Cooperative Advertising with Bilateral Participation

Decision SciencesVolume 44 Number 1February 2013

© 2012 The AuthorsDecision Sciences Journal © 2012 Decision Sciences Institute

TECHNICAL NOTE

Cooperative Advertising with BilateralParticipation*

Jihua Zhang and Jinxing Xie†Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China,e-mail: [email protected], [email protected]

Bintong ChenSchool of Business Administration, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu611130, China and Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark,DE 19716, USA, e-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

We study cooperative (co-op) advertising strategies in a two-tier distribution channel andextend the popular unilateral participation strategy to bilateral participations. Our re-search shows that a properly designed bilateral participation has several advantages overunilateral participation. Bilateral participation is capable of coordinating the distributionchannel under a very general demand function. In addition, when channel members de-termine participation parameters endogenously, the bilateral participation improves thechannel efficiency and leads to a Pareto improvement over the corresponding unilateralparticipation. [Submitted: November 3, 2008. Revised: December 1, 2010. Accepted:April 15, 2012.]

Subject Areas: Bilateral Participation, Channel Coordination, ChannelEfficiency, Cooperative Advertising, Marketing, and Stackelberg Game.

INTRODUCTION

Consider a two-tier distribution channel with a manufacturer and a retailer, themodeling setting used by many researchers to study cooperative (co-op) advertis-ing (Berger, 1972; Huang, Li, & Mahajan, 2002; Xie & Wei, 2009). The manu-facturer advertises nationally to promote the brand name while the local retaileradvertises locally to boost short-term sales. It is well established that if the man-ufacturer shares a portion of the retailer’s local advertising cost, the retailer willbe motivated to spend more on its local advertisement and generate more sales.Such unilateral participation in co-op advertisement usually leads to better chan-nel performance, and eventually benefits the manufacturer, which justifies the

*The authors gratefully acknowledge Vicki Smith-Daniels, an associate editor and two anonymous refer-ees for many helpful comments and suggestions, which contributed significantly to improve the presentationof this note. This work was supported by the NSFC Projects No. 70971072, 71031005, and 71171165.

†Corresponding author.

193

194 Cooperative Advertising with Bilateral Participation

manufacturer’s contribution to the retailer’s local advertisement. Following thesame logic, the manufacturer’s national brand name promotion should also enhancethe sales of retailer’s products associated with the brand name, which benefits theretailer. Should the retailer also contribute to the national advertisement that ben-efits itself? If so, we call such mutual contributions the bilateral participation inco-op advertising. To the best of our knowledge, this strategy has not been studiedin the co-op advertising literature.

Clearly, bilateral participation is an extension of unilateral participation. Asa result, a properly designed bilateral participation strategy should lead to a betterchannel performance. In this article, we are interested in more precise comparisonsbetween bilateral and unilateral participation strategies. In particular, we show thata properly designed bilateral participation strategy is capable of coordinating thedistribution channel under a very general demand function. In addition, whenparticipation parameters are determined endogenously by channel members, weshow that the bilateral participation improves the channel efficiency and leadsto a Pareto improvement over the corresponding unilateral participation under apopular demand function.

BILATERAL PARTICIPATION AND CHANNEL COORDINATION

Consider the two-tier distribution channel of a certain product with one manu-facturer M and one retailer R. The short-term product sales S(aM, aR) depend onboth M’s national advertising expenditure aM and R’s local advertising expenditureaR. According to Huang et al. (2002, p. 471), “the manufacturer’s brand name in-vestment and the retailer’s local advertising perform different but complementaryfunctions that have positive effects on the ultimate product sales.” We assume con-stant profit margins ρM and ρR for M and R, respectively. Denote r = ρM/ρR > 0.Clearly, r reflects the relative “channel power” between the two channel members.

For bilateral participation, M shares tM ∈ [0, 1] portion of R’s local advertis-ing cost aR, and R shares tR ∈ [0, 1] portion of M’s national advertising cost aM.We call tM the manufacturer’s participation rate and tR the retailer’s participationrate. It is easy to verify that profits for M, R, and the whole distribution channelare

�M (aM, aR; tM, tR) = ρMS(aM, aR) − (1 − tR)aM − tMaR, (1)

�R(aM, aR; tM, tR) = ρRS(aM, aR) − tRaM − (1 − tM )aR, (2)

�(aM, aR) = �M + �R = ρS(aM, aR) − aM − aR, (3)

respectively, where ρ = ρM + ρR is the profit margin of the whole channel. Clearly,bilateral participation reduces to unilateral participation when tR = 0.

Let the participation rates tM and tR be given exogenously and known toboth channel members, and let them play the Stackelberg game led by M; inother words, for given tM and tR, M first decides aM, and R then chooses aR. Thefollowing result shows that the bilateral participation strategy, with participationrates properly specified, can lead to full channel coordination under a very generaldemand function. To achieve full channel coordination, the game’s equilibrium

Zhang, Xie, and Chen 195

(i.e., the players’ advertising decisions), must maximize the profit of the wholedistribution channel.

Proposition 1: Suppose the manufacturer and the retailer play the Stackelberggame specified above and determine their advertising expenditures accordingly.If the demand function S(aM, aR) is twice differentiable and strictly concave,then the distribution channel is coordinated if and only if the channel members’participation rates are given by

tM = r/(r + 1) and tR = 1/(r + 1). (4)

Proof: Necessity: For an integrated distribution channel, Equation (3) gives theoverall channel profit. Since the market demand S(aM, aR) is strictly concave in(aM, aR), there is a unique solution (a∗

M, a∗R) that solves the first-order conditions

∂�/∂aM = 0 and ∂�/∂aR = 0, which are equivalent to

∂S(aM, aR)/∂aM = 1/ρ, (5)

∂S(aM, aR)/∂aR = 1/ρ. (6)

Therefore, the channel is coordinated if and only if players’ advertisingexpenditures in equilibrium coincide with (a∗

M, a∗R).

When M leads the Stackelberg game, R, at the second stage, will chooseits best response advertising level aR(aM; tM, tR) according to M’s decision onaM, as well as the participation rates (tM, tR). By solving the first-order condition∂�R/∂aR = 0, we have

ρR∂S(aM, aR)/∂aR = 1 − tM. (7)

Comparing Equations (6) and (7), we get

tM = 1 − ρR/ρ = ρM/ρ = r/(r + 1), (8)

which proves the first half of Equation (4).Taking R’s optimal responses into consideration, M, at the first stage of

the game, maximizes its profit �M (aM, aR; tM, tR) = ρMS(aM, aR(aM ; tM, tR)) −tMaR(aM ; tM, tR) − (1 − tR)aM . Solving the first-order condition ∂�M (aM,

aR; tM, tR)/∂aM = 0, we obtain

ρM

[∂S(aM, aR)

∂aM

+ ∂S(aM, aR)

∂aR

∂aR(aM ; tM, tR)

∂aM

]= tM

∂aR(aM ; tM, tR)

∂aM

+ (1 − tR).

(9)Utilizing conditions (7) and (8), we can simplify Equation (9) to

ρM∂S(aM, aR)/∂aM = 1 − tR. (10)

Comparing Equation (5) with Equation (10), we get

tR = 1 − ρM/ρ = 1/(r + 1), (11)

which proves the second half of Equation (4).


Sufficiency: Under condition (4) channel members’ individual profits are inducedconsistent with (proportional to) the whole channel’s profit, as

�M = ρMS(aM, aR) − (ρM/ρ)aM − (ρM/ρ)aR = (r/(r + 1))�, (12)

�R = ρRS(aM, aR) − (ρR/ρ)aM − (ρR/ρ)aR = (1/(r + 1))�. (13)

In other words, condition (4) aligns player’s best interests with the wholesystem. Then, optimal individual actions will certainly maximize the total channelprofit. This completes the proof. �

To the best of our knowledge, Proposition 1 is among the first results thatprovide a clear incentive mechanism to coordinate the distribution channel in co-opadvertising. It contrasts with conventional co-op advertising literature (e.g., Berger,1972; Huang et al., 2002) that focuses on the Pareto improving bargaining processby sharing the additional profit when all channel members adopt the centralizeddecisions. In addition, Proposition 1 remains true if R becomes the leader or if Mand R play the Nash game instead. Based on Proposition 1, we have the followingobservations:

Observation (i): The unilateral participation strategy is in general not able tocoordinate the distribution channel. This is because, according to Equation (4),unilateral participation (tR = 0) coordinates the distribution channel if and only ifthe retailer profit is zero (i.e., ρR = 0). As a result, a unilateral participation strategysuch as that proposed in Huang et al. (2002) cannot coordinate the distributionchannel since their demand function S(aM, aR) = α − βa

−γ

R a−δM (where α, β, γ ,

and δ are all positive parameters) satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 1 and isa special case of our general demand function.

Observation (ii): For the bilateral participation strategy to coordinate the distri-bution channel, it is necessary that participation rates tM and tR be exogenouslyspecified. If channel members were to decide their participation rates endogenouslytheir decisions would deviate from those specified by Equation (4). In fact, if Rwere allowed choose its participation rate tR, it would have chosen tR = 0.

COMPARISON OF TWO PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES

In this section, we provide quantitative comparisons between two participationstrategies under various game settings. In particular, we focus on situations wherethe participation rates are endogenously determined since channel members (asopposed to a third party) are typically responsible to negotiate and develop theirown advertising decisions. We proceed by specifying the demand function andthen defining different game settings.

For convenience of calculation, we choose the following additive demandfunction:

S(aM, aR) = kM

√aM + kR

√aR, (14)

where kM, kR are positive constants that reflect the efficacy of national and locationadvertisement, respectively. This function was also used in Xie and Wei (2009).


In particular, it is strictly increasing and concave with respect to aM and aR

and models the commonly observed “advertising saturation effect” (Simon &Arndt, 1980). In addition, it also satisfies the assumption of Proposition 1. Denotek = k2

M/k2R; it measures the relative effectiveness of national versus local adver-

tising in generating customer demands. To further specify the game structures, weconsider the following two issues.

Who Leads the Game?

Traditional literature in co-op advertising typically considers the manufacturer-leddistribution channel; studies regarding the retailer-led channel are sparse. Re-cently, more studies have focused attention on market structures where retailersretain equal or greater power than manufacturers (Buzzell, Quelch, & Salmon,1990; Huang et al., 2002; Buratto, Grosset, & Viscolani, 2007). Buratto et al.(2007) study two vertical co-op advertising programs by assigning the manufac-turer and the retailer alternately as the game leader to make final decisions onthe participation rate. Their observation regarding channel members’ incentivesto lead the distribution channel is partially verified by our model. However, thereare significant differences; Buratto et al. (2007) conclude that the retailer is theonly member that always benefits by taking the lead; our study, on the other hand,reveals that the manufacturer also benefits by taking the lead. Moreover, we showthat profit increases only when the distribution channel is led by the member withthe higher profit margin.

Who Makes Which Decision?

The equilibrium of the game and the resulting profit for each player depend onthe allocation of decision power to each player. In fact, inappropriate allocationof decision powers leads to trivial or unreasonable game results. For example,if the retailer is allowed to decide both the manufacturer’s participation rate tMand its own advertising effort aR, the Stackelberg game will have a trivial andunreasonable outcome with tM = 1 and aR → +∞. To exclude the trivial gamesettings, we propose two general decision rules:

Rule 1. The game follower should not decide either member’s participation rate.

Rule 2. No game player can make both of the following decisions: one member’sadvertising level and the other member’s participation rate.

Notice that Rule 1 prevents the game follower from making decisions onchannel members’ participation rates. This is necessary because the follower tendsto set the participation rates at the extreme levels. Given the game leader’s actions,the follower certainly prefers its own participation rate to be zero and the othermember’s participation rate to be one, which leads to trivial cases. Rule 2, onthe other hand, balances decision powers between channel members; each playershould have sufficient but not excessive powers. Any violation of Rule 2 will leadto a trivial game. For example, if a channel member decides both its participationrate and the other member’s advertising level, it will set its own participation rateat zero and the other member’s advertising level as large as possible. Similarly, ifa channel member decides both its own advertising level and the other member’s


participation rate, it will set its advertisement level at infinity and have the othermember cover all the advertisement cost.

By screening all possible combinations for assigning decision variables (40cases total) between channel members, we end up with four cases that satisfy bothRule 1 and Rule 2. We summarize the associated game equilibrium and channel per-formance in Table 1. For simplicity, we denote each game setting by Uni(Bi)/M(R),where Uni(Bi) denotes whether players adopt a unilateral or bilateral participationstrategy and M(R) indicates who leads the game (manufacturer/retailer).

For comparison, we also present two additional situations as benchmarks:the full co-op case and the null co-op case. The former represents a fully integrateddistribution channel in which all decisions are made centrally; the latter describesa case where channel members do not share advertising costs. We will associatethe over bar “−” with the full co-op case.

To evaluate channel efficiencies, we introduce the profit ratio η = �∗/�∗ ∈[0, 1], in which the numerator is the channel profit under a specific game settingand the denominator is the optimal profit for the integrated channel. We list allassociated results in Table 2. For example, the value 5

9 ≤ η ≤ 89 in the second row

indicates that the channel profit from the null co-op can be as low as 56% of thatof the coordinated channel (�∗) and is limited to no more than 89% of �∗. Weassume that all efficiency calculations require r to stay in the range 1

2 ≤ r ≤ 2 toensure all entries in Table 2 are valid.

Detailed derivations of equilibrium solutions and channel efficiency evalua-tions are quite similar for all cases. To save space, we provide only one derivation,and use the Bi/M setting as our example. Under the Bi/M setting, R makes decisionson both the national and the local advertising expenditures (aM, aR); M controls thesupport rates for both types of advertising (tM, tR). For any given (tM, tR), at the sec-ond stage of the game R chooses its best responses aM(tM, tR) and aR(tM, tR) such that∂�R

∂aM= 0 and ∂�R

∂aR= 0. As a result, we have aM (tM, tR) = (ρRkM

2tR)2, and aR(tM, tR) =

( ρRkR

2(1−tM ) )2. Substituting these into Equation (1) and solving the first-order condi-

tions of �M on tM and tR, respectively, we obtain the optimal participation ratest∗M = 2r−1

2r+1 and t∗R = 22r+1 , where r = ρM /ρR ≥ 1

2 . Then, players’ equilibrium ad-

vertising expenditures can be expressed as a∗M = aM (t∗M, t∗R) = [ρMkM (2r+1)

4r]2, and

a∗R = aR(t∗M, t∗R) = [ρRkR(2r+1)

4 ]2. Consequently, profits for M, R, and the whole

channel are computed as �∗M = ρ2

Rk2R

4 (k + 1)[r + 12 ]2, �∗

R = ρ2Rk2

R

4 (k + 1)(r + 12 ),

and �∗ = ρ2Rk2

R

4 (k + 1)[(1 + r)2 − 14 )]. By definition, the channel efficiency under

the Bi/M setting is given by η = �∗/�∗ = 1 − [ 12(r+1) ]

2, which increases in r. We

can set r = 12 (r = 2) to compute the lower (upper) bound of 8

9 ( 3536 ).

By carefully comparing various game structures and their associated resultsin Table 1 and Table 2, we make the following observations:

Observation (iii): Under both unilateral and bilateral participation strategies, al-though both members have the incentive to take the lead, the channel profit ishigher when it is led by the member with the higher profit margin.

Observation (iii) can be verified by comparing the channel profits for casesin which M takes the lead (Uni/M, Bi/M) with those in which R takes the lead(Uni/R, Bi/R) for values of r >1 (ρM > ρR) and r < 1 (ρM < ρR) in Table 2.


Tabl

e1:

Cha

nnel

mem

ber’

spe

rfor

man

ceun

der

diff

eren

tgam

ese

tting

s.

Opt

imal

Dec

isio

nFr

amew

ork

Part

icip

atio

nG

ame

M’s

deci

sion

R’s

deci

sion

Equ

ilibr

ium

Nat

iona

lE

quili

briu

mL

ocal

Part

icip

atio

nR

ate(

s)

Stra

tegi

esL

eade

rva

riab

leva

riab

lefo

rM

for

Rad

Lev

els

(∗·ρ

2 Rk

2 R

4)

adL

evel

s(∗

·ρ2 Rk

2 R

4)

Ful

l–

––

––

k(r

+1)

2(r

+1)

2

Nul

lM

(R)

a Ma R

––

kr

21

Uni

Ma M

,tM

a R2r

−12r

+1–

kr

2(r

+1 /

2)2

Ra M

,aR

t M2r r+2

–kr

2(r/ 2

+1)

2

Bi

Mt M

,tR

a M,a

R2r

−12r

+12

2r+1

k(r

+1 /

2)2

(r+

1 /2)

2

Ra M

,aR

t M,t

R2r r+2

−r+2

r+2

k(r/ 2

+1)

2(r/ 2

+1)

2


Tabl

e2:

Profi

tfun

ctio

nsan

dsy

stem

effic

ienc

yes

timat

ion.

Gam

eM

’sO

ptim

alR

’sO

ptim

alO

ptim

alC

hann

elSy

stem

Con

ditio

nsfo

rth

eE

ffici

ency

Bou

nds

Setti

ngPr

ofit(

∗·ρ

2 Rk

2 R

4)

Profi

t(∗·

ρ2 Rk

2 R

4)

Profi

t(∗·

ρ2 Rk

2 R

4)

Effi

cien

cyL

ower

Bou

ndU

pper

Bou

nd

Ful

l–

–(k

+1)

(r+

1)2

1–

–N

ull

kr

2+

2r2k

r+

1k

(r2+

2r)+

2r+

1[5 9

,8 9]

k=

0,r

=2

ork

→+∞

,r

=1 2

k→

+∞,r

=2

ork

=0,

r=

1 2

Uni

/Mkr

2+

(r+

1 /2)

22k

r+

r+

1 /2

k(r

2+

2r)+

(r+

1)2−

1 /4

[5 9,

35 36]

k→

+∞,r

=1 2

k=

0,r

=2

Uni

/Rkr

2+

r(r/ 2

+1)

2kr

+(r/ 2

+1)

2k

(r2+

2r)+

(r+

1)2−

r2 / 4

[5 9,

35 36]

k→

+∞,r

=1 2

k=

0,r

=1 2

Bi/

M(k

+1)

(r+

1 /2)

2(k

+1)

(r+

1 /2)

(k+

1)[(r

+1)

2−

1 /4]

[8 9,

35 36]

r=

1 2r

=2

Bi/

R(k

+1)

(r2 / 2

+r)

(k+

1)(r/ 2

+1)

2(k

+1)

[(r

+1)

2−

r2 / 4

][8 9

,35 36

]r

=2

r=

1 2


Observation (iv): The bilateral strategy leads to greater channel profits than thecorresponding unilateral one regardless of channel leader, even under the worstsituation.

By comparing the optimal channel profits under unilateral and bilateral par-ticipation in Table 2, it is straightforward to show that bilateral participation leads tohigher channel profits. In addition, the system efficiency column in Table 2 showsthat bilateral participation leads to higher system efficiency. Notice that while Ob-servation (iv) is obvious when participation rates are specified exogenously, it isnot as obvious when those decisions are made endogenously. It is also worthwhileto note that according to Table 2 the distribution channel achieves almost perfectefficiency, between 89% and 97%, as long as the bilateral participation strategy isadopted.

Observation (iv) suggests that bilateral participation leads to better channelperformance. However, it is not clear whether channel members have incentives toadopt this strategy. Our last result provides a positive answer to this concern: bothchannel members will be better off by switching to bilateral participation.

Proposition 2: For any given unilateral participation strategy with participa-tion rate tM ∈ [0, 1] endogenously chosen, there exists a corresponding bilateralparticipation strategy (tM, tR) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that all members’ individual profitsgrow (i.e., there always exists a strict Pareto improvement bilateral participationstrategy).

Proof: For any unilateral participation rate tM ∈ [0, 1], channel members’profit functions are �M (tM ) = 1

4k2Rρ2

R[kr2 + 2r1−tM

− tM(1−tM )2 ] and �R(tM ) =

14k2

Rρ2R[2kr + 1

1−tM], respectively. For any bilateral participation strategy where

M controls (tM, tR) ∈ [0, 1]2 and delegates both advertising decisions to R, chan-nel members’ profits are �M (tM, tR) = 1

4k2Rρ2

R[ 2krtR

+ 2r1−tM

− (1−tR)kt2R

− tM(1−tM )2 ]

and �R(tM, tR) = 14k2

Rρ2R[ k

tR+ 1

1−tM]. For strict Pareto improvement, we are

to find (tM, tR) ∈ [0, 1]2 s.t. �M (tM ; tM, tR) = �M (tM, tR) − �M (tM ) > 0, and�R(tM ; tM, tR) = �R(tM, tR) − �R(tM ) > 0. Let tM = tM , then we reduce�M = 1

4k2Mρ2

R[r + 14 ], which is always greater than zero, and �R(tR) =

14k2

Mρ2R[ 1

tR− (r − 1

tR)2], which takes positive values if and only if tR1 < tR < tR2,

where tR1 = 1+2r−√1+4r

2r2 and tR2 = 1+2r+√1+4r

2r2 are the two real roots of equation�R(tR) = 0. Since 0 < tR1 < 1 ≤ tR2 holds for all r > 0, there always existssome tR ∈ [0, 1] that also belongs to the interval (tR1, tR2). This completes theproof. �

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

While it prevails in current co-op advertisement, we have shown that in general uni-lateral participation is not able to coordinate the distribution channel. In contrast,the extension to bilateral participation makes channel coordination possible. Inaddition, bilateral participation will create a win–win situation for both the man-ufacturer and the retailer, making it a potentially promising and implementablestrategy for co-op advertisement.


However, a practical example of bilateral participation as described in thisarticle has not yet been found. One reason may be that many retailers are not con-vinced of the benefit from the manufacturer’s national advertisement. Furthermore,in the case of multiple retailers sharing the benefit of national advertisement, eachindividual retailer has no incentive to contribute due to the “free riding” effect. Inorder to make the bilateral participation strategy practical, an incentive mechanismmust be designed so that the retailers will choose to contribute. We hope to designand study such an incentive mechanism for a distribution channel with multipleretailers in our future research.

REFERENCES

Berger, P. D. (1972). Vertical cooperative advertising ventures. Journal of Market-ing Research, 9(3), 309–312.

Buratto, A., Grosset, L., & Viscolani, B. (2007). Advertising coordination gamesof a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product. TOP, 15(2),307–321.

Buzzell, R. D., Quelch, J. A., & Salmon, W. J. (1990). The costly bargain of tradepromotion. Harvard Business Review, 68(2), 141–149.

Huang, Z., Li, S. X., & Mahajan, V. (2002). An analysis of manufacturer-retailersupply chain coordination in cooperative advertising. Decision Sciences,33(3), 469–494.

Simon, J. L., & Arndt, J. (1980). The shape of the advertising function. Journal ofAdvertising Research, 20(4), 11–28.

Xie, J., & Wei, C. (2009). Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer channel. European Journal of Operational Research, 197(2), 785–791.

Jihua Zhang is an analyst at the Research Center for Investor Returns, HarvestFund Management Co., Ltd., Beijing, China. He received his PhD in operationsresearch in 2011 and his BSc degree in applied mathematics in 2006, both fromTsinghua University, and his second BSc degree in economics in 2009 from PekingUniversity. His current research interests lie in the fields of supply chain manage-ment, marketing, and financial engineering.

Jinxing Xie is a professor at the Department of Mathematical Sciences, TsinghuaUniversity, Beijing, China. He received his BSc degree in applied mathematicsin 1988 and his PhD in computational mathematics in 1995, both from TsinghuaUniversity. He has the experience of working at Shanghai Baoshan Steel Group as aproduction planning and scheduling engineer for 2 years (1988–1990). His currentresearch interests lie in the fields of logistics and supply chain management. Hehas published in Decision Sciences, Operations Research, Production and Oper-ations Management, Omega, European Journal of Operational Research, Opera-tional Research Letters, Journal of the Operational Research Society, International


Journal of Production Economics, and International Journal of Production Re-search, among others.

Bintong Chen is Associate Dean for research and professor of business adminis-tration at Lerner College for Business and Economics, University of Delaware. Hereceived his PhD in operations management/research from the Wharton School,MS in systems engineering from the University of Pennsylvania, and dual BS de-grees in ship-building and naval architecture as well as electrical engineering fromShanghai Jiao Tong University in China. His research interests include optimiza-tion techniques and applied business modeling. He has published in many highquality academic journals and his research work has been widely cited. He hassupervised and worked on consulting projects for JPMC, Delaware Department ofTransportation, Nordstrom, Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, Key Bank, North-west Dairy Farm, Burlington Northern Rail, AT&T, and others. He was recentlyselected to be a board of director for APICS.

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Cooperative Advertising with Bilateral Participation