COMMISSION ON

NARCOTIC DRUGS AGENDA: PREVENTION OF

ILLICIT TRADE AND

TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC

DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPHIC

SUBSTANCE AND ITS ROLE IN

FUNDING

Letter to the committee

Dear Delegates,

It is a matter of great honor and privilege for us to serve as your executive board members.

Having gained experience at various MUNs we feel that there is dire need of promoting the

ideas of peace and ensuring security at international level. Pursuing dialogue with enhanced

understanding of international law across generations can have great results.

Model United Nations is one of the finest methods to learn about the practice of states and

understand their policies.

Delegates, it is you who form the committee and are the ones who raise (or reduce) the

quality or the level of debate in a committee. So, a majority share of responsibility with in

ensuring the overall success of the CND rests on your shoulders.

We hope to see the delegates well versed with the foreign policy of their countries

representing their countries with a diplomatic courtesy in the best possible manner. We also

hope that you will find the issue at hand interesting. We look forward to a successful

committee.

Also please feel free to contact us at any point of time.

All the best!

Gitanjali Jaggi (jaggi.gitanjali973@gmail.com)

Chairperson

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) was established by the Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC) resolution 9(I) in 1946, to assist the ECOSOC in supervising the

application of the international drug control treaties. In 1991, the General Assembly (GA)

further expanded the mandates of the CND to enable it to function as the governing body of

the UNODC, and to approve the budget of the Fund of the United Nations International Drug

Control Programme, which accounts for over 90 per cent of the resources available to the

United Nations for drug control. In ECOSOC resolution 1999/30, the CND was requested to

enhance its functioning by structuring its agenda into two distinct segments: a normative

segment, during which the CND discharges its treaty-based and normative functions; and an

operational segment, during which the CND exercises its role as the governing body of

UNODC.

The Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an

Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem of 2009 is the main

policy document of the United Nations guiding action by the international community in this

field. It reaffirms the principle role played by the CND as one of the United Nations organs

with prime responsibility for drug control matters. In line with its mandates, the CND

monitors the world drug situation, develops strategies on international drug control and

recommends measures to combat the world drug problem, including through reducing

demand for drugs, promoting alternative development initiatives and adopting supply

reduction measures.

The Commission reviews and analyses the global drug control situation, considering the

interrelated issues of prevention of drug abuse, rehabilitation of drug users and supply and

trafficking in illicit drugs. It takes action through resolutions and decisions.

It was established by the Economic and Social Council as one of its functional commissions

on 16 February 1946 (resolution 9(I)). The Commission assists the Council in supervising the

application of the international drug control treaties. It also advises the Council on all matters

pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs has important normative functions under the

international drug control conventions. It is inter alia authorized to consider all matters

pertaining to the aims of the Conventions and see to their implementation.

As a treaty organ under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 and the Convention

on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, the Commission decides, on the basis of recommendations

by the World Health Organization (WHO), to place narcotic drugs and psychotropic

substances under international control. Pursuant to the Convention against Illicit Traffic in

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, the Commission decides, upon the

recommendation of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), to place precursor

chemicals frequently used for the manufacture of illicit drugs under international control. The

Commission may also decide to remove or modify international control measures over drugs,

psychotropic substances or precursors.

The mandates of the Commission were further expanded in 1991. The Commission functions

as a governing body: It approves the budget of the Fund of the United Nations International

Drug Control Programme, which is administered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC) and finances measures to combat the world drug problem.

Illicit Drug Trade By most estimates, the traffic in illicit drugs is one of the worlds most substantial money earners. The retail value of drugs now exceeds the value of the international trade in oil and is

second only to that of the arms trade.

The consumption of illicit drugs not only has serious physical, social and economic

consequences for the individual consumer, but also imposes enormous costs on society as a

whole, and ultimately funds massive criminal systems. People may choose to take drugs to

rebel, to escape, to cope, to survive, to belong or to register resignation and defeat. The

current global increase in the consumption of illicit drugs may be related to changes in

society, including reduced family and community cohesiveness, increased unemployment and

greater feelings of alienation.

Why do people produce and traffic in illicit drugs, and how are they able to do so on such a

large scale? While one obvious incentive is the money that is to be made in servicing

consumer demand for drugs, other factors are also involved. The structure of society, the

nature of political power, the impact of economic policy, and the resistance of the cultural

fabric to private drug consumption and public corruption - all these are factors that influence

how successfully illicit drugs can be produced and traded.

Multiple papers, drawing on recent UNRISD research, examine the chain of illicit drug

production, distribution and consumption. It focuses on the social consequences of these

activities and the forces contributing to the global drug problem. The analysis indicates the

complexity of the illicit drug trade and the need for a multi-pronged policy to address the

problem.

The Illicit Drug Problem: Why has it Become Worse? Illicit drugs typically move internationally from less developed areas of the world to more

developed countries, where most drug consumption takes place. In recent years, just as the

growth of legitimate global businesses has been facilitated by the globalization of financial

systems and market relations, drug producers and traffickers have also taken advantage of the

opportunities presented by the changing macro-economic environment. They have organized

themselves on a global scale and put a significant proportion of their drug profits in financial

centres offering secrecy and attractive investment returns. Their adoption of high-tech

computer and communications technology has facilitated the expansion of their trade and the

protection of industrial secrets. Drug traffickers are now able to launder illicit profits by

moving money around the world electronically with few national controls. They are aided by

porous borders due, in some cases, to policies intended to encourage trade and investment,

and in other cases to weak governments and weak or unenforceable laws against money

laundering, fraud or organized crime. The consumption, production and trade of illicit drugs

have a wide variety of adverse socio-economic and political effects. These activities can at

times undermine the legal economy (for instance by contributing to an overvalued exchange

rate). They contribute to increased crime and social disruption on all levels, and their adverse

effects can in fact be intensified by drug control laws. Most of the benefits and liabilities

associated with the production and trade of drugs ultimately derive from illegality itself, a

condition which the drug control laws, by definition, establish. Illegality provides what has

been called the crime tax: the difference between prices in legal and illegal markets. This tax

is reaped principally by traffickers, but they pass on a sufficient proportion to peasant

growers to create incentives for drug crop production. Given the lack of alternative economic

opportunities, especially in rural areas of producing countries, illegality and the profits

associated with it make it very difficult to devise a policy mix of punishments and incentives

that would induce growers to abandon their drug crops. In many cases, moreover, drug

control initiatives have actually contributed indirectly to social dislocation, corruption,

militarization and abuse of human rights.

The following sections examine in more detail the economic, social and political impacts of

illicit drugs at the production, trafficking and consumption stages, as well as the forces

contributing to the problem. Effective policy strategies should be based on an understanding

of the linkages between these different stages in the illicit drug chain.

Bloc Positions Asian Bloc: Asia is one of the more prevalent areas of drug trafficking. With the involvement

of drug problems within the Golden Triangle, Asia has shown to consist of large numbers of

drug abusers and producers. Economic developments have helped and hindered the

preventative measures taken by such nations because of the large populations consumption making the larger markets more lucrative to the cause.

Latin American Bloc: Drug trafficking and production has had a widespread appearance in

Latin America. With the regions situation consisting of poverty, the financial capabilities of the drug production and trafficking of drugs has caused the major dependency of drugs for

the nations. Violence is a major problem in this region because the various drug rebel groups

demanding the cultivation of illicit drugs. Alternative development has been previously

implemented throughout the region however the alternative drugs are not meeting the

economic demands as illicit drug trade does for these nations.

African Bloc: The African region are not much of the producers of illicit drugs, however the

trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs have been the major deficit of this region. The

African nations often transport in drugs from the Middle Eastern and Latin American regions.

African governments have continually been very cooperative in extending the drug limitation

throughout nations, however the enforcement of governments are lacking.

Middle Eastern Bloc: The Middle Eastern bloc is greatly affected by the rebel groups

controlling the drug trade. The governments are unable to combat the rebel groups

successfully since these rebel groups are usually powerful state sponsored issues. The drug

related problems in these nations are not only political, but they are also religious, which has

the greatest influence throughout these nations.

Western Bloc: This bloc has been the most lucrative and persistent regions of the consumers.

Nations in this region have tried to strengthen borders in order to decrease the trafficking.

Because these nations are often larger with stable financial situations, they are able to provide

funds to decrease the presence of rebel drug groups

Policy Options This question encompasses some of the worlds most hotly debated policy issues. Should stronger interdiction campaigns be undertaken against drug producers and traffickers? Should

economic incentives, educational campaigns and other activities be undertaken to encourage

people to change their behavior as consumers or producers? Should the war on drugs be

declared to have been misconceived, and expanded discussions be undertaken about some

controlled form of decriminalization and legalization?

Responses vary according to peoples values and views. The primary focus of drug control policies in most parts of the world has heretofore been on supply suppression through drug

crop eradication and disruption of trafficking channels. It is becoming increasingly clear,

however, that North America, Western Europe and other net consuming regions are unlikely

to solve their illicit drug consumption problems through the continuation of current supply

suppression strategies. Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars on controlling supplies,

the successful capture of major traffickers and dismantling of their drug empires, and the

weaning of peasant growers away from coca and opium via alternative crop incentives, the

global supply and consumption of drugs has continued to grow.

The reasons for the failure of current drug control policies are numerous: the lack of

alternative income-earning possibilities among rural people in net producing countries is too

substantial, the price differential between licit and illicit crops is too great, the huge profits

acquired by traffickers in illegal business are too enticing, and traffickers are too skilled at

eluding law enforcement efforts. If supply suppression is successful in one area, crop

production or drug refining activities quickly move elsewhere.

Moreover, even if supply suppression policies are successful in increasing the costs of

supplying drugs, and reducing the amount of drugs on the market, consumption will only be

reduced under certain conditions. Assuming consumption to be price responsive (a condition

that does not always hold), prices can be driven up beyond peoples willingness or ability to pay only if true scarcity relative to demand is created. A well-known study undertaken by the

Rand Corporation has suggested that, because the price of the coca leaf accounts for less than

1 per cent of the retail price of cocaine, even a crop eradication programmable to triple the

cost of production to the growers would raise cocaine prices in the United States by no more

than 1 per cent. The same study indicates that, even if interdiction programs were to become

vastly more successful, and were able to intercept 50 per cent of the cocaine arriving from

Colombia, US street prices would rise less than 3 per cent.

In most cases where supply control strategies have been implemented, grower and trafficker

counter-strategies have been more than sufficient to maintain supplies on the market. In the

United States, for example, in spite of the large tonnage of illicit drugs confiscated every

year, drugs are as plentiful now as ever, and are sold at more affordable prices. In Colombia,

despite the destruction of the Medellin syndicate, drug production continues as usual.

Medellins markets, resources, stocks and many of its personnel have been incorporated into the rival Cali syndicate, making it now the worlds leading cocaine trafficker. Crop suppression strategies have been no more effective than efforts to control drug

trafficking. Experience shows that pressure placed on growers is not sufficient to reduce drug

crop production significantly. In Bolivia, interdiction efforts against processors and

traffickers have brought down the price of coca leaves, leading to a slight drop in the amount

of coca produced since 1989. In Peru, however, coca production increased between 1989 and

1992 by an amount equivalent to 73 per cent of Bolivias reduction. It is likely that one countrys success in reducing production will simply be anothers problem as traffickers, refiners and intermediaries migrate to places of least resistance and most opportunity,

creating a demand for drug crop production. This phenomenon is referred to as the balloon

effect: what is pushed down in one place simply springs up in another.

In some countries, cash rewards have been paid to growers who voluntarily eradicate their

crops, in order to compensate them for their loss of income. However, in Bolivia for example,

many of these growers simply moved to new areas and planted new drug crops in more

remote areas, or eradicated only those crops that were old and unproductive. This has led

many experts to argue that crop eradication should be rewarded not with monetary

compensation, but with other crops or income-generating opportunities, or with social

infrastructure such as better roads and services.

Another obstacle to successful crop eradication is lack of sufficient funds. National

governments often argue that they cannot implement eradication programs unless they have

strong financial backing from international organizations and governments in the developed

world. They frequently complain that the amount of money needed to replace drug-based

economic activities is not forthcoming. But the funding agencies are reluctant to release large

sums of money unless they are convinced that national governments are serious about

implementing drug suppression programs.

The fact that supply suppression, both absolutely and as a surrogate for consumption control,

seems to be a general failure at present levels of investment in drug control indicates a need

to re-examine drug control policies. The following sections examine the main types of

strategies that have been proposed: (a) the intensification of crop suppression and interdiction

efforts through greater militarization of the war on drugs; (b) greater implementation of

.alternative development strategies meant to wean growers away from drug crops; and (c)

demand or harm reduction in consuming countries, including controlled legalization or

decriminalization.

Narco-Terrorism

Narco-terrorism refers to the aptitude of drug traffickers to manipulate a government or

society by threatening or using violence and intimidation methods. Much of the current

narco-terrorism deals with terrorist organizations that also deal in the drug trafficking world.

Another example of narco-terrorism is when a terrorist organization is able to fund their

activity through the illicit drug trade. This money circulates and increases the narco-terrorism

occurring in these areas. Narco-terrorism is difficult to combat because of how difficult it is

to combat illicit drug trading.

The FARC The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army, also known as the FARC is an organization in Colombia. The members of the Columbian Communist Party

established it in 1966. Even though it was primarily an agricultural movement that was based

in the remote rural areas of Colombia, it slowly became one of the best-organised guerrilla

movements of Latin America. The FARC is recognized as a terrorist group by the

governments of Colombia, the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and the

European Union. The FARC finances its operations via multiple ways. Immediately after its

establishment, the organization received support from citizens of the areas they were active

in. This way of financing their terroristic acts slowly decreased, but it was substituted by

extortion, protection money, ransoms from kidnapping and drug trafficking. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant decline in funding of guerrilla and

terrorist groups by ideologically motivated state sponsors. As a result, these groups have

become increasingly reliant on drug trafficking as a principal source of funding. Terrorist

groups that are known to be involved in the narcotics trade include Hizballah, Al-Qaeda, the

FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed force of Columbia-Peoples Army), the PCP, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), and the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). The narcotics trade has proven to be

profitable for these groups.

Conceptual Framework There is obviously a relationship between drug consumption and crime, although it is often

not clear which is cause and which is effect. In principal consuming areas such as North

America and Western Europe, psycho-pharmacological effects, economic-compulsive drives

and systemic violence are considered the principal components of the drugs-crime link.

The most harmful psycho-pharmacological effects of drug use, particularly those associated

with crackcocaine, involve people becoming irrational, excited, agitated or impulsive. Users

may become unable to control their anger and vent it in the form of physical assault,

including homicide. In one of the first studies clearly linking violent behavior and crack

cocaine use, it was reported that nearly half the callers to a nationwide cocaine hotline in the

United States said they had committed violent crimes or aggressive acts (including child

abuse, murder, robbery, rape and physical assault) while using crack.

The economic-compulsive dimension of drug-related crime is associated with criminal acts to

obtain funding for personal drug consumption (through burglaries, for instance). The

systemic dimension refers to the activities of drug syndicates, associations, gangs and

smugglers involved in protecting their product from law enforcement officials or from each

other by whatever means necessary. A fourth dimension could be added to this standard

analysis - the corruption-criminality connection, which occurs when administrative and

political personnel such as drug enforcement agents and border patrol officers themselves

become allied with the drug trade.

Over the years, a link between drug activity and terrorism has become more than evident. The

former Executive Director of UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa, stated the following in 2004:

The fight against terrorism will be more effective if drug trafficking is interrupted...There is mounting evidence of drug money being used to finance criminal activities, including

terrorism. This statement referred to the situation in Afghanistan, but it also fits to the situation in other

Middle Eastern countries or Colombia.

Terrorist organizations need to finance their operations and their organization (recruit

members, administration). In order to do so, they engage in drug trafficking activities. In

addition to the main reason for engaging in illicit drug trafficking, it has been said that

organizations try to weaken their enemies by making drugs available in their enemies

societies. Furthermore, it has to be noted that the relation between the terrorist organization

and the drug traffickers is beneficial for both parties. Drug traffickers gain military skills,

weapons and relations with other organizations who they cooperate with. Thus, they are able

to exercise control and decisively influence the society, even though their major goal is

broadly considered money, which is a crucial means of manipulation and extortion. The

terrorist organizations most important profit from the illegal trade with narcotics is

predominantly money which they can finance their terroristic actions with. Another benefit is

the manipulation of corrupt governments. Terrorist organizations often bribe or threaten

unstable governments or high-level politicians.

Symbiotic Relationship There often is a nexus between terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking.

Links between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers take many forms, ranging from

facilitation -- protection, transportation, and taxation -- to direct trafficking by the terrorist

organization itself in order to finance its activities. Traffickers and terrorists have similar

logistical needs in terms of material and the covert movement of goods, people

Relationships between drug traffickers and terrorists benefit both. Drug traffickers benefit

from the terrorists' military skills, weapons supply, and access to clandestine organizations.

Terrorists gain a source of revenue and expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of proceeds

from illicit transactions. Both groups bring corrupt officials whose services provide mutual

benefits, such as greater access to fraudulent documents, including passports and customs

papers. Drug traffickers may also gain considerable freedom of movement when they operate

in conjunction with terrorists who control large amounts of territory.

Similarity Of Methods

Terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations increasingly rely on cell structures to

accomplish their respective goals. While there may be a strong central leadership, day-to-day

operations are carried out by members of compartmentalized cells. This structure enhances

security by providing a degree of separation between the leadership and the rank-and-file. In

addition, terrorists and drug traffickers use similar means to conceal profits and fund-raising.

They use informal transfer systems such as "hawala," and also rely on bulk cash smuggling,

multiple accounts, and front organizations to launder money. Both groups make use of

fraudulent documents, including passports and other identification and customs documents to

smuggle goods and weapons. They both fully exploit their networks of trusted couriers and

contacts to conduct business. In addition, they use multiple cell phones and are careful about

what they say on the phone to increase communications security.

The methods used for moving and laundering money for general criminal purposes are

similar to those used to move money to support terrorist activities. It is no secret which

countries and jurisdictions have poorly regulated banking structures, and both terrorist

organizations and drug trafficking groups have made use of online transfers and accounts that

do not require disclosure of owners. Moreover, bulk cash smuggling methods and informal

networks such as "hawala" and the black market peso exchange are easy and efficient ways to

launder money. Criminal networks are in a perfect position to use methods that require

doctoring of passports or customs declaration forms. These methods are unlikely to change in

the near term. Though many countries have been quick to update their regulations, few have

the law enforcement structure in place to carry out interdiction. If law enforcement

capabilities improve globally, in the long term traffickers and terrorists may increasingly use

trusted individual couriers, or more complex balance transfers in informal networks.

From State-Sponsorship To Drug Trafficking

In the past, state sponsors provided funding for terrorists, and their relationships with terrorist

organizations were used to secure territory or provide access to gray arms networks. Lately,

however, as state sponsorship of terrorism has come under increased scrutiny and greater

international condemnation, terrorist groups have looked increasingly at drug trafficking as a

source of revenue. But trafficking often has a two-fold purpose for the terrorists. Not only

does it provide funds, it also furthers the strategic objectives of the terrorists. Some terrorist

groups believe that they can weaken their enemies by flooding their societies with addictive

drugs.

Growing pressure on state sponsors of terrorism has increased the likelihood that terrorists

will become involved in the drug trade. Interdiction of terrorist finances and shutdowns of

"charitable" and other non-governmental front organizations have also contributed to their

convergence. Terrorist groups are increasingly able to justify their involvement in illicit

activity to their membership and have largely abandoned the belief that it can damage the

moral basis for their cause.

Latin America

In the Western Hemisphere, there is an historic link between various terrorist groups and

narcotics trafficking. The Shining Path cut a brutal swath through Peru from the 1980s to the

mid-1990s, largely funded by levies the group assessed on cocaine trafficking. In Ciudad del

Este, Paraguay, and along the loosely controlled region that it borders with Brazil and

Argentina, members of radical Islamic groups are reported to be engaged in money

laundering, intellectual property rights piracy, alien smuggling, and arms trafficking.

The Andean region is the source of virtually all the world's cocaine. Colombia, Peru and

Bolivia, in that order, are the primary producers of coca and the final products. The presence

of terrorist organizations in Colombia and Peru -- and their need to finance operations --

establishes a natural symbiotic relationship to exploit drugs as a revenue source.

The linkage between drugs and terrorism in Colombia is one that particularly concerns us and

one that we watch carefully. In the 1990s, the international drug cartels operating in

Colombia embarked on a campaign of violence that severely challenged the authority and

even the sovereignty of the Colombian state. The September 11 attacks illustrate in graphic

detail the serious threat posed by forces hostile to the United States operating under the cover

and protection of a narco-terrorist state.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- Although the FARC-controlled safe

haven, or "despeje" -- which is situated between two of Colombia's largest coca cultivation

areas -- is not considered a major area for coca cultivation or drug trafficking, many FARC

units throughout southern Colombia raise funds through the extortion ("taxation") of both

legal and illegal businesses, the latter including the drug trade. Similarly, in return for cash

payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, some FARC units protect cocaine

laboratories and clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia. In addition, some FARC units

may be independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations. Some FARC units

in southern Colombia are more directly involved in local drug trafficking activities, such as

controlling local cocaine base markets. At least one prominent FARC commander has served

as a source of cocaine for a Brazilian trafficking organization. There are strong indications

that the FARC has established links with the Irish Republican Army to increase its capability

to conduct urban terrorism. In July 2001, the Colombian National Police arrested three

members of the IRA who are believed to have used the demilitarized zone to train the FARC

in the use of explosives.

National Liberation Army (ELN) -- The ELN operates primarily along Colombia's

northeastern border with Venezuela and in central and northwestern Colombia. The territories

under ELN influence include cannabis and opium poppy growing areas. Some ELN units

raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. Some ELN units may be

independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations, but the ELN appears to be

much less dependent than the FARC on coca and cocaine profits to fund its operations. The

ELN expresses a disdain for illegal drugs, but does take advantage of the profits available

where it controls coca producing areas.

United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) - The AUC umbrella group, which

includes many Colombian paramilitary forces, admittedly uses the cocaine trade to finance its

counterinsurgency campaign. The head of the AUC, Carlos Castano, stated in 2000 that "70

percent" of AUC operational funding was from drug money and described it as an undesired

but necessary evil. AUC elements appear to be directly involved in processing cocaine and

exporting cocaine from Colombia. In 2001, the AUC claimed publicly that it was getting out

of the drug business, but it will be very difficult for this umbrella group to keep its many

semi-autonomous units from continuing in the lucrative drug business.

Shining Path (SenderoLuminoso SL) (Peru) - The SL historically has operated in remote

areas of Peru where central government authority is least prevalent--a condition conducive to

drug producers, drug traffickers and terrorists. The geographic coincidence and reliance on

violence to protect safe havens made the SL a natural to engage in protection and extortion

rackets involving coca and cocaine. The SL cut a brutal swath through Peru from the 1980s to

the mid-1990s, largely funded by levies it imposed on cocaine trafficking. As the SL waned

in the late 1990s, so did its influence on the drug trade. But in 2001, the SL had a slight

resurgence in areas like the Huallaga and Apurimac valleys where coca is cultivated and

processed, indicating that the remnants of the group are probably financing operations with

drug profits from security and taxation "services."

Tri-Border Islamic Groups -- In Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and along the loosely

controlled region that it borders with Brazil and Argentina, members of radical Islamic

groups are reported to be engaged in drug trafficking, money laundering, intellectual property

rights piracy, alien smuggling and arms trafficking. One such individual is Said Hassan Ali

Mohamed Mukhlis, a suspected member of the Egyptian Islamic Group with possible ties to

Osama bin Laden. This group is linked to the murder of 58 tourists in Luxor, Egypt, and

Mukhilis himself was arrested in 1999 by Uruguayan authorities in connection with foiled

plots to bomb the U.S. embassies in Paraguay and Uruguay.

South Asia & Former Soviet Union

Throughout this region, proximity to cultivation and production, combined with the

infrastructure provided by the traffickers, has encouraged mutually beneficial relationships

between terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations.

Al-Qaida - Since it transferred its base of operations to Afghanistan, al-Qaida has been

sustained by a government that earned a substantial part of its revenue through taxes on

opium production and trafficking. Afghanistan's opiate trafficking, which accounts for more

than 70 percent of the world's supply, was reportedly advocated by Osama bin Ladin as a way

to weaken the West.

Kashmiri militant groups - These groups likely take part in the drug trade to finance their

activities given their proximity to major production and refining sites and trafficking routes.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) -- Individual members and sympathizers

worldwide traffic drugs -- principally heroin -- to raise money for their cause, but there is no

evidence of official LTTE involvement in the drug trade. The LTTE reportedly has close ties

to drug trafficking networks in Burma, and Tamil expatriates may carry drugs in exchange

for training from Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - The IMU has reportedly profited from the drug

trade out of Afghanistan and trafficking through Central Asia to Russia and Europe.

Middle East

Hezbollah-- The Lebanese "Hezbollah" group smuggles cocaine from Latin America to

Europe and the Middle East and has in the past smuggled opiates out of Lebanon's Bekaa

valley, although poppy cultivation there has dwindled in recent years. Its involvement in drug

trafficking and other illicit activity may expand as state sponsorship declines.

Europe

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) - The PKK "taxes" ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers and

individual cells traffic heroin to support their operations.

Irish Terrorists -- Although there is some evidence linking the Real IRA to drug trafficking,

the extent to which the Real IRA or other terrorist groups in Ireland engage in drug

trafficking is unclear.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) -- Reporting indicates the ETA or its members have

been involved in a variety of crimes from drug trafficking to money laundering

Research Questions:

1. How can we redefine the legal structures of drug policy in order to make them more sustainable?

2. How do we take into consideration the impact of drug networks upon economic systems of local livelihoods?

3. What are the social and cultural implications in the perspective of drug tourism on developing countries?

4. How first-world drug laws are creating demand for illicit drug smuggling and how are these legal systems affecting demand for drug tourism?

Further Research:

1. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, see annual report 2012 [Online]: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/

2. International Drug Policy Consortium (2011), for Middle East and North Africa bloc [Online]: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1908878.

3. Cockburn, A. and St. Clair, J. (1998) Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press. London: Verso. This is a good general guide with critical perspectives on U.S. relationship with Asia and Central America.

The Economist (2012) [Online]. Burn-out and battle fatigue. Available from: http://www.economist.com/node/21550296. Focus on drug policy in Latin America.