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8/9/2019 Complaint Against Def. John E. Steele
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DEFENDANT JOHN EDWIN STEELE
RECORD LACK OFIMMUNITY- PERPETRATION OF ILLICIT ACTS
1. The Plaintiff public corruption victims are suing Defendant Corrupt John Edwin Steele in
his private individual capacity and official capacity as U.S. District Judge. Defendant
Steeles criminal and unlawful acts on record were outside any immunity and officialcapacity.
PROSECUTION UNDER CIVIL RICO
2. The CivilRICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1964, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, expressly authorized
civil remedies. Defendant John E. Steele perpetrated record RICO predicate acts such as,
e.g., extortion, obstruction of justice, and retaliation.
INJURY TO PROPERTY AND BUSINESS
3. Defendant Crooked Judge John E. Steele injured the Plaintiff record property and business
owners by reasons of publicly recorded violations of Section 1962. See Section 1964(C).
Plaintiffs are holding legal and beneficial interests in their business and property, riparian Lot15A on the Gulf of Mexico, Parcel # 12-44-20-01-00015.015A. See Section 1961(3).
Plaintiffs demand recovery for both tangible and intangible property losses, businessinterruptions, and other losses.
18 U.S.C. 1962 VIOLATIONS
4. Pursuant to Section 1964(C), Plaintiffs suffered damages by reason of Defendant John E.
Steeles Section 1962 violations, which proximately and directly resulted from the publicly
recorded commissions of the predicate acts such as, e.g., extortion, retaliation, fraud, fraudon the State and Federal Courts, fraudulent concealment of facially forged land parcels12-44-20-01-00000.00A0 and 07-44-21-01-00001.0000 under color of a fake writ ofexecution, fake judgment, fake debt, fake $5,048.60 debt, fake ripenessrequirements, et al. See Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, Doc. ## 434, 432, 424, 422, 386, 338,288, 282, 360, 87, 25, 5.
CONSPIRACY TO CORRUPTLY GAIN CONTROL OF PLAINTIFFS PROPERTY5. Defendant Steele acquired control and conspired with other Officials to acquire control of
Plaintiffs property and business through, e.g., organized crime such as, e.g.:a. Exercising various forms ofextortion;
b. Acquiring interest in Plaintiffs property in satisfaction of illegally procured debt suchas, e.g., $5,048.60;
c. Charging and collecting forfabricated frivolity with usurious rates;d. Profiteering from extra-judicialcrimes.
DEFENDANT STEELES SECTION 1962(B) LIABILITY
6. Under color of prima facie falsified writ of execution, falsified judgment, fake$5,048.60 debt, falsified law, legislative act, regulation, resolution 569/875,O.R. 569/875, falsified land parcels, Defendant Steele has been collecting an unlawfuldebt to acquire and maintain an illegalinterestin and control ofthe prima facie illicit parkenterprise in the private, undedicated, residential Cayo Costa Subdivision as platted in
1912, PB 3 PG 25. Plaintiffs injuries flowed directly from Defendant Steeles and other
Officials maintenance and acquisition of control of the park, entertainment, andrecreation enterprise, and acquisition and/or maintenance of control of falsified landparcels 12-44-20-01-00000.00A0 and 07-44-21-01-00001.0000 with an area ofHundreds of Acres along the Gulf of Mexico and Charlotte Harbor, PB 3 PG 25.
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7. Section 1962(B) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
throughcollection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.DEFENDANT STEELES SECTION 1962(C) LIABILITY & ASSOCIATION8. Under color of prima facie falsified writ of execution, falsified judgment, fake
$5,048.60 debt, falsified law, legislative act, regulation, resolution 569/875,O.R. 569/875, falsified land parcels, Defendant Steele has been collecting an unlawfuldebt and participated in the conduct and affairs of said Government enterprise. Plaintiffs
injuries flowed directly from Defendant Steeles and other Officials participation in said
record Government land parcel extortion and fraud scheme, ## 12-44-20-01-00000.00A0 and 07-44-21-01-00001.0000, and the participation in Government fraud
and extortion schemes of frivolity and vexatiousness.9. Section 1962(c) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by orassociated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, toconduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity orcollection of unlawful debt.10. The Plaintiffs proved
1. The existence of Defendant(s) entertainment and recreational enterprise affecting
interstate commerce;2. That the Defendants were associated with the State Park and Recreationenterprise;
3. That Defendant participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct or theaffairs of said entertainment enterprise; and
4. That Defendants participated through a pattern of racketeering activity, whichincluded the allegation of at least two racketeering acts such as, e.g., extortion,
bribery, obstruction of justice, and retaliation.
11. As a Judge presiding over Defendants prima facie fraudulent defenses, claims,falsifications, and forgeries, Defendant Steele had a very meaningful connection between the
enterprise and the racketeering and extortion of land and money for the enterprise under
color of office and authority.
DEFENDANT STEELES SECTION 1962(A) LIABILITY & DERIVED INCOME
12. Under color of prima facie falsified law, legislative act, regulation, resolution569/875, O.R. 569/875, a falsified writ of execution, unrecordedfake judgment in thepurported amount of $5,048.60, official right, and a facially forged and non-authentic writof execution, Defendant J. E. Steele received bribes and incomederived from a pattern of
racketeering and/or through collection of an unlawful debt in which Defendant Steele
participated as presiding Judge and principal. See Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, Doc. ## 434,
432, 424, 422, 338, 288, 282, 87, 5. Section 1962(A) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal, to use or invest,directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
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which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce
13. Plaintiffs demand relief for their injuries by reason of the investment and use of the
racketeering income from unlawful use of the private undedicated residential Cayo Costa
Subdivision and its private implied easements. Defendants and Steele have derived income
from people from all over the world, who unlawfully use the private implied easements andSubdivision lands as conveyed in reference to said PB 3 PG 25 (1912).
14. Defendant Steele played a centralGovernment role and participated in the Government
operation by extortingland and money for the enterprise.15. With corrupt intent to obtain illegal benefits at Plaintiffs expense and injury, Steele
falsified documents for the Government enterprise under color of office. Steele knew that it
would be extremely difficult to eradicate public corruption, and that he would most likelyget away with the proverbial murder and racketeering.
16. Because the park and recreation enterprise was a Government enterprise, Defendant
Steele was empowered to play a central role ofobstructing, delaying, and preventing thecommunication of crime and felony information.
DEFENDANT STEELES SECTION 1962(D) LIABILITY & CONSPIRACY17. Defendant Steele conspired to violate all subsections. Section 1962(D) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions ofsubsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18. The alleged violations, or "predicate acts", included violations of 18 U.S.C. 1341, relating
to mail fraud. 18 USC Section 1341 provides that"whoever, having devised . . . any scheme orartifice to defraud. . . for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice . . . places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by thePostal Service . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . .."
19. The Plaintiffs proveda. The existence of a plan orschemeto defraud;
b. That it was foreseeable that the defendant's scheme would cause the mails to be used;
c. That the use of the mails was for the purpose of carrying out the fraudulent scheme.It was unnecessary to show that Defendant Steeles mailings contained a misrepresentation
unlike common law fraud.
RECORDED SCHEME TO DEFRAUD AND DELIBERATELY DEPRIVE
20. As a matter of public record, Def. Steeles scheme to defraud included, e.g.:a. Prima facie idioticfabrication of a legislative act [O.R. 569/875]; b. Prima facieidioticfabrication ofinvoluntary alienation by law;c. Prima facie idioticfabrication of a writ of execution absent any recorded judgment;d. Removal of Plaintiffs State action to U.S. Court and destruction of official records;
e. Prevention of Plaintiffs communications about Def. Steeles and other Defendants
commission offelonies, extortion, obstruction of justice, and retaliation.
BRIBERY
21. In exchange for bribes, Defendant John E. Steele deliberately deprived the Plaintiff
corruption victims of their express fundamental rights under the Florida and Federal
Constitutions. Defendant Steele perverted the express fundamental rights to be free ofGovernment corruption, oppression, fraudulent seizure of property, to own property, exclude
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Government, redress Government grievances, and defend against public corruption and
Government crimes.
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF LACK OF RECORD
22. Crooked Steele knew and fraudulently concealed that
a. Nojudgmentpertaining to the non-existent Rule 38 motion existed;
b. No Rule 38 motion by Def. Forger Wilkinson could be found in the official records ofthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit;
c. No lawful and legitimate writ of execution was issued;d. No mandated July 2009 judgment in the amount of $5,048.60 had everexistedand/or
been receivedby the District Clerk.
CONSPIRACY TO CONCEAL AND COVER UP
23. For bribes, Defendant Crooked Steele conspired with other Defendants and Officials to
conceal Def. Crooked Appraiser Wilkinsons prima facie record forgeries of land parcels12-44-20-01-00000.00A0 and 07-44-21-01-00001.0000 and cover up for, e.g.,
Defendant Wilkinson and other Government Officials and Defendants. See Doc. ## 87, 338,422; Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228.
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT24. Corrupt Steele knew and fraudulently concealed that on the record Defendant Forger
Wilkinson had forged land parcels, which Def. Steele could not locate on the 1912 CayoCosta Subdivision Plat recorded in Lee County Plat Book 3, Page 25.
CONSPIRACY TO FABRICATE RULE 38 MOTION
25. Def. Corrupt Steele conspired with other Officials to fabricate a Rule 38 Motion, whichDefendant land parcel Forger K. M. Wilkinson had neversignedand/orfiled.
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF FALSIFIED motions AND orders
26. Defendant Crooked Steele knew and fraudulently concealed that Def. S. F. Birch had
falsified motions and orders; e.g., on 03/05/09, Def. Birch had falsified a motionforsanctions for Busses pursuit of a frivolous appeal, Doc. # 386-4, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228.
27. Corrupt Steele knew and concealed that the fraudulently pretended grant of a non-existent motion was a fraud and extortion scheme on the public record.
FALSIFICATIONS OF RECORD AND NON-EXISTENT $5,048.60 JUDGMENT
28. Steele falsified the record and fraudulently pretended a judgment even though nojudgment in the amount of $5,048.60 had everexistedon the Docket of Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, or could havepossibly become a lien on Plaintiffs property.
FABRICATIONS OF FRIVOLITY FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES
29. Defendant Steele knew and fraudulently concealed that Def. land parcel ForgerWilkinson had neverfiledany motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal, Fed.R.Civ.P. 38.Defendant Corrupt Steele concealed that any time to file the non-existent Rule 38 motionhad expired on 08/08/2009. See 11
thCir. R. 38-1 and Dockets.
30. Def. Steele fabricated frivolity for criminal and unlawful purposes of punishing thePlaintiffs and coercing them to refrain from prosecuting Government Officials andDefendants and extorting fees and Plaintiffs property
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEECOUNTY COMMISSIONERS; THE LEE COUNTYPROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDABOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNALIMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OFFLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION,
Defendants.___________________________________
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendants
Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property
(Doc. #432) filed on May 21, 2010. No response has been filed and
the time to respond has expired.
Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff.
Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM-
36SPC, Doc. #245) was issued on July 20, 2010, prohibiting any
further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant
plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendants
motion.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 2
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Plaintiff may file one response to defendants Motion for
Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432)
within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is
received, the Court will rule on the motion without the benefit of
a response and without further notice.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 22nd day of
July, 2010.
Copies:PlaintiffCounsel of record
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEECOUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M.WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTYAPPRAISERS OFFICE; STATE OF
FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT]TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTTRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDADEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION, AND DIVISION OFRECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTYATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON,
Defendants.___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:
(1) defendant Property Appraisers Motion to Dismiss and Close File
(Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2)
defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of
Environmental Protections (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc.
#291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)
defendant The Lee County Appraisers Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
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Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#318). Because Plaintiff is proceedingpro se, his pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an
attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
I.
On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee
County, Florida adopted the Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands
in Cayo Costa Subdivision, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution).
The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo
Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas
and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that
the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying
East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying
West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The
Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and
west of the tier of blocks as public lands together with all
accretions thereto and does by this Resolution claim all of said
lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public
for public purposes. (Doc. #288, p. 9.)
Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is
the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and
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accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, 1, 2.) Plaintiff describes Lot
15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of
Mexico with an estimated fair market value of more than $2 million.
(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution violates his
property rights in Lot 15A, which includes accretions, under both
federal and state law.
Count 1 sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff
alleges that the Resolution deprived him of his riparian rights,
private easements, accreted property and privileges secured by the
United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that
Lee County had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the
undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, and therefore the Resolution
was unenforceable and in violation of the United States
Constitution. (Doc. #288, 13.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants
confiscated more than 2.5 acres of his accreted property without
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at
14.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants also illegally took more
than 200 acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa pursuant to
the Resolution, all without compensation. (Id. at 15.) Further,
plaintiff asserts that Defendant State Actors claimed riparian
rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby
unlawfully discriminating against plaintiff because he is entitled
to equal rights as the State property owner. (Id. at 16, 27.)
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Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under
color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was
never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution
and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be
recorded and must be stricken from the public record. (Id. at
17.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision
was outside of Lee Countys home rule powers, and therefore the
State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances,
and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and
the County capriciously grabbed private accreted land and
easements. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants took
his accretions onto the riparian gulf front Lot 15A without
authority, justification, due process of law, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized
unconstitutional taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his
property value. (Id. at 19.)
Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass. Plaintiff
alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted
that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have
induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches
and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiffs property. (Id.
at 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise
power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of
the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of
Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at 22.)
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Count 4 alleges a conspiracy to fabricate, fraud and
malfeasance. Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property
Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to
ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has
admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution.
(Id. at 23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face
did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the
County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of
the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence
of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block
and park for the benefit of the State and County. (Id. at 24.)
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant denied agricultural
classification to his accreted lot. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that
defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of
private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection
in a land grab scheme. (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as
being to assist the unconstitutional confiscation of the
accretions. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff also asserts that the County
Appraiser made incompetent valuation reports which were
controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation
of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander
plaintiffs perfect title. (Id. at 26.) As a result, plaintiff
received purchase offers far below market value and the County
Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position. (Id.)
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Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and
defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to
the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has
been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession.
(Id. at 29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee Countys claims of
ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax
revenues which could have been received from the private accretions
and easements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired
to misrepresent the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers
authority over his lagoon. (Id. at 32.)
Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant
Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution
despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at 33-35.)
The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction
based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), 28 U.S.C. 1343,
Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments
4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, 7), the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. 403)(id. at 8),
the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at 9), the federal common law Doctrine
of Accretion and Erosion (id. at 10), the Federal Appraisal
Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12
U.S.C. 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28
U.S.C. 2201)(id. at 12).
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See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)1
for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoninghistory of the island since 1978.
-7-
III.
The Court will first address the federal claims, since these
claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given
plaintiffs pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended
Complaint liberally.
A. Takings Clause Claims:
A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiffs
counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo
Costa island. The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude1
plaintiffs takings claim.
Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978). The Third Amended
Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the
Takings Clause.
State law defines the parameters of a plaintiffs property
interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is
a legal question for the court to decide. Morleys Auto Body, Inc.
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v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Florida law
a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high
water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral
property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to
the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987);
Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These
rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the
government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key
Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013,
1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). By now it is beyond question that a
permanent physical occupation of private property by the state
constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.
New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th
Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).
Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his
property, a property owner has not suffered a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures
provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .
Williamson County Regional Planning Commn v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 195 (1972). Williamson County boils down to the rule
that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a
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takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe
until the state has denied the would-be plaintiffs compensation
for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state
court proceeding. Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla.,
F.3d , 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008). Without having
pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiffs Takings
Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at
195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162
Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least
1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse
condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,
563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d
1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have
pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA. STAT.
86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of
State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or
a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute.
Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff
pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested
that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or
receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.
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Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings
Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to
violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without
prejudice.
B. Substantive Due Process Claim:
A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest
that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property
rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is
no independent substantive due process taking cause of action.
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14
(11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects
only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the
Constitution, and do not include property rights. Greenbriar
Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2003). Merely asserting that the governments actions were
arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the
protection of the substantive due process provision. Greenbriar
Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. Therefore, those portions of counts
in the Third Amended Complaint which attempt to assert a
substantive due process takings claim or conspiracy will be
dismissed.
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C. Procedural Due Process Claim:
Plaintiffs counts may also attempt to state a procedural due
process claim. For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had
no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa
subdivision (Doc. #288, 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was
never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution
and recording requirements (id. at 17, 23), and that the taking
was without authority, justification, due process, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at 19).
Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.
Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).
Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural
due process claim. The Countys action in passing the Resolution
constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state
a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade
County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200
acres other than his 2.5 acres. This is sufficient to constitute
a legislative act. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is
impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act
applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a
legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist
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merely because state mandated procedures were not followed. First
Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla.,
20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the
allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the
Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution
attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was
signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and
plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining
claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not
arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state
a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that
Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation
remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as
discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate
post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on
procedural due process will be dismissed.
D. Equal Protection Claim:
Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal
protection rights. To properly plead an equal protection claim,
a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly
situated persons have been treated disparately. Boyd v. Peet, 249
Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th
Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any
similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The
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Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200
acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres.
The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned
by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights
taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be
compared to a public owner such as a government unit. Therefore,
no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be
dismissed without prejudice.
E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction:
Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended
Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of
federal jurisdiction.
Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of
the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the
discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may
be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal
courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a
congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate
Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore
Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal
jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiffs reliance on Article IV of
the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address
the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. 1343 as a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district
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courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create
a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232
Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007). Since none of plaintiffs
federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, 1343
is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.
Plaintiffs reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 403 is misplaced. Section 403
relates to the creation of an obstruction not authorized by
Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this
case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. 161-64, cannot form
basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976. Assuming
there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it
cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The
Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. 3331-3351, also do not create
federal jurisdiction. These standards relate to real estate
appraisals utilized in connection with federally related
transactions, 12 U.S.C. 1331, and no such transaction was
involved in this case. Additionally, in Florida the county
property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose
appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA. STAT.
193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by
the International Association of Assessing Officers and the
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Appraisal Institute. Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2
(11th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, the Court finds no other basis of federal
jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint.
F. Remaining State Law Claims:
The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint
are all state law claims. Read liberally, the Third Amended
Complaint may be read to allege a claim to invalidate the
Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law
claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent,
a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a
state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of
title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th
Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims
where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been
dismissed.) The dismissal of the state claims will be without
prejudice. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
Having found that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the
Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining
defendants motions to dismiss.
Accordingly, it is now
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ORDERED:
1. Defendant Property Appraisers Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the
extent set forth in paragraph 5 below.
2. Defendant Property Appraisers Motion to Dismiss and
Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot.
3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection
and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board
of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Funds Joint Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a
Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in
paragraph 5 below.
4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County
Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Petersons Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph
5 below.
5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice as to all defendants and all claims. The Clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot,
and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 5th day of
May, 2008.