Concurring & Dissenting Del Castillo

7/28/2019 Concurring & Dissenting Del Castillo

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EN BANC

Agenda for February 1, 2011Item No. 11

G.R. No. 193459 MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, versusTHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISAHONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYNPESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONGALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN,CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDREOLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OFPEOPLES LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON,

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OFGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); AND JAMES TERRY RIDON OFTHE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),Respondents.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,Respondent-Intervenor.

Promulgated on February 15, 2011x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and itcannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book ofmathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it

tends to become.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.The Common Law, Lecture 1 (1881)


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At the heart of this controversy is the interpretation of the rule enshrined in Article

XI, Sec. 3(5) of our Constitution, that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated

against the same official more than once within a period of one year. With due respect

to my esteemed colleague, Mme. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, I do not agree thatthere may be multiple complaints embraced in only one impeachment proceeding.

Recall that Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives1[1] involved two

impeachment complaints filed on separate occasions, the first of which had been resolved

long before the second complaint was filed. The first complaint was filed on June 2,

2003 by former President Joseph E. Estrada against then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,

Jr. and Associate Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno,

Antonio T. Carpio, Renato C. Corona, Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

Upon referral to the House Committee on Justice, the Committee ruled that the complaint

was sufficient in form, but voted for the dismissal of the complaint for being insufficient

in substance. Subsequently, a second complaint was filed on October 23, 2003 against

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., accompanied by the endorsement of at least one-

third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

The Court inFrancisco faced this question: when a first impeachment complaint

is filed against an impeachable officer, subsequently referred to the House Committee on

Justice, and then dismissed, may another impeachment complaint prosper? We said then

that from the moment that the first complaint was referred to the proper committee, the

filing of a second impeachment complaint was prohibited under paragraph 5, section 3 ofArticle XI of the Constitution. Though the first impeachment complaint was found to be

insufficient in substance, it still served as a bar to a subsequent complaint within the same

year.

1[1] 460 Phil. 830 (2003).


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The Court ruled that initiation [of an impeachment proceeding] takes place by the

act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House

Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the Houseof Representatives with the Secretary General of the House x x x2[2] Thus, [o]nce an

impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be

filed against the same official within a one year period.3[3] It was on that basis that the

Supreme Court invalidated Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings of the 12th Congress, and declared that the second impeachment complaint

filed against Chief Justice Davide was barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI

of the Constitution.

The rule seems simple enough, and has since been readily applied. But what of a

case where two impeachment complaints are separately filed and then simultaneously

referred to the Committee on Justice. Does it then follow that only oneproceedinghas

been initiated? To put it differently, is it possible to have two impeachment complaints

but just one proceeding?

Mme. Justice Carpio Morales posits that multiple complaints within one

proceeding are possible, because the purposes of the one-year ban as enunciated by the

framers of our Constitutionto prevent harassment of the impeachable officials and to

allow the legislature to focus on its principal task of legislation4[4] reveal that the

consideration behind the one-year ban is time and not the number of complaints.

2[2]Id. at 932.

3[3]Id. at 933.

4[4]See Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (Azcuna, Separate Opinion), id. at 1053, citing the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission. During said deliberations, Mr. Romulo, in response to queries regarding the one-yearlimitation, stated:


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Unfortunately, while we are in agreement as to the reckoning point of initiation, I

cannot find any reasonable justification for the conclusion that there can be multiple

complaints in one proceeding. I posit this view for two reasons: first, it does not appearto be entirely accurate that both complaints were simultaneously referred to the

Committee on Justice. Second, even assuming that there was simultaneous referral, upon

referral of the First Complaint5[5] to the Committee, an impeachment proceeding had

already been initiated, so as to bar any further proceedings on the Second Complaint.6[6]

As regards the simultaneous referral, as shown in the Congressional records,7[7]

and acknowledged by counsel for the respondents during the October 12, 2010 Oral

MR. ROMULO: Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, inthis case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its workwhich is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachmentcharges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.

5[5]Used here to refer to the Verified Complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed

by Ms. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Mr. Danilo Lim, Mr. Felipe Pestao, and Ms. Evelyn Pestao with the Resolutions of

Endorsement filed by Representatives Bag-ao and Bello filed on July 22, 2010.

6[6]Used here to refer to the Verified Complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed

by Mr. Renato Reyes, Mo. Mary John Mananzan, Mr. Danilo Ramos and Atty. Edre Olalia with the Resolutions of

Endorsement filed by Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus filed on August 3, 2010.

7[7]House of Representatives (15th Congress of the Philippines), Journal No. 9, August 11, 2010, available online athttp://www.congress.gov.ph/download/journals_15/J09.pdf.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

On motion of Rep. Romulo, the Body proceeded to the Reference of Business, and the Chair directed the

Secretary General to read the following House Bills and Resolutions on First Reading, which were referred

to the appropriate Committees hereunder indicated:

x x x x

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

Verified complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed by Ms.

Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Mr. Danilo Lim, Mr. Felipe Pestano, and Ms. Evelyn Pestano with the Resolutions

of Endorsement filed by Representatives Bag-ao and Bello

TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/journals_15/J09.pdfhttp://www.congress.gov.ph/download/journals_15/J09.pdf


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Arguments (interpellation of Mr. Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura), it appears that

during the House plenary session on August 11, 2010, each complaint was read

separately by the Secretary General and individually referred to the Committee on Justice

by the Chair.8[8]

Thus there was, strictly speaking, no simultaneous referral.

Verified complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed by Mr.

Renato Reyes, Mo. Mary John Mananzan, Mr. Danilo Ramos and Atty. Edre Olalia with the Resolutions of

Endorsement filed by Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE (Rollo, p. 576)See also, the Congressional Record of the Plenary Proceedings of the 15

thCongress, First Regular Session, Volume 1, No. 9,

Wednesday, August 11, 2010,available online

at http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS-09-081110.pdf. The records indicate that [t]he Secretary General read the following House Bills and Resolutions on First

Reading, and the Deputy Speaker made the corresponding references.

8[8]The TSN of the Oral Arguments before this Court dated October 12, 2010, pages 146-150 states:

Associate Justice Nachura: Ah, one final thing, if this Court should decide not to revisit Francisco, a

question I asked Assistant Solicitor General Laragan is that, when there are

two complaints, [is it] the second complaint that is [infirm] if the second

complaint is referred [to] the House Committee, after the first complaint shall

have been referred? [Thus] the second complaint that will now be [infirm]

and barred by Francisco.

Ret. Justice Mendoza: Yes with particular reference to the facts of this case, it would be the second

complaint (interrupted)

Associate Justice Nachura: The second complaint (interrupted)

Ret. Justice Mendoza: That would have [to] be dropped, if Your Honor please, for the simple reason

that in the proceedings of the (interrupted)

Associate Justice Nachura: House

Ret. Justice Mendoza: . . . House, on August 11 (interrupted).

Associate Justice Nachura: Eleven

Ret. Justice Mendoza: 2010, the Order of Business. If you look just at the Order of Business listed

the first complaint filed by Risa Hontiveros-Baraquiel and three others ahead

of the second complaint, and not only that, set or, rather, shows after reading

the (interrupted)

Associate Justice Nachura: Order of Business


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No doubt this Court should be more concerned with overarching principles rather

than the ephemeral passing of minutes or seconds. But even if we were to assume that

there was, indeed, simultaneous referral, it would be no less true that the filing and

referral of each individual impeachment complaint amounts to the initiation of twoseparate impeachment proceedings.

The word proceedinghas been defined as the regular and orderly progression

of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the

entry of judgment; any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency;

an act or step that is part of a larger action.9[9] This is in contradistinction with a

Ret. Justice Mendoza: title of the complaint, this is the action taken by the Speaker, refer it to the

Committee on Justice accompanied by the banging of the gavel, so that if we

have to be (interrupted)

Associate Justice Nachura: Technical

Ret. Justice Mendoza: Concerned with, not only our second, ah, minute and seconds of what is

done, then I would say just looking at these, that there are time difference

between the action taken here in referring the first complaint and the action

taken in referring the second complaint which was similarly, read afterward,

and then the Speaker said to the Committee on Justice accompanied or

followed by the banging of the gavel to signify the action of the Chair.

Associate Justice Nachura: That - that is what?

Ret. Justice Mendoza: ButBut thats not [a] concern and I am sure that this Court did not intend

that when it wrote the Francisco ruling.

Associate Justice Nachura: Ah, that is precisely what I asked Assistant Solicitor General Laragan, that it

would not [have] been possible to say that both complaints were referred at

the same time, because the House in plenary would have acted on each

individual complaint in the Order of Business separately. And the referraltechnically could not have happened at the same time, to the exact minute

and the exact second. And so if we were to x x x apply Francisco very strictly

the second complaint would be barred.

Ret. Justice Mendoza: Yes.

9[9]Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (available online at www.westlaw.com).


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complaint, which is [t]he initial pleading that starts a[n] x x x action and states the

basis for the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the demand for

relief.10[10]

InFrancisco, this Court stated that the impeachment proceeding consists of the

following steps:

(1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House ofRepresentatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of theRepresentatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committeewhich may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of theCommittee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to theHouse for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint bythe House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of theCommittee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. x

x x11[11]

Here, both the First and Second Complaint separately went through these steps

they were filed, referred to the Speaker of the House, included in the Order of Business,

referred to the House Committee on Justice, and separately considered by the Committee.

In fact, the records bear out that each individual complaint was separately scrutinized to

determine whether each was sufficient in form and substance, and the petitioner was

required to answer both complaints. In all respects, there were two proceedings.

To summarize:

First Complaint Second ComplaintDate of Filing July 22, 2010 August 3, 2010

10[10]Id.

11[11]Supra note 1 at 931, adopting the explanation of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.

12[12] Rollo, p. 91.

13[13]Id. at 133.


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Transmittal to the

Speaker of the HouseJuly 27, 2010

14[14]August 4, 2010

15[15]

Directive regarding

inclusion in the

Order of Business

August 2, 2010 August 9, 2010

Referral by theSpeaker of the House

to the Committee on

Justice

August 11, 2010 August 11, 2010

Results of Vote on

whether or not the

complaint was

Sufficient in Form

(September 1, 2010)

39 in favor, 1 against 31 in favor, 9 against

Results of vote on

whether or not the

Complaint wassufficient in

substance

(September 7, 2010)

41 in favor, 14 against 41 in favor, 16 against

These two complaints have, in all respects, been treated separately by the House,

and each stands alone. In fact, the complaints have been treated in separate proceedings,

as indicated by the fact that there was no identity in the votes received by each

complaint.18[18]

14[14]Id. at 561.

15[15]Id. at 563.

16[16]Id. at 562.

17[17]Id. at 564

18[18]On the question of sufficiency in form, the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Justice held on September 1,

2010, Wednesday, 9:30 AM (Id. at 76-82), provide:

x x x x

Rep. Farias then moved to declare the first impeachment complaint filed [sic] Risa Hontiveros-

Baraquel as sufficient in form. The motion was duly seconded. x x x

x x x x

With 39 votes in favor and 1 against, the Chair declared the first impeachment complaint filed by Risa

Hontiveros-Baraquel as sufficient in form.


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To use the analogy of the candle, each matchstick is a separate impeachment

complaint, and referral may ignite the wick. But in reality, only one matchstick will

cause the candle to melt; the other may feed the flame, but a candle, once lit, stays lit, thesecond matchstick becomes superfluous. In Shakespeares immortal words, whats done

is done.19[19] In truth, each matchstick ignites a separate candle, because separate and

distinct proceedings are contemplated.

But perhaps we need not venture so far for an analogy. Just like in a regular

lawsuit, different parties may prepare their initiatory complaints and file them in court.

The Clerk of Court then refers the complaints to the branch for appropriate action. Even

if the Clerk of Court refers two complaints to the same branch at exactly the same time,

this does not detract from the fact that two proceedings have been initiated, particularly

Rep. Casio also moved that the Committee likewise vote to declare the second complaint file [sic] by

Mr. Renato Reyes, et al. sufficient in form. The motion was duly seconded. With 31 members in favor of the

motion and 9 members against, the motion to declare the second impeachment complaint sufficient in

form was carried. (Id. at 80-81)

On the question of sufficiency in substance, the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Justice held on September 7,

2010, Tuesday, 9:30 AM (Id. at 555-560), provide:

x x x x

Thereafter Rep. Farias repeated his previous motion to find the Hontiveros complaint sufficient in

substance, which was duly seconded by Rep. Remulla. The Chairman proceeded with the voting on the

motion, and with forty-one (41) members in favor and only fourteen (14) against, the Chairman declared

the impeachment complaint of Hontiveros, et al sufficient in substance.

Rep. Farias then made a motion to find the impeachment complaint filed by Reyes, et al. sufficient in

substance. x x x (Id. at 560)

x x x x

With forty one (41) votes in favor of the motion, and sixteen (16) against, and one (1) refusal to

vote, the Chairman declared the impeachment complaint filed by Reyes, et al. sufficient in

substance.

19[19] Macbeth, act 3, scene 2, line 12.


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where each complaint alleges different causes of action. And though the branch may

hear the two complaints in one hearing, the two proceedings remain separate and distinct.

To summarize, notwithstanding simultaneous referral, once the First Complaintwas initiated, that is to say, filed and referred to the Committee on Justice, no other

proceeding could be initiated against the petitioner. This protection granted by the

Constitution cannot be waved away merely by reference to the layers of protection for

an impeachable officer and the likelihood that the number of complaints may be reduced

during hearings before the Committee on Justice. As such, the filing and referral of the

First Complaint against the petitioner precluded the Committee on Justice from taking

cognizance of the Second Complaint.

However, though the Second Complaint is barred by Section 3(5) of the

Constitution, the House Committee on Justice should be allowed to proceed with its

hearing on the First Complaint.

I believe the Members of this Court are well aware of the tension here between theclamor for public accountability and claims of judicial overreach vis--vis the demand

that governmental action be exercised only within Constitutional limits. In fact, our work

here has been called unjustifiable arrogance by an unelected minority who condescends

to supplant its will for that of the sovereign people and its elected representatives.20[20]

Nonetheless, try as we might, we cannot shirk from our duty to say what the law

is.21[21] Particularly, if one conceives of the law as both the reflection of societys most

cherished values as well as the means by which we, as a nation, secure those values, then

20[20]The phrase counter-majoritarian difficulty as an issue in constitutional law theory is widely attributed to

Alexander Bickels 1962 book entitled THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT ATTHE BAR OF POLITICS.

21[21] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), 1803 WL 893.


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Concurring & Dissenting Del Castillo