Compiled Agri law case digests.docx

COMPILED AGRI LAW CASE DIGESTS AgrarianLaw1 Summer2013

Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Almuete Vs. Marcelo Andres and CA

Facts:On March 25, 1957, a parcel of agricultural land, located at San Vicente, Angadanan,

Isabela, was awarded to Rodrigo Almuete by National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Since then, Rodrigo exercised exclusive possession over the subject property, planting crops and growing fruits therein for 22 years.

On August 17, 1979, unknown to Rodrigo, Letecia Gragasin, an Agrarian Reform Technologist, filed an inspection and investigation report stating that: The whereabouts of Rodrigo was unknown. That he has waived all of his right as awardee of the said land by NARRA, because of poor health and financial crisis. And that the occupant of the land was Marcelo Andres since 1967. She then recommended to the Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) that the land be awarded to Andres and cancel the award given in favor of Rodrigo.

Marcelo further contended to MAR that Rodrigo sold the land to one Victor Masiglat, and since Masiglat is disqualified to be an awardee of the said land, he transferred it to Marcelo by paying P600 and 1 Carabao. All of these transfers were not covered by written contracts. Thereafter, MAR granted Marcelo a homestead patent and was soon issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) no. P-52521 on July 7, 1988, upon recommendation of DAR.

Rodrigo, unaware that the award given to him by NARRA was cancelled, continued to cultivate the land. Until one day, Marcelo Andres, together with 10 men, armed with boloes and sharp objects, entered the property, took possession and controlled half of the subject land.

Rodrigo immediately complained to the DAR authorities about what happened, and it was only at this time that he became aware that his property was already titled now to Marcelo. He filed an action in court for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo with the RTC of Isabela. The court rendered a decision in favor of Rodrigo, finding that Marcelo didn’t acquire any right over the subject property as he was not able to present any valid documents that would support his contention. That Rodrigo never abandoned the subject property. And Gragasin made obvious false assertions on her report resulting to the cancellation of Rodrigo’s award and issuance of the homestead patent in favor of Marcelo.

Marcelo failed to file an appeal on time and the decision became final and executory. Marcelo filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, stating that the case was within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and not with regular courts, because the property involved is an agricultural land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case?

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HELD:

No, DARAB has no jurisdiction. The action filed by Rodrigo was cognizable by regular courts. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between petitioner Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property. It was thus a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the phrase "agrarian dispute." No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Chavez v Philippine Estate Authority and AMARI G.R. No. 133250July 9, 2002

Facts:President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." Then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

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PEA and AMARI entered into the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) through negotiation without public bidding. President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation and among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Issue: Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed is valid

Held: No. The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands. Moreover, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. In the case at bar the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public

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bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

GAVINO CORPUZ vs. Spouses GERONIMO and HILARIA GROSPEG.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000

Facts:Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer

(OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.

To pay for his wife’s hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan," which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage.

Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of possession. In his Complaint, he alleged that they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land. Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"[7] over the landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and alleged that his and his children’s signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the

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said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries." The appellate court also ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It rejected his contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were unenforceable.

Issue:p

Did the petitioner abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27?

HELD:

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Supreme Court DENIED instant petition and the assailed Decision and Resolution was AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioner’s appeal. The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the property, validly awarded it to private respondents.

Heirs of Juanite vs CAGR No. 138016

FACTS:Sps Romero owned a piece of agricultural land which they sold separate portions to

Pania, Sanchez and Yonson on different dates. Claiming as agricultural tenants of the land in dispute, petitioners Jose Juanite (now deceased) and wife Nicolasa, filed a complaint with the Provincial Agricultural Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) for the cancellation of the sales and to exercise their right of redemption pursuant to RA No. 3844, section 12 of which provides: “Sec. 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration xxx”

Defendants Sps Romero alleged that being the owners of the property, they had the perfect right to sell any portion thereof to any person; and denied the Juanite’s contention that they were their tenants.

PARAB issued a ruling declaring petitioners as tenants. Dept of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), affirmed by CA, reversed the decision, hence this appeal by certiorari.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners Juanite were tenants of the Romero spouses as to entitle them to the right of redemption.

HELD:

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Yes, petitioners Juanite are tenants. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;(2) the subject is agricultural land;(3) there is consent;(4) the purpose is agricultural production;(5) there is personal cultivation; and(6) there is sharing of harvests.All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the

parties. Although the petitioners failed to submit evidence that there existed a sharing of harvests between petioners and Sps Romero, however, the landowners’ admission that petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of “sharing harvest” is assumed as a factual element in that admission.

PHILBANCOR FINANCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS[G.R. No. 129572. June 26, 2000]Private respondents Alfredo Pare, Pablo Galang and Amado Vie filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a complaint for maintenance of possession with redemption and tenancy right of pre-emption against petitioners Philbancor Finance, Inc. and Vicente Hizon, Jr. They allege that the subject lots are occupied by them as legitimate and bona fide tenants thereof, spanning for 50 years, and that such was mortgaged by the owner Hizon to Philbancor without their knowledge. The lots were subsequently foreclosed and sold at public auction to Philbancor upon failure of Hizon to comply with his obligations to the former. They further allege that they came to know of the transaction only when they were notified by petitioner Philbancor to vacate the lots, threatening to take from them the actual or physical possession of the agricultural lots. On the other hand, Philbancor avers that it has no tenancy or agricultural relationship with private respondents considering that it acquired ownership over the disputed lots by virtue of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale and that it is not an agricultural lessor as contemplated in Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended. Furthermore, it contends that assuming private respondents have the right to redeem the lots in question, it had already expired as it was not exercised within 2 years from the registration of the sale.The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, which was affirmed in toto by DARAB. Petitioners then filed a petition for review of the decision of the DARAB, but such was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents could still exercise their right of redemption over the property sold at public auction due to foreclosure of the mortgages thereon considering that they invoked their right to redeem only after seven years after the date of registration of the certificate of sale.

NO. Republic Act No. 3844, Section 12, provides that in case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. The right of redemption under this

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section may be exercised within two (2) years from the registration of the sale and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption." In this case, the certificate of sale of the subject property, which was sold at public auction, was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on July 31, 1985. The two-year redemption period thus expired on July 31, 1987. The complaint for redemption was filed by respondents only on July 14, 1992, five (5) years after expiration of the redemption period prescribed bylaw.Nonetheless, private respondents may continue in possession and enjoyment of the land in question as legitimate tenants because the right of tenancy attaches to the landholding by operation of law. The leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.

REMIGIO ISIDRO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ.G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993

Facts:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the landwithout paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint was triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action.

The trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond and, the complaint was dismissed, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board). An appeal was filed by private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 889. In due course, the RTC rendered a decision on 5 November 1991 concurring with the findings of the MTC and affirming in toto the trial court's decision. The RTC held that under the given facts there was a tenurial arrangement, within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of RA 6657, thereby placing the dispute involved in this case within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

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Private respondent Gutierrez appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. On 27 February 1992, Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in question and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It ruled that the agrarian dispute over which the DAR may have jurisdiction by virtue of its quasi-judicial power is that which involves tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangement is concerned with the act or manner of putting into proper order the rights of holding a piece of agricultural land between the landowner and the farmer or farmworker. It held that absent any prima facie proof that private respondent has a tenancy relationship with petitioner, the established fact is that private respondent is possessing the property in dispute by mere tolerance, and when such possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate by the petitioner, private respondent became a squatter in said land. The MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. Petitioner moved for but, also as earlier stated, it was denied in a resolution for lack of merit.

ISSUES: WON petitioner Isidro should vacate the subject fish pond and WON such fish pond is considered as an agricultural land.

HELD:

The Court ruled that petitioner Isidro must leave the fish pond. The private respondent had the legal right to demand upon petitioner to vacate the land. The tenancy of the petitioner was based only on mere tolerance. Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or agricultural/ leasehold relationship existing between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

The land in question which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. Such fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm

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activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial.

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. The petition is denied. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed.

LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF DAR PARAS J., Dec. 4, 1990 FACTS:

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —

The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:ARTICLE XIIIx x x

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AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORMSection 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.x x x"

It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.

Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry.

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals."

ISSUE:

WON Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith is constitutional?

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HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit. The question raised is one of constitutional construction.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process

GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

Title: JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners, vs. JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and DANIEL CORRAL, respondents. (G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999)

Facts:Petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed 2 cases for damages with preliminary injunction with the MTC against respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral. Petitioners alleged that respondents, through the instigation of Atty. Baranda,

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gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land, delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens titles of the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the registered owner. Gil Opiana was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who inherited the lots upon the former's death. Respondent Jaime Occidental contended that he was a bona fide tenant of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was no annotation on the titles establishing petitioners' right over the land. They denied harvesting the anahaw leaves and coconuts, as well as delivering the produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr.The MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that petitioners had been in actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the land in question for 45 years. Respondents appealed to the RTC. They questioned the trial court's jurisdiction contending that the case was cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). The RTC rendered a decision reversing that of the MTC, ruling that these cases for damages are tenancy-related problems which fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, stressing that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties, as certified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). The CA denied the motion, hence, a petition for review on certiorari filed in the SC. Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime Occidental or Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO certification. They argue that the present action for damages is not tenancy-related, and, hence, is properly cognizable by the trial court, not the DARAB.Issue: WON the present action is properly cognizable by the trial court

Held: YES. The issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.There is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land: Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction, and must be resolved in the trial court. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case can not be considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the

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landowner, Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, the SC concluded that the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.Nuesa vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 132048. March 6, 2002

FACTS:

On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an “Order of Award” in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land, Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters with the conditions that the awardee shall personally cultivate or develop at least one-fourth of the area or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment. It also stated that failure to comply shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the said order.

On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same.Petitioner had filed his own application for said parcels in opposition to that of private respondent.

On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an investigation to look into the conflicting claims of the petitioner and the private respondent. It was found out that the said lots were in possession/cultivation of other persons exclusive of Jose Verdillo. It is crystal clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor for lots covered thereby.

The Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order canceling the Order of Award issued on favor of Jose Verdillo. The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, however, chose to resolve the case on the merits and on October 14, 1994, promulgated a Decision denying the petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss and reversing the Order of the Regional Director. Thereafter, the Petition for Review filed by herein petitioners with the Court of Appeals was denied due course and ordered dismissed.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners’ claim that in this case,

the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction

HELD:

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After carefully perusing the records of this case and considering the contentions of the parties thereto, the SC found the petition impressed with merit. The SC agreed with petitioners that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in this case.

The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case.

Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), “agrarian dispute” is defined to include “(d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent’s petition in the first place.

In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARAB’s unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.OCA v. CAFacts: This is a case about Tenancy of fishponds in the province of Pangasinan. Jose and Isabelo Oca are the civil owners and Abalos is the one who claims to cultivate the fishponds. The setup of such arrangement entitles Abalos to the sari- sari fish while the Oca’s get all the Bangus. In 1992 when Abalos asked for his compensation he was asked to vacate the premises and that’s when he filed a demand for Peaceful possession, Leasehold and Damages with motion for the issuance of Interlocutory Order, aside from this he prayed for the order that the rental must be fixed to 25% of the average net normal harvest of Bangus annually.

The Oca’s filed a counterclaim alleging that the accusations of Abalos are not true and the he was compensated in a piece meal basis. They also alleged that they personally cultivate the land with occasional help from their piece meal workers. The Adjudicator ruled in favor of Abalos. The case was appealed to DARAB and was denied, even in the CA, it was affirmed that Abalos had a better right to the land and that the DARAB should assist in the protection of Abalos’s rights.

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Issue: WON the DARAB had jurisdiction over this case since it was about fishponds and not land?HELD: After being denied in the DARAB and CA, Oca raised the issue that DARAB had no power to decide the case and asked that the decision of DARAB be nullified and the case be tried again in the proper court. The Court said that the doctrine of Laches applies, raising the issue of jurisdiction can no longer be entertained since it has passed through various courts already with the participation of the petitioners without the raising this issue at once, showing that they were sitting on their rights. Petitioners also filed a Counterclaim, which automatically recognizes the power and jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. To invoke the changing of the decision of the DARAB which would entail power to decide then subsequently questioning the power and jurisdiction of that entity is wrong and against public policy.

PNR v. Del Valle

Facts:Philippine National Railways (PNR) owned three strips of land along the Manila- legazpi

route, part of its railroad right of way. Some portions of the land were occupied by people, prompting disputes. PNR adopted temporary rules for the possession of the land through rentals. PNR awarded the use of the land after a bidding to Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three years creating a civil law lease expressly stipulating Bingabing to "occupy and us the property…. temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing failed to take possession of the said piece of land as Pampilo Doltz had occupied the land and claims that he is a tenant of the previous awardees and Bingabing too. In response to this, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of the possession of the land, to remove the house of Doltz and pay for compensation to Bingabing.

Doltz defenses state that he is inter alia tenant on the property for 20 years placed by deceased lessor Pablo Gomba, and successor Demetrio de Vera. He also claimed that he had given Bingabing 1/3 of the crop harvest profits and by effect become a tenant of Bingabing.Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favour. While the case was pending, Doltz registered with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein there maintained the position that the premises in controversy are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case between the same parties in another court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of action. CAR decided in favor of Doltz and that the sharing ratio be maintained.

Issues:

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(1) Is the land in dispute agricultural land within the Agricultural Tenancy act and the Agricultural Land ref orm code?(2) Is Doltz considered a tenant?

Held:

(1) No. Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both

Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, "agricultural land" means land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section

The land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture. Agricultural activities may hamper the operation, security and safety of the PNR.

(2) The contract of lease executed by PNR in favour of Bingabing was merely temporary and may be revocable at any time the PNR needs the leased land for its own use. Also, the contract rules stipulate that any form of sublease of the land is prohibited and that previous awardees de Vera, Gomba or present leaseholder Bingabing cannot create one, since PNR did not consent to the creation of such.

ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. CA

Facts:Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in Nasugbu, B atangas. Before the effectivity of the CARL law (RA 6657), petitioner filed with DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to provisions of EO 229 (before CARL). Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with CARL.Nevertheless, on Aug 6, 1992, Roxas and Co. through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangunniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural land. As a result thereof, DAR was informed by the petitioner of the application for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. Petitioner filed for this application for conversion, assuming that when PP 1520 declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourist zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Pending application for conversion of petitioner, DAR already issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries.

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Issue:WON PP 1520 automatically convert all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasubgu tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas and Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage?

Held:No. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only “certain areas in the sector comprising the three Municipalities that have potential tourism value” and mandated the conduct of “necessary studies” and the segregation of “specific geographic areas” to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those “specific geographic areas” are.

This Court has made it clear that the “power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform and not with this Court. The DAR, is an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas and Co. it finding that PP 1520 did NOT automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the “specific geographic areas” for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.

All these were contained and clarified by the Memorandum Circular No. 7 Series of 2004.

A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands with the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.

Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government.

Furthermore, Roxas and Co.’s application in DAR Administrative Case for CARP exemption in Hacienda Palico subject of GR 179650 cannot be granted in view of discrepancies in the location and identity in the subject parcels of land.

Issue:

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WON the CLOAs issued by DAR are valid?

Held:No. The CLOAs should be cancelled.

The failure of DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued. To assume the power is to short circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.

In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine parcels of land identified in Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR administrative case). But as for the rest of the CLOAs, they should be respected since Roxas and Co, as shown, failed to prove that the other lots, aside from the abovementioned nine lots, are CARP exempt.

Roxas and Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands before the CLOAs covering them can be cancelled.

Vda. De Tangub v Court of Appeals FACTS:

Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of their unlawful dispossession was tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants who were all employees of the National Steel Corporation, and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided. In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. He opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the Tangub Spouses then filed a petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, acting as special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657 has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.The provisions of Executive Order 229 and Executive Order 129-A relating to the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform are evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department.

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Documents

Compiled Agri law case digests.docx