Confronting SpaCe DebriS StrategieS and WarningS from Comparable exampleS inCluding deepWater Horizon

8/7/2019 Confronting SpaCe DebriS StrategieS and WarningS from Comparable exampleS inCluding deepWater Horizon

1/157

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicatedin a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RANDintellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorizedposting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs areprotected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce,or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. Forinformation on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions.

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

Visit RAND atwww.rand.org

Explore the RAND National Defense

Research Institute

Viewdocument details

For More Information

This PDF document was made available

fromwww.rand.org as a public service of

the RAND Corporation.

6Jump down to document

THE ARTS

CHILD POLICY

CIVIL JUSTICE

EDUCATION

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NATIONAL SECURITY

POPULATION AND AGING

PUBLIC SAFETY

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

TERRORISM AND

HOMELAND SECURITY

TRANSPORTATION ANDINFRASTRUCTURE

WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

The RAND Corporation is a nonprotinstitution that helps improve policy and

decisionmaking through research and

analysis.

Purchase this document

Browse Books & Publications

Make a charitable contribution

Support RAND
http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/publications/permissions.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/monographs/MG1042/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/arts/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/children/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/civil_justice/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/education/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/energy_environment/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/health/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/international_affairs/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/national_security/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/population/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/public_safety/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/science_technology/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/substance_abuse/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/infrastructure/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/infrastructure/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/workforce/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/monographs/MG1042/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/online/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/giving/contribute.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/giving/contribute.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/online/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/monographs/MG1042/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/workforce/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/infrastructure/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/substance_abuse/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/science_technology/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/public_safety/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/population/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/national_security/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/international_affairs/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/health/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/energy_environment/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/education/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/civil_justice/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/children/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/arts/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/monographs/MG1042/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pdfrd/http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/publications/permissions.html


2/157

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.

RAND monographs present major research ndings that address the

challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono-

graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for

research quality and objectivity.


3/157

StrategieS and WarningS from Comparable

exampleS inCluding deepWater Horizon

ConfrontingSpaCe DebriS

dv bcch W Ws iV

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Prepared for the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited


4/157

he RAND Corporation is a nonproit institution that helps improve

policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RANDspublications do not necessarily relect the opinions o its research clientsand sponsors.

R is a registered trademark.

Copyright 2010 RAND Corporation

Permission is given to duplicate this document or personal use only, aslong as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated orcommercial purposes. Unauthorized posting o RAND documents to anon-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected undercopyright law. For inormation on reprint and linking permissions, pleasevisit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html).

Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation

1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-21381200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

4570 Fith Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org

o order RAND documents or to obtain additional inormation, contact

Distribution Services: elephone: (310) 451-7002;

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected]

Library o Congress Control Number: 2010940008

ISBN: 978-0-8330-5056-4

he research described in this report was prepared or the Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency. he research was conducted withinthe RAND National Deense Research Institute, a ederally undedresearch and development center sponsored by the Oice o the Secretaryo Deense, the Joint Sta, the Uniied Combatant Commands, the Navy,

the Marine Corps, the deense agencies, and the deense IntelligenceCommunity under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.
http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.rand.org/http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html


5/157

iii

Preface

Orbital (space) debris represents a growing threat to the operation oman-made objects in space.1 According to Nick Johnson, the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASAs) chie scientist ororbital debris, []he current orbital debris environment poses a real,albeit low level, threat to the operation o spacecrat in both low earthorbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) (Johnson, 2010). Tereare currently hundreds o thousands o objects greater than one cen-

timeter in diameter in Earths orbit. Te collision o any one o theseobjects with an operational satellite would cause catastrophic ailure othat satellite.

Tis monograph presents a new way o thinking about the orbitaldebris problem. It should be o interest to space-aring nation-statesand commercial frms, the legislative and executive branches o theU.S. government, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceul Useso Outer Space, and the general public.

Tis research was sponsored by the Deense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (DARPA) and conducted within the Acquisition andechnology Policy Center o the RAND National Deense ResearchInstitute, a ederally unded research and development center spon-sored by the Oce o the Secretary o Deense, the Joint Sta, the Uni-fed Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the deenseagencies, and the deense Intelligence Community.

1 NASA defnes orbital debris as artifcial objects, including derelict spacecrat and spentlaunch vehicle orbital stages, let in orbit which no longer serve a useul purpose (NASA-Handbook 8719.14, 2008).


6/157

iv Confronting Space Debris

For more inormation on the RAND Acquisition and echnologyPolicy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/atp.html or contact

the Director (contact inormation is provided on the web page).
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/atp.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/atp.html


7/157

v

Contents

Preace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii

CHAPER ONEIntroduction: Te Problem o Orbital Debris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

What Is Orbital Debris? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CHAPER WO

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CHAPER HREEComparable Problems and Identiying Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

CHAPER FOUR

Nomenclature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Mitigation and Remediation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CHAPER FIVE

A Framework or Addressing Orbital Debris and the ComparableProblems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


8/157

vi Confronting Space Debris

Progressing Trough the Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Incorporating the Concept o Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Describing Additional Levels o Complexity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

CHAPER SIX

Analysis: Comparing the imeline o Orbital Debris with the

imelines o the Comparable Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Relative imelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CHAPER SEVEN

Mitigation Strategies and Teir Use in Other Communities. . . . . . . . . . . 27What Is Mitigation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Describing the Stakeholder Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Describing the Orbital Debris Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Approaches to Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Command/Control Approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Market-Based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Perormance-Based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Practical Examples o Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Airline Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Radon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Acid Rain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

CHAPER EIGH

Remedies and Teir Use in Other Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

What Is Remediation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

ypes o Remediation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Set 1: Relocation Versus Elimination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Set 2: argeted Versus Dragnet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Te Role o echnology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Case Study: Deepwater Horizon (Gul O Mexico) Oil Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Remediation Lessons Learned rom the Deepwater Horizon Spill . . . . . . . . . 55

CHAPER NINE

Summarizing Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59


9/157

Contents vii

Te Case or Additional Mitigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Te Case or Developing Remediation echnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

APPENDIXES

A. A Brie Overview o Orbital Debris and the Comparable

Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

B. Te Descriptive Framework Applied to Orbital Debris and the

Comparables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Works Consulted or imelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121


10/157


11/157

ix

Figures

S.1. Framework Stages via Concentric Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviS.2. Stakeholder Diversity and ype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviiS.3. Stakeholder Spectrum: Blameworthy Versus Aected . . . . . . . xviii5.1. Framework Stages via Concentric Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165.2. Risk olerance Versus Undesirable Behaviors

(Simple Cases) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205.3. Risk olerance Versus Undesirable Behaviors

(Complex Cases) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

6.1. Notional Comparison o Concentric Ring Progression overime Across Orbital Debris and Comparables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

7.1. Stakeholder Diversity and ype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287.2. Stakeholder Spectrum: Blameworthy Versus Aected . . . . . . . . . . 297.3. Orbital Debris: Stakeholder Diversity, ype,

and Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327.4. Airline Security: Stakeholder Diversity, ype,

and Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

7.5. Radon: Stakeholder Diversity, ype, and Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397.6. Acid Rain: Stakeholder Diversity, ype, and Spectrum. . . . . . . . . 418.1. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: imeline o Remediation

Attempts and Estimate o Amount Spilled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54B.1. Acid Rain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70B.2. Airline Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72B.3. Asbestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74B.4. CFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

B.5. Hazardous Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78B.6. Oil Spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80B.7. Orbital Debris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82


12/157

x Confronting Space Debris

B.8. Radon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84B.9. Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

B.10. U.S. Border Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88


13/157

xi

Tables

A.1. Overview o Orbital Debris and Comparable Problems . . . . . . . . 67B.1. Acid Rain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71B.2. Airline Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73B.3. Asbestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75B.4. CFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77B.5. Hazardous Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79B.6. Oil Spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81B.7. Orbital Debris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

B.8. Radon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85B.9. Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

B.10. U.S. Border Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89


14/157


15/157

xiii

Summary

Background and Objective

Orbital (space) debris represents a growing threat to the operation oman-made objects in space.2 According to Nick Johnson, NASAs chiescientist or orbital debris, []he current orbital debris environmentposes a real, albeit low level, threat to the operation o spacecrat inboth LEO and GEO (Johnson, 2010). Tere are currently hundreds o

thousands o objects greater than one centimeter in diameter in Earthsorbit. Te collision o any one o these objects with an operational sat-ellite would cause catastrophic ailure o that satellite.

DARPA, within the context o the Catchers Mitt study, is inthe preliminary stages o investigating potential technical solutionsor remediating debris.3 Tis investigation is a critical step becauseeven the most rudimentary cleanup techniques will require signifcantresearch and feld testing beore they can be successully implemented.

In addition, uture pathfnder missions will require extensive resources,


3 Te DARPA Catchers Mitt study is tasked with the ollowing objectives: model the space

debris problem and its uture growth; determine which class o satellites is most aected;and, i appropriate, explore technically easible solutions or debris removal. DARPA intendsto use the results o the Catchers Mitt study to determine i they should invest in a spacedebris remediation program (Jones, undated).


16/157

xiv Confronting Space Debris

and the U.S. government will need sucient justifcation beore pursu-ing these programs.4

With this background in mind, this research had three primarygoals. Te frst was to determine whether analogous problems romoutside the aerospace industry exist that are comparable to space debris.Assuming that such problems exist, the second goal was to develop alist o identiying characteristics along with an associated rameworkthat could be used to describe all o these problems, including debris.Te fnal goal, provided that the frst two were possible, was to use thisramework to draw comparisons between orbital debris and the analo-

gous problems. Ultimately, we hoped to provide context and insightor decisionmakers by asking the ollowing question: How have otherindustries approached theirorbital debrislike problems? What les-sons can be learned rom these cases beore proceeding with mitigationor remediation measures?

Comparable Problems

We identifed a set o comparable problems that share similarities withorbital debris and narrowed this set down to the ollowing nine issues:acid rain, airline security, asbestos, chlorouorocarbons (CFCs), haz-ardous waste, oil spills, radon, spam, and U.S. border control.5

Tese problems are related because they all share the ollowing seto characteristics:

Behavioral norms (past and/or present) do not address the prob-lem in a satisactory manner.

I the problem is ignored, the risk o collateral damage will besignifcant.

Tere will always be an endless supply o rule-breakers.

4 Within the scope o this document, we defne the wordpathfnderto mean an experimen-

tal prototype used to prove a capability.5 We do not describe the rationale behind this statement in the executive summary. How-ever, more inormation about the comparable problems is available in Chapter Tree and in

Appendixes A and B.


17/157

Summary xv

Te problem will likely never be considered solved because theroot cause is dicult to eliminate.

Nomenclature

We reer to the terms mitigation and remediation throughout thisanalysis, so it is important to provide our defnitions or these terms:

Mitigation reers to a class o actions designed to lessen the pain or

reduce the severity o a problem. Mitigation measures are inher-ently preventive, and they are enacted to prevent a problem or toprevent one rom getting worse.

Remediation reers to the act o applying a remedy in order toreverse events or stop undesired eects. Remedies are targetedreactions oten designed to address an undesirable event that hasalready occurred.

Methodology

We used a literature survey and interviews with experts to gather theollowing pieces o inormation or each o the comparable problems:

1. Basic overview. What is the problem?2. Calendar dates o key milestones. When was the problem frst

identifed? When were major mitigation measures imposed?When (i at all) were remedies felded?

3. Stakeholder demographics. Who is viewed as having causedthe problem? Who is aected by it? How large is each group?How diverse are their interests?

4. Current status. What was the status o each o the problems, aso May 2010? Was it being remedied or simply mitigated?


18/157

xvi Confronting Space Debris

The Framework

Once we had this inormation, we designed a ramework that could beused to describe the process or addressing orbital debris and any o thecomparable problems. We identifed our stages o increasingly aggres-sive measures that could be used to address the various problems: iden-tiying, characterizing, and bounding the problem; establishing nor-mative behaviors; mitigation; and remediation.

Tese stages can be represented with a series o concentric rings, asshown in Figure S.1. Tis concentric geometry highlights an important

eature o the approach: As the community moves toward the center(which indicates increasingly aggressive deterrents), the size o the risk-generating population decreases with each inward step.

Te progression through these stages is determined by the risktolerance o the aected entities. Specifcally, decisionmakers shouldproceed to the next stage when the existing population o unwantedincidents exceeds the communitys risk tolerance level. For example,catastrophessuch as an oil spillcan cause a community to reassess

(and oten lower) its risk tolerance, and additional mitigation or reme-diation strategies may be needed ater such an event.

Figure S.1Framework Stages via Concentric Rings

RAND MG1042-S.1

Remediate

Iden

tify/char

acterize/bound

Establis

hnormativebeh

aviors

Mitigate


19/157

Summary xvii

It is also important to note that eliminating the problem is notnecessarily the primary objective. Instead, the goal should be reducing

the risk posed by unwanted phenomena (air pollution, radon levels, air-crat hijackings) to a level that the aected stakeholders fnd acceptable.

We also developed two tools to aid in describing the stakeholdercommunities. Tese tools are shown in Figures S.2 and S.3, and moreinormation is provided in Chapter Seven.

Analysis: Comparing the Relative Time Spent in EachStage

Our literature survey uncovered several important dates, milestones,and achievements associated with all o the comparable problems. Weused this inormation to build a series o timelines that allowed us to

compare the dierent problems. Ater reviewing these timelines, wemade the ollowing observations:

Figure S.2Stakeholder Diversity and Type

RAND MG1042-S.2

More

stak

ehold

ers

Local

State

National

Multinational

Mored

iverseinterests


20/157

xviii Confronting Space Debris

It may take several years to identiy the problem (acid rain, asbes-tos, and spam).

In some cases, a single critical event is enough to propel the prob-lem through several o the stages shown in Figure S.1 at once (air-line security, oil spills, radon, and spam).

A problem need not have existed or a long time beore remedia-

tion is deemed necessary (hazardous waste, oil spills, and spam). Once in remediation, the problem is not considered solved. Air-line security, hazardous waste, oil spills, radon, and spam are allexamples o problems that are di cult to completely eliminate.

Mitigation Concepts

We identifed three mitigation approachestaken rom the environ-mental protection industrythat can be applied to any o the prob-lems that we considered, including space debris:

Te command and control (C2) approach institutes an incentivestructure to control community behavior. Tis approach is easilyunderstood by most cultures, so it is oten the frst mitigationstrategy to be implemented.

Market-based approaches acknowledge that the problem existsand organize a ormal allocation scheme or the right to engagein that behavior.

Figure S.3Stakeholder Spectrum: Blameworthy Versus Affected

RAND MG1042-S.3

Blameworthy

Affected


21/157

Summary xix

Perormance-based strategies use a quota-based system to set alimit on the undesired behavior.

We highlighted the mitigation strategies used to address acid rain,airline security, and radon. Our analysis o these issues yielded the ol-lowing observations on each.

Acid Rain

In order to successully implement a large C2 strategy, the symp-

toms must be categorized into groups that represent dierentlevels o relative risk.

A market approach is oten most eective only ater an eectiveC2 strategy is already in place.

Airline Security

Preparing or potential threats requires an ecient and eective

system or collecting and disseminating inormation. An eective mitigation strategy evolves over time. A successul C2 strategy is enorced by organizations with clearly

defned jurisdictions.

Radon

Nonregulatory approaches may be good at increasing public aware-

ness, but they are unlikely to achieve high levels o compliance. Mitigation is relatively straightorward when the problem can be

described and measured accurately.

Remediation Concepts

Types of Remedies

Remedies can be classifed using two sets o descriptive categories:


22/157

xx Confronting Space Debris

Relocation versus elimination. An undesired object can be relo-cated such that it no longer poses a high risk, or it can be com-

pletely eliminated. argeted versus dragnet. Undesired objects can be relocated or

eliminated using processes that are either targeted or dragnet-like. argeted removal techniques use a specifc method to aecta single, known object. Dragnet strategies indiscriminately trawlspace to gather and remove all objects with a particular set ocharacteristics.

Lessons Learned From the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil SpillUsing this oil spill as a case study, we identifed the ollowing lessonslearned:

Simply having one or more remediation technologies is not su-fcient. Te remedies must be tested and proven to work in theexpected operating conditions.

Te community will only support the development o an eec-

tive remedy when the risk posed by the threat is considered to beunacceptable.

When reacting to a catastrophe, a dragnet solution is needed toaddress the atereects.

Ater a catastrophe, a targeted solution may also be necessary toremedy a problem.

Remedies must be adaptable so that they may evolve to ace the

latest challenges.

Summarizing Observations

We noted the ollowing key themes as we compiled the results romthis research:

Improving situational awareness should be an ongoing eortwithin any community.


23/157

Summary xxi

Te Superund could serve as an eective model or orbital debriscleanup.

Incentive structures (associated with mitigation strategies) workbest in the short term. In order to achieve a cost-eective long-term solution, it is necessary to change stakeholder preerences.

All o the stages shown in Figure S.1 must continually evolve overtime along with the problem.

The Case for Additional Mitigation in Orbital Debris

When viewed in light o the comparable problems, there is evidence to

suggest that orbital debris does not at present pose a great-enough riskto warrant the deployment o a remediation technology.6 A commu-nity will only move on to the next stage shown in Figure S.1 when thecurrent stage is not sucient to properly address the problem. Whileeveryone in the space community certainly agrees that orbital debrisposes a risk, the lack o government and private industry unding orthis eort suggests that the perception o risk has not yet crossed a criti-cal threshold that would prompt demands or remediation.

Te current lack o private unding or debris remedies is particu-larly telling. oday, the majority ownership o operational space assets(as a percentage o the total operational inventory) has shited romgovernment to commercial industry.7 For this new majority o com-mercial stakeholders, the imperative to create shareholder value entailsthat any investment in a technical system be guided by its value cre-ation potential (Brathwaite and Saleh, 2009). In other words, i debris

were deemed to represent an unacceptable risk to current or utureoperations, a remedy would already have been developed by the privatesector.

6 Te use o the word deploymentis intentional: It implies an operationaland not simplya pathfndersystem.

7 According to the April 2010 Union o Concerned Scientists (UCS) Satellite Database,41 percent o the worlds active, operational satellites are solely commercial; 17 percent are

solely military; 18 percent are solely government; and the remaining 24 percent are eithermultiuse or used or research or scientifc purposes. While the UCS database represents onlyan approximate count o the worlds total satellite inventory, it is useul in providing a quickestimate to support our claim (UCS, undated).


24/157

xxii Confronting Space Debris

Te space industry is currently dealing with the debris problemvia mitigation, and we oer the ollowing observations about these

eorts:

Mitigation is an eective way to reduce the probability that acatastrophe will occur.

racking metrics over time is an eective way to measure a miti-gation strategys ongoing eectiveness.

The Case for Developing Remediation Technologies

Te lack o unding initiatives associated with developing a deployableremedy or orbital debris suggests that the community currently doesnot need such a capability. However, our research presents several les-sons that suggest it may be wise to develop a pathfnder system in thenear term:

A community must be prepared or shocks or catastrophicevents. Sometimes a single catastrophic event, or shock, is su-

cient to propel a community through several o the stages at once.For orbital debris, the Chinese antisatellite test and the Iridium/Cosmos collision are two obvious examples (see Chapter Oneor more detail about these events). Tese two events are likelythe cause or the increased interestto include this researchinthe debris problem. In addition, remedies are needed to clean upthe atereects o such catastrophic events. Developing the path-fnder technology now or such a remedy may prove to be a wisedecision because on-orbit collisions are likely to continue to occurin the uture.

Remedies must be designed and tested to work under theactual operating conditions. Tis is the biggest lesson rom theDeepwater Horizon spill. All o the remedies felded during thefrst 40 days o the spill were not eective because they had notbeen tested or proven to work in deepwater drilling conditions.

Fielding a demonstration technology will prove useul only i itwill provide operators and engineers with relevant inormation ontechnology perormance under the actual working conditions. In


25/157

Summary xxiii

addition, decisionmakers will gain important data points on real-istic values or recharge times, reaction times, and the magazines

associated with any potential remediation technology. Ultimately,the pathfnder system must strive toward remedying a realisticproblem, or the development will risk being considered purelyacademic and not operationally useul.

One remedy is not good enough. A remedy is oten used torespond to an event that has already occurred. As a result, reme-diation technology is oten very specialized, and our researchindicated that or many problems, several dierent techniques are

necessary. Tere are examples o this throughout all o the compa-rable problems. Airline security, asbestos, environmental hazards,oil spills, radon, and spam all use multiple techniques to remedya problem. For this reason, it may be wise to begin developinga pathfnder system now so that alternative, tangential methodsmay be developed more quickly in the uture.

When a problems efects are not directly observable, a com-munity is likely to underestimate the risk posed by the efects.Asbestos and radon are invisible, and the cancers they cause maynot appear or several decades. Under such circumstances, a com-munity may have a low perception o risk because the cause andeect are separated by long spans o time. By contrast, the neigh-bors o a polluting actory are likely to see its eects every day.Orbital debris, unortunately, belongs to the category o problemsthat are not easily observed either by those who create it or by

those who might be harmed by it. Because the harm is virtu-ally invisible until a major collision occurs, the broader commu-nity may be simply unaware o the severity o the problem, orthey may tend to underestimate the potential risk. Tereore, thetechnical community should consider implementing an ongoing,metric-based stakeholder awareness program alongside the devel-opment o a technical remedy.


26/157


27/157

xxv

Acknowledgments

We thank the Deense Advanced Research Projects Agencys acti-cal echnology Oce, specifcally Wade Pulliam and his team, orthe opportunity to perorm this research on orbital debris. NicholasJohnson, NASAs chie scientist or orbital debris, played an importantrole in educating us on current mitigation eorts as well as contextor the debris-related timeline and stakeholder risk tolerances. Lt GenLarry James, 14th AF/CC, and Brig Gen John Hyten, Director, Space

Acquisition, Oce o the Under Secretary o the Air Force, and theirrespective stas provided key background inormation on the tacticalaspects o identiying and managing the existing debris population.

Roseanne Ford, rom the University o Virginia, deserves ourappreciation or sharing some considerations that aect the develop-ment o remediation-ocused technologies.

Tis research would not have been possible without the respon-siveness, resourceulness, and enthusiasm provided by RAND librar-

ian Anita Szaran. We are extremely grateul or her assistance in com-piling sources or our literature survey and building the Bibliographyand Works Consulted or imelines lists, which contain over 360 re-erences. Anita embodies the ways in which the library sta is criticalto RAND research, and we are very thankul or her contributions tothis work.

Sonni Eron reviewed an early drat o the manuscript, and sheprovided a number o recommendations designed to clariy and refneour conclusions. We are very thankul that she was willing to provideso many thoughtul suggestions.


28/157

xxvi Confronting Space Debris

We are very lucky to have an excellent team o administrative stathat helped us with document preparation and project travel. We have

the pleasure o having Holly Johnson and Regina Sandberg supportour research activities on a day-to-day basis. Special thanks are due toKarin Suede and Vera Juhasz, who took great care in ormatting thedocument or release to the sponsor and peer reviewers.

We are also grateul or our talented research editor, Nora Spiering,whose expertise in editing and typesetting the fnal document helpedacilitate the publication process.

We thank our colleagues, Natalie Craword, im Bonds, Phil

Antn, Kenneth Horn, Karl Mueller, Andrew Morral, and HenryWillis, or their insights and support throughout this project.

Finally, we want to thank our spouses and amilies or theirtolerance and understanding during the three months in which weresearched and wrote this monograph.

From the onset we have wholeheartedly believed in the utility andimportance o this research and have spent countless hours reading,discussing, and analyzing inormation on this problem. We have takenextra care to ensure that this document presents an intuitive and acces-sible approach to the debris problem. We accept the responsibility orthe observations and statements within this monograph.


29/157

xxvii

Abbreviations

14th AF/CC Commander, Fourteenth Air Force

ASA antisatellite

C2 command and control

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response,Compensation, and Liability Act

CFCs chlorouorocarbons

DARPA Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DH Deepwater Horizon

EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency

GAO United States Government Accountability Oce(ormerly United States General Accounting Oce)

GEO geosynchronous orbit

LEO low earth orbit

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

pCi/L picocuries per liter

SA ransportation Security Administration

UCS Union o Concerned Scientists


30/157


31/157

1

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: The Problem of Orbital Debris

What Is Orbital Debris?

Orbital (space) debris represents a growing threat to the operation oman-made objects in space.1 According to Nick Johnson, the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASAs) chie scientist ororbital debris, []he current orbital debris environment poses a real,albeit low level, threat to the operation o spacecrat in both low earth

orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) (Johnson, 2010). Tisrisk poses a threat to the United States ability to access and use thespace environment. For example, on the most recent Hubble Spaceelescope repair mission in May 2009, NASA estimated that astro-nauts aced a 1-in-89 chance o being atally injured by a piece o debriswhile operating on the telescope outside the space shuttle (Matthews,2009).

Te United States maintains a catalog or space objects that are

larger than about 10 cm in diameter, and this catalog currently containsabout 20,000 objects, o which debris constitutes a majority (Kehler,2010; Space rack, undated). In addition, NASA estimates that thereare an additional 500,000 objects between 1 and 10 cm, and that thereare likely tens o millions o particles smaller than a centimeter (OrbitalDebris Program Oce, undated).



32/157

2 Confronting Space Debris

Tese smaller objects pose some o the greatest risk to orbitingpayloads. As Johnson notes, []he principal threat to space opera-

tions is driven by the smaller and much more numerous uncatalogueddebris (Johnson, 2010). In LEO, objects have velocities o 7 or 8 km/swith respect to the ground, which means that even small particles canimpart a tremendous amount o energy i they collide with anotherobject. Tis threat is especially sobering because most small particlesare uncataloged.2

Prior to 2007, the primary source o orbital debris was explosionso spent rocket engines. Originally, these engines were jettisoned in

orbit ater launch, and the remaining uel expanded because o thethermal conditions. Under the right conditions, the pressure becametoo great, and the rocket body exploded. Since the mid-1990s, engineshave been designed with valves that relieve the pressure by venting theresidual uel, and contemporary rocket bodies are no longer a majorcontributor o debris.

o date, the largest two contributors o debris have been col-lision events. Te frst was the 2007 Chinese antisatellite (ASA)test. As part o this test, China launched a ballistic missile and hitthe Fengyun-1C, a deunct Chinese weather satellite. Tis collisionevent generated a debris cloud that has added 2,606 trackable objectsto the U.S. space catalog as o June 2010 (Space rack, undated). Inaddition, some estimates suggest that between 35,000 and 500,000smaller, untrackable pieces o debris were created as a result o this test(Carrico et al., 2008). Te second event was an inadvertent collision

in February 2009 between an active Iridium communications satel-lite and Cosmos 2251, a retired Russian communications satellite. Tiscrash added 1,658 trackable objects to the U.S. catalog as o June 2010(Space rack, undated).

2 By contrast, larger objects are relatively easy to track and catalog. In addition, many largeobjects in LEO will eventually all back to earth. Tis is because the larger objects have ahigher drag coecient, so they tend to slow down, enter the earths atmosphere, and burn upupon reentry.


33/157

Introduction: The Problem of Orbital Debris 3

Objective

Te Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), withinthe context o the Catchers Mitt study, is in the preliminary stageso investigating potential technical solutions or remediating debris.3Tis investigation is a critical step because even the most rudimentarycleanup techniques will require signifcant research and feld testingbeore they can be successully implemented. In addition, uture path-fnder missions will require extensive resources, and the U.S. govern-ment will need sucient justifcation beore pursuing these programs.4

With this background in mind, this research had three primarygoals. Te frst was to determine whether analogous problems romoutside the aerospace industry exist that are comparable to the prob-lem o orbital debris. Assuming that such problems exist, the secondgoal was to develop a list o identiying characteristics along with anassociated ramework that could be used to describe all o these prob-lems, including debris. Te fnal goal, provided that the frst two werepossible, was to use the ramework to draw comparisons between space

debris and the analogous problems. Ultimately, we hoped to providecontext and insight or decisionmakers by asking the ollowing ques-tion: How have other industries approached their orbital debrislikeproblems? What lessons can be learned rom these cases beore pro-ceeding with mitigation or remediation measures?5

3 Te DARPA Catchers Mitt study is tasked with the ollowing objectives: model the spacedebris problem and its uture growth; determine which class o satellites is most aected;and, i appropriate, explore technically easible solutions or debris removal. DARPA intendsto use the results o the Catchers Mitt study to determine whether or not to invest in a spacedebris remediation program ( Jones, undated).

4 We defne the wordpathfnder to mean an experimental prototype used to prove acapability.

5 Readers seeking additional background on the debris problem are encouraged to obtain

a copy oArtifcial Space Debrisby Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren S. McKnight (1987).Alternatively, see Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palaiss 1978 paper entitled Colli-sion Frequency o Artifcial Satellites: Te Creation o a Debris Belt, which is considered theseminal work on the problem o orbital debris.


34/157


Tis monograph summarizes our methodology, describes theramework that we developed, and highlights the observations that we

made when analyzing debris and all o the comparable problems.


35/157

5

CHAPTER TWO

Methodology

We began by examining how perspectives rom environmental law,insurance regulation, international relations, policing strategies, anddeterrence theory could inorm the space debris community rombroader, nontechnical perspectives. During discussions with expertswith remediation experience rom outside the aerospace industry, weexamined how technology demonstrations aected the deployment oremediation eorts in these other industries. Furthermore, we investi-

gated key legal, economic, regulatory, and policy concerns that shouldbe considered when evaluating the easibility o testing technologyaimed at reducing orbital debris.

In these discussions, we realized that orbital debris belonged to agroup o problems that share a similar set o characteristics. We there-ore hypothesized that all o these problems could be evaluated using asingle ramework, and that we could use this ramework to draw com-parisons between them.

Tis idea presented us with the ollowing approach: Use thesecomparable problems to yield resh insights on how to think about anddeal with the debris problem. For example, how do other industriesapproach remediation? How has technology development and deploy-ment enabled the remediation eorts? Are there any lessons that couldbe applied to the debris problem?

We assembled a list o comparable problems that could be ana-lyzed or insights. By choosing to investigate an extensive list o com-parable problems, we were able to gather and analyze a set o data romopen literature sources that was comprehensive and objective. In addi-


36/157


tion, this allowed us to ask detailed questions about how these prob-lems evolved over time. For example, how much time elapsed between

recognizing that a problem existed and felding an acceptable solution?Our primary tool or gathering data was through a literature

survey. We also supplemented this review with discussion with expertson several topics that we analyzed. We used the results rom these con-versations to supplement our understanding and to confrm that ourfndings were consistent with the established belies o the community.

In the end, we gathered the ollowing pieces o inormation oreach o the comparable problems:

1. Basic overview. What is the problem?2. Calendar dates o key milestones. When was the problem frst

identifed? When were major mitigation measures imposed?When (i at all) were remedies felded?

3. Stakeholder demographics. Who is viewed as having causedthe problem? Who is aected by it? How large is each group?How diverse are their interests?

4. Current status. What was the status o each o the problems, aso May 2010? Was it being remedied or simply mitigated?

Once we had this inormation, we set about describing a stan-dard process that could address space debris and any o the comparableproblems. o aid in this process, we also designed a set o tools thatallowed us to describe the current status o debris and all o the com-parables. Once described using this ramework, we started looking orsimilarities and lessons that could be applied to the debris problem.

Te remainder o this document eectuates the methodologydescribed in this chapter. In Chapter Tree, we introduce the set ocomparable problems that we considered throughout the analysis. Wealso present a list o characteristics that we developed to describe all othe problems. In Chapter Four, we defne the key terms o mitigationand remediation, and in Chapter Five, we describe the ramework that

we developed. Chapter Six contains an analysis that compares eachproblems historical progress as it moved rom identifcation to miti-gation or remediation. Chapter Seven reviews the concept o mitiga-


37/157

Methodology 7

tion and provides some eective lessons rom other industries. ChapterEight explores the concept o remediation, and we use the 2010 Deep-

water Horizon (DH) oil spill as a case study to draw some conclusionsabout the nature o an eective remedy. In Chapter Nine, we summa-rize the important conclusions rom the earlier chapters, and we pro-vide some overall observations on the entire analysis.

Tis document also contains some helpul appendixes. AppendixA contains a brie list o the comparable problems that we identifedand considered throughout this project. Appendix B summarizes thecurrent status o each o these problems.


38/157


39/157

9

CHAPTER THREE

Comparable Problems and Identifying

Characteristics

Te good news about orbital debris is that it is not a unique problem.Several industries have aced analogous challenges over the past cen-tury and dealt with them successully.

We identifed the ollowing nine comparable examples or use inthis analysis: acid rain, airline security, asbestos, chlorouorocarbons(CFCs), hazardous waste, oil spills, radon, spam, and U.S. border con-

trol.1 We assume that the reader has a general amiliarity with each othese topics, and this level o knowledge will be sucient to under-stand the concepts presented in this monograph. In addition, Appen-dix A contains a table that briey describes each o these issues.

We chose these problems because they all possess the ollowingcharacteristics:

1. Behavioral norms (past and/or present) do not address the

problem in a satisactory manner.2 In other words, the exist-ing state o aairs does not (and will not) provide an accept-able solution now or in the uture. In most industries, there is

1 We chose these nine problems because they represent a diverse set o issues. Other com-parable problems certainly exist; this list is not meant to be exhaustive.

2 We broadly defne behavioral norms to include individual, commercial, or government

conduct. Tese norms may be based on individual behavior, government regulations, or stan-dard industry practices. Addressing a problem in a satisactory manner should be consideredthe same as reducing risk below tolerance levels. Te role that risk plays in fnding an accept-able solution is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.


40/157


a set o cultural and behavioral norms that govern acceptablebehavior. Tese norms discourage the majority o individuals

rom engaging in the unwanted behavior, and the results areusually satisactory. However, or a problem like orbital debris,having a set o normative behaviors does not provide an accept-able solution. For example, most o the international space com-munity agrees that creating additional debris is not acceptable.Yet, debris creation continues to prolierate or a variety o rea-sons, despite the established belie that debris is damaging to theorbital environment.

2. Te risk o collateral damage is signicant. I a problem isnot sel-contained, the actions o one party will aect another.Most oten, these actions will maniest themselves as inad-vertent casualties (collateral damage) or damages to a thirdpartys property. Tis threat o collateral damage necessitatesan inrastructure that can protect the interests o all stakehold-ers. For example, i the owner o one satellite creates debris, theresulting ragments could start a chain reaction aecting otherentities satellites and thus their capability, capital investment,or revenue stream.

3. Tere will always be an endless supply o rule-breakers.Rule-breakers may violate the prevailing behavioral normsintentionally or by accident; their intent does not matter. Whatdoes matter is that the supply o rule-breakers is endless. Forexample, debris has been created intentionally, by exploding

lens caps, ASA tests, or negligent command and control (C2),and by accident, as when two satellites collide on orbit. Even ieveryone agreed to stop creating new debris by tethering lenscaps and ceasing ASA use, existing on-orbit satellites may col-lide with one another and generate a debris cloud. In addition,new space-aring countries may not possess the technical capa-bility or the fnancial means to eectively ollow existing rulesand guidelines. In either case, it is reasonable to assume that

new debris will continue to prolierate.4. Te problem will likely never be considered solved because

the root cause is dicult to eliminate. Tere may be several


41/157

Comparable Problems and Identifying Characteristics 11

reasons behind this inability to achieve solved status, but thebiggest is oten that eliminating the root cause is technically

challenging or extremely expensive. At the moment, there is nocost-eective way to remove or relocate threatening debris inorbit. In other cases, eliminating the root cause may simply notbe an option. For example, the international community coulddecide to rerain rom using the space environment, and debriswould no longer be a concern. Obviously, this would be unac-ceptable to most space-aring corporations and governments,including the United States. In a best-case scenario, the solution

will be an asymptotic approach in which the risk is lowered toa level agreed on by all stakeholders. Te solution will merelyminimize collateral damage or eects to a level that is tolerable.

In addition to the comparable problems that we listed, there wereseveral prospective choices that we considered but did not include inthe fnal analysis. For example, we decided to omit global warming. Atfrst glance, global warming seems like an obvious choice: Like orbital

debris, it is a global problem that reaches across international bound-aries. However, o all the comparable problems that we considered,global warming was the most politically polarizing, and we were notable to fnd sources on which both sides o the debate could agree. Inthe end, we concluded that a comparison with global warming wouldprove more distracting than enlightening or this analysis.

However, by making this decision, we also eliminated a key com-

parable problem that, like debris, reached across numerous interna-tional boundaries and relationships. None o the nine comparablesoer such a diverse set o cross-border and relationship considerations.

Tis is a air critique, but all o the comparable problems havestakeholders who possess a set o values similar to a group o nation-states. For example, or acid rain, all o the polluters (i.e., individualactories) have the same motivation and sel-interest that a group ocountries would have. Each wishes to protect its stakeholders, and each

brings dierent cultural values to the discussion. In addition, local andstate laws must be reconciled with one another as ederal policymak-ers decide on the best path orward. Finally, the problem o acid rain


42/157


cannot be solved unless all parties involved agree on a solution. Tissituation is no dierent rom the debris problem, in which space-aring

countries and corporations must work together to develop eectivesolutions.


43/157

13

CHAPTER FOUR

Nomenclature

Mitigation and Remediation

Since we will use the terms mitigation and remediation throughoutthis document, it is critical to defne their meanings and distinguishbetween them beore proceeding with the analysis.

Mitigation reers to a class o actions designed to lessen the pain orreduce the severity o something. Standards, rules, and regulations are

common examples o mitigating actions: Tey do not stop unwantedbehavior or completely eliminate undesirable outcomes, but they canreduce the requency or severity o bad events.

Mitigation measures are aimed at preventing a problem rom get-ting worse. Because o this, an eective mitigation strategy needs to becomprehensive, adaptable, and sel-correcting.

By contrast, remediation aims to reverse events or stop undesiredeects. Remediation is oten achieved using a technical innovation to

reverse undesired outcomes or eliminate undesired risks.1 For exam-

1 In this document, we purposely avoid discussing specifc remediation technologies thathave been proposed or space debris. However, we also recognize that those who are newto the debris problem need to understand what it means to remediate debris. Tereore,

we will mention two exemplar technologies currently under consideration. One proposedapproach would use laser radiation to aect a spacecrats momentum to accelerate the

de-orbiting process. An alternative approach would use robots to reposition (or de-orbit)large pieces o debris. We mention these particular methods simply because they are easy todescribe within a ew sentences; they are not necessarily the most technologically mature norhave they been widely accepted by the space community as viable solutions.


44/157


ple, airports use X-ray machines, magnetometers, and microwave bodyscanners as part o their screening process.

Remedies are oten employed in reaction to something, and thishas a ew implications about their use. First, remedies are targeted reac-tions designed to address an event that has already occurred. Becauseremedies should have a targeted purpose, several remediation strategiesmay be needed to address the overall problem. Finally, remedies areoten (but not always) employed ater catastrophic events.

For the specifc case o space debris, mitigation reers to anyaction that slows or prevents the uture growth o the debris popula-

tion. Remediation is any action aimed at reducing or eliminating thepopulation o existing space debris so as to avoid uture catastrophe.


45/157

15

CHAPTER FIVE

A Framework for Addressing Orbital Debris and

the Comparable Problems

Framework

Orbital debris, as well as all o the comparable problems, is bestaddressed using a series o increasingly aggressive measures designed todiscourage the accidental or intentional creation o debris. Tis chapteroutlines a ramework that we developed to describe this step-by-step

approach.Te ramework, shown in Figure 5.1, is represented by a series oconcentric rings, where actions become more aggressive as they movetoward the center o the diagram. Tis concentric geometry high-lights an important eature o the approach: As the community movestoward the center (and increasingly aggressive deterrents), the size othe debris-generating population decreases with each inward step.

Te frst step in addressing orbital debrisor any o the compa-

rable problemsis to identiy, characterize, and bound the topic inquestion, as the problem cannot be addressed unless it is frst recog-nized and understood by the community as being an issue o concern.

Once the problem has been identifed, characterized, and bounded,the next step is to set normative behaviors that establish acceptableconduct. Most entities will abide by established norms simply becausethey exist, and this is usually an eective frst step toward reducing thenumber o entities engaging in unwanted behavior.

Te United States Pollution Prevention Act o 1990 is a goodexample o an action that clearly defnes some normative behaviors.Tis act established the ollowing expectations:


46/157


Pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever

easible; pollution that cannot be prevented should be recycled inan environmentally sae manner whenever easible; pollution thatcannot be prevented or recycled should be treated in an environ-mentally sae manner whenever easible; and disposal or otherrelease into the environment should be employed as a last resortand should be conducted in an environmentally sae manner.(United States Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2000)

In the case o orbital debris, the established behavioral norm isthat most countries have agreed not to pollute the space environmenti they can avoid doing so. Tis norm is merely a suggestion; there arecurrently no direct legal or fnancial penalties or littering in space.However, the U.S. space community has adopted this practice on goodaith and does not purposeully release debris into the environment.

Norms tend to discourage unwanted behavior, but some individ-uals or groups will continue to out them. o discourage these wrong-

doers, the next step is to establish mitigation practices, which may con-sist o any combination o rules, regulations, standards, incentives, or

Figure 5.1Framework Stages via Concentric Rings

RAND MG1042-5.1

Remediate

Iden

tify/char

acterize/bound

Establi

shnormativebehavio

rs

Mitigate


47/157

A Framework for Addressing Orbital Debris and the Comparable Problems 17

penalties. Tese incentive structures are usually very eective at reduc-ing, while not necessarily eliminating, the population o rule-breakers.

Currently, orbital debris mitigation occurs via a number o guide-lines that have been established by NASA, the United Nations, andthe European Space Agency. For example, in 1993 NASA published alist o guidelines that uture U.S. space missions should observe. Tebehaviors mentioned on the list include the ollowing suggested prac-tices: tethering lens caps, venting spent rocket bodies ater separation,and minimizing the use o explosive bolts (NASA, 1993). In practice,U.S. corporations have adopted these measures, and these items are

now inspected as part o the fnal readiness review or every spacecratlaunched rom the United States. I the spacecrat does not conorm tothese rules, it is not allowed to launch.

Tese mitigation practices have been quite eective. Beore thesemeasures were adopted, debris caused by exploding spent rocket bodieswas the largest contributor to the overall debris population (Prasad,2005). Te rate o incidents or the current generation o spacecrat hasbeen nearly eliminated because o the adoption o these measures.

Te fnal step in addressing the problem is remediation. Norma-tive behavior and mitigation will deter most o the community romengaging in unwanted behavior, but there will always be a handul orule-breakers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, remediation is areactionary measure oten designed to undo catastrophic damage thathas occurred. When a problem is in remediation, the aim is to eitherrelocate the problems source to a place where it poses less risk or elimi-

nate it entirely. Currently, there are not any cost-eective, operationaltechniques or remediating orbital debris.One example rom the list o comparable problems that is cur-

rently in remediation is airline security. As a result o the 11 September2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. military jets are now scrambled i a planeis hijacked and there is sucient evidence to suggest that the planemay be used as a weapon o mass destruction. One remedy, howevergrim, would be the decision to use an F-16 to shoot down the plane as

a last resort. Tis is a targeted solution to a specifc problem, to be usedonly ater terrorists gain control o a plane. Tis remedy would serve torelocate the problem and minimize the number o innocent deaths by


48/157


grounding the plane over a region that is less dense with population orindustrial activity. As this example demonstrates, remedies can be an

important last-ditch contingency option. However, remedies need tobe preceded by mitigation, and then tested and proven eective beorethey can be deployed.

Te 2010 DH oil spill is one example where several remedieswere ineective because they had not been tested in real world condi-tions. Te shuto valves that were designed to close the wellhead in theevent o an accident ailed to engage. In addition, the oil containmentdomedeveloped in the 1970s to contain spills in shallow waters

initially ailed to work because it was not designed or use at a depth o5,000 eet (Krauss and Saulny, 2010).

Progressing Through the Stages

In practice, the stages outlined in Figure 5.1 are designed or usetogether to develop an eective way to address the problem. Even as

new, more aggressive measures are enacted, decisionmakers should con-tinue to iterate the actions represented by the outer rings, and the les-sons gleaned rom these iterative attempts can be expected to improveoutcomes over time.

Te approach must also be exible, because the problem willinevitably evolve, even as the solution is implemented. New contribut-ing actors to a problem may be discovered, which then require addi-

tional mitigation or remedies.

Incorporating the Concept of Risk

Te approach shown in Figure 5.1 describes a ramework that can beused to address orbital debris as well as each o the comparable prob-lems. However, it does not provide an explanation o how this strat-egy should be implemented over time. For example, when should deci-sionmakers conclude that behavioral norms are insucient and begin


49/157


implementing mitigation actions? Te answer to this question dependson the communitys tolerance or risk.1

Consider a decisionmaker who oversees a eet o vehicles chargedwith transporting a benign chemical substance. Te transport vehiclesare several years old and occasionally ail, spilling their contents all overthe road. Te substance is considered to be harmless to living species,so the community is generally tolerant o these spills. Te only per-ceived threat that these spills pose is the resulting trac jam.

In this example, the community will remain indefnitely justinside the Establish Normative Behaviors ring shown in Figure 5.1.

Te eet manageralong with the communityexpects the driversto abide by the rules o the road, but as long as the spills remain occa-sional and accidental, the community is willing to accept them as aact o lie.

Te let-hand plot in Figure 5.2 represents such a scenario. Teblue line represents the rate o chemical spills (assumed to be constantthrough time in this example), and the green line is a notional levelo the communitys tolerance or these spills. Te spills occur less re-quently than the publics notional risk threshold, so nothing else willbe done to address this problem. In this scenario, normative behaviorsare perceived as adequately addressing the problem, and no urtheractions are taken.

However, suppose that one day a leading scientist presents con-vincing evidence that contact with the transported chemical may causeimmediate death in certain individuals. Tis development causes the

community to change its risk tolerance: People want the requency ospills reduced by hal.

1 For the purpose o this research, we used Williss defnition o risk, which (paraphrased)is the threat o an unwanted atereect (Willis et al., 2005). I the risk eventually turns intoreality, the consequences may be realized as (or example) lost revenue, reduced capability,or loss o an asset. Risk can be subdivided into perceived or actuarial risk, both o which can

inuence a problem. For this research, we will reer to risk only in a general sense, meaningthat it can be either perceived or actuarial. We acknowledge that the distinction is important,but speciying this level o detail or each o the analogous problems is outside the scope othis work.


50/157


Te middle plot in Figure 5.2 represents this scenario. Te sci-entists announcement (the critical event) is represented by the stepunction in the green curve. Ater the announcement, the communitysacceptable level o chemical spills (shown in green) suddenly decreases.Te eet manager is now aced with a crisis.

o address this problem, the decisionmaker needs to proceed tothe next ring in Figure 5.1, Mitigate. He sets aside a portion o hisbudget or vehicle repair, and he authorizes his drivers to use the undto maintain their vehicles. He also issues a new rule: Any driver whodoes not maintain his vehicle will be dismissed.

Te right-hand plot in Figure 5.2 represents the result o thispolicy. It takes some time ater the scientists announcement or thedecisionmaker to ormulate and implement a mitigation policy, but his

drivers start maintaining their vehicles, and chemical spills are even-tually cut by hal. Because the spill rate now alls below the notionaltolerance level set by the community, the problem has been adequatelyaddressed using mitigation.

While this example is a simple problem with a straightorwardsolution, it helps to highlight some important concepts o the rame-work outlined in Figure 5.1:

Decisionmakers must proceed to the next stage when theexisting level o unwanted behavior exceeds the communitysrisk tolerance level. In this case, mitigation practices were estab-

Figure 5.2Risk Tolerance Versus Undesirable Behaviors (Simple Cases)

RAND MG1042-5.2

Rateofchemical

spills

Time Time Time

Communitys

toleranceforrate

ofchemicalspills

Criticalevent

Criticalevent


51/157


lished, and they successully addressed the problem. However,had these practices only been marginally successul, the deci-

sionmaker would have needed additional mitigation eorts, orhe would have needed to proceed to the next ring to pursue aremedy.

Eliminating the problem is not necessarily the primary objec-tive. Te primary goal is only to reduce it beneath the communi-tys risk tolerance level. I the decisionmaker tried to eliminate allchemical spills, he might risk bankrupting the company trying todo so. As long as the requency o spills remains below the toler-

ance level, the solution is considered adequate, and no additionaleort is needed.

As mitigation measures are enacted, behavioral norms arestill at work. Even ater the decisionmaker institutes a mitigationpolicy, he still expects his drivers to engage in normative behav-iors by abiding by the rules o the road. Te result is a compoundeect: When implemented together, normative behaviors, mitiga-tion practices, and direct remedies can oten result in an eectivesolution.

Describing Additional Levels of Complexity

Te example cited in the previous section is relatively simplistic, but thisramework can be adapted to more complex (and realistic) scenarios.

In the hypothetical chemical spill example, neither the spill rate

nor the communitys tolerance or spills is likely to remain constantover time. Tis concept is illustrated in the let-hand plot o Figure5.3. Te maximum depicted by the blue line could have been causedby external circumstances, such as a harsh winter that prompted moreaccidents than usual.

One might assume that the community would become weary othe spills and its tolerance would automatically decrease over time, butthis is not necessarily the case. In this example (Figure 5.3, let-hand

plot), the tolerance level gradually increases as people realize that deathby contact is an exceedingly rare occurrence. In act, it is also possible


52/157


that the communitys tolerance or these spills will increase over time ithe local media simply ceases to report them.

In other circumstances, sudden critical events could have a dominoeect: Tey could simultaneously raise the spill rate and decrease thetolerance threshold. Tis is shown in the middle plot o Figure 5.3.In a short time ater the critical event, the tolerance levels could dropto unreasonably low levels, only to recover ater the anomalous eventbegins to ade rom the communitys collective memory. Te DH is agood example o such an event. In the days immediately ater the spill,the U.S. government issued a moratorium on deepwater drilling. How-ever, this act will likely be eased as the country begins to recover andmitigate against uture events.

Finally, sometimes it might take several steps o mitigation (or

premeditative) eorts beore the problem is properly addressed. Tisconcept is illustrated in the right-hand plot o Figure 5.3. When theeet managers frst response did not suciently reduce the problembelow the tolerance threshold, he was orced to take additional action:He replaced the oldest vehicles in the eet with new ones.

Figure 5.3Risk Tolerance Versus Undesirable Behaviors (Complex Cases)

RAND MG1042-5.3

Rateofchemical

spills

Time Time Time

Communitys

toleranceforrate

ofchemicalspills

Critical

event

Critical

event


53/157

23

CHAPTER SIX

Analysis: Comparing the Timeline of Orbital

Debris with the Timelines of the ComparableProblems

In the previous chapter, we used a notional example o chemical spillsto describe the conditions under which a eet manager would moverom relying on behavioral norms to implementing mitigation actions.In this chapter, we present a series o timelines that depict how orbitaldebris and the nine comparable problems have progressed through the

stages o identifcation, establishing behavioral norms, mitigation, andremediation.

As we mentioned at the beginning o Chapter Tree, we are usingthe ollowing nine comparable problems or this analysis: acid rain, air-line security, asbestos, CFCs, hazardous waste, oil spills, radon, spam,and U.S. border control. As we mentioned earlier, a general amiliaritywith these topics is sucient or understanding the analysis presentedin this chapter, but a brie overview o each o these topics is providedin Appendix A. In addition, a detailed summary on the current statuso each problem is provided in Appendix B.

Relative Timelines

When evaluating orbital debris and the comparable examples, it is

helpul to compare how the problems have evolved in time relativeto one another. o do this, we conducted a literature survey on eacho the comparable problems. We then determined the length o time


54/157


spent in each stage (problem identifcation, establishment o norma-tive behaviors, mitigation, and remediation) based on research rom

periodical sources, legislative records, and court rulings. We also con-sulted existing analyses rom the Congressional Research Service, theUnited States Government Accountability Oce (GAO), and theRAND Corporation. Te events associated with each problem werethen visualized in a timeline ormat using a sotware package designedor this purpose. Finally, we inspected each timeline and made a judg-ment about the approximate year in which each problem entered a newstage. All o the reerences that we used or this task are listed by topic

in the Works Consulted or imelines section at the end o this doc-ument. Te result is shown in Figure 6.1, and it provides a notionalcomparison that shows how each o the problems progressed throughthe our stages.

It is important to note that previous stages do not stop occurringwhen a new one begins. Tis is because these problems continue toevolve, and the entire strategyincluding all o the stages enacted tothe current pointmust adapt to these changes. For example, bordercontrol is shown in remediation since the early 1900s, but, even today,the community continues to reidentiy the problem, develop norma-

Figure 6.1Notional Comparison of Concentric Ring Progression over Time AcrossOrbital Debris and Comparables

RAND MG1042-6.1

Border controlAsbestos

Oil spills

Orbital debris

Acid rain

Airline security

CFCs

Hazardous waste

Spam

Radon

1860 1910 1960 2010

Identify/characterize/bound

Normative behaviors

Mitigate

Remediate


55/157

Analysis 25

tive behaviors, and implement mitigation strategies to address the latestdevelopments.

Te geometry o the bar chart also suggests that a fnite boundaryexists between each o the stages, but this is generally not the case. Formany o the problems, the change rom behavioral norms to mitigationor rom mitigation to remediation did not happen at a discrete momentin time. Instead, transitions occurred over a series o months or yearsas legislation or court rulings (or example) were refned or updated.

We used our best judgment to determine where these breaksshould occur, based on the list o reerences that we researched. How-

ever, these transitions are approximate and are only meant to provide agraphical representation o the relative progress between the dierentproblems. We did not create this chart with the intent o pinpointingthe exact year in which a problem entered a new stage.1

Te chart shown in Figure 6.1 is useul because it shows the rela-tive lietime or all o the comparable problems. Border control isby arthe oldest issue, while spam and radon are newer problems,by comparison. A closer inspection o the chart yields the ollowingobservations:

It may take several years to identiy the problem. Tere areseveral reasons why this may be the case. First, there may be dis-agreement within the community on whether or not a problemactually exists. In addition, identiying the problem may be di-fcult because o poor measurement techniques or insucient

communication within the community. When the frst asbestosexposure cases were tried in court, there was evidence that themanuacturers had known about the dangers o asbestos exposureas early as the 1930s (Carroll et al., 2005). Finally, it may take awhile or a phenomenon to reach a critical mass beore it is con-sidered a problem. For example, the frst piece o spam was sentin May 1978, but spam did not become a serious problem untilthe Internet linked large numbers o personal computers together.

1 o emphasize the act that these transitions are approximate, the horizontal axis has beenlabeled in 25-year increments instead o in 5- or 10-year increments.

8/7/2019 Confronting SpaCe DebriS Strat

Documents

Confronting SpaCe DebriS StrategieS and WarningS from Comparable exampleS inCluding deepWater Horizon