PREAMBLE Latin – Preambulare: “To walk before.”

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Preamble is not a part of the Constitutions nor a source of rights. But it can certainly be referred to in knowing the aims or purposes of the Constitutions. 

VALUE OF PREAMBLE

It contains the origin and the purpose of the constitution. The preamble of the Philippine Constitution gives the spirit behind the constitution as well as its broad outline. It states the authors of the Constitution, for whom it has been promulgated, the general purposes which are to be achieved as well as the basic principles in the fundamental charter. It also serves as an aid in determining the meaning of the provisions in the constitution (De Leon, 2005).

The meaning of each point:

Sovereign means Filipinos are independent people who can exercise supreme or permanent authority in their nation. The Filipinos have the ultimate power to rule in their country. Imploring means the Filipinos are begging for help or mercy.Just means the Philippine society should be guided by fairness, reason, and truth.Humane society means a society with tenderness, compassion, and sympathy for people.Embody means to express and organize.Ideals means  a standard of perfection or excellence.Aspirations means strong desire.Patrimony (pa-truh-moh-nee)  means the properties or qualities we inherited from our ancestors, our heritage. Posterity means the succeeding or future generations, our descendants.Regime means system or rules or simply, government. Ordain means to enact or establish by law. Promulgate means to proclaim formally or put into operation. 

ARTICLE II – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Article II sets down basic social and political creed of the country, particularly the implementation of the constitution and sets fort the objectives of the government. Some of its provisions are

• Philippines is a Democratic and Republican State (Section 1)• Renunciation of War (Section 2)• Supremacy of Civilian Authority (Section 3)• Prime duty of the government (Section 4)• Defense of the State and Services to be rendered by the Citizens (Section 4)• Separation of church and state (Section 6)• Independent Philippine Foreign Policy (Section 7)• Freedom from Nuclear Weapon (Section 8)• Just and Dynamic Social order and Social Justice (Section 9 and 10)• Family as the Basic Autonomous Unit (Section 12)• Role of the Youth and Women in Nation-Building (Section 13 and 14)• The affirmation of labor "as a primary social economic force" (Section 14)• Autonomy of local governments (Section 25)

• Prohibition of Political dynasty and adoption of measures against graft and corruption (Section 26 and 27)

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE STATE

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

The Constitution establishes the Philippines as a "democratic and republican State", where "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them".

WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC? WHAT IS REPUBLICAN

REPUBLIC: Representative government, a government run by and for the people. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation.

- Representatives chosen by the people, and its government officials hold and discharge their position as public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, “at all times be accountable to the people” they are sworn to serve.

DEMOCRACY: Essentially government by the people.

-It provides for people’s recall, initiative and referendum, and also the right to information on public concern.

- People can now directly propose and enact law or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body and even directly propose amendments to the Constitution on initiative.

WHAT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT

Article 2, Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Our Constitution clearly articulates that it is the prime duty of the government to serve and protect its people.

The provision is based upon the inherent right of every State to existence of self-preservation. A State may take up all necessary action, including the use of arm force, to repel any threat to its security.

RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

The right to bear arms is a statutory, not a constitutional right. The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power. The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties

CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO , 431 SCRA 534 [G.R. NO. 157036] (JUNE 9, 2004)

FACTS: The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Evidently,

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possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, thus right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.

Acting on President Arroyo’ directive in her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.

Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents.

The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and contends that (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the citizens’ right to bear arms is constitutional right

HELD: The Right To Bear Arms Cannot Be Classified As Fundamental Under the 1987 PhilippineConstitution. The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution.Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, thus right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.

Petitioner’s assertion that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his “vested property right” without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law is unmeritorious. The test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority.

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.

At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR which the Court believes to be reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

WHAT IS CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

Article 2, Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. 

The military establishment is the physically strongest single institution in our country and has the capacity and might to wrest power from the constituted authorities. To avoid this, under Article 7, Section 18, that the President, who is civilian official, shall be the commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines.

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

ALIH VS. CASTRO, 151 SCRA 279 [NO. L-69401] (JUNE 23, 1987)

FACTS: More than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners. The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona”, contention that the petitioners are involved in the latest killing of the town's mayor Cesar Climaco.

Unfortunately, the soldiers fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties.

The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation civilian supremacy

HELD: "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military". In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive

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measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Functions1. To secure the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory.2. Protect the country from foreign aggression and internal subversion.3. To advance the national aims and interest.4. To perform such duties as the President may direct.

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 – COMMANDER IN CHIEF CLAUSE

Article 7, Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

To call out the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion (whenever it becomes necessary)- Vested directly by the Constitution - Authority to declare a state of rebellion - Military Tribunals are simply instrumentalities of the executive power provided by the legislature for the Commander-in-Chief to aid him in enforcing discipline in the armed forces.

WHAT IS THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE

Article 2, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Bound by the generally accepted principle of International Law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.

It means that the rules of International law form part of the law of the land and no legislative action is required to make them applicable in a country. By this doctrine, the Philippines is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. (Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997)

The phrase “generally accepted principles of international law’’ refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states.

WHAT IS THE TRANSFORMATION METHOD OF ANNEXING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO MUNICIPAL LAW

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both.

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 21

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION VS. HEALTH SECRETARY, 535 SCRA 265 [G.R. NO. 173034]( OCTOBER 9, 2007)

FACTS: Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

ISSUE: Whether the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR.

If yes, Whether the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements

HELD: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA

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Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

WHAT IS THE POLICY OF THE STATE TOWARDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Article 2, Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

“Nuclear-free” Philippines

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Article 2, Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

The rationale of the principle of the separation of Church and State is summed up in the familiar saying "Strong fences make good neighbors." The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore unto Caesar thethings that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's". While the State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 259 SCRA 529[ G.R. 119673], (JULY 26,1996)

FACTS: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. When the petitioner submitted to the Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television, respondent, the VTR tapes of its several TV program series, the Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case alleging that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the “Ang iglesia ni Cristo program” is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise

HELD: RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its

right to free exercise of religion. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticismsof some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. ―Attack‖ is different from―offend‖ any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom maybe justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.

WHAT IS THE STATE POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 2, Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

- Respect for human dignity and human rights.

RAZON VS. TAGTIIS, 606 SCRA 598, [G.R. NO. 182498], (DECEMBER 3, 2009)

IS ARTICLE II, SECTION 16 A SELF-EXECUTING PROVISION

Article 2, Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792, [G.R. NO. 101083], (JULY 30, 1993)

FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. 

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. 

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the

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dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action (in relation to Article 2, Section 16)

HELD: As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

WHAT IS LOCAL AUTONOMY

Local autonomy is the exercise of certain basic powers, i.e. police power, power of eminent domain, and taxing power, by local government units so as to best serve the interest and promote the general well being of their inhabitants.

By express constitutional mandate, enjoyment of local autonomy by the territorial and political subdivisions, i.e. all government units including the two autonomous regions (actually just one: ARMM), is now a basic state policy.

BASCO VS. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, [G.R. NO. 91649], (MAY 14, 1991)

On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, “ to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

FACTS: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:

Section 1.     Declaration of Policy.    It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD: No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governm

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____

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes on PAGCOR. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an “Imperium in imperio” it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government.

LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN, 170 SCRA 786, [G.R. NO. 80391], (FEBRUARY 38, 1989)

FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the

latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. 

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. 

WHAT ARE THE SECTIONS IN ARTICLE II RELATED TO SOCIAL JUSTICE

Article 2, Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Article 2, Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Article 2, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Article 2, Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

- To give those with less privilege in life more privileges in law. - The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. - The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS (CRUZ, P. 114)

Article 2, Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization

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of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number.

What is the policy of the State on disclosure of matters of public interest

Article 2, Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL, 568 SCRA 402,[ G.R. NO. 183591], (OCTOBER 14, 2008)

FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. 

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. 

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

HELD: Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

____There is a violation of the people’s right to information. An essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

WHAT IS THE STATE POLICY ON PUBLIC SERVICE?

Article 2, Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

PAMATONG VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public

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office?

HELD: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

IS ARTICLE II, SECTION 12 AGAINST ABORTION

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Abortion in the Philippines is illegal, or banned by law. The Revised Penal Code criminalizes the act. Articles 256, 258 and 259 of the Code mandate imprisonment for the woman who undergoes the abortion, as well as for any person who assists in the procedure, even if they be the woman's parents, a physician or midwife.

ARTICLE XV

THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

1. The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;2. The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

3. The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security.

IS THERE ANY PROVISION IN THE CONSTITUTION THAT PREVENTS GAY MARRIAGES

None, Philippine laws do not recognize and protect same-sex marriage.

“Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the

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establishment of conjugal and family life.” This is part of the definition provided in Section 1 of the Family Code.

The Supreme Court stated in a 2007 case that one of the most sacred social institutions is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman, referring to the institution of marriage. One of its essential requisites of marriage is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. The SC also noted that allowing a change of name by reason of a sex reassignment surgery (sex change) “will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual)”.

ARTICLE 2, SECTION 6 The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

FACTS: Upon the death of Mons. Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) since1902, Mons. Santiago A. Fonacier was elected Obispo Maximo, on 14 October 1940, in accordance with the constitution of the church. The latter's successor should have been elected by the Asamblea Magna of the Church on 1 September 1943. However, due to the circumstances brought about by the Pacific War, it was agreed, on 16 December 1941, by the Bishops stationed in Manila and neighboring provinces that Mons. Fonacier should hold over as Obispo Maximo of the IFI, for the duration of the emergency created by the year. After the liberation of the Philippines, and on 1 September 1945, an attempt was made to convene the Asamblea Magna for the purpose of electing the Obispo Maximo, but owing to lack of quorum, the Bishops present agreed that Mons. Fonacier would continue for another year, or until 1 September 1946. On 2September 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of Bishops) of the IFI convened and approved the designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. In that meeting Mons. Alejandro Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that the latter notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Mons. Fonacier wrote him a letter dated 18 September 1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite until he (Fonacier) had approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council as provided for in the constitution. To this letter Bishop Remollino replied explaining his side and adding that he was ready to defend his stand on the matter before the courts of justice. In view of this attitude, Mons. Fonacier ordered the expulsion of Bishop Remollino from the church and also of Bishop Manuel Aguilar whom Mons. Fonacier suspected to be the instigator of certain acts of insubordination and defamation against him. On 1 December 1945, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges against Mons. Fonacier as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the Supreme Council of Bishops, held on 21 January 1946, which decreed the forced resignation of Mons. Fonacier, and to the Asamblea Magna or Asamblea General of the church, held on 22 January 1946. Thisbody approved the forced resignation of Mons. Fonacier and elected Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca as Supreme Bishop to succeed Mons. Fonacier. When notified of his removal as Obispo Maximo and required to turn over all the funds, documents and other properties of the church to his successor, Mons. Fonacier refused. The case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the IFI, represented by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against Mons.Fonacier seeking to require the latter to render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties he has his possession belonging to said church and to recover the same from him on the ground that he had ceased be the Supreme Bishop of said religious organization. On 1 September 1946 the Asamblea Magna convened and elected Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as Obispo Maximo. On the same date Mons. Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and elected Mons Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop. Thus two factions of the IFI were created. Thus, Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., was made a co-plaintiff in a supplementary complaint. The faction under Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. according to the statement of the Director of National Library, issued on 22 May 1947, had 19 bishops and 252 priests while the faction under

Mons. Juan Jamias had 10 bishops and only 40 priests. Thus on 23 June 1947, the Secretary of Public Instruction promulgated an order to the effect that for administrative purposes, Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., was recognized as sole head of the IFI and the applications of priests of said church for permits to solemnize marriages would be granted if it were shown thereon that they recognized Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., as the Obispo Maximo of said church. The Supreme Court, however, denied the power of the Secretary to stop the Fonacier group from obtaining licenses to solemnize marriages. On 22 January 1948, the bishop and priests under Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., had increased from 252 to 293 while those under Mons. Jamias were only 64 and Mons. De los Reyes, Jr. was duly registered as "corporation sole for the administration of the temporalities of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 154-164 of the Corporation Law." On 17 May 1950, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of the IFI, and ordering Mons. Fonacier to render an accounting of his administration of the properties and funds of the church "from thetime he began occupying the position of Secretario de Economia Temporal thereof until the present time." When the case was taken to the Court of Appeals, the latter found the decision of the Court of origin in accordance with law and the evidence and affirmed the same in toto. The case was elevated to the Superme Court by virtue of a petition for review interposed by Mons. Fonacier.

ISSUE: Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the ouster of certain bishops of the IPI, to determine the proper faction to hold the church’s property, and/or pass upon matters involving the church’s amendment of its constitution, etc.

Held: Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the civil courts. In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the right to inquire into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of the church. Thus, it has been held that expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property right is involved. Where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. If there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere in the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property. The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the government body, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation. Herein, the properties of the IFI are heldby a religious congregation, and that the numerical majority is on the side of the faction of Mons. de los Reyes, et. al. where the number of its bishops and priests, as of 22 January 1948, were 293 as against 64 of Mons. Fonacier's group. On the other hand, the amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by Mons. Fonacier, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.

---- SHORTER ----FACTS: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his

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administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop. 

Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was anaccounting of his administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America. 

CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render anaccounting of his admistration

CA affirmed the decision of the CFI

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.

HELD: Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws

To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule in property controversies within religiouscongregations strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiasticalassociation (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rulesfor resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntaryassociation. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.

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