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COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN UGANDA By NOAH MWELU (3245346) Msc.PSCM, Bsc.PSCM & SPLM (MAKERERE UNIVERSITY) A thesis submitted to University of Newcastle, Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment, School of Architecture and Built Environment in fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the Degree of Philosophy in Building. Supervisors: Professor Peter Davis and Dr Yongjian Ke October 2019

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Page 1: COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN PUBLIC

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN UGANDA

By

NOAH MWELU

(3245346)

Msc.PSCM, Bsc.PSCM & SPLM (MAKERERE UNIVERSITY)

A thesis submitted to University of Newcastle, Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment, School of Architecture and Built Environment in fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the Degree of Philosophy in Building.

Supervisors:

Professor Peter Davis and Dr Yongjian Ke

October 2019

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Doctorial Confirmation Committee

Prof: Thayaparan Gajedran Chair Person

Prof: Willy Sher Member Member

Dr Marcus Jefferies Member

Prof: Peter Davis Principal Supervisor

Dr Yongjian Ke Co-Supervisor

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Certification

The undersigned certify that they have read and recommend for acceptance by the University of Newcastle as a dissertation titled Compliance and Regulatory Framework in Public Procurement of Public Road Construction Projects in Uganda. In fulfilment for the award of the Degree of Philosophy (Building) of the University of Newcastle Australia.

……………………………………………

Dr Yongjian Ke

(Supervisor)

Date: 30th October 2019

……………………………………………

Professor. Peter Davis

(Supervisor)

Date: 30th October 2019

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Statement of Originality

I Noah Mwelu, hereby certify that the work embodied this thesis is my own original work, conducted under normal supervision. The thesis contains no material which has been accepted, or is being examined, for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. I give consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide when deposited in the University’s Digital Repository, subject to the provisions of the copyright Act 1968 and any approved embargo.

……………………………………….

Signature

Date: 30th October 2019

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Acknowledgment of Authorship

I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis contains published paper/s/scholarly work of which I am a joint author. I have included as part of the thesis a written declaration endorsed in writing by my supervisor, attesting to my contribution to the joint publication/s/scholarly work.

By signing below, I confirm that Noah Mwelu contributed by extracting three papers from this thesis as detailed below. As a process of peer reviewed paper for publication, Noah as a lead and corresponding author together with co-authors listed below participated in revising the manuscripts throughout the entire process until these articles were accepted and published. In addition, Noah as a lead author had extra workload through coordination with the respective journal editorials.

No Title Journal Authors

1 Compliance within a Regulatory Framework in Implementing Public Road Construction Projects.

Construction Economics and Building.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5130/AJCEB.v18i4.6362

Name Sig

Noah Mwelu

Prof Peter Davis

Dr Yongjian Ke

Dr Susan Watundu

2 Success Factors for Implementing Uganda’s Public Road Construction Projects

International Journal of Construction Management.

DOI:10.1080/15623599.2019.1573481

Noah Mwelu

Prof Peter Davis

Dr Yongjian Ke

Dr Susan Watundu

Dr Marcus Jefferies

3 Compliance Mediating Role within Road Construction Regulatory Framework

Journal of Public Procurement Noah Mwelu

Prof Peter Davis

Dr Yongjian Ke

Dr Susan Watundu

[Professor Peter Davis]

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Abstract

Public road construction projects are a key to economic development of many Nations

including Uganda being the focus of this dissertation. However, persistent lack of compliance

in public sector procurement and increasingly unsuccessful public road construction projects

were observed in Uganda. This thesis considered compliance with a public procurement

regulatory framework and the successful implementation of public road construction projects

as key components to boost Uganda’s economic development. Consequently, the dissertation

examined six factors influencing compliance with a regulatory framework and seven factors

influencing successful implementation of public road construction projects using agency and

institutional theories. The theories guided in the selection of study variables that were

explored in a comprehensive literature review. The thesis adopted a cross-sectional research

design using a self-administered questionnaire to collect data from five organizations

involved in public road construction projects. Considering a sample size of 299 participants,

a response rate of 64.9% was achieved.

Structural Equation Modelling based on Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) was used

for data analysis and model estimation. Additionally, Med-Graph excel programme and Sobel

test were used to determine mediation and examine interactive effects among factors that lead

to the successful implementation of public road construction projects. Three validated models

named compliance; project success and mediation are established to guide management in

implementing road construction projects. Under the compliance model, results show that staff

sanctions, perceived inefficiency of a regulatory framework and contractors’ resistance to

non-compliance significantly enhanced compliance with the public procurement regulatory

framework. While under the project success model, compliance with regulatory framework,

familiarity with regulatory framework, monitoring activities, professionalism of staff and

perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework significantly enhanced the successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Finally, the mediation Med-Graph Sobel

test results show that compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework

significantly mediated the relationship between familiarity with the regulatory framework,

monitoring activities, sanctions on staff, and contractors’ resistance and project success.

The compliance model was developed to support governmental efforts to initiate and

ensure compliance in public procurement, while the project success model would guide

governments through respective bodies on how to successfully implement public road

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construction projects. Given the complexity of construction projects, the interplay of factors

is inevitable to reinforce successful construction sector. Hence, mediation effects would

enhance stakeholders’ understanding on the mediating role of compliance with a regulatory

framework in successful implementation of public road construction projects. Consequently,

management should consider an interactive effect rather than singularly applying success

factors whilst implementing construction projects. Finally, management should pay attention

to respective indicators of compliance and project success factors (Study variables) when

implementing validated models. This would save the Ugandan government significant funds

that could be channelled to other priority sectors, increase paved road networks and boost

economic development in Uganda.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved wife Dr Susan Watundu Mwelu and my

daughters Lucky Mercy Mwelu, Peace Joy Mwelu, Talituleka Hope Mwelu, Blessed

Malyamu Mwelu and Mariza Susan Mwelu.

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Preamble

My quest for public procurement started back in 1990 when I was in senior three.

During that time, I was studying commerce as one of the ten subjects at Ordinary level in

Moroto High School. In Commerce, under the topic departmental stores, I became impressed

with the economic advantages of a purchasing officer. My impression increased with the

wellbeing and lifestyle of a few purchasing officers that I had encountered. However, at that

time and as a student of a remote up-country school, I did not know that there was a bachelor’s

degree or a PhD in public procurement. Having stayed out of school for long because of

tuition, in 2006, I embarked on my dream by doing a Certificate in Strategic Procurement

and Logistics Management from Makerere University under the guidance and encouragement

from my uncle Geoffrey Wepondi. This certificate secured me a job as a stores officer. Later

in 2007, I started a Bachelor’s degree in Procurement and Supply Chain Management that

culminated into my promotion to stores manager. During my Bachelor’s study, the quest of

public procurement increased with the motivation from my lecturer Professor Moses

Muhwezi who by then was holding a PhD with vast experience in public procurement. This

motivation saw me in 2010 enrolling for a Master’s degree in Procurement and Supply Chain

Management that I completed in 2012.

From 2007 onwards, I gained experience in public procurement with some most

memorable times when I participated in two projects for procurement of secondary schools’

textbooks respectively funded by World Bank and African Development Bank through

Ministry of Education and Sports. During this time, I learnt of many challenges facing public

procurement especially procurement irregularities accounting for some of the greatest

percentage of the National budget of Uganda. These challenges particularly surrounding

heavily funded construction projects motivated my quest to do a PhD and conduct an

empirical study to determine factors enhancing compliance with a public procurement

regulatory framework and successful implementation of public construction projects. The

procurement knowledge gained from certificate to PhD level coupled with experience has

enabled my understanding of how public procurement can transform economic development

of any Nation if effectively managed.

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Acknowledgement

This PhD was fully funded by the Commonwealth Government of Australia through the

University of Newcastle, Australia. Successful completion of this PhD study is attributed to

a number of factors and personalities. In this regard, I would like to extend my sincere

gratitude and heartfelt feelings to the following;

I start by thanking the Almighty God through the name of our Lord Isa Masiya for

enabling me to reach all this far. I know perfectly well that without God’s grace and Mercy I

would be nowhere. Recalling my humble background, gambling with tuition fees and life

etcetera, thank you very much my Almighty God. It is from this point that I would like to

thank my late grandmother Efulasi Nakhumitsa for sowing an education seed into me as a

key to bright future. “Mum” as I used to call you, thanks very much Grandmother for being

my earthly God. May the Almighty God be with you wherever you are.

I would like to thank the Commonwealth Government of Australia and the University

of Newcastle Australia for the generous and particularly financial support that enabled me to

achieve this spectacular dream and academic status. May the Almighty God bless you all.

Furthermore, special thanks go to the Government of the Republic of Uganda and

management of Makerere University Business School for granting me a study leave and

supporting me throughout this academic journey. I will live to remember all your

contributions and support in various capacities.

I would like to extend my sincere and heartfelt thanks to my committed supervisors

Professor Peter Davis and Dr Yongjian Ke for their tireless supervision and guidance that has

resulted into this tremendous achievement. Besides your academic mandate, you showed me

parental love that I will remember forever. May the Almighty God bless you and be with you

always. I equally thank the Doctorial confirmation committee Professor Thayaparan

Gajedran, Professor Willy Sher and Dr Marcus Jefferies. This achievement would be just a

dream without you.

I would like to thank the School of Architecture and Built Environment, University

of Newcastle for academic, material and social support and facilitation that greatly enhanced

my success. I will always remember Professor Sue Anne Ware Head of School and her

professional team for equal treatment of PhD students in sharing resources including partying

and provision of meals among others. Special thanks go to Professor Suzanne Ryan of the

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Business School, University of Newcastle for her tremendous research methods’ class and

facilitation that I will live to remember. In the same vein, I thank Ms Lisa Ogle senior

researcher and librarian Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment for her EndNote

classes and guidance. May the Almighty God bless you all abundantly.

I am extremely thankful to my beloved wife Dr Susan Watundu Mwelu and our lovely

daughters Lucky Mercy, Peace Joy, Talituleka Hope, Blessed Malyamu and Mariza Susan

for your prayers, encouragement and tireless support that has seen me all this far. Dr Super

girl Susan Watundu, thank you very much for looking after our daughters and home. I am

equally indebted to tell you that you have contributed greatly towards my life and

achievements. May the Almighty God bless you and our daughters generously in the name

of our Lord Isa Masiya. Special gratitude goes to Evangelist Christopher Besweri Kaswabuli

and the entire church of Isa Masiya for your heartfelt prayers and support. I am equally

grateful to my mother Naome Namono, Uncle Richard Mabonga; Uncle Geoffrey Wepondi,

Uncle Perez Matanda, Uncle Dyson Maswere, Uncle Richard Wambi, Uncle Francis Waluya,

Uncle Peter Khaukha, Aunties: Joy Namasaba, Deborah Wanyenya, Lorna Watela, Maris

Wanyerah, Connie Mlay, Sister Loy Lunyolo, Mother in-law Malyamu Wambi and brother

in-law Simon Sakwa among others for your support.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the staff of Makerere University

Business School for your generosity and support in various capacities that have enabled me

to reach this far. Special recognition of the Principal and Professor Waswa Balunywa,

Professor Moses Muhwezi, Professor Moya Musa, Dr Lubogoyi Bomali, Dr Nkutu Geoffrey,

Mr. Gad Mutaremwa, Ms Irene Namutebi and my fellow colleagues. In the same vein, I am

equally thankful to my Australian/Ugandan mentors and seniors including Dr Matthew

Kalubanga, Dr Sarah Eyaa, Dr Patrick Kakwezi, Dr Sheila Namagembe, Dr Friday Derick,

Dr Mathias Mulumba and Mr. Julius Bulamu, all my lecturers at various levels and my

teachers of primary and secondary schools. I will never forget your support and contribution

both academically and socially that has made me what I am.

Furthermore, I thank my PhD colleagues Dr Tanvi Nwaz, Dr Josephine Vaughan, Dr

Michael Dawes, Dr Olabode Ogunmakinde, Dr Matthew Abunyewah, Owi Toinpre, Meney

Brendan, Tania Papasotiriou, Georgia Kissa, Ali Yousefi, Ali Papzan, Simon Laura, Salah

Alghamdi, Mahmoud Ershadi, Adane Molla, Abhinav Walia, Reza Forghani, Bernard

Tuffour, Udara Ranasinghe, Shumnk Deep, Sulala Zaki, Rumana Asad, Nurul Along and

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Mina Tehrani. Finally, and in a special way, I thank my Australian Landlord/lady (Stephen

and Nina) for your passion, all my relatives, friends and neighbours in various places for your

support and contribution in my life from such a humble background. May the Almighty God

bless and reward you all in the name of our Lord Isa Masiya. Amen.

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Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1

1.1 Background to the Study ................................................................................................................ 2 1.1.1 Importance of public procurement and construction industry .................................................. 5 1.1.2 Importance and challenges of Uganda’s public road construction projects .............................. 7

1.2 Sample road construction projects under investigation for procurement irregularities ............... 8

1.3 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................. 10

1.4 Research Aim ................................................................................................................................ 12

1.5 Research objectives ....................................................................................................................... 12

1.6 Significance of the Study .............................................................................................................. 12

1.7 Study scope ................................................................................................................................... 13

1.8 Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................................... 14

CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................ 15

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION ................................................................................. 15

2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 16

2.2 Agency theory, Compliance in public procurement and Project success .................................... 16

2.3 Institutional theory, Compliance in public procurement and Project success ............................ 22

CHAPTER THREE........................................................................................................ 28

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT ........................... 28

3.1 Introduction` ................................................................................................................................. 29

3.2 Research Model ............................................................................................................................ 29

3.3 Implications of Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework ......................... 33 3.3.1 Familiarity with regulatory framework and compliance ......................................................... 37 3.3.2 Monitoring activities and compliance ...................................................................................... 40 3.3.3 Professionalism of staff and compliance .................................................................................. 42 3.3.4 Sanctions on staff and compliance............................................................................................ 46 3.3.5 Perceived Inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and compliance .......... 49 3.3.6 Contractors’ resistance and compliance .................................................................................. 51

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3.4 Implications of Construction Project success ............................................................................... 52 3.4.1 Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and Project success ................. 53 3.4.2 Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework and Project success .................. 55 3.4.3 Monitoring activities and project success ................................................................................. 57 3.4.4 Professionalism of staff and project success ............................................................................. 58 3.4.5 Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and project success ..... 60 3.4.6 Contractors’ resistance and project success ............................................................................. 61 3.4.7 Sanctions on staff and project success ...................................................................................... 62

3.5 Mediation effects and Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 64

3.6 Selection of study variables .......................................................................................................... 68

3.7 Justification for used study variables ........................................................................................... 70

CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................................... 74

METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 74

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 75

4.2 Research Question ........................................................................................................................ 75

4.3 Literature Review Approach ........................................................................................................ 75

4.4 Research Framework and Approach ........................................................................................... 76 4.4.1 Research Approach .................................................................................................................. 79 4.4.2 Research Design and Justification ............................................................................................ 79

4.5 Measurement Development .......................................................................................................... 80 4.5.1 Questionnaire Design, Justification and Variables .................................................................. 80 4.5.2 Questionnaire Validity and Reliability ..................................................................................... 85

4.5.2.1 Internal Validity .............................................................................................................. 86 4.5.2.2 Face Validity.................................................................................................................... 86 4.5.2.3 Content Validity .............................................................................................................. 86 4.5.2.4 External Validity ............................................................................................................. 86 4.5.2.5 Stability ........................................................................................................................... 87

4.6 Data Collection ............................................................................................................................. 87 4.6.1 Data Collection Method and Questionnaire Justification ........................................................ 87 4.6.2 Data Type and Sources ............................................................................................................. 88 4.6.3 Study Population and Sample .................................................................................................. 88 4.6.4 Study Participants .................................................................................................................... 91 4.6.5 Sample ...................................................................................................................................... 93

4.6.5.1 Sample Size Determination .............................................................................................. 93 4.6.6 Sampling Technique ................................................................................................................. 93

4.7 Ethical Consideration ................................................................................................................... 94

CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................ 96

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DATA ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 96

5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 97

5.2 Data Processing and Analysis ....................................................................................................... 97 5.2.1 Data Preparation ...................................................................................................................... 97

5.3 Adoption and Justification for Using PLS-SEM ........................................................................ 101

5.4 Measurement Model Evaluation ................................................................................................ 103 5.4.1 Validity and Reliability........................................................................................................... 104

5.4.1.1 Reliability ....................................................................................................................... 104 5.4.1.2 Convergent and Discriminant Validity .......................................................................... 105

5.5 Structural Model Evaluation ...................................................................................................... 106 5.5.1 Collinearity Assessment .......................................................................................................... 107 5.5.2 Significance and Relevance of Structural Model Relationships............................................. 108 5.5.3 Coefficient of Determination (R²) ........................................................................................... 108 5.5.4 Effect Size (ƒ²) ......................................................................................................................... 109 5.5.5 Model Fitting .......................................................................................................................... 110

5.6 Mediational Effect ...................................................................................................................... 110

CHAPTER SIX ............................................................................................................. 112

RESULTS INTERPRETATION ................................................................................. 112

6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 113

6.2 Profile of Respondents and their Organisations ........................................................................ 113

6.3 Composite Reliability.................................................................................................................. 117

6.4 Factor Loadings .......................................................................................................................... 119

6.5 Average Variance Extracted (AVE) ........................................................................................... 120

6.6 Discriminant Validity ................................................................................................................. 122

6.7. Diagnostic Tests ................................................................................................................................ 123 6.7.1 Collinearity Test ..................................................................................................................... 123 6.7.2 Normality Test ........................................................................................................................ 125 6.7.3 Linearity Test ......................................................................................................................... 126 6.7.4 Homogeneity Tests .................................................................................................................. 127

6.8 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of Study Variables ................................................................... 128

6.9 Relationship between Study Variables ....................................................................................... 130 6.9.1 Path Coefficients and Significance Level ............................................................................... 130 6.9.2 Mediational Effect Analyses ................................................................................................... 133

6.10 Coefficient of Determination (R2), Effect size (f2) and Model Fit............................................... 147

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6.11 Validation of Results ................................................................................................................... 151

6.12 Final Validated Models ............................................................................................................... 152

CHAPTER SEVEN ...................................................................................................... 155

DISCUSSIONS ............................................................................................................. 155

7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 156

7.2 Compliance Relationships .......................................................................................................... 156 7.2.1 The Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework. ........................................................ 156 7.2.2 The Relationship between Monitoring Activities and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory ........................................................................................................................................... 158 7.2.3 The Relationship between Professionalism and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework ....................................................................................................................... 159 7.2.4 The Relationship between Sanctions and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework .......................................................................................................................................... 161 7.2.5 The Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework .............................. 162 7.2.6 The Relationship between Contractors’ Resistance and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework ....................................................................................................................... 163

7.3 Project Success Relationships ..................................................................................................... 164 7.3.1 The Relationship between Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success .................................................................................................................................... 164 7.3.2 The Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success .................................................................................................................................... 166 7.3.3 The Relationship between Monitoring Activities and Project Success .................................. 167 7.3.4 The Relationship between Professionalism and Project Success ........................................... 168 7.3.5 The Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success ......................................................................................................... 169 7.3.6 The Relationship between Contractors’ Resistance and Project Success .............................. 170 7.3.7 The Relationship between Sanctions and Project Success ..................................................... 171

7.4 Mediation Relationships ............................................................................................................. 172

7.4.1 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success. .............. 172

7.4.2 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Monitoring Activities in Public Road Construction and Project Success ............................ 174 7.4.3 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Professionalism of Staff in Public Road Construction Projects and Project Success .......... 175 7.4.4 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Sanctions in Public Road Construction Projects and Project Success ................................. 176 7.4.5 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success. 178 7.4.6 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Contractor’s Resistance to Non-Compliance and Project Success....................................... 178

7.5 Hypotheses Summary ................................................................................................................. 180

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CHAPTER EIGHT ...................................................................................................... 181

STUDY IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................. 181

8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 182

8.2 Theoretical Implication and Contributions ................................................................................ 182

8.3 Managerial Implications and Contributions .............................................................................. 184

8.4 Methodological Contribution ..................................................................................................... 187

8.5 Knowledge Contribution ............................................................................................................ 187

8.6 Practical Contribution ................................................................................................................ 189

CHAPTER NINE ......................................................................................................... 192

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 192

9.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 193

9.2 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework ................................................ 193

9.3 Public Road Construction Project Success................................................................................. 195

9.4 Mediational effects ...................................................................................................................... 198

9.5 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 200

9.6 Limitations .................................................................................................................................. 204

9.7 Further Research ........................................................................................................................ 206

9.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 206

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 209

APPENDICES .............................................................................................................. 235

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List of tables Table 1.1 Showing Public Sector Procurement Expenditure and Contribution ............................. 6

Table 1.2: Showing stock of paved national roads .................................................................... 8

Table 1.3: Showing sample road construction projects marred by lack of compliance ............... 9

Table 2.1 Theoretical tenets and application of Agency theory .................................................. 21

Table 2.2: Three dimensions of institutional theory. ............................................................... 25

Table: 4.1. Research framework.................................................................................................... 76

Table 4.2 Variable measurement and Questionnaire design ....................................................... 82

Table 4.3 Completed and On-going National Road Construction Projects .................................. 89

Table 4.4 Participants................................................................................................................ 92

Table 4.5: Response rate ........................................................................................................ 94

Table 6.1: Organisations ...................................................................................................... 113

Table 6.2: Education ............................................................................................................ 113

Table 6.3: Professional Training ........................................................................................... 114

Table 6.4: Age ..................................................................................................................... 114

Table 6.5: Title .................................................................................................................... 115

Table 6.6: Gender ................................................................................................................ 115

Table 6.7: Registration with any professional body ............................................................... 116

Table 6.8: Name of registered professional body .................................................................. 116

Table 6.9: Descriptive Statistics for Years in Current Position in the organization and number of employees 117

Table 6.10: Reliability test results .......................................................................................... 118

Table 6.11: Outer Loadings .................................................................................................... 119

Table 6.12: Average Variance Extracted (AVE) ..................................................................... 122

Table 6.13 a: Fornell-Larker Criterion ................................................................................... 122

Table 6.13 b: Cross Loadings ................................................................................................ 122

Table 6.13 c: Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) ............................................................... 123

Table 6.14 a: Smart-PLS Inner VIF Values ........................................................................... 124

Table 6.14 b: Smart-PLS Outer VIF Values ........................................................................... 124

Table 6.15 a: SPSS Compliance model Coefficientsa results .................................................. 124

Table 6.15 b: SPSS Project success model Coefficientsa results ............................................. 125

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Table 6.16: Statistics for skewness and Kurtosis results .......................................................... 126

Table 6.17 a: Compliance model Regression linearity results ................................................ 127

Table 6.17 b: Project success model Regression linearity results. ........................................... 127

Table 6.18: Levene test of Homogeneity of Variance results................................................... 127

Table 6.19: One-Way ANOVA results ................................................................................... 129

Table 6.20: Path Coefficients ................................................................................................. 133

Table 6.21: Coefficient results for the three steps above ......................................................... 134

Table 6.22: Hierarchical regression results for familiarity, compliance and project success ..... 135

Table 6.23: Compliance Mediating Familiarity and Project Success ....................................... 135

Table 6.24: Coefficient results for the three steps above ......................................................... 136

Table 6.25: Hierarchical regression results for monitoring activities, compliance and project success 137

Table 6.26: Compliance Mediating Monitoring activities and Project Success ........................ 138

Table 6.27: Coefficient results for the three steps above ......................................................... 139

Table 6.28: Hierarchical regression results for professionalism, compliance and project success 139

Table 6.29: Compliance Mediating Professionalism and Project Success ................................ 140

Table 6.30: Coefficient results for the three steps above ......................................................... 141

Table 6.31: Hierarchical regression results for sanctions, compliance and project success ....... 141

Table 6.32: Compliance Mediating Sanctions and Project Success.......................................... 142

Table 6.33: Coefficient results for the three steps above ......................................................... 143

Table 6.34: Coefficient results for the three steps above ......................................................... 144

Table 6.35: Hierarchical regression results for contractors’ resistance to non-compliance, compliance and project success ................................................................................................... 145

Table 6.36: Compliance Mediating Contractors’ Resistance and Project Success .................... 145

Table 6.37: R2, Adjusted R2 and Standardized Root Mean square Residual (SRMR) ............... 148

Table 6.38: Effect size (f2) results........................................................................................... 148

Table 6.39: Total effect .......................................................................................................... 149

Table 6.40: Summary of hypotheses results ............................................................................ 151

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List of figures

Figure 2.1: Summarised theoretical foundation linked to literature review................................ 26

Figure 3.1(a) Broad conceptual model linking compliance factors with regulatory framework and project success ....................................................................................................................... 31

Figure 3.1(b) Conceptual model showing selected compliance and project success factors....... 31

Figure 3.1(c) Final conceptual model of compliance and Project Success with Respective Measurement Indicators ................................................................................................................ 32

Figure 3.2: Mediation illustration ................................................................................................. 65

Figure 5.1: Types of construct measurement .......................................................................... 104

Figure 6.1: Compliance Mediating Familiarity and Project Success ............................................. 136

Figure 6.2: Compliance Mediating Monitoring activities and Project Success ........................ 138

Figure 6.3: Compliance Mediating Professionalism and Project Success ................................ 140

Figure 6.4: Compliance Mediating Sanctions and Project Success.......................................... 143

Figure 6.5: Compliance Mediating Contractors’ Resistance and Project Success .................... 146

Figure 6.6: Final Structural and Measurement model (PLS-Algorithms) ................................ 150

Figure 6.7: Final validated Structural model (Bootstrapping output)....................................... 151

Figure 6.8: Combined Validated Model ................................................................................ 153

Figure 6.8.1 Compliance Validated Model............................................................................... 154

Figure 6.8.2 Project Success Validated Model ......................................................................... 154

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List of Abbreviations ACCU Anti-corruption coalition Uganda

AG Auditor General

AVE Average Variance Extracted

APRM African Peer Review Mechanism

ARB Architecture Registration Board

AU$ Australian Dollar

ERB Engineering Registration Board

ERP Enterprise Resource Planning

EU European Union

Fig Figure

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HREC Human Resource Ethics Committee

HTMT Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio

IPPU Institute of Procurement Professional Uganda

IGG Inspector General of Government

KSH Kenyan Shillings

MoWT Ministry of Works and Transport

MoFEP&D Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development

NDP National Development Plan

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PPDA Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assents Authority

PPDA Act Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assents Act 2003

PDEs Procuring and Disposal Entities

PLS-SEM Partial Least Square-Structural Equation Modelling

PSRRC Public Service Review and Reorganization Commission

RDC Resident District Commissioner

SPSS24 Statistical Package for Social Scientist version 24

SRB Surveyor’s Registration Board

SRMR Standardized Root Mean Square Residual

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TSH Tanzanian Shillings

UACE Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers

UGX Uganda Shillings

UIPE Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers

UNABCEC Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors

UNRA Uganda National Roads Authority

URF Uganda Road Fund

USA United States of America

US$ United States Dollar

UK Unites Kingdom

VIF Variance Inflation Factor

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

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1.1 Background to the Study The introduction chapter identifies the study background, problem statement with the

research question, research aim, objectives, study scope, significance and the study structure.

For purposes of this thesis, the public procurement regulatory framework is a collective term

for regulations, laws, rules, policies, procedures, directives and formal instructions governing

public road construction projects.

For decades, Uganda’s public entities have been known for poor performance and

lack of compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework. This has caused poor

utilisation of resources and personnel management etc. Because of these inefficiencies, in

1989 the Ugandan government initiated a public service review and reorganisation

commission (PSRRC) to examine and suggest recommendations for improving service

delivery, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the whole framework (Kakwezi and

Nyeko, 2010). The review subsequently established public agencies for example; Public

Procurement and Disposal of Public Asset Authority (PPDA), Uganda Revenue Authority

(URA), National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) among others aimed at

improving service delivery. Improving service delivery requires complying with regulatory

framework and since government on behalf of the public spends public funds, accountability

and transparency are important (Basheka and Bisangabasaija, 2010, Wittig, 1999).

Complying with regulatory framework is important because it plays a vital role in delivering

construction projects successfully (Zadawa et al., 2018a, Signor et al., 2016b). The current

Ugandan public procurement regulatory framework came into existence on February 23,

2003 (Tukamuhabwa, 2012, PPDA Authority, 2003). The Ugandan government and

International Development Partners have worked together since 2000 to reform public

procurement system resulting into PPDA Act 2003, aiming at strengthening public

procurement. The Act established Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Asset

Authority (PPDA) to regulate and oversee public procurement (PPDA Authority, 2003). Prior

to PPDA Act 2003, public procurement was conducted under 1990 Statute where

procurement was undertaken by the government central purchasing corporation with parallel

police and military tender boards being responsible for their respective procurement

activities. The government central purchasing corporation replaced Central Purchasing

Organisation (CPO) established in 1977 that was inefficient and unprofessional (Agaba and

Shipman, 2007).

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Public procurement is a contractual arrangement between government and private

sector to deliver infrastructure, goods and services (Frøystad et al., 2010). It is the purchasing,

hiring or obtaining by any other contractual means of goods, works and services by public

sector (Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016). Public procurement is different from private

procurement because public procurement economic results are measured against complex

and long-term criteria including economy, accountability, non-discrimination and respect for

international obligation. It is subjected to all countries and requires enacting regulation to

protect public interest unlike private procurement (Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003).

Accordingly, public procurement in Uganda’s construction sectors is governed and regulated

by PPDA Act No 1 of 2003, Regulations 70 of 2003, Local Government (Amendment) Act

No 2 of 2006 (February 2006) and Regulations S1 No 39 of 2006 (August 2006), Standard

Biding Documents (SBD) and PPDA guidelines (PPDA Authority, 2008). However, public

procurement in the construction sector is vulnerable to procurement irregularities affecting

both developed and developing economies (Chan and Owusu, 2017). These irregularities, in

the form of fraudulent practices account for failed public construction projects (Shan et al.,

2020a, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Gambo et al., 2016, Signor et al., 2016b). Interestingly,

construction sectors have a significant impact on the development of these economies (Shan

et al., 2020b, Love et al., 2019, Darko et al., 2017, Shan et al., 2017). This is why a strong

and effective regulatory framework is important to govern public procurement and meet

government objectives especially for complex construction sector including road

construction projects.

The construction sector plays a crucial role in accelerating economic development of

nations worldwide (Sinesilassie et al., 2019, Munyasya and Chileshe, 2018, Zadawa et al.,

2018a, Love et al., 2018b, Shaban, 2008). However, the sector is dynamic with increasing

uncertainties revolving around technology, budgets and process that complicates successful

implementation of construction projects (Sinesilassie et al., 2019, Jari and Bhangale, 2013).

Particularly, delivering transport construction projects within estimated budget is still a

challenge among governments worldwide (Love et al., 2019). The success of construction

projects is tagged on a number of factors that need careful attention in order to meet intended

goals. For example, these projects can only be successful if they meet construction

stakeholders’ expectations as well as achieving intended goals (Jari and Bhangale, 2013).

The common expectations and goals determining successful construction sector include but

are not limited to cost, time and quality (Hussain et al., 2019, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Kog and

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Loh, 2011). Considering a regulatory framework in the construction industry is important.

Interestingly, a regulatory framework is a significant factor for the successful construction

sector (Tabish and Jha, 2011). Despite its significance, a public procurement regulatory

framework in construction industry is complex because it involves human resource,

equipment, materials, environment, political factors and many stakeholders requiring careful

attention to enhance compliance and successful implementation. Particularly, construction

projects are complex since they involve various participants with varying interests that affect

their successful implementation (Hussain et al., 2019, Sinesilassie et al., 2019, Lapidus and

Yves, 2018, Shaban, 2008). Furthermore, the construction industry is complicated and

requires highly skilled and competent staff to encounter growing challenges (Hussain et al.,

2019, Love et al., 2002). With dynamism and complexity of construction projects,

establishing and understanding success factors suitable for implementing these projects

would ensure an effective construction sector by eradicating impeding challenges (Jari and

Bhangale, 2013).

A lack of compliance pose serious challenges in the procurement of construction

projects (Zadawa et al., 2018a, Abdullahi et al., 2017). According to a 2008 PPDA

consultative workshop with stakeholders in public construction sector, major challenges

identified include lack of clear national construction standards and regulations (PPDA

Authority, 2008). These challenges create uncertainty in regulatory frameworks governing

the construction sector causing, lack of compliance in project implementation. Specifically,

weaknesses challenging public procurement include; poor contract management, record

keeping, tender evaluation, confidentiality, rational use of prequalification lists and dispute

resolution mechanism (PPDA Authority, 2009b). Such inefficient and ineffective structures

promote lack of compliance with the procurement regulatory framework, costing

government million dollars and poor service delivery (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Ntayi and Eyaa,

2009). The construction industry globally loses significant funds annually. For example

US$340 billion (AU$ 462.4B) is lost worldwide through fraudulent practices (Sohail and

Cavill, 2008). These are compliance and projects implementation challenges equally

affecting Uganda’s public road construction projects causing late project delivery,

substandard works and over budget. Convincingly, a construction project is successful if it is

completed within time, budget and according to specifications (White and Fortune, 2002).

Noteworthy, according to His Excellency the President of Uganda, road construction projects

are failing to meet these key success indicators (Red Pepper, 2018).

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Uganda’s road network consists of four groups namely; national roads, district roads,

urban roads and community access roads. The research scope of this thesis was limited to

the implementation stage of national roads. The national roads are grouped into completed,

on-going and future construction projects. This dissertation was further limited to completed

and on-going road construction projects rather than those that are under pre-planning stages.

Furthermore, Uganda’s national roads are managed and supervised between other public

bodies including; Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT), Uganda National Roads

Authority (UNRA), Uganda Road Fund (URF) and Public Procurement and Disposal of

Public Assets Authority (PPDA). Basing on the public service review and reorganization

commission, these bodies were established under different Public Acts with respective

mandates. For example; supervising, monitoring, developing and maintain national roads in

addition to managing ferries linking the national road network and axle control. All of these

aimed at strengthening efficiency in service delivery (Ministry of Works and Transport,

2014). However, balancing between transport sector importance and its challenges requires

a sound and effective regulatory framework to achieve government goals. Achieving

government goals would guarantee justification for increased budget allocation and public

confidence in government expenditure. A lack of compliance with a public procurement

regulatory framework and unsuccessful public road construction projects impairs achieving

government goals. The following section outlines importance of public procurement and

construction industry.

1.1.1 Importance of public procurement and construction industry

Public procurement is a macro-economic tool relied upon by most governments as a

backbone for economic development (Davis et al., 2016, Peprah, 2015). Particularly,

procurement of construction projects is key in the construction industry (Sinesilassie et al.,

2019, Zadawa et al., 2018b, Zadawa et al., 2018a). This is because large funds are committed

to public procurement especially in works (Czarnitzki et al., 2018, Chan and Owusu, 2017,

Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016, Signor et al., 2016b). Interestingly, for public procurement

to achieve economic development, effective and efficient management is paramount Obicci

(2015), Mahmood (2010) because an ailing economy can use public procurement for

economic development and stabilisation (Thai, 2001, Arrowsmith, 1998). Of note, public

procurement is increasingly promoting innovative activities (Czarnitzki et al., 2018).

However, if public procurement is mishandled, its contribution may be catastrophic to

economic development because public procurement is a powerful driver in sustaining

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economies (Cheng et al., 2018, Abdullahi et al., 2017). Table 1.1 presents information on

public procurement across sectors based on contribution and expenditure in terms of Gross

Domestic Product (GDP). This shows how governments globally spend more funds in public

procurement.

Table 1.1 Showing Public Sector Procurement Expenditure and Contribution

Item/procurement Expenditure (%GDP) Contribution (GDP) Source

World procurement 15-18.42 Mahmood (2010), (Decarolis

et al., 2018)

Global average 12-20 Frøystad et al. (2010)

Global construction AU$ 74.352b Sohail and Cavill (2008)

Australia building &

construction

7.9 AU$ 99.4b Australian Procurement &

Construction Council (2013)

Developed countries 5-7 (Sohail and Cavill, 2008,

Kenny, 2007, Rizk et al., 2018)

Developing countries 2-3 (9-13)% Sohail and Cavill (2008),

Oluka and Basheka (2014)

Industrialized countries 5-8 10% (Navon, 2005, Trionfetti,

2000, Shaban, 2008)

OECD countries 12 (Czarnitzki et al., 2018, Appelt

and Galindo-Rueda, 2016)

European Union 17 (Turley and Perera, 2014,

Wittig, 1999)

South Africa 29 (Turley and Perera, 2014,

Wittig, 1999)

Middle East & Africa 9-13 Odhiambo and Kamau (2003)

USA Federal AU$ 272b Pegnato (2003)

Russia Federal 40 Fradkov (2004)

Uganda 70 Akech (2004)

Uganda construction

industry

50.2 13.7% Ministry of Finance (2013)

Road sector 2-3.5 Estache (2006)

Kenya 60 Akech (2004)

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Tanzania 70 Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013)

Nigeria 1.4% Abdullahi et al. (2017)

The next section explains importance and challenges in Uganda’s road construction subsector.

1.1.2 Importance and challenges of Uganda’s public road construction projects

Having reviewed procurement expenditure in relationship to GDP, this section

investigates Uganda’s transport subsector in particular. The transport sector plays a crucial

role in Uganda’s economic development and it is prioritised in the National Development

Plan (NDP) (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2014). The notion of criticality is supported

by reports attaching the transport sector’s importance to economic development (Love et al.,

2019, Munyasya and Chileshe, 2018, Love et al., 2018b, Shan et al., 2017, Amann et al.,

2016). An efficient transport system enables lower production costs, timely service delivery,

access to markets, boosting tourism, promoting imports and exports. Indeed, efficient

transport infrastructure is a hallmark for a well-functioning economy (Love et al., 2017). The

road sector is a core mode of transport with 90% of cargo freight and passengers (Ministry

of Works and Transport, 2014). Despite its core importance, Uganda’s road subsector is

facing underfunding and increasing construction and maintenance costs (Uganda National

Road Authority, 2018). For example, in 2012/13 cost increased by 25% and in 2013/14 by

41%. Sharply rising road construction costs in Uganda are worsened by restrictions of

companies outside African Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) region to bid for European Union

(EU) funded projects (Ministry of Works & Transport, 2013).

The transport and communication subsector contributed 5.3% to total GDP in

2013/2014 and 5.1% in 2012/2013 and its budget allocation increased by 16% 2014/2015 and

17% in 2015/2016 (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2015). Further, in budgetary terms, the

road sector absorbs substantial capital compared to other sectors. For example in 2008/2009,

budget was increased from UGX (400million-1.6trillion) (AU$ 0.152M-608M) (Cornish and

Mugova, 2014, Ministry of works and Transport, 2012). While road maintenance budget

increased from UGX (158.577-181.87) billion (AU$60.259-69.111M) in financial Year (FY)

2007/2008 and FY2012/2013 (Uganda National Roads Authority, 2013, Ministry of Works

& Transport, 2013). Before data collection in Uganda, the national road network was

21,000km consisting of 3,981km (19%) paved and 17,019km (81%) unpaved roads as at June

2015 (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2015). However, according to financial year (FY)

2017/2018, the stock of national roads is 20,544Km (4,551 paved and 15,993 unpaved). This

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represents a 22.2% paved against 77.8% un paved roads (Uganda National Road Authority,

2018). Accordingly, Table 1.2 shows accumulating paved roads from FY2007/2008 to

2017/2018.

Table 1.2: Showing stock of paved national roads

Financial year Paved roads

Annual increase (KM) Stock (KM)

2007/08 2,875.6

2008/09 159.0 3,034.6

2009/10 165.4 3,200.0

2010/11 64.1 3,264.1

2011/12 53.0 3,317.1

2012/13 172.5 3,489.6

2013/14 305.2 3,795

2014/15 186 3,981

2015/16 238 4,157

2016/17 100 4,257

2017/18 294 4,551

Source: (Uganda National Road Authority, 2018, Ministry of Works and Transport, 2015)

1.2 Sample road construction projects under investigation for procurement

irregularities

Procurement irregularities are a consequence of unprofessional behaviours by public

procurement stakeholders (Basheka and Mugabira, 2008). They depict a lack of compliance

with their respective public procurement regulatory framework (Kingsford Owusu and Chan,

2018, Chan and Owusu, 2017, PPDA Authority, 2009b, Kling, 2008). Media reports show

increasing cases of public procurement irregularities (New Vision, 4th August 2017, Red

Pepper, 3rd November 2016, Daily Monitor, 24th October 2016). These irregularities cause

public road construction projects to incur significant losses (New Vision, 28th July 2016).

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Despite appeals by Uganda National Roads Authority’s (UNRA) executive director for

timely and quality road construction projects, UNRA is accused of failing to meet its

obligations. For example, irregularities have led to unsuccessful implementation of public

road construction projects (Red Pepper, 2018, New Vision, 4th August 2017). This has

attracted public attention with the Ugandan parliament commencing investigations on 28 on-

going road construction projects (Red Pepper, 21st October 2016). Examples of public road

construction projects reportedly facing procurement irregularities are shown in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3: Showing sample road construction projects marred by lack of compliance

Road Construction

Project

Amount Problem Reference

Hima-Katunguru

(58KM) and Kanoni-

Ssembabule-Villa

Maria (110KM

UGX22 billion

(AU$ 122.36M)

Queried and being

investigated on lack of

compliance.

(New Vision, 20th

October 2016).

Mukono-Katosi-

Nyenga (74KM)

UGX24.7 billion

(AU$9.386M)

Funds lost and project

delayed.

(New Vision, 28th

July 2016, New

Vision, 4th August

2017).

Kampala-Entebbe

Expressway (51KM

UGX55 billion

(AU$20.9M)

Inflated cost due to lack

of compliance with road

specifications and

delayed completion.

(Daily Monitor, 5th

November 2016,

New Vision, 4th

August 2017).

Musita-Lumino-

Busia-Majanji

(105KM)

Not specified Delayed completion. (Daily Monitor,

29th August 2016)

Busega-Masaka

(51Km)

Not specified Over 52% contract cost

variation and delayed

completion by three

years.

(Uganda National

Road Authority,

2014)

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Kanungu–Kihiihi–

Ishasha–Rukungiri

road (78.5Km).

Not specified Delayed completion (Red Pepper,

2018)

These examples show lack of compliance with the public procurement regulatory

framework affecting successful implementation of public road construction projects. They

are costing taxpayers significant funds and with schedule overruns, altogether failing

government goals, inconveniencing business communities and affecting economic

development. Hence, this leads to problem statement.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

A lack of compliance is persistently reported in public sector procurement and

particularly in the construction sector, leading to extra cost and time wastage (Kingsford

Owusu and Chan, 2018, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Abdul-Rahman, 1995). Surprisingly, a lack of

compliance costs the construction sector US$340B (AU$ 462.4B) (Shan et al., 2020b, Rizk

et al., 2018, Shan et al., 2017). A lack of compliance include; poor implementation plans,

substandard work, high contract price variations and schedule overruns. These factors have

cost Uganda US$258.6 million (AU$ 351.696M) annually (Agaba and Shipman, 2007).

These compliance issues affect successful implementation of public road construction

projects (Red Pepper, 2018, Love et al., 2016a, Kakitahi et al., 2013). For example, deviating

from regulatory frameworks affects implementation of construction projects (Stansbury,

2003). Convincingly, Golden and Picci (2006) highlighted that an increasing lack of

compliance in the construction industry has resulted in significant loss of funds and failed

construction projects. In Uganda, reports show that compliance with the regulatory

framework in public procurement is reducing despite efforts to enforce improvement

strategies through capacity building (PPDA Authority, 2012, Tukamuhabwa, 2012).

Particularly, a lack of compliance occurs frequently under contract award, contract

implementation and record keeping (Bowen et al., 2012). This is equally affecting Uganda’s

public road subsector that is heavily donor funded. Reports arising from Public Procurement

and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, Inspector General of Government, Attorney General

and the Media provided the catalyst for this research project as they identified a lack of

compliance with a regulatory framework, they suggested a significant funds loss and pointed

to unsuccessful construction projects.

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Whenever a lack of compliance is mentioned, people think of unethical procurement

officials Ntayi et al. (2013) but attach less importance to explaining why this occurs (Ntayi

et al., 2010b). Recent reports by the PPDA authority document a lack of compliance with

public procurement regulatory frameworks amongst Procuring and Disposal Entities (PDEs)

hampering successful implementation of many projects (PPDA Authority, 2007). Since the

PPDA Act 2003 was enacted, several reforms have taken place with the current PPDA

amendments 2014 all aiming at strengthening public procurement regulatory framework to

achieve value for money. Despite these, procurement officials still do what they find

convenient. This action affects successful implementation of public road construction

projects in Uganda. For example, cost variations and delayed completion in road construction

projects affected successful implementation of these projects that in turn affect performance

of public sector (Odeck, 2004). Specific examples listed in Table 1.3 underpin Uganda’s

unsuccessful road construction projects depicting lack of compliance (Red Pepper, 2018,

New Vision, 20th October 2016).

Despite efforts by the Ugandan government and development partners to improve

public procurement performance, a lack of compliance, substandard works and contract cost

variations persist, leading to unsuccessful implementation of public road construction

projects (New Vision, 4th August 2017, Daily Monitor, 5th November 2016). Noteworthy,

pertinent reports show that over UGX22 billion (AU$8.36M) was paid to Chinese ghost

contractors Red Pepper (3rd November 2016). In addition, UGX577 billion (AU$219.26M)

was paid to suspected ghost claimants in dubious transactions on land acquisition for various

road projects where UGX49 billion (AU$18.62M) was lost and another UGX562 billion

(AU$213.56M) funds was paid without a satisfying reason (Daily Monitor, 24th October

2016). A Report by African Peer Review Mechanism Country review (APRM) in 2009,

identified a lack of compliance costs Uganda over US$184 billion (AU$ 250.24B) annually,

while Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU) put the figure at UGX200 billion (AU$

76M) annually (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011). Similarly, a lack of compliance accounts for

unsuccessful large construction projects in Uganda. For example, the World Bank funded

Bujagali hydroelectricity project worthy US$550 million (AU$ 748M) was suspended for

wrongly awarding a contract (Prayas Energy group, 2002).

Previous studies such as those by Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013), Eyaa and Oluka

(2011) attempted to determine compliance factors in public procurement, other studies

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considered project success factors for the construction industry (Hussain et al., 2019, Tayeh

et al., 2018, Love et al., 2015b, Langston, 2014, Shaban, 2008). However, less attention has

been placed on the economically dependable public road construction subsector (Amann et

al., 2016). Additionally, few of the studies focusing on the public road construction subsector,

when they did they hinged on only a few indicators (Ameyaw et al., 2017, Love et al., 2016a,

White and Fortune, 2002). However, with the uniqueness and complexity in operations of

road construction, this subsector requires a more elaborate study involving expected

compliance and success factors from different perspectives. Hence, with literature evidence

on anomalies facing public road project implementation, there exists a call for research to

establish factors affecting compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and

successful implementation of Uganda’s public road construction projects (Eyaa and Oluka,

2011). The Research Question enhanced the study: What factors affect compliance in

performance of public road construction projects? This leads to the research aim and

objectives of this dissertation.

1.4 Research Aim

This dissertation aims to establish factors responsible for compliance with the public

procurement regulatory framework and successful implementation of public road

construction projects in Uganda.

1.5 Research objectives

To achieve this aim, three specific research objectives are;

I. To investigate what compliance factors are and how these factors influence

compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework.

II. To ascertain how compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework and

compliance factors influence successful implementation of public road construction

projects.

III. To evaluate the mediating role of compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework in successful implementation of public road construction projects.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The public road subsector is the backbone for economic development of a nation as it

accounts for movement of all business forms. Failure in road construction projects implies

economic decline. This dissertation establishes significant compliance and success factors in

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implementing public road construction projects. Established significant factors are the

cornerstone for successful implementation of future public road construction projects.

Complying with public procurement regulatory framework is important in successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Significant compliance and project

success factors would ensure meeting government objectives, achieving value for money and

steering economic development. This is possible when these projects are implemented within

time, budget and according to project specifications.

The study in this thesis is important because it establishes significant factors

enhancing compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework and

successful implementation of public road construction projects.

The research findings offer the opportunity for government to identify areas for

performance improvements and choose appropriate factors from recommendations

herein.

This research enables Procuring and Disposal Entities (PDEs) to implement public

road construction projects successfully in a transparent manner by learning from study

results.

This research contributes to existing body of knowledge and forms a basis for further

research especially exploring compliance and project success factors as well as

mediational effects in the construction industry.

The researcher gained from the study by acquiring research knowledge, skills and

accomplishing a PhD.

1.7 Study scope

Public procurement in construction projects is broad and given the PhD time

constraints coupled with complexity of public road construction projects Tayeh et al. (2018),

Chan and Owusu (2017), this thesis was limited to the implementation stage of national

public road construction projects in Uganda including completed and on-going road

construction projects. Particularly, the study was limited to investigating which factors were

significant in ensuring compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework and

successful implementation of public road construction projects in Uganda (Gelderman et al.,

2017, He et al., 2015). This research further investigates the mediating role of compliance

with the public procurement regulatory framework in successful implementation of public

road construction projects. Uganda was considered since its public road construction projects

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are majorly donor funded and there are persistent procurement irregularities reported (Red

Pepper, 2018, PPDA Authority, 2014). The finding would be equally important globally

given similarities in public sector procurement (Kling, 2008, Verdeaux, 2003).

1.8 Structure of the thesis Chapter one explains the public procurement regulatory framework background, the

road construction sector, the importance of the construction sector and public road

construction sub-sector, challenges facing Uganda’s road subsector with sample cases under

investigations. The chapter further provides the problem statement, research aim, objectives,

study scope, significance, and structure of the thesis. Chapter two explains the theoretical

foundation supporting research study linked to study variables. Agency and institution

theories are discussed to extract and support the study variables. Chapter three details the

literature review from peer reviewed journals and public documents, hypotheses

development, research model, selection and justification of using study variables. Chapter

four presents the research methodology that addresses the research question including;

research question and hypotheses, literature review approach, research framework, research

approach, research design and justification, measurement development, data collection and

ethics consideration.

Chapter five presents detailed data analysis including data processing and analysis,

adoption and justification for using Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-

SEM), measurement model evaluation, and structural model evaluation and mediation effects

determination. Chapter six presents results interpretation including descriptive statistics,

composite reliability, factor loadings, Average Variance Extracted (AVE), discriminant

validity, diagnostic tests, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), relationship between study

variable, model estimation and fitting, validation of results and final validated model. Chapter

seven provides discussion of results that includes; compliance relationships, project success

relationships, mediation effects and summary of hypotheses. The discussions of results are

in line with nineteen hypotheses developed in chapter three. Chapter eight presents study

implications and contributions including; theoretical and managerial implications,

methodological, knowledge and practical contributions. Chapter nine presents conclusions

and recommendations including limitations and areas for further research. The following

chapter discusses theories underpinning study factors.

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CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

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2.1 Introduction

Chapter two explains the thesis’s theoretical foundation that supports the study

variables. Theory drives a research problem from causal factors and explores possible

governance mechanism to solve the problem. The move to use a theoretical approach was

inevitable since sound and relevant research is built from theoretical foundation (Mentzer et

al., 2008). Likewise, a theory is good in grounding knowledge (Boer et al., 2014). The

research focus was to formulate knowledge and test relationships Pitariu and Ployhart (2010),

agency and institutional theories were selected to enhance the research and expose several

study variables described below. These theories were selected because previous studies had

used them to underpin compliance with regulatory framework (Zadawa et al., 2018b). In

addition, public road construction projects are the government’s mandate. This mandate

controls the implementation process through institutions informed by regulatory framework.

Hence, institutional theory is paramount in legitimacy of stakeholders’ management given an

existing phenomenon to instill value and shaping the organisations (Brammer et al., 2012,

Zsidisin* et al., 2005). In addition, these projects are implemented by a team acting on behalf

of government that clearly mimic Principal-Agent relationship. Finally, these theories are

consistently and widely applied to enhance research across different fields (Scaraboto and

Fischer, 2012, Brammer et al., 2012, Hillebrand et al., 2011, Bruton et al., 2010, Zsidisin and

Ellram, 2003, Reichelstein, 1992).

Notably, public road construction projects in Uganda are implemented according to

the Public Procurement Act 2003 since these are procurement of works. Hence, the three

isomorphism of institutional theory (Regulatory, Normative and Cultural-Cognitive) and

principal-agency theory are deemed fit to enhance compliance and successful implementation

of public road construction projects. A theory approach was used to establish study variables

as a guiding foundation in literature review as demonstrated in section 2.2 and 2.3.

2.2 Agency theory, Compliance in public procurement and Project success

The background to agency theory is linked to information economics emphasising

risk sharing between contractual parties for efficient contracts in different environment

(Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Principal-Agent theory is a contract theory used to evaluate

public procurement contracts (Zadawa et al., 2018b). For example, in this dissertation,

implementing public road construction projects is a contract between the Ugandan

government and a project implementation team. Ideally, agency theory specifies the

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relationship between the principal and the agent through a contract whereby the agent is

delegated to accomplish the principal’s tasks (Saam, 2007). Convincingly, agency theory

offers insights into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, risk and power

asymmetry (Saam, 2007, Eisenhardt, 1989). In public procurement of construction projects,

information asymmetry arises due to a principal’s failure to monitor an agent’s competences

(Saam, 2007, Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). In addition, information asymmetry results in a lack

of professionalism in the administration of a principal-agent contract referred to as

opportunistic behaviour (Um and Kim, 2018, Müller, 2009). The attitude jeopardises

compliance and project implementation (Um and Kim, 2018). A lack of information and

knowledge during public road implementation incapacitates a government’s ability to

monitor and assess staff performance. Such monitoring inability permits opportunistic

behavior in combination with organizational complexity and presents a failing to meet targets

(Worsham et al., 1997). This identifies that staff knowledge and monitoring are vital during

public road implementation since it influences compliance with project requirements.

Relatedly, staff use their own unprofessional behavior to maximize benefits for themselves;

this costs the government consequently affecting successful project implementation. This

unprofessional behavior has been attributed to goal conflict and differing risk perception

(Wright et al., 2001). Wright and colleagues suggest that a team’s expertise through

professionalism in executing duties can influence compliance and promote successful

implementation of public road construction projects (Wright et al., 2001).

When the principal delegates authority to its agent and because of self-seeking

behaviour, problems arise in meeting goals especially when the principal lacks information

in verifying the agent’s actual performance (Um and Kim, 2018). Differing attitudes of the

principal and agent in risk sharing associated with meeting contractual goals complicates

matters. It is the basis of agency theory that advocates for the principal to invest in

information systems, monitoring agent activities and countering opportunistic behaviour

(Saam, 2007, Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal is encouraged to invest in agent capabilities

through training to seal any incompetence gap during project implementation. Hence, the

government is encouraged to equip road construction team with necessary skills through

training workshops. These training workshops enable an understanding and compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework governing different procurement contacts. This

includes the implementation of public road construction projects (Agaba and Shipman, 2007).

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Such investment would promote staff professionalism and familiarity underpinned in agency

theory.

The government undertakes public road construction projects on the public’s behalf

and different players in respective entities implement these projects. This process calls on the

government’s legal authority to influence road construction team to comply with its interest

(Heath and Norman, 2004). Such influence is enforced through sanctioning stakeholders to

ensure compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework and successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Uganda’s public procurement legal

power is derived from the PPDA Act 2003, Local government Act 2006 and Public Finance

Act 2003 on performing different procurement contracts. Accordingly, agency theory is

widely applied to influence management strategies by eradicating unprofessional behavior

(Um and Kim, 2018, Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Enforcing sanctions to influence road

construction staff is inevitable because humans being are rational, self-seeking and risk

averse (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Saam, 2007, Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003, Wright et al.,

2001). These human elements challenge successful implementation of public road

construction projects and government’s goals.

Self-seeking attitude is a major cause of teamwork failures because the attitude

undermines staff professionalism in contract implementation. This attitude has caused many

projects and their concomitant objectives to fail (Um and Kim, 2018). Since public road

construction projects bring different stakeholders together to accomplish common goal, such

attitude hampers government goals by failing to implement these projects. Furthermore,

information asymmetry causes project implementation problems because the government

contracts the road implementation team without knowing their potential capabilities. This

arises from moral hazard and adverse selection of staff due to hidden information or

misrepresentation because the government lacks complete information on staff

professionalism and familiarity embedded in qualifications, skills and competencies (Saam,

2007). Similarly, goal conflict increases cost in agency theory when the principal strives to

bring order in attaining goals. Accordingly, government incurs costs for ensuring compliance

and successful implementation of public road construction projects. For example, the

government may increase governance mechanism, pursuing court cases, retendering, and

compensations and rectifying substandard works with the aim of meeting goals.

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Evidence shows that agency theory aims to minimise cost in the principal-agent

relationship (Hillier et al., 2011, Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003, Wright et al., 2001).

Convincingly, agency theory is well known for managing risks across purchasing

organisations when implementing various projects (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). The theory

is equally vibrant to guide government in implementing public road construction projects

through minimum costs because the theory helps in leveraging risks (Leland, 1998). In

addition, agency theory is prominent in successful designing of outsourcing transport

contracts by reducing relationship risks (Logan, 2000). Ideally, a road implementation team’s

compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework would ensure the projects are

implemented according to set requirements and in line with government goals. This is crucial

because the implementation team plays a relationship role to successfully implement public

road construction projects and meet government’s objectives (Donahue, 1989). However,

through delegation of authority a gap between the government and the road implementation

team is created because of conflicting interest and opportunistic behaviour that hampers

compliance and successful implementation of projects. Such a gap and attitude can be

rectified through controlling, monitoring and sanctioning staff (Mwakibinga and Buvik,

2013, Tracey and Johannesson, 2008, Saam, 2007).

Furthermore, the theory is predominant in establishing governance models driven by

goal conflict and interest divergence between the principal and the agent who are viewed as

utility maximisers (Davis et al., 1997). This is attributed to individual interest where each

strives to maximise gains at the expense of the other. Lack of compliance would arises when

there is a conflict of interest between the government and public road implementation team

in achieving goals. To ensure compliance in project implementation and goal achievement,

sanctions are inevitable (Obanda, 2010). Convincingly, compliance with a regulatory

framework is based on certainty and severity of sanctions (Gelderman et al., 2010, Sutinen

and Kuperan, 1999). Furthermore, Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) contends that compliance is

affected by illegal behaviour imbedded in professionalism and measured through unethical

conduct of staff charged with implementation of public road projects. Sutinen and Kuperan

(1999) adds that the agent is controlled through monitoring, surveillance and enforcement

mechanisms. These control mechanisms would equally enable the government to

successfully implement public road construction projects as supported by various scholars

(Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Davis et al., 1997, Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In addition,

the government should monitors staff compliance with project requirements aimed at value

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for money through cost reduction (Robinson and Scott, 2009). This is worthy emphasising

since road implementation team manipulate government and pursue individual interests that

cost the government (Saam, 2007, Brown and Potoski, 2003, Ross, 1973).

Reviewing agency theory from a supply chain management perspective, information

sharing, incentive alignment and trust are important (Fayezi et al., 2012). These aspects are

equally important in implementing complex public road construction projects involving

multiple stakeholders, allowing a government to meet project goals. A lack of compliance

manifested through a conflict of interest in public road construction projects is costs both the

primary stakeholders, the government and its taxpayer (New Vision, 20th October 2016, New

Vision, 28th July 2016). Accordingly, to enforce compliance, Kauppi and van Raaij (2015)

suggested monitoring, training and sanctioning an agent to achieve the principal’s objectives.

Monitoring enables a government to measure and control staff behaviour to enhance

compliance and successfully implement road construction projects. This is propelled through

punishment, performance evaluations and audits (Davis et al., 1997). Additionally, training

promotes staff professionalism and familiarity that in turn would promote compliance and

successful implementation of public road construction projects. Professionalism and

familiarity encompass staff competence in public road construction projects. Success is

boosted if the regulatory framework governing these projects is clear to reduce lack of

compliance (Gelderman et al., 2010). Interestingly, successful contract performance is

achieved if the government objectives are clear and the staff are competent (Chiappori and

Salanié, 2002). This notion introduces the need for an efficient regulatory framework to

enforce compliance and successful public road construction projects. This is inevitable

because an efficient regulatory framework can effectively bond contracts that influence

compliance with project requirements (Wright et al., 2001). Conversely, this is linked to a

perceived inefficiency of the regulatory framework in determining compliance and successful

implementation of public road construction projects (Gelderman et al., 2006).

According to Rokkan and Buvik (2009), agency theory explains the use of sanction

by the principal to influence the agent’s actions in meeting expectations. Rokkan and Buvik

emphasises compliance through power influence by the principal that is in line with

government’s legal powers of controlling public road construction team. The use of sanctions

in implementing public road construction projects is equally important to ensure compliance

and successful implementation of these projects. Similarly, agency theory suggests a use of

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effective monitoring and sanctions mechanisms to improve compliance, this outcome is

inconsistent with the empirical findings of Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) showing that

increasing monitoring and sanctions simultaneously fail to enhance compliance with a

regulatory framework. However, when monitoring and sanctions are applied sequentially,

they effectively enhance compliance. When increasing monitoring, it is proposed that

sanctions should be reduced otherwise staff may retaliate by not complying due to a

perception of mistrust from management (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). Other authors have

shown that monitoring mechanisms are vital in solving principal-agent problems that arise in

the course of achieving organisational goals (Rutherford et al., 2007, Ross, 1973).

In summary, agency theory was considered suitable for this study because it is an

inspiring theory widely applied in different research areas to manage contracts between the

agent and the principal including; procurement, manufacturing and supply chain management

(Fayezi et al., 2012, Saam, 2007, Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Additionally, agency theory is

universally applied in many contractual relationships including buyer-supplier relationship,

employer- employee relationships within organisations and supplier-retailer among

organisations (Norrman, 2008, Zsidisin and Smith, 2005, Ross, 1973). By mimicking

government and road implementation team, agency theory clearly explains each party’s role

in managing contract relationships and ensuring compliance to achieve set goals (Van Slyke,

2007, Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003, Frey, 1993, Ross, 1973). Ideally, the implementation team

is in a contractual relationship with the government whereby failure to fulfil obligations, the

government enforces compliance to successfully implement public road construction projects

legally through signed contract and governing regulatory framework, sanctions, monitoring

and reporting mechanism (Van Slyke, 2007).

Table 2.1 Theoretical tenets and application of Agency theory

Theme Tenets Application

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Goal incongruence: Assumes goal divergence based on self-interested rational actors. Initial disposition is to distrust. Control-oriented management philosophy. Theoretical assumptions are from economics.

Use of incentives and sanctions to foster goal alignment:

Assign risk to the agent to ensure goal compliance

Monitoring

Reward systems

Use of bonding threats to reputation

Eliminate opportunistic behaviour

Provide level of incentives and sanctions which reduce the threat of information asymmetry

Correct through specific contract requirements for asset specificity and moral hazard

Uses reputation as an incentive and sanction

Ensure goal alignment

Source: (Van Slyke, 2007)

Table 2.1 summarises by linking and supporting the conceptual framework in Fig 3

to a theoretical foundation. The theory helped to establish factors causing lack of compliance

and affecting successful project implementation. For example, how sanction, monitoring,

effective and efficient regulatory framework and professionalism influence compliance with

a regulatory framework and successful implementation of public road construction projects.

Agency theory established that a lack of compliance is caused by goal conflict or

incongruence, information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard, leading to self-

interest, opportunistic behaviour and mistrust that equally affect successful implementation

of public road construction projects. By linking to this thesis’s conceptual framework,

ensuring compliance with the public procurement regulatory and successful implementation

of public road construction projects, opportunistic behaviour could be eliminated through

sanctions on staff, monitoring activities, perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework in

terms of clear instructions and efficient contracts, professionalism and familiarity in terms of

competence, training and knowledge. The next section discusses institutional theory in light

of compliance and project success.

2.3 Institutional theory, Compliance in public procurement and Project success

Institutional theory is widely applied in different fields including but not limited to

organisational behaviour, economics, political science and business to advance respective

research objectives (Scaraboto and Fischer, 2012, Brammer et al., 2012, Hillebrand et al.,

2011, DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Institutional theory is critical in identifying factors

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useful for pursuing research (Bruton et al., 2010). Specifically, institutional theory is known

for explaining compliance within the organisation (Zadawa et al., 2018b). In this regard, the

theory is equally important to establish factors affecting a lack of compliance and successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Comparatively, institutions behave

similarly since the same forces influence them. Convincingly, institutional norms are

enforced through coercive, mimetic and normative governance mechanisms (DiMaggio and

Powell, 2015, DiMaggio and Powell, 2000). Interestingly, institutional theory is concerned

with how organisations legitimately positioned themselves by complying with institutional

environment. This is hedged on the premise that organisations are controlled under some

rules of which compliance with these rules defines organizational success (Scott, 2013,

Brammer et al., 2012, Scott, 1983). Organizational performance is attributed to adoption of

different norms in managing their affairs and creating competitive advantage that has seen

success of some organisations while others failing because of risk aversion and selfish interest

(Kondra and Hinings, 1998). Conversely, organisations are managed differently with

differing regulatory frameworks that determine their performance in terms of efficiency and

effectiveness (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). This explains why certain projects fail while

others succeed. By linking to current study constructs, perceived inefficiency of a public

procurement regulatory framework would determine compliance and successful

implementation of public road construction projects.

Institutions use established formal rules that guide organisations to meet objectives

often through monitoring and forms of enforcement (North, 2016, North, 1993). Ideally,

institutions are designed and enforced to control human interaction in carrying out

organizational activities (North, 2016). For example, safety measures in construction projects

with multiple stakeholders have been enforced through regulative, normative, and cultural

cognitive mechanisms (Ju and Rowlinson, 2014). These institutional mechanisms provided

government the power to influence organizational results through sanctions and monitoring

employees which in turn influences their compliance (Hillebrand et al., 2011, Kondra and

Hinings, 1998). This is necessary in public road construction projects with a myriad of

stakeholders. However, compliance may be met with resistance from some players who find

alternative means to successfully accomplish tasks using their knowledge and interest

(Kondra and Hinings, 1998). A notion supported by the argument from Greenwood and

Hinings (1996) that compliance with institutional norms can be contingent on specific

reasons. Looking at this from the contractors’ perspective, respect for a contractors’

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commitment to fulfill their obligations and providing moral guidance would ensure

successful team performance (Babalola et al., 2016). Furthermore, North (2016) notes that

institutions who have professional code of conduct and sanctions face retaliation that equally

challenges public road construction project teams.

Regulative, cultural cognitive and normative isomorphism form institutional theory

(Scott, 2005). Regulative dimensions help enforce legally binding contracts signed between

parties, for example the government and contractors for construction of public road

construction projects (Geels, 2004). The regulatory element deals with rules, laws and

sanctions as enforcement mechanisms that requires compliance for successful construction

project implementation (Su et al., 2018). However, to ascertain how public road construction

team perceives project activities and objectives in doing the right thing, a cultural cognitive

element is the key. It deals with symbols, beliefs and common understanding that defines

individual behavior (Scott, 2013). However, a normative element is about professionalism

and deals with norms and values, which form a set of rules to which staff must comply within

project implementation (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Scott, 2013). Professionalism is

necessary for road construction team because it deals with a members’ professional behavior,

better work methods and conditions. It is often enabled through formal university education,

specialized skills and professional networking (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Wall and

Ahmed, 2008). The road implementation team requires training and mentoring to reinforce

their skills and expertise crucial for familiarity, professionalism and successful performance

(Cullen et al., 2014). Such competencies describing staff personality characteristics

consequently influence their performance (de Jong et al., 2013). Professionalism compels

public road construction stakeholders to understand the norm of public road construction

projects, the values and social obligation of public entities.

Workers’ performance in project implementation is based on compliance and

credibility of enacted norms as well as sanctioning of underperforming employees (Styhre,

2011). Deviating from a regulatory framework governing public road construction projects

may result in different goals that affect successful implementation of these projects. Such

deviations are easily detected if the organizational norms are effective with strong sanctions

capable of correcting deviant behavior (North, 2016, Oliver, 1991). An efficient and effective

regulatory framework with strong sanctions is paramount for the road construction projects.

Because organizational success depends on effectiveness and compliance with institutional

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norms called institutional fit (Oliver, 1991). For successful implementation of public road

construction project, stakeholders’ compliance with established public procurement

regulatory framework is important. Organizational success is emphasised because institutions

minimize risks and determine organizational performance through transaction costs and

production (North, 2016). Efficient regulatory framework and effective enforcement

mechanism would tame deviant public road construction stakeholders leading to improved

compliance and successful project implementation.

Firm’s successful performance depends on effective sanctions enforcement, staff

skills and knowledge to achieve organizational objectives (Hillebrand et al., 2011, North,

1993). The article notes that investing in staff competence by improving their skills and

knowledge coupled with professional code is paramount for organizational success. These

are components determining professionalism and familiarity in public road construction

which requires management intervention for its staff performance (Beltrán-Martín et al.,

2008). Relatedly, workforce diversity and structural differentiations are competitive

advantage for organisation’s successful performance (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). With

different stakeholders involved in public road construction projects, each player seeks high

performance by accomplishing respective obligations and have specific reasons to do so

while resisting non-compliance. Thus, project performance evaluated through efficiency and

effective institutional norms (perceived efficiency) and monitoring arrangements determines

its success.

Convincingly, institutional theory uncovers organizational success as being reliant on

perceived efficiency of a regulatory framework, staff professionalism, familiarity based on

staff knowledge, compliance with a regulatory framework, monitoring activities, sanctions

on staff, contractors’ resistance and project success factors (Geels, 2004, Scott, 1995).

Table 2.2: Three dimensions of institutional theory.

Regulative Normative Cognitive

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Examples Formal rules, laws,

sanctions, incentives

structures, reward and

cost structures,

governance systems,

power systems, protocols,

procedures and standards

Values, norms,

roles, authority

systems, duty,

expectations and

codes of conduct

Priorities, beliefs,

problem agendas, body

of knowledge

(Paradigms), modes of

reality, categories,

classifications, jargons,

search heuristics

Compliance

mechanism

basis

Expedience, coercive

force and punishments

Social obligations,

Normative pressure

like social sanctions

Taken for granted,

mimetic, learning and

imitation

Logic Instrumentality (creating

stability, rules of the

game)

Appropriateness

and being part of

the group and how

to do things

Orthodoxy (Shared

ideas and concepts)

Legitimacy

basis

Legal sanctions Morally governed Culturally supported

and conceptually correct

Source:(Scott, 1995, Geels, 2004)

Figure 2.1: Summarised theoretical foundation linked to literature review

Agency and institutional theories helped to support identification of eight factors used

in this dissertation. These factors include; familiarity (FAM), monitoring activities (MONT),

professionalism of staff (PROF), sanctions on staff (SANC), perceived inefficiency of a

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public procurement regulatory framework (PEIR), contractors’ resistance to non-compliance

(CONTR), compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework (COMP) and project

success (PROJSU) as depicted from Fig 2.1 respectively.

These factors are explored through the literature review in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER THREE LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

DEVELOPMENT

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3.1 Introduction` This chapter explores via a comprehensive literature review the factors derived from

the theoretical foundation in chapter two. The chapter explains the implications of public

procurement regulatory compliance and project success to determine the knowledge gap in

implementing public road construction projects. The knowledge gap in this thesis was

enhanced through a research question, three objectives and nineteen hypotheses. Literature

relating to familiarity with a public procurement regulatory framework, monitoring activities,

professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects, sanctions on staff,

perceived inefficiency of a public procurement regulatory framework and contractor’s

resistance to non-compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework as

independent variables to compliance with a regulatory framework and project success

respectively is presented. In addition, methodical literature on mediation is explored as

guidance to determining mediation effects. Respective hypotheses are developed as

demonstrated in the conceptual model Fig 3c. The process explaining how the research model

was developed from literature review is also presented here. It ends with a justification for

using selected study variables after mediational effects.

3.2 Research Model

The model illustrates relationships between study variables linked by arrows as shown

in Figure 3.1 (a, b & c). A three step-process was used in formulating the research model.

The first step involved comprehensive literature review. In the literature review, compliance

and project success factors were identified and grouped into four major categories, which are

environmental, organizational, project and individual factors. The second step involved

analysis and interpretation that enabled merging and eliminating similar factors. Accordingly,

six compliance factors and seven project success factors were established (see Fig 3.1b). Note

that the six compliance factors double as project success factors and are superimposed by

arrows in the conceptual framework. Reducing factors helps in an in-depth understanding

since many factors are time consuming and wasteful of resources (Collin, 2002). The third

step involved identifying measurement indicators for each variable as illustrated in Fig 3.1c.

Note that according to the literature review, some factors are interchangeably used as

indicators. This is particularly evidenced in the project success factor. The final model is in

three segments. The first segment illustrates the relationship between six independent

variables (compliance factors) and compliance with a public procurement regulatory

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30

framework is demonstrated by black arrows. The second segment illustrates the relationship

between seven project success factors including compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework and project success as demonstrated by blue arrows. The third invisible

segment illustrates the mediation effect between the six independent variables and project

success (Dependent) through compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

(Mediator). Hypotheses H1-H13 illustrates study variable relationships as well as mediation

effect hypotheses H14-H19 that were statistically tested for significance. The conceptual

framework is in the next section.

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Figure 3.1(a) Broad conceptual model linking compliance factors with regulatory framework and project success

Note: Organizational incentives and pressure captures sanctions

Figure 3.1(b) Conceptual model showing selected compliance and project success factors

Compliance

factors

Project success

Compliance with

regulatory framework

Familiarity

Monitoring

activities

Professionalism

Contractor

resistance

Perceived

inefficiency

Sanctions

Environmental factors

Perceived inefficiency of

regulatory framework

Political interference

Project factors

Contractor’s resistance

Contract management

Record management

Organizational factors

Monitoring activities

Organizational incentives

Institutional factors

Organizational pressure

Individual factors

Familiarity

Professionalism

Compliance with regulatory framework

Regulations

Laws

Rules

Policies

Procedures

Formal instructions

Project Success factors

Client Satisfaction

Time

Cost

Quality

Safety

Others

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Figure 3.1(c) Final conceptual model of compliance and Project Success with Respective Measurement Indicators

Source: Modified from (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Eyaa and Oluka, 2011, Basheka and Mugabira, 2008, Gelderman et al., 2006, Payan

and McFarland, 2005, Dvir and Lechler, 2004)

Familiarity with regulatory framework

Familiarity with applicability

Familiarity with exceptions

Overall regulatory Knowledge

Perceived clarity of regulatory framework

Qualifications

Monitoring activities

Inspection for timely recording

Inspection for proper storage methods

Inspection for timely deliveries

Inspection for actual deliveries

Inspection for authorization

Professionalism

Confidentiality

Competence

Integrity

Professional behaviour

Expertise

Training

Professional membership

Experience

Sanctions

Penalties for violation

Credibility of sanctions

Known stipulated sanctions

Consideration of outcome for non-compliance

Reasons for penalty

Compliance with regulatory framework

Regulatory adherence

Timeliness of delivery

Timeliness of recording

Loss/Damages

Unauthorized

procurement

Project success

Time

Cost

Quality

H1

H2

H3

H4

H7

Perceived inefficiency of

regulatory framework

Ban on Negotiations

Ban on contract

extension

Ban on exclusion of

underperforming

contractors

Contractor’s resistance

Readiness to take

action

Contractor’s

knowledge

Fear of being exposed

H5

H6

H12

H13

H10

H9

H8

H11

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Globally, few studies have been undertaken on a lack of compliance in public

procurement. In addition, these studies were limited in nature and paid less attention to

compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework in construction sector especially

with respect to Uganda’s public road construction projects (Duraku, 2018, Gelderman et al.,

2017, Tender and Enterprises, 2016, Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Eyaa and Oluka, 2011,

Gelderman et al., 2010). The main objectives of a public procurement regulatory framework

are to promote fairness, transparency, accountability and value for money with efficient and

effective procedures benefiting all stakeholders (Duraku, 2018, PPDA Authority, 2003,

Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). Literature shows a number of challenges affecting successful

implementation of public road construction projects and enforcing compliance with a public

procurement regulatory framework (Hansen et al., 2018, KAPLIŃSKI, 2018, Marnewick et al.,

2018, Kingsford Owusu and Chan, 2018, Amann et al., 2016, PPDA Authority, 2016, Carr and

Sundaram, 2016, PPDA Authority, 2008, Agaba and Shipman, 2007). These challenges include

but are not limited to delayed completion of road construction projects, contract price

variations, inefficiency in regulatory framework and procurement irregularities. Interestingly,

challenges in the construction industry are partly blamed on a lack of theories underpinning

cost overruns experienced in transport infrastructure projects (Love et al., 2018b). Particular

road construction projects affected by these challenges are listed in Table 1.3. The next

subsections present a specific literature review starting with the implication of compliance with

a public procurement regulatory framework.

3.3 Implications of Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Compliance refers to a target acting in accordance with influence from a power source

(Payan and McFarland, 2005). Alternatively, compliance is pursuing government objectives

through established frameworks (Krambia-Kapardis, 2019). While a lack of compliance is

disobedience with a regulatory framework (Obanda, 2010, Lisa, 2010). In the context of this

thesis, a lack of compliance implies that staff implementing public road construction projects

are not adhering to the public procurement regulatory framework. In addition, lack of

compliance encompassed all issues including but not limited to procurement/project

irregularities, corruption, unethical behaviours among others.

Promoting and managing compliance should identify what factors cause a lack of

compliance in procurement contracts. For example, GlaxoSmithKline company lost between

US$(80-120) million and failed to achieve its objectives because of procurement occurring

outside contractual agreements (Kulp et al., 2006). Relatedly, the root cause of poor

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performance of transport infrastructure projects delivered over budget is referred to as a

planning fallacy (Love et al., 2019). Several writers suggest, a lack of compliance is caused

by self-interest, a weak enforcement mechanism, inefficient regulatory framework,

inducement, social pressure, obligation, habit/practice and unprofessional behaviour among

others as evidenced from theoretical foundation (Zadawa et al., 2018b, North, 2016, DiMaggio

and Powell, 2015, Saam, 2007, Van Slyke, 2007). Consequently, these factors among others

stand to fail government goals (Kingsford Owusu and Chan, 2018, Gambo et al., 2016,

Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Trepte, 2004). Alternatively, complying with a public

procurement regulatory framework significantly enhances value for money by eradicating

procurement irregularities and ensuring successful implementation of government projects

(Signor et al., 2016b, Agaba and Shipman, 2007). For example, timely implementation of

public road construction projects that are durable and cost effective (Farshchian et al., 2017,

Amann et al., 2016). This notion is further support by Nielsen-Parker’s holistic compliance

model that stresses the need for regulators to enforce compliance with regulatory framework

to achieve set objectives (Parker and Nielsen, 2017, Krambia-Kapardis, 2019).

A lack of compliance in public procurement affects transparency, accountability and

leads to unsuccessful implementation of public construction projects (Signor et al., 2019,

Kingsford Owusu and Chan, 2018, Kling, 2008, Søreide, 2002). In Australia, but irrespective

of the country’s jurisdiction, government projects lack the implementation of best procurement

practices compared to private sector. This is due to procurement irregularities with inefficient

procurement processes that inevitably cost the taxpayer more (Duraku, 2018, Volintiru and

Olivas Osuna, 2018, Kajevska, 2018, Kling, 2008). Complying with a public procurement

regulatory framework saves funds; however, it requires an effective enforcement mechanism

to ensure compliance and the meeting of government targets (Oluka and Basheka, 2014). A

lack of compliance manifested into non-durable construction products are challenging

construction projects. For example, approximately 0.25-2.5% of contract value is spent on

reworks because of non-compliant products (Australian Procurement & Construction Council,

2013). Particularly, Australian examples show that lack of compliance manifested through cost

and schedule overruns accounts for 48% failed public road construction projects. These

projects include; Sydney cross city tunnel, Brisbane’s river city motorway and Sydney’s M7

Clem Jones Tunnel (Love et al., 2018b, Love et al., 2016a). Additional examples in Australia

show that Westconnex motorway suffered significant cost increase, Ipswich motorway upgrade

had a 196% cost overrun and the Forrest Highway Peel deviated by over 400% from the original

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budgeted value (Love et al., 2019). Lack of compliance through contract variations,

substandard works and cost overrun is not only reported in Australia and Uganda but also

equally reported in Brazil, Hong Kong, Pakistan and Asian transport infrastructure projects

(Love et al., 2019, Hussain et al., 2019, Signor et al., 2017, Signor et al., 2016a, Park and

Papadopoulou, 2012).

In Uganda, the executive director of PPDA noted that improving compliance with a

public procurement regulatory framework requires compliance checks and strengthening

professionalism. Empowering the Institute of Procurement Professional Uganda (IPPU),

Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers (UACE) and Uganda National Association of

Building and Civil Engineering Contractors (UNABCEC) among others to regulate

procurement practitioners and promote ethical behaviours was emphasized the director (PPDA

Authority, 2009a, PPDA Authority, 2008). While currently these bodies are established and

recognised in Uganda’s procurement ranks, they lack the mandate and power to enforce

professionalism and compliance in public sector procurement. Additionally, PPDA revealed

that a lack of compliance in procurement contracts was high. For example, out of 1,520

contracts reviewed, only 21% of contracts were compliant against 79% non-compliant

contracts. In addition, 2005 procurement audit reports revealed that lack of compliance among

central Procuring and Disposal Entities (PDEs) was high. For example, out of 322 audited

contracts, only seven were compliant (representing 2%) and 315 (98%) were not compliant.

Unsurprisingly, local and international companies complain about Uganda’s procurement

officials not following a public procurement regulatory framework in implementing awarded

contracts (Daily Monitor, 12th March 2019, Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Reports show that

lack of compliance is manifest through corruption and challenges national road construction

projects (Uganda National Road Authority, 2018). A lack of compliance underpinned by

procurement irregularities has failed Uganda’s large construction projects. For example, the

World Bank funded Bujagali Hydroelectricity project worth US$550 million (AU$ 748M) was

suspended after a high ranking public official took a US$10,000 (AU$ 13,600) bribe and

influenced the contract award (Agaba and Shipman, 2007, Prayas Energy group, 2002).

Similarly, World Bank reports show that US$1 Trillion (AUD 1.360T) is lost in

procurement irregularities annually and specifically, US$79.65 million (AU$ 108.324M) was

lost in 2004/2005 financial year (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004). Lengwiler and Wolfstetter

(2006) estimate that US$200 billion (AU$ 272B) is lost annually because of the lack of

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compliance that is affecting public construction projects (Thai, 2008b, Stansbury, 2003).

Uganda is in a similar position with reports suggesting adoption of good procurement practices

to improve public construction sector performance are required (Kakitahi et al., 2013). These

recommendations are inevitable because a lack of compliance is common in both public and

private sectors (Kulp et al., 2006). Adopting good procurement practices and systems in the

public road construction subsector would enhance compliance, successful project

implementation, achieve value for money and foster economic development as the subsector is

heavily relied upon in Uganda’s transport system (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2014).

Good public procurement practices and governance saves approximately US$150

million (AU$ 204M) annually (Anvuur et al., 2006). In sub-Saharan Africa, 70% of public

contracts experience 20-30% contract price increase due to lack of compliance with a

regulatory framework (Ameyaw et al., 2012, Mawenya, 2008). While Africa lose US$148

billion (AU$ 201.28B) annually in procurement irregularities prevalent throughout

procurement process. This is attributed to poor governance, week enforcement, inefficient

regulatory framework especially in public works construction projects influenced by various

stakeholders (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Owusu et al., 2017, Osei-Tutu et al., 2010, Mawenya, 2008,

Li et al., 2000). A lack of compliance cost government significant funds including delivery of

substandard works affecting successful implementation of public road construction projects.

For example, substandard road construction projects not meeting contract specifications in

West Africa were approved (Frøystad et al., 2010). Interestingly, a lack of compliance in public

procurement is a common problem in both developed and developing countries and requires

reforms to successfully implement public projects (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Thai, 2008b). Without

an effective public procurement regulatory framework in developing countries, public funds

would be consumed without due care and diligence (Fofie, 2016). Investors, operators and

consumers would benefit from a regulatory governance system that fosters commitment and

industrial endowment (Eberhard, 2007).

An effective regulatory framework for public construction projects requires the design

of rules to align with clear reporting structures allowing transparency and accountability at all

stages when undertaking construction projects. In Bangladesh, World Bank funded post-flood

rehabilitation projects failed to achieve objectives because public roads construction projects

were marred with procurement irregularities (Mahmood, 2010). Accordingly, the World Bank

suspended funding of 14 road construction projects. Similarly, significant funds are wasted

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annually in inefficient procurement practices where public procurement continues to

underperform (Kiama, 2014, Attaran and Attaran, 2002). For example, Uganda’s construction

industry experience value losses worth 2-25 % of the contract sum (Kakitahi et al., 2013).

Uganda’s national construction industry policy 2010 was established to improve integrity in

the industry, despite this, construction projects continue to be predominantly challenged

(Kakitahi et al., 2015). Lack of compliance with regulatory requirements in Uganda’s public

construction projects need attention otherwise substandard works will continue to occur leading

to unsuccessful construction projects.

It has been convincingly shown that successful public construction projects rely on

compliance with a regulatory framework (Owusu et al., 2017, Kassel, 2008). National integrity

survey 2009 Uganda chapter revealed that in 2009/2010 FY, the government earmarked

UGX7.3 trillion (AU$ 9.928B) for public procurement, however, value for money was not

achieved due to massive procurement irregularities leading to failed government projects and

objectives (PPDA Authority, 2009b). For example performance in construction projects was

below standard with contractors attributing substandard works to reduced amount for project

implementation after bribing public procurement officers (PPDA Authority, 2009b).

Contractors further noted that irrespective of substandard works, project monitors for works

would only approve work when bribed. Such procurement irregularities affect successful

implementation of public construction projects. In addition, lack of compliance is a double

tragedy for government since public funds are lost and substandard works delivered.

Consequently, affecting government objectives and programs to steer the economy forward

(Rogerson, 2018, Preuss and Walker, 2011, Ruddock and Lopes, 2006). The following

subsections (3.3.1 to 3.3.6) presents literature on the six compliance factors respectively.

3.3.1 Familiarity with regulatory framework and compliance In the context of public procurement, familiarity refers to one’s knowledge of an entire

regulatory framework, process and procedures in performing duties that extends beyond

academic qualifications (Hunja, 2003). Familiarity is important in most aspects. For example

researchers’ familiarity with analytical techniques and concepts motivates them to use certain

software (Hayes, 2012). Likewise, familiarity in public procurement of construction projects is

important because of the complex nature of these projects (Kagioglou et al., 2000). Familiarity

with regulatory framework is a key determinant of compliance in construction sector

(Abdullahi et al., 2017). Interestingly, academically qualified procurement officers lack

general knowledge on a comprehensive public procurement regulatory framework especially

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on interpreting technical sections (Hunja, 2003). Public road construction projects are governed

by a myriad of policies and procedures in the form of regulatory frameworks. Management

should embrace familiarity by orienting staff on emerging issues in public procurement

regulatory framework to effectively implement construction projects (Chi and Nicole

Javernick‐Will, 2011). Orientation is crucial in public road implementation because it ensures

staff are familiar with current implementation issues (Kaluarachchi and Jones, 2007). Evidence

show that lack of familiarity with a regulatory framework underpins a lack of compliance

across nations (Decarolis et al., 2018, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Shan et al., 2017). For example in

Kenya, a lack of compliance significantly affected compliance with public procurement

requirements in secondary schools (Migosi et al., 2013). Additionally, a lack of familiarity with

organizational structures and governance mechanism caused capacity problems in public sector

procurement (Hunja, 2003). Similarly, Bangladesh failed to meet goals because staff were not

familiar with a regulatory framework governing public procurement (Mahmood, 2010). In the

Ugandan context, limited staff knowledge of public procurement process and the PPDA Act

2003 affected compliance with procurement system (PPDA Authority, 2009b).

The PPDA Act 2003 demands conducting public procurement in systematic stages to

enable fair treatment of stakeholders. A sound public procurement system requires a clear

regulatory framework that is easily interpreted and understood by different stakeholders (Thai,

2008a). Reports show that implementing public construction projects successfully, contractors

and project managers should thoroughly understand the project scope and governing regulatory

framework to avoid manipulations in the construction industry (Tabish and Jha, 2015, Tabish

and Jha, 2011). Furthermore, in Uganda National Roads Authority’s (UNRA) end of 2013/2014

performance workshop, a lack of familiarity with the roads management system was disclosed

as a factor affecting compliance with UNRA’s objectives (Uganda National Road Authority,

2014). Reports suggest increased staff knowledge over rules would ensure compliance with

formal elements (Shan et al., 2017, Preuss and Walker, 2011, McNutt and Rossi, 2010).

Improving staff familiarity through education and training would increase their competence

required for implementing public road construction projects (Decarolis et al., 2018, DiMaggio

and Powell, 2015, Wall and Ahmed, 2008).

Familiarity with a public procurement regulatory framework significantly influences

compliance with regulatory framework (Gelderman et al., 2006). However, procurement

officers were shown only to comply if the regulatory frameworks were clear. In recent research,

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a lack of compliance with a regulatory framework was attributed to ignorance among

construction stakeholders who viewed compliance as a regulatory burden (Chitengi, 2018,

Becker, 2004). Pertinent report shows that Netherland’s municipalities experienced a lack of

compliance with procurement procedures due to lacking familiarity with procurement process

(Boer and Telgen, 1998). Similarly, misconception, ignorance and lacking familiarity with

procurement policies have been found to significantly affect compliance in Nigeria’s public

construction industry. These factors complicated implementation of Nigeria’s procurement Act

(Abdullahi et al., 2017, Zadawa et al., 2015). In United States’ (US) public procurement, a lack

of compliance is attributed to limited information available amongst procurement officers

(Kulp et al., 2006). This was because policies were made at the top level and procurement is a

tactical level task performed by middle-lower cadres who lack complete information for a

particular contract. This creates ambiguity in regulatory framework especially when

communication is not clear and delivered late.

Once there is ambiguity in a regulatory framework, staff interpretation would be difficult

thereby affecting compliance. On the contrary, when employees are too familiar with certain

processes and or suppliers, they tend not to comply with new company process or suppliers by

pretending to be ignorant (Kulp et al., 2006). Relatedly, Uganda’s public procurement is

becoming enhanced, since inception of the PPDA Act 2003 with subsequent amendments.

Accordingly, public procurement stakeholders may be unfamiliar with amended regulatory

frameworks that in turn affects compliance with public procurement regulatory frameworks

particularly in the context of governing complex construction projects. In addition, a lack of

compliance is affected by new organisations awarded contracts when they are not familiar with

amended regulatory framework governing road construction projects. Familiarity with ways

through which things are done makes work easier and completed within time (Sidwell et al.,

2002). Correspondingly, government agencies and stakeholders use procurement methods they

are familiar with for effective project implementation. However, the approach is not automatic

in yielding positive results as it is subject to prevailing project implementation circumstances.

Considering risk averse perception of agency theory, road construction stakeholders will only

use implementation methods known, rather than unknown despite of their ineffectiveness.

The above discussion shows that familiarity with a public procurement regulatory

framework particularly governing complex public road construction projects is important. This

leads to propose the hypothesis;

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H1. Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework increases compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework.

3.3.2 Monitoring activities and compliance Agency theory defines monitoring as a principal’s efforts to control its agent to comply

with contractual terms. Accordingly, monitoring is an organizational governance mechanism

that ensure staff meet goals. Correspondingly, for large and complex organizational structures

to realise their objectives, they require a well-defined system for supervising and controlling

procurement officers (Jha and Misra, 2007, Thai, 2001). Reports show that regular monitoring

of budgets for respective projects enables timely corrective actions to improve productivity

(Isaac and Navon, 2014, Schapper et al., 2006). Similarly, a lack of monitoring procurement

officials affects compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (Volintiru and

Olivas Osuna, 2018, Peprah, 2015, Adusei and Awunyo-Vitor, 2015). Hence, preventing

procurement irregularities in public road construction projects requires ongoing monitoring of

project implementation (Basheka et al., 2012, Helsby and Kaizer, 2005). In a public road

implementation context, constant monitoring of staff is suggested to support them to discount

unethical interest in pursuit of organizational goals (Zhang et al., 2016, DiMaggio and Powell,

2015).

According to Zhang et al. (2016), management should monitor its staff to avoid

undesirable behaviour as it has been found that monitoring construction projects ensures

quality implementation (Hussain et al., 2019, Lapidus and Yves, 2018, PPDA Authority, 2008).

For example, monitoring underground construction projects using Cyber-Physical Systems

have proved effective (Zhou et al., 2019). Considering agency theory approach, monitoring

alone could not significantly influence agent behaviour in complying with principal’s interest

and meeting goals (Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015, Rutherford et al., 2007). This notion is

supported by Tabish and Jha (2015) who established that monitoring is an insignificant factor

influencing public construction projects. These reports contradict Van Slyke (2007) assertion

that suggests monitoring as a mechanism to militate opportunistic behaviour. Hence, the need

to investigate the impact of monitoring public road construction projects on compliance with a

public procurement regulatory framework.

Despite criticising procurement irregularities in public construction industry, a study on

construction and rehabilitation of nursing schools in Uganda funded by the European Union

was unique. The project was free from procurement irregularities because of strict monitoring

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by the project supervising authority (Kakitahi et al., 2013). The article adds that inadequate

works supervision and ineffective stakeholders’ management promotes lack of compliance and

results in rework in Uganda’s public construction projects. Poor construction supervision and

site management cause delays and affect project performance. However, complying with a

regulatory framework effectively reduce delays and improve project performance (Tabish and

Jha, 2015, Sweis and Bisharat, 2014). Systematic monitoring of an entire project

implementation process ensure efficiency, transparency and accountability (Zolfani et al.,

2018, Freeman et al., 2006). Notably, enforcing compliance in public road construction projects

requires on-site project monitoring and inspection by different stakeholders (Deng et al., 2014).

This notion is supported by reports demanding a holistic approach to contract monitoring to

improve contract performance (Oluka and Basheka, 2014). Such approaches could mitigate a

lack of compliance by militating deviant staff during project implementation.

Rework evident in the construction industry ensures construction projects meet desired

specification (Fellows and Liu, 2012, Love et al., 2010). However, lacking compliance and

persistent rework in the construction industry is attributed to limited inspection (Smolders and

Sher, 2016). Monitoring road construction is inevitable to achieve efficiency and value for

money (Owusu et al., 2017, PPDA Authority, 2009a). According to National Integrity Survey

report 2009 in Uganda, 75.4% households support public monitoring of government projects

to enforce compliance with project implementation requirement (PPDA Authority, 2009b).

Actively involving local community in monitoring project implementation enhances quality

project implementation. For example, in Kabale district, a road was rejected after the

community under Resident District Commissioner (RDC) leadership found it unsatisfactory. It

was reconstructed to comply with project specifications. Whereas local community could

monitor road construction projects, the civil society express fear for their lives when reporting

procurement irregularities (Kingsford Owusu and Chan, 2018). For example, an incidence in

Uganda Soroti district where a sub county chief with two officials were arrested and charged

with trespass when inspecting a construction project in their area (PPDA Authority, 2009b).

Monitoring public projects at a community level can be empowerment through sensitization,

providing resources and leaders taking short courses in monitoring and evaluation.

Since public construction projects use public funds, monitoring these projects could

enhance public confidence, transparency and promote compliance with project requirement

including governing regulatory framework. For example, the Malaysian construction industry

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is marred with incomplete construction projects due to poor monitoring and auditing of project

implementation (Shu Hui et al., 2011). Relatedly, Bangladesh’s public procurement reforms

failed to attain its objectives due to poor monitoring of political and public stakeholders

sabotaging reform agenda (Frøystad et al., 2010). Consequently, observations suggest

intensifying supervision and monitoring of public road construction projects to enhance

compliance (Uganda National Road Authority, 2014, Uganda Road Fund, 2014). Effective

monitoring mechanisms would enhance compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework and enforcing contractors to meet their obligations. Such mechanisms would ensure

infrastructure development that accelerates economic development. For example, India’s

government earmarked US$514 billion (AU$ 699.04B) towards infrastructure development for

five years plan (2007-2015), however, realising its goals were reliant on effective governance

mechanism alone (Tabish and Jha, 2011).

Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms could enhance compliance with

government policies (Uganda Road Fund, 2015, PPDA Authority, 2008). For example, when

constructing Kenya’s national insurance health fund, a lack of supervision and monitoring

project implementation resulted in substandard works measured against the required

specifications (Akech, 2004). In addition, substandard works were accepted, payments made

for non-deliveries and the contract price doubled. Relatedly, Uganda’s statistical compliance

reports show that effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms detect procurement

irregularities arising from lack of compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework.

These irregularities affect value for money (Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Convincingly, agency

theory suggests monitoring of road construction projects enforce compliance and meet

government goals (Van Slyke, 2007).

This thesis aims to establish the relationship between monitoring activities and

compliance with regulatory framework through the following hypothesis;

H2. Monitoring activities on public road construction projects increases compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework

3.3.3 Professionalism of staff and compliance This section digests literature-linking professionalism of staff to compliance with a public

procurement regulatory framework. Professionalism in the context of this dissertation refers to

a collective term encompassing academic qualification, competence, experience, specialised

knowledge, skills, being ethical/not corrupt, having integrity, commitment and being a member

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of a professional body. Scholarly, professionalism refers to one’s competence in skills, special

knowledge with experience and a member of a professional body exhibiting an ethical code

(Watson, 2002). Additionally, a profession results from distinct academic training and

specialised knowledge monopolised in certain positions guided by common ethical code

(Osland and Strand, 2010).

In the construction industry, operators focus on achieving professionalism through

professional bodies, code of conduct, monitoring and benchmarking to increase accountability

and ensure compliance (Sohail and Cavill, 2008, PPDA Authority, 2008). This is because

professionalism guide construction professionals based on knowledge and experience to ensure

compliance with a regulatory framework (Murtagh et al., 2018, PPDA Authority, 2008).

However, a lack of professionalism in construction industry is attributed to unethical behaviour

and the complex nature of construction projects (Shan et al., 2020a, Tayeh et al., 2018, Le et

al., 2014a). Relatedly, a lack of compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework

is caused by poor professionalism among public officers entrusted with specific tasks (Zhang

et al., 2016, Basheka and Mugabira, 2008, Boer and Telgen, 1998). Professionalism in public

procurement is achieved through training and instilling ethical standards among public

procurement stakeholders (PPDA Authority, 2016). In addition, professionalism of staff is

assessed through qualifications, adhering to professional code and continuous training

(Obanda, 2010). Implementing public road construction projects equally requires staff

professionalism enhanced through academic qualifications, skills and professional networking

(DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Wall and Ahmed, 2008). This is important because

professionalism is effective in improving purchasing performance Boer and Telgen (1998) as

well as project success by limiting opportunistic behaviours among a project team (Um and

Kim, 2018).

Indeed compliance with in construction projects is tagged on staff adherence to their

respective ethical codes (Owusu et al., 2017). Consequently, in Uganda, public procurement

personnel are required to register with the Institute of Procurement Professionals of Uganda

(IPPU) that brings procurement personnel together in the country. Accordingly, UACE,

UNABCEC, Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers (UIPE), Engineering Registration

Board (ERB), Architecture Registration Board (ARB) and Surveyor’s Registration Board

(SRB) are formed to ensure professionalism in the construction sector (PPDA Authority, 2008).

These professional bodies would equally enforce compliance with a public procurement

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regulatory framework governing an array of procurement contracts in Uganda (PPDA

Authority, 2016). Similarly, a well-functioning public procurement system is based on

integrity, transparency, accountability, regulatory framework and adequate resources (Basheka

and Mugabira, 2008). Interestingly, lacking skills, motivation and integrity among procurement

officers have been found to cause public procurement inefficiencies (Decarolis et al., 2018,

Nsanganzelu, 2015, Ojo and Gbadebo, 2014, Onyema, 2011). These unprofessional issues are

evidently affecting construction industry (Brown and Loosemore, 2015). Accordingly, Uganda

is branded a grand seat of unprofessional behaviour (Kalinzi, 2014). Ideally, Uganda’s public

procurement is at infant stage requiring increased staff professionalism and consequently

improving their procurement skills and competence (Decarolis et al., 2018, Kalinzi, 2014). For

example, during PPDA/UNRA stakeholder’s consultative workshop 2008 under the theme

“Uganda’s construction sector challenges”, lack of professionalism among construction

stakeholders was raised as a factor affecting the sector performance (PPDA Authority, 2008).

This was particularly regarding non-adherence to ethical code of conduct. Staff must adhere to

their professional code otherwise, they are embarrassed for acting contrary (Mawenya, 2008,

Larmour, 2007).

Lack of specialised training in road construction projects challenge their implementation

because general sensitisation and workshops on procurement are inadequate for complex public

road construction projects. Finding, hiring and maintaining dedicated, ethical and competent

employees is hard (Lan et al., 2005). This adversely affects Uganda’s construction projects

characterised with substandard works due to non-committed workforce exhibiting poor

contract implementation and lack of compliance with a public procurement regulatory

framework (Oluka and Basheka, 2014). A competent workforce is a critical factor in contract

implementation (Decarolis et al., 2018). Particularly, Uganda lacks trained, qualified and

experienced staff in the road construction subsector (Cornish and Mugova, 2014, Nadiope,

2005). This is equally evident in large construction projects experiencing inadequate trained

staff (Kim and Huynh, 2008). Professionalism in public road construction subsector could

improve compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework. Interestingly, Eyaa

and Oluka (2011) discovered that professionalism insignificantly affects compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework.

A lack of professionalism challenges Uganda’s road construction subsector as noted in

performance evaluation reports by different public organisations (PPDA Authority, 2014). This

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was evidenced by lack of skilled and experienced staff and road contractors to implement

public roads (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2014, Ministry of works and Transport, 2012).

Consequently, staff training is important to ensure professionalism by boosting their

understanding of the road implementation procedures well to deliver goals (Preuss and Walker,

2011, Shaban, 2008). Training based on identified needs make staff understand operational

functionalities, thus promoting professionalism (Basheka et al., 2012). Reports show that lack

of and inadequately trained procurement staff underpin professionalism that affect compliance

with a public procurement regulatory framework (Obanda, 2010). Relatedly, Uganda’s

Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR 2004), reveals that unprofessional behaviour

affects public procurement process. This is particularly related to interference from politicians

and high ranking officials (Rogati, 2004). Embracing professionalism in public road

construction projects in important. For example, United States of America (USA) opted for

contracting out procurement opportunities to contractors with specialised expertise to deliver

timely quality contracts (Bartle and Korosec, 2003). In addition, United States’ defence

department is promoting education, training and developing staff so that they are competent in

contract implementation (Rendon, 2010). Professionalism is boosted through a variety of

training including formal, informal, in-house, contract compliance training and service contract

training conducted by different bodies (Bartle and Korosec, 2003). Hence, “a well-trained

officer need to be trained” (Bartle and Korosec, 2003).

Continuous training is crucial for staff implementing public road construction projects

because it keeps the workforce competent while increasing their knowledge and skills in

handling different construction tasks (Shaban, 2008). This is supported by institutional theory

advocating for staff professionalism based on specialised skills and competence (DiMaggio

and Powell, 2015). The article emphasised that professionalism could be achieved through

workshops, training, in-service educational programs, consultations, employer-professional,

school associations and career paths. Continuous upgrading of purchasing knowledge creates

organizational competitive advantage because training keeps staff updated on emerging issues

and allows for the design of appropriate strategies (Carr and Smeltzer, 2000, Duffy, 2000).

Correspondingly, organisations investing in effective staff training enhance professionalism.

However, training programs should be tailored to ever changing required skills (Taylor, 2002,

Duffy, 2000). Professionalism of a road construction team is paramount because competence

acquired from adequate training helps them to interpret and comply with a public procurement

regulatory framework (Trepte, 2004, Hunja, 2003).

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Lack of professionalism is not only affecting Uganda’s construction industry, but other

countries as well. For example in China, unprofessional behaviour affects compliance in

China’s construction industry and requires promoting an ethical code to enforce regulatory

frameworks (Deng et al., 2014). In Malaysia, the public construction projects experience

unprofessional behaviour because public officers reveal government prices to preferred

contractors making quotations in open tendering system which is against confidentiality (Shu

Hui et al., 2011). They accept bribes and equally share profits of a successful quotation of a

fraudulent contractor (Shu Hui et al., 2011). However, some procurement officers demand

contractors to adhere to contract specifications by upholding professional integrity and ethical

code that promotes compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework governing

construction projects. Similarly, a lack of professionalism affects compliance with the

Ghanaian Public Procurement Act that requires recruiting qualified procurement personnel and

conducting regular training in procurement issues for proficiency (Ameyaw et al., 2012, Osei-

Tutu et al., 2011). Unethical behaviour amongst public road implementation team affects

professionalism and compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework governing

these projects. A lack of professionalism masterminded by conflicts of interest and

unprofessional attitude promotes lack of compliance leading to costly and substandard

procurements (Obicci, 2015).

Consequently, professionalism of staff in public road construction projects could have

implications on compliance with a regulatory framework. Hence, propose the hypothesis;

H3. Professionalism of staff in public road construction projects increases compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework

3.3.4 Sanctions on staff and compliance This section discusses literatures relating to sanctions on staff and compliance with a

public procurement regulatory framework. In the context of this dissertation, sanction means

negative incentives including threats and punishments/penalties imposed on violators of

regulatory framework governing public road construction projects. Sanctions are an

enforcement mechanism used by regulatory bodies to ensure compliance with a regulatory

framework (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Zubcic and Sims, 2011). Surprisingly, the application of

sanctions to achieve compliance with respective regulatory frameworks has mixed reactions.

For example, looking through the lens of agency theory, sanctions make violators/agent plot

how to prevent and conceal detection of wrong doing by the principal (Zubcic and Sims, 2011,

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Sparrow, 2000). However, many studies agree that sanctions improve compliance with

regulatory framework (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019, Zadawa et al., 2018b, Mwakibinga and

Buvik, 2013, Zubcic and Sims, 2011, Ntayi et al., 2010a, Thai, 2008b). Beside the complexity

of construction projects, lack of compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework

is attributed to ineffective sanctions in the construction industry (Rizk et al., 2018, Chan and

Owusu, 2017, Ameyaw et al., 2017, Bowen et al., 2012). Convincingly, imposing sanction on

staff implementing public road construction projects is inevitable to achieve compliance since

these projects are equally complex (Owusu et al., 2017). However, imposing legal sanctions to

improve regulatory compliance should be cautiously applied as it is not obvious to enhance

compliance (Gunningham and Kagan, 2005).

Whereas principal’s powers influence agent to comply in attaining set objectives,

corporate governance studies in Africa blame weak enforcement mechanisms affecting

compliance with the regulatory frameworks and failing government objectives (Owusu et al.,

2017, Okeahalam, 2004). Enforcing sanctions would ensure a transparent procurement process

that could allow bidders to verify an effective public procurement regulatory framework and

would encourage procurement officials to comply. For example, the Malaysian government is

under pressure to enforce strict penalties including cutting public officers’ salaries and

confiscating their property to enhance compliance with their public procurement regulatory

framework (Shu Hui et al., 2011). In USA, punitive actions including contract termination,

suspension, non-payment and use of performance bonds and securities have enhanced

compliance (Bartle and Korosec, 2003). Such punitive actions ensure compliance with

respective regulatory frameworks. For example, in Ghana, punishments of procurement

officers engaging in maverick buying has increased compliance with their public procurement

Act (Peprah, 2015). Correspondingly, enforcing strict punitive action have been recommended

for Nigeria’s construction industry (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Gambo et al., 2016).

Sanctions applicable to many fields are linked to agency theory where the agent is

required to comply with the principal’s instructions and meeting set goals (Van Slyke, 2007,

Saam, 2007). Sanctions in public construction projects would enforce compliance with a public

procurement regulatory framework since staff fear consequences when apprehended (Wirick,

2009). This is equally inevitable for implementing public road construction projects by

applying rigorous sanctions if public procurement regulatory framework is deliberately flouted

(Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Rigorous sanctions will protect the law from being a dead letter

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and ensure value for money. Reports show that ineffective punitive measures affect compliance

in public procurement and that the Ugandan government has lost significant funds especially

in the public road construction subsector (PPDA Authority, 2009b, PPDA Authority, 2008).

This is worsened by laxity in enforcing sanction on public procurement stakeholders (Obanda,

2010). Convincingly, penalising the whole group/department where violation occurred

compels staff to work collectively by watching one another and ensure compliance (Kulp et

al., 2006). In public procurement, effective sanctions compel the staff to comply with a public

procurement regulatory framework and government’s assignments (Payan and McFarland,

2005). Whereas Gelderman et al. (2010) report that certainty and severity of sanctions do not

significantly influence compliance with regulatory framework, sanctions do compel public

officers to comply (Van Snellenberg and van de Peppel, 2002, Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999).

In a threat influence strategy, the principal imposes sanctions on the agent to reduce free

riding behaviour and help meet expectations (Rokkan and Buvik, 2009, Rokkan and Buvik,

2003, Kumar et al., 1998). Additionally, Venkatesh et al. (1995), advocates using threats,

promises and legalistic pleas involving formal laws, policies, norms, ethical code and written

contracts in ensuring compliance. Convincingly, compliance is enforced through coercive

sanctions (Scheer and Stern, 1992, Hunt et al., 1987). These sanctions are necessary in

compelling contracting parties to fulfil their obligations and avoid fines (Kumar et al., 1998,

Scheer and Stern, 1992). Threat based sanctions are widely applied in enforcing compliance

because employees fear to lose their jobs and to be imprisoned. Despite wide application of

sanctions, institutional theory posed that its effectiveness relies on organizational complexity

(DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). This caution is equally applicable to public road construction

project because they too are complex.

In Uganda, PPDA Act 2003 spells out punitive actions on defiant officers including fine

and imprisonment. However, credibility of such sanctions is still questionable since there are

numerous reports showing lack of compliance in the public road subsector losing significant

funds (Daily Monitor, 24th October 2016, Red Pepper, 21st October 2016, New Vision, 20th

October 2016). Human behaviour has been shown to be reinforced through rewards Braun

(2003) or sanctions (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013).

This dissertation was limited to sanctions by ascertaining its impact on compliance with

a public procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction projects

through the proposed hypothesis,

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49

H4. Sanctions on staff in public road construction projects increases compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework

3.3.5 Perceived Inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and compliance This section discusses literatures relating to the perceived inefficiency of a public

procurement regulatory framework and compliance within a public procurement regulatory

framework. Inefficiency in the context of this dissertation refers to loopholes within a

regulatory framework that is manipulated for personal interest once noticed by unethical

stakeholders (Eeckhout and Munshi, 2005). A public procurement regulatory framework is

designed to facilitate procurement activities in an accountable and transparent manner to

achieve value for money (Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Consequently, implementing public road

construction projects requires an efficient public procurement regulatory framework to achieve

value for money. Notably, the Ugandan government has prioritised funding of the road

subsector for economic transformation (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2015). However,

detailed description of the regulatory framework is perceived as inefficient particularly

regarding implementation processes that question its effectiveness. Whenever the regulatory

framework is inefficient, stakeholders find difficulties in adopting it leading to compliance and

enforcement problems (Chitengi, 2018).

An efficient and effective public procurement regulatory framework is capable of saving

significant funds and better service delivery (Decarolis et al., 2018). Literature shows that the

nature of procurement irregularities depend on efficient procurement structures and regulatory

framework (Ameyaw et al., 2017, Shan et al., 2017). In support, institutional theory suggest

efficiency and effectiveness of institutional norms to achieve set objectives (Greenwood and

Hinings, 1988). In addition, institutional theory contends that organizational performance relies

on compliance with its norms (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). Reports attribute a lack of

compliance with construction norms to perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework

(Styhre, 2011). Whenever regulatory framework is perceived ineffective in capturing a user’s

application, lack of compliance is prone to occur. For example, the European Union (EU)

directives governing public procurement among EU member states were flouted because the

directives were perceivably ineffective (Gelderman et al., 2006). Such inefficiencies equally

affect Uganda’s regulatory framework governing public road construction projects evidenced

with contradictory decisions by public officers. For example, contract price variations are

common in public road construction projects beyond allowable (20-30) % (PPDA Authority,

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50

2003). Similarly, Love et al. (2019) reveals that 47% (5 out 10) of transport construction

projects deviate from approved budgets. While Park and Papadopoulou (2012), Flyvbjerg et al.

(2002) put the deviations at 9 out of 10 projects. Particularly 20% of road construction projects

suffer from cost escalations (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). This shows that

detailed guiding procedures to handle contract variations among other project implementation

issues are lacking.

Institutional theory reports that unprofessional behaviours occur when there is

inefficiencies within the institutional framework that affects its enforcement (Oliver, 1991).

Similarly, public procurement in East Africa is disorderly because of inefficient regulatory

frameworks that affect stakeholders’ compliance (Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). Such

inefficiencies are evidenced with persistent procurement reforms by respective governments to

strengthen public procurement regulatory framework accordingly (Thai, 2010, Odhiambo and

Kamau, 2003). These persistent public procurement reforms in developing countries prove that

the regulatory framework governing public contracts is inefficient and ineffective,

consequently promoting lack of compliance through manipulation (Thai, 2008b, Odhiambo

and Kamau, 2003, Thai, 2001). This notion is supported by reports showing that inefficient

regulatory framework affects construction projects and poses interpretation difficulties (Owusu

et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2016). Convincingly, infrastructure effectiveness rests in efficiency

of public procurement regulatory framework (Estache and Iimi, 2009).

In a PPDA consultative workshop with construction sector stakeholders, major

challenges affecting Uganda’s construction sector were identified. These challenges included

unclear National Construction Standards and regulations (PPDA Authority, 2008). The

challenges render the regulatory framework ineffective, consequently affecting

implementation of public road construction projects. Public procurement stakeholders find it

hard to comply with an ineffective regulatory framework due administrative issues and time

wastage that directly affect set targets (Gelderman et al., 2006, Boer and Telgen, 1998). This

is an area of concern since inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework could

encourage unethical personnel to pursue selfish interests when implementing infrastructure

projects. Interestingly, infrastructure projects boost economic development that requires an

efficient regulatory framework (Bogiatzis et al., 2018, Decarolis et al., 2018, Shan et al., 2017).

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Despite current public procurement reforms, inefficiencies still exist and this thesis aims

to ascertain how it effects compliance in public road construction projects through the proposed

hypothesis,

H5. Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework reduces compliance

with a public procurement regulatory framework.

3.3.6 Contractors’ resistance and compliance This section discusses literatures relating contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework by public officers and compliance with a public

procurement regulatory framework. In the context of this dissertation, contractor’s resistance

refers to contractor’s refusal to take unethical decisions of public officers regarding

procurement of public road construction projects. Implementing public road construction

projects requires complementary efforts from the implementation team and complying with

governing regulatory framework is inevitable (Scott, 2005). Convincingly, contractors’

professional skills would potentially influence project results (Hemström et al., 2017).

Surprisingly, institutional theory notes that different players with varying ambitions and means

of accomplishing tasks meet compliance with resistance (Kondra and Hinings, 1998).

Considering contractors’ perception, promoting compliance with the public procurement

regulatory framework demands contractors to take action against public procurement officers

deviating from a procurement regulatory framework (Gelderman et al., 2010, Gelderman et al.,

2006, Pachnou, 2005a). However, contractors’ knowledge over public procurement regulatory

framework governing implementation of public road construction projects determine their

action. Contractors use the knowledge to report deviant officers through right channels that

compels public officers to comply with the governing regulatory framework when

implementing these projects because they fear being exposed. However, contractors should be

careful to balance between winning and losing cases because of efficiencies within remedy

mechanism (Pachnou, 2005a, Braun, 2003).

Contractors are unwilling to take action against defiant public officers if the remedy

enforcement mechanism is weak. Perceived inefficiency of a public procurement regulatory

framework coupled with ineffective remedy mechanism encourages defiant public officers to

pursue unethical interests and not complying with a public procurement regulatory framework

governing public road project implementation. Strengthening the remedy mechanism would

encourage contractors to boldly report deviant public officers that would in turn promote

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52

compliance with regulatory framework (Braun, 2003). Additionally, strengthening the remedy

mechanism would bar public officers from attempted manipulations and retaliating against

contractors in awarding future contracts (Pachnou, 2005a). A strong remedy mechanism is

necessary because public officers are charged with overseeing the whole procurement process

including contract initiation, award, implementation and project handover. Such

responsibilities make them powerful to victimize innocent contractors if not managed well in

a way that could affect compliance in public road construction projects.

This leads to propose the hypothesis,

H6. Contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

by public officers increases compliance with public procurement regulatory framework.

3.4 Implications of Construction Project success Construction projects are unique, set up for a specified period, purpose and implemented

by a team of members from different organisations (Hussain et al., 2019, Samaraweera et al.,

2018, Papadonikolaki, 2018). These projects are heterogeneous and complex with various

activities to deliver specified objectives that require effective management for successful

implementation (Sutrisna et al., 2018, Papadonikolaki, 2018, Jari and Bhangale, 2013, Doloi

et al., 2011, Chan et al., 2002). Project success is evaluated on long-term, strategic term and

short-term outcomes (Gledson et al., 2018). Accordingly, project success is the successful

accomplishment of tasks/operations by meeting predetermined objectives including cost, time,

performance and safety (Tayeh et al., 2018, Gambo et al., 2016, Jari and Bhangale, 2013, Kog

and Loh, 2011, Chan et al., 2002, Lim and Mohamed, 1999). For example, successful project

implementation is achieved if employees comply with safety measures to avoid accidents and

ensure successful project performance without causalities (Love et al., 2016b). In addition, a

construction project is deemed successful if client satisfaction is achieved (Hussain et al., 2019,

Tayeh et al., 2018, Hwang et al., 2014, Kog and Loh, 2011, Shaban, 2008, Furneaux et al.,

2006, Pheng and Chuan, 2006, Chan et al., 2002).

Previously, Chan and Chan (2004), Sidwell et al. (2002), Atkinson (1999) presented the

Iron triangle performance indicators for construction projects as time, cost and quality (Love

and Smith, 2019, Sinesilassie et al., 2019). More recently, additional performance indicators

including safety, functionality and satisfaction have been established to determine construction

project success (Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015, Lam et al., 2008). However, from the

contractors’ view, a construction project is considered successful when it is implemented

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53

within scope, time, cost and quality (Tayeh et al., 2018, Gledson et al., 2018, Zadawa et al.,

2018b). This equally applies to public road construction projects where the government would

consider these projects successful if they are implemented according to predetermined quality,

time and budget (Shivambu and Thwala, 2019, Kog and Loh, 2011). Disappointingly, cost and

schedule overruns derail satisfaction among stakeholders in transport infrastructure projects

(Love et al., 2015c). Hence, in the context of this thesis, successful implementation of public

road construction projects means that these projects are implemented according to

predetermined specifications, time and estimated costs. These indicators are chosen to

determine achievement of government goals and expectations because success means project

goals and expectations are achieved (Gudienė et al., 2013, Jari and Bhangale, 2013, Chan et

al., 2002).

Pertinent reports show that many construction projects have failed because they do not

comply with predetermined objectives including governing regulatory framework. For

example in Australia, non-compliant construction products account for 50% unsuccessful

project implementation (Australian Procurement & Construction Council, 2013). On average,

48% of infrastructure projects entirely are not completed on time, within estimated cost and

expected quality (Love et al., 2018a, Love et al., 2018b). A lack of compliance is affecting

Australian construction industry (Gambo et al., 2016, Brown and Loosemore, 2015). Further

international reports show that unsuccessful construction projects are caused by cost and

schedule overruns (Signor et al., 2019, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Liu et al., 2016, Shaban, 2008).

Specifically, overruns endemically challenge transport infrastructure projects (Signor et al.,

2016a, Love et al., 2015c). Cost escalation is a pervasive problem in the construction industry

that has affected public construction projects (Love et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018b, Signor et al.,

2017, Signor et al., 2016a, Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Scholars are now calling for strict

enforcement of regulatory framework in a transparent manner for successful implementation

of construction projects (Signor et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018b, Ameyaw et al., 2017). Given the

complexity of construction projects, poor performance of infrastructure projects require an

interwoven of factors to determine their successful implementation (Sinesilassie et al., 2019,

Love et al., 2018b). Accordingly, seven probable success factors are discussed in the following

subsections (3.4.1 to 3.4.7).

3.4.1 Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and Project success This section discusses literatures relating compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework to the success of public road construction projects. Public road construction projects

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54

are temporary unique endeavours that should comply with selected performance policies for

successful implementation (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Parker and Nielsen, 2017, Ogunlana et al.,

2003). For example, complying with contract specifications and scope of works ensures

successful project implementation (Hussain et al., 2019, Gambo et al., 2016, Snyder, 2013).

However, for compliance to ensure project success, project inspections and audits are crucial

(Snyder, 2013). Convincingly, compliance with a regulatory framework significantly

influences successful performance of construction projects (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Zadawa et

al., 2018a, Ameyaw et al., 2017, Tabish and Jha, 2011). Disappointingly, road construction

stakeholders are dissatisfied with project cost and schedule overruns affecting 30% of roads

and bridges performance (Love et al., 2015c, Ford, 2011). Such overruns are attributed to lack

of compliance with project requirements that equally affect government satisfaction with

implementing road construction projects. Yet satisfaction is a key project success factor

(Ameyaw et al., 2017, Hwang et al., 2014, Sadeh et al., 2000). The government would be

satisfied with public road construction projects if they were implemented according to project

specifications, budget and time (Gambo et al., 2016, Dvir and Lechler, 2004).

Lack of compliance arising from mistrust amongst contractors competing for public

construction projects accounts for unsuccessful implementation of these projects

(Samaraweera et al., 2018, Papadonikolaki, 2018, Ntayi et al., 2010b). This attitude coupled

with lack of commitment and cooperation contributes to continuous cost and schedule overruns

in road construction projects, thereby affecting successful project implementation (Munyasya

and Chileshe, 2018, Zadawa et al., 2018b, Ameyaw et al., 2017, Kaliba et al., 2009). Indeed,

lack of cooperation among parties involved in projects has been found to affect the construction

industry (Papadonikolaki, 2018, Gambo et al., 2016, Adafin et al., 2015, Kim and Huynh,

2008). However, it is imperative for infrastructure stakeholders to cooperate and ensure cost

effective and timely implementation of transport infrastructure projects (Love et al., 2018b).

Notably, cost overruns in road construction projects have been found to affect public sector

performance (Love et al., 2019, Odeck, 2004). In addition, these overruns affect productivity

and performance of public construction projects rendering them unsuccessful (Shan et al.,

2020b, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Love and Smith, 2016). Whenever a road construction team does

not comply with project specification, the quality of these projects is affected and yet quality

defines successful construction project performance (Hussain et al., 2019, Marnewick et al.,

2018, Rwelamira, 1999). A lack of compliance with project requirements affect successful

implementation of construction projects. For example, the Ugandan President attributed

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55

delayed road construction projects in Kanungu district to lack of compliance characterized by

irregularities (Red Pepper, 2018).

Furthermore, lack of compliance morfed into poor quality workmanship significantly

contributes to reworks in construction projects (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Love et al., 1998).

Reworks is an indicator of poor construction quality rendering the project unsuccessful since

it measures what correction are required to comply with project specifications (Love and Smith,

2019, Love et al., 2015a). Such project failures are prominent in road construction projects due

to a lack of compliance with governing regulatory framework, quality deviations, failures and

defects accounting for 5 – 20% of the project contract value (Love and Smith, 2019, Love et

al., 2015c, Love, 2002). Initiating an effective regulatory framework to sustain compliance

within the construction industry is important for successful implementation of construction

projects (Chileshe et al., 2018). Such an effective regulatory framework would deter fraudulent

practices challenging compliance and performance of the construction industry (Zadawa et al.,

2018a).

Public road construction projects use public funds and these projects are successful if

they meet government goals aligned with public expectation. Additionally, these projects are

successfully implemented if they comply with governing regulatory framework including

contract terms and conditions outlined in a signed governing contract. The terms and conditions

include among others, project specifications, quality, cost and time (Gambo et al., 2016).

Whereas scholars have considered various success factors in the construction industry, less

attention was paid to compliance with public procurement regulatory framework in

construction industry particularly when implementing public road construction projects.

Accordingly, this dissertation determines the effect of compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework on the successful implementation of public road

construction projects through the proposed hypothesis,

H7. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework in public road construction

projects leads to project success

3.4.2 Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework and Project success This section discusses literatures relating familiarity with public procurement regulatory

framework to the successful public road construction projects. As defined in section 3.3.1, staff

familiarity extends beyond academic qualifications and refers to one’s knowledge of the entire

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regulatory framework including process and procedures (Hunja, 2003). Accordingly, staff

implementing public road construction projects should be knowledgeable with project

activities to successfully implement these projects. Hence, for the project to be successful,

project stakeholder need to understand detailed implementation process (Gambo et al., 2016).

Complex construction projects bring together different stakeholders with varying

perceptions and attitudes when implementing different projects (Tayeh et al., 2018). This calls

for careful planning and control right from project initiation stage to completion by making the

project well defined and recruiting competent staff to implement these projects (Gambo et al.,

2016, Gudienė et al., 2013, Doloi et al., 2011). Staff competence is enabled through specified

training to enhance their familiarity with project requirements (Decarolis et al., 2018, North,

2016). Continuously enabling staff competence through training is equally important for

implementing public road construction projects (Zadawa et al., 2018a, Shaban, 2008). This is

because poor training accounts for flaws in the construction sector (Hussain et al., 2019,

Othman et al., 2018). Enabling staff competence ensures accumulated knowledge and expertise

in project implementation that creates competitive advantage and enhancing project success

(Gambo et al., 2016, Love et al., 2015a, Swart and Harcup, 2013, Prencipe and Tell, 2001,

Argote and Ingram, 2000).

Implementing public road construction projects successfully requires staff familiarity

with project requirements. For example, familiarity with ways through which things are done

make work easier and completed within time (Sidwell et al., 2002). Furthermore, successful

implementation of public construction projects requires the project implementation team to

understand its scope with clear governing regulatory framework to avoid manipulations

(Tabish and Jha, 2015, Tabish and Jha, 2011). The construction team should be skilful and

knowledgeable to successfully implement construction projects within specified parameters

Jari and Bhangale (2013) as lack of understanding and knowledge affects project

implementation (Shan et al., 2017, Hwang et al., 2014). Indeed, ignorance is detrimental to

successful implementation of construction projects (Ika, 2018, Flyvbjerg, 2016). This is

attributed to lack of education and training affecting sustainability in the construction sector

(Abduh et al., 2018, Abdullahi et al., 2017). Scholars are calling on management to improve

staff knowledge in the construction sector for successful implementation of construction

projects (Munyasya and Chileshe, 2018). This is necessary because most government agencies

and stakeholders find it easier and effective to implement projects using procurement methods

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they understand. Ideally reinforcing staff skills and expertise enhances their familiarity with

project requirements that are paramount in successful implementation of public road

construction projects (Cullen et al., 2014, Gudienė et al., 2013).

Previous studies used familiarity to explore its effect on compliance with regulatory

framework in public procurement (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011, Gelderman et al., 2006). However,

these studies paid less attention on the effect of familiarity in implementing public road

construction projects. Accordingly, this thesis bridges the gap by determining how familiarity

affects successful implementation of public road construction projects through the following

hypothesis,

H8. Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework governing public road

construction projects leads to project success

3.4.3 Monitoring activities and project success This section discusses literatures relating monitoring activities to successful

implementation of public road construction projects. North (2016) noted that monitoring

activities is an organizational governance mechanism that ensures that staff meet set goals. This

notion is supported by Schapper et al. (2006) reporting that regular monitoring of budgets for

respective projects and taking corrective actions is important for successful implementation of

these projects. Indeed, successful performance of construction projects rely on regular

monitoring of activities undertaken (Shan et al., 2017, Obanda, 2010, Lam et al., 2008, Reeves,

2008, Ng et al., 2002). For example, successful performance of the United States’ construction

sector is attributed to effective monitoring and tracking of contractors thus avoiding shoddy

workmanship, cost overruns and corruption (Bartle and Korosec, 2003). In China, monitoring

underground construction projects was found to enhance successful implementation of these

projects (Zhou et al., 2019). Recent studies emphasise monitoring mechanisms to successfully

implement quality construction projects (Lapidus and Yves, 2018, Othman et al., 2018, Ali et

al., 2018b, Kog and Loh, 2011, Shaban, 2008). These mechanisms encourage total supervision

and performance monitoring of construction projects starting with contractors by reducing risks

that typically antagonise successful project implementation (Hussain et al., 2019, Topchiy et

al., 2018, Love et al., 2015c). Furthermore, effective monitoring of irresponsible construction

staff ensures successful implementation of public construction projects (Love et al., 2016b).

Road construction projects in Uganda are monitored by different agencies including

Ministry of Works and Transport, Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority,

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Uganda National Roads Authority among others. However, policy makers should clearly define

roles for each agency to avoid conflict and confusion. Clearly, defining supervision and

monitoring responsibilities is crucial to successfully implement large and complex construction

projects (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019, Owusu et al., 2017, Jha and Misra, 2007, Thai, 2001).

Uganda’s construction industry is challenged with failed projects due to ineffective monitoring,

lack of commitment and cooperation amongst contractors competing with one another (Ntayi

et al., 2010b, PPDA Authority, 2008). Despite Tabish and Jha (2015) study reporting

insignificant relationship between monitoring activities and the successful implementation of

public construction projects, agency theory encourages monitoring mechanism as a governance

tool (Van Slyke, 2007). This assertions are in line with reports contending that whereas (42-52

%) of costs are incurred in project inspection, direct monitoring of construction projects is an

effective method of successfully implementing these projects (Woo et al., 2019).

Hence, this thesis investigates the relationship through the following hypothesis.

H9. Monitoring activities on public road construction projects leads to project success

3.4.4 Professionalism of staff and project success This section discusses literatures relating professionalism of staff to success of public

road construction projects. Professionalism refers to one’s competence in skills, special

knowledge with experience and a member of a professional body exhibiting an ethical code

(Watson, 2002). Ethical codes are vital in controlling staff in the construction industry Owusu

et al. (2017) and professionalism is inevitable for public road construction projects Ogunlana

et al. (2003) that requires using staff with competent skills, ethical, experienced and

knowledgeable to successfully implement these projects (Hussain et al., 2019, Decarolis et al.,

2018, Gambo et al., 2016, DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). Giroud et al. (2018), Pheng and Chuan

(2006) noted that professional competence is essential for successful performance and it is

achieved through the training, coaching, mentoring, developing and retaining of a competent

workforce (Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015, Obanda, 2010, Witting, 2005). In addition,

professional experience is vital for successful construction industry (Hwang et al., 2014).

Interestingly, lack of construction expertise affects quality of construction projects in Australia

(Rafferty and Toner, 2018). Consequently, the Australian government has recommended all

public agencies handling construction projects to have professionals with required skills and

expertise for successful project implementation (Furneaux et al., 2006, Australian Procurement

& Construction Council, 2002). Such recommendations were meant to minimise pushing risks

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to contractors and relying on costly external consultants especially in managing capital works

(Furneaux et al., 2006).

Considering professionalism from project management perspective, staff with technical

skills from relevant qualifications and practice, need specialised skills for successful project

implementation (Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015, Gudienė et al., 2013). Accordingly,

specialised skills should be determined in the tendering process for each project (Runeson and

Skitmore, 1999). This would ensure that the project has the right and committed team for

successful implementation (Kagioglou et al., 2000). Wall and Ahmed (2008) noted that staff

skills and experience are of paramount importance for a successful construction industry.

Because professionalism ensures timely completion of construction projects that are within

estimated budget (Wall and Ahmed, 2008). It has been found that inflated project cost and

substandard works underpin lack of professionalism in the construction sector (Ameyaw et al.,

2017, Signor et al., 2016b). Whereas inflated project cost is partly blamed on construction

design variations, professional workforce could reduce such variations to successfully

implement construction projects (Xiao and Proverbs, 2003).

Lack of professionalism is a barrier to project success according to Um and Kim (2018)

that is globally challenging the construction industry (Shan et al., 2020a). For example,

shortage of a skilled, qualified and experienced workforce in South Africa, Jordan, Gaza strip,

and India among others have been found to affect project success (Tabish and Jha, 2015, Sweis

and Bisharat, 2014, Enshassi et al., 2009, Shaban, 2008, Faridi and El‐Sayegh, 2006, Hanson,

2006). Equally, Uganda’s construction industry is unsuccessful because it is marred by an

incompetent workforce lacking necessary skills in construction due to poor training and

recruitment methods (Alinaitwe et al., 2007). Accordingly, Uganda’s construction stakeholders

are calling for use of expertise and professionals when implementing construction projects

(PPDA Authority, 2008). Professional management of construction projects is required to

manage quality, cost and time for a successful construction industry (Woo et al., 2019). Lack

of professionalism is acerbated by poor employment terms forcing few competent staff in road

construction projects to seek better opportunities in the private sector and overseas. These

incompetency affect productivity and construction performance calling for a learning culture

that transforms errors into experience by encouraging no blame philosophy in team work (Love

and Smith, 2016). In addition, such a culture accumulates knowledge, experience and creates

competitive advantage enhancing project success (Love et al., 2015a, Swart and Harcup, 2013,

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Prencipe and Tell, 2001, Argote and Ingram, 2000). Thus, scholars are now calling for

experienced and highly qualified staff to successfully implement construction projects (Tayeh

et al., 2018, Gambo et al., 2016, Jari and Bhangale, 2013, Kim and Huynh, 2008).

This leads to propose the following hypothesis,

H10. Professionalism of staff in public road construction projects leads to project success

3.4.5 Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and project success This section discusses literatures relating to perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework in public road project success. A clear and simple regulatory framework

governing complex public road construction projects is inevitable for road subsector players to

understand and interpret easily (See Latham and Egan reports) (Kagioglou et al., 2000). This

is important because it limits unethical manipulators to drive their ambitions progressively

(Shan et al., 2017, Saam, 2007). Furthermore, an efficient regulatory framework facilitates a

timely road implementation process by eliminating frequent legal consultation with legal

fraternity for interpretation. Such a framework would ensure a clear scope of construction

projects which is important for successful project implementation (Tayeh et al., 2018).

Convincingly, inefficient public procurement regulatory frameworks affect successful

implementation of procurement projects in East Africa (Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). Further

international literature shows that inefficient regulatory framework affects construction

projects (Owusu et al., 2017, Ameyaw et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2016, Brown and Loosemore,

2015, Le et al., 2014b, Le et al., 2014a). This view is supported by recommendations for a

proper regulatory framework to govern construction industry with appropriate enforcement

mechanism (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Shaban, 2008).

A pertinent example in Uganda’s construction sector showed that the sector is challenged

with unclear National Construction Standards and regulations (PPDA Authority, 2008). These

challenges underpin an unsuccessful construction sector because public procurement

stakeholders find difficulties in complying with an ineffective regulatory framework due to

administrative issues and time wastage in meeting targets (Gelderman et al., 2006, Boer and

Telgen, 1998). In essence, inefficient regulatory framework emanating from poor quality

legislative actions cause difficulties and inconsistencies in the construction sector (Chitengi,

2018). Additionally, inefficient regulatory framework creates administrative barriers that affect

implementation and enforcement of construction projects (Chitengi, 2018). Conversely,

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inefficiencies within the construction sector account for delayed and costly construction

projects (Othman et al., 2018, Gambo et al., 2016). Perceived inefficient regulatory frameworks

equally affect implementation of public road construction projects since it is the project-

governing instrument. This suggests a need for clarity and efficiency to eradicate loopholes

and enhance successful implementation of these projects. This need is vital because an efficient

regulatory framework would enable construction sector players to manage project

implementation with greater success (Othman et al., 2018, Zadawa et al., 2018b).

Accordingly, this dissertation addresses this need by determining the role of perceived

inefficiency with regulatory framework in successful implementation of public road

construction projects through the proposed hypothesis,

H11. Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework reduces project

success

3.4.6 Contractors’ resistance and project success This section presents literature relating to contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework and the success of public road construction projects.

In the context of this thesis, contractors’ resistance refers to their refusal to accept bad decisions

of public officers regarding project implementation. As observed earlier, different public road

construction stakeholders come to accomplish specific assignments and as they do so, they may

have conflicting interest contrary to project success (Wirick, 2009, Wright et al., 2001). This

notion is emphasised by institutional theory noting that compliance meets resistance from

different players with varying ambitions and means of successfully accomplishing project tasks

(Babalola et al., 2016, Kondra and Hinings, 1998). Ideally, project success is about teamwork

through coordination whereby contractors’ commitment and cooperation to fulfil their

obligations and resisting bad decisions would lead to successful implementation of

construction projects (Babalola et al., 2016, Ntayi et al., 2010b). Interestingly, coordination

among construction participants is significant in project success by reducing risks associated

with cost estimation (Hussain et al., 2019, Adafin et al., 2015, Shaban, 2008). This is in line

with Latham 1994 recommending openness, cooperation, trust, honesty, commitment and

mutual understanding among team members for a successful construction industry (Love et al.,

2015c). Accordingly, successful implementation of road construction projects is crucial for

contractors. Because they compete for limited government contracts and yet winning future

contracts is tagged on previous performance. Notably, contractors’ capability and performance

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is inevitable for successful implementation of public construction projects (Hussain et al., 2019,

Doloi et al., 2011).

Reports show that substandard works are attributed to little funds left for contractors to

implement public construction projects after public officers take lamp sum bribes (Daily

Monitor, 12th March 2019, Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Further in international literature,

contractors bribe public officials by paying 10-20% of contract price to secure public contracts

(Ameyaw et al., 2017). However, in most cases, substandard works cost contractors by losing

future contracts. To mitigate this, compliance with regulatory framework is inevitable. This

has prompted contractors’ actions against deviant public officers for a successful public

procurement (Gelderman et al., 2010, Gelderman et al., 2006, Pachnou, 2005a). Such actions

to resist bad decisions are equally important in successful implementation of public road

construction projects. However, contractors’ knowledge of the entire regulatory framework

governing these projects is key. Being knowledgeable enables contractors to resist public

officers and compelling them to adhere to project requirements. Whereas previous studies

determined project success factors (Love et al., 2016a, Kaliba et al., 2009, Lam et al., 2008,

Shaban, 2008, Atkinson, 1999), less attention was paid to contractors’ resistance in successful

implementation of construction projects.

This dissertation bridges the gap by ascertaining whether contractors’ resistance would

lead to the successful implementation of public road construction projects through the proposed

hypothesis.

H12. Contractor’s resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework by public officers in public road construction projects leads to project success

3.4.7 Sanctions on staff and project success This section presents literature-relating sanctions on staff to project success. Sanction are

coercive strategies involving threats and penalties levied on staff working contrary to

predetermined targets (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Hartley, 2009). Despite mixed reaction on using

sanctions to achieve these targets, they are widely applied to militate deviant staff (Scheer and

Stern, 1992). Applying sanctions in public road construction projects is important given the

current wave of procurement irregularities (New Vision, 28th July 2016). Because public road

construction projects are setup for a specific purpose using public funds, the government should

enforce strategies that would successfully implemented these projects in an accountable and

transparent manner. Extant literature shows that successful implementation of road

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construction projects requires punitive measure to achieve set targets (Paulson Jr and Fondahl,

1983). This notion is supported by Ministry of works and Transport (2012) calling for strong

enforcement mechanisms involving sanctions to successfully implement road construction

projects. Such calls could sustain an effective and efficient transport sector with sound transport

policy to achieve government goals. Correspondingly, failed construction projects are a

consequence of either laxity in enforcing punitive measures or ineffective sanctions that

encourage unethical acts among project implementers (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Rizk et al., 2018,

Owusu et al., 2017, Ameyaw et al., 2017, Saam, 2007, Runeson and Skitmore, 1999).

Public road construction projects involve multiple stakeholders and co-funded by

multilateral bodies including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) among others

including respective governments. However, implementing these projects requires strict

punitive actions against perpetrators to avoid suspension of funding by respective international

bodies (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Ali et al., 2018b, Chan and Owusu, 2017, Gambo et al., 2016).

For example in Bangladesh, the World Bank suspended funding of fourteen highway road

construction projects as a punitive measure to safeguard public funds (Mahmood, 2010). The

World Bank noted that failure to impose sanctions on public procurement violators account for

US$100 million (AU$136M) financial loss annually (Mbabazi et al., 2015). To mitigate against

these losses and reduce unacceptable practices, the Australian construction sector emphasised

enforcing sanctions to successfully implement construction projects (Hartley, 2009). In

addition, institutional theory suggests effective sanctions to correct deviant behaviours for

successful organizational performance (North, 2016, Oliver, 1991). This suggestion is equally

inevitable for implementing Uganda’s public road construction projects.

The road subsector is Uganda’s major transport mode providing goods and services

(Ministry of Works and Transport, 2014). Currently the Ugandan government has embarked

on massive economic development through prosperity for all and modernisation of agriculture

among other programs. However, one key success factor in these programs is the public road

construction projects that have to facilitate these programs in order to achieve government

objectives. Accordingly, imposing stringent actions when implementing these projects is

necessary to achieve government objectives and value for money (Kakitahi et al., 2016,

Ameyaw et al., 2012, Kenny, 2007). Interestingly, tough sanctions including forfeiture of

contract and exclusion of companies for future bidding are proposed for an effective

construction industry (Sohail and Cavill, 2008).

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This dissertation determines the relationship between sanctions on staff and project

success through the proposed hypothesis,

H13. Sanctions on staff in public road construction projects leads to project success

3.5 Mediation effects and Hypotheses This section presents literature on mediation effects and extends further by examining the

mediating role of compliance with public procurement regulatory framework between six

compliance factors and public road construction project success. It ends by developing six

mediation hypotheses that were tested for statistical significance. Many researchers are mainly

concerned with predicting direct relationships among study constructs and overlook any

mediation effect (Carrión et al., 2017, Nitzl et al., 2016). However, there is need to unearth an

underlying criterion explaining how variables are associated beyond simple relationship

prediction (Hayes and Scharkow, 2013, Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010, Cheung and Lau,

2008). Because ignoring mediation effects creates bias in interpreting results when a certain

variable does not influence another variable directly and researchers assuming it is irrelevant

in answering a research question completely (Nitzl et al., 2016). Mediation testing helps in

further examining how variables are related (Hayes and Scharkow, 2013, Fairchild and

McQuillin, 2010, MacKinnon et al., 2002). In other words, mediation provides an

indispensable scientific understanding of the mechanism intervening in the relationship

between independent and dependent variables (Memon et al., 2018, Aguinis et al., 2017,

Carrión et al., 2017). Convincingly, mediation has been shown as the significant relationship

between independent and dependent variable that is partially or fully explained by the

mediating variable in a specified causal order (Mojtahedi and Oo, 2017, Miller et al., 2007,

Mathieu and Taylor, 2006).

In many studies, scholars use the terms mediator and moderator interchangeably

however, researchers should clearly distinguish mediation from moderation at the research

onset (Hayes, 2012, Garcia and Kandemir, 2006, Muller et al., 2005, Baron and Kenny, 1986).

Ideally, the goal of mediation is to determine how an independent variable influences

dependent variables through a mediating variable (Hayes and Rockwood, 2017, Hayes and

Preacher, 2014, Hayes, 2012). Despite mediation studies increasingly gaining momentum,

mediation is a new arena in the construction industry and public procurement. Consequently,

little is known about the mediating role of compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework in the construction industry and particularly in the road construction subsector.

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Convincingly, compliance with regulatory framework has been shown to significantly

influence successful implementation of construction projects (Tabish and Jha, 2011).

Accordingly, this thesis was limited to mediation testing in road construction projects involving

eight factors. Particularly the thesis was concerned with establishing whether compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship between six probable

compliance factors and the success of public road construction projects in Uganda.

Researchers should explicitly conceptualise the relationship through hypotheses before

testing mediation (Memon et al., 2018). Mediation effect is vital when an identified third

variable contributes an effect between two existing variables as illustrated in Fig 3.2. In

addition, the two existing variables (independent and dependent) should have a strong

relationship. Under this consideration, the mediating variable influences the relationship

between independent and dependent variables that is measured by the predictive power of

coefficient of determination (R2) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). However, partial mediation testing

requires sufficient coefficient of determination Cheung and Lau (2008), Mathieu and Taylor

(2006), MacKinnon et al. (2002) with significant relationship between the six compliance

factors and project success (Hayes, 2009, Preacher and Hayes, 2004). Furthermore, mediation

is also possible if the indirect relationship between the six factors and compliance is significant

as well as compliance and project success (Tabassi et al., 2014, MacKinnon et al., 2002).

Significance of regression coefficients and effect size were tested through multiple regressions

that assumed compliance was not caused by project success (MacKinnon et al., 2002). Ideally,

these causal steps coupled with mediation assumptions should be satisfied before mediational

tests. Surprisingly, majority of researchers violate these steps (Shaver, 2005).

Figure 3.2: Mediation illustration

b c

a

According to Baron and Kenny, there are two types of path relationship. Compliance factors

(A) can directly cause project success (C) demonstrated by path <a> or indirectly cause C

through compliance (B) indicated by path <b> and <c>.

A

B

C

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Mediation is possible when the following assumptions are satisfied (Preacher and

Leonardelli, 2001, Baron and Kenny, 1986).

1. Variations in the levels of independent variable should be significantly accountable to

variations in the mediating variable. This implies that the six compliance factors should be

significantly related to compliance variable.

2. Variations in mediating variable should significantly account for variations in dependent

variable. Implying that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and project

success should be significantly related.

3. When path <b> and <c> are controlled, previous significant relationship between

independent and dependent variables should be zero for perfect (Full) mediation. Full

mediation can occur when the mediator explains total effect size (Hayes and Rockwood, 2017).

This implies that direct relationship between independent and dependent variables is

insignificant while partial mediation occurs when the mediator significantly accounts for a

portion of total effect size (Hayes and Rockwood, 2017, Zhao et al., 2010, Mathieu and Taylor,

2006, James et al., 2006). However, in the real world, it is not possible for a single perfect

mediator. In this regard, the thesis sought a significant reduction in the direct relationship

between A and C rather than eliminating it to zero (Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). This implies

that compliance factors and project success should be significantly related. Interestingly, there

is a lack of statistical evidence on assumptions surrounding mediation tests (James et al., 2006,

Frazier et al., 2004).

The theoretical ground enables a conceptual model for cross-sectional research

specifically demonstrating causal relationship to test mediation effects (Mitchell and James,

2001, Sutton and Staw, 1995, Whetten, 1989). Implying that the direct relationship between

compliance factors (familiarity, monitoring activities, professionalism, sanctions, perceived

inefficiency and contractors’ resistance) and project success should be significantly related

without involving compliance (mediating variable) (Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). In addition,

on introducing compliance, indirect path should also be significant (Hair et al., 2016, Hair et

al., 2014, Preacher and Hayes, 2004, Shrout and Bolger, 2002). This process aims at

establishing the magnitude of both direct effect between the six compliance factors and project

success as well indirect effect between compliance factors through compliance and project

success.

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In practice, mediation testing is performed via two approaches namely; Structural

Equation Modelling approach (SEM), and Baron and Kenny approach. Despite ongoing debate,

none of the approaches is superior to the other (James et al., 2006). The two approaches’

baseline for mediation differ with SEM based on full mediation while Baron and Kenny

focused on partial mediation. Interestingly, Hayes and Rockwood (2017) noted that statistical

tools aid researchers to draw conclusions amidst uncertainty and yet these tools make mistakes

since they are fallible in nature. Accordingly, researchers should clearly state whether they are

testing for full or partial mediation. Problems with mediation tests arise due to many statistical

approaches. However, these approaches are similar on most aspects but differ on few (James

et al., 2006). Many researchers have continuously used hierarchical regression approach to

examine significant mediation effects based on Sobel test with more than 2,000 citations

(Bolin, 2014, Cheung and Lau, 2008, MacKinnon et al., 2002). While Zhao et al. (2010) puts

the figure to 12,688 citations with an annual increase of 1,762 in 2009. While other reports

express credibility of Baron and Kenny mediation procedures with 8,120 citations (Bontis et

al., 2007).

Conversely, the popularity of the Sobel test has seen many research projects rejected for

not applying Baron and Kenny mediation approaches (Zhao et al., 2010, Cheung and Lau,

2008). Surprisingly, a majority of these mediation studies are in behavioural sciences, social

sciences, marketing and business research fields (Hayes, 2012). Hence, this dissertation bridges

the gap by considering mediation effects in the field of construction management and public

procurement. As part of this thesis, partial mediation testing was sequentially performed

corresponding to the six compliance factors including familiarity, monitoring activities,

professionalism, sanctions, perceived inefficiency and contractors’ resistance following Baron

and Kenny assumptions in conjunction with a Sobel test (Preacher and Leonardelli, 2001,

Baron and Kenny, 1986, Sobel, 1982). This approach was adopted because it is the best

alternative, its causal steps are widely applied, with greater statistical power, clearly

demonstrating conceptual linkage between each hypothesised relationship and their respective

statistical tests (Memon et al., 2018, Bontis et al., 2007, MacKinnon et al., 2002, Shrout and

Bolger, 2002). This leads to six hypotheses corresponding to the six compliance factors

grounded in theoretical foundation and discussed in the literature review.

H14. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework and project success.

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H15. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between monitoring activities in public road construction and project success.

H16. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between professionalism of staff in public road construction projects and project success.

H17. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between sanctions on staff in public road construction projects and project success.

H18. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and project

success.

H19. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework by public officers and project success.

3.6 Selection of study variables Evidence from literature summarised in appendix F, shows that over 700 peer reviewed

journals and public documents were reviewed and found relevant to answer the research

question. Whereas different studies have used different factors to explain compliance and

project success, it is noteworthy that most studies were tailored to specific scenarios with some

repetitive factors, for example;

Participant’s satisfaction, user satisfaction and environmental performance collectively

described as satisfaction when determining project success. Satisfaction with project

success comes when the project is completed within time, budget and conforms to

project specifications (Quality).

Training, knowledge, academic qualification, skills and experience leads to staff

competence that describes staff professionalism and familiarity.

Professionalism encompass competence, ethical behaviour/code, corruption, integrity,

transparency, accountability, fraudulent practices, opportunism, perceived gain, self-

interest, political influence and influence peddling. All these attributes together

determines one’s professionalism in doing the right thing.

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Familiarity with the regulatory framework encompasses awareness of, limited knowledge

of the law/Act, clarity and communications as stressed in literature by different scholars

describing different phenomena.

Audits, inspections, E-procurement system and reporting collectively described

monitoring activities. Different organisations applied varying monitoring techniques as

explained by scholars to enhance compliance, successful implementation of projects

and meeting set objectives.

Enforcement, policing, threats, punishments and control collectively describe sanctions.

Effectiveness of sanctions relies on mode of enforcement by respective organisations

to achieve desired objectives.

Through literature review, twelve compliance factors and seventeen project success

factors were established although some of them are used interchangeably depending on study

phenomena. This dissertation compressed them analytically into six and seven factors to

determine compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and success of public

road construction projects respectively as follows,

Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework.

Monitoring activities.

Professionalism of staff.

Sanctions on staff.

Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework.

Contractors’ resistance to non-compliance.

These factors were considered because they are comprehensive and include other factors

to avoid them being discarded. For example, organizational pressure, institutional factors and

organizational incentives are governance mechanisms explained through supervision,

monitoring, coordination, administrative pressure, motivation, punishments among others.

These were covered under either sanctions on staff or monitoring activities. Perceived gains,

irregularities, fraudulent practices and corruption are covered under professionalism of staff.

Supplier resistance refers to supplier demand for fair and transparent procurement process

through retaliating bad decisions of public procurement officers (Gelderman et al., 2010).

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Supplier resistance was modified to mean contractors’ resistance to fit current study covering

public road construction projects where government undertakes public road construction

projects in the public interest. These projects are considered successful when the project

conforms to predetermined specifications, terms and conditions, delivered on time, within

budget, of right quality, safe to use and capable of meeting government objectives. These

indicators were compressed to time, cost and quality (specifications) and selected to measure

public road construction project success (Dvir and Lechler, 2004, Atkinson, 1999).

Relatedly, sanctions not rewards were used to establish impact on compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and project success. Dropping rewards, was based on

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs stating that satisfying human beings is hard to achieve

(Udechukwu, 2009, Wachter, 2003). Furthermore as a rational human being, meeting set

targets is a positive self-motivation leading to promotion for hard work contrary to non-

achieving due to unprofessional behaviour that attracts sanctions (Mwakibinga and Buvik,

2013). Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework was determined through

staff masterly knowledge on public road construction projects and governing regulatory

framework. Government can reinforce familiarity and professionalism by investing in staff

competence through education, training and orientation (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015,

Kaluarachchi and Jones, 2007). Finally, perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework aimed at ascertaining effectiveness of the regulatory framework

governing public road construction projects. Selected factors underpinned this dissertation by

enabling clear understanding, interpretation and generalising study results. However, little is

known about combined use of these factors to explain compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework and successful public road construction projects. Hence, this gap

motivated the thesis to provide scholarly contribution and expand the body of knowledge

generally and particularly in public procurement and construction management.

3.7 Justification for used study variables

This section presents evidence justifying why the current dissertation used the eight

factors as well as considering mediation tests. Throughout the literature review, different

authors were found to establish common compliance factors and attempted to solve lack of

compliance without considering project success in the road construction sub-sector. Despite

their efforts, a lack of compliance persists in public procurement with failing construction

projects. A few studies built their argument on agency theory with cross-sectional research

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design but different results emerge. However, there are limited compliance studies in

construction industry particularly in the public road construction subsector. In addition, less

attention is paid to success factors for implementing public road construction projects.

Accordingly, a research question was developed to enhance this dissertation. Subsequently, six

probable compliance factors were established to determine their impact on compliance with a

public procurement regulatory framework. Additionally, compliance with a public regulatory

framework together with these six compliance factors (plus seven Success factors) were

examined to determine their impact on successful implementation of public road construction

projects. Appendix G demonstrates the literature gap based on these factors shown in the

conceptual model. Proof of using these factors was founded on scholarly areas of further

research suggested by various peer reviewed journal article as discussed below.

Familiarity with regulatory framework and organizational incentives was shown to

have a positive significant impact on compliance (Gelderman et al., 2006). Due to the fact that

the sample was drawn from Dutch public entities, the study acknowledged its limitation and

recommended using these factors, including professionalism and involving top management in

studies in other countries. Similar reports based on Uganda’s public entities suggested using

staff familiarity to establish its effect in public procurement (Tukamuhabwa, 2012, Eyaa and

Oluka, 2011). Furthermore, familiarity with public procurement guidelines was used to

determine compliance levels in Nigeria’s construction industry (Zadawa et al., 2015). Since the

study was limited to Nigeria’s construction industry, was theoretical in nature, qualitative, and

lacked theory backing, a quantitative approach using similar factor was suggested to provide

additional empirical evidence (Zadawa et al., 2015).

There are contradictions in using monitoring activities and sanctions to enhance

compliance. For example, Kauppi and van Raaij (2015) established that monitoring does not

influence agent compliance with principal’s instructions. Since the study was cross-sectional,

further studies were encouraged across other countries and sectors to determine its influence in

more details. Meanwhile, there are reports that argue using monitoring and sanctions cautiously

to enhance compliance. They suggested investigations to establish their influence on regulatory

compliance in public sector procurement (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). Whereas there is a

positive association between sanctions and compliance in Tanzania’s public sector

procurement, sanctions insignificantly enhanced compliance. Similar studies in other sectors

and countries were suggested using sanctions to evaluate compliance (Mwakibinga and Buvik,

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2013, Tukamuhabwa, 2012, Payan and McFarland, 2005). Relatedly, Rokkan and Buvik

(2009) recommended sanction for further research based on agency theory in investigating how

the agent complies with principal’s instructions to achieve set objectives.

Institutional theory recommends staff professionalism through education, skilling and

professional networking (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). Surprisingly, professionalism was an

insignificant predictor of compliance in public procurement (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011). The

article recommended further investigations to establish consistency by extending the study to

other sectors and using more factors. This move was supported by Tukamuhabwa (2012)

proposing a quantitative research based model with more factors to examine compliance in

public procurement through future research. Furthermore, Gelderman et al. (2006), Gelderman

et al. (2010) encouraged future researchers to replicate compliance studies using factors

including perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework, sanctions, organizational pressure

and contractors’ resistance to other countries, sectors and agencies.

Project success is measured through time, cost, quality, satisfaction and safety (Chan

and Chan, 2004, Atkinson, 1999). With complex construction projects operating in a dynamic

environment, scholars are encouraged to use these indicators as a benchmark for future research

since results change over time (Chan and Chan, 2004, Atkinson, 1999). In addition, future use

of these indicators is recommended since they are key in determining successful project

implementation and client satisfaction (Pinto and Mantel, 1990). Relatedly, Tabish and Jha

(2015) identified compliance with regulatory framework as a key success factor for

construction safety performance and suggested further investigation on its effectiveness in the

construction industry. This notions was supported by Mbabazi et al. (2015) who investigated

compliance in local government service delivery. Despite using time, cost and quality to

measure compliance in service delivery, the study objective was different, majorly qualitative,

lacked background theory and limited to district roads without considering national roads.

Finally, reports showed that mediation studies are emerging and important globally

(Mojtahedi and Oo, 2017, Hayes, 2009, Baron and Kenny, 1986). However, mediation studies

in the construction management research are only recently emerging. For example, reports

show mediation studies in Nigerian construction industry that are encouraged in other countries

(Zadawa et al., 2018b, Zadawa et al., 2018a). Accordingly, researchers are calling for

expansion of mediation studies in the construction industry since they have proved useful in

other fields (Mojtahedi and Oo, 2017, Cheung and Lau, 2008, James et al., 2006). In

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conclusion, suggested recommendations supported this research in adopting eight factors

including familiarity, monitoring activities, professionalism, sanctions, perceived inefficiency,

contractors’ resistance, compliance and projects success for this thesis.

This leads to the overall research methodology described in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FOUR METHODOLOGY

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4.1 Introduction This chapter describes the research methodology used to address the research question,

objectives and hypotheses. It outlines; research approach, research design, measurement

development, data collection procedures, sampling techniques and ethical considerations. The

methodology described was considered because a research methodology is important for an

academic study since it provides an overarching strategy that sets out systematic procedures to

answer a specific research question and ensures robustness of entire research (Sutrisna et al.,

2018).

4.2 Research Question

The research was guided by the following research question extended from chapter one:

What factors affect compliance in performance of public road construction projects?

This research question was handled in two parts. Part one focused on establishing factors

influencing compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework governing public

road construction projects and part two focused on how compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework together with compliance factors influence successful implementation

of public road construction projects. This manifested into the research aim and objectives (See

section 1.4 and 1.5 respectively) that were addressed through respective hypotheses in chapter

three.

4.3 Literature Review Approach

A comprehensive literature review was carried out in the domain of public procurement,

regulatory compliance and construction projects. To arrive at this, published research in peer-

reviewed journals were retrieved by use of different databases by title on the University of

Newcastle library catalogue. They included; Scopus, Google Scholar and Science direct search

engines. The journal articles were filtered to get relevant journals and articles from mass

downloads by a quick look at their respective abstracts. Textbooks, conference papers, public

reports were also used in this thesis. The literature search produced over 700 journal articles

and public reports from a period of 1987 to 2018. All downloaded materials were grouped and

stored on Endnote X8 library. Key search terms were used to ease searching of journal articles

including; Public procurement and construction, construction projects, compliance and

regulatory framework, regulations, regulatory framework, public procurement, public sector,

legal and compliance, non-compliance, Australia, Uganda, performance, road construction and

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performance. Furthermore, emphasis was put on; Road construction projects, compliance in

project implementation, enforcement mechanism, performance outcome, project success,

determinants of regulatory compliance and success factors in construction industry. Additional

articles were discovered from bibliographies of downloaded articles. Finally, the supervisors

provided articles relevant to the thesis topic. Reviewing literature, guided the study in a

theoretical context and reviewing public documents helped to establish compliance and project

success issues at entity level.

4.4 Research Framework and Approach

This dissertation adopted the research framework of Hair et al. (2014), Urbach and

Ahlemann (2010) to guide the research methodology as depicted in Table 4.1. The research

framework started with problem identification and research design to drive the study. The

second step involved theoretical foundation including; reviewing relevant literature that

unearthed theories, compliance and project success factors. The third step involved

constructing a conceptual model and developed hypotheses based on research objectives.

Model construction further linked study variables in a structural model and developing

measurement indicators for respective study variables. The fourth step was concerned with data

collection. This step involved establishing sampling frame, target sample size and type of data.

A questionnaire was used to solicit views from respondents in participating organisations.

Ethics approval was also considered in this step as a requirement before collecting data

involving human beings and animals. The fifth step concentrated on model validation through

evaluating coefficient of determination, path analysis, reliability, convergent and discriminant

validity as well as model fitting using Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). The

final step involved discussion, implications, contributions, recommendations and consideration

for future research. Of recent, these steps have been modified to reflect determination of

research gap, structural model specification, measurement model specification and model

estimation and results evaluation (Ringle et al., 2018).

Table: 4.1. Research framework

Phase Activities and results

Problem definition and research design Research question: What factors affect

compliance in performance of public road

construction projects?

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Research design: A cross-sectional and

questionnaire based was adopted. A

conceptual model transformed into structural

equation model for empirical testing

(Estimation).

Theoretical foundation and literature review Literature review: Reviewing relevant

literature and theories, tuned the research

question, conceptual framework, variables,

measurement indicators and hypotheses.

Comprehensive literature review discovered

compliance and project success factors as

well as mediational effects in public road

construction projects.

Model construction and instrument

development

Structural model: Hypothesised compliance

factors were linked to compliance and

project success respectively.

Measurement model: This involved

modification of existing measurement items

with a reflective mode. Self-administered

questionnaire was used.

Data collection Sampling frame: Public road construction

players including; MoWT, UNRA, URF,

PPDA and Contractors formed a sampling

frame.

Data type: Primary data collected using

questionnaire and secondary data from

public documents for example, annual

performance reports, compliance reports,

and audit and investigation reports. The

questionnaire was piloted for improvement.

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Ethics approval: Human Resource Ethics

Committee (HREC) of University of

Newcastle approved this study and a permit

number H-2017-0056 was obtained.

Target sample: 200 respondents were

targeted and actual 194 responses received.

However, 192 valid responses were usable.

Model validation Analysing results on compliance and project

success factors in public road construction

projects using Smart-PLS3, SPSS24 and

Med-Graph3.

Measurement model: Internal consistence,

convergent and discriminant validity were

respectively evaluated through composite

reliability ( 𝜌𝑐), AVE and HTMT.

Structural model: Path coefficients (α),

Coefficient of determination (R²), and effect

size (ƒ²) were evaluated.

Model fit: Standardized Root Mean Square

Residual (SRMR) determined model fit.

Mediation: SPSS regression and Med-graph

Sobel test based on (Baron and Kenny 1986)

were handy used.

Reporting results Discussion of results: Hypotheses

evaluation, implications, contributions,

limitations, recommendations, future

research and conclusion.

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4.4.1 Research Approach Research is normally conducted through quantitative or qualitative methodology. The

quantitative approach is statistically based and deductive in nature to explain variable

relationships while qualitative approach is non-numerical and inductive (Bryman and Bell,

2007). Quantitative research includes the benefits of statistical techniques to analyse data and

allows testing of variables for relationship strength and direction (Saunders, 2012, Mark et al.,

2009). A deductive research approach was used in this thesis because it enabled testing of the

hypotheses developed for strength of relationships between variables and variance through

statistical techniques including mediation effects. Furthermore, previous construction studies

have used this approach over time and yielding reliable results. Such support prompted this

thesis to use similar methodology for consistence and concretising its application in

construction research.

4.4.2 Research Design and Justification A research design is a guided plan that initiates questions to be answered up to

conclusion and includes study questions, unit of analysis, linking of data to study questions and

criteria for data interpretation (Yin, 2003). It is essential in directing research, determining

research contributions, enabling research problem specification and resolution (Babbie, 2015,

Rubin and Babbie, 2012, Knight and Ruddock, 2009). The design enabled in developing the

conceptual model for answering research questions linked through hypotheses and generalising

study results based on collected data and assessment (Bryman and Bell, 2011). A cross-

sectional study also called snapshot, is a good one point in time study for drawing inferences

on an existing phenomenon (Barratt and Kirwan, 2009). A cross-sectional study using a

questionnaire survey is commonly applied in construction research by getting original data

from a sampled population cheaply, timely and reliably yielding robust results for

generalisation (Ameyaw et al., 2017, Darko et al., 2017, Abdullahi et al., 2017, Robson and

McCartan, 2016, Babbie, 2015, Rubin and Babbie, 2012, Dainty, 2008, Robson, 2002). This

dissertation used a cross-sectional research design as it deals with the causal effect between

independent and dependent variables that required testing relationships. Additionally, a cross-

sectional survey research is good at generating information from both primary and secondary

data suitable for specific research study. This design was selected because its statistical

techniques are good for accuracy, validity, reliability generalisability and objectivity compared

to a qualitative design (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Sekaran and Bougie, 2010).

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Determining the correlational effect between independent and dependent variables,

justified why a cross-sectional design was selected for this dissertation and for consistency as

previous studies in the construction management research have used it. Survey research using

the questionnaire was also preferred due to its ability to obtain secondary data from public

documents on performance of public road construction projects through performance and

compliance reports as well as primary data from actual staff involved in these projects (Sekaran

and Bougie, 2010). Furthermore, since this dissertation was time constrained, this snapshot was

convenient compared to longitudinal studies in meeting the PhD timeframe. Major weaknesses

of cross-sectional survey include weak internal validity, bias, missed data and low response

rates (Babbie, 2015, Bryman, 2004). However, this was solved through piloting the

questionnaire for improvement by getting input from respective experts in public procurement,

construction projects and academia. The questionnaire was precisely written to encourage

respondents and minimise completion time. Additionally, persistent reminders as a follow-up

and checking for completeness before collecting the questionnaires from respondents increased

response rate and reduced missing values.

4.5 Measurement Development This subsection contains questionnaire details, variables, measurement scales, validity

and reliability. This is an important stage in research involving questionnaire survey as it helps

in obtaining viable measurement indicators for specific study variables (Hair and Black, 2009).

Through literature review, study variables and measurement indicators were respectively

determined as discussed below.

4.5.1 Questionnaire Design, Justification and Variables Questionnaire survey research is commonly applied where secondary data is available

and accessible (Darko et al., 2017, Abdullahi et al., 2017, Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, Sekaran,

2006). Furthermore, public road construction projects involve different stakeholders with

varying opinions and expectations. Hence, use of a questionnaire for primary data collection

was viable to solicit stakeholders’ views (Chan et al., 2018, Mojtahedi and Oo, 2017, Liu et

al., 2016, Olander, 2007). The questionnaire is appropriate in obtaining sensitive views and

securing anonymity of respondents (Ameyaw et al., 2017). The questionnaire is also

appropriate in studying attitudes in the construction sector (Shaban, 2008). Ideally, the major

concern for scale establishment is item inter-correlation, variance, unidimensionality,

reliability and validity. Accordingly, the questionnaire was developed in a three-step process

including; item generation, measurement purification and validation (Diamantopoulos and

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Siguaw, 2006). The questionnaire was developed and designed to answer study objectives and

hypotheses derived from general research question.

The questionnaire is a set of standardised questions that are precisely written for easy

interpretation by respondents across the sampling frame (Robson and McCartan, 2016, Robson,

2002). The questionnaire contained eight variables including; familiarity with regulatory

framework, monitoring activities, professionalism of staff, sanctions on staff, contractors’

resistance to non-compliance, perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework, compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework and project success anchored on a 5-point

Likert scale as depicted in Table 4.2. This dissertation adopted an ordinal level data with Likert

scales because it is appropriate for measuring attitude in quantitative studies (Mwakibinga and

Buvik, 2013, Aaker et al., 2008, Kumar et al., 2002, Likert, 1932). A Likert scale is efficient

unidimensional scale that ensures all items measure the same thing (Zadawa et al., 2018a,

Zadawa et al., 2018b, Cornalba and Giudici, 2004). In addition, a Likert scale is widely used

in construction management research (Darko et al., 2017, Abdullahi et al., 2017, Qin et al.,

2016). This was considered because of correlational and causality of the study in this

dissertation. For consistency and reliability, the dissertation maintained odd numbered scales

as compared to even point Likert scale which avoid mid-points (neutral statements) for definite

answers (Raaijmakers, 2000).

Through extensive literature review, a number of variables were identified with various

measurement items. The measurement items for respective variables were developed and given

to different experts in the field of procurement and construction management for comments.

Before the questionnaire was given to the experts, two university professors supervising this

research scrutinised the instrument carefully for possible errors and misrepresentation to ensure

validity and reliability. The aim was to establish irrelevant, ambiguous and poor worded

questions for elimination. In this way, the questionnaire was development and piloted in order

to have relevant and valid measurement items representing respective study variables. Piloting

is good at getting constructive feedback used to update the instrument accordingly (Memon et

al., 2017, Babbie, 2015). Pretesting the questionnaire ensures validity and reliability to yield

quality and dependable results (Chandran, 2004, Gupta, 2002). All these steps were taken to

address content validity of the questionnaire. Because content validity ensures validation of the

instrument by assessing how well instrument items represent the respective constructs (Gambo

et al., 2016, Sekaran and Bougie, 2016).

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The questionnaire was administered to selected procurement officers and construction

managers for clarity, relevance and updating. Participants in the pilot study did not take part in

the final study. One professor and chair of construction management identified experts in

procurement and construction industry from New South Wales Australia for their input on the

instrument. The feedback from the pilot study enabled rewording of the questionnaire and

deleting ambiguous statements. This resulted in a questionnaire with ninety-three questions.

Further statistical validation of the measurement items including reliability and validity were

performed after data collection (Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010). Whereas the questionnaire

adopted measurement items previously used as evidenced in Table 4.2, modifications was

made to fit current study by raising questions that reflected study variables and phenomenon

accordingly. Modification was necessary since previous studies that used these indicators were

not in road construction projects, did not use these independent variables together and their

respective models were either limited to compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework or project success and without considering mediation effect.

Table 4.2 Variable measurement and Questionnaire design

Variable Number of

question

Measurement

item code

Measurement

Scale

Reference

Familiarity with public

procurement regulatory

framework

15 F1 – F15 5-point Likert

scale

Mwakibinga & Buvik 2013,

Eyaa & Oluka 2011, &

Gelderman et al 2006

Monitoring activities 16 M1 – M16 5-point Likert

scale

Mwakibinga & Buvik 2013,

Rokkan & Buvik 2003 & 2009

Professionalism of staff 24 PR1 – PR24 5-point Likert

scale

Basheka & Mugabira 2008 &

Eyaa & Oluka 2011

Sanctions on staff 16 S1 – S16 5-point Likert

scale

Mwakibinga & Buvik 2013 &

Payan & McFarland 2005

Perceived inefficiency of

regulatory framework

4 PI1 – PI4 5-point Likert

scale

Gelderman et al 2006; 2010

Contractor’s resistance to

non-compliance

3 CR1 – CR3 5-point Likert

scale

Gelderman et al 2006

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Compliance with public

procurement regulatory

framework

11 CP1 – CP11 5-point Likert

scale

Mwakibinga & Buvik 2013 &

Gelderman et al. 2006 Payan &

McFarland 2005

Project success 4 PS1 – PS4 5-point Likert

scale

Pinto & Mantel 1990 and Dvir

& Lechler 2004

Source: Researcher

Familiarity with Regulatory Framework

Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework was measured through

familiarity with applicability of regulatory framework, familiarity with exceptions, overall

knowledge and perceived clarity of rules. Different authors with reliable results as depicted in

Table 4.2 had consistently used these items and were earlier used by Gelderman et al. (2006)

in evaluating public procurement and EU tendering directives. They were later modified and

applied in Uganda’s and Tanzania’s public procurement system respectively (Mwakibinga and

Buvik, 2013, Eyaa and Oluka, 2011).

Monitoring Activities

Monitoring activities on public road construction projects was measured through;

Frequent inspection for timely delivery, frequent inspection for timely recording, frequent

inspection for actual delivery and frequent inspection for proper storage. These were adopted

and modified from (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Rokkan and Buvik, 2009, Rokkan and

Buvik, 2003). Actual and timely delivery were based on set performance targets and

completion dates for implementing public road construction projects. While proper storage

referred to how safe, road construction materials and equipment were stored to prevent theft

and damage.

Professionalism of Staff

Professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects was measured

through; Confidentiality, competence, integrity and professional membership. These were

adopted and modified from (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011, Basheka and Mugabira, 2008). Whereas

there are limited public procurement studies using professionalism factor, little is known about

its application in procurement of public road construction projects. The questions raised in the

instrument were directly linked to the above indicators with modification to fit public road

construction study.

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Sanctions on Staff

Sanctions were measured through; Penalties for violation, consideration of outcome for

non-compliance, credibility of sanction and known stipulated sanctions. These were adopted

and modified from (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Payan and McFarland, 2005). As noted

earlier, sanctions have been applied in general concept of restoring sanity in an appealing

situation where principal’s goals are in stagnation under agency theory. However, application

of coercive means is still debatable despite its application in Tanzania’s public procurement

study (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). The sanction’s application in public road construction

subsector is at infant stage and this was a premise for its application in this thesis using those

measurement indicators to iron some contrivance.

Perceived Inefficiency of Regulatory Framework

Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework was measured

through ban on negotiation during project implementation, ban on contract extension and ban

on exclusion of underperforming contractors. These items were adopted and modified from

(Gelderman et al., 2010, Gelderman et al., 2006). Perceived inefficiency is an emerging

variable and its application is not known in the construction industry. Its indicators were used

in EU public procurement directives and is crawling slowly in application. Despite its infancy,

this thesis adopted the indicators and modified questions in the instrument to match public

procurement of road construction projects.

Contractors’ Resistance to Non-Compliance

Contractors’ resistance was measured through readiness to take action, contractors’

knowledge of regulatory framework and public officers’ fear of being exposed. These items

were adopted and modified from (Gelderman et al., 2006). This is an armature factor in public

procurement generally. Having been applied in the EU public procurement directives

Gelderman et al. (2006), little is known about this variable in the construction industry and

specifically in public road construction projects. This dissertation adopted these indicators and

modified the questions to link them to public road construction projects since developing new

indicators requires substantial efforts and time for reliability and validity.

Compliance with Regulatory Framework

Compliance can be measured either through dichotomous (comply or not comply) or

through probability. However, weakness of dichotomous is that it lacks a degree of compliance

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and probability is challenged by estimating actual and future compliance (Mwakibinga and

Buvik, 2013, Gelderman et al., 2006). In order to determine compliance, this thesis adopted

and modified approaches of Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013), earlier developed by (Gelderman

et al., 2006, Payan and McFarland, 2005). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of

agreement on compliance indicators comprising of timely delivery, timely recording, use of

imprest, damages or loss and unauthorised procurement on a 5-point Likert scale.

Project Success

A wide range of project success studies have concentrated on critical success factors of

construction projects. However, few of these studies have specifically identified critical items

measuring project success (Atkinson, 1999). Despite this shortfall, works of (Pinto and Mantel,

1990, Pinto, 1986) are the foundation for underlying indicators measuring project success

including; time, cost and quality that many studies are now applying in the construction

industry. This dissertation adopted these measurement indicators that have been earlier

developed and used by Pinto and Mantel (1990) and later adopted with modifications by (Dvir

and Lechler, 2004).

4.5.2 Questionnaire Validity and Reliability

Validity is concerned with question of good fit or concurrence between what

researchers have defined as a characteristic of phenomenon under study and what researchers

are reporting in the measurement (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). Alternatively, validity refers to

the degree to which the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure (Shaban, 2008). It

implies that variable measurement by the instrument should measure what the researcher

intended. Validity is the accuracy of information presented (Santosh, 2007, Mehmetoglu,

2004). On the other hand, data reliability is important when there is trust in data source and in

respondents filling the questionnaire (Oppenheim, 1992). Reliability involves removal of

mistakes in the measurement instrument for data consistency (McDaniel and Gates, 2010,

Santosh, 2007, Gupta, 2002). Additionally, reliability is the consistency and stability of

measures. Accordingly, this thesis used staff who are knowledgeable in procurement and public

road construction projects as respondents. This boosted data reliability and consistency with a

right data collection source. The questionnaire was pretested to improve the instrument. In

addition, using existing scales and measurement items previously used with good Cronbach’s

alpha coefficients, increased reliability. Furthermore, instrument validity can be in the form of

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internal validity, content validity, face validity, external validity and stability of the

questionnaire as discussed in the proceeding break down.

4.5.2.1 Internal Validity

A pilot study was conducted outside a wider selected sample where the questionnaire

was given to procurement and construction experts to ascertain whether the questions raised,

covered all key study issues to ensure reliability and consistency. This ensured that conclusions

made are well supported and free of bias.

4.5.2.2 Face Validity

This is the degree to which findings correctly map the phenomenon in question. The

questionnaire was organised in sections systematically matching independent variables

influencing compliance and project success to determine representative measurement items.

With the help of experts who examined the questionnaire, measurement items were grouped in

their respective variables.

4.5.2.3 Content Validity

This looked at representativeness of the measurement item for the main variables under

study. The manner to which questions are raised in the questionnaire should fully correspond

to the variables and match developed hypotheses and objectives of the study. This was

enhanced through piloting the questionnaire by getting input and feedback from experienced

personnel working in public procurement and construction projects. Content validity is

concerned with how manifested variables represent respective latent variable (Sekaran and

Bougie, 2016, Gambo et al., 2016, Götz et al., 2010). Content validity was achieved by raising

questions matching hypotheses for respective variables. The factors were operationalised in the

form of manifested variables to enable representation of measurement indicators for each

variable. In addition, after content validity, further evaluation for construct reliability and

validity is recommended (Götz et al., 2010). This was achieved by running PLS-algorithm

using Smart-PLS 3 version 3.2.3 (Ringle et al., 2015a).

4.5.2.4 External Validity

This deals with generalisation of study results to the whole population. Since the study

was quantitative and the sample was statistically selected, its appropriateness warranted

application to population as it was free of researchers’ bias (Clark-Carter, 2009). The sample

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was carefully and statistically selected through stratified proportionate random sampling to

allow generalisation of dissertation findings.

4.5.2.5 Stability

This refers to consistency of results produced by the same research instrument with

duplication of measurement items over time (Wood and Ross-Kerr, 2011). Stability ensures

reliability of measurement instrument for the same variables and this was achieved by using

variables and measurement indicators used in previous studies with necessary modification for

suitability of public road construction project study.

4.6 Data Collection Upon ethics approval, data collection commenced and participants were selected from

organisations involved in road construction projects in Uganda.

4.6.1 Data Collection Method and Questionnaire Justification

Research in construction is conducted through surveys, case studies and experiments

(Liu et al., 2016, Babbie, 2015, Ferber, 1980). Survey questionnaires are commonly used in

obtaining appropriate data responding to study objectives with small samples representing a

big population. In this regard, a structured self-administered questionnaire was employed as a

primary data collection instrument to solicit views, attitudes and procurement practices in

public road construction projects. A structured questionnaire was selected for consistency since

a cross-sectional design requires use of quantitative analysis (Gupta, 2003). The questionnaire

was prepared to reflect the research hypotheses, objectives and variables with structured

questions. This method was selected because it is widely used to obtain views of professionals

in construction management and allows determining correlation and causal links for statistical

significance among study variables (Liu et al., 2016, Hwang et al., 2015, Deng et al., 2014). It

is straightforward, clearly outlined, replicable, easy to administer and time saving compared to

an interview guide (Malhotra and Peterson, 2006). Whereas the questionnaire does not prompt

and allow probing for more data, it gives a high degree of standardisation and adoption for

generalising the population. It allows respondents to make their own interpretation of study

variables and avoid researchers’ bias (Chandran et al., 2003).

Permission by top management from participating organisations was officially granted

and respectively assigned staff to facilitate in questionnaire distribution and make follow-up.

The questionnaires were physically delivered and picked when completed. This systematic

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process enabled smooth and timely data collection. Additionally, follow-up through phone

calls and frequent physical visits secured approximately 65% response rate. The response rate

attained for the thesis is good enough since a response rate of 50% is adequate, 60% good and

above 70% is very good for vibrant findings, conclusions and recommendations (Mugenda and

Mugenda, 2003). Additional reports indicate that a response rate of 20-30% when using a

questionnaire in construction management is appropriate (Liu et al., 2016, Hwang et al., 2015).

4.6.2 Data Type and Sources

This thesis used both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was retrieved from

annual performance reports, compliance reports, monitoring and evaluation reports, audit and

investigation reports and national media. These sources are vital since potential data sources

include but are not limited to; documentation, archival records, interviews and physical

artefacts (Yin, 2006, Yin, 2003). Primary data was obtained from the Ministry of Works and

Transport (MoWT), Uganda Road Fund (URF), Public Procurement and Disposal of Public

Assets Authority (PPDA) and private road contractors awarded respective public road

construction projects. These organisations were considered because they are involved in public

road construction projects in Uganda. The data collected from these partisans enabled

researchers’ in-depth understanding of compliance and implementation issues surrounding

public road construction projects.

4.6.3 Study Population and Sample

Population is a totality of items including people, firms and objects that forms a research

base from which study sample is drawn (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). A sample is a subset of a

population that is drawn to represent a population and sampling is a statistical procedure for

selecting a study sample (Grove et al., 2014). Whereas (Kothari, 2004, Mugenda and Mugenda,

2003) argue that sampling is a uniform selection of a sample from a population and a sample

size of 10-20% is adequately representative, sample size formulation is complex and depends

on population homogeneity, cost, time and respondents available (Churchill and Iacobucci,

2002). According to UNRA’s website, there are 42 public road construction projects (5

completed and 37 on going) as at July 2016. Since this dissertation was limited to the public

road implementation stage, all 42 projects were considered. In addition, these projects were

based on to generate a list of private contractors who were awarded respective contracts (See

Table 4.3). Both the unity of analysis and unity of inquiry were the respondents from five strata

with a population of 299 staff as depicted in Table 4.4.

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Table 4.3 Completed and On-going National Road Construction Projects

No Project Contractor

Completed Road Construction Projects

1 Vurra-Arua-Koboko-Oraba Chongqing International

Construction Corporation

(CICO)

2 Kawempe-Luwero-Kafu (Overlay) Energo Projekt

3 Gulu-Atiak road CHICO

4 Kampala Busega-Masaka RCC/SBI

5 Mukono-Jinja Sterling Civil Engineering

On-going road construction projects

1 Ishaka-Kagamba General Nile & Dotti

services

2 Nakapiripirit-Moroto road China Road & Bridge

Corporation

3 Kamwenge-Fort Portal China Railway Seven Group

4 Atiak-Nimule China Railway Group 5

5 Mbarara-Bypass China Railway Seven Group

6 Mpigi-Kanoni China Railway number 3

7 Ntungamo-Kakitumba/Mirama Hills Zhongmei Engineering

Group

8 Mukono-Kyetume-Katosi/Kisoga-Nyenga SBI/RCC JV

9 Luuku-Kalangala Spencon Services

10 Kanoni-Ssembabule-Villa Maria China Railway number 3

11 Musiita-Lumino-Busi/Majanji China Railway 18th Bureau

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12 Acholi Bur-Musingo Chongqing International

Construction Corporation

(CICO)

13 Olwiyo-Gulu Zhongmei Engineering

Group

14 Gulu-Acoli Bur China Railway No.5

15 Mukono-Kayunga-Njeru SBI

16 Mbale-Soroti Dott Services

17 Mbarara (Buteraniro)-Ntungamo RCC

18 Ntungamo-Katuna road RCC

19 Kafu-Kiryandongo Energo Projekt

20 Kiryandongo-Kamdini China Communication

Construction Company

(CCCC)

21 Kamdini-Gulu China Communication

Construction Company

(CCCC)

22 Pakwach-Nebbi Shengil Engineering

Construction Company

(CECC)

23 Sironko-Namusi-Muyembe Shengil Engineering

Construction Company

(CECC)

24 Iganga-Tirinyi Dott Services

25 Nansana-Busunju Spencon services

26 Iganga-Kaliro Sterling Civil Engineering

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27 Seeta-Namugongo-Kireka Abu baker Technical

services

28 Selected National roads Lira District(Lot 6) Multiplex LTD

29 Kampala-Entebbe Expressway/Munyonyo China Communication

Construction Company

(CCCC)

30 Kampala Northern Bypass Mota Engil Enginharia E

Construcao SA

31 Mpigi-Kanoni road Energo Projekt

32 Bulima-Kabwoya China Railway No.5

Engineering Group

33 Kyenjojo-Kabwoya Shengil Engineering

Construction Company

(CECC)

34 Mubende-Kakumiro-Kagadi China Communication

Construction Company

(CCCC)

35 Tororo-Mbale road Dott services

36 Jinja-Kamuli road Dott services

37 Mvara-Ediofe Cathedral road Chongqing International

Construction Corporation

(CICO)

Source: UNRA 2016

4.6.4 Study Participants Participants for this study included staff from Directorate of Engineering and Works

(DE&W), Directorate of Transport (DT), Procurement and Disposal Unit (PDU), Policy &

Planning (P&P) and Finance & Administration (F&A) of Ministry of Works and Transport.

Directorate of Performance and Monitoring (DP&M), Directorate of Legal & Investigations

(DL&I), Directorate of Operations (DOP), Directorate of Capacity Building & Advisory

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Services (DCB&AS) and Directorate of Corporate (DCP) of Public Procurement and Disposal

of Public Asset Authority. Fund Management Department (FMD) of Uganda Road Fund and

contractors for respective public road construction projects. Participants were majorly road

engineers, procurement managers, project managers, finance managers, accountants and

human resource managers. These departments were selected because they are involved in road

construction projects and had necessary information for this study. In addition, the participants

in these departments were selected based on their knowledge and experience in road

construction projects (Darko et al., 2017). Table 4.4 shows the total number of staff from

respective directorates/department that formed sampling frame.

Table 4.4 Participants

Organization Directorate/Department Number of staff Total Sample size

MoWT DE&W 26 94 54

DT 10

PDU 6

F&A 40

P&P 12

UNRA DP 21 21 12

URF FMD 12 12 7

PPDA DP&M 55 130 74

DOP 30

DCB&AS 15

DL&I 12

DCP 18

Contractors Contract Managers 42 42 25

Total 299 299 171

Source: Researcher

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4.6.5 Sample In PLS-SEM, minimum sample size is determined by multiplying a number of variable-

paths in a model by ten (Ten times rule of thumb) for reflective model (Hair et al., 2012a,

Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010). This rule of thumb is extensively used because of its simplicity

in determining the minimum sample size in PLS-SEM (Kock and Hadaya, 2018). This implies

that the minimum sample size for this study model based on this rule would be 130 i.e. (13*10).

All 299 respondents were selected as depicted in Table 4.4. This move was considered to

reduce none response rate, increase accuracy and objectivity of the results (Stopher, 2012).

Furthermore, whereas PLS-SEM can handle small sample sizes, precaution should be exercised

since sampling error may arise yielding inflated bootstrap error and reducing statistical power

especially with highly skewed data (Hair et al., 2012a). Such sampling errors are minimised

through increasing the sample size. Increasing the sample size, further improves accuracy since

the sample size is a major determinant of statistical power (Henseler et al., 2014). Based on the

consistency at large principle, correct model parameter estimators are observed when indicators

per variable increase to infinity (Sawyer, 2005, Chin, 1998). According to Krejcie and Morgan

(1970) sample table, the right sample size for a population of 300 is 169. However, the sample

size was determined using Slovene’s formula stated in equation (i) following Krejcie & Morgan

at 0.05 significance level (Nsanganzelu, 2015).

4.6.5.1 Sample Size Determination

n =𝑁

1+𝑁(e2) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………i

Where; n = Sample size, N = population and e = significance level of 0.05

By substituting in formula i, the actual sample size for population of 299 is 171.

4.6.6 Sampling Technique Uganda’s national roads sprout across the entire country with participating

organisations having staff stationed at both head and upcountry offices. Bearing in mind that

respondents are from different organisations, stratified proportionate random sampling was

appropriate in selecting key respondents involved in public road construction projects and

generalising findings (Clark-Carter, 2009). Stratification was based on organisations of which

there are broadly two categories involved in public road construction projects

(Government/public and private). Government organisations included; Ministry of Works and

Transport (overall supervisor), Uganda National Road Authority (implementer), Uganda Road

Fund (custodian of road funds) and Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets

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Authority (Public procurement regulator), while private included road construction firms

(contractors). These formed five strata and respondents in each stratum were randomly

selected.

Despite Uganda National Roads Authority’s decline to participate in this study, the

targeted sample size was not affected since it was compensated by issuing more questionnaire

in other participating organisations within the sampling frame. Noteworthy, participation is

voluntary and the study was obliged to University of Newcastle Human Resource Ethics

Committee regulations that emphasis voluntary participation and liberty of participants to

withdraw in research at will and anytime. Stratified proportionate random sampling was

preferred because of wanting all key national road sector players to participate in this study

without bias in selecting respondents (Clark-Carter, 2009). Furthermore, stratified

proportionate random sampling yields better responses and all staff have equal chances of being

selected in each stratum involving only those organisations knowledgeable in public road

construction projects. This dissertation considered all the population since the numbers were

manageable and to have a good response rate. However, 194 responses were obtained forming

a 64.9% response rate as depicted in Table 4.5. This is an extremely successful attained

response rate since it is above recommended threshold of 37% when using questionnaire survey

for data collection (Almarri et al., 2019, Doloi et al., 2011).

Table 4.5: Response rate

Organization Number of responses Proportionate response rate (%)

MoWT 88 45

PPDA 56 29

URF 12 6

Contractors 38 20

Total 194 100

4.7 Ethical Consideration The Australian government requires all research involving human and animal subjects

to seek clearance from Human Resource Ethics Committee (HREC) of University of Newcastle

before data collection. This is in line with Becker et al. (2012) necessitating researchers

involving humans and animals to always consider safety, informed consent and privacy of

study participants. Ethics clearance was obtained before data collection since the study

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involved human beings as a unit of inquiry. Notable issues considered were privacy and safety

of all participants in the research project, anonymity, confidentiality of information obtain and

voluntary consent from participants. Participation in this research project was voluntary and

participants were free to withdraw at any time. The right procedure was followed by seeking

permission from selected entities and obtaining organizational consent to allow individual

respondents for voluntary participation. Finally, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of

information obtained was ensured. Organisations and individuals who declined participation

were excused accordingly. The ethics approval permit (Number: H-2017-0056) from

University of Newcastle human resource ethics committee helped the researcher’s introduction

and seeking of permission from respective organisations to allow their staff participate in this

survey.

Conclusion

A quantitative cross-sectional research design was employed in this dissertation with

both primary and secondary data collected through administering a structured questionnaire

and reviewing public documents respectively. The questionnaire was developed through

phases consisting of reviewing existing measurement indicators, modification, content

verification and relevancy by academic professors and finally piloting to get expert opinion for

reliability and validity. Proportionate random sampling was adopted to select respondents from

five participating organisations involved in public road construction projects. The

questionnaires were physically distributed and collected from respondents. A response rate of

64.9% was obtained.

This leads to chapter five that report on data analysis.

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CHAPTER FIVE DATA ANALYSIS

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5.1 Introduction This chapter presents data processing, techniques and tools used in analysing data.

Three statistical tools consisting of Smart-PLS version 3, Statistical Package for Social

Scientist version (SPSS) version 24 and Med-graph Excel programme version 3.0 were adopted

in the analysis process with respective techniques employed as discussed below.

5.2 Data Processing and Analysis Data analysis techniques include; pattern matching, linking data to propositions,

explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models and cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2003).

One important practice during analysis phase is returning to hypotheses. These lead to a

focused analysis when otherwise tempted to analyse data outside the research question’s scope

and exploring rival hypotheses by engaging an iterative process (Yin, 2003). Confidence in the

findings will increase as number of hypotheses are addressed and accepted or rejected.

Furthermore, quantitative research through a cross-sectional survey focuses on how variables

interact or are inter-linked (Field, 2013). The analysis started with establishment of descriptive

statistics performed in SPSS24 and since this dissertation was guided by nineteen hypotheses,

analysis was linked to developed hypotheses and facilitated by Smart-PLS version 3 statistical

software for data analysis (Ringle et al., 2015b). Smart-PL 3 is the latest version that offers

great range of Modeling and algorithmic functions with improved usability compared to

previous versions (Sarstedt and Cheah, 2019). In addition, Smart-PLS was considered because

it is more advantageous compared to ADANCO, PLS-Graph and Warp-PLS that have limited

algorithmic functions and not regularly updated (Sarstedt and Cheah, 2019). Mediation tests

were determined through Sobel tests following Baron and Kenny (1986) in Med-graph version

3.0 excel programme (Jose, 2013). Data was screened thoroughly for reliability to ensure

completeness and accuracy.

5.2.1 Data Preparation Descriptive statistics was performed to check for normality in data distribution,

completeness and accuracy. This was good at providing background information on both

respondents and characteristics of the study variables. Descriptive statistics summarise huge

data through: frequency and distribution tables, central tendency, normal distribution,

variability, skewness and kurtosis (Davis et al., 2004, Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). Whereas

PLS-SEM is flexible in handling non-normal data with less stringent constraints, some level of

data screening is necessary (Ringle et al., 2018, Le et al., 2014a, Henseler et al., 2009). Before

detailed analysis, data was subjected to screening. This was important in handling reliability,

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validity, multi-collinearity, normality, outliers and missing values. This purification process is

majorly concerned with obtaining final measurement items with high inter-correlation that

enable internal consistency for reflective models (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). Data

screening was conducted to enable data normality and extreme collinearity (Diamantopoulos

and Siguaw, 2006). Data cleaning, diagnostic tests, reliability tests, factor analysis, computing

of variables, correlations and regression were performed using both Smart-PLS version 3

Ringle et al. (2015b) and SPSS version 24 (George and Mallery, 2016, Field, 2013).

With the help of Smart-PLS statistical software, PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping

resampling approach were employed to determine relationship between variables by estimating

path coefficients and significance. Path coefficients helped to determine strength, direction and

significance of relationships and coefficient of determination helped to examine variance of

dependent variable explained by combined independent variables (Newbold and Agiakloglou,

1991). Bootstrap techniques are good in parameter estimation and are commonly applicable in

analysing risks in construction projects (Mojtahedi et al., 2009). Model fitting was examined

through Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). Finally, mediation effects were

performed to determine interactive effects among compliance factors and public road

construction project success following procedures by (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The screening

process involved checking for unidimensionality, collinearity, unreasonable values, missing

values, outliers and normality as described below.

Unidimensionality: Refers to how measurement items for a particular variable relate to that

variable better than any other (Um and Kim, 2018). Unidimensionality was conducted in line

with Kline (2015) to determine construct validity. This was important for data analysis since

reflective models’ variables are supposed to be unidimensional (Kline, 2015). This was handled

in Smart-PLS3 by running PLS-algorithm and determining discriminant validity. To determine

discriminant validity, HTMT values, cross loadings and Fornell-Larcker criterion were

assessed. This process requires particular variable indicator loading to correlate higher than

any other variable. This is achieved if the indicator coefficients are above or equal to 0.6 but

below 0.95 while indicators with coefficients below 0.5 are rejected (Urbach and Ahlemann,

2010).

Collinearity: Extreme collinearity can occur if indicators that seem to measure separate

variables, actually measure the same thing, for example, if indicator coefficient α > 0.90 (Kline,

2015). Extreme collinearity are issues of discriminant validity that occur when variables

correlate highly as if they are measuring the same thing. Hence, poor discriminant validity

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leading to poor model prediction. This is solved through positive definiteness common in some

computer tools. With reflective measurement models, measurement errors for individual

indicators are established and removed through factor analysis. Whereas extreme collinearity

makes estimations hard and can be solved by removing indicators, researchers should pay

attention to not affect content validity. Data screening is good at solving these problems.

Extreme collinearity was solved by eliminating variables’ indicators with very high collinearity

(α > 0.95) and retained ones (α ≥ 0.5 α ≤ 0.95). This is recommended for reflective models

where the variable meaning is not changed unlike formative models (Urbach and Ahlemann,

2010).

Outliers: Data screening also aims at getting rid of outliers that affect results by either

overstating or understating regression coefficients. Notably, outliers distort statistical results

and affect validity of structural equation models and questionable conclusions (Schamberger

et al., 2019). Outliers are scores that are different from the rest and they are either univariate or

multivariate. This happens when standard deviation scores are three times more than the mean.

This is solved by either applying mathematical transformation or converting extreme scores to

a value equal to next most extreme score that is within three standard deviation of the mean. In

this thesis, the second option was chosen by converting to the next extreme score. Z score were

used with the condition: Z ≥ ± 2.5 (i.e. Z ≥ -2.5, implies extreme low value and hence add 1

to that value and Z ≥ 2.5, implies high extreme value and hence subtract 1 from that value).

Missing data: Missing data occurs when certain values are skipped during data input or if

respondents’ failure to answer certain questions. There are several methods of solving missing

data including; available case method whereby the incomplete cases are deleted thus only

analysing available complete data, using a single imputation method whereby each missing

score is replaced with a single calculated score done by use of mean or regression substitution

technique. Missing values can also be solved through a model-based imputation method that

generates more than one score for each missing observation. However, each of these methods

will depend on the percentage of missing values. This dissertation adopted available case

method for missing data by excluding two questionnaire with 178 (86.4%) total missing data.

They were removed from analysis since they would distort prediction of variable relationships

(Ali et al., 2018a, Hair et al., 2014). This reduced the number of collected questionnaire from

194 to 192 valid responses. Consequently, affecting the sample size while maintaining quality

analysis (Kline, 2015).

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Normality test: This is concerned with data distribution (Darko et al., 2017). Whereas

PLE-SEM is flexible in handling non-normal data, some level of fair normal distribution is

paramount in yielding strong significant statistical findings and recommendations (Ali et al.,

2018a, Henseler et al., 2009). Additionally, highly skewed data can inflate bootstrap error that

reduce statistical power (Ali et al., 2018a, Hair et al., 2012a). Descriptive statistics was

performed using SPSS24 to test for normality under the following methods:

Graphical methods involving Histogram with normal curve, PP-plot and QQ-plot. The

former requires majority of the bar graphs to be under the normal curve (Doane and

Seward, 2011, Gan and Koehler, 1990).

Skewness and Kurtosis: Skewness and Kurtosis statistics should lie between ±3 and ±5

respectively to exhibit fair normal data distribution.

According to the histogram output, all study variables (familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework, monitoring activities, professionalism of staff, sanctions on staff,

perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework, contractors’ resistance to

non-compliance, compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and public road

construction project success) exhibited fairly normal distribution. The majority of the bar

graphs are under the normal distribution curve as shown by respective figures. Additionally,

all the PP-plots and QQ-plots of the study variables exhibited fairly normal distribution since

the majority of the points are close to the straight line as demonstrated by respective figures.

Furthermore, descriptive statistics using Skewness and Kurtosis was performed to determine

normality. Findings show that Skewness and Kurtosis for all study variables are within

acceptable limits of ±3 and ±5 respectively (Jondeau and Rockinger, 2003). Hence, data for

all study variables exhibited fairly normal distribution as depicted in Table 6.16.

Additional Diagnostic Tests

Diagnostic tests are good for data normalisation before embarking on detailed analyses.

These were performed based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumptions. Diagnostic tests

involved testing for normality, multi-collinearity, linearity and homogeneity as a requirement

for cross-sectional data. If not corrected, these issues contribute to poor predictive power of the

model, poor t-values and misleading data specifications (Chen and So, 2006, Walfish, 2006,

Grewal et al., 2004, Min and Mentzer, 2004, Jarvis et al., 2003). Normality and collinearity are

already discussed in section 5.2.1. Linearity and homogeneity were handled in SPSS24 as

discussed in respective subsections.

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Linearity Test Linearity was determined based on F-statistics and significance level by running a linear

regression and evaluating ANOVA and coefficient results. Under this method, F-statistics are

supposed to be greater than 3, to demonstrate linear model (Grewal et al., 2004, Faraway,

2002). In addition, a graphical method was used. Under the graphical method, when a straight

line among scatter points exits, it shows the model is linear (Faraway, 2002).

Homogeneity Tests

Homogeneity test is important at initial stage of data analysis to avoid occurrence of

heteroscedastic that may be caused by the same variance of different population and from

unknown distribution (Chen and So, 2006). Simple regression analysis was performed with

plots option to establish data homogeneity among study variables. This was measured based

on scatter plot (Z-prediction value Vs Z-residual value). Under this method, when the points

converge, it proves that the data was homogeneous (Faraway, 2002). Furthermore, Levene test

was also performed under SPSS descriptive and explore options. According to this test, p-

values should be above 0.05 (Sig ≥ 0.05) based on mean for dependent variables to prove that

the data was homogeneous (Sattari et al., 2012, Scotti et al., 2011).

5.3 Adoption and Justification for Using PLS-SEM Whereas there are various regression techniques used in estimating models, Structural

Equation Modeling (SEM) was preferred for this analysis. SEM is widely used in different

fields for example; social sciences, information systems, international business, marketing and

construction management among others (Sarstedt et al., 2019b, Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Ali

et al., 2018a, Kock and Hadaya, 2018, Cheah et al., 2018, Ringle et al., 2018). Additionally,

SEM is a powerful statistical tool capable of producing robust results (Hussain et al., 2019,

Hwang et al., 2019, Hair et al., 2019, Memon et al., 2017). Convincingly, SEM is most suitable

for analysing relationships among variables in construction management research field (Shan

et al., 2020b, Sinesilassie et al., 2019, Müller et al., 2018, Newaz et al., 2018, Shan et al., 2017,

Liu et al., 2016). This analysis’s suitability is due to PLS-SEM prediction- oriented approach

unlike Covariance based-SEM (CB-SEM) (Sarstedt et al., 2019b, Ali et al., 2018a, Ringle et

al., 2018). Specifically, Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling is suitable for

theoretical explanations of outcome results (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019, Chileshe et al., 2018,

Kumar and Purani, 2018).

Whereas there are two types of SEM, Partial Least Square - Structural Equation Modeling

(PLS-SEM) was preferred to Covariance-Based Structural Equation Modeling (CB-SEM)

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because of its prominence in various research fields, ability to handle non-normal data and use

of small sample size (Ali et al., 2018a, Memon et al., 2017, Liu et al., 2016). Particularly,

PLSE-SEM is good when premises (distribution assumptions) of CB-SEM are violated (Ali et

al., 2018a, Kumar and Purani, 2018, Ringle et al., 2018). In addition, PLS-SEM can combine

factor analysis and regression in simultaneous analysis when determining the relationships

among study variables (Müller et al., 2018, Shan et al., 2017, Hair et al., 2014, Le et al., 2014a,

Gefen et al., 2000). The approach is good at theory confirmation, predicting variable

relationships and identifying hypotheses within structural model (Foroughi et al., 2019, Memon

et al., 2017, Chin, 1998). Furthermore, PLS-SEM is good for exploratory research, using non-

normal distribution data and can solve complex scenarios using small samples (Chileshe et al.,

2018, Hair et al., 2017, Le et al., 2014a, Hair et al., 2011, Henseler, 2010). The ability to handle

skewed data with less stringent assumptions compared to CB–SEM was good enough to adopt

PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2017, Memon et al., 2017, Henseler et al., 2014, Urbach and Ahlemann,

2010, Chin, 1998).

Whereas in covariance based SEM, maximum likelihood estimation method does not deal

with incomplete raw data file, PLS-SEM uses an iterative sequence of ordinary least square

estimation method capable of handling incomplete data (Memon et al., 2017, Gefen et al.,

2000). PLS-SEM is efficient in dealing with low missing values (Memon et al., 2017, Hair et

al., 2014, Little and Rubin, 2002). In addition, PLS-SEM is capable of using nominal, ordinal

and scale measures in predictor constructs (Ringle et al., 2018). Previously, scholars criticised

PLS-SEM approach for lacking a global goodness fit to estimate the models. However, current

Smart-PLS version 3 use Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) to estimate model

fit (Hair et al., 2019, Ringle et al., 2015b, Hair et al., 2014, Henseler, 2010). Conclusively,

reports show that PLS-SEM is suitable for small sample size, its ability to produce acceptable

statistical power with small samples, complex models with reflective or formative indicators,

and parameter estimation that provides significant relationships (Sarstedt et al., 2019b,

Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Kock and Hadaya, 2018, Kumar and Purani, 2018,

Ringle et al., 2018, 2014, Henseler, 2010). Hence, with eight study variables, nineteen

hypotheses and 192 valid responses together qualify PLS-SEM as a suitable approach for data

analysis in this dissertation. Furthermore, because this dissertation aimed at predicting variable

relationships in the theoretical model, PLS-SEM was appropriate to determine prediction

following correlational linkages in simultaneous analysis. This was achieved by running PLS-

algorithm and bootstrapping techniques, and examining path coefficients.

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5.4 Measurement Model Evaluation The measurement model (outer model) defines the relationship between manifested

variables (indicators) and their respective latent variables that can be reflective or formative

(Sarstedt and Cheah, 2019, Ringle et al., 2018, Götz et al., 2010). Under measurement model

evaluation, four key estimations are determined including; indicator reliability, construct

reliability (internal consistency), Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and discriminant validity

(Chileshe et al., 2018, Kumar and Purani, 2018, Ringle et al., 2018, Müller et al., 2018, Ali et

al., 2018b). After verifying content validity, determining both indicator reliability and internal

consistence is equally important. Indicator reliability ascertains how much of the indicator

variance is explained by its variable established through indicator loadings. The variance

should be above 50% (Le et al., 2014a, Götz et al., 2010, Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010). Internal

consistency (construct reliability) is determined by how adequately, combined indicators

measure their variable together. Strong indicator association is good and was determined

through composite reliability that measures representativeness of indicators to their respective

variable. PLS-SEM explores a three-step process in obtaining factor loadings, path coefficients

and coefficient of determination (R²). In the first step, an iterative process involving multiple

regressions on the model is performed until a solution converges on a group of weights

estimating latent variable scores. Step 2 and 3 are none-iterative and uses ordinary least squares

to establish factor loadings, path coefficients and mean scores for latent variables and indicators

(Chin, 1998). Recently, Kumar and Purani (2018) categorized the steps into iterative estimation

of latent variable scores, estimation of parameters for structural and measurement models.

To have good scales for measuring study variables, measurement items were generated and

validated in line with model validation process (Hair et al., 2014, Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010).

This was done to achieve better reliability and validity of study variables and avoiding random

errors (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Forza, 2002). This was achieved by running PLS

algorithm and evaluating indicator coefficients. Indicators with coefficients ≥ 0.7 were

retained while indicators with coefficients < 0.5 were dropped (Chileshe et al., 2018, Ali et al.,

2018a, Kline, 2015, Wong, 2013). All variables were measured reflectively and dropping

indicators with coefficients below 0.5 did not affect construct meaning since these were

reflective measures (Müller et al., 2018, Gefen and Straub, 2005, Gefen et al., 2000). The

process of retaining and deleting measurement items was systematic and was done by accepting

items with indicator loadings ≥ 0.6, then removing items that correlated negatively.

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Figure 5.1: Types of construct measurement

(a) (b)

There are two measurement models in structural equation Modeling (i.e. Formative and

Reflective) as depicted in Fig 5.1 (Sarstedt et al., 2019a, Sarstedt and Cheah, 2019, Müller et

al., 2018, Ringle et al., 2018). The models for this thesis were measured reflectively. According

to Müller et al. (2018), reflective models are characterized by:

Any variation in latent variable does not vary their indicators. Accordingly,

removing an indicator does not affect that variable.

The causal direction is indicated by arrows originating from the variable towards

indicators as seen from Fig 5.1a.

The indicators in reflective models are highly correlated, positive and covary with

each other.

5.4.1 Validity and Reliability Extending questionnaire reliability and validity from section 4.5.2, and since the study

model is reflective, it was important to test the measurement model for internal consistency ,

indicator reliability, convergent and discriminant validity (Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010).

5.4.1.1 Reliability

Having obtained data from the right source by using staff knowledgeable in public road

construction projects as respondents and eliminating mistakes from the questionnaire through

systematic improvement for better instrument reliability, the next stage embarked on statistical

test for reliability. PLS-Algorithm based on factor analysis was conducted to obtain

measurement indicators with sufficient reliability and internal consistency for respective study

variables. Composite reliability and Cronbach alpha are used to test internal consistency based

on data collected from the questionnaire administered. In determining internal consistency, a

composite reliability coefficient (𝜌𝑐 ) of 0.7 is acceptable, 0.8 very good and above 0.90

excellent (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Ringle et al., 2018, Kline, 2015, Le et

al., 2014a, Field, 2013, Hair et al., 2012a). Composite reliability is recommended in reporting

internal consistency than Cronbach’s alpha and the 𝜌𝑐 coefficient should be above 0.7.

Reflective Formative

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However, 0.6 is acceptable (Chileshe et al., 2018, Wong, 2013, Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).

Composite reliability is preferred to Cronbach alpha because composite reliability assume more

accurate parameter estimation compared to Cronbach alpha (Müller et al., 2018, Ali et al.,

2018b, Chin, 2010). High coefficient values indicate that all indicators are similar with the

same range. While values below 0.6 show lack of reliability (Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010,

Gefen and Straub, 2005).

Indicator reliability shows how a set of measurement items measure a particular

variable different from other variables. It is achieved by observing reflective indicator

coefficients (outer loadings) that are squared to obtain respective indicator reliability (Wong,

2013). The variable should at least explain 50% of individual indicator’s variance (Urbach and

Ahlemann, 2010). Ideally, indicator reliability with standardized loadings more than 0.7 is

desirable (Ringle et al., 2018). The PLS-algorithm results for both construct reliability and

indicator reliability were satisfactory as demonstrated in section 6.3 and 6.4 respectively.

5.4.1.2 Convergent and Discriminant Validity

Validity refers to whether measurement tests meet researcher’s intended measures

(Clark-Carter, 2009). In addition, validity establishes whether the measurement indicators

capture underlying construct (Um and Kim, 2018). Construct validity is either convergent or

discriminant.

Convergent validity: Is concerned with individual measurement indicators reflecting

a particular variable to converge in respect to indicators of another construct or how well

indicators represent their variable. Simply, convergent validity measures the representativeness

of measurement indicators in respective variables (Cheah et al., 2018, Müller et al., 2018, Ali

et al., 2018b). For indicators to converge, the range between lowest and highest loading should

be narrow. However, Chin (2010) notes that there is no minimum set range for estimating

convergent validity for example, 0.7 to 0.9 (narrow range) is better than 0.5 to 0.9 (wide range).

Convergent validity is examined through Average Variance extracted (AVE) that is useful in

determining construct validity and test for model development (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017,

Hair et al., 2012a). Average Variance Extracted values greater or equal to 0.5 shows that the

latent variable explains more than 50% variance of its indicators. Hence, representing

sufficient convergent validity (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Chileshe et al., 2018, Ali et al.,

2018a, Cheah et al., 2018, Ringle et al., 2018, Müller et al., 2018, Le et al., 2014a, Urbach and

Ahlemann, 2010).

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Discriminant Validity: Reflective model validation ends with discriminant validity

tests (Götz et al., 2010). Discriminant validity measures inter-construct relationship. It ensures

that the indicators of one variable are different from indicators of another variable. It ascertains

how distinct latent variables are from one another (Müller et al., 2018). Ideally, discriminant

validity ensures that the indicators should measure what they are supposed to measure.

Indicator loadings for each latent variable should correlate highly with each other in the same

variable than any other latent variable. This process enabled the study by obtaining right

measurement indicators to facilitate further model estimation. This was enhanced by

eliminating indicators that are poorly loaded on hypothetical variables while balancing with

content validity. There are different methods of determining discriminant validity including;

Cross loadings, Fornell-Larker and Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT) (Rasoolimanesh et al.,

2019, Ringle et al., 2018, Müller et al., 2018, Ali et al., 2018b). Under cross loadings, indicator

reliability is calculated by squaring each corresponding factor loadings. In addition, when each

variable loads highly with its indicators rather than other variable’s indicators, it proves that

they are distinct. The AVE of individual variable should be higher than the highest squared

correlation of another variable that is observed in cross loadings criterion (Müller et al., 2018,

Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010).

Alternatively, square root of AVE should be higher than correlations among latent

variables that is demonstrated by Fornell-Larker criterion (Müller et al., 2018, Ali et al., 2018b,

Wong, 2013, Chin, 2010). Discriminant validity is also determined using HTMT currently

available in Smart-PLS 3 version. Under this method, HTMT values below 0.85 or < 0.9 are

recommended (Sarstedt et al., 2019a, Ali et al., 2018a, Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017, Hair et al.,

2017, Ringle et al., 2015b). Notably, HTMT is now recommended as a superior criterion for

determining discriminant validity because the other two criterion overstate discriminant

validity (Sarstedt et al., 2019b, Ali et al., 2018a, Kumar and Purani, 2018, Ringle et al., 2018,

Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017, Hair et al., 2017). After running PLS-algorithm, HTMT, Fornell-

Larker criterion and cross-loadings coefficients were verified and results are presented in

interpretation chapter under respective tables.

5.5 Structural Model Evaluation Structural model also called inner model is concerned with relationships between

hypothetical variables established by the researcher. It is profound on the path coefficients

using empirical data to prove or disprove theory surrounding the conceptual model. PLS-SEM

follows a three-step process of evaluating the structural model including; specification,

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identification and validation. Under model specification, the researcher clearly explains

whether the model is reflective or formative. Under identification, the reflective model

identification follows a “Three thumb rule” that requires each variable in the model to have at

least three indicators for identification (Freeze and Raschke, 2007). After validating the

measurement model, the structural model needs to be validated using non-parametric tests to

establish structural model quality. Parametric tests have constrained assumptions that are

satisfied before they are applied. For example, they assume normal data distribution. A series

of parametric tests are used in the analysis and interpretation of results to confirm the

researcher’s hypotheses. The hypotheses are either supported or not supported depending on

significance of Chi-Square (ᵡ²) values (Naoum, 1998).

While non-parametric tests (t-statistics) in PLS-SEM are generated by bootstrapping

techniques/ procedure and are not constrained by many assumptions and are applicable for

ordinal and nominal data (Müller et al., 2018, Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017, Nitzl et al., 2016).

This dissertation adopted non-parametric techniques based on the significance of t-statistics for

path coefficients, coefficient of determination (R²) and model fit to validate the structural

model. This dissertation followed Hair et al. (2012b) five step structural model assessment

process consisting of assessment for: 1. Collinearity 2. Significance and relevance of structural

model relationships 3. Level of coefficient of determination (R²), 4. Effect size (ƒ²) and 5.

Model fitting. These basic steps are commonly used in PLS-SEM (Chileshe et al., 2018, Ringle

et al., 2018). These are good cross-validation and relevant function fitting technique like hands

in the glove (Hair et al., 2012b). The steps are described below.

5.5.1 Collinearity Assessment Collinearity was primarily handled in data preparation (section 5.2.1)). This was enabled by

running PLS-algorithm and assessing Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for all study

variables. Verifying VIF for reflective measurement models is important since multi-

collinearity can inflate bootstrapping standard errors and misinterpretation of indicators (Ali et

al., 2018a, Hair et al., 2012b). VIF values for both compliance and project success models were

verified and reported in Table 6.15a. PLS-algorithm unlike SPSS, only gives VIF values.

Hence, a parallel collinearity analysis was performed in SPSS24 based on linear regression for

all study variables. Under this analysis, VIF and tolerance values were verified and results

compared to PLS-algorithm output. Both results are satisfactory as depicted in Table 6.14 (a &

b) corresponding to compliance and project success models. Tolerance values of ≥ 0.20 and

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VIF ≤ 5.00 are recommended thresholds for retaining dependent variables (Chileshe et al.,

2018, Ali et al., 2018a, Ringle et al., 2018, Hair et al., 2012b).

5.5.2 Significance and Relevance of Structural Model Relationships Path coefficients represent the linkage between study variables demonstrating hypothesised

relationships and the values range between -1 and +1 (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019). The

relationship is confirmed and supported if a path coefficient is significant after performing

bootstrapping (Chileshe et al., 2018, Ali et al., 2018a, Ali et al., 2018b, Müller et al., 2018,

Hair et al., 2014). Individual path coefficients are based on standardized beta coefficients

estimated from ordinary least squares (Ali et al., 2018a, Ali et al., 2018b, Götz et al., 2010).

Bootstrapping resampling technique was performed and significance of t-values for respective

paths coefficients determined. Determining path coefficients involves establishing signs,

magnitude and significance levels (Ali et al., 2018a). In this step, signs contrary to stated

hypotheses indicate that the hypothesis is not supported and vice-verse. The magnitude

indicates the strength or impact size of relationship between the variables. The strength is

assessed through path coefficients that should exceed 0.10 to show impact in the model, while

their significance should be at-least at 0.05 level. Significance of t-values is achieved at the

following levels: t > 1.96 at 0.05 significance level, t > 2.576 at 0.01 level of significance and

t > 3.29 at 0.001 significance level using a two-tailed test or t > 0.98 using a one-tailed test (Le

et al., 2014a, Hair et al., 2012b). After performing bootstrapping resampling with 5000

subsamples, all path coefficients for independent variables corresponding to compliance and

project success models were respectively assessed to determine individual impact size. The

results are presented in Table 6.20 section 6.9 showing supported and unsupported hypotheses.

5.5.3 Coefficient of Determination (R²) The structural model’s predictive accuracy is determined through coefficient of

determination whose values range from zero to one (Hussain et al., 2019). A good model fitting

is achieved with significant path coefficients, high R² and when the construct reliability is ≥

0.7 (Kumar and Purani, 2018, Hair et al., 2012a, Gefen et al., 2000). Coefficient of

determination of dependent variable represents its explained variance by the total independent

variables (antecedent constructs) also known as predictive power assessment (Müller et al.,

2018). Recommended values of R² ≥ 0.1 demonstrate a well explained variance by the

dependent variables while R2 less than 0.1 is unsuitable (Hussain et al., 2019, Falk and Miller,

1992). However, R² values of 0.670, 0.333 and 0.190 show substantial, average and weak

explained variance respectively (Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010, Chin, 2010, Chin, 1998). While

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Hussain et al. (2019) asserts that R2 values greater than 0.26, between 0.13 and 0.26, and

between 0.02 and 0.13 are considered substantial, moderate and weak respectively.

Alternatively, recent reports show that R2 measure model’s predictive power and values of

0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 shows that model’s in-sample predictive power is weak, moderate and

strong respectively (Ringle et al., 2018). Whereas there are no cut off points for acceptable R2,

its size depends on the complexity of the structural model (Kumar and Purani, 2018, Hair et

al., 2011, Götz et al., 2010, Henseler et al., 2009). However, large R2 implies large variance

explained (Kumar and Purani, 2018, Götz et al., 2010). By running PLS-algorithms and

bootstrapping, significant R2 values for compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework and public road construction project success were respectively determined and

presented in Table 6.37 section 6.10.

5.5.4 Effect Size (ƒ²) Whereas R2 is more concerned with predictive model accuracy, structural model evaluation

requires determining individual independent variable impact on a dependent variable. This is

called effect size. Respective effect size is achieved through omission of one independent

variable from the analysis and rerunning the model to ascertain its influence on corresponding

dependent variable. To examine individual independent variable impact on dependent variable,

changes in R² are used to determine effect size of each path through Cohen’s ƒ². Each

independent latent variable effect size measure (ƒ²) shows the magnitude of influence on the

corresponding dependent latent variable. Ideally, ƒ² measures changes in R² when specified

independent variable is excluded from the model and re-estimate R² to determine its impact

(Hair et al., 2012b). Values of ƒ² ranging between 0.020 and 0.150, 0.150 and 0.350 and above

0.350 show that independent variable has small/weak, medium/moderate and large/strong

effect on dependent latent variable respectively (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019, Ali et al., 2018a,

Kumar and Purani, 2018, Müller et al., 2018, Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010, Götz et al., 2010,

Chin, 2010, Gefen et al., 2000, Chin, 1998).

Estimating effect size follows systematic steps by omitting independent latent variable one

by one and rerunning the model to re-estimate R² for corresponding dependent variable and

their respective effect size as per the formula ii. Previous versions of Smart-PLS software

lacked effect size estimation feature as opposed to the current version used in this analysis.

PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping resampling technique in Smart-PLS3 were performed and

the effect size on both compliance and project success by respective independent variables

automatically calculated. Despite simultaneous effect size determination, the calculations

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follow the same procedures described above corresponding to formula ii. Respective ƒ² values

for the six independent variables predicting compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework and ƒ² value for the seven independent variables predicting public road construction

project success are presented in Table 6.38 section 6.10.

𝑓2 = 𝑅2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑−𝑅2𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑

1−𝑅2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 ii

5.5.5 Model Fitting Acceptable model fitting is important to determine whether the underlying theory is

reflected in the data (Sinesilassie et al., 2019). Hence, it is simply an empirical evidence to

prove that the estimated model fits the data collected (Müller et al., 2018). Fitting of structural

model and significance of coefficient of determination are now possible with current Smart-

PLS3. Previous versions of Smart-PLS software lacked statistic for model fit. Indeed, the

software was criticised for lack of a global model fit statistic. However, the current version is

inbuilt with Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) to determine model fit (Hair et

al., 2019, Ringle et al., 2015a). SRMR measures the mean absolute correlation residual as a

difference between observed and predicted correlation (Kline, 2015, Hu and Bentler, 1999).

For acceptable model fit, SRMR ≤ 0.08 is recommended (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Hair et

al., 2019, Sinesilassie et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Nitzl et al., 2016). Alternatively, values of

0.08 is good while 0.1 is fair (Kumar and Purani, 2018, Newaz et al., 2018, Mathieu and Taylor,

2006, Browne and Cudeck, 1989). Hence, this dissertation adopted Standardized Root Mean

Square Residue statistic to determine the model fit and the findings are presented in Table 6.37

section 6.10.

5.6 Mediational Effect Mediation is based on the framework that assumes that the independent variable

predicts the mediating variable that finally predicts the dependent variable. This is achieved by

specifying the causal order of these variables (Mojtahedi and Oo, 2017, Mathieu and Taylor,

2006). The article further notes that mediation refers to significant total relationship between

independent and dependent variables that is either partially or fully explained by the mediating

variable. Testing for mediation effect is vital when a third variable is identified as contributing

an effect between the two existing variables. This thesis was concerned with establishing

whether compliance with public procurement regulatory framework mediates the relationship

between each of the six probable compliance factors and the success of public road construction

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projects in Uganda. The mediation test was sequentially carried out six times corresponding to

the six hypothesised compliance factors (Familiarity, monitoring activities, professionalism,

sanctions, perceived inefficiency and contractors’ resistance) following Baron and Kenny’s

assumptions in conjunction with Sobel test (Preacher and Leonardelli, 2001, Sobel, 1982). The

analyses were performed concurrently using SPSS24 and Med-graph3 Excel program. Detailed

findings for respective mediational effects and corresponding tables and figures are reported in

section 6.9.2.

This leads to the interpretation of results presented in chapter six.

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CHAPTER SIX RESULTS INTERPRETATION

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6.1 Introduction This chapter presents results performed by Smart-PLS3, Statistical Package for Social

Scientist (SPSS24) and Med-Graph Excel program based on research objectives and

hypotheses. It begins with descriptive statistics majorly performed in SPSS24, preliminary

analysis, assessment of the measurement model, structural model, hypotheses testing

performed in Smart-PLS3, and mediation tests performed using Med-Graph3 Excel program.

It ends with validated models resulting from Smart-PLS-SEM bootstrapping resampling

technique (Ringle et al., 2015b).

6.2 Profile of Respondents and their Organisations Descriptive statistics are recommended for summarising huge data on the

characteristics of study variables for easy and quick interpretation (Davis et al., 2004). This is

important for the forthcoming data analysis stages with respect to normal distribution,

frequencies, means, skewness and kurtosis. Descriptive statistics provided background

information on study variables and were performed in SPSS24 (George and Mallery, 2016,

Field, 2013).

Table 6.1: Organisations

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid MOWT 87 45.3 45.3 45.3

URF 12 6.3 6.3 51.6 PPDA 55 28.6 28.6 80.2 Contractors 38 19.8 19.8 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.1 presents number of participating organisations in this study showing

respective percentage to the study sample size. Ministry of Works and Transport had the

highest percentage of participants followed by Public Procurement and Disposal of Public

Assets Authority.

Table 6.2: Education

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid Primary 1 0.5 0.5 0.5

Diploma 10 5.2 5.2 5.7 Bachelors 75 39.1 39.1 44.8 Masters 103 53.6 53.6 98.4

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PhD 3 1.6 1.6 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.2 presents respondents’ education level who participated in this study showing

respective percentage to the study sample size. Education is one of the factors determining

seniority and maturity of respondents to give reliable and credible information on

organizational affairs. It was clear that over 94% of the respondents possessed a bachelor’s

degree and above. This implied that the majority of the respondents were academically

qualified staff and competent to interpret and answer questions raised. This increased

confidence and reliability of the responses obtained.

Table 6.3: Professional Training

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid CIPS 38 19.8 19.8 19.8

CILT 9 4.7 4.7 24.5 ACCA 11 5.7 5.7 30.2 CPA 18 9.4 9.4 39.6 Others 116 60.4 60.4 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.3 presents professional training attained by respondents in this study showing

respective percentage to the sample size. The majority of respondents had professional

qualifications, which was majorly in the engineering profession. This option was not listed in

the questionnaire. The respondents only expressed their profession by choosing ‘other’ option

and briefly explaining what the profession was. In further evaluation of these responses,

respondents indicated that they possessed professional certificate provided by respective

engineering association. This was because road construction is largely implemented by staff

with engineering background. Professional qualification was an added advantage on normal

academic qualification that influences staff competence and capability (DiMaggio and Powell,

2015).

Table 6.4: Age

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid 30 years and below 43 22.4 22.4 22.4

31 to 40 Years 75 39.1 39.1 61.5 41 to 50 years 69 35.9 35.9 97.4

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Above 50 years 5 2.6 2.6 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.4 presents age brackets for respondents who participated in this study showing

respective percentages. The thesis aimed at obtaining credible information based on maturity

of respondents. Statistics indicate that 77.6% of staff were above 30 years old. This increased

confidence and reliability of the responses obtained because age is one of the components that

determine staff maturity in understanding organisation matters.

Table 6.5: Title

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid Below officer 30 15.6 15.6 15.6

Officer or Manager and above

162 84.4 84.4 100.0

Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.5 presents the level of seniority among study participants within organizational

ranks. According to respective percentages, most of the respondents were senior officers as

demonstrated by 84.4% compared to 15.6% who were below officer level in organizational

hierarchy. This indicates that the study involved suitable respondents who are knowledgeable

within their respective activities. Hence, they were well positioned and able to give reliable

information in their respective organisations, which increased confidence in this dissertation

having credible information regarding compliance and project success factors in the

procurement of public road construction projects.

Table 6.6: Gender

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid Male 121 63.0 63.0 63.0

Female 71 37.0 37.0 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.6 presents gender representation of study participants showing respective

percentages. Since study participants were at senior level, it was worth noting to establish any

bias in responses based on gender. The findings indicate that 63.0% of study participants were

male compared to 37.0% female. Initially, males dominated most of organizational positions

compared to female and now with gender equality, the numbers of female participants are

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increasing considerably. Accordingly, this study registered a good gender distribution balance

with small difference given the current generation.

Table 6.7: Registration with any professional body

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid No 87 45.3 45.3 45.3

Yes 105 54.7 54.7 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.7 presents the respondents’ professional body registration status with respective

percentages. Most of the respondents are registered with their respective professional bodies.

This reaffirms earlier report on professional training. With practical road construction projects,

professional training is just emerging. Professional bodies have a mandate of controlling their

members and issuing them with practising certificates. In this dissertation, the majority of the

participants had an engineering background and were registered under their professional body

as an added requirement for employment. Hence, in Uganda’s case most of these staff under

ministry of works and transport, Uganda road fund and contractors were registered with

Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers (UIPE).

Table 6.8: Name of registered professional body

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative

Percent Valid NO 88 45.8 45.8 45.8

CIPS 14 7.3 7.3 53.1 UIPE 36 18.8 18.8 71.9 ERB 6 3.1 3.1 75.0 IPPU 21 10.9 10.9 85.9 ICPAU 3 1.6 1.6 87.5 ACCA 4 2.1 2.1 89.6 CPA 6 3.1 3.1 92.7 CILT 2 1.0 1.0 93.8 USS 1 .5 .5 94.3 IKS 1 .5 .5 94.8 SMED 1 .5 .5 95.3 CISSCO 1 .5 .5 95.8 CMAU 1 .5 .5 96.4 ULIA 1 .5 .5 96.9 ULS 1 .5 .5 97.4 EC (UK) 1 .5 .5 97.9 CFDE 1 .5 .5 98.4

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SRB 1 .5 .5 99.0 CEEM 1 .5 .5 99.5 KTA 1 .5 .5 100.0 Total 192 100.0 100.0

Table 6.8 presents the respondents’ respective professional body. The results indicate

that out of 192 participants, 88 (45.8%) do not belong to any of the listed professional bodies

and a majority of the participants 104 (54.2%) were registered. By analysing their registration

further, 36 (18.8%) were registered with Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers (UIPE)

and 6 (3.1%) were registered with Engineers Registration Board (ERB). Procurement

professional bodies including; Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supplies (CIPS),

Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) and Institute of Procurement

Professionals Uganda (IPPU) collectively had 37 (19.2%) study participants. This is relatively

a good number because the study revolved around public procurement of road construction

projects. Hence, a good blending of engineers and procurement professionals formed large

percentage of participants. While others comprised of accountants and financial professionals

for accountability purposes. This built further reliability and validity of responses obtained in

this dissertation.

Table 6.9: Descriptive Statistics for Years in Current Position in the organization and number of employees

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Years in current position 192 .3 27.0 5.112 4.3645 Number of employees 192 2 150 20.64 21.941 Years in Organisation 192 .3 22.0 6.340 5.0871

Table 6.9 presents respondents’ years in their current position and in the organisation.

It was necessary to look into the experience of study participants in their respective

organisations. Statistics show that most of the respondents have served in both their current

position and organisation for a long period as demonstrated by respective means of 5.1 and 6.3

years. This implied that participants were experienced and able to give reliable information to

support the results of this dissertation. The demographic characteristics proved helpful in

understanding the nature of study participants before embarking on the data characteristics in

terms of data reliability and validity that follows in the next section.

6.3 Composite Reliability With satisfactory demographic results, the thesis assessed reliability for the

measurement instrument aimed at obtaining valid and consistent output. Data reliability is

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important when there is trust in data source from respondents filling the questionnaire

(Oppenheim, 1992). Reliability is getting rid of mistakes in the measurement instrument for

data consistency (McDaniel and Gates, 2010, Gupta, 2002, Santosh, 2007). The purpose of the

reliability test enabled the retention of indicators that qualified to measure study variables in

the initial factor analysis stage. Both indicator and construct reliabilities determination are

important. Composite reliability results from Smart-PLS algorithm are above 0.7 and in

conformance with literature cited as depicted in Table 6.10 (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019,

Hussain et al., 2019, Foroughi et al., 2019).

Reliability results were extracted as follows; Familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework had originally fifteen indicators and only three were retained with 𝜌𝑐 =

0.792. Monitoring activities had sixteen indicators originally and four were retained with 𝜌𝑐 =

0.830. Professionalism had originally twenty-four indicators and five were retained with 𝜌𝑐=

0.838. Sanctions had originally sixteen indicators and three were retained with 𝜌𝑐 = 0.798.

Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework had originally four

indicators and only three were retained with 𝜌𝑐 = 0.817. Contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework had originally three items and only

two were retained with 𝜌𝑐 = 0.802. Compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework had originally eleven indicators and only four were retained with 𝜌𝑐 = 0.840.

Project success had originally four indicators and only three were retained with 𝜌𝑐 = 0.865.

Table 6.10: Reliability test results

Variable N of Items Scale Composite

Reliability (𝜌𝑐)

Familiarity

3 1 - 5 0.792

Monitoring activities

4 1 - 5 0.830

Professionalism

5 1 - 5 0.838

Sanctions

3 1 - 5 0.798

perceived inefficiency 3 1 - 5 0.817

Contractors’ Resistance 2 1 - 5 0.802

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Compliance

4 1 - 5 0.840

Project success

3 1 - 5 0.865

6.4 Factor Loadings

PLS-algorithm with factor analysis helps in obtaining indicators to explain a study

variable through correlational patterns and data reduction. PLS-algorithm aimed at further

retaining indicators that represent the variable very well (Wong, 2013). Factor loadings (outer

loadings) were examined for indicator reliability by extracting suitable indicator for respective

study variables. Through running PLS algorithm, outer loadings for each variable with

coefficient ≥ 0.6 were retained while indicators with coefficients < 0.5 were dropped (Wong,

2013). The results of indicator loadings also called outer loadings are presented in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11: Outer Loadings

Compliance

Contractors' resistance Familiarity Monitoring Perceived

inefficiency Professionalism Sanctions Project success

CP1 0.895 CP10 0.727

CP2 0.663 CP3 0.719 CR1 0.856 CR2 0.779 F1 0.746 F13 0.675 F3 0.818 M13 0.597 M14 0.858 M15 0.820 M4 0.675 PI1 0.730 PI2 0.845 PI3 0.742 PR18 0.682 PR19 0.686 PR20 0.714 PR21 0.791

PR3 0.690 S7 0.812

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S8 0.862 S9 0.569 PS1 0.728 PS2 0.883 PS3 0.858

6.5 Average Variance Extracted (AVE)

Construct validity is either convergent or discriminant validity. Convergent validity

was concerned with individual measurement indicators converging on a particular variable in

respect to indicators of another variable. The results show that AVE values for all study

constructs are above 0.5 proving sufficient convergent validity as portrayed in Table 6.12

(Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Hussain et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Ali et al., 2018b, Hair et

al., 2014, Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010).

Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

Fifteen indicators were initially determined to measure familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction projects. However,

after running PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping technique, only three indicators were retained

to measure this variable i.e. F1, F3 and F13 (See Table 6.11). It shows that these indicators

explained 56.0% of total variance as presented in Table 6.12.

Monitoring Activities

There were sixteen indicators originally for measuring monitoring activities of public road

construction projects. However, on performing PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping and verifying

factor loadings, only four indicators qualified and correlated highly on the variable. The four

indicators including; M4, M13, M14 and M15 accounted for 55.5% total variance as depicted

in Table 6.12.

Professionalism of Staff

Originally, there were twenty-four indicators to measure professionalism of staff involved

in public road construction projects. However, only five indicators including; PR3, PR18,

PR19, PR20 and PR21 were retained after performing PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping. These

indicators represent a strong correlation and explained 50.9% of total variance as presented in

Table 6.12.

Sanctions on Staff

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Sixteen indicators were initially identified to measure sanctions on staff involved in public

road construction projects. However, after running PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping, three

indicators comprising of S7, S8 and S9 were retained. These indicators explained 57.6% total

variance as shown in Table 6.12.

Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

Four indicators were initially established to measure perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework. However, after running PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping,

and verifying indicator loadings, three indicators were retained after deleting one that was

poorly loaded. Retained indicators including PI1, PI2 and PI3 explained 59.9% variance as

shown in Table 6.12.

Contractors’ Resistance to Non-Compliance

Three indicators were originally established to measure contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. However, after performing PLS-

algorithm and bootstrapping, two indicators showing strong indicator loading were retained.

The qualified indicators CR1 and CR2 explain 67.0% total variance as presented in Table 6.12.

Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

Eleven indicators were initially identified to measure compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction projects. However,

after running PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping techniques, four indicators including CP1, CP2,

CP3 and CP10 qualified to measure this variable. They explain 57.2% total variance as shown

in Table 6.12.

Project Success

Four indicators were originally identified to measure public road construction project

success. However, after running PLS-algorithm and bootstrapping, and verifying indicator

loadings, three indicators including PS1, PS2 and PS3 were retained. Retained indicators

represent a strong association and explained 68.3% total variance as seen in Table 6.12.

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Table 6.12: Average Variance Extracted (AVE)

Average Variance Extracted (AVE) Compliance 0.572 Contractors' resistance 0.670 Familiarity 0.560 Monitoring 0.555 Perceived inefficiency 0.599 Professionalism 0.509 Sanctions 0.576 Project success 0.683

6.6 Discriminant Validity

Discriminant validity ensured that the indicators measured what they were supposed to

measure. This was determined through three methods including; Fornell-Larker criterion,

cross-loadings and Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT). All the results are satisfactory

showing that the indicators loaded highly on to their respective variables demonstrating

acceptable discriminant validity as presented in Table 6.13 (a, b & c). However, HTMT values

take precedence since they are more reliable (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Ali

et al., 2018b, Hair et al., 2017, Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017).

Table 6.13 a: Fornell-Larker Criterion

Compliance

Contractors' resistance

Familiarity

Monitoring

Perceived inefficiency

Professionalism

Sanctions

Project success

Compliance 0.756 Contractors' resistance 0.266 0.818 Familiarity 0.121 0.279 0.748 Monitoring 0.064 0.279 0.352 0.745 Perceived inefficiency -0.432 -0.361 -0.295 -0.178 0.774 Professionalism 0.047 0.335 0.449 0.522 -0.249 0.714 Sanctions 0.451 0.277 0.224 0.256 -0.521 0.205 0.759 Project success 0.262 0.421 0.465 0.574 -0.385 0.600 0.285 0.826

Table 6.13 b: Cross Loadings

Compliance

Contractors' resistance

Familiarity

Monitoring

Perceived inefficiency

Professionalism

Sanctions

Project success

CP1 0.895 0.298 0.200 0.105 -0.450 0.105 0.410 0.323 CP10 0.727 0.203 0.052 0.128 -0.319 0.050 0.390 0.254 CP2 0.663 0.086 0.029 -0.098 -0.190 -0.049 0.252 0.003 CP3 0.719 0.137 0.009 -0.057 -0.259 -0.047 0.254 0.061 CR1 0.263 0.856 0.260 0.279 -0.366 0.267 0.266 0.360 CR2 0.165 0.779 0.192 0.169 -0.213 0.284 0.182 0.328 F1 0.021 0.195 0.746 0.250 -0.123 0.361 0.192 0.373 F13 0.052 0.227 0.675 0.282 -0.194 0.346 0.130 0.286

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F3 0.181 0.213 0.818 0.268 -0.332 0.312 0.176 0.377 M13 -0.035 0.219 0.168 0.597 -0.036 0.334 0.091 0.290 M14 0.138 0.276 0.329 0.858 -0.207 0.425 0.290 0.450 M15 0.072 0.208 0.325 0.820 -0.221 0.408 0.249 0.447 M4 -0.012 0.143 0.203 0.675 -0.039 0.381 0.104 0.482 PI1 -0.267 -0.284 -0.260 -0.137 0.730 -0.185 -0.304 -0.290 PI2 -0.395 -0.313 -0.274 -0.169 0.845 -0.296 -0.486 -0.358 PI3 -0.327 -0.239 -0.142 -0.101 0.742 -0.068 -0.400 -0.232 PR18 0.028 0.216 0.302 0.364 -0.215 0.682 0.197 0.420 PR19 -0.011 0.125 0.205 0.315 -0.134 0.686 0.085 0.323 PR20 -0.064 0.164 0.276 0.373 -0.042 0.714 0.105 0.389 PR21 0.092 0.275 0.347 0.458 -0.281 0.791 0.208 0.524 PR3 0.084 0.369 0.433 0.330 -0.173 0.690 0.108 0.443 S7 0.380 0.250 0.089 0.194 -0.401 0.124 0.812 0.215 S8 0.436 0.237 0.232 0.190 -0.469 0.134 0.862 0.235 S9 0.122 0.113 0.226 0.240 -0.298 0.296 0.569 0.220 PS1 0.053 0.310 0.371 0.494 -0.083 0.455 0.097 0.728 PS2 0.298 0.390 0.420 0.497 -0.421 0.532 0.306 0.883 PS3 0.270 0.338 0.361 0.438 -0.411 0.497 0.281 0.858

Table 6.13 c: Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT)

Compliance

Contractors' resistance

Familiarity

Monitoring

Perceived inefficiency

Professionalism

Sanctions

Project success

Compliance Contractors' resistance 0.378 Familiarity 0.195 0.501 Monitoring 0.180 0.460 0.524 Perceived inefficiency 0.555 0.602 0.451 0.249 Professionalism 0.140 0.518 0.650 0.691 0.340 Sanctions 0.572 0.453 0,381 0.389 0.769 0.335 Project success 0.305 0.671 0.677 0.761 0.512 0.770 0.410

6.7. Diagnostic Tests

6.7.1 Collinearity Test

Extreme collinearity are issues of discriminant validity, solved by eliminating

indicators with very high collinearity (α > 0.95), and retained ones (α ≥ 0.5 α ≤ 0.95). To

achieve this, PLS-algorithm was performed to establish collinearity among study variable by

verifying Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. The results are satisfactory since the VIF

values are far less than the threshold of five. Implying that there is no high relationship

(Collinearity) among study variables (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Kline, 2015,

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Hair et al., 2014, Hair et al., 2012b). These results were compared to SPSS results for

collinearity assessment and they are similar as depicted in Table 6.14 and 6.15 respectively.

Table 6.14 a: Smart-PLS Inner VIF Values

Variable Compliance Project success Compliance 1.387 Contractors' resistance 1.273 1.298 Familiarity 1.348 1.348 Monitoring 1.462 1.465 Perceived inefficiency 1.528 1.616 Professionalism 1.602 1.617 Sanctions 1.434 1.572 Project success

Table 6.14 b: Smart-PLS Outer VIF Values

Indicators VIF CP1 2.005 CP10 1.330 CP2 1.586 CP3 1.564 CR1 1.133 CR2 1.133 F1 1.195 F13 1.190 F3 1.289 M13 1.222 M14 2.746 M15 2.569 M4 1.192 PI1 1.263 PI2 1.379 PI3 1.287 PR18 1.372 PR19 1.570 PR20 1.606 PR21 1.597 PR3 1.344 PS1 1.305 PS2 1.973 PS3 1.903 S7 1.325 S8 1.393 S9 1.161

Table 6.15 a: SPSS Compliance model Coefficientsa results

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Model 1

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

t Sig.

Collinearity Statistics

B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF (Constant) 1.035 .443 2.334 .021

Familiarity with PPRF .110 .101 .084 1.083 .280 .752 1.329 Monitoring Activities -.179 .112 -.145 -

1.592 .113 .539 1.856

Professionalism .310 .159 .196 1.949 .053 .446 2.244 Sanctions .277 .123 .209 2.253 .025 .524 1.910 Perceived inefficiency -.023 .048 -.033 -.484 .629 .983 1.018 Contractors' Resistance .117 .066 .139 1.786 .076 .744 1.343 a. Dependent Variable: Compliance

Table 6.15 b: SPSS Project success model Coefficientsa results

Model 2

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

t Sig.

Collinearity Statistics

B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF (Constant) -1.435 .521 -

2.757 .006

Compliance with PPRF .177 .085 .127 2.077 .039 .830 1.204 Familiarity with PPRF .005 .117 .003 .046 .964 .748 1.338 Monitoring Activities .590 .131 .346 4.518 .000 .532 1.881 Professionalism .602 .186 .274 3.240 .001 .437 2.290 Sanctions -.156 .144 -.084 -

1.079 .282 .510 1.962

Perceived inefficiency -.084 .056 -.085 -1.500

.135 .981 1.019

Contractors' Resistance .209 .077 .178 2.724 .007 .732 1.366 a. Dependent Variable: Project Success

6.7.2 Normality Test

Descriptive statistics was performed to test for normality under the following methods:

Graphical methods including; Histogram with normal curve, PP-plot and QQ-plot.

Skewness and Kurtosis.

According to the histogram output, all study variables exhibited fairly normal distribution since

a majority of the bar graphs are respectively under the normal distribution curve as

demonstrated by respective figures (Doane and Seward, 2011, Gan and Koehler, 1990).

Additionally, all the PP-plots and QQ-plots of study variables exhibited fairly normal

distribution since a majority of the points are close to the straight line as demonstrated by

respective figures (Doane and Seward, 2011, Gan and Koehler, 1990). After determining

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normality through the graphical method, further normality tests were performed based on

Skewness and Kurtosis. Findings show that Skewness and Kurtosis for all study variables are

within acceptable limits of ±3 and ±5 respectively as demonstrated in Table 6.16 (Jondeau and

Rockinger, 2003). This implies that the data for all study variables exhibit fairly normal

distribution.

Table 6.16: Statistics for skewness and Kurtosis results

Familiarity

with PPRF

Monitoring

Activities Professionalism Sanctions

Perceived

inefficiency

Contractors'

Resistance

Compliance

with PPRF

Project

Success

N Valid 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192

Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Mean 3.5874 3.5592 3.5187 3.4544 2.9427 3.7161 3.2054 3.3611

Std. Error of

Mean

.03857 .04110 .03191 .03804 .07091 .05972 .05050 .07012

Std.

Deviation

.53441 .56945 .44215 .52716 .98249 .82747 .69980 .97158

Skewness -.345 -.545 -.063 .086 -.018 -.699 .069 -.509

Std. Error of

Skewness

.175 .175 .175 .175 .175 .175 .175 .175

Kurtosis -.333 .973 .277 -.328 -.331 .266 -.619 -.407

Std. Error of

Kurtosis

.349 .349 .349 .349 .349 .349 .349 .349

6.7.3 Linearity Test

Regression was performed to determine model linearity for both compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework and project success respectively. By evaluating

ANOVA results based on F-statistic, the compliance model comprising of six independent

variables including; familiarity, monitoring activities, professionalism, sanctions, perceived

inefficiency and contractors’ resistance is linear since the F-statistic is significantly greater than

three as depicted in Table 6.17a (F = 6.301, p = 0.000) (Grewal et al., 2004, Faraway, 2002).

While the project success model comprising of seven independent variables including;

compliance, familiarity, monitoring activities, professionalism, sanctions, perceived

inefficiency and contractors’ resistance is also linear, since the F-statistic is significantly

greater than three as depicted in Table 6.17b (F = 19.534, p = 0.000) (Grewal et al., 2004,

Faraway, 2002). Additionally, graphical tests results show that both compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and project success models have a linear relationship with

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their respective independent variables since straight lines exist among scatter points

respectively (Faraway, 2002).

Table 6.17 a: Compliance model Regression linearity results

Model 1(Compliance) Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Regression 15.871 6 2.645 6.301 .000b Residual 77.665 185 .420 Total 93.536 191 a. Dependent Variable: Compliance with PPRF b. Predictors: (Constant), Contractors' Resistance, Perceived inefficiency, Familiarity with PPRF, Sanctions, Monitoring Activities, Professionalism

Table 6.17 b: Project success model Regression linearity results.

Model 2 (Project Success) Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

Regression 76.864 7 10.981 19.534 .000b Residual 103.432 184 .562 Total 180.296 191 a. Dependent Variable: Project Success b. Predictors: (Constant), Contractors' Resistance, Perceived inefficiency, Familiarity with PPRF, Compliance with PPRF, Monitoring Activities, Sanctions, Professionalism

6.7.4 Homogeneity Tests Homogeneity test results show that the data is homogeneous since the scatter points

have converged (Faraway, 2002). Furthermore, Levene test for homogeneity show that the data

is homogenous since the Levene statics for both compliance and project success models are

significantly greater than 0.05 based on the mean for variables as depicted in Table 6.18 (P ≥

0.05) (Sattari et al., 2012, Scotti et al., 2011). The p-values for dependent variables compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework and public road construction project success

respectively are 0.374 and 0.550 based on mean.

Table 6.18: Levene test of Homogeneity of Variance results

Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. Familiarity Based on Mean .829 1 190 .364 Monitoring Activities Based on Mean .062 1 190 .803 Professionalism Based on Mean .570 1 190 .451 Sanctions Based on Mean .201 1 190 .654 Perceived inefficiency Based on Mean 4.905 1 190 .028 Contractors' Resistance Based on Mean .118 1 190 .732 Compliance Based on Mean .795 1 190 .374 Project Success Based on Mean .359 1 190 .550

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6.8 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of Study Variables The aim of performing a one-way ANOVA was to ascertain staff perception on the

items raised in the study instrument across participating organisations. This was based on F-

statistics to determine whether respondents across these organisations understood the questions

in the same way or not. According to Table 6.19, there is no significant difference between the

views of employees across participating organisations on the study variables since the

significance level is above 0.05 (Faraway, 2002). This implies that the statements raised on the

study variables in the instrument were perceived in the same way across these organisations as

demonstrated by P-values. Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework (F =

0.821, P = 0.484). Under this construct, being aware of public procurement regulatory

framework governing public road construction projects was perceived in the same way across

all staff of participating organisations. Hence, respondents’ views on familiarity with road

construction implementation processes, regulating framework, qualifications and experience

were the same.

Monitoring activities on public road construction projects was perceived in the same

way across participating staff of MoWT, URF, PPDA and contractors (F = 2.492, P = 0.062).

This implied that monitoring activities, regular reports, and extensive provision of required

information, supervision and timely completion among others were understood similarly.

Professionalism among staff involved in public road construction projects was viewed

similarly among staff of MoWT, URF, PPDA and contractors (F= 1.330, P = 0.266). This

implied that staff were not under pressure, guided by professional code, integrity, competent

and knowledgeable of public road construction projects. Sanctions on staff involved in public

road construction projects was understood in the same way by all staff who participated in this

study (F = 1.658, P = 0.178). They were knowledgeable on penalties being enforced, reasons

for penalties and consequences of violating the public procurement regulatory framework

governing road construction projects. Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

framework was also perceived in the same way by staff of MoWT, URF, PPDA and contractors

(F = 0.808, P = 0.491). They similarly viewed banning of underperforming contractors, contract

extension and negotiation among contractors and public staff as good for meeting government

targets.

Contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework was perceived in the same manner by all staff who participated in this study (F =

0.303, P = 0.823). Contractors being knowledgeable of the governing regulatory framework,

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as well as readiness to take action on violating public officers was viewed in the same way to

achieve set government targets. Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

was viewed similarly by all study participating staff (F = 1.422, P = 0.238). They believed that

timely recording of road construction activities, proper transaction payment systems,

authorisation and timely delivery were basics in meeting government targets. Finally, the

success of public road construction projects was similarly tagged on road specifications, time

and budget by all staff of MoWT, URF, PPDA and contractors (F = 0.417, P= 0.741).

Table 6.19: One-Way ANOVA results

N Mean Std. Deviation

Std. Error

F Sig

Familiarity MOWT 87 3.6396 .50928 .05460 0.821 0.484 URF 12 3.5298 .63776 .18410 PPDA 55 3.5013 .54058 .07289 Contractors 38 3.6109 .55221 .08958 Total 192 3.5874 .53441 .03857

Monitoring Activities

MOWT 87 3.6133 .59218 .06349 2.492 0.062 URF 12 3.5298 .47718 .13775 PPDA 55 3.3935 .50878 .06860 Contractors 38 3.6842 .59103 .09588 Total 192 3.5592 .56945 .04110

Professionalism MOWT 87 3.5617 .39535 .04239 URF 12 3.4205 .51431 .14847 1.330 0.266 PPDA 55 3.4347 .48246 .06505 Contractors 38 3.5730 .45449 .07373 Total 192 3.5187 .44215 .03191

Sanctions MOWT 87 3.5352 .48895 .05242 URF 12 3.4531 .64023 .18482 1.658 0.178 PPDA 55 3.3341 .58658 .07909 Contractors 38 3.4441 .46676 .07572 Total 192 3.4544 .52716 .03804

Perceived inefficiency

MOWT 87 2.8621 1.02495 .10989 0.808 0.491 URF 12 2.9167 .79296 .22891 PPDA 55 2.9273 .89968 .12131 Contractors 38 3.1579 1.05334 .17087 Total 192 2.9427 .98249 .07091

Contractors' Resistance

MOWT 87 3.7126 .76869 .08241 0.303 0.823 URF 12 3.7917 .78214 .22578 PPDA 55 3.6455 .90099 .12149 Contractors 38 3.8026 .88179 .14305

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Total 192 3.7161 .82747 .05972 Compliance MOWT 87 3.0969 .67059 .07189 1.422 0.238

URF 12 3.2738 .60135 .17360 PPDA 55 3.2597 .67852 .09149 Contractors 38 3.3534 .80452 .13051 Total 192 3.2054 .69980 .05050

Project Success MOWT 87 3.3870 .93022 .09973 0.417 0.741 URF 12 3.1667 1.02986 .29729 PPDA 55 3.2909 1.00217 .13513 Contractors 38 3.4649 1.02386 .16609 Total 192 3.3611 .97158 .07012

6.9 Relationship between Study Variables Since the data and sample characteristics are satisfactory, the next step embarked on

relationship analysis in line with study objectives outlined in chapter one and hypotheses stated

in literature review. Under these analyses, degree and direction of the relationship, magnitude

and predictive significance are determined. Furthermore, Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-

SEM) was estimated using Smart-PLS3 software by performing PLS-algorithms and

bootstrapping resampling techniques. Additionally, mediation effects were tested and results

presented in section 6.9.2. The prediction significance was based on to support and reject stated

study hypotheses as discussed below.

6.9.1 Path Coefficients and Significance Level

This section interprets the results for the thirteen hypotheses based on PLS-SEM

bootstrapping. All the analysis converged at 11 interactions far below the pre-set 300-stop

criterion that implied good convergence and prediction (Sarstedt et al., 2019b, Ringle et al.,

2015a). The findings show individual path analysis indicated by respective path coefficients

with corresponding p-values for both compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework and public road construction project success as presented in Table 6.20.

Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Compliance with

Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

There is an insignificant relationship between familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework governing public road construction projects and compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework (α = 0.000, t = 0.001, p = 0.999). This implies that

familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework did not predict compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework and H1 is not supported.

Monitoring Activities and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

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There is an insignificant inverse relationship between monitoring activities on public

road construction projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α

= -0.046, t = 0.522, p = 0.601). This implies that monitoring activities did not predict

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and H2 is not supported.

Professionalism of Staff on Public Road Construction Projects and Compliance with

Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

There is an insignificant inverse relationship between professionalism of staff on public

road construction projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α

= -0.102, t = 1.250, p = 0.211). This implies that professionalism of staff on public road

construction projects did not predict compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework and H3 is not supported.

Sanctions and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

There is a significant positive relationship between sanctioning of staff on public road

construction projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α =

0.315, t = 3.540, p = 0.000). This implies that sanctioning of staff on public road construction

projects predicted compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and H4 is

significantly supported.

Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Compliance

with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

There is an inverse significant relationship between perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework and compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework (α = -0.253, t = 3.052, p = 0.002). This implies that perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework predicted and reduced compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework. Hence, H5 is significantly supported.

Contractors’ Resistance and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory

Framework

There is a significant positive relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction

projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = 0.135, t = 2.002,

p = 0.045). This implies that contractors’ resistance predicted compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and H6 is significantly supported.

Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Public Road

Construction Project Success

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There is a significant positive relationship between compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and success of public road construction projects (α = 0.147,

t = 1.960, p = 0.05). This implies that compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework by staff on public road construction projects predicted the success of these projects

and H7 is significantly supported.

Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Public Road

Construction Project Success

There is a significant positive relationship between familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework and public road construction project success (α = 0.140, t = 2.231, p =

0.026). This implies that familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework predicted

the success of public road construction projects and H8 is significantly supported.

Monitoring Activities and Public Road Construction Project Success

There is a significant positive relationship between monitoring activities on public road

construction projects and success of these projects (α = 0.314, t = 4.875, p = 0.000). This

implies that monitoring activities predicted success of these projects. Hence, H9 is significantly

supported.

Professionalism of Staff on Public Road Construction Projects and Public Road

Construction Project Success

There is a significant positive relationship between professionalism of staff on public

road construction projects and public road construction project success (α = 0.305, t = 4.695, p

= 0.000). This implies that professionalism of staff involved in public road construction

projects predicted the success of these projects. Hence, H10 is significantly supported.

Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Public Road

Construction Project Success

There is an inverse significant relationship between perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework and public road construction project success (α = -0.135, t

= 2.099, p = 0.036). This implies that perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

framework predicted and reduced success of public road construction projects. Hence, H11 is

significantly supported.

Contractors’ Resistance to Non-Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory

Framework and Public Road Construction Project Success

There is a positive insignificant relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction

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projects and success of public road construction projects (α = 0.121, t = 1.792, p = 0.073). This

implies that contractors’ resistance predicted successful implementation of public road

construction projects. However, H12 is not statistically supported at 0.05 significance level.

Sanctions on Staff on Public Road Construction Projects and Public Road Construction

Project Success

There is an insignificant inverse relationship between sanctions on staff involved in

public road construction projects and public road project success (α = -0.059, t = 0.856, p =

0.392). This implies that sanctions imposed on these staff did not predict success of public road

construction projects and H13 is not supported.

Table 6.20: Path Coefficients Table 6.20 presents Smart-PLS bootstrap results used to accept and reject hypotheses one to

thirteen.

Path coefficient (α)

Sample Mean (M)

Standard Deviation (STDEV)

T Statistics (t) P Values

Familiarity - Compliance 0.000 0.005 0.082 0.001 0.999 Monitoring - Compliance -0.046 -0.045 0.088 0.522 0.601 Professionalism - Compliance -0.102 -0.105 0.082 1.250 0.211

Sanctions - Compliance 0.315 0.323 0.089 3.540 0.000 Perceived inefficiency - Compliance -0.253 -0.253 0.083 3.052 0.002

Contractors' resistance - Compliance 0.135 0.138 0.067 2.002 0.045

Compliance - Project success 0.147 0.145 0.075 1.960 0.050

Familiarity - Project success 0.140 0.142 0.063 2.231 0.026

Monitoring - Project success 0.314 0.311 0.064 4.875 0.000

Professionalism - Project success 0.305 0.305 0.065 4.695 0.000

Perceived inefficiency - Project success -0.135 -0.136 0.064 2.099 0.036

Contractors' resistance - Project success 0.121 0.123 0.067 1.792 0.073

Sanctions - Project success -0.059 -0.056 0.068 0.856 0.392

6.9.2 Mediational Effect Analyses This section interprets the mediation effects corresponding to the six hypotheses based

on significance of correlations, hierarchical regressions and Sobel z-value following Baron and

Kenny (1986). This was aimed at establishing whether compliance with public procurement

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regulatory framework mediated the relationship between the six compliance factors and project

success as presented below.

H14. Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the

Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and

Project Success.

Results for a five-step mediation process are as flows:

Step 1: When compliance was regressed on familiarity, the results show that compliance and

familiarity are significantly related (β = 0.194, p = 0.007).

Step 2: When project success was regressed on compliance, the results show that project

success and compliance are significantly related (β = 0.305, p = 0.000).

Step 3: When project success was regressed on familiarity, the results show that project success

and familiarity are significantly related (β = 0.315, p = 0.000). Hence, as depicted in Table

6.21, all the three steps are satisfied and mediation testing is possible.

Table 6.21: Coefficient results for the three steps above

Familiarity Compliance Project Success

Familiarity Pearson Correlation 1 .194** .315** Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .000 N 192 192 192

Compliance Pearson Correlation .194** 1 .305** Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .000 N 192 192 192

Project Success Pearson Correlation .315** .305** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Step 4: Results from a hierarchical regression indicate that both compliance and

familiarity are significantly related to project success as demonstrated in Table 6.22. This

implies that compliance could be mediating the relationship between familiarity and project

success. Hence, Sobel test is possible to determine mediation effect.

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Table 6.22: Hierarchical regression results for familiarity, compliance and project success

Variable Model 1 Model 2

B β B β

Constant 2.005 0.502

Compliance .423*** .305*** 0.351*** 0.253***

Familiarity 0.483*** 0.266***

R2 0.093 0.161

Adjusted R2 0.088 0.152

∆R2 0.093*** 0.068***

∆F 19.448*** 15.296***

F 19.448 18.103

Sig .0000 .000 ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

Step 5: Sobel test

According to Sobel test results, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework mediates the relationship between familiarity with public procurement regulatory

framework and public road construction project success (Sobel z-value = 2.204441, p =

0.027493). As depicted from Table 6.23 and Fig 6.1, there is a significant partial mediation

because familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework predicts project success

directly (0.266) and indirectly (0.049) through compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework. Hence, H14 is significantly supported.

Table 6.23: Compliance Mediating Familiarity and Project Success

Type of mediation Significant Sobel z-value = 2.204441 p = 0.027493 95% Symmetrical Confidence interval Lower 0.00989 Higher 0.16842 Unstandardized indirect effect a*b 0.08915 se 0.04044 Effective Size measures Standardised Coefficients R² Measures (Variance) Total: 0.315 0.099 Direct: 0.266 0.068 Indirect: 0.049 0.031

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Indirect to Total ratio 0.155 0.313

Figure 6.1: Compliance Mediating Familiarity and Project Success

Independent Variable

0.315*** [c] Dependent Variable Familiarity Project Success (0.266***) [c']

0.305*** 0.194** [a] (0.253***) [b]

Mediating Variable

Compliance

H15. Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the

Relationship between Monitoring Activities in Public Road Construction and Project

Success

Results for a five-step mediation process are as flows:

Step 1: When compliance was regressed on monitoring activities, the results show that

compliance and monitoring activities are significantly related (β = 0.172, p = 0.017).

Step 2: When project success was regressed on compliance, results show that project success

is significantly related to compliance (β = 0.305, p = 0.000).

Step 3: When project success was regressed on monitoring activities, the results show that

project success and monitoring activities are significantly related (β = 0.547, p = 0.000).

According to the results in Table 6.24, all the three steps are satisfied and hence, there is need

for mediation testing.

Table 6.24: Coefficient results for the three steps above

Monitoring Activities

Compliance with PPRF

Project Success

Monitoring Activities Pearson Correlation 1 .172* .547** Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .000 N 192 192 192

Compliance with PPRF

Pearson Correlation .172* 1 .305** Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .000 N 192 192 192

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Project Success Pearson Correlation .547** .305** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Step 4: Results from a hierarchical regression indicate that both compliance and

monitoring activities are significantly related to project success as demonstrated in Table 6.25.

Implying that compliance could be mediating the relationship between monitoring activities

and project success. Hence, Sobel test is necessary.

Table 6.25: Hierarchical regression results for monitoring activities, compliance and project success

Variable Model 1 Model 2

B β B β

Constant 2.005 -0.697

Compliance 0.423*** 0.305*** 0.301*** 0.217***

Monitoring

activities

0.869*** 0.509***

R2 0.093 0.344

Adjusted R2 0.088 0.338

∆R2 0.093*** 0.253***

∆F 19.448*** 72.542***

F 19.448 49.656

Sig .0000 .000 ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

Step 5: Sobel test

According to Sobel test results, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework mediates the relationship between monitoring activities in public road construction

and project success. (Sobel z-value = 2.000092, p = 0.04549). Table 6.26 and Fig 6.2 show that

there is a significant partial mediation because monitoring activities in public road construction

predicts project success directly (0.509) and indirectly (0.037) through compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework. Hence, H15 is significantly supported.

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Table 6.26: Compliance Mediating Monitoring activities and Project Success

Type of mediation Significant Sobel z-value = 2.000092 p = 0.04549 95% Symmetrical Confidence interval Lower 0.00127 Higher 0.12575 Unstandardized indirect effect a*b 0.06351 se 0.03175 Effective Size measures Standardised Coefficients R² Measures (Variance) Total: 0.547 0.298 Direct: 0.509 0.252 Indirect: 0.037 4.646 Indirect to Total ratio 6.823 0.155

Figure 6.2: Compliance Mediating Monitoring activities and Project Success

Independent Variable

0.547*** [c] Dependent Variable Monitoring Activities

Project Success (0.509***) [c']

0.305*** 0.172* [a] (0.217**) [b] Mediating Variable Compliance

H16. Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Professionalism of Staff in Public Road Construction Projects and Project Success

Results for a five-step mediation process are as flows:

Step 1: When compliance was regressed on professionalism, results show that compliance and

professionalism are significantly related (β = 0.338, p = 0.000).

Step 2: When project success was regressed on compliance, the results show that project

success and compliance are significantly related (β = 0.305, p = 0.000).

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Step 3: When project success was regressed on professionalism, results show that project

success and professionalism are significantly related (β = 0.553, p = 0.000).

Summary results in Table 6.27 show that all the three steps are satisfied and hence, there is

need for mediation testing.

Table 6.27: Coefficient results for the three steps above

Professionalism Compliance with PPRF

Project Success

Professionalism Pearson Correlation 1 .338** .553** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

Compliance with PPRF

Pearson Correlation .338** 1 .305** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

Project Success Pearson Correlation .553** .305** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Step 4: Results from a hierarchical regression indicate that both compliance and

professionalism are significantly related to project success as demonstrated in Table 6.28. This

is an indication that compliance could be mediating the relationship between professionalism

and project success. Hence, Sobel test of mediation is inevitable.

Table 6.28: Hierarchical regression results for professionalism, compliance and project success

Variable Model 1 Model 2

B β B β

Constant 2.005 -1.160

Compliance 0.423*** 0.305*** 0.185* 0.133*

Professionalism 1.117*** 0.508***

R2 0.093 0.322

Adjusted R2 0.088 0.314

∆R2 0.093*** 0.229***

∆F 19.448*** 63.744***

F 19.448 44.807

Sig .0000 .000

***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

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Step 5: Sobel test

Sobel test results show that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

does not significantly mediate the relationship between professionalism of staff in public road

construction projects and project success (Sobel z-value = 1.935215, p = 0.052964). As

depicted from Table 6.29 and Fig 6.3, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework insignificantly mediates the relationship between professionalism of staff on public

road construction projects and success of these projects. Implying that H16 is not statistically

supported.

Table 6.29: Compliance Mediating Professionalism and Project Success

Type of mediation Null Sobel z-value = 1.935215, p = 0.052964 95% Symmetrical Confidence interval Lower -0.00127 Higher 0.19922 Unstandardized indirect effect a*b 0.09898 se 0.05114 Effective Size measures Standardised Coefficients R² Measures (Variance) Total: 0.553 0.305 Direct: 0.508 0.228 Indirect: 0.044 7.727 Indirect to Total ratio 8.129 0.252

Figure 6.3: Compliance Mediating Professionalism and Project Success

Independent Variable 0.553*** [c] Dependent Variable

Professionalism Project Success (0.508***) [c']

0.305*** 0.338*** [a] (0.133) [b] Mediating Variable Compliance

H17. Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the

Relationship between Sanctions on Staff in Public Road Construction Projects and

Project Success

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Results for a five-step mediation process are as flows:

Step 1: When compliance was regressed on sanctions, the results show that compliance and

sanctions are significantly related (β = 0.341, p = 0.000).

Step 2: When project success was regressed on compliance, the results show that project

success and compliance are significantly related (β = 0.305, p = 0.000).

Step 3: When project success was regressed on sanctions, the results show that project success

and sanctions are significantly related (β = 0.401, p = 0.000).

Summary results in Table 6.30 show that all the three steps are satisfied and there is need for

mediation testing.

Table 6.30: Coefficient results for the three steps above

Correlations

Sanctions Compliance with PPRF

Project Success

Sanctions Pearson Correlation 1 .341** .401** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

Compliance with PPRF Pearson Correlation .341** 1 .305** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

Project Success Pearson Correlation .401** .305** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Step 4: Results from a hierarchical regression indicate that both compliance and sanctions

are significantly related to project success as demonstrated in Table 6.31. Implying that

compliance could be mediating the relationship between sanctions and project success. Hence,

Sobel test for mediation is necessary.

Table 6.31: Hierarchical regression results for sanctions, compliance and project success

Variable Model 1 Model 2

B β B β

Constant 2.005 0.373

Compliance 0.423*** 0.305*** 0.264*** 0.190***

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Sanctions 0.620*** 0.337***

R2 0.093 0.193

Adjusted R2 0.088 0.184

∆R2 0.093*** 0.100***

∆F 19.448*** 23.443***

F 19.448 22.594

Sig .0000 .000 ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

Step 5: Sobel test

According to Sobel test results, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework mediates the relationship between sanctions in public road construction and project

success (Sobel z value = 2.388039, p = 0.016939). Table 6.32 and Fig 6.4 show that there is a

significant partial mediation because sanctions on staff in public road construction predicts

project success directly (0.337) and indirectly (0.114) through compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework. Hence, H17 is significantly supported.

Table 6.32: Compliance Mediating Sanctions and Project Success

Type of mediation Significant Sobel z-value = 2.388039, p = 0.016939 95% Symmetrical Confidence interval Lower 0.02144 Higher 0.21775 Unstandardized indirect effect a*b 0.11959 se 0.05008 Effective Size measures Standardised Coefficients R² Measures (Variance) Total: 0.574 0.203 Direct: 0.337 0.099 Indirect: 0.114 0.104 Indirect to Total ratio 0.199 0.510

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Figure 6.4: Compliance Mediating Sanctions and Project Success

Independent Variable

0.574*** [c] Dependent Variable Sanctions Project Success (0.337***) [c']

0.690*** 0.603*** [a]

(0.190**) [b] Mediating Variable Compliance

H18. Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success.

Results for a three-step mediation process are as flows:

Step 1: When compliance was regressed on perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework, the results show that compliance and perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework are not related significantly (β = -0.020, p = 0.785).

Step 2: When project success was regressed on compliance, the results show that project

success is significantly related to compliance (β = 0.305, p = 0.000).

Step 3: When project success was regressed on perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework, the results show that project success and perceived inefficiency of

public procurement regulatory framework are not related significantly (β = -0.064, p = 0.377).

These results in Table 6.33 indicate that the three steps are not satisfied since perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework is insignificantly related to

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and project success. Hence,

mediation testing is not possible implying that H18 is not supported (Baron and Kenny, 1986).

Table 6.33: Coefficient results for the three steps above

Perceived

inefficiency Compliance with PPRF

Project Success

Perceived inefficiency Pearson Correlation 1 -.020 -.064 Sig. (2-tailed) .785 .377 N 192 192 192 Pearson Correlation -.020 1 .305**

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Compliance with PPRF

Sig. (2-tailed) .785 .000 N 192 192 192

Project Success Pearson Correlation -.064 .305** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .377 .000 N 192 192 192

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

H19. Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the

Relationship between Contractors’ Resistance to Non-Compliance with Public

Procurement Regulatory Framework and Public Road Construction Project Success

Results for a five-step mediation process are as flows:

Step 1: When compliance was regressed on contractors’ resistance to non-compliance, the

results show that compliance and contractors’ resistance are significantly related (β = 0.292, p

= 0.000).

Step 2: When project success was regressed on compliance, the results show that project

success and compliance are significantly related (β = 0.305, p = 0.000).

Step 3: When project success was regressed on contractors’ resistance to non-compliance, the

results show that project success and contractors’ resistance are significantly related (β = 0.419,

p = 0.000).

The summary results in Table 6.34 show that all the three steps are satisfied since all the three

variables are significantly related. Hence, mediation testing is required.

Table 6.34: Coefficient results for the three steps above

Contractors' Resistance

Compliance with PPRF

Project Success

Contractors' Resistance

Pearson Correlation 1 .292** .419** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

Compliance with PPRF

Pearson Correlation .292** 1 .305** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

Project Success Pearson Correlation .419** .305** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 N 192 192 192

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

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Step 4: Results from a hierarchical regression indicate that both compliance and

contractors’ resistance to non-compliance are related significantly to project success as

demonstrated in Table 6.35. This indicates that compliance could be mediating the relationship

between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance and project success. Hence, Sobel test is

vital.

Table 6.35: Hierarchical regression results for contractors’ resistance to non-compliance, compliance and project success

Variable Model 1 Model 2

B β B β

Constant 2.005 0.900

Compliance 0.423*** 0.305*** 0.277*** 0.199***

Contractors’

resistance

0.424*** 0.361***

R2 0.093 0.212

Adjusted R2 0.088 0.204

∆R2 0.093*** 0.119***

∆F 19.448*** 28.551***

F 19.448 25.409

Sig .0000 .000 ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05

Step 5: Sobel test

According to Sobel test results, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework mediates the relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance and

public road construction project success (Sobel z value = 2.409704, p = 0.015965). As depicted

from Table 6.36 and Fig 6.5, there is a significant partial mediation because contractors’

resistance to non-compliance predicts project success directly (0.361) and indirectly (0.058)

through compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. Hence, H19 is

significantly supported.

Table 6.36: Compliance Mediating Contractors’ Resistance and Project Success

Type of mediation Significant Sobel z-value = 2.409704, p = 0.015965 95% Symmetrical Confidence interval Lower 0.01277 Higher 0.12407

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Unstandardized indirect effect a*b 0.06842 se 0.02839 Effective Size measures Standardised Coefficients R² Measures (Variance) Total: 0.419 0.175 Direct: 0.361 0.119 Indirect: 0.058 0.056 Indirect to Total ratio 0.138 0.322

Figure 6.5: Compliance Mediating Contractors’ Resistance and Project Success

Independent Variable

0.419*** [c] Dependent Variable Contractors' Resistance

Project Success (0.361***) [c']

0.305*** 0.292*** [a] (0.199**) [b] Mediating Variable Compliance

According to mediation results, four hypotheses out of the six hypotheses (H14, H15,

H17 and H19) are supported significantly while H16 and H18 are not supported. This implies

that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework is a key mediator between the

four compliance factors (familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework,

monitoring public road construction activities, sanctions on staff and contractors’ resistance to

non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework) and success of public road

construction projects. Overall, twelve (12) hypotheses are statistically supported out of

nineteen (19). Three hypotheses (H4, Sanctions, H5, Perceived inefficiency and H6,

Contractors’ resistance) are significantly supported under compliance model, five hypotheses

(H7, Compliance, H8, Familiarity, H9, Monitoring activities, H10, Professionalism and H11,

Perceived inefficiency) are significantly supported under project success model and four

hypotheses (H14, Familiarity, H15, Monitoring activities, H17, Sanctions and H19,

Contractors’ resistance) are significantly supported under mediation.

This implies that sanctioning on staff involved in public road construction, perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and contractors’ resistance to non-

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compliance with public procurement regulatory framework enhance compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction projects. While

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework, familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework, monitoring activities on public road construction projects,

professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects and perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction

projects, enhance the success of these projects. Finally, compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework is a key mediator between the success of public road construction

projects and familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework, monitoring activities

on these projects, sanctions on staff and contractors’ resistance against public officers who

wish to deviate from established regulatory framework governing public road construction

projects. The study also established that two hypotheses are supported but statistically

insignificant. They comprise of contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework by public officers (H6) and mediating effect of compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework on professionalism of staff involved in public

road construction projects and success of these project (H16).

6.10 Coefficient of Determination (R2), Effect size (f2) and Model Fit

Coefficient of determination was used to determine predictive performance for both

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and public road construction

project success models. The results show that respective explained variances for both models

are significantly good as depicted in Table 6.37 (Compliance, R2 = 0.279, p < 0.001 and Project

success, R2 = 0.552, p < 0.001) implying acceptable predictive performance (Rasoolimanesh

et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Ali et al., 2018b). Consequently, 27.9% variance in compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework is substantially explained by the six compliance

factors and 55.2% variance in public road construction project success is substantially

explained by the seven project success factors (Hussain et al., 2019). Furthermore, individual

effect size on both models by their respective independent variables in Table 6.38 were

assessed. The findings show that sanctions on staff, perceived inefficiency of regulatory

framework and contractors’ resistance to non-compliance have a small significant influence on

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (Sanctions, f2 = 0.096, Perceived

inefficiency, f2 = 0.058 and Contractors’ resistance, f2 = 0.020) (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019,

Ali et al., 2018a). While monitoring activities and professionalism of staff are the most

influential factors with medium effect size on successful implementation of public road

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construction projects (Monitoring, f2 = 0.150, and Professionalism, f2 = 0.128) (Rasoolimanesh

et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a). Other factors including: compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework (f2 = 0.035), familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework

(f2 = 0.032), perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework (f2 = 0.025),

and contractors’ resistance to non-compliance (f2 = 0.025) have a small significant influence

on successful implementation of public road construction projects (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019,

Ali et al., 2018a). Finally, by evaluating standardized root mean square residual, it shows that

the overall model is significantly fitting well since SRMR is less than 0.08 as depicted in Table

6.37 (SRMR= 0.068, P < 0.001) (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2019, Ali et al., 2018a, Nitzl et al.,

2016). This implies that the estimated model compared to the saturated model proved that the

model in set-up theory represented by the conceptual model matches the collected data (Müller

et al., 2018). Hence, the validated model has appropriate reliability and validity capable of

ensuring compliance with regulatory framework and successful implementation of public road

construction projects. Note that the saturated model is the model that perfectly fits the data

(Müller et al., 2018).

Table 6.37: R2, Adjusted R2 and Standardized Root Mean square Residual (SRMR)

Original Sample (α)

Sample Mean (M)

Standard Deviation (STDEV)

T Statistics (t|) P Values

R2 Compliance 0.279 0.315 0.054 5.199 0.000 Project success 0.552 0.578 0.048 11.517 0.000

Adjusted R2 Compliance 0.256 0.293 0.055 4.613 0.000 Project success 0.535 0.562 0.050 10.753 0.000

Standardized Root Mean square Residual (SRMR) 0.068 0.085 0.005 13.729 0.000

Table 6.38: Effect size (f2) results

Dependent variable Independent variable f2 Inference Hypothesis

Remarks

Compliance

Familiarity 0.000 Insignificant Not supported Monitoring 0.002 Insignificant Not supported Professionalism 0.009 Insignificant Not supported Sanctions 0.096 Small Significantly

supported Perceived inefficiency 0.058 Small Significantly

supported Contractors' resistance 0.020 Small Significantly

supported

Project success Compliance 0.035 Small Significantly supported

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Familiarity 0.032 Small Significantly supported

Monitoring 0.150 Medium Significantly supported

Professionalism 0.128 Medium Significantly supported

Perceived inefficiency 0.025 Small Significantly

supported Contractors' resistance 0.025 Small Insignificantly

supported Sanctions 0.005 Insignificant Not supported

Table 6.39: Total effect

Construct relationship

Path coefficient (α)

Sample Mean (M)

Standard Deviation (STDEV)

T Statistics (t) P Values

Hypothesis Remarks

Familiarity - Compliance 0.000 0.005 0.082 0.001 0.999 Not supported

Monitoring - Compliance -0.046 -0.045 0.088 0.522 0.601 Not supported

Professionalism - Compliance -0.102 -0.105 0.082 1.250 0.211 Not supported

Sanctions - Compliance 0.315 0.323 0.089 3.540 0.000 Significantly

supported Perceived inefficiency -Compliance -0.253 -0.253 0.083 3.052 0.002 Significantly

supported Contractors' resistance - Compliance 0.135 0.138 0.067 2.002 0.045 Significantly

supported Compliance - Project success 0.147 0.145 0.075 1.960 0.050 Significantly

supported Familiarity - Project success 0.140 0.143 0.062 2.247 0.025 Significantly

supported Monitoring - Project success 0.307 0.304 0.063 4.849 0.000 Significantly

supported Professionalism - Project success 0.290 0.290 0.068 4.261 0.000 Significantly

supported Perceived inefficiency - Project success -0.172 -0.172 0.061 2.817 0.005 Significantly

supported Contractors' resistance -Project success 0.141 0.142 0.065 2.147 0.032 Insignificantl

y supported Sanctions - Project success -0.012 -0.010 0.059 0.210 0.833 Not supported

Mediation

Total Effective Size measures

R² Measures

(Variance)

Sobel Z-Value

Familiarity – Compliance - Project 0.315 0.099 2.204 0.027 Significantly

supported Monitoring – Compliance - Project 0.547 0.298 2.000 0.045 Significantly

supported Professionalism – Compliance - Project success

0.553 0.305 1.935 0.053 Insignificantly supported

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Sanctions – Compliance - Project success

0.574 0.203 2.388 0.017 Significantly supported

Contractors' resistance - Compliance- Project success

0.419 0.175 2.410 0.016 Significantly supported

Figure 6.6: Final Structural and Measurement model (PLS-Algorithms)

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Figure 6.7: Final validated Structural model (Bootstrapping output)

6.11 Validation of Results This section tabulates the nineteen hypotheses results as indicated in study conceptual model

based on interpreted results.

Table 6.40: Summary of hypotheses results Hypotheses Hypothesized

effect

Results Sig level Remarks

H1 + Neutral P > 0.05 Not supported

H2 + - P > 0.05 Not supported

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H3 + - P > 0.05 Not supported

H4 + +*** P < 0.001 supported

H5 - -** P < 0.01 supported

H6 + +* P < 0.05 supported

H7 + +* P < 0.05 supported

H8 + +* P < 0.05 supported

H9 + +*** P < 0.001 supported

H10 + +*** P < 0.001 supported

H11 - -* P < 0.05 supported

H12 + + P > 0.05 Not supported

H13 + - P > 0.05 Not supported

H14 + +* P < 0.05 supported

H15 + +* P < 0.05 supported

H16 + + P > 0.05 Not supported

H17 + +* P < 0.05 supported

H18 + - P > 0.05 Not supported

H19 + +* P < 0.05 supported

Note: Two tailed *** p < 0.001, Two tailed ** p < 0.01, Two tailed * p< 0.05

6.12 Final Validated Models

The final validated model is a summation of measurement and structural models showing

relationship linkages that are supported as well as those that are not supported for compliance,

project success and mediation as depicted by respective coloured arrows. After respective

validated models, a discussion of the results follows in chapter seven.

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Figure 6.8: Combined Validated Model

Compliance effect Project success effect Mediation effect Combined mediation effect

Familiarity

Monitoring activities

Professionalism

Sanctions

Compliance

Project

success

Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

Supported

Supported

Perceived inefficiency

Contractor’s resistance

Supported

Supported

Not supported

Not supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Not Supported

Supported

Supported

Not Supported

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Figure 6.8.1 Compliance Validated Model

Figure 6.8.2 Project Success Validated Model

Familiarity

H8 :( α = 0.140, t = 2.231, p = 0.026) H7 :( α = 0.147, t = 1.960, p = 0.050)

Compliance

Project Success

Sanctions

H13 :( α = -0.059, t = 0.856, p = 0.392)

Monitoring Activities

H9 :( α = 0.314, t = 4.875, p = 0.000)

Contractors’ Resistance

H12 :( α = 0.121, t = 1.792, p = 0.073)

Perceived Inefficiency

H11 :( α = -0.135, t = 2.099, p = 0.036)

Professionalism H10 :( α = 0.305, t = 4.695, p = 0.000)

Familiarity

Compliance

H1 :( α = 0.000, t = 0.001, p = 0.999)

Contractor’s

Resistance H6: (α = 0.135, t =

2.002, p = 0.045)

Perceived Inefficiency

H5: (α = -0.253, t =

3.052, p = 0.002)

Monitoring Activities

H2: (α = 0.046, t =

0.522, p = 0.601)

Professionalism

H3: (α = -0.102, t =

1.250, p = 0.211)

Sanctions

H4: (α = 0.315, t = 3.540, p = 0.000):

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CHAPTER SEVEN DISCUSSIONS

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7.1 Introduction This chapter unveils the impact relationships between study variables based on the

interpreted results in chapter six. It starts with shedding light on the impact of familiarity with

public procurement regulatory framework, monitoring activities, professionalism of staff,

sanctions on staff, perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and

contractors’ resistance on compliance. This is followed by explanations of the effect of

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework, familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework, monitoring activities, professionalism of staff, perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework, contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance and sanctions on staff on the success of public road construction projects. Finally,

the mediation impact between compliance factors and public road construction project success

is discussed. The relationship effects are discussed in line with significant measurement

indicators for respective variables.

7.2 Compliance Relationships

7.2.1 The Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework.

The study objective for H1 was to ascertain whether familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework affects compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework governing public road construction projects. According to PLS-algorithm path

coefficient results, there is an imperfect relationship between familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework and compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework. This implies that familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework does

not predict increase in compliance. Meanwhile bootstrapping results show that there is an

insignificant relationship between familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework

and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = 0.000, t = 0.001, p = 0.999)

at 5% significance level. Hence, H1 is not supported and the objective is not achieved. Implying

that simplifying the regulatory framework governing public road construction projects for easy

interpretation, using staff who are familiar with project implementation and employing staff

with appropriate academic qualification to work on applicable road construction projects is not

effective in achieving compliance. Compliance was measured through proper authorisation of

road construction projects, timely delivery of road construction projects, timely recording of

road construction transactions and achievable road construction project objectives.

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This is contrary to earlier findings that established that familiarity significantly

enhanced compliance in public procurement (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011, Gelderman et al., 2006).

Notably, their research was based on responses from procurement officials in Procuring and

Disposal Entities (PDEs) in Uganda and Netherlands respectively without specific reference to

public road construction projects. Nevertheless, this is because staff handling public road

construction projects are academically qualified with vast experience ranging between 1-22

years. Evidence show that 93.8% of staff hold first degree and above. In addition, 84.4% of

these staff are senior officers who are capable of managing public road implementation

processes. Being academically qualified alone does not guarantee familiarity with complex

public road construction projects having many stakeholders and regulatory framework in a

dynamic context (Chi and Nicole Javernick‐Will, 2011). However, in Uganda’s case, it appears

experienced staff working on these projects would ensure compliance. Previously, a lack of

familiarity has been documented to hamper compliance in public road subsector and

consequently, considerable efforts have been made to improve the situation (Uganda National

Road Authority, 2014). Such efforts include involving highly qualified staff in road

implementation and UNRA’s continuous improvement in staff competence through capacity

building (Uganda National Road Authority, 2018). Interestingly, high staff qualifications are

associated with innovativeness (Czarnitzki et al., 2018). Hunja (2003) notes that compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework requires stakeholders’ full awareness with the

practical details in public procurement. This is inevitable for complex construction projects

whose implementation require a lot of personal attributes and their consideration (Uganda

National Road Authority, 2014, Migosi et al., 2013).

In the light of the foregoing analysis, a lack of familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework leads to poor quality road construction projects that are completed late

thereby hampering government goals. These projects deteriorate faster than their life

expectancy. This contrasts with both regional and global findings showing that government

objectives are affected by failed projects and not complying with regulatory framework

because stakeholders lack familiarity with project details (Zadawa et al., 2015, Boer and

Telgen, 1998). Hence, the need for public procurement regulatory framework governing road

construction projects to be written in a nonprofessional’s language that can easily be interpreted

by respective stakeholders. In addition, management should encourage qualified and competent

staff involvement in public road implementation since these are key indicators measuring

familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework. Transparent and merit based

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selection criterion involving required formal academic qualifications and experienced

competent team is encouraged.

7.2.2 The Relationship between Monitoring Activities and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory

The objective for H2 was to ascertain whether monitoring activities affect compliance

in public road construction projects. PLS-algorithm path coefficient results show that there is

an inverse relationship between monitoring activities and compliance with public procurement

regulatory frameworks. This implies that monitoring activities does not predict increase in

compliance with public procurement regulatory governing public road construction projects.

Meanwhile bootstrapping results show that there is an inverse insignificant relationship

between monitoring activities on public road construction projects and compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework (α =- 0.046, t = 0.522, p = 0.601) at 5% significance level.

Hence, H2 is not supported and the objective is not achieved. This implies that increased

frequent inspections to check on timely recording of project progress, timely project

completion and proper storage methods is not effective in achieving compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework. These results are in line with Tabish and Jha (2015),

Rutherford et al. (2007) findings, whose theories suggest a use of effective monitoring

mechanism to enhance compliance with principal goals (Rajab and Eydgahi, 2019, Kauppi and

van Raaij, 2015).

The findings are in contradiction with previous scholars emancipating for increased

monitoring in public procurement to meet goals (Adusei and Awunyo-Vitor, 2015, Jha and

Misra, 2007). Notably, these scholars’ findings were based on general procurement practiced

with less emphasis on complex public road construction projects. Nonetheless, current findings

are attributed to various improvement strategies involving different monitoring agencies for

public construction projects through consultative forum (PPDA Authority, 2008). Furthermore,

Uganda’s Parliament and various judicial arms are currently investigating irregularities in

public road construction projects. Electronically, Uganda National Roads Authority is currently

implementing Enterprise Resource Planning software to ensure efficient monitoring of its

functions through road assets management and maintenance systems (Uganda National Road

Authority, 2018). Consequently, all these together compel project implementers to comply.

Such strategies encourage project implementers to comply with project specifications because

continuous monitoring of government projects prevent fraud (Basheka et al., 2012). In addition,

regular and random inspection of construction projects is inevitable for construction industry

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(Owusu et al., 2017). Studies across the globe have revealed failed government projects

especially in construction because of inadequate supervision (Blount et al., 2017, Jha and

Misra, 2007). This concurs with reports showing that effective monitoring of construction

projects ensures that set targets are met and mitigating against cost and time overruns

commonly reported in the construction industry (Lapidus and Yves, 2018, Love et al., 2016a,

Tabish and Jha, 2015, Kakitahi et al., 2013).

7.2.3 The Relationship between Professionalism and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

The objective for H3 was to ascertain whether professionalism affects compliance in

public road construction projects. According to PLS-algorithm path coefficient results, there is

an inverse relationship between professionalism of staff involved in public road construction

projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. This implies that

professionalism among these staff does not predict increase in compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework. Meanwhile bootstrapping results show that there is an

insignificant relationship between professionalism of staff involved in public road construction

projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = -0.102, t = 1.250,

p = 0.211) at 5% significance level. Hence, H3 is not supported and the objective is not

achieved. This implies that increased demonstration of high professional integrity by staff,

professional judgement during decision-making, high level of confidentiality, employing

practically experienced road construction staff with required expertise is not effective in

achieving compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. These indicators

measured professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects to meet

government objectives. However, basing on the analysis of respondents’ answers, even if there

were mechanisms of ensuring professionalism of staff involved on these projects, enforcement

was not effective.

Whereas these results are in line with findings that found insignificant relationship

between professionalism and compliance in public procurement (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011),

reports show that unprofessional behaviour significantly affects compliance in China’s and

Malaysian construction industries (Deng et al., 2014, Shu Hui et al., 2011). Conversely,

Loosemore and Malouf (2019) observed that training as a component of professionalism, was

largely ineffective in achieving workers’ compliance with safety measures in the construction

industry. Furthermore, the findings contradict previous recommendations emphasising

increased training of staff, professional code, confidentiality, expertise and professional

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membership in public procurement (PPDA Authority, 2016, Sohail and Cavill, 2008, Wall and

Ahmed, 2008, Gelderman et al., 2006). This is attributed to highly qualified staff involved in

public road construction projects. For example 93.8% hold a bachelor’s degree and above and

60.4% are professional engineers registered by various engineering boards. In addition, UNRA

has embraced continuous investment in staff professionalism through capacity building that is

improving staff skills, knowledge and utilisation of required tools and equipment (Uganda

National Road Authority, 2018). This is boosted by increased higher institutions of learning

offering degrees that is associated with increasing employment of qualified staff.

Consequently, ensuring staff competence and increasing their innovativeness (Czarnitzki et al.,

2018, Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016).

In addition, tremendous efforts has been applied in the past to improve professionalism

in the construction industry through upholding professional ethics and honest culture (Owusu

et al., 2017). For example, Uganda is enforcing an ethical code of conduct through Ministry of

Ethics and Integrity. This is complemented by establishing various professional bodies

including; Institute of Procurement Professionals of Uganda (IPPU), UACE, UNABCEC,

Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers (UIPE), Engineering Registration Board (ERB),

Architecture Registration Board (ARB) and Surveyor’s Registration Board (SRB) to ensure

professionalism in the construction sector national wide (PPDA Authority, 2008). Such efforts

are meant to address lack of required skills and integrity among procurement staff that are

causing inadequacies in public sector procurement (Nsanganzelu, 2015, Ojo and Gbadebo,

2014). The fact that public road construction projects are complex, multidimensional skills are

required and management need to embrace continuous professionalism of public sector

procurement. With persistent public procurement reforms globally and particularly in Uganda

where currently public procurement regulatory framework is under review for possible

amendments, professionalism in the sector is mandated to government and should be in

harmony with international standards as proposed by earlier scholars (Deng et al., 2014). This

would address incompetence in Uganda’s construction workforce characterised with

inappropriate skills due to poor training and recruitment methods (Ministry of works and

Transport, 2012, Alinaitwe et al., 2007). Consequently, the public road construction subsector

should be appropriately staffed with a qualified, competent and experienced work force. Bodies

like Institute of Procurement Professionals of Uganda and Uganda Institute of Professional

Engineers (UIPE) among others should be fully empowered to enforce respective standards in

public procurement and construction sectors.

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7.2.4 The Relationship between Sanctions and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

The objective of H4 was to ascertain whether sanctions affect compliance in public road

construction projects. PLS-algorithm path coefficient results show that there is a positive

relationship between sanctions on staff involved in public road construction projects and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. This implies that sanctioning of

these staff predicted increase in compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. In

addition, bootstrapping results show that there is a significant relationship between sanctions

on staff involved in public road construction projects and compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework (α = 0.315, t = 3.540, p = 0.000) at 1% significance level. Hence, H4 is

supported and the objective is achieved corresponding to previous findings that found sanctions

as an effective mechanism ensuring compliance in public procurement (Peprah, 2015,

Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). This implied that increased penalties on both contractors and

public officers found in wrong during public road implementation period is effective in

achieving compliance with public procurement regulatory framework as supported by

institutional theory (Chan and Owusu, 2017, Scott, 2013). Such sanctions will ensure that staff

implement properly authorised road construction projects, timely delivery of road construction

projects, timely recording of road construction transactions and achieving objectives of the

road construction projects.

Analysis of responses reveal that contractors are punished when they do not meet

specifications as well as not following the regulatory framework during road construction,

proportional sanctions are effected immediately after a violation of the regulatory framework

is detected and timely administrative sanction e.g. warnings, suspension, disqualification,

dismissal and fines on errant officers are enforced. Credible sanctions with negative

consequences are imposed on road implementation team without any warning for non-

compliance. Additionally, imposed sanctions compel the team to work consciously. These

indicators effectively measured sanctions on staff involved in public road construction projects

to meet government objectives. Ensuring effective sanctions on staff involved on these projects

should be continuously applied with transparency and objectivity. This is in line with previous

studies emphasising strict and swift penalties on offenders who deliberately flout public

procurement regulatory framework (Shu Hui et al., 2011, PPDA Authority, 2009a, Agaba and

Shipman, 2007). Such sanctions increase fear among staff involved in public road construction

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projects when implementing the projects that in turn ensure government goals are attained

(Wirick, 2009).

Whereas some studies suggest non-coercive sanctions (including rewards,

recommendations and requests), threats are widely applied to instil fear among staff in public

sector procurement (Payan and McFarland, 2005, Braun, 2003, Venkatesh et al., 1995).

Surprisingly, Gelderman et al. (2010) revealed that sanctions are not significant in influencing

compliance with EU directives. Nonetheless, sanctions including tough penalties restore sanity

in a corrupt public procurement sector and save government from loosing significant funds

because staff will be compelled to comply (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013, Van Snellenberg

and van de Peppel, 2002, Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). Generally, tougher sanctions on

contractors and public officers in respective departments handling public road construction

projects influence these players to ensure that government objectives are achieved (Rajab and

Eydgahi, 2019, Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Furthermore, punitive sanctions including;

contract termination, suspension, confiscation of property and none payments are widely

applied globally to achieve compliance, value for money and saving government significant

funds (Shu Hui et al., 2011).

7.2.5 The Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

The objective of H5 was to ascertain whether perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework affect compliance in public road construction projects.

PLS-algorithm path results reveal that there is an inverse relationship between perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework. This implies that perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework predicted reduction in compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework. In addition, bootstrapping results show that there is a significant

relationship between perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = -0.253, t = 3.052, p = 0.002)

at 1% significance level. Hence, H5 is supported and the objective is achieved contrary to

findings that established an insignificant relationship between these factors in Netherland’s

public procurement (Gelderman et al., 2006). The results found in this thesis imply that banning

negotiation between contractors and public officers during road construction, banning contract

extension beyond agreed period and banning of underperforming contractors are effective in

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achieving compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. Enforcing these key

indicators would ensure efficiency of public procurement regulatory framework governing

public road construction projects and achieving government objectives.

Effective enforcement of these indicators is required at all times on each public road

construction project. Clear and detailed description on every clause cited in the main public

procurement regulatory framework should be brought to the attention of participants during

public road construction implementation. Otherwise, if perceived as unclear, then non-

compliance is highly unavoidable (Gelderman et al., 2006). Public procurement among

developing countries is disorderly because of unclear regulatory framework and with

complexity of public road construction projects, a vibrant public regulatory framework is

necessary to meet government objectives. Reference is made on persistent public procurement

reforms in East Africa aimed at closing the loopholes within the framework to achieve value

for money and fighting corruption (Obanda, 2010, Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). It is

recommended that governments should develop clear policies and procedures operating these

projects and public procurement regulatory framework should be explicitly written in a

nonprofessional language for easy interpretation. Strengthening regulatory framework is

inevitable for construction projects (Shan et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2016). Where possible,

legal interpretation assistance from experts on technical issues would assist in project

implementation. Whereas there are limited studies on perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework in achieving compliance, this thesis has discovered that it

is effective in reducing non-compliance in public road construction projects.

7.2.6 The Relationship between Contractors’ Resistance and Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

The objective of H6 was to ascertain whether contractors’ resistance affect compliance

in public road construction projects. According to PLS-algorithm path coefficient results, there

is a positive relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction projects and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. This implies that contractors’

resistance to non-compliance predicted increase in compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework. Further bootstrapping results show that there is a significant relationship

between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework by public officers and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

governing these projects (α = 0.135, t = 2.002, p = 0.045) at 5% significance level. Hence, H6

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is supported and the objective is achieved. This implied that increased contractors’ knowledge

on public road procurement process and encouraging them to take action against defiant public

officers is effective in achieving compliance with public procurement regulatory framework.

These findings contradict previous study that found an insignificant relationship between

contractors’ resistance and compliance with EU directives in Netherlands public procurement

(Gelderman et al., 2010).

Respondents agreed that contractor’s knowledge on procurement process helps in

controlling public officers from making bad decisions and contractor’s readiness to take action

against a bad decision makes public officers fear reprisals in turn achieving compliance.

Contractors may be unable to take action if they fear retaliation from public procurement staff

who are responsible for awarding and managing future contracts. However, when the

regulatory framework is transparent and effective in outlining remedies and protecting

suppliers from public officers’ retaliation, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework would be achieved. These remarks were earlier applauded in the compliance studies

covering USA and Netherlands (Pachnou, 2005b, Braun, 2003). Contractors’ readiness and

willingness to take action as well as being knowledgeable of the public procurement regulatory

framework were basic indicators measuring contractors’ resistance. Enforcing these indicators

would eradicate non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing

public road construction projects and meet government objectives. Institutional theory avers

that different stakeholders with specific reasons and experience to accomplish organizational

tasks resist others failing to comply with the norms of meeting organisation’s objectives

(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Contractors should be encouraged to take action against bad

decisions by public officers and increase their knowledge on public procurement regulatory

framework in order to control these officers in entire procurement process.

7.3 Project Success Relationships

7.3.1 The Relationship between Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success

The objective of H7 was to ascertain the effect of compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework on public road construction project success. PLS-algorithm coefficient

results show that there is a positive relationship between compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework and success of public road construction projects. This implies that

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework predicted the success of public road

construction projects. Additionally, bootstrapping results show that there is a significant

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relationship between compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and project

success (α = 0.147, t = 1.960, p = 0.05) at 5% significance level. Hence, H7 is supported and

the objective is achieved. Implying that emphasising proper authorisation of road construction

projects, timely delivery of road construction projects, timely recording of road construction

transactions and achieving road construction objectives are effective in implementing these

projects successfully. Successful implementation is realised if public road construction projects

are implemented according to specifications, on time and within budget (Hussain et al., 2019,

Gledson et al., 2018, Dvir and Lechler, 2004, Atkinson, 1999). Alinaitwe et al. (2013), Tabish

and Jha (2011) contended that compliance with regulatory framework is a significant factor in

the performance of construction projects. These findings correspond to current thesis findings

and thus, for successful public construction projects, compliance with governing regulatory

framework is essential (Zadawa et al., 2018a, Kassel, 2008).

Compliance in public road construction projects is achieved if causes of non-

compliance are established and mitigation strategies accordingly determined (Kulp et al.,

2006). Many projects have failed due to selfish interests, inefficient regulatory framework,

inducement and weak enforcement mechanism (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). Complexity of

public road construction projects with multiple stakeholders and directives from government

and donors complicate implementation process with multi-stakeholders’ demands. However,

harmonising all the policies, procedures and directives from different stakeholders is

paramount for the success of these projects. Stakeholders are dissatisfied with cost and

schedule overruns that affect road construction projects by 30% (Ford, 2011). Cost and

schedule escalations surrounding Uganda’s road construction projects are evidenced with

complaints from multi-stakeholders community (Red Pepper, 2018, PPDA Authority, 2009b).

Furthermore, lack of cooperation, mistrust and not complying with regulatory framework

account for failed construction projects (Ntayi et al., 2010b).

Relatedly, in Australia, non-compliance accompanied with non-durable construction

materials are challenging the construction industry (Australian Procurement & Construction

Council, 2013). Comparatively, cost and schedule overruns are reportedly affecting

international construction industry specifically accounting for (47- 48)% failed Australian

public road construction projects (Love et al., 2019, Love et al., 2016a). Complying with the

public procurement regulatory framework is inevitable for the successful public road

construction projects and stakeholders should pay attention to road specifications, cost and time

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throughout the implementation process (Gambo et al., 2016, Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015,

Chan and Chan, 2004, Atkinson, 1999). Additionally, emphasising timely recording of road

construction transaction, project delivery, proper authorisation and achieving project objectives

is important when implementing public road construction projects since they are key indicators

measuring compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. These will ensure value

for money, transparency, accountability, successful road construction delivery, saving

significant funds and increasing quality-paved roads. Saved funds can be channelled to other

priority sectors for example; modernisation of agriculture, poverty eradication and extending

road network to rural agricultural areas to market agricultural products.

7.3.2 The Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success

The objective of H8 was to ascertain whether familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework leads to project success. According to PLS-algorithm path coefficient

results, there is a positive relationship between familiarity with public procurement regulatory

framework and project success. This implies that familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework predicted success of public road construction projects. Meanwhile

bootstrapping results show that there is a significant relationship between familiarity with

public procurement regulatory framework and project success (α = 0.140, t = 2.231, p = 0.026)

at 5% significance level. Hence, H8 is supported and the objective is achieved. These findings

are supported by the previous studies contending that successful public construction projects

rely on managers’ thorough understanding of the project scope and governing regulatory

framework (Gambo et al., 2016, Tabish and Jha, 2015, Jari and Bhangale, 2013, Shaban, 2008).

Implying that simplifying regulatory framework governing public road construction projects

for easy interpretation, using staff who are familiar with implementation of these projects and

employing staff with appropriate academic qualification to work on applicable road

construction projects is effective in successful implementation of public road construction

projects.

The government should emphasise improving staff familiarity with public road

construction projects through training and inductions as proposed by institutional theory

(North, 1993). Gelderman et al. (2006) observed that staff training and education are important

in achieving public procurement targets. However, the training programs should be tailored to

project needs and learner centric (Loosemore and Malouf, 2019). These projects should be

implemented in accordance with specifications, budget and time since these are major

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indicators measuring the success of public road construction projects. In addition, management

should encourage qualified and competent staff involvement in public road implementation

since these are key indicators measuring familiarity with public procurement regulatory

framework. This is inevitable since many construction projects have failed due to using staff

who are unfamiliar with project requirements (Jari and Bhangale, 2013, Mahmood, 2010). Staff

familiarity is achieved through transparent and merit based selection criterion such as formal

required academic qualifications and experienced competent team (DiMaggio and Powell,

2015). Once staff involved in public road construction projects comprehensively understand

the detailed requirements of these projects, it would be easy to implement them within

described parameters leading to successful project completion. Interestingly, construction

projects are completed easily and within schedule if staff are familiar with ways of doing works

related to that project (Sidwell et al., 2002). Hence, improving staff knowledge is important for

successful construction sector (Munyasya and Chileshe, 2018).

7.3.3 The Relationship between Monitoring Activities and Project Success The objective of H9 was to ascertain whether monitoring activities leads to project

success. PLS-algorithm path coefficient results show that there is a positive relationship

between monitoring activities of public road construction projects and the success of these

projects. This implies that monitoring activities predicted the success of public road

construction projects. Furthermore, bootstrapping results show that there is a significant

relationship between monitoring activities on public road construction projects and project

success (α = 0.314, t = 4.875, p = 0.000) at 1% significance level. Hence, H9 is supported and

the objective is achieved. This is in conformance with the recommendations revealing that

successful public construction projects rely on regular monitoring of project activities (Hussain

et al., 2019, Owusu et al., 2017, Obanda, 2010, Reeves, 2008, Lam et al., 2008). This implies

that frequent inspections to check on timely recording of project progress, timely project

completion and proper storage methods were effective in successful implementation of public

road construction projects. Despite significant results, they contradict previous study that

established that monitoring construction staff was insignificant in ensuring safety in

construction projects (Tabish and Jha, 2015). Considering a theoretical approach, agency and

institutional theories support current results contending that monitoring public road

construction projects ensure that government objectives are met and value for money achieved

(DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Van Slyke, 2007).

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Successful procurement of public projects is highly dependent upon increased

monitoring of procurement activities (Adusei and Awunyo-Vitor, 2015, Jha and Misra, 2007).

Whereas Kauppi and van Raaij (2015) revealed that monitoring activities is not significant in

influencing agents’ actions to meet principals’ goals, evidence shows that continuous

monitoring of government projects prevents fraud and saves the projects from collapsing

(Basheka et al., 2012, PPDA Authority, 2008). Management should actively monitor public

road construction projects to determine if they are implemented in accordance with project

specifications, on time and within budget. This would ensure that set objectives are achieved.

Studies across the globe attach inadequate supervision to failed government projects especially

in construction (Blount et al., 2017, Ntayi et al., 2010b, Olken, 2005). On the contrary,

successful performance of USA’s construction sector that was previously marred by cost

overrun, shoddy works by contractors and corruption is attributed to effective monitoring of

entire construction procurement process (Bartle and Korosec, 2003). This notion is supported

by extant literature in the construction industry calling for effective monitoring of construction

projects to reduce reworks, cost and time overruns (Lapidus and Yves, 2018, Love et al., 2016a,

Kakitahi et al., 2013). This would be achieved through timely recording of public road

construction activities, frequent inspections to ensure timely completion of these projects and

proper storage methods to avoid damage and stealing of public road construction materials.

7.3.4 The Relationship between Professionalism and Project Success The objective of H10 was to ascertain whether professionalism of staff leads to project

success. According to PLS-algorithm path coefficient results, there is a positive relationship

between professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects and project

success. This implies that professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects

predicted the success of public road construction projects. Furthermore, bootstrapping results

show that there is a significant relationship between professionalism of staff involved in public

road construction projects and project success (α = 0.305, t = 4.695, p = 0.000) at 1%

significance level. Hence, H10 is supported and the objective is achieved. The findings are

supported by recommendations agitating for trained, experienced and skilful staff for

successful construction project implementation (Hussain et al., 2019, Tayeh et al., 2018,

Gambo et al., 2016, Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015, Shaban, 2008, Wall and Ahmed, 2008).

This implies that high professional integrity by staff, professional judgement during decision-

making, high level of confidentiality, employing practically experienced road construction staff

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with required expertise is effective in successful implementation of public road construction

projects.

Institutional theory contends that professionalism is achieved through academic

qualifications, training, professional networking capable of empowering staff competence for

successful organizational performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). This notion is further

supported by (Gelderman et al., 2006). Professionalism ensures project success when staff are

knowledgeable with particular project requirements (Giroud et al., 2018). In addition,

professionalism is enforced through emphasising ethical codes and honesty in the construction

sector (Owusu et al., 2017). Hence, investing in staff competence is important for public road

construction projects (Kalinzi, 2014, Wall and Ahmed, 2008). For example through continuous

training (Loosemore and Malouf, 2019, Shaban, 2008). Management should determine project

requirements from initiation stage through to project completion. This would help management

to source the rightful personnel with required expertise and competence to execute the project.

Expertise in project implementation especially in managing capital works is the cornerstone

for successful project completion (Furneaux et al., 2006). In addition, implementing public

road construction projects require rightful machinery, qualified and competent staff who are

knowledgeable with public road construction implementation process. Careful selection of

project team based on their competencies will lead to successful delivery of these projects

PPDA Authority (2016) because the selection would ensure the team is composed of

experienced, skilful and competent staff to enforce successful project performance (Gambo et

al., 2016).

7.3.5 The Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success

The objective of H11 was to ascertain whether perceived inefficiency with public

procurement regulatory framework reduces project success. PLS-algorithm path coefficient

results reveal that there is an inverse relationship between perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework and the success of public road construction projects. This

implies that perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework predicted

reduction in the success of public road construction projects. Additionally, bootstrapping

results show that there is a significant inverse relationship between perceived inefficiency of

public procurement regulatory framework and project success (α = -0.135, t = 2.099, p = 0.036)

at 5% significance level. Hence, H11 is supported and the objective is achieved. This finding

corresponds to recommendations calling for an efficient and effective regulatory framework to

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govern construction industry (Shaban, 2008). In addition, stakeholder experience difficulties

in accomplishing tasks when the regulatory framework is unclear (Gelderman et al., 2006).

This implied that enforcing ban on negotiation between contractors and public officers during

road construction, ban on contract extension beyond agreed period and banning of

underperforming contractors is effective in successful implementation of public road

construction projects. Emphasising these indicators ensures that regulatory framework is

effective and cannot be manipulated (Thai, 2008a).

Relatedly, enforcing these indicators would ensure successful public road construction

projects since successful organisations rely on effective institutional norms (Oliver, 1991). This

proposal is further supported by the argument that successful public construction projects

require stakeholders’ understanding of the project scope with a clear governing regulatory

framework capable of eradicating manipulations (Tayeh et al., 2018, Zhang et al., 2016, Tabish

and Jha, 2015, Tabish and Jha, 2011). Surprisingly, little is known about the role of perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework in implementing public road projects.

However, with concerns from public construction stakeholders lamenting on unclear national

standards and regulations challenges facing construction sector PPDA Authority (2008),

government should explicitly come up with clear public procurement regulatory framework in

a nonprofessional’s language for easy interpretation during public road implementation.

Otherwise, deviating from clarity will continuously affect successful completion of public road

construction projects (Shan et al., 2017). Unsuccessful public road construction projects is

possible since previous studies established that East African public procurement legal

framework is unclear requiring respective governments to strengthen the frameworks for

proper guidance in procurement activities (Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). Consequently,

Uganda National Roads Authority has improved on implementation of regulatory framework

to ensure successful road construction projects (Uganda National Road Authority, 2018).

7.3.6 The Relationship between Contractors’ Resistance and Project Success The objective of H12 was to ascertain whether contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework leads to project success. According

to PLS-algorithm path coefficient results, there is a positive relationship between contractors’

resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and success of

public road construction projects. This implies that contractors’ resistance to non-compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction projects

predicted success of these projects. Meanwhile bootstrapping results show that there is an

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insignificant relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and project success (α = 0.121, t = 1.792, p = 0.073) at 5%

significance level. Hence, H12 is not statistically supported and the objective is not achieved.

This implies that contractors’ knowledge on public road procurement process and encouraging

them to take action against defiant public officers predicted successful implementation of

public road construction projects. However, the prediction is not sufficient to ensure that public

road construction projects are implemented according to specifications, on time and within

budget. This is attributed to contractors’ reluctance to report defiant public officers fearing

retaliation from these officers in awarding future contracts if the remedy mechanism is

ineffective (Gelderman et al., 2010, Gelderman et al., 2006).

Institutional theory contends that different players have specific reasons and knowledge

to perform an organisation’s tasks successfully (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). This explains

why contractors should resist bad decisions by public officers during road construction.

Notably, contractors are obliged to meet project demands by fulfilling their mandate and

protect their name for future contract award. Despite contractors’ commitment to fulfil their

mandate, an effective regulatory framework is inevitable to support their actions. Whereas,

contractors’ resistance does not significantly lead to successful public road construction

projects implementation, empowering them through knowledge and readiness cannot be

ignored as these are key indicators to influence project implementation (Gelderman et al.,

2010).

7.3.7 The Relationship between Sanctions and Project Success The objective of H13 was to ascertain whether sanctions on staff leads to project

success. PLS-algorithm path coefficient results show that there is an inverse relationship

between sanctions on officers involved in public road construction projects and public road

project success. Implying that sanctions imposed on these staff did not predict success of public

road construction projects. Furthermore, bootstrapping results show that there is an

insignificant relationship between sanctions on staff involved in public road construction

projects and project success (α = -0.059, t = 0.856, p = 0.392) at 5% significance level. Hence,

H13 is not supported and the objective is not achieved. This is contrary to reports suggesting

tough sanctions for successful construction industry (Chan and Owusu, 2017, Sohail and

Cavill, 2008). The contradiction could be linked to the fact that these studies supported use of

sanctions in eradicating corruption for successful construction industry without acknowledging

specific attention to public road construction subsector. The findings suggest that imposing

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penalties during public road implementation period is not effective in successfully

implementing these projects. This is because currently the Ugandan government through the

Parliament and Anti-corruption court have embarked on serious condemnation and prosecution

of guilty public road stakeholders including imprisonment and recovering lost funds.

Furthermore, PPDA is empowered to punish deviant stakeholders and enforce termination of

contracts (PPDA Authority, 2008). Such measures have caused fear amongst public road

implementation team in Uganda.

Interestingly, Uganda’s condemnation is in line with recommendations that suggest

strict sanctions in the construction industry to ably implement construction projects

successfully (Kakitahi et al., 2016, Gambo et al., 2016, Hartley, 2009). Despite these

recommendations, application of sanctions should be carefully considered and enforcing

sanctions depends on player’s attitude and interest to meet set objectives (Saam, 2007,

Gunningham and Kagan, 2005). In addition, sanctions at times makes violators plan how to

conceal detection by the principal (Zubcic and Sims, 2011, Sparrow, 2000). Nevertheless, for

an efficient and effective transport sector to meet its goals, a sound transport policy needs

strong sanctions’ enforcement mechanism (Ministry of works and Transport, 2012). This is

economically vital since significant funds are lost globally due to failure in sanctioning

violators (Mbabazi et al., 2015).

7.4 Mediation Relationships

7.4.1 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the

Relationship between Familiarity with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and

Project Success.

The objective of H14 was to ascertain whether compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework mediates the relationship between familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework and project success. Compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework measured by proper authorisation of road construction projects, timely delivery of

road construction projects; timely recording of road construction transactions and achievable

road construction project objectives has a mediating effect on the relationship between

familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework and the success of public road

construction projects. Direct effect is represented by standardized coefficient of 0.266 and

indirect effect accounts for 0.049 totalling to 0.315. According to Sobel test, compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework significantly mediates the relationship between

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familiarity and project success as demonstrated by Sobel z-value (Sobel z-value = 2.20, p <

0.05) at 5% significance level. There is a partial mediation since familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework predicts the success of public road construction projects

directly and indirectly through compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

(Miller et al., 2007). Hence, H14 is supported and the objective is achieved. Implying that

successful implementation of public road construction projects is achieved when familiarity

with public procurement regulatory framework and compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework governing these projects are simultaneously applied (Zadawa et al.,

2018a, Gelderman et al., 2006, Sidwell et al., 2002).

The findings of this dissertation are aligned with recommendations and guideline

encouraging mediation testing (James et al., 2006, Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). Despite

significant relationships between the three study variables as a precondition for mediation

testing Hayes (2009), no similar studies have tested mediation involving familiarity with public

procurement regulatory framework, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework and project success before. Nonetheless, the findings have enabled further

understanding on how these study variables are related as proposed by earlier advocates for

mediational studies (Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010, Preacher and Hayes, 2004, MacKinnon et

al., 2002, Baron and Kenny, 1986). Accordingly, compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework plays a crucial role in influencing familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework for successful implementation of public road construction projects.

Consequently, commitment and compliance approaches have registered successful

performance by achieving government objectives (Su et al., 2018). Commitment approach

emphasises familiarity through staff knowledge, skills and abilities, while regulatory

compliance eliminates role ambiguity, controlling staff and guiding firm capabilities leading

to successful performance (Su et al., 2018).

Introducing compliance significantly improves staff familiarity which actively

increases organisation performance (Andrevski et al., 2014). Successful project performance

is achieved if projects are implemented in accordance with project specifications, completed in

time and within budget (Hussain et al., 2019). The government can emphasise; proper

authorisation of road construction projects, timely delivery of road construction projects, timely

recording of road construction transactions and achievable road construction objectives. In

addition, simplifying a regulatory framework governing these projects for easy interpretation,

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employing staff who are familiar with implementing these projects and staff with appropriate

academic qualifications to work on road construction projects is important. Accordingly,

management need to reinforce human capital appropriately to ensure familiarity and capability

in successful task performance (Beltrán-Martín et al., 2008). Because appropriate staff

competence through proper staffing procedures and skill development are important in

ensuring familiarity leading to successful organizational performance (Hussain et al., 2019,

Beltrán-Martín et al., 2008). A combination of these two factors displays a good interactive

effect on the success of public road construction projects by changing the mindset of staff who

are familiar with traditional methods (Kaluarachchi and Jones, 2007).

7.4.2 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Monitoring Activities in Public Road Construction and Project Success

The objective of H15 was to ascertain whether compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework mediates the relationship between monitoring activities and project

success. Regression results show that compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework has a mediating effect on the relationship between monitoring activities and the

success of public road construction projects. Direct effect is represented by standardized

coefficient of 0.509 and indirect effect accounts for 0.037 totalling to 0.547. Furthermore,

Sobel test results show that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

significantly mediates the relationship between monitoring activities and project success as

demonstrated by Sobel z-value (Sobel z-value = 2.00, p < 0.05) at 5% significance level. There

is a partial mediation since monitoring activities predicts the success of public road

construction projects directly and indirectly through compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework (Miller et al., 2007). Hence, H15 is supported and the objective is

achieved, implying that successful implementation of public road construction projects is

realised when both monitoring activities and compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework governing these projects are applied simultaneously (Tabish and Jha, 2015, Jha and

Misra, 2007).

The findings are in line with recommendations and guideline of (James et al., 2006,

Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). Despite significant relationships between the three study variables

as a precondition for mediation testing Hayes (2009), no similar studies have tested mediation

involving monitoring activities, compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

and project success before. However, this mediation test has enabled further understanding on

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how these study variables are related (Memon et al., 2018, Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010,

Preacher and Hayes, 2004, MacKinnon et al., 2002, Baron and Kenny, 1986). Effective

monitoring methods are paramount for project success because they provide quicker failure

identification that ensures reduced reworks and enhances value for money (Robinson and Scott,

2009). Additionally, staff supervision helps management to evaluate their experience and

performance in meeting set objectives (Babalola et al., 2016). Such effective mechanisms are

capable of eradicating opportunistic behaviour, increasing performance, controlling costs and

enhancing firm efficiency (Martin et al., 2016). However, management should avoid abusive

supervision that demoralises public road implementation staff (Krasikova et al., 2013).

The findings suggest that government should emphasise both monitoring activities and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework to successfully implement public

road construction projects since these factors have portrayed a good interactive effect (Preacher

and Hayes, 2004, Baron and Kenny, 1986). This can be emphasised through proper

authorization of road construction projects, timely delivery of road construction projects,

timely recording of road construction transactions and achieving project objectives as well as

frequent inspections to check on timely recording of project progress, timely project

completion and proper storage methods. Such continuous monitoring improves project

productivity (Isaac and Navon, 2014).

7.4.3 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Professionalism of Staff in Public Road Construction Projects and Project Success

The objective of H16 was to ascertain whether compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework mediates the relationship between professionalism and project success.

Regression results show that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework has a

mediating effect on the relationship between professionalism of staff on public road

construction projects and the success of public road construction projects. Direct effect is

represented by standardized coefficient of 0.508 and indirect effect accounts for 0.044 totalling

to 0.553. According to Sobel test results, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework insignificantly mediates the relationship between professionalism of staff on public

road construction projects and project success as demonstrated by Sobel z-value (Sobel z-value

= 1.94, p = 0.05) at 5% significance level. This is an insignificant partial mediation since

professionalism of staff on public road construction projects predicts the success of public road

construction projects directly and indirectly through compliance with public procurement

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regulatory framework. Hence, H16 is not statistically supported and the objective is not

achieved. This implies that successful implementation of public road construction projects is

realised when professionalism of staff on public road construction projects and compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are applied

sequentially.

The findings unveil management understanding on how these factors interact that helps

in determining their application during project implementation (Memon et al., 2018, Fairchild

and McQuillin, 2010, Preacher and Hayes, 2004, MacKinnon et al., 2002). Whenever staff lack

professionalism, compliance with regulatory framework will be affected thereby undermining

successful construction project implementation (Tabish and Jha, 2015, Deng et al., 2014).

Despite importance of professionalism, scholars cast doubt in the relevancy of staff

competence, skills and commitment in meeting set performance targets (Beltrán-Martín et al.,

2008). Whereas the findings are not statistically supported, construction professionals have a

fiduciary duty to perform to client’s expectations (Hussain et al., 2019, Bowen et al., 2012).

Hence, the government should not ignore the interactive effect between these two factors since

it has shown predictive relevance in achieving the success of public road construction projects.

These findings cannot be compared to any earlier studies that have tested mediation involving

professionalism among staff on public road construction projects, compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and project success.

The government should emphasise proper authorisation of road construction projects,

timely delivery of road construction projects, timely recording of road construction transactions

and achieving objectives of road construction projects. Additionally, high professional integrity

by staff, professional judgement during decision-making, high level of confidentiality and

employing practically experienced road construction staff with required expertise all together

are crucial indicators for implementing public road construction projects. Successful

implementation of public road construction projects is achieved if these projects conform to

project specifications, completed in time and within budget (Hussain et al., 2019, Dvir and

Lechler, 2004, Atkinson, 1999).

7.4.4 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Sanctions in Public Road Construction Projects and Project Success

The objective of H17 was to ascertain whether compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework mediates the relationship between sanctions and project success.

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Regression results show that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework has a

mediating effect on the relationship between sanctions on staff involved in public road

construction projects and the success of public road construction projects. This is shown by

direct effect represented by standardized coefficient of 0.337 and indirect effect accounts for

0.114 totalling to 0.574. In addition, Sobel test results show that compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework significantly mediates the relationship between sanctions

on staff involved in public road construction projects and project success (Sobel z-value = 2.39,

p < 0.05) at 5% significance level. There is a partial mediation since sanctions on staff predicts

the success of public road construction projects directly and indirectly through compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework (Miller et al., 2007). Hence, H17 is supported and

the objective is achieved. This implies that successful implementation of public road

construction projects is achieved when sanctions on staff involved in public road construction

projects and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing these

projects are applied simultaneously (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Shu Hui et al., 2011). This notion is

supported by evidence showing that whereas sanctions could not predict project success

directly (see H13, section 7.3.7), it was able to predict project success through compliance with

regulatory framework (Nitzl et al., 2016).

The findings are supported by the recommendations and guideline of mediation testing

(Mathieu and Taylor, 2006, James et al., 2006). Despite significant mediation effect among

these variables Hayes (2009), these findings are not directly compared with any studies since

no similar studies have tested mediation involving sanctions on staff involved in public road

construction projects, compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and project

success before. However, these findings have enabled further understanding on how these

factors interact (Memon et al., 2018, Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010, Preacher and Hayes, 2004,

MacKinnon et al., 2002, Baron and Kenny, 1986). Management should consider

simultaneously applying these factors when implementing public road construction projects.

Whereas there are costly procedures to enforce prosecution in courts of law, sanctions mitigate

staff crimes in performing company duties through governing regulatory framework (Pierce,

2015). Both sanctions and compliance with the regulatory framework display a good interactive

effect in successful road implementation. This is reinforced through disciplined and bonded

governance mechanisms enforcing team commitment and compliance (Su et al., 2018).

However, management should refrain from destructive enforcement styles that demotivate

implementation team (Krasikova et al., 2013). Additionally, studies show that organizational

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power to enforce tough sanctions may frustrate staff and increase deviance in meeting set goals

(Lawrence and Robinson, 2007). Thus, the projects implemented should meet project

specifications, completed in time and within budget as well as effective penalties on those

found guilty.

7.4.5 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Perceived Inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework and Project Success.

The objective of H18 was to ascertain whether compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework mediates the relationship between perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework and project success. As required by Baron and Kenny

guidelines, mediational testing is applicable when a significant relationship exists among study

variable (Hayes, 2009, James et al., 2006, Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). This condition was not

satisfied since perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework is

insignificantly related to both compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and

project success (Compliance: β = -0.020, p = 0.785, Project success: β = -0.064, p = 0.377),

consequently, rendering the mediational test impossible. Hence, H18 is not supported and the

objective is not achieved. This implies that perceived inefficiency of the public procurement

regulatory framework does not reduce the success of public road construction projects when

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework is introduced. However, when

applied separately, perceived inefficiency with public procurement regulatory framework

reduces project success (Tabish and Jha, 2015).

7.4.6 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Mediates the Relationship between Contractor’s Resistance to Non-Compliance and Project Success

The objectives of H19 was to ascertain whether compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework mediates the relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and project success. Regression

results show that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework has a mediating

effect on the relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and the success of public road construction projects. This

is demonstrated by a direct effect of 0.361 and an indirect effect of 0.058 totalling to 0.419.

Furthermore, Sobel test results reveal that compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework significantly mediates the relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and project success (Sobel z-value

= 2.41, p < 0.05) at 5% significance level. This is a partial mediation since contractors’

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resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework predicts the

success of public road construction projects directly and indirectly through compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework (Miller et al., 2007). This is in line with Nitzl et al.

(2016) emphasising importance of mediation effect in answering a research question rather

than relying only on direct effect. Hence, H19 is supported and the objective is achieved.

Implying that successful implementation of public road construction projects is achieved when

contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are

applied simultaneously (Shu Hui et al., 2011, Gelderman et al., 2010).

The findings correspond to the recommendations and guidelines of mediation tests

(James et al., 2006, Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). Preliminary results proved that a significant

relationship among the three variables existed rendering mediational testing possible (Hayes,

2009). However, the final findings could not be directly compared to other studies since no

similar studies have tested mediation involving contractors’ resistance, compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and project success before. Nonetheless, the findings have

unearthed interact effect involving these factors beyond simple prediction (Memon et al., 2018,

Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010, Preacher and Hayes, 2004, MacKinnon et al., 2002, Baron and

Kenny, 1986). Whereas staff deviance is attributed to stressful and frustrating governance

mechanism Lawrence and Robinson (2007), government should encourage contractors’

resistance to non-compliance by defiant public officers and enforce compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework to successfully implement public road construction

projects. These factors through their measurement indicators exhibited a good interactive

effect, capable of meeting government goals. Contractors’ resistance is inevitable because they

are accountable for project implementation. Notably, accountability is crucial in work

performance (Breaux et al., 2009). Furthermore, contractors’ capability and performance is

important for successful implementation of construction projects (Hussain et al., 2019, Doloi

et al., 2011).

Management should emphasise proper authorisation of road construction projects,

timely delivery of road construction projects, timely recording of road construction transactions

and achieving objectives of the road construction projects. Additionally, increasing

contractors’ knowledge on public road procurement process and encouraging them to take

action against defiant public officers are critical indicators in road implementation.

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Empowering and relying on contractors is necessary since they have the experience, skills,

knowledge, competence and expertise in road construction projects. All these together would

ensure successful implementation of public road construction projects that should be

implemented as per project specifications, completed in time and within budget (Hussain et al.,

2019, Dvir and Lechler, 2004, Atkinson, 1999).

7.5 Hypotheses Summary

The thesis was divided into three segments with respective study objectives and hypotheses.

The first segment established compliance factors. Under this segment, six hypotheses (H1, H2,

H3, H4, H5 and H6) were proposed, of which three hypotheses (H4, H5 and H6) are

significantly supported. The second segment established factors responsible for the success of

public road construction projects. Under this segment, seven hypotheses (H7, H8, H9, H10,

H11, H12 and H13) were proposed, of which five hypotheses (H7, H8, H9, H10 and H11) are

significantly supported. The third segment determined the mediating effects. Here, the main

objective was to establish whether compliance with the public procurement regulatory

framework mediated the relationship between each compliance factor and the success of public

road construction projects sequentially. Under this segment, six hypotheses (H14, H15, H16,

H17, H18 and H19) were proposed, of which four hypotheses (H14, H15, H17 and H19) are

significantly supported. Overall, twelve (12) hypotheses are significantly supported out of

nineteen (19) hypotheses. Finally, this dissertation also established that two hypotheses (H12

and H16) were supported but statistically insignificant.

This leads to chapter eight that provides the study implications and contributions.

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CHAPTER EIGHT STUDY IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

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8.1 Introduction The thesis adopted agency and institutional theories to establish factors responsible for

compliance with regulatory framework and success of public road construction projects as well

as determining the mediation effects. This was enhanced through reviewing literature in peer

reviewed journals and public documents. Accordingly, the discussions and conclusions made

here are compared and aligned with agency and institutional theories in conjunction with peer

reviewed articles. Results in chapter six were discussed in line with thirteen hypotheses (direct

relationship prediction) developed in the conceptual model and six mediation hypotheses that

were respectively analysed based on PLS-SEM and Sobel test of mediation. Accordingly, this

chapter presents study implications and contributions in the order of theoretical, managerial,

methodological, knowledge and practical subsections.

8.2 Theoretical Implication and Contributions

Whereas agency and institutional theories advocate use of sanctions, monitoring, familiarity,

professionalism, perceived inefficiency and contractors’ resistance to meet goals, study

findings show that sanctions on staff involved in public road construction projects, perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance are key factors determining compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework. While familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework, monitoring

activities and professionalism among staff involved in public road construction projects are not

predictors of compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. These results are

compared with the findings of Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) where monitoring and sanctions

are supported when applied separately but when increasing monitoring occurred, sanctions

were reduced. Basing on these theories, the findings of this dissertation show that sanctions on

staff can address non-compliance issues when implementing public road construction projects

(DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Van Slyke, 2007). Contractor’s resistance and perceived

inefficiency of regulatory framework enhance compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework based on institutional theory (Kondra and Hinings, 1998, Greenwood and Hinings,

1988). However, these findings are contrary to previous studies that found these factors were

insignificant in Netherlands’s public procurement (Gelderman et al., 2010, Gelderman et al.,

2006). This is because in Uganda, increased awareness of the benefits of a transparent public

procurement and strengthening of public procurement regulatory framework has encouraged

contractors to resist bad decisions during project implementation.

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The dissertation extended a compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

model to project success in public road construction projects guided by agency and institutional

theories. Under this extension, the aim was to establish success factors for implementing public

road construction projects. The findings show that compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework, familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework, monitoring

activities, professionalism of staff involved in public road construction projects and perceived

inefficiency of public road construction projects are significant factors enhancing successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Successful economies including

Singapore, USA and UK have embraced these factors to sustain their respective construction

industries (Owusu et al., 2017, Le et al., 2014a). Accordingly, this thesis contributes by

encouraging governments to ensure application of these significant factors in the

implementation and management of construction projects. Sanctions on staff involved in public

road construction projects and contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework are insignificant factors. This is attributed to

comprehensive investigations and strict measures enforced by Ugandan Parliament and Anti-

corruption courts implicating those involved in procurement irregularities reported in public

road construction projects. These measures have caused fears among current project

implementers. On the other hand, contractors are not sure of the safety of the remedy

mechanism to deter retaliation from deviant public officers when reported.

Agency theory proposes monitoring, sanctions, professionalism and familiarity to mitigate

against agency problems (Van Slyke, 2007). In this thesis, familiarity, monitoring activities

and professionalism predicted the success of public road construction projects. Implying that

government should invest in staff familiarity and professionalism in order to successfully

implement public road construction projects as supported by institutional theory (DiMaggio

and Powell, 2015). In addition, management should effectively monitor public road

construction projects regularly for their successful implementation as proposed by institutional

theory (North, 2016, Zhang et al., 2016). All these factors would ensure that the public road

construction projects are implemented within respective project scope, time, cost and quality

(Gledson et al., 2018). Ensuring successful implementation of these projects is inevitable since

the construction sector accounts for economic development of nations (Shan et al., 2020b,

Munyasya and Chileshe, 2018, Zadawa et al., 2018a, Abdullahi et al., 2017, Gudienė et al.,

2013). Particularly, transport construction projects are pivotal in economic development

worldwide (Love et al., 2019, Sinesilassie et al., 2019).

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Furthermore, this thesis determined the mediating role of compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework between six compliance factors and project success. The

findings of this thesis show that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

significantly mediated the relationship between familiarity with public procurement regulatory

framework, monitoring activities, sanction on staff and contractors’ resistance to non-

compliance and the success of public road construction projects. However, compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework was shown not to mediate the relationship between

professionalism of staff, and perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

framework with the success of public road construction projects. Hence, governments should

emphasise compliance with public procurement regulatory framework to successfully

implement public road construction projects, again supported by institutional theory

(DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Scott, 2013, Kondra and Hinings, 1998). Whereas sanctions were

a key predictor of compliance with public procurement regulatory framework, they were not

significant in predicting project success. However, sanctions on staff enhanced project success

through mediation. Thus, government should enforce sanctions to promote compliance that in

turn enhance successful implementation of public road construction projects as proven by

interactive effect of compliance and sanctions in mediation testing (Memon et al., 2018,

Zadawa et al., 2018b, Preacher and Hayes, 2004, MacKinnon et al., 2002).

8.3 Managerial Implications and Contributions

The dissertation objectives were to discover compliance factors in public procurement of

road construction projects and further establish their effect together with compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework on success of these projects and to make

recommendations. Notably, this is not a policy statement but suggestions if incorporated;

government would expect positive changes to successfully implement public road construction

projects.

The findings show that sanctions on staff involved in public road construction projects,

perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and contractors’ resistance

to non-compliance with regulatory framework are significant factors enhancing compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework. Furthermore, compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework, familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework,

monitoring activities, professionalism of staff and perceived inefficiency of public

procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are significant factors influencing

successful implementation of public road construction projects. These factors call on

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management attention for better implementation of road construction projects. Management

should choose from these factors carefully when implementing public road construction

projects and it could necessitate inter-mixing of factors based on specific projects. This is

proven from a mediating role of compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

that was found as a key mediating factor. This is suggested in the light of the fact that particular

factors will produce a different outcome contingent on the project scope and deliverables

expected. Given the complexity of public road construction projects, flexibility in factor

selection is paramount (Shan et al., 2017). Evidently, construction projects experience unique

complexities and risks throughout construction process (Doloi et al., 2011). This is true as

empirical findings by different scholars vary when testing similar factors across different fields

over time horizons.

Management should consider these factors with their respective indicators carefully for

enforcing compliance. In addition, these factors can be used to influence and increase the

successful implementation of public road construction projects (Jari and Bhangale, 2013).

These factors forming a validated governance model would ensure government achieves its

objectives and value for money. Management needs to understand the culture of project

implementation staff in application of such factors, as this could have an implication on

achieving intended goals. Given the empirical results, the government should invest in staff

professionalism, increasing familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework,

effectively monitoring of public road construction activities, imposing effective sanctions,

empowering contractors and strengthening the public procurement regulatory framework for

successful implementation of road construction projects. Strengthening the regulatory

framework and improving staff professionalism are essential for a successful construction

industry (Ameyaw et al., 2017, Chan and Owusu, 2017). Familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework, process and road implementation procedures are paramount for

consideration by management. However, public procurement regulatory framework should be

written in nonprofessional language for easy understanding and interpretation. Whereas

monitoring public road construction projects is significant factor, government need to

streamline monitoring agencies with clear roles of each agency. This will avoid confusing

implementers on goal conflict that will affect successful implementation of public road

construction projects. Coordination among various monitoring agencies and departments is

helpful in construction sector (Hussain et al., 2019, Owusu et al., 2017). Additionally, the

government should empower public involvement in road construction projects as emphasised

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by senior officers in the participating organisations. Safety of public participation should be

assured to encourage them in actively monitoring and reporting unpleasant issues that may

arise in the course of implementing public road construction projects.

Key indicators of professionalism with strong factor loading above 0.7 reveal that staff high

professional integrity, professional judgement during decision-making, high level of

confidentiality, practical experience in road construction and required expertise in road

construction are crucial in successfully implementing public road construction projects. Indeed,

employing trained and experienced staff is key in successful construction projects (Hussain et

al., 2019, Tayeh et al., 2018, Gudienė et al., 2013). In familiarity, key indicators with strong

factor loadings ranging from 0.7 to 0.8 considered in successful public road implementation

include; precisely written regulatory framework for easy interpretation, using staff who are

familiar with implementation of public road construction projects and employing staff with

appropriate academic qualifications. Under monitoring activities, key indicators with

respective factor loadings of 0.675, 0.597, 0.858 and 0.820 are frequent inspections to check

on timely recording of project progress, ensure timely project completion, proper storage

methods to prevent damage and theft of construction materials. For sanctions to achieve

compliance, key indicators with corresponding factor loadings are penalties on those found

guilty without any warning (0.812), implementing sanctions in secret (0.862) and imposing

sanctions with negative consequences (0.569) all together determine effective sanctions.

While in contractors’ resistance, key indicators with strong corresponding factor loadings

include; contractors’ readiness to take action against bad decisions (0.856) and contractors’

knowledge on public road procurement process (0.779). Perceived inefficiency of regulatory

framework obtained three key indicators with strong factor loadings including; banning

negotiation between contractors and public officers during road construction (0.730), banning

contract extension beyond agreed schedule (0.845) and banning underperforming contractors

(0.742). Compliance with regulatory framework obtained four key indicators with strong

indicator loadings including; proper authorisation of road construction projects (0.895), timely

delivery of road construction projects (0.663), timely recording of road construction

transactions (0.719) and achieving construction project objectives (0.727). While three key

indicators with strong coefficients measured the success of public road construction projects.

They include; that road construction projects should be implemented in accordance with

specifications (0.728), completed within schedule (0.883) and road completed within budget

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(0.858). Hence, management should pay attention to these indicators to enforce compliance

and successful implementation of public road construction projects.

8.4 Methodological Contribution

This thesis drew a sample from Uganda’s public road construction subsector comprising

of both public and private entities. Opinions of participants on items raised in the research

instrument were tested using a One-way-ANOVA and found to be similar. A cross-sectional

survey involving quantitative data analysis tools was used to establish significant factors

enhancing compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and the success of public

road construction projects. Additionally, mediation effect of compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework on project success of public road construction was

determined quantitatively. Notably, mediation effects are emerging in the construction

industry. Accordingly, this thesis contributes to construction management and public

procurement fields by considering a mediating role of compliance with regulatory framework

in implementing public road construction projects.

Robustness of Structural Equation Modeling using partial Least Square in Smart-PLS

established reliable measurement indicators and estimated a combined validated model

including compliance and project success that management should emphasise when

implementing public road construction projects. This dissertation contributes by providing

empirical findings using a combination of statistical tools including; Partial least squares

Structural Equation Modeling in Smart-PLS version 3, Statistical Package for Social Scientists

version 24 and Sobel test in Med-Graph Excel programme version 3. Little is known about

combined use of these statistical tools in one study. Previous studies that explored compliance

and project success models sequentially used either correlations or regressions in SPSS.

Comparatively, this dissertation applied combined software applications to estimate

compliance model, project success model and determined mediation effects in an extended

model.

8.5 Knowledge Contribution

In this section, the dissertation presents contribution to the body of literature under three

main themes including compliance model, project success model and mediation effects. Under

compliance model, this thesis contributes to existing public procurement compliance and

construction management studies generally and particularly in public road construction by

proving that sanctions on staff, perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

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framework and contractors’ resistance to non-compliance are significant compliance factors

enhancing compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing public road

construction projects. Thesis findings conform to the two theories emphasising these factors in

achieving compliance with principal’s goals and organizational norms respectively (Van Slyke,

2007, Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). In addition, these findings are in line with Parker’s

holistic compliance model (Krambia-Kapardis, 2019, Parker and Nielsen, 2017)

Under the project success model, this thesis contributes by determining that compliance with

public procurement regulatory frameworks, familiarity with these regulatory frameworks,

monitoring activities on public road construction projects, professionalism of staff concerned

with public road construction projects, and perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory frameworks are significant factors responsible for successful implementation of

public road construction projects. Researchers are encouraged to shift from previously used

project success factors such as time, cost, quality and, safety and consider these new significant

factors in meeting project objectives since little is known about using these factors in the

construction industry internationally. For example, to successfully implement quality

construction projects, monitoring various implementation activities is important (Hussain et al.,

2019, Lapidus and Yves, 2018, Blount et al., 2017). Furthermore, training of staff is important

to enhance familiarity and professionalism by having a competent construction team (Tayeh et

al., 2018). Such training would ensure construction team obtain necessary skills and knowledge

to successfully implement public construction projects (Gambo et al., 2016, Jari and Bhangale,

2013). This is inevitable because successful construction projects rely on successful

performance of the implementation team (Doloi et al., 2011, Shaban, 2008). This notion is

evidenced in UK where continuous professionalism is encouraged leading to a successful

construction industry (Wall and Ahmed, 2008).

Under mediation, the dissertation contributes to construction management and public

procurement research field by uncovering the strong mediating role of compliance with the

public procurement regulatory framework that collectively would help government to

implement public road construction projects successfully. Since no single factor can reliably

lead to attainment of objectives, blending these factors through a hybrid governance system Su

et al. (2018), would enable the government to achieve value for money, increase quality and

quantity of paved roads and saving funds that can be channeled to other priority sectors for

economic development (Tayeh et al., 2018). The findings enrich stakeholders’ understanding

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of interactive mechanism through a mediating role of compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework and compliance factors in successfully implementing public road

construction projects. Management should note that relying on staff familiarity, monitoring

activities, sanctions and contractors’ resistance alone might not be effective in implementing

public road construction projects successfully. However, simultaneously introducing

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework proves more effective in an

interactive process.

8.6 Practical Contribution

Despite the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA)

conducting various procurement reforms, public procurement sensitisation, proposing

sanctions, all aiming at increasing efficiency of regulatory framework, a lack of compliance is

persistent (Agaba and Shipman, 2007). Complex public road construction projects in a dynamic

environment require careful attention to meet their objectives. Eradicating inefficiencies within

a regulatory framework for clear interpretation, effective sanctions enforcement and

empowering contractors to take actions against deviant public officers through an effective and

efficient remedy mechanism, altogether enhance compliance in public road construction

projects. Integrating these factors during public road implementation would stand to increase

the coverage of the quality paved road network. However, influence peddling exemplified by

executive orders by His Excellency the President among others with conflicting opinions and

interests render the regulatory framework ineffective thereby affecting compliance in public

road construction projects. Influence peddling predominantly affects compliance in the

construction industry (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Signor et al., 2017). Such executive orders should

work within a formal framework to identify potential providers and produce good contracts in

complex construction projects with many emergent requirements (Fellows and Liu, 2012).

Political influence accounts for cost overruns in construction projects (Love et al., 2018a).

International literature show that cost overruns in construction projects are not seldom on

procurement irregularities but political interference and government announcing of budgeted

project cost early without detailed analysis are potential factors that could affect

implementation process (Love et al., 2019, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018). Early cost

estimations are misleading and count for 25% of the actual project cost (Terrill and Danks,

2016). This is crucial because a number of factors that contribute significantly to contract value

variations challenges construction projects. For example, cost of labour, materials, equipment,

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interest rates on borrowing, market conditions among others (Love et al., 2019, Adafin et al.,

2015).

Referring to item PR14 of the instrument, senior staff agreed that road implementation teams

lack required knowledge in road implementation and hence suggesting project-based training.

Furthermore, contractor managers should not change road implementation team without

government’s knowledge. It has been a common practice for road contractors to change staff

on particular road construction projects after contract award without government approval

especially by subcontracting. Substandard road construction works are blamed on

inexperienced staff in road construction as reflected by item PR19. For example, contractors

may have 15 years’ experience in road construction but not necessarily in constructing highway

roads. This is attributed to lack of capacity locally, hence depending on foreign work forces

that are costly. Road construction projects are not completed on time due to lack of strict

adherence to contract specifications and bureaucracies as reflected in item PS1 of the

instrument. Such findings are useful to stakeholders by understanding effects of not complying

with project specifications and governing regulatory framework. Understanding consequences

of non-compliance, would in turn help to develop factors for promoting compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework and successfully implement public road construction

projects.

The dissertation has identified key measurement indicators for study variables with high

internal consistency, strong convergent and discriminant validities which provides the

government and future researchers a solid reliable ground to explore set targets. Additionally,

the study exhumed strong blended and interactive effects among significant factors including

compliance, familiarity, monitoring activities, sanctions and contractors’ resistance to

successfully implement public road construction projects. This should be achieved by

simultaneously applying these significant factors as portrayed from mediation effects (Su et

al., 2018). Strong interactive effects are enhanced through established measurement indicators

of compliance including; proper project authorisation, timely project delivery and recording of

project transactions, and achievable project objectives with corresponding measurement

indicators of familiarity, monitoring activities, sanctions and contractors’ resistance that

strongly influence successful project implementation. As noted in literature, over 77% of

Uganda’s national road network is not paved (Uganda National Road Authority, 2018). Given

the findings of this thesis, once government implements them carefully, more national roads

would be paved within ten years. This could be achieved by improving compliance with public

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procurement regulatory framework and project implementation based on the significant

factors, recommendations provided in this dissertation and increasing awareness about these

factors. This leads to the conclusions and recommendations in chapter nine.

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CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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9.1 Introduction Under this chapter, conclusions, recommendations, limitations and areas for further research

are presented. The conclusions are in line with respective study objectives and hypotheses

based on validated results in chapter seven.

9.2 Compliance with Public Procurement Regulatory Framework Hypothesis one: Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework increases

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The results established that

familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework has an insignificant effect on

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = 0.000, t = 0.001, p = 0.999).

Hence, H1 was not supported. The findings imply that simplifying regulatory framework

governing public road construction projects for easy interpretation, using staff who are familiar

with implementation of these projects and employing staff with appropriate academic

qualification to work on applicable road construction projects are not effective in increasing

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The results are not consistent with

earlier studies and theory recommendations (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011, Gelderman et al., 2006).

This is because qualified and experienced staff who are familiar with project requirements as

demonstrated by demographic results in chapter six are used to implement Uganda’s public

road construction projects. Indicators used might have not been exhaustive, further

investigation is needed.

Hypothesis two: Monitoring activities on public road construction projects increases

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The results established that

monitoring activities on public road construction projects has an insignificant inverse effect on

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = -0.046, t = 0.522, p = 0.601).

Hence, H2 was not supported. This implies that increased frequent inspections to check on

timely recording of project progress, timely project completion and proper storage methods are

not effective in increasing compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The

findings are in both support of Tabish and Jha (2015), Rutherford et al. (2007), yet contradict

earlier studies as well as theory recommendations (Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015). Given current

investigations in public road construction projects, staff are aware of the consequences of not

complying with the project requirements and regulatory framework. Though all these studies

were in different fields and at different times with varying factors, further studies are

encouraged to establish a firm ground for consistency.

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Hypothesis three: Professionalism of staff in public road construction projects

increases compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The findings revealed

that professionalism of staff in public road construction projects has an insignificant inverse

effect on compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = -0.102, t = 1.250, p

= 0.211). Hence, H3 was not supported. Measurement indicators of professionalism of staff

consisted of high staff professional integrity, professional judgement during decision-making,

high level of confidentiality, practical experience in road construction and required expertise

in road construction. This implies that these indicators are not effective in increasing

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework because road implementation team

is competent and experienced. This is demonstrated by improvement strategies through

capacity building embraced by respective government agencies (Uganda National Road

Authority, 2018). In addition, the team observes ethical codes enforced by their respective

professional bodies. The findings are in line with previous studies Eyaa and Oluka (2011) while

contradicting other scholars and theory recommendations (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). While

these studies are in different fields globally and tackle compliance in a limited context, little is

known about professionalism in the construction sector and the results of this thesis suggest

further studies for consistency.

Hypothesis four: Sanctions on staff in public road construction projects increases

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The findings proved that sanctions

on staff in public road construction projects have positive significant effect on compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework (α = 0.315, t = 3.540, p = 0.000). Hence, H4 was

supported significantly. Sanctions on staff was measured through imposing penalties on those

found guilty without any warning and implementing sanctions with negative consequences.

This implied that these indicators were effective in increasing compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework. Consequently, the government should emphasise the use

of sanctions in public road construction projects. These findings are consistent with many

previous studies and theory recommendations (Shan et al., 2017, Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013,

Scott, 2013, Wirick, 2009).

Hypothesis five: Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework

reduces compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. The findings found that

perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework has a significant inverse

effect on compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (α = -0.253, t = 3.052, p

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= 0.002). Hence, H5 was supported significantly. Perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework was measured using three indicators including; banning negotiation

between contractors and public officers during road construction, banning contract extension

beyond agreed schedule and banning underperforming contractors. This implied that if these

indicators were not enforced effectively, compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework would be reduced. Thesis findings are contrary to previous works of Gelderman et

al. (2006) but consistent with theory recommendations (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988).

Whereas Gelderman et al. (2006) explored Netherland’s public procurement compliance with

EU Directives using this factor, it was not about compliance in road construction subsector.

Furthermore, this factor is new and need further exploration in various sectors to determine its

consistence.

Hypothesis six: Contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework by public officers increases compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework. The findings revealed that contractors’ resistance to non-compliance

has a positive significant effect on compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

(α = 0.135, t = 2.002, p = 0.045). Hence, H6 was supported significantly. Two indicators

strongly measured contractors’ resistance and they included; contractors’ readiness to take

action against bad decisions and contractors’ knowledge on public road procurement process.

This implied that contractors’ knowledge on public road procurement process and encouraging

them to take action against defiant public officers were effective in increasing compliance with

public procurement regulatory framework. These findings contradict the two previous studies

covering compliance with European Union (EU) Directives among EU member states

(Gelderman et al., 2010, Gelderman et al., 2006). However, the findings are supported by

theory recommendations encouraging contractors’ empowerment to ensure compliance in

public procurement (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). As an emerging factor in determining

compliance, further investigations are recommended globally and across different fields using

this factor to cement current findings.

9.3 Public Road Construction Project Success Hypothesis seven: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework in

public road construction projects leads to project success. The findings showed that compliance

with public procurement regulatory framework in public road construction projects has a

positive significant effect on the success of these projects (α = 0.147, t = 1.957, p = 0.050).

Hence, H7 was supported significantly. Compliance with public procurement regulatory

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framework was measured using; Proper authorisation of road construction projects, timely

delivery of road construction projects, timely recording of road construction transactions and

achievable road construction objectives. While success of public road construction projects

was measured using; road construction projects are implemented in accordance with

specifications, road construction projects are completed within schedule and road construction

projects are completed within budget. Implying that emphasising these indicators, would

ensure successful implementation of public road construction projects and meeting government

objectives. The findings are supported by previous recommendations requiring strengthening

of the regulatory framework and adhering to it for successful project implementation (Zadawa

et al., 2018a, Shan et al., 2017, Tabish and Jha, 2011, Obanda, 2010, Lisa, 2010). Despite

compliance studies emerging in the construction industry, few studies indirectly mentioned

road construction subsector. This calls for further investigations to concretise current findings.

Hypothesis eight: Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework

governing public road construction projects leads to project success. The findings show that

familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework governing public road construction

projects has a positive significant effect on the success of these projects (α = 0.140, t = 2.231,

p = 0.026). Hence, H8 was supported significantly. Implying that simplifying regulatory

framework governing public road construction projects for easy interpretation, using staff who

are familiar with implementation of these projects and employing staff with appropriate

academic qualification to work on applicable road construction projects effectively leads to

successful implementation of public road construction projects. These findings correspond to

previous studies and institutional theory advocating for staff familiarity to enhance project

success (Tabish and Jha, 2015, Mahmood, 2010, North, 1993). This emerging project success

factor requires further investigation to establish consistency with current findings.

Hypothesis nine: Monitoring activities on public road construction projects leads to

project success. The findings showed that monitoring activities on public road construction

projects has a positive significant effect on the success of these projects (α = 0.314, t = 4.875,

p = 0.000). Hence, H9 was supported significantly. This implies that increased frequent

inspections to check on timely recording of project progress, timely project completion and

proper storage methods effectively measured monitoring activities leads to successful

implementation of public road construction projects. The findings are in conformance with

previous studies and theories emphasising effective monitoring of project activities to realise

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goals (North, 2016, Love et al., 2016b, DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Van Slyke, 2007).

Management should enforce monitoring of road construction projects and further testing of this

factor in construction industry is paramount.

Hypothesis ten: Professionalism of staff in public road construction projects leads to

project success. The findings show that professionalism of staff has a positive significant effect

on the success of public road construction projects (α = 0.305, t = 4.695, p = 0.000). Hence,

H10 was supported significantly, implying that high staff professional integrity, professional

judgement during decision-making, high level of confidentiality, employing practically

experienced road construction staff with required expertise strongly measured professionalism

leading to successful implementation of public road construction projects. While little is known

about the effect of professionalism in promoting project success, limited studies and theories

encourage staff competence and expertise in project implementation (Tayeh et al., 2018,

Walker and Lloyd-Walker, 2015, DiMaggio and Powell, 2015, Kalinzi, 2014, Wall and

Ahmed, 2008, Alinaitwe et al., 2007). This compels researchers to roll the ball forward by

expanding current dissertation findings to greater heights for concrete recommendations.

Hypothesis eleven: Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

framework reduces project success. The findings have proved that perceived inefficiency of

public procurement regulatory framework has a significant inverse effect on the success of

public road construction projects (α = -0.135, t = 2.099, p = 0.036). Hence, H11 was supported

significantly. This implied that banning negotiation between contractors and public officers

during road construction, banning contract extension beyond agreed period and banning of

underperforming contractors if not enforced effectively, successful implementation of public

road construction projects will be reduced. The findings conform to recommendations

encouraging an efficient regulatory framework in managing project implementation (Shan et

al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2016, Tabish and Jha, 2015, Tabish and Jha, 2011, Oliver, 1991). Since

this is an emerging factor in public procurement and construction industry, further research

using this factor is encouraged to cement current findings.

Hypothesis twelve: Contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework leads to project success. The findings revealed that

contractors’ resistance to non-compliance has a positive insignificant effect on the success of

public road construction projects (α = 0.121, t = 1.792, p = 0.073). Hence, H12 was supported

but statistically insignificant. Implying that contractors’ knowledge on public road

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procurement process and encouraging them to take action against defiant public officers

measured contractors’ resistance effectively to predict successful implementation of public

road construction projects. However, the predictive effect is not significant at 5% significance

level. Despite the findings corresponding to scanty studies exploring compliance with EU

procurement directives (Gelderman et al., 2010), this factor is new in public procurement and

construction industry. Hence, further investigation is needed to build strong ground for its

application.

Hypothesis thirteen: Sanctions on staff in public road construction projects leads to

project success. The findings show that sanctions on staff in public road construction projects

has an inverse insignificant effect on the success of public road construction projects (α = -

0.059, t = 0.856, p = 0.392). Hence, H13 was not supported. This implied that imposing

sanctions in the form of penalties on staff were not effective in implementing public road

construction projects successfully. This is attributed to massive investigation by judicial arms

ordered by Ugandan Parliament (Red Pepper, 21st October 2016). Whereas sanctions on staff

on public road construction projects were effective in achieving compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework (see section 7.2.4) Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013), they

contradict limited studies and theories recommending use of sanctions to successfully

implement construction projects (Kakitahi et al., 2016, Hartley, 2009, Sohail and Cavill, 2008,

Saam, 2007). Further investigation is recommended to establish consistency of these findings.

9.4 Mediational effects Hypothesis fourteen: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

mediates the relationship between familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework

and project success. The findings proved that compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework partially mediated the relationship between familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework and project success (Sobel z-value = 2.204, p = 0.027). Hence, H14 was

significantly supported. Implying that successful implementation of public road construction

projects is realised when both familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are

applied simultaneously (Su et al., 2018, Andrevski et al., 2014). Combining these two factors

provided a good interactive effect on the success of public road construction projects.

Hypothesis fifteen: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

mediates the relationship between monitoring activities on public road construction projects

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and project success. The findings have established that compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework partially mediated the relationship between monitoring activities on

public road construction projects and project success (Sobel z-value = 2.000, p = 0.045). Hence,

H15 was significantly supported. This proves that successful implementation of public road

construction projects is achieved when both monitoring activities and compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are enforced simultaneously

(Tabish and Jha, 2015, Jha and Misra, 2007).

Hypothesis sixteen: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

mediates the relationship between professionalism of staff in public road construction projects

and project success. The findings show that compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework insignificantly mediated the relationship between professionalism of staff in public

road construction projects and project success (Sobel z-value = 1.935, p = 0.0530). Hence, H16

was not supported. This implies that successful implementation of public road construction

projects is realised when both professionalism among staff on public road construction projects

and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are

applied sequentially (Tabish and Jha, 2015, Deng et al., 2014). Despite insignificant partial

mediation, combining these two factors displayed a fair interactive effect on success of public

road construction as demonstrated by the z-value and p-value that are close to cut-off points.

Hypothesis seventeen: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

mediates the relationship between sanctions on staff in public road construction projects and

project success. The findings have proved that compliance with public procurement regulatory

framework partially mediated the relationship between sanctions on staff in public road

construction projects and project success (Sobel z-value = 2.388, p = 0.017). Hence, H17 was

significantly supported. Implying that successful implementation of public road construction

projects is realised when both sanctions on staff in public road construction projects and

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework governing these projects are

simultaneously applied (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Shu Hui et al., 2011). These two factors have

displayed a good interactive effect on the success of public road construction projects through

their respective indicators.

Hypothesis eighteen: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

mediates the relationship between perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

framework and project success. The findings revealed that compliance with public procurement

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regulatory framework does not mediate the relationship between perceived inefficiency of

public procurement regulatory framework and project success. Hence, H18 was not supported.

Whereas compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and perceived

inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework predicted public road construction

project success when applied separately, there is a poor interactive effect between these factors

through their respective indicators. Hence, sequential application of these factors is preferred

rather than applying them simultaneously.

Hypothesis nineteen: Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

mediates the relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework by public officers and project success. The findings show

that compliance with public procurement regulatory framework partially mediated the

relationship between contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework and project success (Sobel z-value = 2.410, p = 0.016). Hence, H19 was

significantly supported. Thus, successful implementation of public road construction projects

is realised when both contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

governing these projects are applied simultaneously (Shu Hui et al., 2011, Gelderman et al.,

2010).

9.5 Recommendations

This section presents recommendations in line with respective study objectives and

hypotheses based on discussion of results in chapter seven.

Whereas there are limited studies on perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework in achieving compliance, this dissertation discovered that it is effective

in reducing non-compliance in public road construction projects. It is recommended that the

government should stick to banning negotiations during project implementation, banning

contract extension beyond agreed schedule and banning underperforming contractors. These

indicators would ensure a clear and efficient public procurement regulatory framework capable

of enforcing compliance with public procurement regulatory framework, successful

implementation of public road construction projects and meeting government goals. A vibrant

public procurement regulatory framework is necessary for complex public road construction

projects to meet government objectives. This would ensure eradicating loopholes within

regulatory framework and achieve value for money. The government should come up with

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clear policies and procedures operating these projects to avoid confusing public road

implementation team.

Furthermore, there are limited studies on contractors’ resistance in achieving

compliance, this dissertation discovered effectiveness of contractors’ contribution to this effect.

The government should empower contractors by increasing their knowledge over the public

procurement regulatory framework and encouraging them to take action against bad decisions

from public officers during project implementation. These were basic indicators measuring

contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework

governing public road construction projects and are effective to meet government objectives.

Empowering contractors would ensure successful implementation of public road construction

projects because they are competent and experienced in implementing these projects. However,

government should strengthen regulatory framework with well-outlined remedial mechanisms

to protect contractors from retaliation of public officers. An effective remedy mechanism

would encourage contractors to resist bad decisions from public officers without fear. This is

important since public officers manage the whole procurement process that makes them

powerful and can victimise contractors in awarding future contracts.

Management should redesign an effective sanctions enforcement mechanism including

penalising those found guilty without any warning, implementing sanctions in secret and

imposing sanctions with negative consequences. These key indicators measuring sanctions

would form effective sanctions that increase fear among staff implementing public road

construction projects leading to compliance with public procurement regulatory framework and

successful implementation of public road construction projects. Punitive sanctions like contract

termination, suspension, confiscation of property and none payments are widely applied. For

example, in the US, UK and Australia among others to achieve compliance and once the legal

fraternity is strengthened, value for money will be attained (Wirick, 2009). Furthermore, strict

penalties are inevitable for the construction sector (Zadawa et al., 2018b, Gambo et al., 2016).

Regular transfers and rotation of staff is recommended in curbing unethical behaviours since

holding one position for long time allow officers to create links. This is an indirect sanctioning

measure to eradicate collusion associated with over staying in one position or workstation.

Additional punitive measures may include but are not limited to; demotion, long time prison

sentencing, confiscating property of those found guilty and introducing attractive rewarding

schemes for outperforming staff.

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The government should embark on improving staff familiarity with public procurement

regulatory framework governing public road construction projects since it has a positive impact

in implementing these projects successfully. Strengthening and clarity of the public

procurement regulatory framework should be enforced to avoid loopholes that are manipulated

by unethical public road stakeholders especially on contract variation during project

implementation. The public procurement regulatory framework governing road construction

projects should be written in a nonprofessional language that can easily be interpreted by

stakeholders involved. Management should encourage qualified and competent staff in public

road implementation. This would be through a transparent and merit-based selection criterion

requiring formal academic qualifications and experienced competent team. These indicators

strongly represent staff familiarity in implementing public road construction projects

successfully. Because public road construction projects are complicated, multidimensional

skills are required to cope with ever changing project needs in the dynamic environment.

Careful selection of the team based on their capabilities would lead to successful

implementation of public road construction projects.

Management should proactively monitor public road construction projects to determine if

project activities are in line with government objectives. Monitoring project activities ensures

successful implementation of public road construction projects. Effective monitoring of public

road construction projects further ensures that set targets are met and eliminating cost and time

overruns which are common in the construction industry. Effective monitoring should

emphasise strong measurement indicators including; timely recording of public road

construction progress, frequent inspections to ensure timely completion of these projects and

proper storage methods to avoid damage and stealing of public road construction materials.

Furthermore, multi-agency monitoring of project activities is vital in enforcing successful

project implementation. However, management should set up a clear description of the roles

of each agency and scope to avoid clashes and confusion that hamper successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Additionally, involving and empowering

the civil society in monitoring public road construction projects is encouraged. Involving civil

society would help in ensuring that public road construction projects are implemented

according to project specifications. Whereas the Whistle-blowers Act encourages this,

literature shows that the civil society is not empowered and protected from powerful unethical

fraudsters who can do anything to the lives of those daring to report them.

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Management need to embrace continuous professionalism of public sector procurement

covering public road construction projects. Continuously investing in staff professionalism is

embraced by the UK construction industry (Wall and Ahmed, 2008). Professionalism should

be in harmony with international standards. Professionalism in public road construction

projects should be enforced by ensuring high staff professional integrity, confidentiality,

professional judgement in decision-making during construction process and engaging staff who

are practically experienced with required expertise. Emphasising these indicators and investing

in staff competence through skill-needs assessment and project-based training would ensure

professionalism of staff in public road construction projects. Additionally, enforcing

professionalism can be achieved through bodies including; Institute of Procurement

Professionals of Uganda (IPPU) and Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers (UIPE) by

fully empowering them to enforce respective standards in public procurement and construction

sectors.

Complying with the public procurement regulatory framework is encouraged to ensure

successful implementation of public road construction projects. Management should rely on

compliance measurement indicators including; proper authorisation of road construction

projects, timely delivery of road construction projects, timely recording of road construction

transaction and achievable road construction objectives. Emphasising these indicators would

ensure that public road construction projects are implemented according to project

specifications, completed within time and budget as indicators of project success. Once

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework is effectively enforced in

implementing public road construction projects, the government would save significant funds

and achieve value for money by building quality durable roads. Saved funds could be

channelled to other priority sectors for example; modernisation of agriculture, poverty

eradication and increasing paved road network countrywide especially to rural agricultural

areas to beef up marketing of agricultural products.

Finally, for the government to successfully implement public road construction projects,

mediating role of compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework should be

considered. Management should consider mediation effects sequentially involving familiarity

with public procurement regulatory framework, monitoring activities on public road

construction projects, sanctions on staff involved in these projects and contractors’ resistance

through compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. A combination of these

factors demonstrated good interactive effects in successful implementation of public road

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construction projects. Applying compliance with one of these factors simultaneously would

ensure that public road construction projects are implemented in accordance with project

specifications, completed in time and within budget. This demonstrates successful

implementation of public road construction projects. Furthermore, mediation effect involving

professionalism of staff in public road construction projects and compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework should not be ignored since its scored significance level of

0.05 is at the border mark showing good effective size measures of both direct and indirect

relationship that are predictively relevant.

9.6 Limitations

Like any academic research endeavour, this dissertation acknowledges a number of

limitations. Public procurement is broad since it includes procurement of works, supplies and

services. With works, public procurement of works is not only broad but also complex. Because

of these factors, the thesis was limited to implementation stage of public road construction

projects. Under this level, the dissertation was concerned with compliance and project

implementation issues affecting successful implementation of public road construction

projects. Specifically, the thesis focused on national road construction projects and left out

local governments’ roads including districts and urban roads. Under national roads category,

the thesis considered responses from five organisations that it believed had necessary

information. Despite the UNRA’s voluntary refusal to participate in this study, other

organisations were left out that are indirectly involved in public road construction activities.

For example; Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development (MoFEP&D),

Inspector General of Government (IGG), Attorney General (AG), President’s office and the

public. This move was considered to meet time constraint placed on PhD studies. Accordingly,

generalising dissertation results are limited to national road construction projects since not all

factors affecting implementation of national road construction projects are applicable to local

government roads. Furthermore, given that the sample was drawn from Uganda, dissertation

results should be consciously applied beyond Uganda’s public road construction subsector in

general and particularly beyond national roads. However, since sample size determination

criteria following a ten time’s thumb rule required by PLS-SEM was satisfactory, statistical

generalisation of this results is allowed (Hussain et al., 2019). In addition, given high

standardisation of construction projects globally, there is little difference in factors influencing

successful implementation of these projects (Hussain et al., 2019). Accordingly, with

interesting findings and good lessons for construction industry stakeholders, some level of

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generalisation is inevitable but full generalisation would not be allowed (Papadonikolaki,

2018). In addition, selection of participants as a unit of inquiry was limited to particular

departments and not entire organisations. This was another limitation since the study could

have missed important information from other departments.

Another limitation was lack of empirical literature on public road construction projects in

Uganda. This affected study examples and the thesis majorly relied on international literature

from nations including Australia, United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA).

Since there is substantial difference in each country’s jurisdiction, with varying problem

causes, examples used could have a different impact on compliance with the public

procurement regulatory framework and successful implementation of public road construction

projects. Additionally, the study emphasised government agencies in road construction and

paid little attention to private sector that could have had relevant information. Despite including

private contractors, their representation to private sector was insufficient. There were

challenges in accessing premises and respondents failing to complete questionnaires because

they were suspicious about the use of data provided. However, assurance was given by stating

that the study was purely academic and identification of participants was purely anonymous.

Furthermore, the research permit from the University of Newcastle’s human research ethics

committee was used to seek permission and reassure participants. This resulted in a 64.9%

response rate with relevant data ensuring the study success.

Furthermore, limited mediation studies and examples in public road construction subsector

affected this study to comprehensively investigate and compare mediation results. With

dynamic road construction projects, expanding mediating role of compliance with regulatory

framework is important to compare these findings. Limited resources affected this study. For

example, time and financial constraints involving transport cost, follow up phone calls,

repeated visits and some respondents and road construction projects were far upcountry.

However, the deadline for data collection was set and obeyed to work within the given

timeframe. Accordingly, researchers tried to minimise cost and work within budget while

maintaining the goal of achieving target response rate. Finally, the thesis adopted a cross-

sectional research design that limits responses to one point in time compared to longitudinal

studies. Further research considering a longitudinal design is important after completing PhD

that would form part of research publications.

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9.7 Further Research

Based on the study limitations in this thesis, doors are now open for future research. The

current public procurement regulatory compliance and project success models have been

developed and tested for future use. However, factors used here are not exhaustive. This

requires scholars to investigate further to bring on board other factors for comprehensive

compliance and project success models. Whereas these models included six compliance and

seven project success factors respectively, it appears these are the first of their kind. Hence, for

consistency and reliability, using these factors in other sectors would concretise their

application. Furthermore, results from the thesis show that some factors are significant while

others are not and with contradictions from earlier studies, there is need to establish this

inconsistency through conducting similar research using insignificant compliance and project

success factors to determine consistency and concretise these findings.

Mediation studies are emerging in the construction industry compared to other sectors.

Coupled with limited compliance studies, there is need to carry out mediation studies in the

construction sector generally and public road construction subsector particularly using similar

factors as well as introducing new factors. Expanding mediation studies should not only be

industry based but global geographical consideration is paramount. By extending mediation

studies, researchers would ably establish interaction effects in the construction industry based

on compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework, success of public road

construction projects and beyond. Such studies would appreciate and cement usefulness of

mediation effects.

9.8 Conclusion The thesis presented study background, theoretical foundation, literature review, research

methodology, results, discussions and ended with areas for future research. The thesis explored

issues surrounding compliance with the public procurement regulatory framework, public road

construction project success and the mediating role of compliance with public procurement

regulatory framework between compliance factors and the success of public road construction

projects. This thesis study was motivated by numerous reports revealing lack of compliance in

Uganda’s public road construction subsector. In addition, limited studies if any have been

undertaken to determine factors responsible for successful implementation of public road

construction projects. Three validated models (Compliance, Project Success and Mediation)

are established to guide in implementing public road construction projects. Implementing

public road construction projects following these models would enable government to meet its

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objectives, save significant funds and increase the paved road network nationwide. Saved funds

could be channelled to other priority sectors to steer economic development and eradicate

poverty.

It is established that because of the complexity of public road construction projects with

huge budget allocations, unethical issues arose affecting successful implementation of public

road construction projects, thus failing government objectives. The dissertation established that

key factors including sanctions on staff, perceived inefficiency of public procurement

regulatory framework and contractors’ resistance to non-compliance significantly enhanced

compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. While compliance with public

procurement regulatory framework, familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework,

monitoring activities on public road construction projects, professionalism of staff involved in

public road construction projects and perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory

framework significantly enhanced successful implementation of public road construction

projects. Furthermore, compliance with public procurement regulatory framework is a key

mediating factor between familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework,

monitoring activities on public road construction projects, sanctions on staff, and contractors’

resistance and success of public road construction projects. This informs the government and

management on the importance of strengthening and enforcing compliance with the regulatory

framework to ensure successful implementation of public construction projects.

The research question “What factors affect compliance in performance of public road

construction projects”, together with the dissertation objectives and hypotheses, enabled this

work to traverse through factors responsible for compliance with the public procurement

regulatory framework and successful implementation of these projects. The thesis dug out

significant and insignificant compliance and project success factors as well as the mediating

effects responsible for successful implementation of public road construction projects to make

recommendations. Whereas previous studies attempted to establish success factors for the

construction industry, scholars only concentrated on direct factors influencing success of

construction projects. This thesis went a step beyond to establish an interactive effect among

success factors by considering a mediating role of compliance with regulatory framework in

implementing public road construction projects. These mediation effects have proved effective.

Hence, suggesting future scholars to shift from predicting direct relationships among factors

but to consider mediation in finding possible solutions on challenges facing public procurement

and construction sectors. Several recommendations are drawn based on significant results.

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Once these recommendations are carefully implemented, the government would be able to

achieve its objectives in the interest of public community. These recommendations are in line

with reports demanding an effective procurement of transport construction projects to sustain

a competitive advantage and economic growth (Love et al., 2019, Sinesilassie et al., 2019).

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APPENDICES Appendix A. Exchange rate (As at 21/11/2016)

1 UGX = 0.00038 AU$, 1 US$ = 1.360 AU$, 1Tsh = 0.00062 AU$ and 1ksh = 0.013 AU$.

Appendix B. Publications

Extracted papers from the thesis for publication in peer reviewed journal

1. Compliance within a regulatory framework in implementing public road construction

projects: Journal of Construction Economics and Building.(Published already)

2. Success factors for implementing Uganda’s public road construction projects:

International Journal of Construction Management. (Published already)

3. Compliance mediating role within road construction regulatory framework: Journal of

Public Procurement. (Accepted for publication)

Published refereed journal articles

1. Compliance within a regulatory framework in implementing public road construction

projects: Journal of Construction Economics and Building.

2. Success factors for implementing Uganda’s public road construction projects:

International Journal of Construction Management.

3. Lean manufacturing and profitability of manufacturing firms in Uganda: European

Journal of Business and Management.

4. Outsourcing practices and profitability levels of manufacturing firms in Uganda:

European Journal of Business and Management.

5. Risk management and profitability of manufacturing firms in Uganda: Industrial

Engineering Letters.

6. Testing for volatility and market efficiency of Uganda securities exchange: Journal of

Research in Business, Economics and Management.

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Appendix C. Questionnaire

Dear respondent

This questionnaire is to collect data on an on-going PhD study at University of Newcastle, Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment, School of Architecture and Built Environment, Australia.

The study is on compliance and regulatory framework in public procurement road construction projects in Uganda. You are selected to participate in this study as one of the respondents.

Please allow approximately twenty (20) minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire. Your answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Note that information provided here is only for academic purpose and will be confidential. Please rate/indicate/tick () appropriately your response in respect to level of agreement with the statements below:

A. Familiarity with regulatory framework 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly

Agree 1 2 3 4 5

F1 The procurement regulatory framework is written in the way that is easily understood.

F2 In road project implementation, familiarity with the procurement regulatory framework is the basic requirement for staff.

F3 In road project implementation, only those familiar with the regulatory framework carry out procurement tasks.

F4 I frequently participate in training programs that aims to increase my familiarity with the regulatory framework.

F5 I am familiar with the public procurement regulatory framework in road construction projects.

F6 I have worked on similar road construction projects for a long time.

F7 I am familiar with road construction implementation processes.

F8 I have intimate understanding of road construction implementation strategies.

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F9 Inadequate knowledge with the regulatory framework negatively affects compliance in road construction projects.

F10 Road construction project implementation team have limited access to information to carry out their work.

F11 I can interpret all sections of the regulatory framework on road construction projects.

F12 I have sufficient knowledge about the objectives of established regulatory framework.

F13 Only staff with appropriate academic qualifications work on applicable road construction projects.

F14 Procurement officers and contract committee members should have knowledge on procedures for project implementation.

F15 I have been made awareness of the regulatory framework governing the project implementation.

B. Monitoring activities

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5

M1 There are regular reports on activities/targets achieved on road construction projects.

M2 Key road project implementation targets are reported on regular intervals.

M3 I provide extensive information regarding project procurement practices to my supervisors.

M4 There are frequent inspections to check whether I record project progress activities on time.

M5 Road construction projects are supervised by a contracts committee.

M6 I am frequently asked to report on my activities.

M7 I always receive directives on how to carry out road project implementation.

M8 I am assessed based on reported project implementation performance.

M9 Project performance reports are verified through physical on site evaluations.

M10 Management monitors the extent road implementation activities are progressing in line with regulatory framework.

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M11 There are frequent inspections to determine whether I comply with regulatory framework.

M12 There are frequent inspections to determine whether the project is implemented within established regulatory framework.

M13 There are frequent inspections to determine whether I ensure timely completion of the road construction project.

M14 There are frequent inspections to determine whether I apply proper storage methods to prevent damage of road construction materials.

M15 There are frequent inspections to determine whether I apply proper storage methods to prevent theft of road construction materials.

M16 There are frequent inspections to determine whether any variations in project implementation is approved by relevant authorities.

C. Professionalism 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly

Agree 1 2 3 4 5

PR1 I am always under pressure to deviate from road project implementation process.

PR2 Procurement officers are guided by professional code in performing procurement tasks.

PR3 Staff undertaking road construction project exercise high level of professional integrity.

PR4 I regularly participate in procurement training programs aimed at increasing my professional behavior.

PR5 The level of professionalism amongst project team affects positively on compliance with regulatory framework.

PR6 The level of professionalism amongst project team affects negatively on compliance with regulatory framework.

PR7 Pressure from interested parties on road construction projects influence my compliance with public procurement regulatory framework.

PR8 As long as my objectives are achieved, I am less concerned about complying with public procurement regulatory framework.

PR9 Training program conducted is related to public procurement process in general.

PR10 Training program conducted is related to road construction implementation process and procedures.

PR11 There is training on each particular road construction project being undertaken.

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PR12 Despite experience, procurement staff must have awareness workshops on public procurement.

PR13 Staff on road implementation have appropriate competence to handle compliance processes.

PR14 Public procurement staff on road construction project lack proper training to comply with implementation procedures.

PR15 Implementation team on road construction is knowledgeable in dealing with their respective tasks during construction process.

PR16 I regularly participate in training programs aimed at increasing my procurement knowledge.

PR17 Training in a timely manner is provided to staff on the road construction projects.

PR18 Road construction team exercise professional judgement in decision making during construction process.

PR19 Road construction staff have practical experience in road construction.

PR20 Staff on the road construction project have required expertise.

PR21 Staff undertaking road construction projects exercise high level of confidentiality.

PR22 Confidentiality is enforced by team throughout project implementation.

PR23 Public procurement officers ought to have certified professional training like CIPS.

PR24 Staff hold appropriate qualifications required by their professional bodies e.g. IPPU, CIPS, Building & Construction association etc.

D. Sanctions

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5

S1 There is penalty for non-compliance with regulatory framework.

S2 I am concerned that my specific benefits will discontinue for non-compliance.

S3 Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) enforce proportional and timely administrative sanction e.g. warnings, suspension, disqualification, dismissal and fines on errant officers.

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S4 Sanctions are effected immediately after a violation of the regulatory framework is detected.

S5 UNRA punishes contractors when they don’t meet specifications during road construction.

S6 UNRA punishes contractors when they don’t follow the regulatory framework during road construction.

S7 Contractors are penalized without any warning for non-compliance.

S8 Sanctions are implemented in secret.

S9 Sanctions with negative consequences are imposed on contractors who fail to meet their obligations.

S10 It is an organizational policy to take action with negative consequences on staff who fail to meet their obligations.

S11 I am sanctioned for not complying with the regulatory framework.

S12 I am provided reasons for implemented penalties.

S13 All stipulated sanctions are known by staff involved in road construction projects.

S14 Failure to comply with public procurement process on road construction will attract retaliation from authorities.

S15 Stipulated penalties in public procurement regulatory framework provide fear of violating it.

S16 I weigh benefits against possible negative outcomes of complying with the regulatory framework.

E. Perceived inefficiency of Public Procurement Regulatory Framework

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5

PI1 There is ban on negotiations between contractor and UNRA team during road construction.

PI2 There is ban on contract extension beyond agreed schedule.

PI3 There is ban on excluding underperforming contractors in road construction.

PI4 I need legal assistance during project implementation of road construction process.

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F. Contractor resistance

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5

CR1 Contractors are ready to take action against bad decision to achieve compliance.

CR2 Contractor’s knowledge on procurement process helps in controlling public officers from making bad decisions.

CR3 Public officers fear to be exposed by contractors if they don’t follow the correct procurement procedures.

G. Compliance with regulatory framework

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5

CP1 Road construction projects are implemented without proper authority.

CP2 Road construction projects are not delivered on time.

CP3 Road implementation transactions are not recorded on time.

CP4 There is always damage or loss of road construction materials during project implementation.

CP5 Road implementation transactions are paid through invoices as per Government policy.

CP6 Road implementation transactions are paid through imprest as per Government policy.

CP7 Adherence to organizational specific directives entails breach of public procurement regulatory framework.

CP8 Particular road construction projects are given conflicting objectives.

CP9 Road construction procedures match with applied public procurement regulatory framework.

CP10 It is easy to achieve road construction project objectives without complying with public procurement regulatory framework.

CP11 I comply with public procurement regulatory framework during road construction project implementation.

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H. Project success 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5

PS1 Road construction projects are implemented in accordance to specifications.

PS2 Road construction projects are completed within schedule.

PS3 Road construction projects are completed within budget.

PS4 Compliance with public procurement regulatory framework leads to public road project success.

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION.

I. Background information

Please fill in or use a tick ( ) to indicate your response where applicable.

1 Your Organization’s Name

MoWT UNRA URF PPDA Contractor

2 Highest education PhD

Master’s degree Bachelor’s degree Diploma Secondary school Primary school Others (please specify) ………………………………………………...

3 Professional training (e.g.)

CIPS CILT ACCA CPA Others (please specify)

….…………………….………

4 Indicate your gender. Female Male

5 Tick the age range which represents you. Below 30

31-40 41-50 Above 50

6 What is your title/position in this organization?

7 How many years have you been working in your current position?

Number of years

8 How many years have you been working in this organization? Number of years

9 How many employees work for this department? Number of employees

10a Are you a registered member of any professional body? Yes No

10b If Yes, name the professional body to which you are registered and category of your membership.

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Appendix D. RESEARCH PERMIT: HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

Notification of Expedited Approval

To Chief Investigator or Project Supervisor: Professor Peter Davis

Cc Co-investigators / Research Students: Mr. Noah Mwelu, Dr Yongjian Ke

Re Protocol: COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN PUBLIC

PROCUREMENT ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS BY UGANDA NATIONAL

ROAD AUTHORITY

Date: 24-Apr-2017

Reference No: H-2017-0056

Date of Initial Approval: 24-Apr-2017

Thank you for your Response to Conditional Approval (minor amendments) submission to the

Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) seeking approval in relation to the above protocol.

Your submission was considered under Expedited review by the Ethics Administrator.

I am pleased to advise that the decision on your submission is Approved effective 24-Apr-2017.

In approving this protocol, the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) is of the opinion

that the project complies with the provisions contained in the National Statement on Ethical

Conduct in Human Research, 2007, and the requirements within this University relating to

human research.

Approval will remain valid subject to the submission, and satisfactory assessment, of annual

progress reports. If the approval of an External HREC has been "noted" the approval period

is as determined by that HREC.

The full Committee will be asked to ratify this decision at its next scheduled meeting. A formal

Certificate of Approval will be available upon request. Your approval number is H-2017-0056.

If the research requires the use of an Information Statement, ensure this number is inserted

at the relevant point in the Complaints paragraph prior to distribution to potential

participants You may then proceed with the research.

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Conditions of Approval

This approval has been granted subject to you complying with the requirements for Monitoring

of Progress, Reporting of Adverse Events, and Variations to the Approved Protocol as detailed

below.

PLEASE NOTE:

In the case where the HREC has "noted" the approval of an External HREC, progress reports

and reports of adverse events are to be submitted to the External HREC only. In the case of

Variations to the approved protocol, or a Renewal of approval, you will apply to the External

HREC for approval in the first instance and then Register that approval with the University's

HREC.

Monitoring of Progress

Other than above, the University is obliged to monitor the progress of research projects

involving human participants to ensure that they are conducted according to the protocol as

approved by the HREC. A progress report is required on an annual basis. Continuation of your

HREC approval for this project is conditional upon receipt, and satisfactory assessment, of

annual progress reports. You will be advised when a report is due.

Reporting of Adverse Events

1. It is the responsibility of the person first named on this Approval Advice to report

adverse events.

2. Adverse events, however minor, must be recorded by the investigator as observed by the

investigator or as volunteered by a participant in the research. Full details are to be

documented, whether or not the investigator, or his/her deputies, consider the event to

be related to the research substance or procedure.

3. Serious or unforeseen adverse events that occur during the research or within six (6)

months of completion of the research, must be reported by the person first named on the

Approval Advice to the (HREC) by way of the Adverse Event Report form (via RIMS at

https://rims.newcastle.edu.au/login.asp) within 72 hours of the occurrence of the event

or the investigator receiving advice of the event.

4. Serious adverse events are defined as:

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Causing death, life threatening or serious disability. Causing or prolonging hospitalisation.

Overdoses, cancers, congenital abnormalities, tissue damage, whether or not they are judged

to be caused by the investigational agent or procedure.

Causing psycho-social and/or financial harm. This covers everything from perceived invasion

of privacy, breach of confidentiality, or the diminution of social reputation, to the creation of

psychological fears and trauma.

Any other event which might affect the continued ethical acceptability of the project.

5. Reports of adverse events must include: Participant's study identification number; date

of birth;

date of entry into the study; treatment arm (if applicable); date of event;

details of event;

the investigator's opinion as to whether the event is related to the research procedures; and

action taken in response to the event.

6. Adverse events which do not fall within the definition of serious or unexpected, including

those reported from other sites involved in the research, are to be reported in detail at

the time of the annual progress report to the HREC.

Variations to approved protocol

If you wish to change, or deviate from, the approved protocol, you will need to submit an

Application for Variation to Approved Human Research (via RIMS at

https://rims.newcastle.edu.au/login.asp). Variations may include, but are not limited to,

changes or additions to investigators, study design, study population, number of participants,

methods of recruitment, or participant information/consent documentation. Variations must

be approved by the (HREC) before they are implemented except when Registering an

approval of a variation from an external HREC which has been designated the lead HREC, in

which case you may proceed as soon as you receive an acknowledgement of your Registration.

Linkage of ethics approval to a new Grant

HREC approvals cannot be assigned to a new grant or award (ie those that were not identified

on the application for ethics approval) without confirmation of the approval from the Human

Research Ethics Officer on behalf of the HREC.

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Best wishes for a successful project.

Associate Professor Helen Warren-Forward

Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee

For communications and enquiries:

Human Research Ethics Administration

Research & Innovation Services Research Integrity Unit

NIER, Block C

The University of Newcastle Callaghan NSW 2308

T +61 2 492 17894

[email protected]

RIMS website - https://RIMS.newcastle.edu.au/login.asp

Linked University of Newcastle administered funding:

Funding body Funding project title First named

investigator

Grant Ref

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Appendix E. Consent Forms

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Compliance and regulatory framework in public procurement road construction

projects by Uganda national road authority

Document Version 1; Dated 18 June 2017

Dear Professor Mark Rubarenzya,

It is with great pleasure that I write to you after the email introduction from our University student and ambassador, Noah Mwelu. In the first instance, I would like to apologise for not responding sooner to your queries arising from your meeting with Noah on 15 June 2017. However, I am sure you will appreciate there are matters that I am required to assess and check when our University students are working remotely from campus in Australia and questions arise.

The survey that is being carried out by Noah is not focused only on UNRA, but a broad cross section of the road construction industry in Uganda. This may be observed with reference to the questionnaire that identifies five strata (please see Page7 of the proposal).

UNRA is believed to be a key respondent because it is core in implementing national road projects and it is crucial to the structure of national roads construction and management. It is the implementing authority for national roads that account for the highest percentage of the road network in Uganda. (please see page 3, 7 and 31 of the proposal).

Whilst the questionnaire is designed to obtain information about that which currently happens, Noah’s overall research question is focused on obtaining benefits for the Ugandan economy, via its procurement and project delivery processes driven by individual companies that work within your regulatory frameworks. In particular I expect that the outcomes of this research will be helpful in developing new policy and governance processes.

This study will establish compliance factors and their impact on road construction performance to devise appropriate means for successful performance (mitigation strategies). This will also enable stakeholders to identify areas for performance improvements hence, successful delivery of road construction projects that achieve value for money.

It is my obligation and as per University of Newcastle research ethics to treat all responses with utmost confidentiality. Only aggregated and anonymous data that will be described in Noah’s thesis document. Therefore, any outputs and all research papers arising from this work will also be treated in the same confidential way. No individual organisations will be identified in any way.

Professor Peter Davis School of Architecture and Built Environment Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment University of Newcastle [email protected]

Noah Mwelu School of Architecture and Built Environment Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment University of Newcastle +61469881060/[email protected]

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Given the above, Noah is appreciative of your assistance in obtaining a good response of around one hundred and two UNRA staff in the Directorate of Procurement, Directorate of Legal, Directorate of Planning, Human Resource department, Monitoring and evaluation, Finance and Administration and Project managers’ works.

At your request, I have attached the following documents;

A PDF copy of the questionnaire that will be distributed to your staff

A PDF copy of the University of Newcastle approved organisational consent form

A PDF copy of Noah’s research proposal that indicates the necessity of UNRA participating toenable a good research outcome.

Yours Sincerely,

Peter Davis Chair of Construction Management Tel +61 2 4985 4315Fax +61 2 4921 6913Mob +61(0) 418 925 343

E [email protected]

EMAILS FROM HEAD OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UGANDA NATIONAL ROADS AUTHORITY

[email protected] Fri 6/16/2017, 10:53 PM Dear Noah,

I am yet to hear from Peter but at least you are familiar with the process of requesting for information from a public institution. When you have all the requisite information then you can write again to the Executive Director with your complete requests. My office is beneath that of the ED.

Kind regards,

Dr. MARK HENRY RUBARENZYA │Head - Research and Development Directorate of Network Planning and Engineering │Uganda National Roads Authority Plot 3-5 New Port Bell Road, UAP Nakawa business park Block C & D P.O.Box 28487 Kampala, Uganda Office: +256312233340 │ Mobile: +256 782 163508 http://www.unra.go.ug/ Twitter:@UNRA_UG Facebook:UNRApage

UNRA - Connecting Uganda

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NOTE: This e-mail message is subject to the UNRA Email Disclaimer @ https://www.unra.go.ug/index.php/131-uncategorised/509-disclaimer [email protected] Wed 6/14/2017, 11:46 PMNoah Mwelu;[email protected];[email protected] Inbox You forwarded this message on 6/15/2017 8:05 PM Dear Noah, following on our phone conversation this afternoon, I invite you to a meeting in UNRA on 15 June 2017 at 11:00am. The subject of the meeting will be your letter dated 12 June 2017, in which you indicate the selection of UNRA to participate in a study that you are undertaking on 'Compliance and regulatory framework in public procurement road construction projects in Uganda'. Kind regards, Dr. MARK HENRY RUBARENZYA │Head - Research and Development Directorate of Network Planning and Engineering │Uganda National Roads Authority Plot 3-5 New Port Bell Road, UAP Nakawa business park Block C & D P.O.Box 28487 Kampala, Uganda Office: +256312233340 │ Mobile: +256 782 163508 http://www.unra.go.ug/ Twitter:@UNRA_UG Facebook:UNRApage UNRA - Connecting Uganda NOTE: This e-mail message is subject to the UNRA Email Disclaimer @ https://www.unra.go.ug/index.php/131-uncategorised/509-disclaimer NOTE: This e-mail message is subject to the UNRA Email Disclaimer @ https://www.unra.go.ug/index.php/131-uncategorised/509-disclaimer

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Appendix F. Outer Loadings

Indicato

rs

Original Sample

(O)

Sample Mean

(M)

Standard Deviation

(STDEV)

T Statistics

(|O/STDEV|)

P

Values

CP1 0.895 0.892 0.018 49.922 0.000

CP10 0.727 0.721 0.056 12.964 0.000

CP2 0.663 0.664 0.073 9.065 0.000

CP3 0.719 0.720 0.064 11.222 0.000

CR1 0.856 0.854 0.044 19.255 0.000

CR2 0.779 0.774 0.064 12.226 0.000

F1 0.746 0.741 0.063 11.885 0.000

F13 0.675 0.669 0.072 9.389 0.000

F3 0.818 0.815 0.041 19.934 0.000

M13 0.597 0.590 0.092 6.515 0.000

M14 0.858 0.856 0.033 26.044 0.000

M15 0.820 0.818 0.041 20.125 0.000

M4 0.675 0.674 0.054 12.602 0.000

PI1 0.730 0.724 0.069 10.614 0.000

PI2 0.845 0.845 0.029 29.381 0.000

PI3 0.742 0.740 0.054 13.825 0.000

PR18 0.682 0.679 0.055 12.433 0.000

PR19 0.686 0.682 0.062 11.036 0.000

PR20 0.714 0.710 0.054 13.237 0.000

PR21 0.791 0.790 0.032 24.654 0.000

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PR3 0.690 0.690 0.057 12.200 0.000

PS1 0.728 0.726 0.049 14.941 0.000

PS2 0.883 0.884 0.017 50.781 0.000

PS3 0.858 0.857 0.027 31.667 0.000

S7 0.812 0.809 0.043 19.055 0.000

S8 0.862 0.861 0.030 28.486 0.000

S9 0.569 0.557 0.106 5.369 0.000

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Appendix G.

Table 1.3: Constructs regrouping

Category Major factors Sub-factors Comment Reference

Environmental factors

Compliance with Public procurement regulatory framework

Regulations

Laws

Rules

Policies

Procedures

Instructions

Public procurement regulatory framework will be a collective term for regulations, laws, rules, policies, procedures, directives and formal instructions used in this study to reflect compliance as our major dependent variable.

Note: Lack of compliance will encompass all issues including but not limited to procurement/project irregularities, corruption, unethical behaviours among others.

Gelderman et al. (2006), Eyaa & Oluka (2011), Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Agaba & Shipman (2007), Basheka & Sabiiti (2011), Golden & Picci (2006), Kulp et al (2006), Obanda (2010), Sutinen & Kuperan (1999), Fleisher (1991), Kauppi & Van Raaij (2015), Rokkan & Buvik (2008 & 2003), Rutherford, Buchholtz & Brown (2007), Tukamuhabwa (2012), Shu Hui et al (2011), Migosi, Ombki & Evusa (2013), Peprah (2015), Osei-Tutu et al. (2011), Boer & Telgen (1998), Zadawa et al. (2015), Karjalainen, Kemppainen & Van Raaij (2009), Payan & McFarland (2005), Keith, Jackson Jr & Crosby (1990), Venkatesh, Kohli & Zaltman (1995), Zubcic & Sims (2011), Adusei & Awunyo-Victor (2015), Ojo & Gbadebo (2014), Kakitahi et al. (2015), Chan & Owusu (2017), Shan et al, (2016), Owusu et al (2017).

Perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework

Weakness/loopholes

Clarity

Contradictions

This factor will be used in the study and it refers to stakeholder’s view on usefulness or effectives of regulatory framework in achieving intended objectives

Gelderman et al. (2006)

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Category Major factors Sub-factors Comment Reference

Political interference External influence Influence by politicians, top management. This will be covered under professionalism

Adusei & Awunyo-Victor (2015), Ojo & Gbadebo (2014).

Organizational factors

Monitoring activities

Monitoring

Supervision

Coordination

Inspections

Audit

Monitoring activities will be used in this study and will collectively cover monitoring, supervision, inspections, audits and coordination.

Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Agaba & Shipman (2007), Golden & Picci (2006), Kulp et al (2006), Sutinen & Kuperan (1999), Fleisher (1991), Kauppi & Van Raaij (2015), Rokkan & Buvik (2008 & 2003), Rutherford, Buchholtz & Brown (2007), Van Slyke (2007), Peprah (2015), Boer & Telgen (1998), Adusei & Awunyo-Victor (2015), Bartle &Korosec (2003), Tabish & Jha (2015 & 2011), Ameyaw et al 2017.

Organizational incentives

Sanctions (Negative incentives) Sanctions will be used in this study and will cover punishments including penalties, demotion, dismissal, warning among others

Eyaa & Oluka (2011), Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Gelderman et al. (2010), Agaba & Shipman (2007), Rokkan & Buvik (2008 & 2003), Rutherford, Buchholtz & Brown (2007), Payan & McFarland (2005), Keith, Jackson Jr & Crosby (1990), Zubcic & Sims (2011), Ameyaw et al 2017, Chan & Owusu (2017).

Rewards (Positive incentives) Rewards will not be used in this study and involves promotion, recognition etc.

Fleisher (1991), Rutherford, Buchholtz & Brown (2007), Van Slyke (2007).Gelderman et al. (2006)

Institutional factors

Monitoring

Supervision

This factor will not be used in this study as it is reflected under monitoring activities and professionalism

Eyaa & Oluka (2011), Guy (2000)

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Category Major factors Sub-factors Comment Reference

Influence peddling

Organizational pressure

Enforcement mechanism

Incentives

This is part of governance mechanism that will be enforced through sanctions

Gelderman et al. (2010), Braun’s (2003), Van Shellenberg &Van de peppel (2002)

Organizational size Number of staff

Complexity in controlling

Uncertainty of procurement orders management

This factor will not be used in the study and refers to size of an organization in relationship to procurement magnitude. It is left out because road construction is implemented by only one organization meaning that it will not be required to consider organizational size since we are not comparing with other competing firms in road construction project implementation.

Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Kulp et al. (2006), Langbein (2000), Ameyaw et al (2017), Chan & Owusu (2017).

Project factors Contractor’s resistance

Familiarity with regulatory framework

Report cases of non-compliance

Willingness to take action

Power of remedies

This factor will be used in this study and it refers to contractor’s knowledge of regulatory framework to help them resist public officer’s unethical decisions that are not in line with regulatory framework during project implementation

Gelderman et al. (2010 & 2006), Pachnou (2005), Braun’s (2003)

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Category Major factors Sub-factors Comment Reference

Project success (Performance)

Cost

Quality

Time

Client satisfaction

Safety

Dispute occurrence

Scope clarity

Security

Weather

This factor will be used in this study as a final dependent variable. It will be a result of compliance with regulatory framework and will be measured through client’s satisfaction. client satisfaction is selected because it overrides other factors of quality, cost, time, safety among others (Dvir & lechler, 2004)

Neeraj Jha & Misra (2007), Chan & Chan (2004), Chan (2001), Atkinson (1999), Lim & Mohamed (1999), Mbabazi et al. (2015), Alinaitwe, Mwakali & Hansson (2007), Enshassi, Mohamed & Abushaban (2009), Ntayi, Rooks, Eyaa & Qian (2010), Kakwezi & Nyeko (2010), Basheka & Mugabira (2008). Atkinson (1999), Tabish & Jha (2015 & 2011), Dvir & Lechler (2004), Pinto & Mantel (1990), Bartle & Korosec (2003), Agaba & Shipman (2007), Rendon (20010), Iyer & Jha (2005), Jacobson & Ok choi (2008), Ameyaw et al 2017.

Contract management

Information sharing

Monitoring

Flexibility

Leadership/cooperation

Technical knowledge

This factor is the overall idea of project implementation. It will not stand on its own as it is being measured within factors of our study

Rendon (20010), Kakwezi & Nyeko (2010), Bartle & Korosec (2003), Agaba & Shipman (2007), Iyer & Jha (2005), Jacobson & Ok choi (2008), Ntayi, Rooks, Eyaa & Qian (2010), Tabish & Jha (2015 & 2011), Kingsford & Chan 2018, Ameyaw et al 2017.

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Category Major factors Sub-factors Comment Reference

Record management

Record keeping This factor will not be used in this study as it is among items measured under compliance and monitoring activities

Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Basheka & Sabiiti (2011), Chan & Owusu (2017).

Individual factors

Familiarity with regulatory framework

Procurement knowledge

Clarity of regulatory framework & project scope

Familiarity with applications

This factor is selected for this study and it refers to one’s knowledge over regulatory framework, project scope and activities to be performed. It is beyond academic qualification and professionalism as a whole.

Gelderman et al, (2006), Eyaa & Oluka (2011), Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Migosi, Ombki & Evusa (2013), Peprah (2015), Boer & Telgen (1998), Zadawa et al (2015), Adusei & Awunyo-Victor (2015). Obanda (2010), Tukamuhabwa (2012),

Professionalism

Capacity building

Training

Skills

Experience

Qualifications

Procurement knowledge

Confidentiality

Integrity

Corruption

Professionalism will be used in this study and measured through competence, integrity, confidentiality and professional membership that summarizes all other professional sub-factors.

Eyaa & Oluka (2011), Mwakibinga & Buvik (2013), Agaba & Shipman (2007), Obanda (2010), Kaupi & Van Raaij (2015), Bartle & Korosec (2003), Tukamuhabwa (2012), Migosi, Ombki & Evusa (2013), Osei-Tutu et al (2011), Boer & Telgen (1998), Basheka & Mugabira (2008). Shu Hui et al (2011), Ntayi & Eyaa (2010), Ntayi et al. (2009), Peprah (2015), Zadawa et al (2015), Kakitahi et al. (2015), Kalubanga, Kakwezi & Kaise (2013), Ntayi, Rooks, Eyaa & Qian (2010), Thai (2008), Duperouzel (2003), Ntayi, Byabashaija, Eyaa, Ngoma & Muliira (2010), You (2005), Karjalainen, Kemppainen & Van Raaij (2009). Owusu & Chan (2017), le et al 2014, Zhang et al 2016, Kingsford & Chan (2018), Ameyaw et al( 2017), Chan & Owusu (2017).

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Category Major factors Sub-factors Comment Reference

irregularities

Ethical code/behaviour

Professional membership,

conflict of interest

political interference

Perceived gain

Source: Researcher

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Appendix H.

Table 3.1. Showing literature gap

Literature/Research Gap

Author Agency Theory

Quantitative/Cross-sectional

Compliance

Project success

Monitoring

Familiarity

Professionalism

Sanctions

Public procurement (Supplies & Service)

Construction projects

Road construction projects

Gelderman et al (2006)

Eyaa & Oluka, (2011)

Mwakibinga & Buvik, (2013)

Boer & Telgen, (1998)

Migosi, Ombki & Evusa (2013)

Peprah, (2015)

Tukamuhabwa, (2012)

Zadawa et al, (2015)

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Literature/Research Gap

Author Agency Theory

Quantitative/Cross-sectional

Compliance

Project success

Monitoring

Familiarity

Professionalism

Sanctions

Public procurement (Supplies & Service)

Construction projects

Road construction projects

Adusei & Awunyo-Victor (2015)

Obanda, (2010)

Rokkan & Buvik (2009 & 2003)

Kulp et al, (2006)

Jha & Misra, (2007)

Dvir & Lechler (2004)

Lim & Mohamed, (1999)

Chan & Chan, (2004)

Atkinson, (1999)

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Literature/Research Gap

Author Agency Theory

Quantitative/Cross-sectional

Compliance

Project success

Monitoring

Familiarity

Professionalism

Sanctions

Public procurement (Supplies & Service)

Construction projects

Road construction projects

Kakwezi & Nyeko, (2010)

Tabish & Jha, (2015)

Tadeo Mbabazi, (2015)

Ntayi, Rooks, Eyaa & Qian (2010)

Basheka & Mugabira, (2008)

Zubcic & Sims, (2011)

Source: Researcher

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SNAPSHOT OF NOAH MWELU’S BIOGRAPHY

I was born on 8th February 1972 to Ms Naome Hilder Namono and Mr. Alfred Wabuswali. I was

born in the morning of that day in a cobweb kind of membrane. It was unusual birth that almost

took my life had it not been my Untie Joy Namasaba and Uncle Richard Mabonga who arrived

shortly after birth and cut the membrane to pull me out. I am told that reports reached my maternal

grandmother Efulasi Nakhumitsa on the evening of 7th February about a disturbing and expected

baby delivery by her daughter (Naome). As a concerned and responsible mother, my grandmother

sent Untie Joy and Uncle Richard on the bicycle early morning of 8th February with essential tools

for assistance. On arrival, they were shocked by an abnormal birth. Despite their age, they acted

very first by cutting the membrane to save my life. My grandmother had instructed my Untie and

Uncle to carry my mother on the bicycle and return her home (Grandmother’s). This was because

she anticipated better treatment and care of her daughter compared to my father’s place given the

prevailing situation. Accordingly, Uncle Richard carried my mother on the bicycle and Untie Joy

carried baby Noah and took us to my grandmother’s home which is approximately 8 Kilometres

away. My father had three wives. Among whom, my mother was the third.

From 8th February 1972, I stayed at my grandmother’s place with my mother. When I was

one year and two months old, my mother left me with my grandmother and she got married

elsewhere. It is from that time that my grandmother took full care of me solely. My grandmother

looked after me amidst numerous sickness and challenges that I encountered without any

assistance from my father. My mother would come visit us and go. Remarkably, I call my

grandmother “MUM” because I grew up with her biological children calling her MUM. So I got

used to that and up to now, I find it extremely hard to call her my grandmother. My mother is

the overall eldest child followed by Uncle Richard and Untie Joy is their last born. We are seven

children from my mother and all of us were taken care of by our grandmother. I am the third

born and eldest son in the family of four girls and three boys.

My grandmother was a British trained primary teacher specialized in infants and was

employed by the Government of Uganda. She retired in teaching services in 1980 before I

started schooling. Being a British trained specialist in infants, enabled her to bring us up in a

healthy and humble environment amidst poverty challenges as a single parents looking at her

biological children and grandchildren. She taught us all how to work and she never segregated

which work was for boys or girls. All of us were responsible of doing any house work including

gracing cattle, grinding millet flour on the grinding stone among other cores. This has really

helped me in doing all sorts of work for survival. My grandmother had reasonable farm land,

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cattle, goats and chicken that she secured from her earnings as a teacher. It is from these animals

and chicken that she used to sale and pay our school fees and provide us with basics in life. My

grandmother was committed to educating her children and grandchildren. This is exemplified

with extending financial assistance to cater for education of her nieces and relatives. Uncle

Richard is an electrician by profession and Untie Joy is a medical nurse. However, my mother

dropped out of school when she was in primary six after giving birth to my eldest sister.

In 1980, I started subgrade school at Bumasikye Primary School under support of my

grandmother. In 1982, when I was in Primary three, I was sent by my grandmother to grace

cattle as a normal routine work on weekends. However, I was stubborn and went to play football

instead. When I came back in the late evening, my grandmother obviously wanted to punish me

for that. However, my mother who had visited us at the time motivated me to run away and she

took me to my fathers’ place. I had to change to another school near my fathers’ place. My

grandmother was furious about this move because she knew it was going to affect my future.

While at my father’s place, I was chased out of school several times because he was not paying

school fees. Most of the time, I was gracing his cattle which he never wanted to sell and pay my

school fees. The whole of 1982 was academically wasted. My grandmother learnt of the hard

times I was going through including sleeping in the neighbours and looking after cattle. She sent

someone to ask me return home (Grandmother’s). I returned and she took me back to

Bumasikye Primary School to continue with my studies. One important thing I will never forget

among my grandmother’s reprimands, “She used to tell me and my siblings that it is very hard

to enjoy staying comfortably in the place where you never grew up from”. This reprimand was

intendent to stop us from misbehaving with a hope that we shall go to our respective fathers.

This was really true because I tested it personally. My father would tell me during that short stay

with him that these cows are meant to pay dowry when I marry a wife but not school fees.

Another important thing I learnt from my grandmother, she used to tell us that the

education she is providing us, is a key to anything good and for our bright future. She would list

some of the benefits of education as; marrying a good wife, paying dowry, building a good

house, driving a car among others. I now see the reality of her words very fresh in my mind

whenever I go. My grandmother was able to educate me up to senior two when her animals she

used to sell and pay our school fees got finished. She remained surviving on her little pension

and farming. The pension was not enough to pay school fees nor would she sell her land that

was meant for her biological children. This was a turning point in my academic life. That was

the time I started doing all sorts of businesses and casual jobs to raise my school fees as well as

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support my siblings. These included fetching and selling firewood, sugarcanes, local brew

(Malwa and Waragi), labouring in peoples’ gardens, drinking clubs/Joints and restaurants among

others. At times, I would take the local brew to my mother’s place to make and sale for me given

the stiff competition at my grandmother’s place. Uncle Richard and Untie Joy had their own

families they were respectively struggling for and would not meet my major educational burden.

However, they would on some occasions provide me with books, pens and clothing. My eldest

sister who later qualified as a primary teacher would also help me with scholastic materials and

at times top up my fees.

In 1991 after sitting Ordinary Secondary School Level Exams, I move to Kampala to stay

with Untie Joy hopping to join Advanced Level Secondary School. During that time, I got

opportunity to do casual jobs on construction sites and in manufacturing factories to buy myself

basics like beddings, shoes and clothes that I was lacking. The money earned was not enough

for tuition. Whereas Untie Joy was not able to pay my tuition, her place was another link point

in my life that I appreciate forever. In 1992, having excelled in Ordinary Level Secondary School

Exams, I was admitted in one of the good High Schools in Kampala but I could not join because

the tuition fees was high. In this High School, I was required to pay basic tuition fees amounting

to UGX320, 000 (AUD124) without other academic requirements. This was a lot of money at

that time. I explored numerous options to get that money but I failed. I finally resorted to going

to my father for help. I remembered my grandmother’s statements “Education is a key to

everything good in future”. Based on that statement, I decided to go and convince my father to

get for me this money on condition that I will pay my own dowry in future when I marry. This

was a major convincing point because previously whenever, I would go to him for help, he

would tell me to marry and he pays dowry using the cows he had. I travelled from Kampala to

the village to convince him. It was a difficulty trip since along the way, I was debating within

myself how I would win him to give me the UGX320, 000. Remember, I was not thinking about

the other academic requirements which would cost approximately UGX100, 000 (AUD39) nor

how I would pay fees for the other coming three academic terms of High School.

The following day after travelling to the village, I met my father and we talked. I explained

to him about the whole scenario surrounding UGX320, 000. I begged him to recue me on

condition that in future, I will pay dowry on my own. He told me, go to Uncle Richard in Nairobi

Kenya for assistance and I come back to him. I agreed and I thought he had understood the

magnitude of fees required. I sold my goat at my grandmother’s place that I was given by one

of my uncles as a gift during my circumcision. This was to get the transport to Nairobi to seek

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assistance from Uncle Richard. Notably, I got this goat in 1988 when I was in senior one.

According to our culture, I was supposed to sell it immediately. However, I decided not to sell

and instead keep it to produce others so that I could sale for tuition fees. That plan worked for

me during my Ordinary Secondary School as a supplementary source of my fees. By the time I

was travelling to Nairobi, it was only the mother goat left. So I had to sell it and got transport.

Having sold the goat, I started the journey very early morning to Nairobi. However, being a

different country, I needed to convert Ugandan Shillings to Kenyan shillings. I converted the

money at Uganda-Kenya border. During that time in 1992, Kenya and Uganda had political

issues and crossing to Kenya was difficulty. Because of that tension, I was stopped by Kenyan

authorities at the border not to proceed to Nairobi unless I had a Passport. Surely, I did not

possess a passport and my school identity card was no longer allowed. It was late in the evening

when I returned to Ugandan side and tried to reconvert the Kenyan money to Ugandan money.

Part of the money was stolen by crazy money changers at the border. I cried and travelled back

to my grandmother’s place at night. My grandmother was shocked to hear me knocking on her

door at night because she believed I had succeeded travelling to Nairobi despite prevailing

border situation at that time. I slept and the following morning, I went back to my father.

On reaching my father, I explained what had happened and I could not reach Nairobi to

see Uncle Richard. My father told me Okay. He said that he cannot give me any of my allocation

for future dowry because there was no guaranty that I will not task him to pay dowry for me.

However, he promised to give me a piece of land on his own to sell and bail me out. I was very

happy and accepted knowing that the piece of land would fetch approximately UGX320, 000.

He took me to the Promised Land, shown me the boundaries and asked me to look for buyers.

By that time, I had never known the price of land. So I thought it would fetch money close to

what I had explained to him. The land was approximately 12 metres squared and with a very big

rock covering almost 8 square metres. He told me that the rock is money itself. During that time

and being deep in the village, people had not started building permanent houses that requires

crushing such rocks for building aggregates that one can sell to get money. I thanked him and

he himself called one of his neighbours to come and negotiate the price. I was dismayed and

automatically tears started rolling out of my eyes when the neighbour said that he can only give

me 2 ducks for that land. The neighbour was interested because he wanted to level his boundary.

Otherwise given the nature and size of the land, it was hard to get another buyer. When I had

of 2 ducks that is when I roughly understood the value of that piece of land my father was

offering me. I left in tears to my grandmother and told her what had transpired. With no option

left, the following day I went back to Kampala to stay with Untie Joy.

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I missed school for two years. While at Auntie Joy’s place, Mr. Leo Iku used to come for

treatment in Auntie’s clinic that was operated in the same house we were staying. Mr. Leo Iku

asked me why I was not studying. I told him the tuition fees problems and he offered me a job

of a waitress in his Kyambogo Sports Club so that I can raise fees. In this job, he allowed me to

work in the evening on week days from 5.00Pm to late night (Past Midnight) on average and on

weekends or public holidays, from morning to late night. This job enabled me to start Advanced

Level (High School) from Modern Senior Secondary School that Uncle Perez Matanda together

with Auntie Joy secured a vacancy for me. I would study in the morning from 8.00Am to 5.00Pm

then report for work few minutes past 5.00Pm. It was a challenging job that would make me

doze in class because of short sleep at night. In the begging of that job, I encountered challenges

of knocking Auntie Joy past midnight to open for me. This caused problems with her husband

and I resorted to sleeping in her carport where she was raring her chicken for poultry business

since they had no car.

Having stayed with the chicken for more than three weeks, one Good Samaritan whom

I remember by only one name (Kenneth) working with President’s office and used drink from

Kyambogo Sports Club called me one evening and offered me accommodation in one of his

rooms on the boy’s quarters. I believe he might have seen me entering the carport housing

chicken and decided to offer me accommodation. My pay in return was to mow and clean his

compound whenever it was bushy and dirty. Kenneth’s offer greatly relieved me of

accommodation difficulties and was a starting point of being independent. Before completing

my Advanced level, Mr Leo Iku died in a motor accident at night while returning from

Angenuire Disco-Tech (A night Club). This was again a dilemma in my life since the business

was solely managed. Upon his death, his relative closed it and shared the proceeds. During that

time, I was in senior six and completing was a big problem financially. However, I gambled and

sat for the final qualifying exams to the University in 1996. Given prevailing challenges, my

performance was poor and I could not get limited Government admission slots in the

University. I gave up with education and looked for all sorts of jobs for survival.

In 1999, I married Dr Susan Watundu who by then had just finished her Higher Diploma

from Makerere University Business School (MUBS) on Government Scholarship. I knew Susan

way back in childhood since we are from the same village. However, in 1996 while at MUBS is

when I proposed and she told me to wait until she finished her studies. Finally after completing

her studies in 1998, we were able to officially marry on 22nd May 1999 amidst great poverty. In

formalising our marriage, I went to my father asking him for assistance. Surprisingly, he told me

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that the remaining cows are for my step-mothers because they were bride prices for my step-

sisters and he does not own any. However, he gave me one calf. So out of the five cows I paid

dowry, the four were bought using my savings with Susan. This reminded me when my father

visited us one time in 1998 and he jokingly said since my to be daughter in-law is well educated,

she will pay dowry for herself. Indeed it was a reality. I wondered where are the cows he has

been promising to pay dowry while denying me school fees had gone. Given logistic issues, we

combined three functions (Introduction, Dowry and Wedding) in one and it was successful.

This function stressed me and Susan so much because of financial difficulties given our little

earnings. The stress was so much that I developed severe headache which lasted two weeks.

Whenever I think of our function, I always remember the severe headache. Remarkably, I thank

Dr Susan Watundu for accepting me the way I was with my poverty and academic status. Many

Ladies of her status then, prefer getting married to rich and educated men. I really feel honoured

for having secured such a powerful woman as my wife.

From 1996 to 2006, I did all sorts of casual jobs and businesses including working in

Coffee factories, selling soda, plastics, stationary, charcoal, bananas and cocoa. All these were

on short time basis as they were seasonal jobs and business losses respectively. Remarkably, in

all this gambling and survival for the fittest, I was able to save money and acquire tangible items.

In 2000, Susan upgraded for a Bachelor’s degree on Government sponsorship at Makerere

University. She later went back to Makerere University for her Master’s degree before going to

Dar Es-salaam University in the Republic of Tanzania for her PhD that she completed in 2015.

After completing her Higher Diploma through to PhD, Susan worked in various places and

doing all sorts of jobs ranging from low to average income earnings. With our little savings

collectively we were able to acquire land, buildings and educating our children. Concurrently,

with the motivation from Susan and Uncle Geoffrey Wepondi, I resumed my academic journey

by doing a Certificate in Strategic Procurement and Logistics Management from Makerere

University in 2006. In 2007, I sat for Special Qualifying Exams to Makerere University for a

Bachelors’ Degree in Procurement and Supply Chain Management. I passed and started my

Bachelor’s Degree on private sponsorship in 2007. During this time I was working with

Alphamat Consult Limited an affiliated company to Cambridge University Press United

Kingdom based in Kampala. I was studying in the evening while working during day time. I

completed this three years bachelor’s degree in 2010 and immediately enrolled for a Master’s

degree in Procurement and Supply Chain Management from Makerere University that I

completed in 2013. The salary earned from Alphamat enabled me to pay tuition fees for both

degrees as well as supporting my family.

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In September 2012, I left Alphamat and joined Makerere University Business School. In

2013, Susan started her PhD at Dar Es-salaam University (Tanzania) that culminated into her

joining World Bank Washington (USA) before completing in 2015. During this time (2013-

2015), I was motivated by Susan’s PhD studies and I started applying for PhD scholarships.

Upon Susan’s PhD completion, by coincidence and God’s Grace, I luckily won a full

Scholarship from the Australian Government to study a PhD at the University of Newcastle

Australia. I enrolled for the PhD in Public Procurement for Construction Projects in 2016 and

hopefully finishing in 2019. From 1996 up to now, I and Susan have supported ourselves

socially, morally, educationally and materially amidst severe challenges. We have five daughters.

Two of whom (Lucky Mercy and Peace Joy) are joining University this year (2019) to study

Pharmacy and Medicine respectively. One (Talituleka Hope) is in secondary school, another one

(Blessed Malyamu) is joining secondary school next year (2020) and the last born (Mariza Susan)

is in lower primary school. These children have supported the family in various ways despite

their age.

“Education is a key to bright future”….this were my grandmother’s words to me. I

reemphasize her statement to everyone who can listen, care and learn from me together with

my wife. Accordingly, I take this opportunity to thank my maternal grandmother Efulasi

Nakhumitsa (R.I.P 2013) for her tremendous efforts and sowing an education seed into me that

I am reaping from. I thank various personalities and organizations that have come to my rescue

at various stages of life. Starting with my late grandmother (Ms Efulasi Nakhumitsa), my wife

(Dr Susan Watundu), my daughters (Lucky Mercy, Peace Joy, Talituleka Hope, Blessed Malyamu

and Mariza Susan), my mother (Naome Namono), my mother in-law (Malyamu Wambi), Uncles:

Richard Mabonga, Geoffrey Wepondi, Dayson Maswere, Richard Wambi, Perez Matanda,

Francis Waluya, Peter Khaukha, Eric Sakwa, Robert Sakwa, Titus Masete and family, Tsombe

Nampude and family, Yowasi Wanyera and family, Aunties: Joy Namasaba, Lonah Watela,

Connie Mlay, Debora Wanyenya, Sister Loy Lunyolo, all my teachers and lecturers (Primary,

Secondary and University) levels, Evangelist Christopher Besweri Kaswasbuli, The Government

of Uganda and Australia, Sisters and Brothers, Brother in-law (Simon Sakwa), Entire Church of

ISA MASIYA, Relatives, Friends and Neighbours. May the Almighty God Bless you all in the

name of our Lord ISA MASIYA. AMEN.

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DEDICATION TO:

Noah Mwelu

1. “Born to suffer” The songs of people will tell me no for the cause of the

children………If they treat them right, children will have bright future and if they treat

them wrong, we shall have cause of war……If children grow up without

parents………..who will tell them this is right or wrong….. (Born to suffer, born to suffer

haaaaaah)X4 …… Without the mother, children suffering…Without the father, children

suffering… Without the parents, children suffering...… (Born to suffer)X4…They need

parental care….You can suffer if the mother does not care for you…You will suffer if

the father does not care for you…. (We were born to suffer)X4……… We were born to

suffer aaaahhhh…no, no, no, .noooh…Born to suffer… My mother didn’t tell me the

truth nor did my father tell me the truth, born to suffer aawooo,

aayaaahhh…awooyihhhh...Born to suffer... (Lucky Dube…R.I.P).

2. (On my own, on my own)X4….Struggling and Suffering...…..I have been waiting for the

years, for this time to happen……for this day to come…..I have learnt to believe in

myself and no body...Else ….I will face the future with pride…and do much as I

can……………Oh Thank you God …for helping me and making me what I am ,,,,,thank

you, thank you my grandma ,,,,thank you everyone who came to my rescue ,,,Thank you,

thank you my Lord (Lucky Dube…R.I.P).

Dr Susan Watundu (Super Girl)

I am happy to be here with you my Love……I never let you go away……I have a feeling that a

chance is a dream……….and if it is a dream, I will never be weaker to let it

go……Haaaa……After all these problems……Eheeeh…after all these problems I feel happy to

be with you and will never let you go……Baby I want you, Darling I want you………….I will

try to keep you cool as much as I can………(People bring confusion)X2…I feel like going

Heaven…Oh God come by myside..…Happy you my Love……..I still Love you as much as I

can my Dr Super Girl (Beloved Super Boy, Noah Mwelu).

My Beloved Daughters (Lucky Mercy, Peace Joy, Talituleka Hope, Blessed

Malyamu and Mariza Susan)

Education is a key to bright future………….In the fear of God, the Wisdom begins…….Always

sympathize and respect your parents…..See what we are going through…..Always love one

another……Avoid bad groups…..Genuine parents always wish their children the very best of

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their lives…..There you are!!!!!!!!!!!!! All the Very the Best and Long Live my Beloved Daughters

(Daddy, Noah Mwelu).

My Fellow Parents

Being a father or mother is not all about just producing and abandoning children for others to

care on your behalf. If you want your children to treat and respect you as their earthly God,

endeavour to care for them by providing them what they need within your income or capabilities.

I love my parents, I have forgiven them and I have tried to provide them with what they deserve.

However, I have no kind words for what they did (If I keep quiet, people would not know the

truth). Hence, this is a learning point for others to reform. I refer to my grandmother as my

earthly God for the burden she carried (She carried a heavy grinding stone on her head on behalf

my biological parents). God Bless you my ‘Great MUM’ (R.I.P).

I thank and applaud those mothers and fathers who are tirelessly doing all they can for the good

and wellbeing of their children. I pity those who have run away from their responsibilities and

left the children and spouses suffering. “Responsibility defines one’s wealth but not being rich

materially” (Noah Mwelu).

The Wives, Husbands and Relatives

For those intending to marry, marriage should not be based on wealth and education but the way

you perceive someone whom you will stay with together for the rest of your life (True Love).

Otherwise if you base on wealth and education, then it is material love. If you work together to

acquire wealth, you will be more respected than if you got already made wealth. This so called

already made wealth is the source of men and their relatives mistreating women because they

believe that you have come to take away their wealth. Believe me, you will feel greatly honoured

and have control of your wealth that you have worked together. Off course I don’t side with men

who manipulate their wives by grabbing wealth acquired together or solely acquired by the wife.

I find it extremely difficult to say that I own any of our things. This is because I and Dr Susan

Watundu have worked together including our children to acquire what we have. Believe me, some

of the things we own, I have not contributed a coin. This serves as a lesson to husbands and

relatives who manipulate and mistreat women because of wealth to stop forthwith. You should

always remember that irrespective of women contribution to family wealth, genuine wives work

committedly for the well-being of their families. Just think of a husband passing on, who carries

the burden of bringing up the children left behind? If you truly love your son and his children,

then sincerely relatives should not mistreat and grab family properties. Women are not objects

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that you own and sell like property. Hence, those mistreating wives because they paid dowry

should change that attitude of thinking they bought the wives. Furthermore, those who anticipate

material gain by marrying off their daughters should refrain from such cultures. This is because

in no way can the dowry paid be equated to the lives of human being.

I conclude by apologising to those who may feel offended with the message put forward

in this write-up and I invite you for discussions, comments and feedback. Thank you and God

bless you all.

With great pleasure from,

Noah Mwelu.

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Noah with Dr Susan Watundu and the daughters

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Noah with the Family

Noah attending FEBE three minute thesis competition

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Family Photos: (Noah, Susan, Lucky, Peace, Hope, Blessed and Mariza)

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From left: Head of Construction MGT, Supervisor & Chair of Construction MGT, Noah, VC & President,

PVC and Director HDR

Noah with PVC (FEBE), Prof Brett Ninness and HOS (SABE) Prof Sue Anne Ware

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Hand shake by VC and President UON (Prof Alex Zelinsky)

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Hand Shake with PVC FEBE (Prof Brett Ninness)

Hand Shake with Principal Supervisor and Chair of Construction Management (Prof Peter Davis)

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Hand Shake with Head of Construction Management (Dr Kim Maud) and HDR Director (Prof Patrick Tang)

Noah with fellow PhD students