ARTICLE

Cyber Defence in Focus: EnemiesNear and Far – or Just Behind theFirewall: The Case for Knowledge

Management

ROGER DARBY

The management of information and knowledge in the defence sectorstands at an interesting juncture. A key dilemma facing the defence sectoris, on one hand, identifying and effectively using the increasing potentialof technical interoperability; on the other hand, the need for newmanagement practices to be juxtaposed with the escalating global chal-lenge to security involving the rise of cyber crime, cyber espionage and in theextreme, cyber warfare. Indeed, the concept of the ‘5th Domain’ hasalready entered the lexicon of defence information and knowledge man-agement (KM) involving land, sea, air, space and now cyberspace with gov-ernments increasingly identifying their digital infrastructure as a strategicnational asset that needs to be fully protected. The scope of the subjectand the necessity for action can be further underscored by recent evi-dence to show potential vulnerability where nine tenths of Internet traveltransits through fibre-optic cables bunched into 16 chokepoints for exam-ple around New York, the Red Sea and the Luzon Strait in SE Asia withInternet traffic directed by just 13 clusters of vulnerable domain-nameservers.1 This has also been compounded by recent statements bythe head of GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters)alluding to continued cyber attacks on British private-sector firms and

Roger Darby PhD, Centre for Defence Management and Leadership, CranfieldUniversity, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham, UK. Email: r.darby@cranfield.ac.uk

Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, (December 2012), pp. 523–538ISSN 1470-2436http://www.tandfonline.comhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2012.745964 � 2012 Taylor & Francis

government institutions to access valuable intellectual capital (IC) andimportant strategic defence information.

Undoubtedly, the future presents many challenges for cyber-man-agement and its effect on the defence sector. For example, the exponen-tial growth of poorly managed developing countries being connected tofibre-optic cables and the expansion of mobile Internet will potentiallycreate more opportunities for cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism. To sup-port this view, a contemporary example of a state penetrating cyber net-works to steal and manipulate data is well documented in Estonia in2007 and Georgia in 2008 where government, media, military websitesand telephone lines were jammed by, allegedly, Russia’s cyber attackssparking what has been termed ‘Web War 1’. This has prompted com-mentators to note that potential enemy states are no longer on the otherside of the ocean but just behind the firewall.

However, any discussion on the contentious topic of managingdefence in cyberspace leads many to the accusation of scaremongeringon the part of ‘securocrats’. Is this accusation well founded? Or is thewarning prescient and requires a proactive approach on the behalf ofthe defence sector to counter real and transparent threats?

Information and Knowledge Management in the Defence Sector

Within the defence sector over the last ten years challenges to the man-agement and use of information has created considerable change. Thishad been driven by for example, operations in Iraq, Afghanistan andlately, Libya; as well as the need for increased inter-agency workingthrough more cooperation and collaboration with other governmentdepartments, private defence industries and various allies.

Concomitantly, knowledge superiority (KS) in defence has long beenan aspiration as well as a practical necessity in the increasingly complexmodern military involving: command, control, computers communica-tions, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR). Indeed KS is akey enabler to more specific planning and operational effectiveness goalsin for example, Effects Based Operations, and Network Centric War-fare. Yet the globalisation of the battlespace connected to combined andjoint operations is adding changing pressures on the modern militarywhilet for example, the increasing global profile of peacekeeping andsecurity sector reform adds greater complexity to the management ofrelevant, up-to-date information and knowledge. This it can be argued,prompts the need for situational awareness that encourages decisionmaking to be more attuned to information and knowledge beyond the

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immediate battlespace moving from a kinetic to one that is a moreinformation-centric approach; while maintaining a constant need todeliver resource efficiencies. Indeed, the latest Defence Information Vision2,highlights four enduring, key benefits from this vision to support themanagement of the increasingly complex cyber defence space:

Improved Effectiveness – Outputs are better when they are enabledby improvedinformation flows;

Agility –Information can be accessed and manipulated whenever andwhereverrequired subject to affordability and security constraints;

Efficiency – Operational and their supporting processes are moreefficient, both because information flows through them better, andManagement Information is available to govern them;

Compliance – Comply with legal and cross-Government obligations,so that they can focus on resources supporting operations, while main-taining the Departmental reputation.

However, achieving advanced interoperability between forces andtheir command structures to increase situational awareness and opera-tional tempo while also managing increasing scarce resource more effi-ciently is demanding especially as most systems were historicallydeveloped as ‘stovepipe’ projects. Interoperability is not a binary phe-nomenon, it is a sliding scale of sending and receiving shared data,sending and receiving data in a form different from the original,through sending and receiving knowledge. Of course, informationassurance is critically important, as is having the time to process it.

It is axiomatic that sense-making, problem-solving and decision-making are more complex and more vital in military situations than everbefore. New technologies have resulted in increasingly dynamic, unpre-dictable and complex operations that require people to filter and analyseinformation from multiple sources. Concomitantly, know-how, exper-tise and interoperability are equally important key factors in a defencesector organisation’s ability to create knowledge superiority. Commandand control is taking on new dimensions and the role of military per-sonnel is evolving some would suggest, into knowledge workers3. For, asit can be argued, as organisations gain access to even more advancedtechnology the impetus behind successful global organisations (includ-ing those in the defence sector) to maintain competitive advantage ismoving more towards the development of knowledgeable employees(and multi-level and multi-cultural relationships).

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Furthermore, the MoD in the UK, along with other importantdepartments of state, face the increasing affects of economic stringencyIn particular in the defence sector, it also continues to face majorchange initiatives that are currently being implemented and are creatingchallenging consequences. Indeed, the recent strategic defence and secu-rity review (SDSR) suggested that although information was seen as astrategic asset and crucial to delivering military capability to enhancesuccess in both the battle and business spaces, nevertheless, informationis arbitrarily defined, inconsistently gathered and inadequately achieved.This is further added to by recent statements in MOD Information Strat-egy commenting that: ‘Defence must change behaviours to recognise thevalue of information (and knowledge?) and treat it as an asset.’4

More critically, it could be argued, on the whole military-type mod-els are not designed to model human performance, human interfaces,or cognitive aspects of group work. Instead they capture how much, nothow well, the humans are supported by information technology (IT).Therefore, military-type systems can be seen as being of use in repre-senting information flows, rather than knowledge flows, sense-makingor advance thinking about situational awareness, such as culturalinterpretation.

However, any discussion of KM in the defence sector raises thequestion of whether such generic KM models also apply in the militarycontext. Such searching questions need to be addressed whether KM isinherently different in the defence context from that in the civilian andbusiness worlds. However, research interestingly suggests KM in defencevaries not in premises or theory but in terms of context, content andpace.5

Knowledge Management versus Information Management

As a starting point, the role of KM in defence highlights the differencebetween information management (IM) and KM which needs to beaddressed. Girard argues that the distinction between IM and KM mustbe made as many people believe that they are synonymous.6 IM can beseen as the recording of explicit knowledge while many believe thatKM is much more than recording of information and involves the‘dynamic of KM’ concerning the creation, capture and transfer ofknowledge. Therefore, any discussion of KM raises the question of defi-nition. Rumizen defines KM as: ‘...The systematic processes by whichknowledge needed for an organization to succeed are created, captured,shared and leveraged’.7

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While Collison and Parcell suggest that KM: ‘is about capturing,creating, distilling, sharing and using know-how.’8

Further, Frappaolo also supports the distinction between the twoterms arguing that whilst both IM and KM are important that the dis-tinction must be clearly understood: ‘...the primary repository forknowledge is people’s heads (at least until we agree that machines haveintelligence). Electronic and paper-based ‘knowledge repositories,’ thenare merely intermediate storage points for information en route betweenpeople’s heads.’9

This quote introduces the idea that there is a difference between the‘information’ stored or written down to the evolution of what happensto that same ‘information’ when it enters a person’s head. This differ-ence highlights the important distinction between ‘explicit and implicit(tacit)’ knowledge respectively. For Polanyi, the distinction betweenexplicit and tacit knowledge is also crucial to understand: Explicit knowl-edge – codified knowledge that can be recorded. Tacit knowledge – under-stood, implied and exists without being stated, often informal anddifficult to capture (codify) or share.10 Harnessing both explicit and tacitknowledge is an increasing and necessary challenge to support organisa-tional knowledge creation for it is suggested that when explicit and tacitknowledge interact innovation occurs.11 This in turn prompts the viewthat organisational knowledge creation requires first, an acknowledge-ment of the importance and necessity for KM and second, understand-ing and managing the cyclical process involving:

(1) Socialisation – this occurs when knowledge is learned by osmo-sis when one individual shares tacit knowledge with another.When one learns from another by observation and spending timewith another and is socialised into the norms. This type ofknowledge is difficult to codify and store and therefore is noteasily transferrable – but is essential to the organisation. This istacit to tacit knowledge transfer.

(2) Combination – for example the collation of information in theform of facts and figures into an over-arching report. Explicitdata is collected, synthesised and becomes more explicit knowl-edge. This is explicit to explicit knowledge transfer and it is argued thatthis type of knowledge transfer does not add real knowledgevalue to the organisation.

(3) Externalisation – when an individual can articulate the knowl-edge that they have learned and transfer it to others then this is

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tacit to explicit knowledge transfer. This type of transfer is essential toan organisation’s success as it achieves the difficult goal of trans-ferring tacit to explicit knowledge.

(4) Internalisation – this process involves transferring explicitknowledge into tacit knowledge. This occurs when new explicitknowledge (such as doctrine or policy) is internalised by indi-viduals and their own values, ethos and beliefs are embeddedwithin this new explicit knowledge. This then becomes tacitknowledge and becomes embedded within the individual andorganisation.

The importance of tacit knowledge and its creation, capture andtransfer is acknowledged within the KM field. It is suggested that oneof the fundamental aims of utilising KM is to understand the impor-tance of tacit knowledge and have the skills and tools to convert tacit

TACIT

TACIT

SOCIALIZATION

- Sharing

experiences

- On Job Training

- Battlefield Studies

1

EXTERNALIZATION

- After action review

- Lessons learned

- War diaries

3 EXPLICIT

INTERNALIZATION

- Learning by doing

- Experience

- Values/ethos

4

COMBINATION

- Strategy

- Doctrine

- Tactics/SOPs

2

EXPICIT

FIGURE 1. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENTSource: Adapted from I. Nonaka, R. Toyama, and T. Hirata, Managing Flow: AProcess Theory of the Knowledge-Based Firm (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2008).

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knowledge into explicit knowledge.12 Indeed, this has recently beenacknowledged in the MoD Defence Knowledge Strategy13 which recog-nises that it is important to understand the difference between tacit andexplicit knowledge. It must be noted that the DKS paper does not usethe same terminology but refers to knowledge being made up of threemain types, embodied (in individuals), embedded (in processes and ways ofworking) and represented (in documents, manuals etc.). Therefore, it can beargued that a fundamental strategy for successful KM must be to be ableto create and extract tacit knowledge from the people within anorganisation (i.e.UK MoD).

KM can also be seen to be rooted in practice, action and social rela-tionships with an important interplay between the individual and collec-tive levels in an organisation.14 More specifically from a defenceperspective, Girard) defines Defence Knowledge Management as:...thecreation and sharing of knowledge within Defence.’15

Girard also references defence policies that link KM with improvingperformance and investment in intellectual capital. In short, the reasonsgiven for the requirement for KM within the MoD is now arguablyrecognised in the upper echelons of the ministry. However, interest-ingly the recent Joint Service Publication (JSP 747) entitled ‘Informa-tion Management Protocols’ makes no reference to ‘Knowledge’ and isall about ‘Information’ Management.

Many commentators argue that KM is a key asset in organisationsand when utilised successfully is a major contributor to organisationalsuccess. 16Furthermore that a sound framework, well thought out poli-cies and the managed implementation of KM produces a valuablesource for competitive advantage. This view is supported by manydefence analysts, particularly from the US17, Australia18) and Canada19

who are strong advocates of KM and support the view that it is a funda-mental tool in the modern business and battle spaces (and by associa-tion, it could be argued, the cyber space). Furthermore, in the challengingeconomic climate that defence now faces (and with an even more aus-tere future to manage) it could be argued it is essential that KM policiesand practices are implemented effectively – especially in organisationswhere for example, the high churn of staff is leading to a large amountof valuable (tacit) knowledge leaving the organisation (i.e. UK MoD).

The Production and Application of Knowledge

A key issue in this discussion is to raise the debate and spotlight onhow knowledge is managed in the defence sector; and further, to focus

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on practices of knowing and the ways in which such practices might bemore effectively managed rather than just seeing knowledge as a dis-crete, objective entity. The emphasis in this research is on knowledge associally constructed and inherently embedded in practice. Therefore,knowledge is defined in ‘dynamic’ terms rather than something static orobjective. The process of knowing is as important as knowledge itself andis inextricably linked. A comparison of the two key perspectives can beseen in Table 1:

What the two perspectives highlight is a contrast or challenge to theessence of knowledge in the defence sector – the challenge of the dialectic.On the one hand, KM is seen as a static, discrete cognitive entity, exist-ing objectively at the individual and collective levels. On the otherhand, KM is seen as dynamic, ever-changing, reliant on an acknowledg-ment and utilisation of tacit knowledge which can be transferredthrough participation in social networks, and evolving with a strong linkto situational awareness.

These contrasting views of the KM process can be further high-lighted in Table 2.

These two contrasting approaches to KM in defence can be seenwhere on the one hand the cognitive model adopts an information-processing view where valuable knowledge located in individuals or insuccessful organisational practices is identified, captured and processedso that it can be applied in new contexts. The aim is to make the knowl-edge widely available with the idea to ‘stockpile employees’ knowledge’(i.e. capture) and make it accessible to others via a searchable

TABLE 1. THE STRUCTURAL AND PROCESSUAL PERSPECTIVES OF TYPESOF KNOWLEDGE.

Structural Perspective Processual Perspective

Knowledge is a discrete cognitive entitythat people and organisations possess

Knowledge is rooted in practice, action andsocial relationships

Knowledge is objective and static Knowledge is dynamic, the process of knowingis important as knowledge

Knowledge exists at the individual andcollective level

Knowledge exists through the interplay betweenthe individual and the collective level

Different types of knowledge dominatein particular types of organisation

Organisations can be characterised by differenttypes of knowledge and practices of knowing

Knowledge is created via specific socialprocesses

Knowing occurs via social processes

Source: S. Newell, M. Robertson, H. Scarbrough and J. Swan, Managing KnowledgeWork (London. Palgrave 2002).

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application).20 Here, crucial to this model is the role of technology andfor example, the use of the intranet to enable effective knowledge shar-ing. Alternatively, organisational theorists emphasise the need to under-stand knowledge as also embedded in, constructed from and throughsocial relationships and interactions.21 For them, knowledge (unlike data)cannot simply be processed but is continuously recreated and reconsti-tuted through dynamic, interactive and social networking.22 The empha-sis is put on the importance of relationships, shared understandings andattitudes to knowledge formation and sharing.23

Furthermore, the community model suggests it is fairly easy to shareknowledge between individuals who are relatively homogeneous butextremely difficult in globally distributed collaboration where the indi-viduals have heterogeneous beliefs and values, as in for example, across-cultural situation involving a multinational peacekeeping role.Therefore it could be argued, for organisations that adopt a more domi-nant cognitive, information-processing approach it can lead to a failureto take into account the pre-existing organisational structures, normsand cultural values (both professional, organisational and national) thatlead different groups to have divergent and often conflicting views, ofwhat needs to be done and how to do it.24 Conversely, the adoption ofa community model stresses the need for an understanding that

TABLE 2. TWO CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT(KM) PROCESS.

Cognitive model Community model

Knowledge is equal to objectively definedconcepts and facts

Knowledge is socially constructed and basedon experience

Knowledge can be codified and transferredthrough text: information systems have acrucial role

Knowledge can be tacit and is transferredthrough participation in social networksincluding occupational groups and teams

Gains from KM include exploitation throughthe recycling of existing knowledge

Gains through KM include exploitationthrough the sharing and synthesis ofknowledge among social groups andcommunities

The primary function of KM is to codifyand capture knowledge

The primary function of KM is to encourageknowledge sharing through networking

The critical success factor is technology The critical success factor is trust andcollaboration

The dominant metaphors are the humanmemory and the jigsaw (fitting pieces ofknowledge together to produce a biggerpicture in predictable ways)

The dominant metaphors are humancommunity and the kaleidoscope (creativeinteractions producing new knowledge insometimes unpredictable ways)

Source: S. Newell, M. Robertson, H. Scarbrough and J. Swan, Managing KnowledgeWork (London. Palgrave 2002).

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knowledge has to be continuously negotiated through interactive socialnetworks with an emphasis on dialogue rather than linear informationflows. Such dialogue also necessitates among other key factors, anunderstanding of the various cultural nuances and differences that affectthe mediation of the KM process. Further, in direct relation to defence,KM challenges and can be seen to supersede the traditional ‘commandand control’ military culture structures for it to be effective.

To develop these views one step further, by implication, this alsodenotes a change not only in application but also in the production ofknowledge. This distinctive change can be seen in Table 3:

The contrast in knowledge production between Modes 1 and 2shown in Table 3 mirrors the dynamic of knowledge management in theknowledge economy. It highlights the necessity for defence organisa-tions to change the way knowledge is produced at the point of applica-tion and be acknowledged as transdisciplinary – and as also posited inthis paper, it needs to acknowledge a transcultural dimension. Theseclearly have connotations for organisational structure design, manage-ment style and practices, and performance management.26 This can beevidenced in cyberspace, with increasing necessity for flexible produc-tion processes requiring higher levels of information about force needs,changing global strategic power, interoperability, quality control, etc.27

All of which are mediated by cross-organisational cultural filters (i.e.Army, Navy, Air Force) in the dynamic of knowledge creation, captureand transfer.28

Communities of Practice

To support the overall aim stated in the latest MoD Information Strategy(2011) of the importance of ‘collaboration’, the use of communities of

TABLE 3. MODES 1 AND 2 KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION.

Mode 1 Knowledge production Mode 2 Knowledge production

Problems defined by academics and professionalcommunities

Knowledge produced in context ofapplication

Disciplinary knowledge Transdisciplinary knowledge Transculturaldimension

Homogeneity HeterogeneityHierarchical and stable organisations Heterarchical and transient organisationsQuality control by ‘invisible college’ Socially accountable and reflexive

Source: Adapted from Gibbons et al. (1994)25

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practice (CoPs) to support the application of KM in the defence sector,can be highlighted. MoD Information Strategy defines collaborationas: ‘. . .working together, it connects people, information, data and pro-cesses across organisational and national boundaries. The ultimate aim isincreased end-to-end operational effectiveness – i.e. from ‘factory tofoxhole’- so that information can be exploited to its full extent.29

This requires an understanding on the part of organisations like theMoD that it is not simply enough to invest in for example, moresophisticated intranets and document databases alone. It has been arguedthroughout that the most valuable knowledge assets still reside in peopleand one of the best ways to access these is through formal and informalnetworks of people and communities of practice. This needs to bealigned with what a number of authors have described as, the develop-ment and sustainability of the ‘organisational memory’.30 When discussingorganisational as well as individual learning, research has hypothesisedthat the process is not about the accumulation of knowledge in a startto finish manner or by traditionally structured methods. It is argued thatthe majority of learning is far more a social process that involves theinteraction of a group, or groups, of people with similar passions orinterests, interacting on a regular basis, and exchanging everyday experi-ences leading to a much more meaningful knowledge for all partici-pants. Such CoPs can be inter and intra-organisational as well as basedlocally, nationally and internationally. Research has demonstrated howsuch CoPs can provide a range of benefits through greater synergiesincluding better and faster innovation, reduced time-to-objective andimproved operational efficiencies.31

The advantage to defence is that the configuration and dynamics ofCoPs are not prescribed and can take many forms and may be formally orinformally organised and participants may come from all areas of theorganisation or its stakeholders. CoPs do not have vertical power struc-tures and all members of CoPs have an equal voice often leading to asense of well-being and value for participants. The fundamental elementof a CoP is to bring participants with common goals and thought pro-cesses together, to engage and create the added value for learning andtherefore knowledge accumulation and transfer. CoPs are distinguishedfrom other groups and communities by having three distinct and uniquequalities (Wenger 2008, Collinson and Parcell, 2004).32 These are:

� The domain – CoPs are more than a collective or network ofpeople sharing ideas on a subject – the participants have a realinterest or passion in the subject and therefore have a

533CYBER DEFENCE IN FOCUS

commitment to and identity with the community. They have a‘domain’ of interest.

� The community – relationships are built and nurtured within theCoP by interaction and collective participation facilitating acreative and innovative learning environment. This collaborativeinteraction creates the ‘community’.

� The practice – over time, within a CoP the participants developshared ideas, values, resources and experiences that enable thegroup to establish common working practices to address problemsor tackle issues efficiently. The CoP participants become ‘practitioners’.

It is suggested the knowledge benefits realised by CoPs are not con-fined to the participants of the CoPs ()33 since the ‘social capital’ ()34

generated within these groups leads to fundamental changes in thebehaviour of organisations. It is argued that this behavioural changecontributes to the organisation becoming a learning organisation whichinvolves absorptive capacity ()35 and the CoP is a critical element in thisprocess.

As discussed earlier, this is not to downgrade the critical role IT hasplayed in developing and expanding the capabilities and reach of CoPs.Technology enables real time or asynchronous activity and the use ofmore sophisticated software applications effectively contribute toincreased learning of the individual and the organisation.36 However,defence institutions face many challenges to bring the effective use ofCoPs about. One of which, is the acknowledgement and managementof service culture as a key mediator in the CoP process. For it is sug-gested, CoPs need to be approached differently in each cultural setting.It may not be reasonable to expect close relationships between servicepersonnel to form in and across all services. Further, in many defenceinstitutions CoPs may only be effective as vehicles for information andexplicit knowledge exchange rather than the more meaningful tacitknowledge transfer. However, there is undoubtedly a strong argumentto be made that CoPs directly contribute to more effective, agile andflexible KM involving the knowledge capital of an organisation and, assuggested in this paper, can enhance the efficiency, effectiveness andultimately the service of an organisation like the MoD.

Conclusion and Discussion

In conclusion, this exploratory paper has argued as the world enters thesecond decade of the 21st century the management of information and

534 DEFENCE STUDIES

knowledge in the defence sector is at a challenging juncture. Key dilem-mas were highlighted that are facing the defence sector which identifiedchallenges to the effective use and the increasing potential of technicalinteroperability. However, there is the suggestion that the CabinetOffice, Office of Cyber Security (OCS); GCHQ’s Cyber SecurityOperations Centre (CSOC): and the Cyber & Influence Science &Technology Centre have yet to gain ‘criticality’. This has been exacer-bated by four key factors: the economic downturn; the lack of skilledCyber-practitioners nationally and in government; a view that institu-tions have approached Cyber reluctantly; and vested interests that maypreclude Cyber-organisations succeeding. These overarching key factorsit was argued can be juxtaposed with the need for new managementpractices to manage escalating global challenges to security from thedamaging potential of cyber warfare. As a consequence, evidence suggestsgovernments are belatedly becoming more aware of the value and alsothe possible paucity of their digital infrastructure as a strategic nationalasset that needs protection from outside forces.

This paper has argued that such threats to the defence sector fromcyberspace challenge existing paradigms for managing information andknowledge and suggested a more radical approach to gaining knowledgesuperiority is both timely and crucial to remain fully prepared for everyeventuality in the ever changing global security sector. Indeed the abilityto manage uncertainty will become even more important given that forexample, deterrence in cyber warfare is more uncertain than in saynuclear strategy given there is no mutually assured destruction guaran-teed. Of course, the military face a truism in that the Internet wasdesigned for convenience and reliability, not for security. Any moves torestrict or overly control its use could be construed as a challenge toprotected freedom of information and human rights.

However, the potential damage to strategic defence and the widereconomic environment from cyber mismanagement is unsettlinglyunnerving in the future and therefore needs to be addressed from apractical, as well as a doctrinaire standpoint.

The discussion led on to the important distinction between informa-tion and knowledge management and the implications for practice. Itwas argued that KM principles can be applied to situational awareness,sense-making and decision-making in the military context. Here, thedynamic of KM involving knowledge creation, capture and transference wasimportant to highlight. This is not only in terms of content but also inrelation to process issues. The production, practice and process perspec-tives on knowledge have also been advocated to add a focus on processes

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or practices of knowing. To develop these views one step further, by impli-cation, this also connotes a change not only in application but also in theproduction of knowledge. Further, what the two perspectives highlight isa contrast or challenge to the essence of knowledge in the defence sec-tor – the challenge of the dialectic. It was posited that, this requires anunderstanding on the part of organisations like the MoD that it is notsimply enough to invest in for example, more sophisticated intranetsand document databases alone. It has been argued throughout this arti-cle that the most valuable knowledge assets still reside in MoD person-nel and one of the more effective ways to access these is through formaland informal networks of people and communities of practice. Theimportance of CoPs was highlighted as a useful aid to linking the keyissues of the production and application of knowledge within the widerdefence environment. However, it was noted that such communitiescan challenge existing service culture, formal hierarchies and traditionalstovepipe designs which need to be managed in a different manner ifeffective and efficient KM is to be utilised when managingcyber-defence in the increasingly complex and challenging defenceenvironment of the 21st century.

Finally, this paper has put a case in general, for placing KM at thecentrality of all aspects of defence management but particularly in rela-tion to cyber defence. It has argued for a re-focus in the MoD due tochanging strategic defence and economic needs from being morekinetic-centric to more information-centric. This in turn connotesacknowledging that the key knowledge asset resides primarily in MoDpersonnel and that requires adopting a more people-centric managementapproach. Further, this suggests a new management paradigm isrequired for using knowledge and information more effectively and effi-ciently in the defence sector. An approach ‘fit for purpose’ to providemore agility, flexibility and which complies more succinctly withgovernment obligations and objectives.

Notes1 The Economist, ‘War in the fifth domain’ (July 2010) pp.25–7.2 MoD Information Strategy 2011: Better Informed, Better Defence, <www.mod.uk/Defence-Internet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/ModInformati-onStrategymodis.htm>.

3 P. Adler, ‘The Future of Critical Management Studies: A Paleo-Marxist Critique ofLabour Process Theory’, Organization Studies 28 (2007) pp.1313–45; W.Starbuck, ‘Learningby Knowledge-Intensive Firms’ , Journal of Management Studies 29 (1992) pp.713–40.

4 MoD Information Strategy 2011 (note 2) p.8.

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5 B.Waruszynski, The Knowledge Revolution: A Literature Review, DRDC HQ tr-2000-02,September 2000.

6 J. Girard, ‘Defence Knowledge Management: A Passing Fad’, Canadian Military Journal,Summer 2004.

7 C.M. Rumizen, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Knowledge Management (Washington DC:Alpha Publishing 2002) p.35.

8 C. Collison. and G. Parcell, Learning to Fly. Practical Knowledge Management from Leadingand Learning Organizations (Chichester, UK: Capstone Publishing 2004) p.24.

9 C.Frappaolo, Knowledge Management (Chichester, UK: Capstone Publishing 2006) p.75.10 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962).11 L. Prusak, ‘The Knowledge Advantage’, Planning Review 24/2 (1996) pp.6–8; I. Nonaka

and H. Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create theDynamics of Innovation (Oxford: OUP 1995).

12 Allee 2002.13 MoD Defence Knowledge Strategy (2010).14 L. Stroh and P. Caligiuri, ‘Increasing global competitiveness through effective people

management’, Journal of World Business 33/1 (1998) pp.1–16; T. Davenport and L. Prusak,Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know (Boston, MA: HarvardBusiness School Press 1998); L. Thurow, ‘The rise and fall of the brain power’, IndustryWeek 246/11 (1997) pp.114–17; E. Lank, ‘Leveraging invisible assets: the human factor’,Long Range Planning 3/3 (1997) pp.406–12.

15 Girard (note 6) p.63.16 K. M. Bartol and Srivastava, A., ‘Encouraging Knowledge Sharing: The Role of Organi-

zational Reward Systems’, Journal of Leadership and Organization Studies 9/1 (2002);B. Marr,O. Gupta, S. Pike, and G. Roos, ‘Intellectual Capital and Knowledge ManagementEffectiveness’, Management Decision 41/8 (2003) pp.771–81; Allee 1997; S. Debowski,Knowledge Management (Wilton, Australia: Wiley 2006); P. Probst, B. Raub, and C. Rom-hardt, Managing Knowledge Building Blocks for Success (Chichester, UK: Wiley 1998).

17 Sloan, E. 2000 ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’. Directorate of Strategic Analysis,Department of National Defence, Canada.

18 Morrison, J., and Slay, J. (2000) Does Knowledge Management Theory Support the Achievementof Knowledge Superiority in Defence? AJIS: Australia Special edition. December 2007.

19 Girard (note 6).20 B. Cole-Gomolski, ‘Users loathe to share their know-how’, Computerworld 31/46 (1997)

p.6.21 Nonaka and Takeuchi (note 11); F. Blackler, ‘Knowledge, knowledge work and organiza-

tions: an overview and interpretation’, Organizational Studies 16/6 (1995)pp.1021–46.22 Stroh and Caliguiri (note 14); Davenport and Prusak (note 14).23 F. Kofman, and P. Senge, Communities and commitment: the heart of learning organisa-

tions. Organizational Dynamics 22/2 (1993) pp.5–22.24 R. Darby, E. Herboltzheimer, and C. Van Winkelan, ‘The Impact of National Cultures

on Acceptance of Knowledge Management Approaches’, Henley Working Papers, HWP0807 (2008): Van Wijk, R., Jansen, J. and Lyles, M. 2008 ‘Inter- and intra-organizationalknowledge transfer: A meta-analytic review and assessment of its antecedents and conse-quences’. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 830–53.

25 Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwarzman, S., Scott, P. and Trow (1994)‘The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Con-temporary Societies’. London: Sage.

26 Bartol and Srivastiva (note 16).27 C. Solomon, ‘Return on Investment’, Workforce 2/4 (Global Workforce Supplement)

(1997) pp.12–=-18; Mendenhall, M., Punnet, B. and Ricks, D. 1995 ‘Global Manage-ment’. Cambridge, MA: Prusak (note 11).

28 R. Foley, S. Griffin, and H. McCartney, ‘Transformation in contact: learning the lessonsof modern war’, International Affairs 87/2 (2011), 253–70.

29 MoD Information Strategy (note 2).

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30 J. Cornelissen, ‘Beyond compare: metaphor in organization theory’, Academy of Manage-ment Review, 30 (2005) pp.751–64; J. Cornelissen, ‘Metonymy in language about organiza-tions: a corpus-based study of company names’, Journal of Management Studies 45 (2008)pp.79–99; V. Anand, C. Manz, and W.Glick ‘An organizational memory approach toinformation management’, Academy of Management Review, 23 (1998) pp.796–809; A.Alderson, ‘The Army’s Brain: A Historical Perspective on Doctrine and Development’,British Army Review, No. 150 (Winter 2010) pp.60–4; J.Walsh and G. Ungson, ‘Organiza-tional memory’, Academy of Management Review 16 (1991) pp.57–91; E. Wenger, Communi-ties of Practice, Meaning and Identiity (Cambridge: CUP 1998); E. Wenger, ‘Communities ofPractice and social learning systems’, Organization 7 (2000) pp.224–5.

31 E. Wenger, R. McDermott, and W. Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice. (Boston,MA: Harvard Business School Publishing 2002); J. Lave and E.Wenger, Situated Learning:Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge: CUP 1991); Wenger 1998 (note 29).

32 Wenger, E. 2000 ‘Communities of practice and social learning systems’. Organization, 7(2): 225–46. Collison and Parcell (note 8).

33 D. Garvin, ‘Building a Learning Organization’, Harvard Business Review (July–Aug.1993)pp.78–91;Lave and Wenger (note 30).

34 I. Nahapiet and S.Ghoshal ‘Social capital, intellectual capital and the organizationaladvantage’, Academy of Management Review 23/2 (1998) pp.242–66.

35 U. Lichtenhaler and E. Lichtenhaler, ‘ A capability-based framework for open innovation:complementing absorptive capacity’, Journal of Management Studies 46 (2009) pp.1315–38;.H.Volberda, N. Foss, and M. Lyles, ‘Absorbing the concept of absorptive capacity: Howto realize its potential in the organization field’, Organization Science (2009); P. Senge, TheFifth Dimension: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organisation (London. Random House2006); Starbuck (note 3).

36 E. Fontainha, and P. Leary-Gannon, Communities of Practice and virtual learningcommunities: benefits, barriers and success factors. [/www.elearningpapers.eu/ No. 5(Sept. 2007)].

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