University of Groningen

Challenging conflicting discourses of climate changeFleming, Aysha; Vanclay, Frank; Hiller, Claire ; Wilson, Stephen

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DOI:10.1007/s10584-014-1268-z

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Challenging dominant discourses of climate change

Aysha Fleming, Frank Vanclay, Claire Hiller and Stephen Wilson Dr Aysha Fleming Research Officer, Science Into Society Group, CSIRO, Castray Esplanade, Battery Point, 7001, Tasmania, AUSTRALIA Prof Frank Vanclay (corresponding author) Head, Department of Cultural Geography, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, THE NETHERLANDS Phone: +31-50 363 8657 Fax: +31-50 363 3901 Email: frank.vanclay@rug.nl Dr Claire Hiller Consultant, Sandy Bay, Tasmania, AUSTRALIA Dr Stephen Wilson Tasmanian Institute of Agriculture, University of Tasmania, Sandy Bay, Tasmania, AUSTRALIA ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This work was undertaken while the first two authors were at the Tasmanian Institute of Agriculture at the University of Tasmania. Financial support was provided by CSIRO’s Climate Adaptation Flagship. Thanks to Dr Mark Howden for comments on an earlier version of the paper. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: Aysha Fleming is now a Research Officer with CSIRO’s Science Into Society Group. The research was undertaken as part of her PhD at the University of Tasmania. Frank Vanclay is now professor of cultural geography at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. At the time of the research, he was professor of rural sociology at the University of Tasmania. Claire Hiller is now a consultant, but was previously associated with the School of Education at the University of Tasmania. Stephen Wilson is associated with the Tasmanian Institute of Agriculture at the University of Tasmania.

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Challenging dominant discourses of climate change

ABSTRACT

The influence of language on communication about climate change is well recognised,

but this understanding is under-utilised by those seeking to increase uptake of action for

climate change. We discuss the terms, discourse, resistance, and agency, to assist in

developing ways to progress social action for climate change. Using a review of

academic literature about climate change, we explore three of the many dominant

discourses that constrain action: the logical action discourse; the complexity discourse;

and the culture of consumption discourse. While there are more discourses about

climate change, especially in the popular literature, the ways these three operate in the

peri-scientific sphere is under-recognised. We suggest that by examining the different

framings of climate change, there is potential to create novel discourses and to start new

processes of societal response. This paper challenges the dominant scientific framing of

climate change and seeks to begin the process of creating change through changing

discourses.

KEYWORDS: climate discourses; discourse analysis; subject positioning; science

communication; public understanding of science

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Challenging dominant discourses of climate change

1 INTRODUCTION

Climate change research continues to produce an information explosion. The diversity

and volume of information means that different understandings of climate change

abound as individuals struggle to make sense of it all. Sarewitz (2004, p.389) warns

that: “those holding different value perspectives may see in the huge and diverse body

of scientific information relevant to climate change different facts, theories, and

hypothesis [sic] relevant to and consistent with their own normative frameworks”. It is

therefore appropriate to think about how ideas and discourses about climate change gain

currency, and how these discourses help or hinder action in response to climate change.

Various discourses of climate change are created within different social groups using

different types of language and privileging different concepts. For example, climate

change is constructed differently by science (Sarewitz 2004); the media (Boykoff 2008;

Carvalho 2007; Ahchong and Dodds 2012); politics (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007;

Oels 2005); environmental education (Clover and Hill 2003); and different groups

within society (Ratter et al. 2012). Each social group or discipline advocates one way of

constructing climate change over others. Each also generally refuses to acknowledge the

existence of others. There is potential to create change through enhanced awareness of

the multiple framings and by challenging the dominant discourses (Hardy et al. 2000;

Gatenby and Hume 2004; Lejano et al. 2013).

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Post-structural theory is concerned with language, the effects of language, and

alternative possibilities for thought (Foucault 1972; Kress 1985). The way language is

used in relation to climate change has important consequences, which are currently not

sufficiently recognised (Pettenger 2007). As an alternative to positivist or psychological

approaches, post-structural theory advocates examination of discourse to understand

behaviour, rather than examining attitudes, perceptions, and opinions. Post-structural

theory contends that individuals are constituted within discourse(s) and that discourses

are an opportunity for change (Hajer 1995).

Accounts of discourses of climate change have been provided in many papers, including

and amongst others (in chronological order): Kempton (1991, 1997); Weingart et al.

(2000); Adger et al. (2001); Feindt and Oels (2005); Hajer and Versteeg (2005);

Lindseth (2005); Etkin and Ho (2007); Lorenzoni et al. (2007); Hulme (2009); Risbey

(2008); Doulton and Brown (2009); Malone (2009); Fleming and Vanclay (2010);

Boykoff et al. (2010), Nerlich et al. (2010); Arora-Jonsson (2011); Hoffman (2011); and

Hobson and Niemeyer (2011). In general, however, while discourses are identified, the

ideas are not developed further. For example, Hulme (2009) discusses four ways of

narrating the significance of climate change. Although described as ‘discourses’ in the

preface to the book, Hulme did not focus on how subject positions and opportunities for

social change were constructed or constrained.

Our paper adds to these accounts by applying post-structural theories of agency and

change (Foucault 1972; Kress 1985). Our approach was to undertake a discourse

analysis based on a critical reading of academic papers on climate change, and to

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discuss how the discourses we identified and their corresponding subject positions

might influence perspectives on climate change communication.We argue that an

awareness of the multiple possibilities of discourse can begin the process of creating

new discourses. Effective promotion of change at individual, community and

government levels is essential to limit the negative effects of climate change and to

enable vulnerable communities to adapt. By discussing three examples of discourses of

climate change, this paper demonstrates the importance of language in framing the

actions able to be considered. We emphasise that there are many discourses of climate

change, not all of which can be discussed here.

2 DISCOURSE, RESISTANCE AND AGENCY

The terms ‘discourse’, ‘resistance’ and ‘agency’ are central to post-structural

interpretations. They have varying meanings in different contexts and disciplines such

as communication studies, education, environmental studies, and sociology. Also,

academic understandings do not necessarily align with public understandings of these

terms. Although all have been used in relation to climate change, their meanings are

unstable because they are contested by other discourses that also use the terms (Gee

2003).

Discourse refers not to language as simple conversation, but rather to everything that

language use entails, including the active construction of thoughts, identities, and

actions (Foucault 1972, 1980; Gee 2003; Kress 1985). Discourse “provides a set of

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possible statements about a given area, and organises and gives structure to the manner

in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about. … it provides

descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions of social and individual action” (Kress

1985, p.7).

Although the term ‘resistance’ is usually applied to inaction or refusal to act, and is

perceived as a problem to overcome, in post-structural theory resistance becomes a

potential site for change, “the means through which individuals change social processes

and structures and build alternatives” (Sage 2007, p.4707). Thus, resistance can be a

positive process as part of the social processes that create change. Reasons for

resistance occur at the level of individual, infrastructure and societal norms, but

resistance also occurs at the level of discourse. Arguably there is little value in

examining individual, infrastructural or normative causes of resistance without

exploring discourse, because discourse influences all of these.

Agency is how an individual is able to act, and includes awareness of options and

personal capacity to implement those options. In essence, agency equates to action, but

it is social discourses that create possibilities for individual action, because context

shapes opportunities for action. Individuals contribute to social discourses and therefore

influence their own futures. However, individual agency is not possible without access

to resisting discourses that demonstrate how resistance at the level of discourse is

positive and leads to agency and change (Darier 1999; Hardy et al. 2000; Gatenby and

Hume 2004).

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3 CLIMATE DISCOURSES

By applying the concepts of discourse, resistance and agency to climate change and by

taking three examples, we illustrate how dominant discourses are currently constraining

possibilities for thinking about action among different groups within society. As part of

a study into communication of climate change to farmers (Fleming and Vanclay 2009,

2010), literature was gathered over several years on anything that could be considered

relevant to climate change communication and agriculture across a range of disciplines,

including climate science, science communication, environmental sociology,

environmental education and media studies. Over the whole research process – i.e.

gathering literature, data collection (interviews with farmers and climate scientists), data

analysis, attending conferences, and writing papers, ideas about how the discourses

influenced action were developed.

During the development of these ideas and in the process of identifying discourses, it

became apparent that some discourses were readily recognisable and recognised, while

others were less clear and not widely acknowledged. Discourses around social

marketing, environmental education, the green movement and vegetarianism, for

example, were already receiving considerable academic attention. Nevertheless, action

on climate change was still constrained. Therefore, from the many discourses of climate

change we identified, we selected three indicative discourses which we thought

provided good examples of how discourses can subconsciously constrain wider action in

a way that warranted closer critical attention.

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The three discourses we selected related to concerns about: (1) a problem of a lack of

information; (2) a problem of a lack of clear science; and (3) a problem created by a

consumerist society. For convenience, we called them the ‘logical action discourse’, the

‘complexity discourse’, and the ‘culture of consumption discourse’. These three

discourses were chosen because they appeared to us to be particularly powerful in

constraining active social action for climate change because they emphasized: (1) the

need for more science, so society cannot act until more is known; (2) confusion, so

individuals cannot be sure they are doing the right thing; and (3) the need for extreme

change to society, which is difficult for individuals to implement alone. Each of these

three discourses has different consequences for how people are able to think and act.

They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and although there are similarities, there is

a unique storyline in each.

We stress that we are not criticizing the publications that co-construct the discourses or

the underlying understandings, rather we seek to reveal how the presentation of

arguments within these discourses may hinder rather than advance action in responding

to climate change. We also note that publications on climate change extend beyond

academic papers to popular works and the general media. Discourse analyses of such

material has been completed by many others (e.g. Hulme 2009) and so our approach is

to focus on the rarely-critiqued academic literature. The aim of our paper is to

encourage people to challenge these and other discourses in order to create new

possibilities for thought and action.

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An important concept in discourse analysis, ‘subject positioning’, refers to how each

discourse emplaces and empowers, or disempowers, individuals within the discourse

(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). In our discussion of each discourse, we highlight the

respective subject positions in order to highlight opportunities for contestation and

change.

4 THE LOGICAL ACTION DISCOURSE

A dominant construction of climate change presents the need for more information, or

at least the need for a better understanding of available information, as the most

significant barrier to what it presumes would be logical action in response to climate

change. Climate change presents an urgent reason for change in the eyes of many

influential authors (e.g. Stern 2007). The long-established diffusion of innovations

model (Rogers 1962) presents a way to understand social response to the need for

behaviour change in a way that is attractive to policymakers (Pannell et al. 2006). The

diffusion of innovations model has similarities to the information deficit model (Potter

and Oster 2008) because both assume a direct link between information and behaviour

change. Sociology has refuted this assumption for decades (Wynne 1991, 1992;

Vanclay and Lawrence 1994; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Vanclay 2004), yet in the climate

change arena the assumption that the lack of information is the most important obstacle

in the way of otherwise logical action remains a dominant discourse (Potter and Oster

2008; Moser and Dilling 2007).

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Related to the discourse of logical action are two key issues of persuasion and personal

capacity, which underpin a core assumption of the logical action discourse that

responsive action is (or should be) the logical outcome of the provision of appropriate

information. Persuasion refers to the notion that scientific information is the only

correct source of information and a critical component in catalysing change. The belief

is that scientists have an obligation to influence the public through the provision of

information. Because of differences between people, the information may need to be

targeted differently in order to effectively influence various groups of people to bring

about change. This is illustrated in the following extract: “Information is necessary, but

not likely to be sufficient, to bring about change. What is critical, however, is the way

that information is conveyed to different stakeholder groups” (Milne et al. 2008, p.91).

Persuasion also emphasises the need for credible messengers (Cole and Watrous 2007)

or opinion leaders (Nisbet and Kotcher 2009; Keys et al. 2010), and for appealing and

manageable pieces of information (McKenzie-Mohr and Smith 1999).

Personal capacity, the second key issue in the logical action discourse, regards the

personal context of individuals as being critical in influencing change. Personal capacity

includes various contextual factors such as: (1) the availability of the physical resources

required to change, e.g. time, money, infrastructure, and technology; (2) the

characteristics of the change process, e.g. risk, convenience, ease, flexibility, and

divisibility; and (3) personal orientation to change, e.g. motivation, risk acceptance,

access to support networks, and other individual character traits and skills (Moser and

Dilling 2007). Personal capacity (or rather the lack of capacity) regards behaviour

change as being difficult, constrained by ‘barriers to change’, and as requiring a range

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of steps to address. The primary important step is the provision of information. Thus,

the ability to source information and the skills to apply it to one’s own context are major

issues of personal capacity. Both persuasion and personal capacity rely on the

assumption central to the logical action discourse that change is a logical and natural

response to reflection on the scientifically-endorsed information. This means that it is

expected that, once the appropriate information about the issue and required change has

been persuasively conveyed, action should directly follow if there is sufficient personal

capacity to act.

4.1 Subject positions in the logical action discourse: laggards lacking resources

The diffusion of innovations model (Rogers 1962) labels individuals who are slow to

change as ‘laggards’, often associating them with a lack of capacity (Vanclay 2004;

Vanclay et al. 2009). This is illustrated in the logical action discourse where resistance

to change is seen as being the result of an individual having insufficient information, a

lack of understanding of available information, or an incapacity to act. In the logical

action discourse, individuals are positioned as passive recipients of information who

should respond to expert information with immediate change, regardless of their

personal context. Society is understood to be heterogeneous, and it is accepted that there

is no single type of information that will encourage all people to change. Instead, it is

necessary to tailor and target information to different groups and, ideally, information

for each group should be communicated from an accepted and familiar source. It should

also be clearly relevant and easily applied (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001; Moser and

Dilling 2007). Therefore, skilled communicators are required to translate the

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information, and thus a failure by the public to respond positively is seen as a failure of

the information or its communication. In the logical action discourse, externally-

produced and communicated information is essential, because individuals are not

recognised as being capable of producing their own reasons or methods for change.

Therefore, if individuals understand and accept information but do not respond, it is

because they lack the necessary resources or personal capacity to change. The discourse

of logical action privileges behaviour change at the level of the individual rather than

society.

Behaviour models (e.g. Rogers 1962) usually ignore the connections between an

individual’s capacity to act and power, particularly in terms of the differential power of

institutions, social networks, cultures and languages. Information is an important

element of behaviour change, but it can also be argued that the socio-cultural factors of

discourse are more important in shaping, constraining and creating behaviour (Sturgis

and Allum 2004; Potter and Oster 2008).

The considerations that shape behaviour are complex and inter-related, and are based on

language and social processes, which are not properly acknowledged by the logical

action discourse. Examining the individual characteristics of people, behaviours, or the

quality of information without connection to wider social, political, cultural and

historical constructions of discourse is not an adequate way to understand behaviour or

to create change (Vanclay 2004; Feindt and Oels 2005). We contend that the logical

action discourse limits possibilities for thinking about climate change and for taking up

action because of its over-emphasis on individual deficits.

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5 THE COMPLEXITY DISCOURSE

In the complexity discourse, climate change is promoted as complex because climate

research, the dissemination and comprehension of information, and behaviour change,

all represent wicked problems. Problems termed ‘wicked’ are those which are especially

interrelated and complex. This complexity means that actions intended to address

climate change can appear difficult, overwhelming or pointless (Hulme 2009, Moser

and Dilling 2007). An example of this discourse is the following extract: “climate

change is a very complex, pervasive and uncertain phenomenon, generally difficult for

people to conceptualise and to relate to their daily activities, arguably because it cannot

be easily translated into the language of popular culture” (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006,

p.74).

The complexity discourse presents climate change as a highly-specialised science, as a

totality in itself, but also as being compartmentalised into various subgroups, e.g.

associated with oceans, land masses, or the atmosphere. This discourse emphasises that

there are diverse and interrelated effects of climate on the environment and on people,

with multiple layers of possible interactive responses in both mitigation and adaptation

to climate change. Furthermore, these effects occur over long timescales (decades and

centuries), thus cause-and-effect connections are difficult to establish and not likely to

be experienced in an individual’s lifetime (Moser and Dilling 2007).

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In the complexity discourse, there is a tendency to detail the multiple areas of

complexity involved with climate change, to indicate that climate change is complex but

to create an awareness (belief) that it can be managed if issues are simplified and

resolved separately (Moser and Dilling 2007). This converts a seemingly-impossible,

gargantuan task into an easier task of dealing with a multitude of smaller but

manageable problems.

Two key issues in the discourse of complexity are uncertainty and misunderstanding. A

focus on the uncertainty of climate change and the complexity of interpreting climate

data is common (Mearns 2010). In most cases, the uncertainty is integral to the science

and relates to notions of statistical probability and confidence intervals rather than to

any diminution of scientific validity. Nevertheless, perceived uncertainty emphasises

complexity, which is promoted by the media to create controversy and debate and thus

generate a market for news (Carvalho 2007).

Emphasis on uncertainty and the need for more science to create more knowledge

commonly occurs in the complexity discourse, as demonstrated by: “Troubles in

translating this consensus in climate science have led to the appearance of amplified

uncertainty and debate, also then permeating public and policy discourse” (Boykoff

2008, p.1).

The complexity discourse emphasises uncertainty as a normal part of the production of

science, but it is an uncertainty not properly understood by non-scientific audiences

(Hulme 2009). With uncertainty comes confusion and misunderstanding (Bord et al.

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2000; Kempton et al. 1995). Well-publicised misunderstandings around climate science

include: the difference between ‘the hole in the ozone layer’ and climate change;

weather and climate; climate change and environmental pollution/acid rain; and

adaptation and mitigation. The complexity discourse uses these misunderstandings as

evidence that the public is confused and requires more education. The discord between

public and scientific understandings of uncertainty, probability, confidence and risk is

regarded as a problem to be resolved, rarely taking into account the possibility that the

differing values and belief systems that produce these understandings are irreconcilable.

The complexity discourse also emphasises complexity in communication:

“Communication about climate change is as complex as the science” (Chess and

Johnson 2007, p.223). The range and inconsistent use of terms adds to the confusion. In

order to overcome complexity, the discourse promotes the view that a better

understanding of the key terminology is required. This strategy fails to acknowledge

that words tend to change meanings within different discourses, so education of specific

terms and concepts to reduce complexity is futile. A better approach would be to

promote an awareness of meaning within context and within discourse, and to promote

awareness of the concept of discourse in general, and the range of discourses relating to

climate change.

5.1 Subject positions in the complexity discourse: ignorant and sceptic

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People required to act on climate change are constructed within the complexity

discourse as being, at best, sceptic1 and, at worst, ignorant and insufficiently skilled to

comprehend the complexity of climate change information without significant

assistance. A society ignorant of the proper facts about climate change is expected to

come to simplistic and incorrect conclusions. Individuals are perceived as not being able

to relate scientific knowledge to their own situations in ways that might be legitimate,

valuable or important, because the information is seen as being too complex for them.

The complexity discourse promotes the complexity of climate change as a problem to

be overcome (Potter and Oster 2008). It deems the most appropriate solution as being to

increase the funding available for, and the amount of, information and communication

about climate change. However, because the essence of the message perpetuates the

discourse, perversely this strategy perpetuates uncertainty and misunderstandings

(Ungar 2000).

In the complexity discourse, people who resist action to address climate change are

labelled as sceptics because they fail to accept the climate science justification for

change. Although in ‘science’ generally, scepticism is a key component of scientific

rigour and engagement with data, in the complexity discourse the wider society is not

seen as being an authorised participant and not given the authority to participate in the

legitimation (and delegitimation) of information. This means that if people are sceptical,

it is the result of either a social failure in that the media has failed to adequately

communicate the information from science, or an individual failure where a person has 1 ‘Sceptic’ is meant as a neutral term here in its original understanding as a person inclined to question. Although sceptics are generally caricatured negatively by climate science, we point out that the sociology of climate scepticism is quite complex and sophisticated, see Lahsen (2013).

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failed to adequately comprehend and/or act on the information they have been provided.

The clash between science and the media creates different perceptions of the same

information because “forms of filtering and reinterpreting information about climate

change are rooted in, and reproduce, profoundly divergent value systems” (Carvalho

2007, p.239). We contend the complexity discourse limits action for climate change by

over-emphasizing uncertainty and complexity, by failing to accept that individuals have

agency, and it therefore contributes to promulgating misunderstanding and confusion.

6 THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION DISCOURSE

The culture of consumption discourse emphasises that climate change is highly linked

to current social attitudes about lifestyles, consumption habits and environmental values

(Tjernström and Tietenberg 2008; Hulme 2009). In this discourse, climate change is a

problem caused by materialism and consumerism, as represented in the excerpt: “We

have created a society that is totally geared toward generating wealth and satisfaction”

(Röling 2003, p.77). Because of this, climate change can be addressed only by changing

culture, as demonstrated by the comment that “ultimately, the greatest potential for a

shift towards sustainable lifestyles might be through a change in culture – that is, a shift

in assumptions about human nature, our relationship with the world around us, the

nature of human society, and our aspirations for the Good Life” (Michaelis 2007,

p.258). In the culture of consumption discourse, current cultural norms are seen as being

so entrenched that a significant event, such as a major natural disaster, is needed to

catalyse action and a re-evaluation of culture at individual and societal levels. Without

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such a catalyst, society is seen to be doomed to continue to ignore serious

environmental problems and the possibility of catastrophic climate change in the blind

pursuit of consumption.

Within this discourse, addressing climate change presents a threat to the ideology of

consumerism and will be resisted. This is despite clear links between consumer demand

for products and the causes of climate change. “Important environmental threats,

including climate change, can be directly linked to production of commodities” (von

Moltke cited in Clover 2003, p.8). The culture of consumption discourse provides many

examples where over-consumption is seen as central to the climate change problem. For

example, consumer attention is drawn to food miles, waste, excessive packaging, and

our insatiable appetite for cheap products. People are berated for their travel behaviour,

especially their personal vehicle use and air travel.

Two key issues prevalent in this discourse are the power of consumerism, and

individualism. Individualism is the ideology of the primacy of the individual, where

each person is positioned as being an individual and as having the capacity to make

individually-rational choices. The irony is that while individualism ostensibly accepts

diversity, it tends to fashion everyone as being similar. By locating decision making at

the level of individual consumer, each person tends to make decisions that support the

status quo. Individualism thus creates resistance to climate change, because, in this

framing, fundamental change, especially cultural change, is hard to attain.

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Consumerism creates resistance to addressing climate change because the values of

competition, capitalism and consumption are actively promoted and widely accepted

around the world. Western culture is seen as being built on a foundation of capitalism,

and success is equated with wealth and power relative to others (Clover and Hill 2003;

Röling 2003). Issues of waste production, environmental degradation, pollution,

resource exhaustion, and the negative effects on human health caused by degraded

environments are largely ignored in the pursuit of consumerism, and are absent, or at

least marginalized, from social awareness and reflection. This discourse encourages us

to perceive humans as beyond, separate to, or outside, nature, but that we should also

accept that we are dependent on nature and the world’s ecosystems (Bowman 2009).

Because people don’t want to accept personal responsibility for climate change and/or

do not want to experience guilt – what Norgaard (2011) calls the social organization of

denial – the culture of consumption discourse creates resistance to the idea of climate

change. The placing of responsibility for climate change on individuals can be seen as

ethically contentious, as it assumes that everyone is equally responsible and equally

culpable (Agyeman et al. 2007). In effect, this legitimates individuals in their failure to

accept personal responsibility because they can blame others who consume even more.

One example of where individuals were made to experience a moral imperative to act

was in Al Gore’s (2006) book and movie, An Inconvenient Truth, which attempted to

link evidence of climate change at the broad scale to specific actions that can be

implemented by each person. It is argued that such moral imperatives are unlikely to be

effective (Markowitz and Shariff 2012) and Gore has been criticised for greenwashing

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(Luke 2008). Individualising actions to address climate change is problematic in this

discourse because the actions individuals can take can seem trivial (Princen et al. 2002),

as demonstrated in the excerpt: “Individuals are reluctant to act alone, and only too

aware that their individual actions will make [only] a minimal impact on large and

complex problems. Our actions are deeply embedded in the wider environment, and in

the habits and culture and social norms of those around us” (Hale 2010, p.262).

Actions are also inhibited by existing social structures and infrastructure (Potter and

Oster 2008). There is a lack of options that are convenient or comfortable, and therefore

resistance to changing behaviour is easily justified (Harrison et al. 1996). For example,

individuals might realise that they should not drive a car to work, but where public

transport is not readily available or unappealing, it is easy for people to accept they

don’t have an alternative. In the culture of consumption discourse, many people struggle

to see their personal role as part of a significant collective response to climate change

(Bateson 2007). Many factors – e.g. nationality, cultural identity, socio-economic status,

age, religion, gender – all influence how people feel they should act and how much they

are able to act (Carvajal-Escobar 2008; Lambrou and Piana 2006; MacGregor 2006;

Patt et al. 2009), yet in the culture of consumption discourse, every individual is

regarded in the same way, as an individual consumer and equal contributor to the

climate change problem.

6.1 Subject positions in the culture of consumption discourse: homogeneous

consumer

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In the culture of consumption discourse, different social groups are not positioned

differently to each other. Therefore, the particular concerns and capacities of various

groups are largely absent from this discourse. People are simply seen as being

ubiquitous consumers. Calls for action are likely to be ineffective because of beliefs that

no practical alternative exists, that one’s personal contribution is insignificant, and that

there are bigger polluters who are more responsible. Part of individuals ‘doing their bit’

and getting involved with their community, whether at the local or global level, relies

on a belief that others will also act, including other industries and other countries

(Bulkeley 2000). Understanding the cultural, social and political causes of behaviour is

limited, despite awareness that these wider understandings are vital in changing

behaviour (Moser and Dilling 2007).

7 CONCLUSION

The three discourses discussed in this paper construct climate change in different ways:

as a problem of a lack of information in the logical action discourse; as a problem of a

lack of clear science creating complexity in the complexity discourse; and as a problem

of consumerism in the culture of consumption discourse. While each discourse tends to

promote its own view as the sole authority about climate change (Kress 1985), they are

interlinked and overlapping. For example, in both the logical action and complexity

discourses, information is the central factor promoting change, and in both an inability

to understand information and to act on it is the fault of individuals limited by their own

22

personal incapacity. In the culture of consumption discourse, actions to promote change

tend to be lost in the requirements and tensions of a consumption-driven society.

The varying language usage of different social groups is not recognised by any of the

discourses. Furthermore, people other than scientists are generally not accepted as being

legitimate producers of knowledge, and their understandings of, and feelings about,

climate change are dismissed or ignored, despite growing acceptance that varying

localised, socially-constructed understandings of climate change are legitimate (Hulme

2009; Pettenger 2007; Potter and Oster 2008; Wynne 1989). The current cycle of

climate change information generation and communication excludes people from

relating to climate change in a personal or social way. It acts to exclude them from

producing and sharing their own knowledge, and from participating in evaluating

knowledge about climate change (Potter and Oster 2008).

Issues are understood differently across different discourses and the same problem can

both stimulate action in one discourse and/or inhibit it in another. People construct

meanings of climate change in their own terms (Bulkeley 2000) and the meaning of

unfamiliar terms is deduced within the discourses in which people are already

embedded. Whether the meaning that is constructed results in resistance to action or

opportunities to act is related to how individual subjectivity and agency are constructed

within each discourse, in other words, the way the discourse positions individuals (i.e.

the subject position).

23

Although each of the three discourses we presented largely constrain possibilities for

action, awareness of these limitations can allow new types of thinking by stimulating

new ways of talking about climate change that are more inclusive of a broader range of

social groups and concerns. We argue that the key contributor to positive change is to

recognise the power of language in shaping perceptions and actions, and to proactively

and reflexively use language to create new conditions. Once recognised, discourses can

be challenged and recreated so that new constructions of knowledge and more forms of

action are enabled. The first steps, however, are recognising the effects of language in

particular situations and using language that is more inclusive.

As the adage normally attributed to Einstein goes: “we cannot solve problems with the

same thinking that created them”. Discourses are powerful because they are easily

normalised and rendered invisible. When specific discourses are recognised and

challenged, exciting changes can occur – for example, a challenge to current hegemonic

discourses could result in new approaches to how we think about and use energy,

transport, services, work, food, etc. The first, most important step, however, is to see

how current ways of thinking may act to produce barriers which could be overcome

with a new approach. Different thinking and different approaches to research on climate

change that recognise and challenge the discourses they work within and contribute to

have the potential to stimulate action, and to break away from the traps set by older

discourses that perpetuate their own power. For the three discourses discussed here, the

traps we identified were: the need to continually produce more technical information

about climate change; the need to continue to elaborate and promote awareness of

climate change as a complex problem; and seeing the problem as being ingrained in

24

social structures which are essentially impossible to address. Better ways of motivating

people to effective action can be found when we reflect on and challenge the discourses

we embrace and when we start creating, legitimising and growing alternate discourses

which might be currently silenced or ignored.

25

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