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birth. 266.

t was a

complaint

of the Jews

that

the Lord was

considered

to

be the Son of the

God

over all.

These

11en also

object

to

those who

truly 11ake

the same

confession about

him.

The Jews thought they were honouring the

God

of the universe by

excluding the Son from like honour. These also bestow

the

same

on

the

One over all,

bestowing

honour on the

Father

by

taking

away

the glory of

the Lord.

XXII 267-294 ne

ought

not

to

attribute

greater and

less to the

divine

being; including an elaborated

stateaent

of

Church

doctrine

267.

t would

be impossible to

give a

proper account

of

the ex

-

tent and

nature

of the other features of their

violence

done

to

the

the Onlybegotten.

Having

f irst invented

an

activity preceding

the

hypost sis

of Christ,

they

call

him a wor and

an

something the Jews have to

this day never dared

to do. Next they

circumscribe the nature

of

the Lord

enclosing

hi11

within

certain

lillits

of the power that made him delimiting him with a measure

to

wit the size of the

activity

that brolight him into existence,

enclosed

on every hand

by the

tunic

of

the

activity thought

up

by

them.

We cannot

accuse

the

Jews

of that

. 268. Next

they Cp.1051

envisage

a

shortage for the being

in

terms

of lessening,

in

some

way using their own power of comprehension

to measure

what has

no quantity or size, and managing

to

discover by what quantity

the

Onlybegotten

God

falls short

of completeness, for lack of

which he

is considered smaller

and incomplete.

n

many other

instances they

profess

one

thing

openly while

secretly arguing

another, C333Ml thus making the

confession

of the Son and Holy

Spirit way of exercising their own malice

. 269 . Must

they not

therefore be

under

more

wretched

judgment than the Jews

i

the

doctrines they so openly

argue are

such

as

the Jews have

never

dared?

The one

who lessens the

being

of the

. Son and

the Holy

Spirit

might

perhaps

seem

if

you

just say or

hear

the

words

to

be

only slightly irreverent. But if the statement is carefully

inspected,

he

will

be convicted of

blaspheny

at the capital

point

.

Let

us

approach the

subject

in this

way:

in

order

to teach

and

clarify. the

falsehood

argued by

my

opponents I hope I

may

be

pardoned

if

I proceed by

stating

our

own

position

.

270.

The

most important distinction

of all

beings is

that between

the

intelligible

and

the sensible.

The

sensible

nature is general-

ly given the name visible by the Apostle . Because

every

material body

has colour,

and because i t is

vision

that

apprehends

colour,

he

ignores

such

remaining

qualities as sub-

stantially inhere,

and

uses for

convenience

the term referring to

visual

rce tion.

271. For the whole

intelligible

nature the

comnon name used by the Apostle, is

the

invisible ;

by removing the sensible

apprehension

p .1061 he leads the mind on

to the incorporeal and

intelligible.

But

reason

divides the

meaning

of

this

intelligible nature

also

into

two. For

logic

per-

ceives

one

kind as

uncreated,

the

other

as

created, an

uncreated

nature which makes the created, and a created nature which

re-

ceives

i ts

cause

and ability

to

exist from the

uncreated.

272.

Among the sensible

are

all

those

things which we apprehend by the

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bodily

senses with reference

to

which

the differences

of quali-

ties adait consideration of 11 ore and

less

since differences of

quantity and quality and

other characteristics

apply

to

them.

273. As to the

intelligible

nature the created one I mean the

sort of principle of differentiation which was perceived in the

case of sensible things

cannot

operate but another

means

is

found

for

indicating the

difference

between greater and

less.

274..

Because the fount and origin and supply of every good is

considered to

e

in the

uncreated

nature and the whole creation

inclines towards the good clasping a t and partaking in the

supreme nature through sharing in the f irst good t follows of

necessity that

in proportion to

their participation

in

the higher

things some receive a

larger share

and others a smaller according

to

their

freely exercised choice and

so

more and less

are

known

in the creation

proportionately

to

the

desire of each. 275.

Since

the

intelligible

nature

on the created side stands at _the border

between good

things

and their opposite

so

as to

be

capable of

receiving

either by inclining to those which

t

prefers as Cp.1071

we

learn

from scripture

C336Ml

there is room to speak of more

and less in the one who excels in virtue in

proportion to

his

rejection of the worse and approximation

to

the better. 276. The

uncreated

nature

is far away from

such

a

distinction

inasmuch

as

t

does not have good

as

something

acquired nor

does

t

receive

moral

virtue

into i tself by

participation

in some higher moral

virtue but

because it is by

nature

what

goodness

is in i tself

and is

perceived

as

goodness

and is attested even by

our

oppon-

ents

to be the fount of goodness simple uniform and uncom-

pounded. 277.

t

has a

distinction

of

ts

own

appropriate to

the

majesty

of

ts

nature

not

thought

of

in

terms

of

more and

less

as Eunomius supposes;

for

one

who lessens his conception

of the

good in any member of the

holy

Trinity

we believe in will surely

be making

out

that some of the opposite state has been mixed in

in the

case

of the one who falls

short

in

goodness

which t is

not pious

to

hold

either about

the Onlybegotten or

about

the Holy

Spirit . Rather being thought of as in utter perfection and

incomprehensible transcendence

t

possesses unconfused and clear

differentiation

through the

characteristics

to

be found in each of

the hypostases

being

invariable

in

the

common possession of

uncreatedness

and singular in

the

special characteristics of

each.

278. The particularity attributed to each of the hypostases

plainly

and unambiguously

distinguishes one

from another. Thus

the

Father

is confessed

to

be uncreated and unbegotten for he is

neither begotten

nor created. This uncreatedness therefore he

has

in common with the Son and the Cp. 1081 Holy Spirit. But he

is

both unbegotten and Father;

this is

personal and incommunicable

and t

is

not perceived in either of the others. 279. The Son is

connected to the Father and the Spirit in

uncreatedness

but

has

his

individuation

in

being

and

being

called Son and Onlybegot

ten

which does not belong

the God

over all or of the Spirit. The Holy

Spirit who

has

a share with the Father and

the

Son in

the

uncreated

nature

is

again distinguished

from them by

recognisable

features.

His feature and mark is quite uniquely to be none of

those things which reason envisaged as peculiar to the

Father

and

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the

Son. 280. To be

neither unbegotten

nor

onlybegotten,

but

certainly to be, provides

his special

personal difference

from

the

others

mentioned. Connected

with

the Father in uncreatedness, he

is

conversely

separated from the Father by not being Father as he

is.

His connexion

with

the Son

in uncreatedness

is

not continued

when i t comes

to the personal

characteristic, since

he

did

not

come to be onlybegotten

from

the

Father and has

been Cp.1091

manifested

through

the

Son hillself. Again,

since

the creation

came

to exist through

the

Onlybegotten,

lest

the Spirit

be

thought

to

have anything

in common with

i t

because he

was manifested

through the Son, the

Spirit ls

distinguished from

the creation

by

changelessness

and

immutability

and independence of outside good-

ness.

Creation C337Ml does not

have

changelessness in

i t s

nature,

as

Scripture

says

when i t relates

the fall of Lucifer

. What

separates

him from

the creation is

the

same as

what

unites

him intimately to

the Father

and

the

Son.

n the case of

those

whose nature

admits nothing

bad one and the same

account

must be

given

of changelessness and immutability.

282. After these

preliminary

remarks

it

is

now

perhaps time to

examine our opponents'

account.

In his artful statement about the

Son and

the

Holy

Spirit he

says,

Necessity requires

that

the

belnf S

are

greater

and lesser

Let us

enquire by

what logic

he

arrives at

the necessity of

such difference, whether

some

material

comparison

has been

made between things measured

against

each

other,

or

whether

i t

is

conceived in terms of the

intelligible

as

one

exceeds or falls short in virtue, or whether it is

in

the

being i tself. 283. n the

case

of being however i t

has

been shown

by those who are skilled in such

philosophy

that

no

difference

can

be predicated,

i

one examines

i t

by

i tself in accordance with

i ts

own

Cp.1101

principle of

being, stripped bare of

· the

qualities

and

characteristics attributed to i t

To conceive such

distinction

in connexion

with the

Onlybegot

ten

and

the Spirit

in terms of

success

or

failure

of

virtue,

and consequently

to suppose

that

the

nature of

each

of them is necessarily defectible,

equally

receptive of opposites

and

lying

on

the

boundary between good and

i ts

opposite,

is

utterly

profane.

One

who

says

this

will

be

arguing that i t is

one thing

1n

i t s

own proper definition,

and

becomes something

else

by

participation in

good and

evil.

Thus

with

iron

it happens

that, i f

i t

associates for

a

long

time

with

fire, i t takes on

the

quality of

heat,

while remaining iron,

but

i

i t gets

into

snow

or

ice,

i t

changes i ts quality

towards

the

pre-

vailing influence, taking the

cold

of the

snow

into i ts

own

intimate parts.

285. Therefore, just as

we

do

not

give

the

material the name of

the quality

attributed to the

iron,

for

we do not call something

fire

or

water

because

l t

has

been

affected

by one

of

these, so

i

i t

be

granted that, as the

impious

argue, in

the

case of the

lifegiving power goodness

does

not

essentially inhere in i t but

that i t

is acquired

by participation, i t will no

longer

have the

right

to

be called by the t i t le •the gQOd• but

such

an under-

standing will

demand some

other

conception,

such

that

goodness is

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not

attributed

to i t eternally nor

is it

intrinsically

understood

to possess the nature of goodness but that the good sometimes

is

not in i t and sometimes

will

not be.

266.

f

good things come to

be by participation n wh.at is

better

then clearly

before

their

participation they were not such; and if when they were

something

else

they Cp.111

340Ml

were

tinged

with the

presence

of good then

surely

i

they

are

deprived

of

i t

they

will

be

reckoned someth.

ing

other

than

the

good.

And i

this is

maintained the divine nature

will

be understood

as

not so

much

a

provider of

good things

as

i tself

in need of a

benefactor.

267 .

How

can one

provide

another

with

what i t does not i tself

possess?

If then i t

has

i t

perfect-

ly

we

shall

envisage no falling short in perfection and it is

vain to argue for

what is less

in

what

is perfect.

f on the

other hand · participation in the good

is

deemed imperfect in them

and

in this respect they

speak

of the less

observe

the conse-

quence

that the

one

in this condition will not

be benefactor to

what

is inferior but

will

make efforts

to

fill

up what

i t

i tself

lacks

. Thus

according

to them

the

doctrine

of

providence

is

false

as are those of

providence

of

judgment

of the

dispen-

sation and

of

all the

things

which are held

to

have been done by

the

Onlybegot

ten

and

to

be done

eternally by

him

since he

is

apparently

busy attending

to his own goodness

and

neglects the

government

of the universe.

268 . If

this

idea were

to

prevail

that

the Lord

is

not

perfect

in

every

good

it is not

diff 1cult to

see

where

the

blasphemy

ends

up. Truly

the

faith of such persons is vain empty their preach-

ing

insubstantial their hopes whose substance comes with faith.

Why are

they

baptized into

Christ who

has no

power

of goodness

of

his

own? -

far

be

it

from

me

to

utter

such blasphemy. 289 .

And why do they believe

in

the

Holy

Spirit

i they

think

the same

things

about him?

How

can Cp.112l they

after their mortal birth

be

born again

by baptism when

on

their

view even

the

power the t

gives them

rebirth

does

not

possess indefectibility and

self-

sufficiency? How is the body of their

humiliation transformed

when they

think that the

one

who transforms

is him-

self

in

need

of

change

for the better

wanting yet another

to

transform even him? 290 . As

long as he

is in

the lesser state

since from the goodness of

hi .s

nature the superior naturally

implants in those inferior

a

ceaseless attraction to himself the

longing for

the

more

will

never

stop

but

as

desire

continually

stretches out

to what is

not yet achieved

what is

less will

always desire what is more and

will

continually be changed

into

what

is

greater and will never reech perfection since i t will

never get

to

the

end by embracing which

i t

will

ceese

i ts

ascent

.

291. Since

the First Good

is

infinite by nature the

perticipat1on

of the one which enjoys

i t

must also

perforce

be

infinite

ever

apprehending more and always discovering what exceeds the

apprehended and

never able to

draw level

with it since neither

can · what is

shared

be fathomed

nor

can what grows

by partic1-

pa tion

desist

.

292 . [341Ml Such

are

the blasphemies

which

erise

from

the

argument based on distinctions of goodness. But i they

apply

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111ore and l ss to them in terms of corporeal

concepts,

Cp.1I31 the

absurdity of the argument is at once generally granted, even

without

precise

examination of the detail . On this theory t

inevitably follows that qualities and dimensions, weights and

shapes,

and

all

those things

which

together

make up

the

account

of a physical

object,

should be included in the divine

nature.

And

where composition

is alleged, there surely i t

must be conceded

there is

dissolution of the

composite.

293. These

and

sillilar

things

are established by the doctrinal absurdity, which dares to

allege

lesser and superior in the

sizeless

and incomparable, as

our account

has

indicated by tailing some of

the

many points; i t

would e

difficult to expose

here

l l the

guile hidden in

the

doc-

trine.

But even a few

statements

will equally well demonstrate

the absurdity of what is claimed in the

sequence

of blasphemy.

XXIII,294-316 The teaching o the

fai th

is not

unattested, being

supported by sa-tptural testiaonies

294. t is for us now to proceed with the next stage of the argu-

ment, after some slight further definitions have been added in

support of our doctrine. Since the

divine testimony

is a sure test

of truth in any

doctrine,

I think it would be as well also

to

con-

firm our word

too with

the words of God.

295 ·

We

know

these differences

in

the distinction

of

beings, f irs t

the one which ls f irst in our

apprehension,

I mean the

sensible,

and next the one perceived by the mind through

the

leading

of

sensible things,

which

we

say

is

intelligible

.

e

also

accepted

another further distinction of

the

intelligible , which divides it

into created and

uncreated

. e decided that the Holy Trinity

belongs to

the uncreated

nature, and whatever is mentioned, exists

and Cp.1 Ul has a name besides the Trinity belongs

to

the

created.

296. So that

our

definition

may not stand unsupported, but secured

by

the

testimonies of

Scripture, we

shall add one

thing to

what

has been

said:

that the Lord was not

created,

but came forth from

the

Father, as

the

Divine

Word

himself in person attests in the

Gospel


6/6

must not heed

the

argument. 299. They do not even

provide

proofs

that

it

is entirely necessary to refer this

text

to the Lord.

Heither Cp.1151 will they

be

able

show the meaning of

the

saying

on

the basis

of

the

Hebrew

scripture

supporting

this inter-

pretation,

since the

other

translators give eitesato

(obtained>

and

ka

testesen are sayings of certain persons

which contain a connotation somewhat

deeper

than

the

obvious

meaning, such that in no way could the idea that the Lord has

been created suggest i tself from these words

to

those

who think

piously,

especially to

those

instructed by the clear voice of the

Evangelist, who Cp.1161 says that all things

that have

come

to

be

have come

to be through

him and are constituted in him.

For •All

things , he says, came to be through him, and without him came

to

be

not

one

thing

that

has

come

to

be

in

him

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