partner stakeholders – perhaps more
so than to the Canadian public. CIDA has made recent commitments to improve transparency,
within the framework of its new communications framework.116 CIDA has initiated an “Open
Data” project, which is expected to contribute to the objective of “responding to the needs of
multiple stakeholders for more transparency.”117 At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011, the Minister of International Cooperation indicated
that CIDA has also joined the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which aims to improve
public availability and accessibility of information on aid.
Human Resources
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance expertise at IHA is robust and relevant, while more limited in
the field and within geographic programs.
IHA has 31 full-time equivalents (FTEs), but only 28 positions are currently staffed. Most are
located at HQ, but there is one IHA-funded position in posts in developing countries – a
humanitarian officer in Sudan. There are also CIDA-funded positions in Rome and Geneva with
responsibility for humanitarian affairs. In some countries, geographic program-funded positions
also support CIDA’s humanitarian response.118 However, although bilateral staff do contribute to
the management of humanitarian programming, bilateral field staff do not have a mandate for
humanitarian programming at the field level (with the exception of the field staff responsible for
the humanitarian programming implemented by the West Bank and Gaza and Afghanistan
desks).
116 “Corporate Communications Framework and Workplan 2011-2014”, CIDA
117 “Better Data for Development: Aid Transparency, Accountability and Open Data”, CIDA presentation
118 In the case study countries, there were one and a half FTEs in West Bank and Gaza and half an FTE
in Haiti.
55 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Most CIDA, NGO and UN agency stakeholders were very positive about the capacity of IHA
staff – noting that they are very responsive and have sufficient expertise and knowledge of the
humanitarian context. Most staff from geographic programs mentioned that basic training in
humanitarian assistance would be most useful for bilateral program staff.
During rapid onset crises, both internal and external stakeholders report that IHA staff are
stretched. However, the Directorate organized its work so that officers can easily be reassigned
during an emergency and most can be replaced by other staff from within the Directorate. This
facilitates the deployment of IHA staff to the field for specific humanitarian responses and may
facilitate IHA programming an increasingly large humanitarian assistance budget, with a limited
increase in resources. There are no guidelines for defining the roles of bilateral and IHA staff
during the deployments. For example, IHA staff were deployed to Haiti within 24 hours, but
CIDA’s AAR acknowledges that the local knowledge and networks of the bilateral field staff
could have been used better. IHA is currently working on clarifying roles and responsibilities
between different internal stakeholders during rapid-onset humanitarian emergencies.
A few CIDA stakeholders mentioned that one consequence of IHA staff being over-stretched is
that the requirements of day-to-day humanitarian operations and daily corporate requests can
displace the more reflective activities of long-term analysis, which support the Agency’s
humanitarian policy dialogue.
4.4 Coordination and Integration of Humanitarian and
Development Programming
The lack of corporate mechanisms for coordination and integration limits the opportunities for
synergies and complementarity between humanitarian and development programming.
IHA and specific geographic program staff frequently discuss how to improve coordination.
However, communication seems to be generally limited to issues related to transactional issues
related to project approval. In fact, interviews with CIDA staff reflected that, except for particular
instances, humanitarian and development programming are generally implemented in silos both
at HQ and in the field. Generally, there are limited mechanisms to ensure coordination and
integration at the corporate level, either through programming tools or staff.
Humanitarian and development programming is separate in most countries.119 The Country
Development Program Frameworks (CDPF) in CIDA’s countries of focus do not include
humanitarian programming, even in countries suffering from protracted emergencies (with the
exception of Sudan). It is recognized that IHA can provide humanitarian assistance in countries
that are not included in CIDA’s countries of focus or modest presence, where integration with
development programming would not be possible. However, there are only limited examples of
119 Only Afghanistan and West Bank and Gaza have completely integrated humanitarian and
development programming.
56 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
the integration of humanitarian and development programming in the countries of focus or
modest presence where CIDA does have an ongoing bilateral program.
Some stakeholders at both HQ and in the field mentioned limited systematic information sharing
and coordination, and few opportunities for planning recovery activities and identifying synergies
in the transition from humanitarian assistance to development programming. This lack of
attention to coordination and integration issues is inconsistent with the practice of other donors
and the GHD principle with respect to providing humanitarian assistance that is supportive of
the return of sustainable livelihoods, and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and
development.
Even though IHA has made efforts to improve its outreach to the field, structures and practices
are not always in place to encourage synergies between humanitarian and development
programming. Successes and challenges in CIDA’s attempts to do this are shown in Box 7.
Box 7: Examples of Successes and Challenges with Integration in the Field
The case studies provide a number of examples of efforts to improve coordination and
complementarity between humanitarian and development programming in the field. These
reflect both successes and challenges:
In Colombia, local funds and DFAIT’s Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) support the
integration of humanitarian assistance and development. The GPSF provides “financial and
operational resources to facilitate timely, effective and accountable conflict prevention, crisis
response, peace operations, civilian protection and stabilization interventions in fragile
states.” (“The Global Peace and Security Fund”, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/gpsf-fpsm.aspx?view=d) In
Colombia, it seeks to strengthen the institutional mechanisms needed to ensure a smoother
transition from the current protracted situation. Sequencing is key in the use of these funds:
IHA will be first to intervene in the crisis, then CIDA’s geographic program and DFAIT will
ensure the follow-up through the use of these funds.
The Sudan bilateral country program and IHA have a strong working relationship. The
2009/2010 Country Strategy includes sections on both development and humanitarian
assistance programming. The bilateral and IHA divisions actively share information with
each other on projects and the country context through informal discussions, program
meetings and the annual strategic planning discussions. The two divisions also have
representatives in the whole-of-government Sudan Task Force led by DFAIT. Yet, most
CIDA staff from both bilateral and IHA programs indicate that integration between
humanitarian and development programming does not occur in any systematic or planned
manner. They suggest that lack of champions at the senior level, the corporate culture, as
well as the lack of an Agency mandate and guidelines on how to engage in cross-branch
coordination, as possible explanations for this lack of integration.
Humanitarian programming in Ethiopia includes a large component of food assistance. At
the same time, the bilateral country program provides support for food security activities to
57 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
develop resilience among the chronically food insecure. A key component of the bilateral
program is support for the Government of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)
to address the issue of chronic food insecurity in the country and improve resilience. The
PSNP is credited with reducing the number of Ethiopians who fall onto emergency
caseloads when the country is affected by drought. The PSNP, as a development program,
includes a risk financing mechanism to provide emergency support to those families who are
part of the PSNP to improve their resilience, allow them to cope with the emergency and
prevent them from losing the gains that they have achieved through PSNP. This mechanism
is funded by DFID and the World Bank. Although Canada supports the overall PSNP, it is
not able to support this specific mechanism within PSNP – which integrates humanitarian
and development programming – because it falls outside the mandates of both IHA and the
development program.
Coordination of humanitarian responses to catastrophic natural disasters is achieved across
government departments through DFAIT-led mechanisms and procedures.
Coordination across government departments can take place at two levels: at the level of the
ongoing coordination of Canada’s humanitarian positions, and at the level of individual
humanitarian responses. With respect to ongoing coordination of humanitarian positions, CIDA
works primarily with DFAIT to develop common positions on issues and themes communicated
to multilateral partners; these positions are then expressed most often in annual policy
discussions as part of the governance process of the partners. This is done reportedly with
varying degrees of success, depending on the partner organization. One area in which there is
still a perceived gap is Canada’s activities in the areas of peace-building and de-mining. These
activities used to be the responsibility of the precursor to IHA. However, they have not been
included in IHA’s current mandate as these activities no longer fit within IHA’s focus on
emergency response. Responsibilities for these activities within CIDA or the GoC, however,
have reportedly not yet been clarified.
On the other hand, coordination at the level of humanitarian responses, particularly with respect
to catastrophic natural disasters, is seen as being very effective. There are mechanisms and
procedures in place for the coordination of whole-of-government responses to natural disasters.
These are reflected in DFAIT’s “Standard Operating Procedures in Response to Natural
Disasters Abroad” which aim “to ensure a rapid and effective whole-of-government response to
natural disasters abroad (such as floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes), and should serve as a
guide, where appropriate, for government officials to prepare for and respond to foreseeable
and unforeseeable natural disasters abroad.”120 Key players in an inter-departmental response
include DFAIT (including several divisions at HQ and the post), CIDA (primarily IHA), and the
Department of National Defence. Other departments that may be involved include Public Safety
120 “Standard Operating Procedures in Response to Natural Disasters Abroad: “The Sops”, Abridged
Version”, Government of Canada, 21 July 2011
58 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Canada, Privy Council Office, Environment Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada,
Canada Border Services Agency, Natural Resources Canada and Passport Canada.
In the case of a catastrophic natural disaster, a meeting of the Interdepartmental Task Force on
Natural Disasters Abroad may be convened, chaired by DFAIT. The Task Force provides a
mechanism for information sharing, assessing the situation and needs, providing updates from
the field, assessing Canadian capacity to respond and discussing necessary
communications/media actions. It makes joint recommendations to senior management, as
required, on policy and operational issues. If warranted by the scope of the crisis, a subsequent
Assistant Deputy Minister meeting can be held to provide guidance to the Task Force, and
working groups may be established to provide enhanced coordination beyond the larger Task
Force. Also, if the scope warrants it, the Task Force may recommend the deployment of an
Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team to support the Canadian mission in the affected
country.121 The Interdepartmental Task Force plays a key role in supporting early (timely), and
informed decision-making.
If the disaster involves the deployment of Canadian military resources, there may be an
exchange of Liaison Officers between DFAIT and DND to facilitate communications and
coordination and a deployment of Liaison Officers from CIDA to the field to “enhance the
capacity of Canadian Forces to effectively perform their humanitarian relief mission in a manner
consistent with and supportive of Canada’s foreign policy, stabilization, and humanitarian
interests and objectives.”122
A key mechanism for supporting a whole-of-government response is the Crisis Pool. This is a
mechanism reportedly unique to Canada. The Crisis Pool may be used to fund the whole-of-
government response, although it is not to be used for situations for which there is funding from
existing programmes. “Crisis Pool funds are to be used for immediate response needs,
including for the emergency phase and early recovery requirements, and/or stabilization.”123
These various mechanisms for inter-departmental coordination were deployed in Canada’s
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Canada’s response was generally seen as a positive
example of whole-of-government coordination in Ottawa (See Box 8). This was also supported
by the After Action Review commissioned by DFAIT in the months following the disaster.124 This
Review found many positive elements in the coordination of Canada’s response, including the
role played by the Interdepartmental Task Force, the deployment of the Interdepartmental
Strategic Support Team in Haiti, and the contribution of the political and humanitarian liaison
officers. However, it also found elements in need of strengthening, including earlier
configuration of, and agreement on, the military assets to be used, synchronising planning
processes between DFAIT, CIDA and DND, and joint training on accepted good humanitarian
121 Ibid., p. 20 – 21
122 Ibid, p. 22
123 Ibid.
124 “Haiti Earthquake 2010: After Action Review of the Government of Canada’s Response”, Hunter
McGill, International Development Policy Consultant, 23 July 2010
59 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
practice, “so as to improve mutual understanding of respective corporate cultures and enhance
efficiency and effectiveness.”125 CIDA is seen as a credible, helpful and supportive participant in
the interdepartmental coordination process.
Box 8: Example of Strong HQ Coordination
Canada’s response to Haiti’s earthquake of January 2010 is widely perceived by internal and
external stakeholders as a positive example of whole-of-government coordination in Ottawa.
Communication was continuous and objectives were well understood by all. Within CIDA, the
humanitarian response quickly became a corporate priority and resources from all parts of the
Agency were involved in an internal task force to respond to the emergency. While standard
procedures and approval processes were followed, the program Director Generals had direct
access to the President and the Minister and this facilitated decision-making. Development
programming resources were re-allocated to early recovery and reconstruction priorities. In
addition, a government-wide task force was put in place and members met twice a day for an
extended period during the initial critical period of the response. This event revealed that
cohesion and coordination are possible within and among departments in Ottawa, as there was
willingness for flexibility and sustained dialogue. Today, about two years after the event, the
involvement of a CIDA field officer, who deals part-time with humanitarian issues, makes a
significant difference to the quality of CIDA’s humanitarian response in Haiti.
The Review also noted that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were not as well known
across the departments as they could have been. As the framework for Canada’s reaction and
response, the Procedures should include “clear reference to the importance of the “Whole-of-
Government” approach to success in planning and delivering Canada’s natural disaster
response... [and] the role of the Interdepartmental Task Force ... in the formulation of the
“Whole-of-Government” perspective and the development of recommendations to ministers.”126
In situations involving deployment of the Canadian Forces, the SOPs are an important tool to
ensure effective impact and continuity.
In addition to the interdepartmental task forces put in place for natural disasters, similar
structures have been created to coordinate responses to protracted emergencies – for example,
the ongoing task forces for Afghanistan and Sudan. These strengthen communication among
humanitarian and development staff and HQ and field staff. HQ/field coordination is
strengthened when roles and responsibilities of IHA and bilateral desk staff are clearly laid out
at HQ.
CIDA is also a member of the interdepartmental Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
(START) Advisory Board, which, while not directly involved with humanitarian response, deals
with Canada’s stance on fragile states that are more susceptible to humanitarian crises.
125 Ibid., p. 4
126 Ibid.
60 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Field staff do not have a clear mandate for humanitarian programming.
While field staff represent the whole of CIDA abroad, they do not have a clear mandate to
contribute to the management of humanitarian programming. Field staff indicated that they do
not have clear guidance/direction from HQ about humanitarian assistance and the extent to
which they are expected and able to contribute to humanitarian programming. Most indicated
that, while they do take the time to provide comments on proposed projects, when requested by
IHA, they are not often asked to provide inputs on humanitarian issues beyond the project level.
For example, they may be (but are not always) asked to provide input into the development of
Canada’s positions in UN agency governing bodies, but seldom get feedback on these positions
or the results of meetings. They were not consulted on the development of the multilateral
institutional strategies, even though the multilateral agency may be a significant player in the
country. In addition, while they bring their knowledge of the country and the partner
organizations as inputs to decisions on humanitarian projects that are made by IHA, they are
not aware of the actual decisions.
In addition, field staff do not have sufficient information about the directions of CIDA’s
humanitarian programming to provide inputs on broader humanitarian issues for CIDA. They
perceive that they are not consulted in the development of CIDA’s humanitarian positions – for
example, staff in geographic programs that make extensive use of food aid programming were
reportedly not consulted on the development of the WFP Strategic Partnership Framework. In
addition, field staff report not being aware of HQ views on particular agencies, and there is
reportedly limited feedback from HQ to the field following participation in meetings of the
governing bodies of these agencies.
To the extent that field staff have the resources to do so, CIDA field staff also play a policy
dialogue role at the country level. It was apparent from the case studies that when CIDA has
staff in the field with humanitarian experience, they are more likely to be engaged at the
country-level in humanitarian policy dialogue. The presence of an IHA humanitarian officer in
Sudan has been positive in terms of policy dialogue. Similarly, the presence of a CIDA field
officer working part-time on humanitarian issues in Haiti has reportedly made a significant
difference on policy dialogue in the field and in coordination with IHA. Staff with humanitarian
experience in Colombia and West Bank and Gaza have also contributed to increased
involvement in policy dialogue in those regions.
… yet the need to link humanitarian and development is increasingly evident.
The recent review of 35 humanitarian assistance evaluations, conducted by the Finnish National
Audit Office, identifies that linking relief and development is both the most effective and efficient
way for donors to address humanitarian issues. However, it also recognizes that there has been
reluctance on the part of many donors to do this. (Box 9) The review goes on to suggest to
donors that there is a need to increase investments for disaster prevention, preparedness and
disaster risk reduction, since developing local planning and response capacity to respond to
61 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
emergencies is “the most effective way of managing the threat of increased disaster risks and
costs.”127
Box 9: Example of Strong HQ Coordination
“By linking relief efforts with early and longer term recovery and development objectives,
livelihood vulnerability issues can be addressed in order to reduce aid dependency and to
strengthen resilience and preparedness against future disasters. This is highlighted as the most
efficient way for donors to maximise the value of their humanitarian assistance and increase its
effectiveness and long-term positive impacts. There has however been reported reluctance in
donor support and funding to disaster risk reduction, preparedness and early recovery activities,
and in integrating these with longer-term development programmes. It is a central GHD
commitment which donors are reported to be performing poorly. The divide between
humanitarian disaster response and development cooperation continues to prevail, despite
increased policy statements emphasizing the need to link relief, rehabilitation and development.”
“International Humanitarian Aid 2007–2010 – An Evaluation Synthesis”, p. 76
4.5 Public Information and Communications
CIDA is missing opportunities to communicate the achievements of its humanitarian
programming.
As noted in Section 1.2, Context for Humanitarian Assistance, Canadians are strongly
supportive of their government’s efforts to help populations affected by natural disaster and
conflict-related emergencies. This suggests that Canadians want to know when and how CIDA
is acting on their behalf in these situations. A review of CIDA press releases between 2005 and
2010 indicated that of 495 press releases, 140 (28%) were related to humanitarian
assistance.128 As a result, timely and accurate information for media use, beyond press
releases, will find an interested audience. Yet there are limited mechanisms for communicating
the achievements of CIDA’s humanitarian programming both in Canada and in partner countries
(as identified in the Sudan case study). The document review revealed no annual report from
CIDA on its humanitarian funding. As a result, there is no publicly available overview of CIDA’s
humanitarian activities during the year and how they fit within the Agency’s overall priorities.
Information about the use of matching funds is also not readily available to the public. Although
there is information available on the web site, it is difficult to piece together the full story of the
use of matching funds.
In addition, although this was not a specific evaluation issue, a few respondents indicated that
there have been missed opportunities for CIDA field representatives and for IHA staff serving on
temporary assignment in countries experiencing emergency situations to respond to journalists’
127 “International Humanitarian Aid 2007–2010 – An Evaluation Synthesis”, National Audit Office of
Finland, Component of the Performance Audit on Humanitarian Aid, 2011, p. 80 128
Review conducted by evaluation team.
62 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
requests for interviews (respondents included CIDA staff, OGD, and NGOs). When CIDA staff
abroad do not engage with the media, there is no messaging from the field to complement
Ministerial statements or commitments. One instance was identified in the Haiti case study and
also in a DFAIT after-action review of the Canadian response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. It
indicated that many Canadians may have believed that Canada’s assistance was completely
managed by the Canadian Forces, given the ability of uniformed staff to brief journalists in real
time. In fact, the humanitarian response was funded substantially by CIDA, and the whole of
government response was coordinated by a high-level interdepartmental task force. However,
IHA and DFAIT staff deployed to Haiti were not able to tell the story of CIDA’s humanitarian
programming.129 Other similar instances have been mentioned in various interviews.
4.6 Conclusion
4.6.1 Policy Framework
The GoC does not have an overall policy on government-wide humanitarian response, nor does
CIDA yet have a humanitarian strategy. This absenceof a strategy does not appear to hamper
CIDA stakeholders’ understanding of the focus of IHA’s humanitarian assistance. However,
there is less understanding of the nature of humanitarian assistance provided by the bilateral
programs, both within CIDA and among partners.
Most external stakeholders (notably NGO and UN partner organizations) identify CIDA’s focus
for humanitarian programming based on its funding patterns. They suggest that they would
benefit from clearer documentation on CIDA’s priorities and approach to humanitarian
assistance. The process of developing a corporate strategy, if it is based on external
consultations, would provide the opportunity to engage stakeholders in addressing the issue of
the scope of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance. A strategy would also provide the framework for
ensuring better links between CIDA’s humanitarian assistance and internationally-accepted
humanitarian principles and practices, as well as highlight the Agency’s contribution to the
humanitarian system.
4.6.2 Scope of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance
IHA provides humanitarian assistance that focuses on immediate life-saving relief. Most external
stakeholders (notably NGO and UN partner agencies) perceive that CIDA is unwilling to fund
activities that go beyond this narrow definition of activities. Nonetheless, IHA does fund, to some
extent, activities in the areas of emergency preparedness, early recovery and transition to
development, through both its support for specific projects and core funding. However, these
types of activities are more likely to be funded by GPB.
129 “Haiti Earthquake 2010: After Action Review Of The Government Of Canada’s Response”, Hunter
McGill, July 23, 2010, p. 22
63 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Other donors have addressed the challenge of funding DRR and early recovery activities by
emphasizing these activities in their humanitarian policies. This is not the case for CIDA, where
the integration of humanitarian and development programming remains ad hoc.
IHA does its job in accordance with the mandate it has been given. Improving humanitarian
capacities and processes is a complex undertaking that involves a wide range of actors, factors
and resources. There is an inconsistent approach to humanitarian programming within CIDA
because the Agency has not engaged on humanitarian issues at the corporate level. It has not
developed a corporate consensus on how to handle coordination and integration between
humanitarian assistance and development, particularly with respect to programming in
protracted crises.
4.6.3 Management
Overall IHA manages its humanitarian assistance programming well. It has adequate
mechanisms and tools for assembling and analyzing needs-based information that is required
for funding decisions. IHA’s decision-making involves choosing among a number of options
proposed by its partners for programming in a given country – a task that requires more general
information than that required to assess basic needs and then design programs to address
them. It has effective relations with its partner organizations, being readily available to its
partners and sharing information informally.
The evidence suggests that the timeliness of the Agency’s humanitarian funding is mixed and
varies based on the type of funding. While funding for UN agencies under the CAP is generally
timely, the speed of funding for NGOs is uneven. Delays are introduced, at least in part,
because IHA is not always able to exercise its delegated authority for funding. CIDA is however
attempting to address timeliness issues by moving to more multi-year and flexible funding, as
timely response is of the essence in humanitarian response and key to the alignment with GHD.
IHA is managing 39% more humanitarian funding (including its initial budget and transfers) than
it did in 2006/07 with only 7% more operational expenditures. This is one indicator of efficient
IHA operations.
The human resources for CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming are -concentrated in
HQ. IHA has considerable knowledge and experience in humanitarian assistance, in a broad
sense which incorporates relief, recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, there are
limited resources at the field level, and field staff have little time to support humanitarian
programming and receive little guidance on the role they are expected to play. While there are
exceptions, beyond commenting on specific funding proposals, they are generally not engaged
in addressing more strategic issues with IHA, even when these issues affect their country of
focus.
In addition, the knowledge and experience of IHA does not seem to be regularly or consistently
drawn upon by the geographic programs, especially for countries recognised as vulnerable to
crises. Since geographic programs staff have limited involvement in humanitarian programming
64 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
and there are few mechanisms to support the integration of humanitarian and development
programming, the links between humanitarian and development programming are not, for the
most part, being made. There are also limited opportunities for training and information sharing
on humanitarian assistance issues within CIDA.
Matching funds are frequently used to engage Canadians in responding to catastrophic natural
disasters. While these matching funds are not a component of CIDA’s programming approach,
IHA staff have developed internal criteria for their implementation. However, there is still the risk
that the use of matching funds is distorting CIDA’s funding for other humanitarian crises. There
is insufficient evidence to say whether or not this is the case. There is also a lack of
transparency with respect to the disbursements of the matched funds.
There are many mechanisms CIDA uses to monitor its humanitarian assistance, but few
mechanisms for systematically integrating information and sharing lessons learned. As a result,
the Agency is missing opportunities for shared learning with both HQ and field staff. The Agency
is, however, conducting reviews to assess the performance of its implementing partners.
Ensuring the effectiveness of its partner organizations contributes to ensuring the effectiveness
of CIDA’s humanitarian funding.
There is no annual report on CIDA’s humanitarian assistance and opportunities are missed for
CIDA staff in the field to highlight what CIDA is doing in response to humanitarian crises. Yet,
given the proportion of CIDA’s press releases that address humanitarian issues, this is clearly a
facet of CIDA’s programming that is of interest to Canadians.
65 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
5.0 CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance Performance
There are two components to CIDA’s humanitarian assistance performance – the achievement
of results in line with its logic model and the efficiency of its programming.
Since this evaluation is primarily qualitative, it provides limited options for measuring directly (or
quantitatively) the results of CIDA’s global humanitarian response on outcomes for partners
(logic model’s intermediate outcomes) and beneficiaries (logic model’s ultimate outcomes). A
quantitative experimental or quasi-experimental design was not feasible for measuring the
impact of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance because it is not possible to find a reasonable
comparative sample. Humanitarian response contexts are different and depend, to a large
extent, on institutional, geographic, social and political contexts in both the countries affected by
the emergency and donor countries, so it is not possible to compare responses from different
donor countries. Aggregation and attribution of humanitarian assistance results is complicated
by the proliferation of humanitarian actors, the diversity of contexts and the increasing number
of assistance channels. As noted in the Finnish review of 35 humanitarian assistance
evaluations, “the problem of attribution is central to explaining why humanitarian aid evaluations
rarely have reports on impact. In the complex operating environments of humanitarian aid
operations, it is very difficult to determine the chain of attribution between an agency's relief
activities and their long-term impacts on the disaster affected communities.130
Moreover, given that CIDA’s humanitarian response is provided through partner organizations,
almost all of whom are also funded by other donors, multilateral organizations and/or the public,
the use of CIDA’s contributions to the partner organization cannot be measured separately from
the contributions provided by other sources of funding. In addition, measurement of
effectiveness based on partner information poses challenges, as noted in IHA’s Performance
Measurement Strategy (see Box 10).
Box 10: Challenge of Relying on Partner Information
As noted in IHA’s performance strategy, “…the quality of information at the level of
beneficiaries, essential to set baseline data, is often extremely poor – due to weak local
capacity, inaccessibility to communities, collapsed infrastructure and continued insecurity. As
such, baseline data beyond the number of people in need of assistance is context-driven and
complex to aggregate. Consequently, it is difficult to get an accurate global-level picture. This
represents a challenge for the measurement of all levels of results, especially for the higher
ones (Ultimate and Intermediate).”
“International Humanitarian Assistance Program Performance Measurement Strategy (Pm
Strategy) 2009-2013”, CIDA, September 2009, p. 5
130 “International Humanitarian Aid 2007–2010 – An Evaluation Synthesis”, p. 55 – 56
66 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Like other donors, CIDA faces additional constraints to results measurement. Some
stakeholders indicated that there are few opportunities for capturing and sharing lessons. In
addition, humanitarian staff members carry a heavy workload, travel budgets for field monitoring
missions are limited and there is limited expertise in the field to monitor humanitarian activities.
Reporting from UN partner agencies is high level reporting and very dependent on the quality of
partners’ monitoring systems. Yet the expected results of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance,
identified in the logic model prepared for this evaluation (see the evaluation methodology in
Background Report A), provide a framework for reporting on CIDA’s performance. Within the
framework of that logic model, results have been separated into two types:
Results that support the global capacity for humanitarian response, through CIDA’s core
funding and funding to NGOs who promote improved performance and accountability and
policy dialogue; and
Results at the country-level achieved through CIDA’s core or responsive funding to partner
organizations.
5.1 Humanitarian Assistance Results to Support Global
Capacity
Measurement and attribution of results remain a challenge in humanitarian assistance.
IHA contributes to building the capacity of the global humanitarian system in two ways:
providing core and multi–year funding to humanitarian organizations and participating in policy
dialogue with key humanitarian stakeholders.
Core and Multi–year Funding and Capacity Building
Canada is a significant supporter of multilateral organizations, and stakeholders appreciate the
level of core and multi-year funding...
Canada is a significant supporter of the multilateral system, reflecting the reach of the UN
system and its capacity to work in some environments where national governments or individual
organisations would not be able to operate. IHA provides core funding for individual UN
humanitarian agencies and system-wide core funding to UN agencies and some NGOs.
Although sometimes this funding is loosely earmarked (e.g. a percentage of HQ and a
percentage for field operations), it is generally unearmarked. Unearmarked funding provides the
flexibility to the organization to use the money for the range of activities within the organization’s
mandate, including activities to strengthen the organization’s capacity, as well as DRR and
transition issues.
Through its support to OCHA, Canada is a major supporter of coordination within the
humanitarian system. In 2005, the humanitarian community launched the UN Humanitarian
Reform Process to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through ensuring
greater predictability, accountability and partnership. The key elements of the reform were: the
67 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Cluster Approach, which clarified leadership and other roles and responsibilities within the UN
system; a strengthened Humanitarian Coordinator’s system; more adequate, timely, flexible and
effective humanitarian financing including a reformed CERF; and the development of strong
partnerships between UN and non-UN actors. Canada was a key proponent of these changes
and, as been noted in various sections of this report, has contributed to a number of the
elements of the reform. The Humanitarian Reform Process serves as the foundation for ongoing
coordination with the UN system.
However, coordination is an ongoing challenge. Numerous evaluations of humanitarian
assistance, most notably the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition report of 2006 and assessments of
the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, as well as the UK’s 2011 Humanitarian Emergency
Response Review, have identified weaknesses in coordination as an ongoing issue restricting
the effectiveness of national and international relief efforts. CIDA’s consistent advocacy for
improvements in coordination, together with its funding to OCHA, have provided incentives to
invest in system coordination capacity. Today, OCHA is recognised as playing a leading role in
humanitarian policy, advocacy and information management and is an “effectively managed and
responsive organisation.”131
IHA has also gradually increased the predictability of its funding. It currently provides multi-year
core funding to OCHA, WFP, CFGB, ICRC and CERF. It also provides multi-year funding to the
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination, the Canadian Red Cross Society and
CANADEM.
UN partner stakeholders were very appreciative of CIDA’s level of core and multi-year funding,
since it provides a predictable source of funding for some of IHA’s key partners. In addition,
Canada’s 2008 decision to untie its food aid budget has increased flexibility for its partners so
that they can procure food locally, which has reportedly helped reduce associated purchase and
transportation costs and promoted more timely responses. The decision was widely heralded as
an important decision that reflected Canada’s leadership in the humanitarian community. As
well, CIDA has been instrumental in encouraging the WFP and CFGB to address the nutritional
impact of food aid.
CERF receives 8% of all CIDA’s humanitarian funding. As a result of support from donors like
Canada, the CERF has increased the predictability of funding through the underfunded window
at global level. A recent CERF evaluation, conducted by OCHA, found that the CERF “Rapid
Response grant offers one of the most rapid funding mechanisms available to UN agencies and
is reported as the fastest external funding source.”132 It “has increased the predictability of
funding flows for new emergencies, even if this is less clearly the case for underfunded
emergencies. Further the CERF has increased the coverage of the humanitarian response.”133
131 “OCHA Meta-Evaluation: Final Report”, Pierre Robert and Dr Achim Engelhardt, July 2009, p. 7
132 5-year Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund: Final Synthesis Report, Channel
Research, August 2011, p. 5 133
Ibid., p. 3
68 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
At the country level, “CERF has added value for recipient agencies by filling funding gaps;
providing funding early in the year; complementing the Humanitarian Response Fund; enabling
agencies to leverage funding from other donors; supporting a response capacity; and being a
straightforward funding mechanism that focuses on addressing gaps in meeting needs.”134
… and the level of support to capacity building and organizational effectiveness.
IHA also supports the development of the capacity of its UN partners in a variety of ways. As a
UN member, Canada is a member of the UN agencies and, as such, has responsibility for the
effective management of the agencies. CIDA participates in the executive bodies of the
agencies and uses these opportunities to promote key CIDA messages and encourage the
improvement of agency effectiveness. As noted above, CIDA also provides core funding for
these agencies and this funding can be used to strengthen capacity. As a member of the
organization, it also provides funding for specific capacity building. (For an example, see Box
11.)
Box 11: Capacity Building at UNHCR
IHA manages two initiatives to strengthen the capacity of UNHCR. The first is the Joint
Organizational Strategy (JOS) – a collaborative framework developed in collaboration with the
UK and Denmark to increase the efficiency of the working relationships and strengthen
UNHCR’s capacity for operational delivery. A recent evaluation of the strategy found that
“notwithstanding some limitations noted in the evaluation, the JOS has contributed to
strengthening UNHCR’s overall performance in the attainment of its strategic goals, most
notably in the evolution of its management systems.”
The second is the Canadian Consultant Management Fund (CCMF), created in 1994 to support
UNHCR’s management system improvements. An evaluation conducted in 2008 noted that the
CMCF “has been effective in supporting management reforms at UNHCR. Some projects have
had very significant immediate impacts on reforms. Others have contributed more indirectly to
reforms or have a reasonable potential to result in significant changes in the future, if continued
support is provided by UNHCR.” (“Evaluation of the Canadian Consultant Management Fund:
Final Report”, CIDA, March 2008, p. vi)
Although IHA does not directly support capacity building for Canadian NGOs, it does provide
support indirectly through activities such as:
Support for the Secretariat of the Policy and Advocacy Group for Emergency Relief
(PAGER), which increased the capacity of the Group to contribute to coordination among
NGOs;
Support for training opportunities offered through PAGER to increase the capacity of staff of
PAGER member organizations;
134 Independent Review of the Value Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund in Ethiopia,
Policy2Practice Team, July 2011, p. 1
69 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Support for the development of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for the
Humanitarian Coalition (a working group of Canadian humanitarian NGOs) that increased its
capacity for performance measurement; and
Support for a range of international NGOs (including ALNAP, Overseas Development
Institute, Development Initiatives, Transparency International, The Assessment Capacities
Project, Feinstein University, Université de Louvain’s Complex Emergency Database,
SPHERE, and other NGOs) that work on issues of learning, accountability, transparency,
and standards with the goal of improving the overall effectiveness of humanitarian
assistance.
With the exception of the CFGB, IHA does not currently provide core funding to NGOs. This,
according to the NGOs, restricts their ability to develop the capacity to respond to humanitarian
crises.
CIDA’s work on emergency preparedness focuses on strengthening the capacity of the system
to respond to humanitarian crises. As such, its activities focus on prepositioning supplies and
funding mechanisms to deploy humanitarian workers, and on reinforcing the response capacity
of National Red Cross Societies. For example, this work has:
Expanded its stockpile of relief supplies to be able to cover the needs of 25,000 people.
These supplies have been deployed thirteen times in about four years to respond to
emergency needs;
Funded the CRCS First Responder Initiative for the establishment and deployment of an
emergency field hospital and reinforcing the response capacity of National Red Cross
Societies in the Americas by developing and improving contingency planning and early
warning systems. The field hospital is on standby in Toronto for deployment in large-scale
emergencies. It was deployed successfully in Haiti from December 2010 to April 2011;
Funded CANADEM to maintain a roster of humanitarian experts and the CRCS’ Overseas
Delegates Program that trains and maintains a roster of Canadian expertise for deployment
in humanitarian crises (see Box 12); and
Set up an agreement with CRCS on the use of an emergency fund for allocations up to
$200K, which CRCS can draw from a CIDA account within 24 hours. CRSC staff report that
this is a useful quick response tool that supports the IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund.
Box 12: Added Value of IHA’s Support for CANADEM and CRCS’ Overseas Delegates Program
IHA’s funding of CANADEM and the CRCS’ Overseas Delegates Program (ODP) contributes to strengthening the international humanitarian assistance system.
CANADEM-deployed experts provide a value-added service to the humanitarian organizations they serve and to the Canadian government. “Cluster Leads also suggest that CANADEM’s work enhances Canada’s reputation as a supporter of humanitarian interventions. Additionally … by providing the Canadian government with access to a roster of qualified civilian humanitarian experts in Canada, CANADEM is providing the Canadian government with a service that it cannot presently obtain otherwise.” (p. ii)
70 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Operational Review of the CANADEM Expert Deployment Phase II Project 2008 – 2010: Final Report, Universalia Management Group, September 2010.
The benefits of CIDA’s support to the ODP include:
Continuing to reflect Canada’s commitment to strengthening the multilateral humanitarian assistance system;
Allowing Canada to play a lead role in the revisions to the ICRC/IFRC’s global introductory course and improve Canada’s visibility within the RC Movement;
Training Canadian delegates, who are then available on a CRCS roster for deployments;
Maintaining a roster of trained delegates available for deployments;
Expanding the number (albeit small – 6% of all CRCS-deployed delegates) of Canadians who are able to participate in international humanitarian activities;
Supporting the deployment of Canadian delegates who are reportedly well-received in the international humanitarian assistance system; and
Providing funding for humanitarian responses that are not well funded through public donations.
“Overseas Delegates Program Review: Final Report”, Goss Gilroy Inc., May 2010
Policy Dialogue
CIDA has been proactive in policy dialogue and achieved results, but it is perceived that there
has been a decline in Canada’s engagement.
CIDA is engaged in policy dialogue on humanitarian issues with both multilateral and NGO
partners, at both the global and country levels.
IHA is responsible for management of the relationship with the key humanitarian UN agencies –
WFP, UNHCR and OCHA – and the Red Cross Movement – ICRC and IFRC. The bilateral desk
responsible for the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian Refugees program, is responsible for
relations with UNRWA. While other UN agencies (such as UNICEF or the World Health
Organization) may implement humanitarian assistance programming for CIDA, as development
or technical agencies, the relationships are managed by other CIDA or OGD units. As a
member of the UN partner agencies, CIDA is represented on the governing bodies of these
agencies and has the opportunity to influence the work of the agencies and participate in
international debate on humanitarian issues.
IHA engages in annual consultations with its UN partners. Over the past few years, MGPB has
developed an institutional strategy for each organization that receives core funding, including
some of its key humanitarian partners (WFP and UNHCR), which outlines CIDA’s priorities for
its relationship with each organization. Action plans for working with each partner have also
been developed and are being used to monitor progress on the identified strategies and to
inform revisions.
IHA maintains an ongoing dialogue with the major NGO implementing partners – primarily
through PAGER – a network of NGOs that discuss policy and operational issues in
humanitarian response. IHA’s regular contact with PAGER provides a mechanism to
communicate upcoming funding opportunities and discuss humanitarian issues. Respondents
71 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
indicated that, over the past few years, there has been an increase in the number of PAGER
members and, as a result, a shift in the level of engagement of government staff. The focus has
reportedly shifted from strategic, policy-focused discussion, to discussion of more operational
issues (e.g. access to populations affected by humanitarian emergencies, clearance for goods
at ports). Some PAGER members also attribute this shift to a change in IHA’s capacity to
engage with its partners. Some NGOs attribute these shifts in engagement to changes in the
extent to which CIDA staff are empowered to engage with external stakeholders.
To the extent that bilateral program staff have the resources to do so, CIDA also plays this
policy dialogue role at the country level. It was apparent from the case studies that when CIDA
has staff in the field with humanitarian experience, they are more likely to be engaged at the
country-level in humanitarian policy dialogue. Sudan is the only country in which IHA has an
officer at the mission (see Box 13). However, in other countries (notably in the case study
countries of Colombia and West Bank and Gaza), CIDA field staff with humanitarian experience
are able to be more actively involved in policy dialogue.
Box 13: Policy Dialogue in Sudan
CIDA’s IHA representative in Sudan has chaired the joint Humanitarian Donor Working Group
(HDWG) for the past two years. During this period, CIDA led a number of efforts, including
advocating for increased humanitarian access along the border with South Sudan. These efforts
in Sudan have been complemented by those of the Sudan Contact Group in New York
(consisting of Canada, the European Union, France, the Netherlands, Norway, the United
Kingdom and the United States). CIDA’s efforts led to increased policy dialogue and influence
among donors, especially through coordinated donor messaging with the Sudanese
government, which, while not resolving the humanitarian access issue completely, has
contributed to more effective messaging.
There were mixed views from external stakeholders (including NGO and UN partner
organizations, other donors and other organizations) about the current strength of Canada’s
policy dialogue. Some external respondents noted that Canada has played in the past, and
continues to play, an active role in the global dialogue on humanitarian issues. They gave very
positive views of Canada’s role on the agencies’ executive bodies, noting that Canada is seen
as offering a balanced perspective, being an honest broker and having an impact on addressing
specific issues such as results-based management (RBM), improvements to needs-based
assessments by partner organizations, the inclusion of nutrition as a component of food
assistance, and gender equality. Canada’s role in the development of the GHD Principles and
Good Practice in 2003, as well as its position as chair of GHD for two years, have made a
significant contribution to strengthening the humanitarian system. CIDA representatives
continue to be active and provide leadership in the GHD Working Group, which is currently
working on revising the indicators for measuring progress on the principles.
On the other hand, some external stakeholders noted that Canada’s policy presence has
weakened in recent years. A number of multilateral partners expressed the view that they no
longer had a clear sense of Canada’s humanitarian assistance priorities and strategies.
72 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Stakeholders attribute this to two things: the lack of a clearly documented whole-of-government
humanitarian assistance policy or strategy, and a perception that CIDA staff are less able to
express themselves in both global and country forums. As a result, Canada’s engagement at
the global and local level is more often described as information sharing rather than policy
dialogue and this means Canada is less able to hold the global system and its component
organizations to account. In one specific case (see Box 14), Canada’s ability to engage in policy
dialogue was undermined by changes and reductions in CIDA’s funding for a multilateral
organization. Funding “buys a seat at the table” for policy dialogue and stakeholders in West
Bank and Gaza noted that funding cuts diminish Canada’s ability to engage in policy dialogue
and influence the programming.
Box 14: Impact of Cuts to UNRWA Core Funding
In 2009/10 CIDA stopped providing core funding to UNRWA, in spite of having provided core
funding to this longest-standing humanitarian agency for over 60 years. In that year there was,
however, a slight increase in project funding for UNRWA. In spite of the increase in project
funding, total funding for UNRWA declined in 2010/11. However, because Canada still provides
more than $1 million/year to UNRWA, it remains on the UNRWA Advisory Committee. Yet,
internal and external stakeholders indicated that not providing core funding makes it much more
difficult for CIDA to influence UNRWA programming.
5.2 Country-level Results
The evaluation has taken two approaches to assessing CIDA’s humanitarian programming
results at the country-level. The first is to identify, through the case studies, specific results (and,
to the extent possible, impacts) of country-level programming. The second is to look at the
effectiveness of CIDA’s partner organizations. The effectiveness of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance programming depends on the effectiveness of its partners.
5.2.1 Country-level Results from Case Studies
This review of country-level results is drawn from the five case studies conducted for this
evaluation and organized according to the expected outcomes in CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance logic model. While the case studies provide examples of the results that CIDA is
achieving with its humanitarian funding, these cannot always be attributed specifically to
Canadian funding.135
It should also be noted that “outcomes” in CIDA’s logic model span a range of results. Some
would be described by other organizations as “outputs” (e.g. improved availability of relief
stocks, technical expertise, and use of needs assessments tools); while others are clearly
ultimate outcomes (e.g. increased lives saved, suffering alleviated and human dignity
135 This is particularly the case with UN agency and Red Cross Movement programming because the
agencies provide corporate reports to fulfill their accountability requirements to CIDA, and these reports reflect the results for the overall funding they received (as opposed to CIDA funding) in any given country.
73 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
maintained in communities experiencing humanitarian emergency or food insecurity). The
following sections provide examples of the range of results, with some of the challenges.
This evaluation can only report on CIDA’s contribution and measure its performance by the
performance of its partners.
CIDA’s expected humanitarian results, as identified in the logic model, can be grouped into
three major outcome areas: improvements in the preparedness for humanitarian responses,
strengthening the capacity of the humanitarian system, and results for beneficiaries. Examples
from the case studies are presented to illustrate these results and, to the extent possible,
evidence of effectiveness is drawn from external evaluations/review. When combined, these
outcomes are expected to contribute to the ultimate outcome of “increased lives saved, suffering
alleviated and human dignity maintained.”
Results in Emergency Preparedness
...however, there are results being achieved in the field with respect to all expected outcomes of
CIDA’s humanitarian assistance.
CIDA’s work on emergency preparedness focuses, at both the global and country level, on
strengthening the capacity of the system to respond to humanitarian crises. At the country level,
CIDA funding also supports the prepositioning of supplies and the deployment of humanitarian
experts, such as:
Provision through the Ethiopian Red Cross of two emergency health and eight cholera kits
to the Ministry of Health – each kit was sufficient to treat 1,000 patients for three months – to
strengthen the capacity of the medical facilities to respond to the floods-triggered epidemics
(IFRC).136
Provision of twelve experts to a number of organizations working in Haiti, including
emergency logisticians, child protection officers, food warehouse managers, camp
managers, shelter operations officer and nurses (CANADEM).
Results in Strengthening the Capacity of the Humanitarian System
While CIDA contributes at the global level to strengthening the humanitarian system, it also
contributes to improving planning and coordination of the humanitarian response at the country
level by, among other things, supporting coordination mechanisms and training of humanitarian
workers.
Through its support to OCHA in the case study countries, CIDA has supported the
coordination mandate of that organization. In West Bank and Gaza, for example, Canadian
contributions to OCHA have allowed it to strengthen coordination mechanisms such as the
establishment of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), the conduct of advocacy activities,
136 Project files: IFRC Ethiopia: Floods Emergency Appeal 24 October 2008.
74 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
leadership for the cluster system, the provision of strategic and policy guidance to the
overall humanitarian response, and monitoring of the humanitarian situation. Humanitarian
access is a key issue in the West Bank and Gaza. In 2008, OCHA chaired an Advocacy
Working Group, under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to “provide a
more ‘united’ voice for the humanitarian community in West Bank and Gaza to achieve
greater awareness of the most pressing needs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”137
In Ethiopia, a five-day Training on Sphere Standards 46 practitioners (including four women)
from different local and international NGOs, government office experts and the NGO’s
affiliates partners and staff in Ethiopia was supported through funding to Oxfam Canada.
Results for Beneficiaries
CIDA funding is expected to meet the basic needs of beneficiaries through improved access to
food and non-food items, re-establishing livelihoods, reducing vulnerability, and providing
protection (including respect for international humanitarian law). CIDA contributes to meeting
these needs through its partner organizations.
As part of its humanitarian response to the earthquake in January 2010, CIDA:
1. Contributed to the provision of emergency food aid to 4.3 million Haitians, water and
sanitation services to 1.3 million Haitians, emergency and temporary housing to 370,000
households, and relief items following the earthquake (2010);
2. Continued to respond to the ongoing and urgent needs of those still suffering the effects
of the devastating earthquake and the widespread cholera epidemic of 2010;
3. Constructed 3,200 transitional shelter units in Port-au-Prince, Léogane and Jacmel
(2010/11);
4. Provided clean drinking water, latrines, and cleaning facilities to 75,000 people
(2010/11);
5. Vaccinated 60,000 children against common diseases (2010/11); and
6. Enabled 85 percent of the affected population to have access to cholera treatment
and/or cholera treatment centres (2010/11).138
In Tonj North county, South Sudan, through a World Vision project, 28% of children aged 12
– 23 months were fully immunized compared to 17% of the population in South Sudan.
There has also been a decrease in diarrhoea incidence by 33% from 2009 to 2010.139
Through a War Child project, thirteen small businesses were established to employ
graduates from masonry/construction and food preservation/processing programs, and
137 “OCHA (Report to donors) Project Completion Report Janunary – December 2008”, OCHA, p. 5 – 6
138 http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-12912349-NLX
139 World Vision Tonj North Emergency Response and Returnee Assistance Project Report, April 2011.
Corresponds to CIDA project M-012558 ($1M)
75 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
eighteen local businesses were involved in capacity-building activities that helped facilitate
graduate employment. Graduates of the masonry program tripled household incomes.140
In Ethiopia, the government (with WFP funding) is currently reaching 3.7 million people in
Ethiopia with emergency food assistance, including 240,000 refugees. A further 3.4 million
people are receiving assistance through non-emergency programs.141
In Ethiopia, in the period of April 2009 to November 2010, a CARE International project
established and supported a total of 145 Out-patient Therapeutic Programmes through the
project in the eight operational woredas (districts). The project reached 20,584 beneficiaries
with ready-to-use therapeutic food and other routine medication, including immunization of
the total discharged beneficiaries - 18,647 were cured, for a recovery rate of 96%; 22 died
with death rate of 0.1%; and 326 defaulted (1.7%).142
In Colombia, Action Contre la Faim reported addressing basic water and sanitation needs
for over 6,000 beneficiaries and 800 households affected by the 2010-2011 floods,
including:
1. Access and capacity to store at least 20 litres per day of safe water increased for
6,218 beneficiaries;
2. Access to water from the distribution of 800 household water tanks (150 litres): 4,017
direct beneficiaries;
3. Water filters: 4,017 direct beneficiaries; and
4. Construction of 56 household water supply systems, reaching 276 beneficiaries vs.
200 planned.
In Colombia, WFP reported that food consumption data from the end of a project showed an
improvement in the nutritional quality of the food consumed. Projects that assist pregnant
and nursing women and at-risk children have had a positive effect on families. The general
pattern suggests that food insecurity has been mitigated.143
In the West Bank and Gaza, a UNICEF program provided capacity building, training, and
awareness-raising activities for staff of family centres and psychosocial supports for
children. A mid-term evaluation reported that the services had had a positive impact on both
140 War Child Canada Darfur Humanitarian Relief Project, Final Report May 2007 to Oct 2009.
Corresponds to projects M012557 ($400K, 2006-2007), and M012557 ($348K, 2007-2008) – multiyear. 141
WFP, Ethiopia Overview: http://www.wfp.org/countries/Ethiopia/Overview 142
Project files: Care International in Ethiopia (April 2009-November 2010). 143
WFP, “Summary Evaluation Report Colombia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 105880”, 2010, WFP/EB.2/2010/6-C. page 11.
76 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
parents and children, and that the activities contributed to longer-term impacts for both
beneficiaries and staff.144
5.2.2 Performance of Humanitarian Partners
… and CIDA’s contribution has enabled its humanitarian partners’ effectiveness.
The second way in which this evaluation assessed the results of CIDA’s humanitarian
programming was to reflect on the performance of its main humanitarian partners, which are
CIDA’s implementing agencies in the field. If its humanitarian partners are effective in the field,
then CIDA’s humanitarian funding is effective.
CIDA and the humanitarian community use a variety of approaches to assess the performance
of UN and NGO implementing agencies:
UN partner agencies provide annual reports on their agency’s activities and results. In the
spirit of GHD, common reports are provided to all donors. However, CIDA, like many other
donors, also has independent mechanisms for assessing performance, such as MOPAN
and multi-donor evaluations of multilateral agencies. Although in the past CIDA has
participated in multi-donor evaluations, it is now focusing its efforts on the new review
process to assess development or humanitarian effectiveness. To date, the only
humanitarian agency to be reviewed under this new approach is WFP.
CIDA also receives narrative reports from its NGO partners for each funded project.
Interviews with NGO respondents suggest that most NGOs (notably the larger NGOs that
are part of international organizations) have evaluation systems in place. However,
information from these internal evaluations is not readily publicly available. However, NGOs
do contribute to system-wide and real-time evaluations and lessons-learned exercises that
are emergency-specific.145 Results identified in these evaluations cannot be attributed
specifically to Canadian partners. However, CIDA also carries out assessments of individual
NGO partners.
Information from these sources provides insights on the effectiveness of CIDA’s UN, Red Cross
and NGO implementing partners.
UN Partners
WFP is CIDA’s largest humanitarian partner. A recent review of the humanitarian and
development effectiveness of WFP showed that the organization is achieving its objectives
and expected results and that its programs are highly relevant to their context.146 “WFP’s
144 “Mid-term Evaluation: Family Centres Project”, Riyada Consulting and Training, September 2010, p. 8
– 9 145
For example, Inter‐agency real‐time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake (Final Report), François Grünewald (Groupe URD). Andrea Binder (GPPi), August 31, 2010 146
“Review of the World Food Programme’s Humanitarian and Development Effectiveness 2006 – 2011: Synthesis Report”, (draft), CIDA, February 2012. The review was a structured meta-synthesis of 52
77 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
most cited achievements were in the distribution of food aid and other programming, which
contributed to improvement of food consumption, prevention of acute hunger and reduction
of the risk of chronic hunger and malnutrition for target populations.”147 WFP also prepares
an annual report that summarized the results of the evaluations conducted during the year.
The 2010 annual report reflected results that were similar to the findings in the WFP review.
WFP’s typical strength is in the area of relief – delivered through general food distribution,
food for work in lieu of general distributions, and contributions to grain bank. However, there
were shortfalls in protecting and rebuilding lives and livelihoods, and disaster preparedness
work. School feeding “continued to be WFP’s other flagship programme, alongside its relief
work. … school feeding helped increase enrolment, attendance and attainment rates.”148
Nutrition programmes “… struggled to demonstrate results, in part because of small
programme sizes related to overall needs, and because of difficulties in measuring
outcomes.”149
UNHCR is CIDA’s second largest humanitarian partner. UNHCR is the only humanitarian
organization to have been covered by MOPAN.150 Even though MOPAN focuses on
organizational effectiveness, the UNHCR report presents relevant conclusions on the
organization’s humanitarian effectiveness for this evaluation. The report notes, among other
things, that UNHCR respects humanitarian principles; it has made progress in managing for
results and its practices are catching up with best practices in emergency preparedness,
and response is improving. Its evaluation function is improving, but is constrained by limited
resources, and it could enhance its transparency by sharing more of its documents.151
Like WFP, UNICEF prepares an annual report on its evaluation function for the year. The
2010 report reflects on a major evaluation undertaken of UNICEF’s education programming
in emergencies and post-emergency situations. The evaluation found that “education quality
in emergencies and post-crisis settings had improved, although there was a lack of
consistent understanding of the program’s objectives.”152 At the same time, the evaluation
found that “… prevention and preparedness pilots had not been tracked adequately … and
that monitoring and evaluation as a whole were weak, impeding the generation of credible
assessment and learning.”153 In its 2012 – 2013 evaluation work plan, UNICEF committed to
evaluations published by WFP covering its programming from 2006 - 2011, mostly at the country level. The evaluation reports were rated using predetermined criteria and an approach approved by the DAC-EVALNET. 147
Ibid., p. vii 148
“Annual Evaluation Report 2010”, WFP, 2011, p. 3 149
Ibid. 150
Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network: Organisational Effectiveness Assessment; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Volume 1, December 2011 151
Ibid, p. ix 152
Annual report on the evaluation function and major evaluations in UNICEF, UNICEF, E/ICEF/2011/15, 18 July 2011, p. 16 153
Ibid., p. 16 – 17
78 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
providing a special emphasis “on humanitarian monitoring and evaluation competencies
following from weaknesses seen in multiple evaluations and reviews.”154
In summary, these organizational evaluations of CIDA’s partners suggest that there are both
strengths and weaknesses in their performance. However, the documents also reflect the
initiatives being undertaken by partners and CIDA to address the weaknesses.
Red Cross Movement
The only information available about the performance of the ICRC and IFRC was the
assessment of these organizations in the UK’s Multilateral Aid Review.155 ICRC received a
strong rating in terms of its contribution to results. Its strength is that it is “often the only
organisation able to access vulnerable populations in some of the most fragile countries in
the world and its ability to deliver under the most difficult circumstances, and crucially where
other organisations cannot, is relatively unique.”156 IFRC received a satisfactory rating on its
contribution to results. It contributes significantly to humanitarian results as “one of the initial
responders following disasters and is able to quickly and effectively mobilise to reinforce
country capacity.” However, it has challenges in maintaining field level capacity and building
the capacity of weak National Societies.157
NGO Partners
There is less publicly available information about the effectiveness of NGO partner
organizations and the organizations themselves appear to do less evaluation of their activities.
The only evaluation identified was a CFGB evaluation. However, this is significant because
CFGB is the NGO receiving the largest amount of IHA funding:
CFGB is CIDA’s largest NGO humanitarian partner. A recent evaluation of CFGB noted that
CFGP and its partners have “contributed to increased immediate levels of food consumption
through many of its projects and available evidence suggests that these increases have
been sustainable over the short and medium term.”158 While the evaluation could not assess
long-term impacts, “some members and partners have documented positive outcomes for
some communities over the longer term” and, although it represented a small part of CFGB
programming, nutrition treatment and supplementary feeding “contributed to reducing acute
and chronic malnutrition among hunger-affected individuals, households, and communities
where nutrition related projects have been implemented.”159 CFGB also contributed to “the
154 Ibid., p. 12
155 Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral
organisations, DFID, March 2011 156
Ibid. 157
Ibid. 158
“Evaluation of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank Program (2006/07- 2009/10): Final Report”, IHA CIDA, May 2010, p. iv 159
Ibid.
79 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
protection and strengthening of livelihoods of hunger-affected individuals, households, and
communities.”160
In conclusion, as would be expected with any organization, there are strengths and challenges
in the performance of CIDA’s humanitarian partners. However, on balance, each key partner
implementing CIDA’s humanitarian response is seen as largely effective. This was also reflected
in the 2011 UK government assessment of the performance of many multilateral organizations
(including a number of humanitarian organizations).161 Organizations were rated on a number of
criteria. While the purpose of the report was to ensure that the UK gets maximum value for its
contributions to multilateral organizations, one key criterion was particularly relevant to this
evaluation of CIDA’s humanitarian programming – contribution to results.162 Six key CIDA
humanitarian partner organizations were included in this review and all but one received ratings
of satisfactory (IFRC, UNICEF and WFP) or strong (UNHCR and ICRC).163 The only agency to
receive a weak rating was OCHA.164
5.3 Efficiency of CIDA’s Programming
On the whole, CIDA’s humanitarian programming seems to be managed efficiently.
It is difficult for the evaluation to draw definitive conclusions about the efficiency of CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance. The first challenge is that the evaluation only assessed in detail the
management of IHA’s programming and not the management of the humanitarian assistance
programming managed by the bilateral desks. Secondly, efficiency in humanitarian action is a
difficult question to address. Delivering assistance in emergency situations can involve high
costs, when logistical/access, management, protection and other factors are taken properly into
consideration. Natural disaster-related crises often result in the destruction of essential
transportation infrastructure that necessitates use of high-cost modes of providing aid.165 Finally,
those elements of efficiency that the team was able to assess reflected mixed results.
160 Ibid, p. v
161 Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral
organisations 162
Criteria included: Objectives are challenging, e.g. strives to reach the very poorest; Strives for results at country level; Demonstrates delivery against objectives; and Contributes to development or humanitarian results 163
Note that the organizations were rated on overall performance – not necessarily just their humanitarian performance. 164
Challenges were related to staffing problems, OCHA’s relationship with the UN Secretariat and the need for OCHA to strengthen its performance with respect to inter-cluster coordination and information management and analysis. 165
Only about three-quarters of WFP’s evaluations included in meta-synthesis of WFP evaluations of its own programming (“Review of the World Food Programme’s Humanitarian and Development Effectiveness 2006 – 2011: Synthesis Report”) were able to assess the extent to which the program activities were cost/resource efficient.
80 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
There are many components of IHA’s management of humanitarian assistance that contribute
to efficiency:166
IHA is able to collect and assess a broad range of information on needs, from a wide range
of partners in a way that allows it to respond, at least, informally to partners on CIDA’s
intentions with respect to a humanitarian response. (Section 4.3.1)
IHA packages its program funding recommendations for review by senior management and
the Minister. This allows IHA staff to compare proposals for the delivery of comparable
services for the same response, and also allows for a more efficient and flexible approval
process with senior management and the Minister. (Section 4.3.1)
Some prequalified NGOs are eligible to submit an abridged proposal form during the first
two weeks of a rapid onset disaster in order to simplify the process for its partners.167
(Section 4.3.1)
IHA has or is adopting a number of practices to ensure more timely response, including
increased use of multi-year funding, funding for CERF, development of a Quick Release
Mechanism for Crisis Pool funding, and the set up of rapid response mechanisms with
CRCS. The multi-year and CERF funding allows IHA to manage a larger volume of
humanitarian assistance funding with a lower administrative burden on its staff. (Section
4.3.1)
IHA is able to ensure that timely decisions are made on funding for appeals under the UN
CAP. (Section 4.3.1)
IHA staff are reportedly readily available to the humanitarian partner organizations and
respond, in a timely way, to questions. (Section 4.3.1)
The operational costs of managing IHA’s humanitarian funding represent a very small
percentage of its humanitarian funding and the percentage is declining. (Section 4.3.2)
On the other hand, while funding for UN agencies under the CAP is timely, the evidence
suggests that there are no service standards for decision-making on NGO project-funding and
that the decision-making is, at times, not timely, in that NGOs have had to redesign their
programming to ensure that it met the needs of the affected population. It is recognized,
however, that IHA has to strike a balance between efficiency and the requirement to exercise
due diligence in funding decisions. (Section 4.3.1)
5.4 Conclusions
Attribution of results is a challenge in humanitarian assistance, given the many actors – funders
and implementing partners – engaged in an emergency response. However, analysis of the
166 Evidence to support these observations is found in earlier sections of the report, as noted by the
Section references in brackets. 167
Since the current situation with respect to these shorter proposals is not well understood across Canadian NGOs, IHA is currently in the process of reviewing its NGO proposal guidelines.
81 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
results of CIDA’s humanitarian funding reflects some important achievements, particularly
through CIDA’s core funding and policy dialogue at the global level. Canada has been
recognized in the humanitarian community as an honest broker while also promoting key issues
such as RBM and gender equality. Support for improvement in the response capacity of the
global system and for better coordination are important contributions made by Canada.
Although it has played a leadership role for many years, there is a general sense that it does not
have as strong a presence in the humanitarian community globally as it did in the past.
This focus on global results does not suggest that results at the country level are less
impressive, but rather it reflects the challenge of evaluating the results at the field level. It is
possible to get an overall picture of the results of CIDA’s humanitarian programming at the
global level, at least at the immediate outcome level. While it is possible to identify results at the
country level, it is challenging to attribute these to CIDA’s funding or aggregate these into an
overall picture of the impact of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance in order to measure outcomes.
However, using two approaches to assess the results of CIDA’s humanitarian programming
leads to the conclusion that, through its partners, CIDA is likely achieving positive results at the
country level. CIDA’s humanitarian programming has contributed, to some extent, to all the
expected outcomes in the humanitarian assistance logic model, including improvements in the
preparedness for humanitarian responses, strengthening the capacity of the humanitarian
system, and improved results for beneficiaries. In addition, CIDA’s key humanitarian partners
are generally seen as effective in implementing humanitarian assistance.
The UN agencies are more transparent, in that they have systematic evaluation processes in
place, make evaluation results publicly available, and are subject to international reviews of their
performance. CIDA has been more systematically engaged in the review of multilateral
organizations – first through multilateral-donor evaluations and more recently in the conduct of
effectiveness reviews. The NGOs make less evaluative information available publicly, but
contribute to response-specific reviews. CIDA is better able to identify the results of NGO
programming (at least at the output level), as their end-of-project reports provide more
information on specific results.
The evaluation found mixed results with respect to the efficiency of IHA’s management of its
humanitarian funding. In terms of project selection and implementation and its management of
its ongoing relations with its partners, IHA is seen as generally effective. Its decisions to provide
multi-year, core and CERF funding and the development of rapid response mechanisms with
some partners, allows IHA to manage a larger volume of humanitarian assistance funding with a
lower administrative burden on its staff. Although it is very timely in decision-making with
respect to UN appeal funding, its efficiency is hampered by a lack of timeliness on some NGO
project decision-making.
82 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
6.0 Conclusions
6.1 Relevance
The Canadian government’s framework for humanitarian assistance has not been set out in a
policy statement. Nonetheless, references in Ministerial speeches/statements, Throne
speeches, and the increase in humanitarian assistance funding over the period covered by the
evaluation suggest that CIDA’s humanitarian assistance activities are aligned with the
government’s priorities. In addition, the Agency’s humanitarian assistance programming links
directly with CIDA’s strategic priorities, as reflected in its Program Activity Architecture (PAA)
and other corporate strategies. It is consistent with three of the five components of the PAA:
Fragile States and Crisis-affected communities, Global Engagement and Strategic Policy and
Canadian Engagement.
Based on the evidence, CIDA is generally aligned with the Principles and Good Practice of
Good Humanitarian Donorship, a key, internationally agreed upon, performance framework for
humanitarian assistance programming. However, in three areas, alignment is unclear. Current
practice at CIDA with regard to the limited funding for prevention, risk reduction and recovery,
delays in making and implementing funding decisions, and transparency with respect to some
humanitarian funding is not consistent with GHD principles and good practice. Further, there are
questions about whether matching funds are compatible with GHD principles, as they can lead
to episodic and disproportionate funding, which work against the needs-based allocation of
resources and longer-term recovery and reconstruction.
6.2 Design and Delivery
Policy and Scope of Humanitarian Assistance
In line with its mandate, CIDA uses a definition of humanitarian assistance that gives little
emphasis to prevention, risk reduction, recovery and transition to development. While IHA
provides limited funding for these activities, some geographic programs are funding them.
However, tracking these expenditures is not easy and thus a full picture of CIDA’s humanitarian
expenditures is difficult to obtain. CIDA’s International Development Assistance Ts&Cs do allow
for financing a somewhat wider range of activities under the category of humanitarian
assistance. Indeed, international trends favour broadening the scope of humanitarian action to
include prevention, risk reduction, recovery and transition to development, as has been done by
Australia, Denmark and Sweden. The evidence suggests that to date CIDA has not made as
much progress on linkage and integration issues as have other donors.
Since there is not yet a CIDA humanitarian strategy, there is insufficient clear documentation on
CIDA’s approach to humanitarian assistance. It is understood that a strategy is being developed
by IHA, but that it is not, as yet, a corporate document based on external consultations that
engage stakeholders in addressing the issue of the scope of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance
83 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
and the comparative advantage of the different branches’ programming in humanitarian
assistance (i.e. MGPB, GPB, PWCB).
Gender Equality
IHA has promoted, in global humanitarian forums, the need for attention to gender equality in
program design and delivery. IHA is increasingly providing more structure to ensure its partners
meet gender equality expectations. It has also examined the gender equality approaches of a
number of key NGO and multilateral partners, and has developed tools to improve assessment
of the gender impact of proposals.
Management
Internal IHA needs assessment procedures and tools are adequate for the purposes of
allocating funding. It has adequate mechanisms for assembling and analysing needs-based
information for making funding decisions. There are some remaining challenges including the
lack of public criteria for triggering the launching of a matching fund and concerns about the
extent to which matching funds may distort humanitarian expenditures and may result in donor
fatigue.
CIDA has a comprehensive set of relationships with multilateral and NGO partners for the
delivery of Canadian humanitarian assistance, with the distribution of funding influenced by the
assessed comparative advantage of each type of organization. IHA has effective operational
relations with these partner organization stakeholders, and these partnerships are key to the
delivery of Canadian humanitarian assistance. However, the absence of a CIDA strategy to
guide performance makes it difficult to assess the performance of CIDA’s partnerships. This
would include the complementarity of the Agency’s humanitarian strategies to those of other
donors, and the extent to which CIDA’s partnerships contributed to policy dialogue and
knowledge-sharing.
Once agreements are in place, IHA is a flexible and knowledgeable funder of humanitarian
assistance with multilateral partners, with an appropriate mix of core, un-earmarked and project
funding, and with timely and needs-sensitive support for NGOs.
CIDA has supported activities aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of humanitarian
assistance. Yet the evidence suggests that the timeliness of the Agency’s humanitarian funding
is mixed and varies depending on the type of funding. Funding for UN agencies under the CAP
is generally timely. However, the timeliness of funding for NGOs is uneven. Delays are
introduced, at least in part, because IHA is not always able to exercise its delegated authority
for funding. CIDA is attempting to address timeliness issues by moving to more multi-year and
flexible funding. CIDA has been a consistent supporter of the CERF and has striven to be a
more predictable partner. IHA has enhanced its relief stockpile of supplies held in Canada for
rapid deployment and has supported partners’ prepositioning projects, including the Canadian
Red Cross emergency field hospital and CANADEM’s roster of experts in emergency response
management. Timeliness in response is of the essence in humanitarian response and key to the
alignment with GHD.
84 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
There are many mechanisms for monitoring CIDA’s humanitarian assistance, but few
mechanisms for systematically integrating information and sharing lessons learned. The Agency
does not systematically undertake after-action reviews or develop lessons learned that focus on
CIDA’s response. Without these initiatives, CIDA is missing opportunities for joint learning with
program managers in affected countries where CIDA has a bilateral program and for providing
feedback to field staff.
The human resources for CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming are focused at HQ in
IHA, which has staff that are knowledgeable, committed and experienced in the design and
delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, this knowledge does not seem to be drawn upon
by the geographic programs, especially for countries recognised as vulnerable to humanitarian
crises, and there is limited knowledge and experience in many of CIDA’s field missions. Since
geographic programs staff have limited involvement in the humanitarian programming and there
are few mechanisms to support the integration of humanitarian and development programming,
these links are not, for the most part, being made. There are also limited opportunities for
training and information sharing on humanitarian assistance issues within CIDA.
Humanitarian assistance activities are not implemented in a consistent manner across the
Agency. Again, the lack of a corporate strategy means that there is no consensus on how to
handle linkage and integration between humanitarian assistance and development, particularly
with respect to programming in protracted humanitarian situations.
Communications
Confusion about what is included in humanitarian assistance at CIDA may be compounded by
some CIDA public communications. Canadians have little awareness of the dimensions of
Canada’s humanitarian action. There have been missed opportunities for CIDA field
representatives and for IHA staff serving on temporary assignment in countries experiencing
emergency situations to respond to journalists requests for interviews.
6.3 Performance
While attribution, as well as measurement and aggregation of humanitarian assistance results,
are complicated by the proliferation of humanitarian actors, the diversity of contexts and the
increasing number of delivery channels, CIDA has achieved positive results in institutional
support, responsive programming and humanitarian system-wide support. Given that CIDA’s
humanitarian response is provided through partner organizations, almost all of whom are also
funded by other donors, multilateral organizations and/or the public, the use of CIDA’s
contributions to the partner organization cannot be measured separately from the contributions
of other sources of funding.
However, there are examples of results achieved through CIDA’s support at both the global and
country levels. CIDA is a consistent participant in global dialogues on improving the
performance of the international humanitarian system, and provides funding to assist
institutional strengthening and capacity building efforts by its multilateral partners. It has
85 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
contributed to improvements in the response capacity of the global system and better
coordination, including through its consistent support for OCHA and advocacy for improved
coordination. However, although it played a leadership role for many years, there is a sense
from stakeholders that Canada does not have as strong a presence in the humanitarian
community globally as it did in the past. It appears that CIDA staff are restricted in the extent to
which they can engage with external stakeholders on policy matters. The absence of a
humanitarian strategy means that there is no framework to guide when and how CIDA staff can
engage with external stakeholders.
There are also examples of CIDA’s contributions at the country level to all outcomes identified in
the logic model, including: improved emergency preparedness, strengthened capacity of the
humanitarian system and improved results for beneficiaries. Based on CIDA’s logic model,
these results would be expected to contribute to the ultimate outcome of “increased lives saved,
suffering alleviated and human dignity maintained.”
CIDA’s humanitarian partners are generally seen as effective implementing agencies. As with
any organization, they have their strengths and weaknesses but they are (particularly the UN
agencies) subject to ongoing review to assess their effectiveness at the country level. Given that
results in all areas of CIDA’s outcomes and its partners are generally effective, CIDA’s
programming can be seen as largely effective in meeting CIDA’s objectives.
The evaluation found mixed results with respect to the efficiency of IHA’s management of its
humanitarian funding. Generally, the management of IHA’s humanitarian funding is efficient;
however, there are issues with respect to the timeliness of decision-making on NGO projects.
7.0 Recommendations
The recommendations arise from the key conclusions of this evaluation. They are intentionally
broad, leaving the scope for CIDA to identify, in its management response, how best to
implement the recommendations.
The primary recommendation is to develop a corporate humanitarian assistance strategy. This
strategy then provides the framework for implementing the remaining recommendations.
A corporate strategy would provide the framework for defining an Agency-wide systematic
approach to addressing, in an integrated way, the full range of humanitarian activities, clarifying
the Agency’s commitments with respect to the timeliness of its funding and the use of matching
funds and, finally, defining its approach to accountability, including the availability of public
information, with respect to humanitarian assistance.
It is recommended that CIDA:
1. Develop a whole-of-agency humanitarian assistance strategy.
Many issues in this evaluation are related, to some extent, to the absence of a whole-of-
agency humanitarian assistance strategy. The development of such a strategy would be a
86 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
critical first step toward addressing the design of an integrated corporate approach to
supporting prevention and risk reduction, and recovery and transition to development,
particularly if it is developed in a participatory fashion that engages all CIDA’s key
stakeholders. A DFAIT-led whole-of-government humanitarian policy would help the Agency
situate its humanitarian assistance, in the context of whole-of-government responses.
Such a strategy should be used to strengthen the management of CIDA’s humanitarian
assistance by outlining clear expectations with respect to the integration of humanitarian and
development programming. The Strategy would provide the framework for the development
of Standard Operating Procedures for responses to natural disasters in developing
countries. It would contribute to better defining the roles and responsibilities of
headquarters and field staff in humanitarian program delivery and policy engagement (i.e.
mandate, direction and, support) and providing a strengthened framework for accountability
and reporting.
2. Develop a systematic, integrated approach to supporting a) prevention and risk
reduction and b) recovery and transition to development.
IHA implements humanitarian assistance that focuses on immediate life-saving, with some
emergency preparedness. Bilateral humanitarian assistance programming, under the DAC
definition, includes activities related to prevention, risk reduction, recovery and transition to
development. The integration of these activities is an issue with which all humanitarian
donors struggle. CIDA should create, at a corporate level, opportunities for synergies and
complementarity between humanitarian and development activities in countries in which
Canada has a development program. This is particularly relevant in those countries that are
prone to humanitarian emergencies, where CIDA’s programming should better support both
development and humanitarian objectives. Integration may require an institutional
mechanism set up within CIDA to ensure linkage and integration of humanitarian and
development programming, and a shift in the mindset of staff to reduce the tendency to work
in silos.
3. Intensify efforts to improve the timeliness of humanitarian response decision-making.
While operational partners (multilateral and NGO) can quickly prepare and submit funding
proposals for humanitarian response, considerable delay can occur before project approval
is received, particularly for NGO funding. This can necessitate proposal re-design as a result
of evolving conditions in the affected country and delay Canada’s response. The CERF
funding and multi-year funding arrangements and quicker Crisis Pool access are helping,
but given the importance of timeliness to effective humanitarian responses, CIDA must
continue its work on this issue.
4. Review its use of matching funds.
Most other humanitarian donors do not use matching funds and these funds are not seen by
other donors as key programming or public engagement mechanisms. The Agency should
87 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
assess the extent to which the matching funds could potentially distort humanitarian funding.
The Agency needs to address the absence of appropriate criteria for the establishment of
these funds.
5. Improve accountability and reporting through the use of monitoring and evaluation to
identify lessons learned and ensuring adequate dissemination and implementation of
these lessons.
Strengthening accountability and reporting might include additional activities such as after-
action reviews for humanitarian responses (addressing processes as well as impact issues),
participation in multi-donor or inter-agency evaluations, strengthening monitoring by CIDA
HQ and field staff, and the systematic integration of monitoring information into reporting
and lessons learned for sharing with other CIDA staff (particularly in the field) and partners.
6. Improve the information available to the Canadian public about humanitarian
assistance activities.
Humanitarian assistance, particularly activities related to immediate life-saving, is probably
the one facet of CIDA’s programming that is easily understood and valued by the Canadian
public. CIDA needs to build on Canadians’ engagement, as reflected in the response to
matching fund appeals, and increase the information available to Canadians. This would be
in line with a number of recent commitments, including the commitment to the International
Aid Transparency Initiative and the Open Data Project and should include providing more,
readily accessible information about the use of matching funds and increased opportunities
for CIDA to be visible in humanitarian responses.
88 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Annex 1: Management Response 2005-11
The Corporate Evaluation of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance by CIDA’s Evaluation Directorate has provided a valuable opportunity
to comprehensively review this activity across the Agency. The Report is particularly timely considering the trend of increasing
humanitarian needs worldwide and the Agency’s growing expenditures on humanitarian assistance in response to this trend.
Moreover, the growing complexity of humanitarian contexts, an array of new challenges across the system, and a rapidly evolving
international policy environment have underscored the importance of reviewing the Agency’s approach to humanitarian assistance. In
this regard, the Report will be a useful tool for informing CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming in the years ahead as it
highlights key operational and policy challenges that are highly relevant to CIDA’s efforts to provide more timely, appropriate, and
effective humanitarian assistance. The Report demonstrates the overall strength of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance programming
while indentifying areas for improvement. The Report concludes that CIDA has achieved positive results in terms of institutional
support, responsive programming, and support for the humanitarian system, and states that CIDA’s humanitarian programming can
be seen as largely effective in meeting CIDA’s humanitarian objectives.
Although largely accepting of the recommendations, management would like to highlight some specific concerns regarding the
evaluation’s methodology. Most importantly, although the evaluation covered the entire Agency the report was overwhelmingly
focused on the International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (IHA). A more consistent approach to evaluating the relevance,
design, and performance of all branches programming humanitarian assistance would have been helpful for informing
recommendations related to the organization of humanitarian assistance within the Agency and intra-Agency coordination. In
addition, although management agrees with the recommendation to continue efforts to improve the timeliness of humanitarian
response decision-making, management does have concerns with the quantitative analysis used to support this recommendation.
Lastly, management is requesting clarification on the linkages between the sixth recommendation and the supporting evidence-base.
With respect to the specific recommendations, management accepts the main recommendation that the development of a whole-of-
agency humanitarian assistance strategy (HAS) will provide a useful framework for addressing a number of the other
recommendations, including efforts to address coordination between humanitarian and development programming. To address this
first recommendation the draft HAS will be reviewed in close consultation with GPB, SPPB, PWCB and other relevant Branches to
take the evaluation findings into account. To address the second recommendation to develop a systematic, integrated approach to
supporting DRR and recovery/transition to development, MGPB, SPPB and GPB, will prepare a set of guidelines which will clarify the
roles of CIDA’s branches through the full spectrum of response. To address the third recommendation to intensify efforts to improve
89 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
the timeliness of decision-making, CIDA will continue to review relevant processes and procedures to improve on efficiency. To
address the fourth recommendation that CIDA review its matching funds, the Government of Canada is currently in the process of
reviewing its guidelines on this issue. To address the fifth recommendation that CIDA improve its accountability through improved
monitoring and lessons learned, this will be incorporated into the revised HAS. To address the sixth recommendation that CIDA
improve the information available to the Canadian public about its humanitarian assistance activities, CIDA will continue to make
improvements to the timeliness at which information is provided to CIDA’s Project Browser and take steps towards integrating
humanitarian assistance communication objectives into the communication plans of CIDA’s countries of focus.
Recommendations Commitments/measures Responsible Completion date
Status
1. CIDA develop a whole-of-agency humanitarian assistance strategy.
Management agrees with this recommendation.
IHA completed a draft Humanitarian Assistance Strategy (HAS) in consultation with other branches which is currently under consideration by Senior Management. Given that IHA now has the benefit of this evaluation to learn from, IHA will review the draft strategy in close consultation with SPPB, GPB, PWCB and other branches to take the evaluation findings into account.
In line with corporate practices, following the completion of the humanitarian assistance strategy, IHA will draft an action plan in consultation with other branches to further detail how it will operationalize its strategic objectives. This action plan will lay out a whole-of-agency agenda for advancing the policy and programming priorities identified in the strategy, and address internal issues raised in the evaluation.
Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate, in close consultation with other appropriate Branches.
HAS revision: August 31 2012
2. CIDA develop a systematic, integrated approach to supporting:
a. Prevention and risk reduction;
b. Recovery and transition
Management agrees with this recommendation.
The periods prior to, during, and post-crisis require coordinated engagements from multiple CIDA Branches in order to achieve durable cost-effective results.
The transition challenge is complex and remains at the forefront of contemporary debates within the humanitarian and development communities. To clarify
Director General, Strategic Policy Directorate, in close consultation with other
Dec. 31 2012
90 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Recommendations Commitments/measures Responsible Completion date
Status
to development. how CIDA will respond to this challenge, SPPB, in concert with MGPB and GPB, will draft guidelines to define CIDA’s approach to prevention and disaster risk reduction on the one hand, and recovery and the transition from humanitarian assistance to development on the other. In addition to articulating CIDA’s orientation to the periods before and after crises, these documents will clarify the roles of CIDA’s branches throughout the full spectrum of the response.
The resulting documents will provide clarity on whether and how to engage pre and post-crisis, while ensuring that CIDA assumes coherent, coordinated responses that make most effective use of its programming tools to deliver durable results for affected populations.
appropriate Branches.
3. CIDA intensify its efforts to improve the timeliness of its humanitarian response decision-making.
Management agrees with this recommendation.
The timeliness of CIDA’s humanitarian assistance is essential to the Agency’s efforts to save lives and alleviate suffering. The evaluation noted gaps in information available which affects the reliability of the data. Further analysis of data collected since and beyond that available for the evaluation, may serve to better pinpoint the issue CIDA needs to address.
As part of the Business Modernization Initiative, the Agency has been reviewing the processes and procedures associated with how it receives and assesses proposals, prepares recommendations, and seeks approvals, and has been continuously working to improve timeliness.
Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate.
Ongoing
4. CIDA review its use of matching funds.
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Matching funds serve primarily as a public engagement
Director General, International
June 30, 2012
91 Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011
Recommendations Commitments/measures Responsible Completion date
Status
tool and have been successful in this regard in the past. They complement existing funding practices and, while labour intensive, do not alter CIDA’s needs-based response to crises. The Government of Canada is currently in the process of reviewing its internal guidelines for the appropriate use of matching funds based on an analysis of best practice and lessons learned.
Humanitarian Assistance Directorate.
5. CIDA improve its accountability, through the use of monitoring and evaluation to identify lessons learned for the Agency and ensuring adequate dissemination and implementation of these lessons.
Management agrees with this recommendation.
The Humanitarian Assistance Strategy will outline a whole-of-agency approach to institutional accountability and ongoing knowledge management in line with corporate practices.
(See response to recommendation #1 for more information on the HAS)
Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate.
HAS revision: August 31 2012
6. CIDA improve the information available to the Canadian public about its humanitarian assistance activities.
Management agrees with this recommendation.
CIDA has made significant progress in making information available to Canadians on humanitarian assistance activities. Improvements are being made in providing information on humanitarian assistance activities to CIDA’s Project Browser in a timely fashion following approval. Steps are also being taken to integrate humanitarian assistance communications objectives into the communications plans for CIDA’s countries of focus, providing better information for interested Canadians.
Director General, Communications Branch.
Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate.
Ongoing
