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COOLTRANS (Dense Phase Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Transportation)

WP5.2.1Socialimpactsoftheinstallationofpipelinenetworks

InterimProjectReport

ClairGough,LauraOKeefeandSarahMander

TyndallCentre,UniversityofManchester

Aug2012

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Contents

Glossary...................................................................................................................................................3

1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................5

1.2. Pipelinesafety.........................................................................................................................7

1.2TransportinfrastructureandRiskAssessment.............................................................................7

1.3Potentialhazards..........................................................................................................................8

1.4CommonlycitedincidentsinvolvingCO2......................................................................................8

2. Socialimpact:ExamplesfrompreviouspipelinesandCO2projects...............................................9

WeyburnMonitoringandStorageProject..........................................................................................9

Overview.........................................................................................................................................9

Conflicts.........................................................................................................................................10

MilfordHavenPipeline.....................................................................................................................12

Overview.......................................................................................................................................12

Conflict..........................................................................................................................................12

CorribGasProject.............................................................................................................................14

Overview.......................................................................................................................................14

Conflict..........................................................................................................................................14

Barendrecht......................................................................................................................................16

Overview.......................................................................................................................................16

Conflict..........................................................................................................................................16

KeystoneXLPipeline.........................................................................................................................17

Overview.......................................................................................................................................17

Conflict..........................................................................................................................................18

3. Controversyandprotest...........................................................................................................19

4. Summary...................................................................................................................................23

References........................................................................................................................................23

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GlossaryAGI AboveGroundInstallatione.g.compressors,blockvalves,pigtraps,

pumpingstations.

ALARP AsLowAsReasonablyPracticableTheALARPprincipleisthattheresidualriskshallbeAsLowAsReasonablyPracticable.Thisrelatestoacostbenefitanalysisofthecostsoftakingmeasurestoavoidtheriskagainstanassessmentoftherisk,inUKlawthisshouldbeweightedtowardscarryingoutthesafetymeasures.

Bar Unitofpressure,equivalenttoatmosphericpressureatsealevel(1barisequivalentto14.5psi)

CCS CarbonCaptureandStorage

CO2 CarbonDioxide

Crackarrestors Preventuncontainedexplosionoccurringalongthelengthofthepipeintheeventofapuncture(Coleman2009)(itisareinforcedsectionofpipethatcanstoparupture/limitdamagebyabsorbingitsenergy).

DECC DepartmentofEnergyandClimateChange

DTL DangerousToxicLoad.Exposureconditions,intermsofairborneconcentrationanddurationofexposure,whichwouldproduceaparticularleveloftoxicity(TypicallytheSLOT(Specificleveloftoxicityforasubstance)inthegeneralpopulation.

EOR EnhancedOilRecovery.AprocessbywhichCO2 isinjectedintoanoilfieldtoincreaseoilproductionfromthatfield.TheCO2isseparatedandrecycledforultimatepermanentstorageinthedepletedoilfield.

Hazard Ahazardissomethingthatcancauseadverseeffects

HSE HealthandSafetyExecutive

Kt/day KiloTonnesaday

LOC LossofContainment

LPG Liquefiedpetroleumgas

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MAHP MajorAccidentHazardPipelines

MTCO2 MetricTonne(ton)CarbonDioxideEquivalent.

ppm Partspermillion

PRI PressureReductionInstallation

psi Poundspersquareinch

PSR PipelineSafetyRegulations

QRA QuantifiedRiskAssessment

Risk Riskisacombination ofthe probabilityandconsequenceofahazardcausingdetriment.

SFAIRP SoFarAsIsReasonablyPracticable

SLOT SpecifiedLevelofToxicity

Note:Notalloftheabovetermshavebeenusedwithinthefollowingreportbutarealltermscommonlyusedinthediscussionofpipelinesmanagementandrisk.

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1. Introduction

COOLTRANS (Dense Phase CarbonDioxide Pipeline Transportation) is a large consortiumprojectfundedbyNationalGrid.TheoverallaimoftheCOOLTRANSprogramme istocarryoutresearchforthedesignandsafeoperationofpipelinesforthetransportofdensephaseanthropogenic CO2 as part of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) schemes. Since 2008 anumber of CCS projects have encountered opposition from local communities and as aconsequence have since been cancelled or gone ahead in a reduced form. Given thepotentialimpactofpipelinesontheunderstandingtheopinionsandconcernsoflaycitizensisan important componentof theprojectplanningprocess.Theoverallpurposeofworkpackage5.2,undertakenbytheteamattheUniversityofManchester,istounderstandthepublicperceptionsofrisk;thiswillbe implementedacrosstwostrandsofresearch.Firstly,thisreportexploresthesocialimpactsoftheinstallationofpipelinenetworksandsecondlythe teamwill complete a series of focus groups exploring the public perceptions of CO2transport inpipelines. Theoverallaimof this report is tounderstand someof the socialimpactsandreactionstopipelineinstallationsusingexamplesinordertoguidetheframingofthefocusgroupstobeconductedinWP5.2.Thereportdoesnotattempttosetguidelinesfor the communication of risk, CCS or CO2 transport there already exists a body ofliterature thataddresses these issues (forexample (WRI2008;Ashworth2009;HammondandShackley2010).

Thisreportbeginswithan introductiontothecontextofCCSandthetransportofCO2bypipeline as part of the CCS process, including a brief explanation of some of the keyprinciples and concepts involved. In Section 2 five case study examples are presented,including a summary of each development, followed by a description of the nature ofassociated controversy. Section 3 introduces themes that emerge across the protestsdescribedduringthecasestudiesandwhichwillinformthefinalstageofthisresearch.

1.1. CO2transportforCCS

Worldenergydemand is forecast to riseby55%by2030and fossil fuelsarepredicted tomeet 84% of this extra demand, potentially resulting in global CO2 emissions being 57%higher in2030than in2005(OECD/IEA2007).CCS isatechnologydesignedtoreduceCO2emissionsassociatedwithfossilfuels,offeringthepossibilityofreducingCO2byupto90%from fossil fuelpoweredstations (VercelliandLombardi2009;WorldCoal Institute2009).The CCS process involves the capture of CO2 (e.g. at a power station) which is thentransported to a permanent storage site (underground such as depleted oil or gasreservoirs,orsalineaquifers).CO2canbetransportedindifferentwaysbyforexampleship,roadorrail;howeverinthecaseofCCS,pipelineisthemosteconomicandefficientoption.Byship,CO2istransportedinasimilarwaytoLiquefiedpetroleumgas(LPG)andissuitablefortransportingCO2 longdistancesoroverseas,whereasroadorrailtransportation isonly

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suitableonaverysmallscale.CO2hasbeensuccessfullytransportedbypipeline,bothoverand underground, in the US since 1972 (Canyon Reef Carrier) and there are now over2500kmofpipelinestransporting50MTCO2perannum, includingtheBravoDome,Cortezandsheepmountainpipeline(IPCC2005).TheUK,incomparison,haslimitedexperienceoftransportingCO2bypipelinehoweverhasvastexperienceintransportingwater,naturalgasandoilusingthesamemethods.

Conventional natural gas pipelines have been designed and operated based on industryknowledgeandexperienceusingtheinstitutionofgasengineersdocumentIGEM/TD/1andmust comply with British normative standards and the British Standards PD series (HSE2008; IGEM 2008). However, CO2 has different properties to natural gas and requiresadditional standardsbeyond theprevailing legislation; IP6,BSEN14161,BSPD8010andDNVOSF101 standards alsohave tobemet (HSE2008).The reuseofexistingpipelinesoriginally constructed for transporting natural gas, for example, is not straightforwardbecause of the properties of the CO2 to be transported. Design considerations for CO2pipelines include: theeffectofcooling frompressurechanges,routeing topography,valvematerialanddispersionpatterns.

CCS requiresCO2 tobe transportedbetween thesourceand thestoragesite (IPCC2005).Under normal atmospheric conditions of temperature and pressure, CO2 exists as a gas;however, to achieve sufficient flow rates and tominimise the pipeline diameter, CO2 istransported in its dense phase i.e. at sufficient pressure that it becomes supercritical(Eldevik2008). At the supercriticalphase (1070psi /74bar and31oC), theCO2has thedensityofa liquidbutexpands to fill the space likeagas; theproposedCO2pipelinewilloperateatapressureup to150bar. Prior to thisstage theCO2mayneed treatment toremoveanyimpurities(suchasH2S,N2,CH4,O2,watervapourandhydrocarbons)whichmayalterimpactthephysicalpropertiesofCO2withconsequencesforthepipelinecapacityandpotentialfractures,forexample(Seevam,Raceetal.2007).Priortotransportation,theCO2isalsodehydrated to levelsof50ppmofwater topreventpipeline corrosion (IPCC2005;Forbes,Verma et al. 2008).Unlike natural gas,CO2 is corrosivewhen dissolved inwaterthereforethematerialsusedinthepipelinemustbesuitable;carbonsteelisthepreferredmaterial for pipeline construction as it shows low or insignificant corrosion rates over arangeofdifferent temperaturesandwatercontents (Heggum,Weydahletal.2005). Thedesignof apipelinemust also take into consideration anumberofdifferent factors: thepressureitwillbeoperatedat,whichwilldeterminethethicknessofthepipe,howtoresistbothinternalandexternaldegradation,howbesttoprotectthepipelinefromdamage,howto incorporateappropriatemonitoring facilitiesand the location inwhich thepipelinewillbesituated(IEAGHG2002;VandeginsteandPiessens2008;Serpa,Morbeeetal.2011).

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1.2. PipelinesafetyCO2isnotclassifiedasadangerousfluidunderthePipelineSafetyRegulations1996(PSR),however,DECCrequiredcompaniesinvolvedinthefirstCCScompetitiontoactasifitwas.TheEUCCSDirective1doesnotprovidetechnical standards for thedesign,construction,monitoring and maintenance of pipelines, [or] public participation procedures in thedecisionmakingwithrespecttopipelinerouteing,thesearecoveredbytheEnvironmentalImpactAssessment (EIA)Directiveorbynational legislation inMemberStates (UCL2012).WithintheUKhowever,theHealthandSafetyExecutive(HSE)areresponsibleforpipelineregulationandenforcingUKHealthandSafetyLawwithrespecttopipelinesbothonandoffshore. Part II of PSR requires that pipelines are designed, constructed, operated andmaintained such that risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and that theycomplywith relevantcodesand standards.However, thecurrentcodesdonotcoverCO2pipelines and theCOOLTRANS research programme is aiming to address this deficit. PSRapplies toallpipelines inGreatBritainand its territorialwaters, includingMajorAccidentHazardPipelines(MAHP)whichtransportanythingdefinedasdangerousfluids(includedinpartIIIofPSR).

1.2TransportinfrastructureandRiskAssessmentEveryeffort ismadetominimisethe impacttoboththecommunityandtheenvironmentwhenplanningaproject.Onshorepipelinesarebuiltaccordingtodefinedstandardsandaresubject to regulatory approval to assure a high level of safety, particularly in denselypopulated areas. The Planning Act of 20082 is there to ensure the planning process forprojectsarebothfasterandfairertoboththecommunitiesanddevelopersinvolved.Thereare anumberof stagesbefore anyproject can commencepreapplication, acceptance,preexamination,planning inspectorate recommendation/secretaryof statesdecisionandpostdecision(TPI2012).

Land use planning zones around the pipeline and associated AboveGround Installations(AGIs)areused in conjunctionwith specifiedminimumdistances fromnormallyoccupiedbuildings(separationdistances)toensurethesafetyofsurroundingcommunities.ThesearebasedonaQuantitativeRiskAssessment(QRA)accordingtothespecificationofthepipeline(i.e.pipelinediameter,wall thickness,maximumoperatingpressure, typeof steeland itsdepth of burial) and the substance being transported. There are several zones definingdifferent probabilities of exposure to a particular risk, for example the inner zone (i.e.closesttothepipeline)typicallydescribesanareainwhichthereisariskof10chancespermillion (cpm)peryearofexposuretoa dangerousdose (which istheequivalentofa1%chanceoffatality inhealthyperson). If,aswasthecasefortheMilfordHavennaturalgas

1Directive2009/31/EConthegeologicalstorageofcarbondioxide.

2PlanningAct2008waslateramendedbythe2011LocalismAct.

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pipeline,theriskatthepipelineisevenlowerthanthis,theinnerzoneisdefinedusingthebuildingproximitydistance (HSE2012). It isnotalwayspossible tosatisfyproximityrulesand insuchcasesthere isaneedtodemonstratethatextraprecautionshavebeentaken,such as extra pipeline thickness. Pipelines in operation are closelymonitored, externallythrough visual inspections for corrosion monitoring and leaks and internally by pipelineinspection gauges or pigs (pistonlike inspection devices that are driven through thepipelinebygaspressure)whichdetectpotential leaks,damage,corrosionor failureofthepipe.Inthecaseofaleak,transportofCO2isshutdownautomaticallybyclosingoffvalvesensuring that any CO2 released is limited. Although block valves are essential to allowcertainsectionsofthepipelinetobe isolated,morevalves increasethecostoftheprojectandmayalso increase the riskof leakagedue to thenumberof jointsalong thepipelineroute(GaleandDavison2004).

1.3PotentialhazardsUnlikeanaturalgaspipeline, theriskofa fireorexplosion isabsent fromaCO2pipeline,howeverCO2presentsother risks. PureCO2 is colourlessandodourlessanddespiteCO2beingpresent intheairwebreathe(ataconcentrationof370ppm), it isbothtoxicandanasphyxiate.Thereareanumberofpotentialhazardsassociatedwiththepipe,whichincludecorrosion, loss of containment (LOC) and its ability to arrest a fracture (HSE 2008).Relatively low concentrationsofCO2 canbehazardous tohumanhealth; inhalingCO2 atconcentrationsabove7% (or7x104ppm) representsasignificanttoxicologicalhazardtohumans (although a concentration of 50% is necessary to present immediate danger ofdeath by asphyxiation) and from the toxicological effects from inhalation at 15%, (DNV2008;Harper2011).Although this suggests thatCO2 isonlymildly toxicwhen comparedwithother commonlyused compounds (such asAmmoniaHydrogen Sulphide (SLOT32 x1012 ppm.min); carbon monoxide (4 x 104 ppm.min) and sulphur dioxide (4.7 x 106ppm.min), the scale of carbon capture from a power station suggests that a release ofpotentiallylargevolumescouldpresentamajoraccidenthazard(SLOT1.5x1040ppm.min)(Harper2011;HSE2012).

1.4CommonlycitedincidentsinvolvingCO2Accidents are rare in CO2 pipelines, over 11 years (1990 2001) only 10 incidentswerereported(Barrie,Brownetal.2005).Therewere5000accidentsinthesameperiodrelatingtonaturalgasandhazardousliquidpipelines;thiscanhoweverbeexplainedbythesamplesize of CO2 pipelines in comparison to that of natural gas and other hazardous liquidpipelines.More recently Edwards (2008) stated that between 1994 and 2008, the 3695

3SLOT SpecifiedLevelofToxicity involves theuseof themost relevant toxicitydataavailable that is thenextrapolated foruseonhumans (TurnerandFairhurst1993).DefinedbyHSEas: Severedistress toalmosteveryone in the area; substantial fractionof exposedpopulation requiringmedical attention; somepeopleseriouslyinjured,requiringprolongedtreatment;highlysusceptiblepeoplepossiblybeingkilled.

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seriousincidentsreportedfromhazardousliquidpipelinesonly36involvedCO2pipelines.Ofthese36,onlyonepersonwas injured (no fatalities)and the remainingwereclassifiedasseriousasaresultofthedamagedonetopropertyorproduct. ThemostcommonlycitedCO2 incident occurred in 1986 as a a result of natural processes at Lake Nyos in theCameroon (naturally saturated with CO2 due to the existence of a magma chamberunderneathwhich continually leaksCO2), inwhich ithasbeenestimated that1.6MTCO2wasunexpectedly released killing inexcessof1700peoplewithmanymore injured.ThequantityofCO2releasedatLakeNyosisvastlygreaterthanthevolumesassociatedwithCO2transportforCCS,whicharemorelikelytobeintheorderof10sofKTCO2atmost(Harper2011).Ofmorerelevanceasananalogueisanaccidentalreleaseofabout15TofCO2fromafireextinguishing installation factory inMonchengladbach,Germany in2008.CoincidentalfailureofdoorsealsresultedinaCO2releaseoutside,verystillairconditionsresultedintheintoxicationof107people,ofwhich19werehospitalised,alloftheserecoveredandtherewerenofatalitiesinthisexample(HSE2011).

2. Socialimpact:ExamplesfrompreviouspipelinesandCO2projects

The following section describes briefly the planning and development of five case studyexamples,focusingonhowconflictsweremanifestedduringtheplanninganddevelopmentprocess,summarised inTable1 (attachedasaseparate file). Eachofthesmallsampleoffour pipeline developments and one CCS project has encountered significant challengesfrompartiesopposingthedevelopment.Furthercasestudies(inadditiontothoseincludedhere)havebeenconsideredelsewhere,withspecificconcernsforlessonstobelearntwithrespect todeveloping communicationandengagementprocesses (Ashworth,Bradburyetal.2011;HammondandShackley,2010).Ourpurposehere istofocusmorespecificallyoncasesthataremostrelevanttothetransportofCO2viapipelineandwhichhelpustobetterunderstandhow individualsandgroupaccommodateand respond to theprospectof thistypeofinfrastructuredevelopment.

WeyburnMonitoringandStorageProject

Overview

TheWeyburnMidaleproject is thebiggestCCSprojectworldwide, transportingCO2viaa200milepipeline(320km)runningfromBeulah,NorthDakotaintheUStotheWeyburnoilfield,Saskatchewan,Canada.Thepipelineoperatesatapressureof152barand isroutedwith a one thousand foot buffer zone from the pipe centre to any occupied residence.Operationbeganin2000,transportingcapturedCO2fromacoalgasificationplantforuseinonshoreEnhancedOilRecovery (EOR);EORusesCO2 tomakeoil thinnerandcauses it toswell,makingiteasierfortheoiltoflowtoproducingwells.TheCO2pumpedoutwiththeoil is then recycled.At the startof theproject in 2000,CO2 injectionbegan at a rateof5kt/day to theWeyburn field (owned by Cenovus Energy formerly EnCana operating on

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behalfof23otherpartners)and,from2005, includedtheMidalefield(ownedbyApache)injectingatarateof1.3kt/day.Inthefinalphase,from20062011theinjectionrateswereincreased to7kt/dayatWeyburnand1.8kt/dayatMidale (Dakota_Gasification_Company2012).Combined,thiswillresultinstoragetotalling40milliontonnesofCO2bytheendoftheprojectlife.OperatedbytheDakotaGasCompany,andsetupasascientificmonitoringstudy,thesitehasbeensubjecttoanextensivemonitoringprogrammeduringtheprojectduration, involving 30 international and independent research institutions led by thePetroleumTechnologyResearchCentre(PTRC).

Conflicts

Unlike the other examples in this report, the controversy associatedwith theWeyburmproject arosemore than10 years into theoperationof the site andnot at theplanningphase.Awellpublicisedpersonalcampaignwas launchedbyCameronand JaneKerrwhoown a farm near Goodwater, Saskatchewan and have farmed in the area since 1975(Ecojustice2010).In2011thecoupleheldanewsconferenceclaimingthatthestoredCO2wasleakingintotheirlocalgroundwater,theyclaimedthatthegascouldbeseenbubblingup through ponds,which had since developed algal blooms4 and that small animals hadbeenfounddeadnearby, leadingtoheadlinessuchasFarmersays landfizzingwithCO2andSask.familyclaimcarboncaptureandstoragesitespeweddeadanimals(Johnstone2011;Vanderklippe2011).

Thecouplehadinitiallyraisedtheirconcernsin2004afterseeingchangesinwaterquality,depth andphysical characteristics in and around theirponds andwerepromised,by theSaskatchewan government, a yearlong investigation; the Kerrs claimed this study nevermaterialised(althoughthegovernmentclaimtohaveundertakenastudyreportingin2008thattherewasnoproblematthesite)(Ecojustice2010).

In2007 theKerrs teamedupwithEcojustice (aCanadianenvironmental lawcharity)andcommissioned a consultant (PetroFindGeochemical) to verify their claims that highCO2concentrations in their soil were derived from the Weyburn storage project (CBCNEWS2011) and had moved off their land two years previously because of their concerns(Vanderklippe2011).ThePetroFindGeochemicalreportclaimedtheprovenancesourceofthehighconcentrationsofCO2insoilsoftheKerrpropertyisclearlytheanthropogenicCO2injected into theWeyburn reservoir, it reported average CO2 concentrations in the soilwere2.3%withpeaksof11%andconcludedthatCO2couldenterthehome indangerousconcentrations(Lafleur2010).ThereportstatedthatraisedlevelsofCO2werearesultofhorizontalflowofCO2fromdeepgeologicalfracturesorfaultsandthattherewasevidenceofsurfaceleakagesofoilwhichcouldcontaminatethelocalwatertable(Lafleur2010).TheresearchteamoverseeingtheWeyburnstudy,thePetroleumTechnologyResearchCentre

4Algalbloomarapidincreaseoraccumulationinthepopulationofalgaeinanaquaticsystem.

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(PTRC),respondedquicklytodiscredittheclaimsonthebasisthattheconsultantsreportdidnotprovide adequate scientificevidence that theCO2 contaminationoriginated fromWeyburn and that the consultant had not explored alternative explanations for thephenomena(CBCNEWS2011).ThePTRCreportedCO2thatatthepropertyhadbeenformedrecentlyandattributed it tonaturalsoil respirationprocesses. On19 January2011PTRCproduced a report responding to thePetroFind report concluding that: ThePetroFindreport reachesaconclusion that isunsubstantiatedby the limiteddata in theirstudy.Thereport contains technicalerrors, invokesundocumenteddata,andprovidesminimal tonoinformationontheirscientificmethodsoranalyticaltechniquesandthatThephenomenaobservedattheKerrpropertycanbeexplainedbynearsurfaceprocessesincludingmicrobialgeneration of soil CO2 andmethane. A site investigation conducted on behalf of PTRCanalysedthesoilgasesatWeyburn,atthefarmandatacontrolsiteandconcludedthatthegasfoundadjacenttotheKerrsfarmwasofnaturalbiogenicoriginalthatitwastypicalofthe soil gas chemistry for the region andnot contaminatedbyhydrocarbons; a separatestudyfoundthatthewellandpipeline integrityweresound(PTRC2011).ThePTRCreportrespondstoeachoftheconclusionspresentedinthePetroFindreport,rejectingeitherthemethodsor conclusionsdrawn, also stating that the soil concentrationsmeasured at thefarmbyPetroFindarenothazardousingroundsamples,astheywouldbeifmeasuredinairsamples(PTRC2011).

Afurtherassessmentwasalsocarriedout in2011byIPACCO25.IPACconvenedateamofinternational experts (requiring that none had held any previous involvement with theWeyburn project) to conduct an independent peerreviewed study into the Kerr farmallegations.ThestatedaimofthestudywastoreducetheuncertaintyregardingthecarbondioxideanomalyreportedtoexistonthepropertyownedbyCameronandJaneKerr.Theenquiryapplieda9stepIncidentResponseProtocol(IRP)developedpreviouslybyIPACandconcluded that there was no evidence that the CO2 found on the Kerr farm was fromWeyburnandthegroundwatermetregionaldrinkingwaterqualitystandards.Insummary,IPAC concluded that all soil, soil gases and groundwater CO2 found were produced bynaturalprocesses.Whilenotexplicitlyinvestigatingthecausesofreportedanimaldeathsorexplosions, the reportconcludes that thesecouldnothavebeena resultof leakedCO2fromtheWeyburnfieldsincenoleakwasdetected.UnsatisfiedbythetworeportsfromtheIPAC and PTRC the Kerrs had not moved back into their property by December 2011(Johnstone 2011). Despite this, Ecojustice claim the protest was successful as previouscomplaintsbytheKerrshadnotbeenheard.

5InternationalPerformanceAssessmentCentreforgeologicstorageofCarbonDioxideanotforprofitenvironmentalNonGovernmentOrganisation(NGO)setuptoassesstheriskandperformanceacrosstheCCSchain

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MilfordHavenPipeline

Overview

TheMilfordHavenPipeline, completedbyNationalGrid in2007, is theUKs largesthighpressuregaspipelineat316km longand1220mm indiameter.Thepipeline links the twoLNGterminalsatMilfordHaven,SouthWales(operatedbySouthHook)totheNationalGasnetworkinGloucestershire,passingthroughtheBreconBeaconsNationalPark.Thepipelineoperatesupto94bartosupply20%oftheUKsgasrequirementsandassuchisidentifiedasbeingofnationalstrategicimportance.Morerecently,permissionhasnowbeengrantedto upgrade the pipeline with a Pressure Reduction Installation (PRI) to increase thepipelines throughputenabling it tooperateat fullcapacity.Theplanningprocess for thisinstallation was subject to significant delays in passing the planning process, includingrelocating the installation in response to localopposition; constructionwillbe completedduring2012(NationalGrid2012).

Conflict

Thisisacomplexcasesinceitrelatestooppositiontothreedistinctcomponentsofalargerdevelopment: the LNG terminals atMilfordHaven, the pipeline and the associatedAGIseach of which attracted opposition from a variety of actors adopting a variety ofapproaches.AGIscanbethefocusofmuchattention.Thedevelopmentofthepipelineandconsequent opposition was closely tied to construction of the LNG terminals at MilfordHaven.Therewereobjections to theprincipleofbuildinga large terminal throughwhichsupertankerswould bring gas in liquid form fromQatar andNorthAfrica (which is thentransferred into LNG storage tanks and before being converted back into normal gas(through the regasification process) and these objections may have carried over to thedevelopmentofthepipeline.ThedevelopmentofboththeLNGterminalsatMilfordHavenand the connecting pipeline were surrounded by high profile protest and opposition; areportonbehalfofPembrokeshireCountyCouncilsuggeststhat,despitesignificanteffortsby the developers through publicmeetings, information events and project literature tolocal residents, the local community and elected representatives, an atmosphere ofsuspicion,distrust and confrontationneverthelessensuedanddevelopersweremetwithwellorganisedopposition(PCC2005;YakovlevaandMunday2010).

Localoppositionwasprimarilymotivatedby the impact to the local area and associatedsafetyissues.ManyofthecommunitiesalongthepipelinerouteinSouthWalesdonothaveaccesstomainsgasandthereforereceived littlebenefit fromadevelopmenttransportinggassuppliesto intoEngland.Howeveralongsidethis,externalgroupswerealsomobilised,introducing protestors that, although deploying arguments related to the local impacts,wereprimarilydrivenbymore genericobjection to the project as awhole.Hence thesedirect action campaigns involving 3rd parties, for example the Brecon protest camp,introducednonsitespecificconcerns,suchasclimatechange,totheprotest(Yakovlevaand

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Munday2010).SignificantoppositionalsofocusedontheAboveGroundInstallationssuchas the Pressure Reduction Installation (PRI) at Cilfrew. Yakovleva and Munday (2010)described how concerns of various protest communities differed along the route of thedevelopmentasdidthelevelofofficialsupportbylocalinstitutions.AttheLNGterminals,concernscentredaround localsocioeconomic impacts,safetyandriskassociatedwiththeLNGcargoes; furtheralongthepipelineconcernsrelatedtotheriskofgasexplosions,theAGIs,implementationofadequateconstructionstandardsandtheimpactonenvironmentalassets (theNational Park) (Yakovleva andMunday 2010). Brecon BeaconsNational Parkopposed the pipeline, requesting a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) into thewideraspectsofnationalgassupplyandwhethertheproposedschemerepresentsthebestoptionavailable.TheParkauthorityfeltthepipelinewouldhaveanegativeimpactonthe environment of the National Park on the grounds of its recognised outstandinggeologicalheritageandraiseddoubtsthatnoreasonablealternativeexistedtoroutethepipe(BBNPA2006).In 2005, the Country Land and Business Association (CLBA) took a less opposing stanceadvisingfarmers,whoselandthepipelinewouldcross,nottoobjecttothedevelopmentonthegroundsthatdespitethedisruption,theywouldultimatelybebetteroffacceptingthecompensation,expressingtheopinionthatthepipelinewouldgoaheadregardlessoflevelsof opposition (Farmers Weekly 2005). Voluntary land agreements were made betweenNationalGridandallexcept twoof the833 landownersalong thepipelinerouteandalsotheBreconBeaconsNationalPark,alllandownerswerefullycompensatedandfarmerswereassured that all normal farming operations could continue over the pipeline (Davidson2007). It is not clear what happened to the two landowners where no voluntary landagreementsweremade.Despite theagreementby the landownersseveralprotestgroupswereorganisedaroundthe development: the Safe Haven Group, initially established against the terminaldevelopment in 2005, later extended to the Safe Haven Network; Cwmtawe ResidentsAction Group (CRAG); Fight the Pipe; Rising Tide; the Cilfrew Residents Association(againstlocationofthePressureReductionStation);andtheCampaignAgainstthePressureReduction Installation (CAPRI)established in2006 (YakovlevaandMunday2010).AswiththeCorribproject (seebelow),protestorshaveuseddirectaction todisrupt constructionandseveralarrestsorprotestshavebeenmadefortrespassingdespitethisconstructionrantoschedule(BBCNews2006;BBCNews2007;BBCNews2007).RisingTideisagrassrootsnetworksupportingcampaigns(groupsandindividuals)linkedtoissues related to climate change.RisingTideentered the sceneat the invitationofCRAG

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who were trying to prevent ring blasting6 through rock found at Trebanos along thepipelinerouteinanareathathadpreviouslyexperiencedsubsidenceclosetohousesandaprimary school (YakovlevaandMunday2010). Themain issues raisedby theRisingTideprotest,otherthantheclaimthatlocalprotestorshadbeenignored,were:thepotentialfora serious incident at the terminal (accident or terrorist), the pipeline passes throughunstable land,MiddleEastgas ismoreenergy intensive thanNorthSeagasand the LNGterminalswillcausea30year lockintomorefossilfuels(RisingTide2007).FurtheralongtheNeathValley, theCilfrewResidentsAssociationcampaignedagainstaPRIstationneartheir village. When planning permission was granted in 2006, the secretary of theAssociation (LindaWare)successfullychallenged thedecision througha JudicialReview intheHighCourt,although subsequently lostanappealagainst thisdecisionbyNeathPortTalbotCouncil in2007 andwas required topay the councils costs.Wares legal aidwaswithdrawnandinanoutofcourtsettlementsheagreedtopaythecostsatarateof10perweekforthenext14years(ThisisSouthWales2009).CAPRIwasestablishedinresponsetotheproposedPRIinHerefordshireandadoptedadifferentapproachtosomeoftheearlierunsuccessfulprotests.Althoughmadeupofordinarylocalresidentstheyhadtheresourcestoemploytheprofessionalservicesofalawyer,webdesignerandabotanistandadoptedamore formal approach to their campaign, aiming to avoid the high profile direct actionmethodsdeployedatotherprotestsalongthepipeline(YakovlevaandMunday2010).Thisapproachprovedsuccessfulinopposingthefirstplanningapplicationandsecuringchangestothedesign,locationsandconditionsforthefinalacceptedproposal.

CorribGasProject

OverviewTheCorribNaturalGasfield,wasdiscoveredin1996byEnterpriseoil,83kmoffshorefromCountyMayointheRepublicofIreland.ThedevelopmentoftheCorribGasprojectstartedin2001asajointventurebetweentheCorribGaspartnersShell,StatoilandMarathon(thisshare isnowownedbyVermillion),with capacity to supply60%of Irelandsnatural gas.Finalapprovalwasgrantedtotheonshorepipelinein2011withthefinalrouteselectedtodeliver the best balance between community, environmental and technical issues (ShellE&P Ireland Limited2012).Thepipelinewilloperateatbetween90110barandpassnocloserthan140mtoanyoccupieddwellings.

Conflict

Theconsentingandapprovalprocess tooperate theGasTerminalbegan in2001buthasbeensurroundedbycontroversy.In2004,theBellanaboygasterminalwasgrantedplanningpermission,howeverworksonthe9kmsectionoftheonshorepipelinebetweenthelandfall

6Ringblastingatypeoflongholeblastingsystem.

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andprocessingplantwere suspended inmid2005 following intense localopposition.Anindependent safety reviewof theonshore sectionof thegaspipelinewasconductedandrecommendedthattheonshorepipelinepressureshouldbe limitedtoamaximumof144bar. The pipeline monitoring and inspection regime was also upgraded and a formalmediationprocesswasestablished.TheCentreforPublicInquiryreportrecommendedthatthepipelineroutearoundthevillageofRossportshouldbemodified inresponsetopublicconcerns (Connolly and Lynch 2005) and inMarch 2008, SEPIL (the operators, Shell E&PIreland ltd) applied for authorisation of a new route, developed following a publicconsultation process, which was revised in February 2009. This application was notapprovedand,however,anewapplicationsubmittedinJanuary2011wasgranted.

Thescaleofthelocaloppositionin2005wascentredon5residentsofRossportvillage(theRossportFive)who,althoughsubjecttoacompulsorypurchaseorder,refusedtoallowthedevelopers access to their land and were jailed for contempt of court as a result. TheimprisonmentpromptedwidespreadresponseacrossIrelandwhichincludedrallies,picketsat Shell garages andblockades at the refinery (Hederman 2005). TheRossport fivewerereleasedafter3months in jailwhenShell liftedthe injunctionandhavesincesoughtHighCourt declarations that theMinisterial consent granted for the pipeline in 2002 did notcomplywiththeconditionsfortheapproval(Independent2010;Siggins2010). OneoftheRossport five, Willie Corduff, a farmer whose land the original pipeline route passedthrough, was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2007 for his grassrootscampaigning against the Corrib pipeline and received $150,000 to support the campaign(TheGoldmanEnvironmentalPrize 2007).However it has been reported since thatCorduffwasallegedlyassaultedbyShellsecurityguardsduringaprotestattheGlengadcompoundand armedmasked protestors attacked Shell security staff (Brady and Shiel 2009;Vidal2009).

Thecontroversyisasyetunresolved,withtheperceptionofalackofbenefitoftheprojecttothe localcommunitywhilstShellprofitsfromthedevelopment.HoweverprotestorswilldeployawiderangeofargumentstosupporttheircaseandboththeShelltoSeacampaignagainstthepipelineandrefineryandtheRossportSolidarityCampremainhighlyactive.Acounter group to the protesters was formed called the Pro Gas Mayo however, thisappears to be a very small group (3 known members) with a low public profile(SourceWatch2008).Therehavealsobeentwofilmsmadeabouttheprojectbothreleasedin2010attheIrishFilmFestivalThePipebyRisingTideandPipeDown.AbookhasalsobeenpublishedtitledOnceUponaTime intheWestTheCorribGasControversy(Siggins2010).

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Barendrecht

Overview

Theonlyexampletobepresentedherethatdoesnotrelatetoapipelinedevelopment,theBarendrect project was a full chain CCS demonstration project operated by Shell andinvolvedthetransportandstorageofpureCO2producedattheShellPernisgasrefinery.Ithasbeenincludedherebecauseitisawelldocumentedandwellstudiedcasethatdeliversvaluable insights(Desbarats,Uphametal.2010;Feenstra,Mikundaetal.2010;Brunsting,BestWaldhober et al. 2011;Brunsting,Desbarats et al. 2011).Our purpose is not to reiteratetheanalysisofhowtheconsultation/communicationprocesswasconductedbuttoreflectontheformoftheopposition,theissuesraisedandhowtheoppositionmanifesteditself.

400KTofCO2perannumwasdue tobe transportedat40bar through20kmofpipeline(16.5km new steel pipeline, the remainder using existing corridor), between the Shellhydrogen processing plant at Pernis and a storage location at near end of life gas fieldsbelow theDutch townofBarendrecht.This isadenselypopulated town thathasseenanincrease in commuter population in the last 30 years. At the request of the Dutchgovernmentandwithsignificantfinancialsupportfromthem(30million),Shellhavebeenpreparingforthisprojectsince2007whentheMinisterofEnvironmentreceivedbudgetforaNationalCCStenderhoweverasaresultofpublicoppositionforthisprojectanditsdelayformore than3years ithassincebeencancelled (VerHagen2010;Kuijper2011).Despitethissetback theNetherlands isstillexpected tostoreup to30million tonnesby2050 inotherlocations.

Conflict

TheconflictinthiscasesurroundsthestorageoftheCO2ratherthanthepipeline.ThiswasaCCS pilot development which was eventually cancelled amidst a high level of publicopposition.

Shell informed the municipal government in 2007 about the project and although thenationalgovernmentweresupportiveoftheproject, localcouncilswereopposedandthetowncouncilrefusedplanningpermission.ShellpublishedtheEIAinJanuary2009andwasapprovedbythelocalauthoritiesinAprilthesameyear,howeverthemunicipalitydisagreedwithseveralpointsinit,whichincludedthatCCSwasanestablishedtechnologyandstatedthat itshouldconsidermorbidity issueswithintheassessment(Brunsting,BestWaldhoberetal.2011).Otherissuesraisedincludedwhythefirstonshoreprojectshouldbeinsuchadensely populated area, and that Shell would be benefiting from public money at theexpense of the local citizens. The public communication process between Shell andresidentsofBarendrechtbegan in February2008. Since thennegativepress storieshavesurrounded the project. Shell cited mistakes relating to the scale of diagrams causedconcern,howeverresidentsfeltthatShelldidnotlistentotheirconcernsandthattheywere

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overconfident(relyingonaPowerPointpresentationtogainsupportfromlocalresidents);consequently, residents did not trust those involved in the setting up of the project(Feenstra, Mikunda et al. 2010). Residents had many questions relating to the projectleadingtoanunexpectedbacklash inthearea.AwarenessofCCStechnology is lowamongDutch people (Brunsting, BestWaldhober et al. 2011) and residents had many safetyconcerns alongside concerns that itmay reduce house prices. The resulting problems atBarendrechthighlight the importance inpublicly cofoundedprojects towork together indevelopingapublicacceptancestrategyfromthestart(Kuijper2011).GroenLinks,thelocalGreen party began to rally the Barendrecht community against the proposed pipelinecollectingover900signaturesand leadinga300 to400strongprotestmarchagainstCCSanda localoppositiongroupalsoformedCO2isNee. Thereweremanyexaggeratedandinaccurate statementsduring this time fromboth sidesof thedebate; forexample leakcouldkill100,000peoplevs CO2 is completelyharmlessneitherofwhichareaccurate(Brunsting,deBestWaldhoberetal.2010).Whenthestoragesite iscompletelyfull itwasexpectedto,usingIPCCestimates,leakatarateof100tonnesor270kgadayequivalenttotheCO2generatedbyjust10humanbeings.

Thereareanumberof lessonsthatcanbetaken fromBarendrechtto futureCCSprojectswhich includes the importance of support from local governments and engaging in keypublicopinionformersmuchearlierintheprocess.Oneofthekeyissueswasresidentsfeltthateverythinghadalreadybeendecided, therewasnoconsultationprocessandassuchthey felt they had little say in their local environment. Kuijper (2011) has suggested tounderstandthearea inwhichtheproject istoberealised is importantandalthoughShellhas been operating close to Barendrecht in 1997 given the new technology, this wasperhapsnotconductedasthoroughlyasitshouldhavebeen.

KeystoneXLPipeline

Overview

TheoriginalKeystonepipelinewasproposedby theTransCanadaCorporation inFebruary2005 becoming operational in June 2010. The pipeline is 1,179miles long (36 inches indiameter)andrunsfromtheAthabascaoilsandsinHardisty,AlbertatoSteelCity,Nebraskatransportingsyntheticcrudeoilanddilutedbitumenatanaturaltemperaturerangeof80120degreesFahrenheittoavarietyofdestinationswithintheUS.TransCanadajudgedthereto be sufficient demand, need and commitment in the US marketplace to warrant anextension,KeystoneXL,applied for in2008 to theUSdepartmentof stateand forms thefocusofourdiscussion. After installation,theKeystoneXLpipelinewouldenteratBaker,MontanaandCushing,OklahomaandbecomethelongestpipelineoutsideRussiaandChinawiththepotentialtocarrymorethanhalfamillionbarrelsofoiladay;enoughcapacitytocarryovera thirdofcurrentUSpetroleum imports (Parfomak2012).Thepipelinewillbeused solely to transport oil across the US and not for export. The construction of the

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extension involves building sections of pipeline underground and includes 26 pumpingstations(TransCanada2012). Ithasbeensuggestedthattheextensionwillofferapositivecontribution to the US economy, generating over 15000 high wage manufacturing andconstructionjobswithadditionalbenefitstoaffectedstates(TransCanada2012).Therehasbeenadegreeofsupportexpressedforthepipeline;SecretaryofState,HilaryClinton,whois leadingtheevaluationoftheprojecthasstatedshe isinclinedtoapprovetheproject;theLaborersInternationalUnionofNorthAmericaarealsoinfavourduetotheamountofjobsthatwillbegeneratedinthecurrentfinancialclimate.

Conflict

KeystoneXLhas facedanumberofproblems: lawsuits from smalloil refineriesand landownerssuingTransCanadaandoppositionfromenvironmentalistsandcertainmembersofUScongress(Vanderklippe2012).TheKeystoneXLproject isassociatedwithahighprofiledebaterelatedtoacontroversialenergysource.However,thereareanumberofconcernsthat have been expressed specifically relating to the pipeline; for example, opponentsconsiderthatthescaleoftheprojectmakes itatarget forterrorists,rendering itbothanenergysecurityandenvironmentalrisk.GalLuft,theexecutivedirectorfortheInstitutefortheAnalysisofGlobalSecurityhasstatedthatpipelinesabotageisbecomingaweaponofchoiceforterroristsgiventhesizeandpredicteddamageofthetarget(IAGS2005).Thereareanumberofpipelines inMiddleEasterncountries thathavebeensubject to terroristattacks;theRasIssaoilpipelineinYemenbyAlQaedamilitantsandtribesmenatareportedcost of $4 billion, the KirkukCeyhan oil pipeline in Turkey by Kurdish separatists, theEgyptianIsraeli natural gas pipeline by Bedouin terrorists and the oil pipeline in HomsprovinceinSyriawasalsodestroyed.Giventhedeeprootedpoliticalproblemsbehindsuchattacks,orthestrategicnatureofalargescaleenergypipeline,itis,however,importanttoconsider thewiderpoliticalor strategic context inevaluating theextent towhich similarthreatsmightposeaseriousrisktoaproject.

The environmental and climate change concerns are widely voiced not only as theextractionoftheoiluseshugeamountsofwaterandheat,butwhenrefinedandusedasoilwould results inhigh atmosphericemissionsof greenhouse gases.Oil sands areamixofclay, sand, water and bitumen, extracting the bitumen and upgrading it to somethingsuitable forpipelinetransportproducesemissions5to15%higherthantheproductionofcrudeoil (FarrellandBrandt2006). Localand Statepoliticianshavealso raised concernsaboutthewatersupplynotonlybecauseoftheamountofdamageaspillcouldcausebutthatthepipelineroutethreatensacrucialaquifer;thesandyandpermeablesoilandhighwatertablemakethesitevulnerabletoanoilspill.

Protests in the summer and autumnmonths brought the issue to theWhiteHouse; theproposal requires the Presidents approval as it crosses international borders. The mainfigure head leading those opposed to the pipeline is environmental and globalwarmingactivist Bill McKibben, supported by a number of other opposition groups: Sierra Club

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(Americas largestandmost influentialgrassrootsenvironmentalorganisation),FriendsoftheEarthandNationalResourcesDefenceCouncil(FriendsOfTheEarth2012;NRDC2012;SierraClub 2012). In August 2011, over 1000 nonviolent arrests took place outside theWhiteHouseandinNovemberthe6thofthesameyear,severalthousandprotestorsformedachainaroundtheWhiteHousetoconvincePresidentObamatoreconsidertheextension,withsomeshoulderingalongblackinflatablereplicaofthepipelinetoillustratetheirpoint.Fourdays after theprotestors formed a ring around theWhiteHouse,PresidentObamapostponedthedecisionuntil2013.

3. Controversyandprotest

It is clearly in the interest of all parties, including local communities, if protest andopposition can be avoided.While there are no rules that can guarantee a developmentproceedswithoutprotest(theopportunityforoppositionanddebateisanessentialpartofthe democratic process, provides learning opportunities and ultimately a check oninappropriatedevelopments),ahealthyandwellrunengagementprocesscanhelptoavoidunnecessaryhostilityanddeliveramorepositiveoutcomeforallparties.Whenoppositiondoesemergehowever,itisimportanttounderstandwhypeopleareprotestingandthetypeofprotestorsinvolvedmembersofthelocalcommunity,political/environmentalpressuregroupsormoreextremesaboteursintentondisruptiveorobstructiveaction.

Allowing local voices to be heard at the beginning of the process could be critical inpreventing larger scale protests; as campaigns grow and external parties (i.e. those notlivinginthelocalarea)becomeinvolved,oftendrivingacampaignandusingtheprojecttofightabiggercause.Asprotestescalates(bothincontent,formandprotaganists)thetermsof the protest are amplified and charges become grander.When this happens, dialoguebecomesamuchmorecomplexandintractableprocess,positionsbecomeentrenchedandalongtermlegacyofhostilitymorelikelytobeestablished.

With reference to a variety of case studies, other authors have identified key steps toachieving public acceptance of CCS projects: why (understanding climate change andenergy)? What (knowledge and understanding)? Who (trust)? Where (social fit)? How(details: benefits and risks)? (Hammond and Shackley, 2010). In addition,Ashworth et al(2011) present guidelines for engagement strategies from CCS and identify seven keyprinciples: timing (engage early); know your community; identifying local benefits;information what to communicate; information how to communicate; sources ofinformation;competition(selfselection)(Ashworthetal.2011).

Through each of the case studies described in the present report, it is clear that publicresponsecan influencethesuccessful implementationofaproject;researchsuggeststhatsupportforCCSasaclimatechangemitigationstrategy is likelytobeamajorfactor intheway thatspecificprojectsare received (see forexampleShackleyetal.2005;Sharpetal.

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2009andTerwelletal.2011).Eachcontroversyisuniquewhilemuchcanbelearnedfromindividualcases,theevolutionandscaleofacontroversymaynotbepredictable,sinceitisdependentoncontingenciesandindividuals.However,certainthemesandpatternscanbeidentified as local communities respond toproposeddevelopments in theirenvirons andthesearesummarisedbelow.

For a large proportion of people CCS is a relatively unknown subject; an increasedawareness could be beneficial to both present and future CCS projects. Research hasemphasisedthe importanceofprovidingthepublicwith informationonCCSthattheycancomparewithotherenergytechnologiestodetermineforthemselvestherisks,benefitsandcostsofCCS(Howell,Shackleyetal.2012).Typically,concernforthedevelopmentmayfirstbevoicedarounddirectlocalimpacts(forexample,intermsofhealthorenvironmentalrisk)but,asadebateheatsup,broaderandmoreabstractargumentsmaycomeintoplay.Thismaybearesultinpartofprotestersdeployingadditionalargumentstosupporttheircausebutalso,asotherparties jointhedebatetheybringto itdifferentperspectives,principlesand concerns. Furthermore, once opposition to a development process becomesentrenched,everydetailofdevelopersresponsecomesunderhostilescrutiny.

Historyandlocalcontext

The importanceofunderstanding the localcontextofadevelopmenthasbeendescribedpreviously (for example, (Bradbury, Ray et al. 2009; Ashworth, Bradbury et al. 2010;Hammond and Shackley 2010) and key to the primary stages for developing a publicengagementstrategy is tounderstand the localareaand toassess the impact theprojectwillhaveonlocalresidentsKuijper(2011).The existence of previous established infrastructure developments in a region does notnecessarily imply that there is a reduced likelihood of opposition to subsequent similardevelopments. In the case of Barendrecht, this has been associated with the notion ofdevelopment fatigue (HammondandShackley2010)wherebycommunities feel theyarebearingmorethantheirfairshareoftheburdenofindustrialdevelopment.Ascommunitiesevolve,populationdemographicschangeover time;newpeoplemoving intoanareamaybelessacceptingofdevelopments.Ahistoryofunpopulardevelopmentsintheregionmayunduly influence futuredevelopments,both intermsofrelationshipswithdevelopersandbyassociation;oppositiontotheMilfordHavenpipelinewaslinkedtotheoppositiontotheLNG terminal from which the gas was to be transported. This demonstrates how anunsuccessfulandcontroversialproposalalsocan leavebehind itsown legacy inanarea theantipathyexperiencedduringtheBarendrechtcasewillcastashadowoveranyfutureCCS plans in the area. Any such legacy following a controversial pipeline development,however, may be more complex; extending over a large range and not necessarilyassociatedwitha specific location, the controversymay flowalong thepipeline route,aswasobservedintheMilfordHavenpipelinecase.

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Physicalrisk

In many cases, a protest may begin small and local, supported by specific and localargumentsrelatingtophysicalrisksorimpacts;thesemayoftenbethefirstprimaryconcernor residentsmaybecomemore sensitised to identifyingpotential impactsasa resultofpreviousexperiences (eg.previousdevelopments,activitiesof thedeveloperorgoverningauthority).Concernmaybeaboutrisktohealth,environmentandlandscapeimpactsor,asin the caseof theWeyburnpipeline,naturallyoccurringorpotentiallyunrelatedphysicalphenomena may be attributed to the development. Genuine engagement with localcommunities to supporting a mutual understanding of risks, impacts and concerns inrelationtosuchphysical impacts isclearlyparamountfromtheoutsetand israrelyabsentfromdebatewhencontroversiesdoarise.Theroleofscientificarguments

Keytoanydiscussionofphysicalimpactsisthewaythatscientificargumentsareusedandframed within the debate. This was critical in the Barendrecht example both thepresentation of technicalmaterialwithin the publicmeetings but also inaccuratemediareporting as the controversy became established. McLachlan and Mander (2011) havedescribedhowdifferentwaysinwhichknowledgeisframedandappliedinfluenceshowitisused to supportdifferentargumentswithinacontroversy. In theWeyburnexample, theentire controversywas framed around conflicting scientific analyses; theNAME concept(NotAccordingtoMyExpert)(HammondandShackley2010)reflectstheincreasinguseofscientificexpertiseasakeyelementofprotest.Localandlargerprotestgroupsincreasinglyhave access to scientific and expert resources, whether through the resources tocommission consultants (for example, as the CAPRI group did in theMilfordHaven casestudy)or through theskillsof individualswithin thecampaign.Despite this importanceofscientificandtechnicalevidenceforallparties,thefullpictureismadeupofamuchbroaderset of factors; ignoringor dismissing concerns that fall outside the scientific or technicalpromotes distrust and hostility (for example arguments dismissed as emotional createdresentmentintheBarendrechtcase).

Trust

Genuineearlyengagementthatisresponsiveandreflexiveisapivotalpartoftheprocessinestablishing trust around a proposed development. Amutual trust requires that citizenshavefaithinthedevelopersandauthoritiestoacthonestlyandtransparentlyandthattheirown opinions and concerns will be respected and taken seriously (Terwell et al 2011).Transparencyofinformationiskeyinbuildingpublictrust,withtrustseenasanecessityinrisk communication (Kasperson et al 1992, Jahansoozi 2006). The developers involved ineachofthecasestudieswereallkeentostressthesafetyofeachofthepipelines,butthisdidnotallay the fearsof local residents. Trust,competence,care, fairness,commitment,satisfaction, control, mutuality and dialogue have all been described as essentialcharacteristicsinbuildingrelationships(KentandTaylor2002;PoortingaandPidgeon2003).

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Publictrust inthestakeholdersandcompanies involved inaCCSproject iscrucial,SiegristandCvetkovich (2000) concluded thatmembers of the publicwith little knowledge on aparticular hazard aremore likely to rely on the authorities involved, resulting in amorepositiveviewofCCS ifthey trust thedeveloper involved.This isparticularly important forCCS projects, given it is a relatively unknown technology to the public and even withextensiveengagementitisnotalwayspossibletoreacheveryresident.Ifaprojectisrunbyawell respectedcompany thismayhelp to reassure thepublic that theprojecthasbeenadequatelyplannedandissafe,particularlyifpreviousprojectshavebeenseentobewellrun.Trustplaysakeyrole inshapingperceptions. Ithasbeenreportedthatpublictrust inthestakeholders involved affects the acceptance of CCS projects and is important for thesuccessful implementation of the technology in general (Terwel et al, 2009; Terwel et al2012).Terweletal2012foundthatcitizensaremorelikelytoacceptenvironmentalNGOsthan industrial partners and it was suggested that this was down to the companymotivations being driven by profit rather than by local interests, rather than perceivedcompetenceoftheindustrialpartnersperse.Establishingareputationforacommitmenttolocalcommunities isoneway tobuildpublic trust (Terweletal.2012). Itwassuggestedthat developers need to think very carefully about how and when to engage with thebroaderpublic inorder toensure that sufficient trustbeenestablished toallow them toproceed.Contingencies,externalfactorsandlinkages

In some instances controversy may arise in relation to concerns, events, individuals ororganisations seemingly separate from, or as an indirect consequence of, the actualdevelopment.Forexample,whilethepurposeoftheKeystoneXLpipelineistotransportoilacross the US objectors used arguments that it could compromise energy security byexposingthesupplyofoiltoariskofterroristactionorotherformsofsabotage.Discussions between developers and residents, local communities and stakeholders willexhibitaparticulardynamicanddialoguecanbeestablished.Thenatureofthedebatecanchangeandinsomecasebecomeamplifiedwhenotherpartiesbecomeinvolvedwhetheritisthemedia,professionalexperts(suchasoccurredatWeyburn),crusadingindividuals(see for exampleHammond and Shackley 2010) or larger nonlocal campaigning groups.Thismaycontributetoacampaignagainstaspecificproposalbecominglinkedtoabroaderissue. In the context of CCS projects, a pipeline is a very visible component of the CCSprocess and provides an access point for opponents of the broader context of CCS inassociationwithcoalfiredpowergeneration.

Justice

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Issuesrelatingto justicemaybecome importantwhenacommunitydoesnot identifyanylocalbenefitsfromaprojectwhichisseentodeliverbenefitselsewhere.Forexamplewhena local community does not perceive any immediate access to the resource beingtransportedby thepipeline (aswas the case in theMilfordHavenpipeline);or identifiesothersprofitingwhilethelocalcommunitybearstheburden(aswasthecaseintheCorribpipeline);orwhenthereisaperceivedconflictbetweenthenationalandlocalinterest(forexample Barendrecht). The importance of delivering community benefits has beenidentified elsewhere as being important both for delivering justice and for promotingacceptanceofthedevelopmentinthecontextofwindfarmdevelopments(Cowell,Bristowetal.2012).InthecaseofaCO2pipeline,constructedsolelyforitsroleindeliveringclimatechange mitigation, it is not bringing clear tangible benefits to another community fromwhichthehostcommunity isexcluded(aswasperceived inthecaseoftheMilfordHavenpipeline);thefollowingstageofourresearchwillenableustoexploresuchissuesinfurtherdepth.

Explicit use of rights and justice based argumentsmay be seen to emerge as a protestescalates;thiswasseenforexample inthecaseoftheCorribpipeline inwhichprotestersclaimed theirdemocratic right toprotestwasbeingchallengedandeventuallychargesofhumanrightsabuseswerelevied.

4. SummaryThis interimreporthassummarised5casestudies inwhicheitherpipelines (4cases)oraCCS project (1 case) has met with controversy. Based on the experience of these casestudieswehaveidentifiedthemeswhichareexemplifiedinthesecases.AlthoughthewidercontextoftheuseofCCStechnologiesinclimatechangemitigationisrelevant,thepresentstudyisspecificallyconcernedwiththetransportofCO2inpipelines.AlthoughmuchcanbelearntfrompreviousexperiencewithbothCO2storageprojectsandpipelinedevelopmentinotherapplications,therehasbeenminimalresearchandnoexperience(intheUK)ofthepotentialresponsetoaCO2pipeline.ThenextphaseofthisprojectwillexplorethespecificissuesandconcernsraisedbylaypublicsresidinginthevicinityofaproposedCO2pipelinedevelopment. The themes identified through the case study analysis will be furtherconsideredintheplanningandanalysisofthefocusgroupstobeconductedduringthenextphaseoftheresearch.

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