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CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore [email protected] Thanks to Franzi Roesner, Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore [email protected] Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

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Page 1: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

CSE484/CSEM584ComputerSecurity:

Clickjacking

[email protected]

ThankstoFranzi Roesner,DanBoneh,DieterGollmann,DanHalperin,YoshiKohno,JohnManferdelli,JohnMitchell,Vitaly Shmatikov,BennetYee,andmanyothersforsampleslidesandmaterials...

Page 2: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Lab2

• Questions– WhatistheflowoftheXSSattacks?– HowkindofinformationdoyouneedleakedforSQLinjectionattacks?

– Others?

Page 3: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

DirectingUserBehavior

• Demo– http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ffgeo2/

Page 4: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ThefollowingslidesoriginallymadebyVitalyShmatikov

hNp://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/courses/cs361s/clickjack.ppt

Page 5: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

• Attackeroverlaysmultipletransparentoropaqueframestotrickauserintoclickingonabuttonorlinkonanotherpage

• Clicksmeantforthevisiblepagearehijackedandroutedtoanother,invisiblepage

Clickjacking(UIRedressing)

slide 5

[Hansen and Grossman 2008]

Page 6: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ClickjackingintheWild

• Googlesearchfor“clickjacking”returns624,000results…thisisnotahypotheticalthreat!

• Summer2010:Facebookwormsuperimposesaninvisibleiframeovertheentirepagethatlinksbacktothevictim'sFacebookpage– Ifvictimisloggedin,automaticallyrecommendslinktonewfriendsassoonasthepageisclickedon

• ManyclickjackingattacksagainstTwitter– Userssendouttweetsagainsttheirwill

slide 6

Page 7: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

It’sAllAboutiFrame

• Anysitecanframeanyothersite<iframesrc=“http://www.google.com/...”>

</iframe>• HTMLattributes

– Style– Opacity definesvisibilitypercentageoftheiframe

• 1.0:completelyvisible• 0.0:completelyinvisible

slide 7

Page 8: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

HidingtheTargetElement

• UseCSSopacity propertyandz-indexpropertytohidetargetelementandmakeotherelementfloatunder thetargetelement

• UsingCSSpointer-events: nonepropertytocoverotherelementover thetargetelement

Click

z-index: -1

opacity: 0.1 pointer-event: none

Click

slide 8

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

Page 9: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Whatothertypesofuser-manipulativeattacksmightbepossibleusingpropertiesofcss?

Page 10: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

PartialOverlaysandCropping

• OverlayotherelementsontoaniframeusingCSSz-index propertyorFlashWindowModewmode=direct property

• WraptargetelementinanewiframeandchooseCSSpositionoffsetproperties

slide 10

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

z-index: 1 PayPal iframe PayPal iframe

Page 11: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Drag-and-DropAPI

• Modernbrowserssupportdrag-and-dropAPI• JavaScriptcanuseittosetdatabeingdraggedandreaditwhenit’sdropped

• Not restrictedbythesameoriginpolicy:datafromoneorigincanbedraggedtoaframeofanotherorigin– Reason:drag-and-dropcanonlybeinitiatedbyuser’smousegesture,notbyJavaScriptonitsown

slide 11

[“Next Generation Clickjacking”]

Page 12: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

AbusingDrag-and-DropAPI

slide 12

[“Next Generation Clickjacking”]

Frog. Blender. You know what to do.

1. Bait the user to click and start dragging2. Invisible iframe with attacker’s

text field under mouse cursor,use API to set data being dragged

3. Invisible iframe from another origin with a form field

Attack webpage

666666666666666666

With two drag-and-drops(simulated scrollbar, etc.),can select and extractarbitrary content fromanother origin

Page 13: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

FakeCursors

• UseCSScursor propertyandJavaScripttosimulateafakecursoricononthescreen

slide 13

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

Real cursor icon Fake cursor icon

cursor: none

Page 14: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

CursorSpoofing

slide 14

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

Page 15: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Keyboard“Strokejacking”

• Simulateaninputfieldgettingfocus,butactuallythekeyboardfocusisontargetelement,forcingusertotypesomeunwantedinformationintotargetelement

slide 15

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

Transfer

Bank TransferBank Account: ________Amount: ___________ USD

Typing GameType whatever screen shows to you

Xfpog95403poigr06=2kfpx

[__________________________]

Attacker’s page Hidden iframe within attacker’s page

95403062

Page 16: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Double-ClickAttack

• Baittheusertoperformadouble-click,switchfocustoapopupwindowunderthecursorrightbetweenthetwoclicks

slide 16

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

First click

Second click

Page 17: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Whack-A-MoleAttack

• Asktheusertoclickasfastaspossible,suddentlyswitchFacebookLikebutton

slide 17

[“Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses”]

Page 18: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

SOLUTIONS?

Page 19: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Solution:FrameBusting

• Iamapageowner• AllIneedtodoismakesurethatmywebpageisnotloadedinanenclosingframe…Clickjacking:solved!– DoesnotworkforFB“Like”buttonsandsuch,butOk

• Howhardcanthisbe?if(top!=self)top.location.href =location.href

slide 19

Page 20: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

FrameBustingintheWild

◆SurveybyGustavRydstedt,Elie Burzstein,DanBoneh,CollinJackson

FollowingslidesshamelesslyjackedfromRydstedt

slide 20

Page 21: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Conditional Statementsif (top != self)

if (top.location != self.location)if (top.location != location)if (parent.frames.length > 0)

if (window != top)if (window.top !== window.self)if (window.self != window.top)

if (parent && parent != window)if (parent &&

parent.frames && parent.frames.length>0)

if((self.parent&&!(self.parent===self))&&

(self.parent.frames.length!=0))

IfMyFrameIsNotOnTop…

slide 21

Page 22: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Counter-Action Statements

top.location = self.location

top.location.href = document.location.href

top.location.href = self.location.href

top.location.replace(self.location)

top.location.href = window.location.href

top.location.replace(document.location)

top.location.href = window.location.href

top.location.href = "URL"

document.write(’’)

top.location = location

top.location.replace(document.location)

top.location.replace(’URL’)

top.location.href = document.location

top.location.replace(window.location.href)

top.location.href = location.href

self.parent.location = document.location

parent.location.href = self.document.location

top.location.href = self.location

top.location = window.location

top.location.replace(window.location.pathname) slide 22

…MoveItToTop

Page 23: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

WhatAboutMyOwniFrames?

• Check:istheenclosingframeoneofmyown?• Howhardcanthisbe?• Surveyofseveralhundredtopwebsites……all framebustingcodeisbroken!

slide 23

Page 24: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

CourtesyofWalmartif(top.location!=location){if(document.referer&&document.referer.indexOf("walmart.com")==-1){top.location.replace(document.location.href);}

}

slide 24

Page 25: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ErrorinRefererChecking

Fromhttp://www.attacker.com/walmart.com.html<iframesrc=“http://www.walmart.com”>

slide 25

Page 26: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Courtesyof

if(window.self!=window.top&&!document.referer.match(/https?:\/\/[^?\/]+\.nytimes\.com\//))

{self.location=top.location;

}

slide 26

Page 27: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ErrorinRefererChecking

Fromhttp://www.attacker.com/a.html?b=https://www.nytimes.com/

<iframesrc=“http://www.nytimes.com”>

slide 27

Page 28: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Courtesyof

if(self!=top){vardomain=getDomain(document.referer);varokDomains=/usbank|localhost|usbnet/;varmatchDomain=domain.search(okDomains);

if(matchDomain==-1){//framebust}

}slide 28

Page 29: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ErrorinRefererChecking

Fromhttp://usbank.attacker.com/<iframesrc=“http://www.usbank.com”>

slide 29

Page 30: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

StrategicRelationship?NorwegianStateHouseBankhttp://www.husbanken.no

slide 30

Page 31: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

StrategicRelationship?BankofMoscow

http://www.rusbank.org

slide 31

Page 32: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

Courtesyoftry{

A=!top.location.href}catch(B){}A=A&&

!(document.referer.match(/^https?:\/\/[-az09.]*\.google\.(co\.|com\.)?[a-z]+\/imgres/i))&&!(document.referer.match(/^https?:\/\/([^\/]*\.)?(myspace\.com|myspace\.cn|simsidekick\.com|levisawards\.com|digg\.com)\//i));

if(A){//Framebust}slide 32

Page 33: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

GoogleImagesdoesnot framebust

DoYourTrustedSitesFrameBust?

slide 33

Page 34: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ManyAttacksonRefererHeader

• Openredirectrefererchanger• HTTPS->HTTPredirectchangestheheader• Apparently,hardtogetregularexpressionright

• Trustothersitestoframeyourpages,butwhatifthosetrustedsitescanbeframedthemselves?

slide 34

Page 35: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

TypicalFrameBustingCode

if(top.location!=self.location){parent.location=self.location;

}

slide 35

Page 36: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

WhoIsYourDaddyParent?

framed1.html<iframe

src=“framed2.html”>

framed2.html<iframe

src=“victim.com”>

slide 36

Double framing!!

Page 37: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

WhoIsOnTop?

Iftop.location canbechangedordisabled,thiscodeisuseless

if(top.location !=self.location)top.location =self.location

slide 37

Page 38: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

LocationClobbering

• IE7varlocation=“clobbered”;

• Safariwindow.__defineSetter__("location",function(){});

– top.locationnowundefined

slide 38

Page 39: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

UserCanStopFrameBusting

• Usercanmanuallycancelanyredirectionattemptmadebyframebustingcode

• Attackerjustneedstoask…<script>window.onbeforeunload =function(){return”DoyouwanttoleavePayPal?";

}</script><iframesrc="http://www.paypal.com">

slide 39

Page 40: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

AskNicely

slide 40

Page 41: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

…OrDon’tEvenAsk

• Mostbrowsersletattackercanceltherelocationprogrammatically

varprevent_bust=0window.onbeforeunload =function(){kill_bust++}setInterval(function(){

if(kill_bust>0){kill_bust-=2;window.top.location='http://no-content-204.com'}

},1);<iframesrc="http://www.victim.com">

slide 41

Page 42: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

X-Frame-Options

• HTTPheadersentwiththepage• Twopossiblevalues:DENY andSAMEORIGIN• DENY:pagewillnotrenderifframed• SAMEORIGIN:pagewillonlyrenderiftopframehasthesameorigin

slide 42

Page 43: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

AdoptionofX-Frame-Options• Goodadoptionbybrowsers• Pooradoptionbysites• Limitations

– Per-pagepolicy– Nowhitelistingoforigins– Proxyproblems

slide 43

Page 44: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

ContentSecurityPolicy(Firefox4)

• AnotherHTTPheader:frame-ancestorsdirectivecanspecifyallowedframers

• Allowsspecificrestrictionsandabilitiespersite

slide 44

Page 45: Computer Security: Clickjacking - University of Washington · CSE 484 / CSE M 584 Computer Security: Clickjacking Jared Moore jlcmoore@cs.washington.edu Thanks to Franzi Roesner,

<style>html{visibility:hidden}</style><script>if(self==top){document.documentElement.style.visibility='visible';}else{top.location=self.location;}</script>

BestForNow(StillNotGood)

slide 45


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