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Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2006

Combat Search andRescue in Desert Storm

D ARREL D. W HITCOMB Colonel, USAFR, Retired

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ii

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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of theauthor and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, theDepartment of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distributionunlimited.

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Whitcomb, Darrel D., 1947-Combat search and rescue in Desert Storm / Darrel D. Whitcomb.

p. ; cm.Includes bibliographical references. A rich heritage: the saga of Bengal 505 Alpha—The interim years—Desert Shield—

Desert Storm week one—Desert Storm weeks two/three/four—Desert Storm week five—Desert Sabre week six.

ISBN 1-58566-153-81. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Search and rescue operations. 2. Search and rescue

operations—United States—History. 3. United States—Armed Forces—Search andrescue operations. I. Title.

956.704424 –– dc22

© Copyright 2006 by Darrel D. Whitcomb ([email protected]).

Air University Press131 West Shumacher AvenueMaxwell AFB AL 36112-6615http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil

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This work is dedicated to the memory of the brave crew of Bengal 15.

Without question, without hesitation, eight soldierswent forth to rescue a downed countryman—

only three returned.God bless those lost, as they rest in their eternal peace.

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Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

1 A RICH HERITAGE: THE SAGA OF BENGAL 505 ALPHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2 THE INTERIM YEARS . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3 DESERT SHIELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4 DESERT STORM WEEK ONE . . . . . . . . 81Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

5 DESERT STORM WEEKS TWO/THREE/FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

6 DESERT STORM WEEK FIVE . . . . . . . . 191Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

7 DESERT SABRE WEEK SIX . . . . . . . . . 209Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

8 POSTSCRIPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

v

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Page

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

Illustrations

Map

Week 1: 17–23 January . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Weeks 2-4: 24 January–13 February . . . . . 168

Week 5: 14–20 February . . . . . . . . . . . 192

Week 6: 21–28 February . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Photo

Brig Gen Dale Stovall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Capt Bennie Orrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Jolly Greens were legendary inSoutheast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Brig Gen Rich Comer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Col George Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Capt Randy O’Boyle andBrig Gen Buster Glosson . . . . . . . . . . . 54

The Apaches of Task Force Normandy . . . . 91

MH-53 pilot, Steve Otto . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Crewmembers on the Stroke 65recovery attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Col Dave Eberly, pilot of Corvette 03 . . . . . 123

Maj Tom Griffith of Corvette 03 . . . . . . . . 123

The crew of Slate 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

CONTENTS

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Photo Page

1st Lt Randy Goff and Capt P. J. Johnson . . . 148

MH-53s stood CSAR alert at ArAr . . . . . . . 176

Capt Bill Andrews with other membersof Mutt flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

LTC Bill Bryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

The crew of Bengal 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

MAJ Rhonda Cornum . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

Capt Tom Trask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

Tables

1 JRCC Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

2 Analysis of combat losses . . . . . . . . . . . 259

CONTENTS

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ix

Darrel D. Whitcomb is a 1969 graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He served three tours in Southeast Asia as a cargopilot and forward air controller and subsequently flew the A-37and A-10 with the 926th Fighter Wing and the 442d Fighter Wing. He also served in fighter plans on the Air Staff and inmobilization plans on the Joint Staff. Most recently, he servedon the faculty at Air Command and Staff College and as themobilization assistant to the commander of the Air Force Doc-trine Center, both at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He retired from

the Air Force Reserve in 1999 with the rank of colonel. He wasalso a career airline pilot for Delta Airlines, retiring in 2003.

As a noted writer on aviation history and combat search andrescue, Colonel Whitcomb has published numerous articles inmagazines and periodicals including Air and Space Power Jour- nal . His first book, The Rescue of Bat 21, was published in1998 (US Naval Institute Press). Still active in aviation, he re-cently completed a tour as a contract pilot in Iraq.

About the Author

Darrel D. Whitcomb, right , with Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, USAF, retired.

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Colonel Whitcomb is a graduate of Squadron Officer School,Maxwell AFB, Alabama; Army Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and National War College,Fort McNair, Washington, DC. He lives with his wife in Fairfax, Virginia, where he works part-time as a contract analyst with TATE Incorporated.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Foreword

As a third-class cadet at the US Air Force Academy in July of 1970, I saw the war in Vietnam as a major determinant of my future. I just did not know then what part I might play in theconflict and felt a youthful, impatient need to decide on my Air Force career so I could see myself in what looked like the war of my generation. I found my calling on a beautiful California afternoon when 22 of us cadets were treated to a ride in an HH-53C Super Jolly Green Giant of the Air Rescue and Recovery Service, a part of the Military Airlift Command.

I enjoyed the ride. I sat beside a pararescueman, or “PJ,”looking out at the treetops as we skimmed along. Turns wereexciting, with the crew windows open up front and the windflowing through the cabin. Unlike the rides I had taken in fight-ers and bombers, I was not breathing through a rubber mask,and I felt like I was in touch with the world below—a partici-pant instead of a spectator. Afterwards, TSgt Stu Stanaland,the PJ, explained that the pilot, Maj Marty Donohue, was oneof the best in the rescue business.

Months later back in school, we were all captivated by news

of the attempt to rescue US prisoners of war (POW) at Son Tay in North Vietnam. When I learned that the raid had been con-ducted using rescue helicopters, I read all I could find about the mission. President Nixon later decorated the mission lead-ers, saying they had performed flawlessly and fought coura-geously without losing a man; and the mission had not suc-ceeded only because of bad intelligence—the POWs had beenmoved from the Son Tay camp. As I watched the presentationon television, I spotted Major Donohue among the honorees.

Now I was hooked. I made a career decision to fly helicopters,

get into rescue, and join those guys for life. That resolutionheld up through my senior year when the commandant of ca-dets told all us prospective helicopter pilots we were making a mistake that would deny us a rewarding career. “If you becomehelicopter pilots, you will not be in my Air Force,” he said.

Still, it was what I wanted most to do and what I did. Whilein HH-53 transition, the most respected instructor pilot—an Air Force Cross recipient named Ben Orrell—told me rescue

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was a job to be proud of and that it would be sufficient in itself to make a career rewarding. Soon after, and still a second lieu-

tenant, I flew my first combat mission—the Mayaguez recovery in 1975. We flew as wingman to another HH-53, which includedSergeant Stanaland among its crew members. I had joinedthose rescue guys.

The years between then and now have seen many changes but almost nothing new. The rescue men—and now also women— are called to enter dangerous territory, flying low and slow, going where a usually faster, less-vulnerable aircraft has recently beenshot down. Instead of having a couple of days’ time to prepareand entering the mission into the air tasking order (ATO) several

days prior to execution, the rescue folks go there from a “coldstart” launch from alert status. They could enhance their prepa-ration by reading the ATO and plotting where the danger areasfor shoot-downs might be, but a large, complex air campaignmay cover an entire country. As you may deduce from this book,a major lesson learned from Desert Storm is that making thecommand and control arrangements murky and time-consum-ing further complicates the task of air rescue. Also, they may not be adequately equipped for the mission, yet the demand for im-mediate, must-succeed operations remains.

During the first Gulf War of 1991, air rescue was in a state of transition and largely performed by aircraft and crews assignedto special operations units. These units were equipped withhelicopters originally procured to perform rescue and modifiedfor their new missions. Remember, the Son Tay raid had beenperformed by crews and aircraft assigned to air rescue, but themission concept more closely resembled a special operation.Likewise, the SS Mayaguez recovery was a rescue mission per-formed by air-assaulting a Cambodian island with US marinescarried on Special Operations and Air Rescue Service H-53s.

Special ops and rescue have closely related needs in terms of aircraft, crew training, and mission profiles. These are missioncousins, and the need for crews to consider themselves bloodrelations is clear.

FOREWORD

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As detailed in this book, the young ones who aspired to be-come rescue guys in one generation often become the rescueleaders of the next. Just as I learned from and admired Ben Or-rell, some of the pilots in the squadron I commanded in Desert Storm (Tom Trask, Tim Minish, Paul Harmon, and Mike Kings-ley) commanded squadrons themselves in later conflicts inKosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As you read the stories of their missions in Desert Storm, you will also better understand their preparations to perform air rescue and special operations inthose later conflicts. But those stories are for other authors.

In this book, Darrel Whitcomb provides a wonderfully objec-tive accounting of combat search and rescue as we performed it during Desert Storm. He accurately discusses the decisions be-ing made and their results. This work gives those who will dothese missions in the future the chance to see things and ask the types of questions which, when answered, may lead to their success:

What is the command and control arrangement?

Who does the search part of search and rescue?

Who makes the launch decision?

What are the launch criteria for a rescue attempt? Will these arrangements speed up or slow decision making?

Have we adequately rehearsed getting the launch decisionpassed to the alert crews?

Have we adequately rehearsed the combat link between thesearch aircraft and the rescue aircraft?

Do we have the right equipment in the hands of potentialsurvivors?

Are the potential survivors trained for the role they must play in their rescue?

As Darrel Whitcomb examines these questions and muchmore in writing this book, we get the chance to learn and to

FOREWORD

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become the rescue guys we would all like to be or would like tohave standing alert in case we get into trouble. This book offers

anyone a good start on that goal, on a wonderfully rewardingcareer, and a lifetime devoted to it.

RICHARD L. COMER Major General, USAF, Retired

FOREWORD

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Introduction

“In combat operations, aircraft will be shot down,” states GenCharles A. “Chuck” Horner in his book, Every Man a Tiger .1 Suchhas been the case since aerial combat became a form of warfare.

Implicit in this fact is the realization that the aircrews that fly those aircraft will be put at risk of capture. Over time, our nation has developed a robust capability to rescue airmen or any military personnel put at risk behind enemy lines. Eachservice has a rescue capability. The Air Force and Navy havededicated rescue squadrons. The Army relies on its line heli-

copter battalions, as do the special operations units. The Ma-rines have pre-trained teams, called TRAP (tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel), on call with each Marine air groundtask force.

Originally, this mission was labeled search and rescue or SAR.SAR, in its original use by the US Air Force Air Rescue Service,meant recovery of personnel anywhere. When our rescue forces were deployed to Korea and Southeast Asia, they referred to allrescue missions, whether in enemy or friendly territory, by that term. The SAR stories from those conflicts are legion.

After Southeast Asia, analysts and force planners came tothe realization that there was a fundamental difference betweenSAR in a permissive area and in an area that was not permis-sive (i.e., under enemy control). This second condition is now called combat search and rescue or CSAR. At the time of Desert Storm, the two forms of rescue were defined thusly:

Search and Rescue (SAR): Use of aircraft, surface craft,submarines, personnel, and equipment to locate and recover personnel in distress on land or at sea.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): A specialized SAR task performed by rescue-capable forces to effect recovery of distressed personnel from hostile territory during contingency operations or wartime.2

The development of this rescue capability has been well es-tablished. Dr. Robert Futrell documented our efforts in Korea in The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953. His work

was followed by Dr. Earl Tilford’s Search and Rescue in South-

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east Asia , which eloquently chronicled the heroic efforts of therescue crews in that conflict who brought back literally thou-sands of airmen. It extensively documented what is now con-sidered the “golden age” of rescue.

This work is meant to follow in those traditions and will fo-cus on our CSAR efforts in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, or

more specifically, the period of Operation Desert Storm, 17 January to 28 February 1991.

The initial reviews of CSAR in Desert Storm have been tepidat best. Dr. Richard Hallion, the Air Force historian, wrote inhis Storm over Iraq that:

One disappointment [in Desert Storm] was combat search and rescue(CSAR). . . . In the Gulf War, CSAR fell under the control of the SpecialOperations Command Central Command (SOCCENT), with all US CSAR forces placed under the management of Air Force Special OperationsCommand Central. While CSAR forces operated with their traditionalreputation for bravery, dedication, and willingness to take chances torescue downed aircrew, there were simply too few aircraft available tomeet the requirements of both combat search and rescue and specialoperations needs. . . . Only three of 64 downed aircrew—roughly fivepercent—were actually picked up. . . . Indeed, only a total of sevenCSAR missions were actually launched.3

Tom Clancy and Gen Chuck Horner, again in Every Man a

Tiger , continue this theme when they state, “In DESERT STORM,the numbers rescued, as compared with the numbers downed, were low: eighteen men and one woman became prisoners of war as a result of aircraft shoot-downs. Seven combat searchand rescue missions were launched, resulting in three saves. That’s one saved for every six lost. Not an inspiring record.”4

Initial impressions are powerful. The passage of time, how-ever, allows a more thorough examination of the record as data becomes available and the veterans begin to speak. The exami-nation of this conflict in a historical context suggests the fol-

lowing conclusions:

1. The Iraqi/Kuwaiti theater of operations was a challengingone for CSAR. The area was mostly barren, affording little

cover for evaders to exploit or for aircraft to terrain mask. The weather was harsh, and the local populace was loyalto Saddam Hussein. Also, Iraqi air defenses were extensiveand lethal.

INTRODUCTION

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2. This conflict reinforced the fundamental truth that the best CSAR strategy is not to get your aircraft shot downin the first place.

3. On the eve of Desert Storm, Air Force CSAR capability had been dramatically reduced from its peak during the war in Southeast Asia. Its primary recovery helicopters,the HH-53s, had been transferred to special operations. The remaining HH-3s were marginally combat-capableor survivable in a high-threat area. New HH-60s wereonly beginning to arrive. Navy combat rescue capability had been almost completely moved into its reserve

component.4. At the same time, the expectations of CSAR among the

flying crews were high. This was based on the recordedhistory from Southeast Asia and the war stories passeddown by the veterans of that conflict to the young troopsin the Gulf. These expectations were reinforced by specificcomments of some senior Air Force officers on the very eve of battle.

5. The non-rescue of an F-15E crew early in the conflict caused a morale problem among the F-15E units.

6. The Air Force component of Central Command (CENTAF)did not have a quick, accurate, and reliable way to locatedowned airmen or discretely communicate with them.

7. Regardless, rescue personnel from the various servicesand Special Operations Command Central Command(SOCCENT) executed numerous joint missions and severalSAR missions. Additionally, there were several intraservicerescues of note.

8. At no time were special operations forces (SOF) aircraft

“not available” for rescue missions. On some occasions,though, SOF commanders did not dispatch aircraft because their assessment of the situation was that themission was just too dangerous. It should be noted that during the conflict, zero rescue personnel were lost or killed on rescue missions directed by SOCCENT. However,a line Army crew was shot down on a rescue mission. That was Bengal 15, which was dispatched from the Air

INTRODUCTION

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Force tactical air control center. That particular mission will be examined later in detail.

9. Making CENTAF responsible for CSAR and then with-holding operational control of the combat recovery assets was a violation of the principle of unity of command.

Two explanations are necessary to ensure the reader’s un-derstanding:

1. Survivor call signs. When an aircraft was shot downand the pilot ejected, he would maintain his call sign, likeBenji 53. If the aircraft had a crew, then a discrete callsign had to be assigned to each individual. This was done

by adding an alphabetical suffix based on the phoneticalphabet to the aircraft call sign. So, if an F-14 with a crew of two and a call sign of Slate 46 were shot down,the pilot would be referred to as Slate 46 Alpha, and theradar intercept officer as Slate 46 Bravo.

2. CSAR as a mission. CSAR is a three-phase processthat involves: locating personnel at risk of capture inenemy territory, authenticating the personnel, and thenprosecuting a combat recovery . This requires aircraft andassets of varying capabilities. Far too many historicaltracts on rescue equate CSAR with combat recovery only. This lack of clarity was an issue in Desert Storm.

Overall, CSAR in Desert Storm appears to have been a mixed bag. Because of advances in precision weaponry, Global Posi-tioning System (GPS) technology, countermeasures, and train-ing, relatively few coalition aircraft were shot down. Forty-threecoalition aircraft were lost in combat, most over high-threat areas. Eighty-seven coalition airmen, soldiers, sailors, and ma-rines were isolated in enemy or neutral territory. Of that total,

48 were killed, one is still listed as missing, 24 were immedi-ately captured, and 14 were exposed in enemy territory. Of those who survived, most landed in areas controlled by enemy troops. Of the few actually rescueable, six were not rescued for a variety of reasons, but primarily because of limitations inCENTAF’s ability to locate them accurately and in a timely manner. Additionally, a lack of unity of command over all CSAR elements caused confusion and a strained working relation-

INTRODUCTION

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ship between the joint rescue coordination center and SOC-CENT, which operationally controlled the actual combat rescueassets. Regardless, the men who actually carried out the res-cue missions displayed a bravery and élan so common to Ameri-can rescue forces in earlier wars.

In this research effort I have many people to thank: Mr. JoeCaver and Mr. Archie Defante at the Air Force Historical Re-search Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; Dr. Wayne Thompsonat Air Force History; the officers and enlisted troops at the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Langley AFB, Virginia; Dr. James Partin in the Special Operations Command History Of-fice at MacDill AFB, Florida; Mr. Herb Mason at the Air ForceSpecial Operations Command History Office at Hurlburt AFB,Florida; and the librarians at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

I also thank Col Gary Weikel, USAF, retired, Col Mark Brac-ich, and Lt Col John Blumentritt for patiently reviewing my manuscript and offering priceless constructive comments.

Finally, to all the veterans of this conflict, thank you for your time. Thank you for sharing your experiences with me. I havetried to relate your words as honestly and accurately as possible. For those of you who requested confidentiality, I have hon-ored your desires. To those of you who refused to speak of the war, I respect that, too. War touches each man differently. Somemen love it; some men hate it. All are changed irrevocably by the experience.

DARREL D. WHITCOMBColonel, USAFR, Retired

Notes

1. Tom Clancy with Gen Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: G.

P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999), 391.

2. See Appendix 6 to Annex C to USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, 18 July

1990.

3. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq (Washington, DC: Smithsonian In-

stitution Press, 1992), 246.

4. Clancy with Horner, Every Man a Tiger , 391.

INTRODUCTION

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1

Chapter 1

A Rich Heritage:The Saga of Bengal 505 Alpha

We’ve got the best mission in Southeast Asia. I don’t think

that there’s any larger pleasure than helping some guy out

like that.

—Capt Dale Stovall

It was the 13th of April 1972. For three days the rescue forcesfrom the 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom Air Base (NKP), Thailand, had been working to rescue an American who had been shot down near Tchepone, Laos, a central trans-shipment point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The two-man crew of an A-6 from Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 224 stationedaboard the USS Coral Sea in the Gulf of Tonkin had ejected when their aircraft was hit by antiaircraft fire as it attacked a convoy of trucks. The pilot, Maj Clyde Smith (Bengal 505 Al-pha), made contact with US aircraft overhead. His bombardier/

navigator, 1st Lt Scott Ketchie (Bengal 505 Bravo), did not, andhis fate has never been determined. Smith was alone, trappedalong one of the most dangerous stretches of the road complex. To the planners and rescue crews at NKP, it was a dangeroustactical problem.1

But this was what US Air Force rescue crews did. Their units—equipped with a variety of helicopters and other support aircraft—had, by this late point in the war, made thousands of rescues. The process was almost routine, although each rescueprovided unique challenges. Regardless, the men of rescue

would fight to get him out. The nearest unit to Major Smith wasthe 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, also located at NKP. It was equipped with new HH-53 helicopters, which werespecifically designed for combat recovery. Its crews were very familiar with the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Like the Air Force, the US Navy also had rescue forces inSoutheast Asia. Their primary rescue unit was Helicopter Squad-ron 7 (HC-7). With detachments aboard ships throughout the

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A RICH HERITAGE

2

Tonkin Gulf, its SH-3 helicopters and aircrews stood ready torecover downed crews, both at sea and on land.2 They especially

liked to pick up Navy and Marine aviators, but the location of Smith dictated that the 40th at NKP would get this mission.

For two days, the rescue planners and crews worked to get Smith out. Forward air controllers flying OV-10s and F-4sswept the area, first to locate the survivor and then to attack enemy guns massed nearby. Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy also had SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteriesin the area. A supreme threat to any rescue attempt, these wereattacked by F-105s firing homing missiles and by several flightsof aircraft with high-explosive bombs. To support the effort di-

rectly, the commanding officer of the Coral Sea , CAPT Bill Harris,launched 78 sorties to hit enemy forces.3 The battle was unend-ing as the Americans relentlessly attacked the North Vietnamese who, in turn, attempted to shoot down more of the orbiting air-craft. They knew that the Americans would try to rescue their man. They knew the Americans would send helicopters. They carefully husbanded their ammunition for the coming battle.

At the same time, North Vietnamese ground units begansweeping through the jungle looking for Smith. To impede their efforts, Air Force aircraft dropped “crowd control” weapons in

the area. The powder that they spread made anyone who camein contact with it violently ill for about 30 minutes. This slowedthe movement of the enemy troops and created a temporary barrier around the survivor.

Enemy defenses had to be subdued before a recovery heli-copter could enter the area. Relentlessly, the forward air con-trollers directed flight after flight of Air Force, Navy, and Marinefighters as they pummeled the guns and SAM sites below. Sev-eral times the rescue commanders—flying in old Douglas A-1Skyraiders and using the call sign Sandy—had considered and

rejected sending in the vulnerable helicopters. The helicopter crews were ready to go, but they needed to have a reasonablechance of success.

Finally, on the afternoon of the 13th, the situation seemed to be propitious for a pickup attempt. As more forward air con-trollers and fighters struck the enemy positions around Smith,a large task force rendezvoused in the sky several miles west of his location. Leading the task force was an HC-130 aircraft

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A RICH HERITAGE

with the call sign King 27. Its crew would provide overall com-

mand and control and critical in-flight refueling to the rescuehelicopters, if necessary, as routinely occurred on longer-rangemissions. The lumbering and vulnerable HC-130 would orbit well away from the recovery area.

The actual pickup would be made by Jolly Green 32, an HH-53 piloted by Capt Ben Orrell. The young captain was a colorfulcharacter. He grew up “out west” and had desired early on to bea bull rider. Discovering airplanes, he instead turned his quiet

3

Brig Gen Dale Stovall learned the basics of combat search and rescue as a young

captain flying helicopters in Southeast Asia, where he earned the Air Force Cross

for one heroic rescue.

Photo courtesy of Dale Stovall

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A RICH HERITAGE

4

strength, courage, and resolve to rescue operations. Described by one contemporary as, “unpretentious, rock solid, steady,cool, and fearless,” he had developed a keen sense of propor-tion, which seemed to give him the ability to quickly size up any situation.4 He and his crew would fly as the “low bird,” or thelead aircraft and would go in for Smith.

Backing them up would be another HH-53, Jolly Green 62,flown by Capt Dale Stovall. Dale was another star in the rescuecommunity. A tall, lanky redhead, he was absolutely fearlessand perpetually fought to fly missions. On his off time, he con-stantly read, researched, and probed for new ideas. To others,he appeared almost hyper and perhaps a bit of a bore. He wasconstantly out talking to the maintenance troops about equip-ment modifications or meeting with tactics officers from allmanner of units to refine or improve operations. He lived res-cue and thrived under the pressure. He and his crew would fly the “high bird” as backup for Orrell. Stovall was not happy. He wanted the lead position. But his time in Southeast Asia taught him that the situation below could rapidly change and pushhim to the fore. He knew his time was coming; if not today, thenat some point in the future. The fighter pilots always needed

the Jolly Greens.5

The two helicopters would be escorted by eight A-1s, led by Maj Jim Harding. Strong of body and quick of mind, Jim was thehard-charging commander of the 1st Special Operations Squad-ron (SOS), also located at NKP. His call sign was Sandy 01. In thecoming battle, he would be the on-scene commander (OSC). He would have to make the difficult and dangerous decision to com-mit Orrell and his crew or, if necessary, Stovall and his. It weighedheavily on his mind.6 Above them would be another armada of forward air controllers, fighters, SAM-suppression flights, and

other supporting aircraft. It was an awesome flock of aircraft,there for one purpose: to get that American out of that mess. The gaggle of helicopters and A-1s flew to a holding point

west of Smith’s position. From there the A-1s proceeded intothe battle area while the helicopters held at high altitude. After trolling the area repeatedly, Major Harding felt that the enemy was quiescent and decided to call for Captain Orrell and Jolly Green 32. He directed two of his A-1s—Sandy 02 and Sandy

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03—to acquire the helicopter and escort him in. Jolly Green 62 with Stovall stayed at the holding point as the backup.

Dutifully, the two A-1s headed off and joined with Jolly Green32. Captain Orrell turned his aircraft and followed. As the he-licopter and A-1s descended, an F-105 overhead detected a SAM site attempting to track the formation. The F-105 crew turned and fired an antiradiation missile at it. The deadly weapon exploded over the radar dish, completely destroyingthe fragile equipment and the men operating it. Jolly Green 32and its escorts then spiraled down through an opening in theclouds. Once below, they were fully exposed to the enemy gun-ners waiting for them.

As they began to cross segments of the Ho Chi Minh Trail,several batteries of 23 millimeter (mm) and 37 mm guns beganfiring at them. As the tracers whizzed by, Orrell took evasiveaction. Spotting the enemy below, the gunners and parares-cuemen, or “PJs,” on board the helicopter began firing their miniguns. Sandy 02 kept firing white-smoke rockets ahead of the formation. As they exploded, their white plumes showedthe pilots in Jolly Green 32 exactly where to fly. Sandy 03darted back and forth around the helicopter, attacking enemy guns. Larger-caliber explosive shells flew back and forth as the

three aircraft flew deeper into enemy-controlled territory.Crossing a ridgeline, the helicopter was hit by 12.7 mm fire.

One of the PJs, Sgt Bill Brinson, was slightly wounded but kept firing his minigun at the increasing number of enemy targetsnow all around them. Orrell pressed on to the waiting survivor.7

Visibility beneath the clouds was clear except for the billow-ing smoke from burning enemy wreckage and the air strikesdirected by Harding. With the helicopter now approaching, hecalled for Smith to ignite a flare that would quickly produce a large cloud of red smoke. The smoke was easily identifiable and

should reveal his exact location for Orrell. The helicopter pilot could then maneuver his aircraft directly over the survivor tomake a pickup. Unfortunately, the smoke also revealed thesurvivor’s location to any enemy troops in the area. This wasone of the hazards of rescue work, but it had to be done.

Smith did as Harding instructed and lit his flare, but thesmoke drifted into nearby trees and the helicopter crew did not see it. As Orrell settled his helicopter just above the trees and

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began to search, enemy troops sprang forth from every quarter and began firing at the vulnerable helicopter with weapons of various types. On board, crewmen in the back fired their mini-guns in response. Above, Major Harding noted the enemy ac-tion and directed some of his A-1s to fire guns and rockets inclose to the helicopter. He also called for other fighters to drop bombs and napalm on enemy forces a little farther away.

Hovering just above the foliage, the helicopter crew searchedin vain for the survivor. Orrell was concerned because he knew that he now had the attention of every enemy gunner in that valley. He kept calling on the radio for Smith to give him direc-tions. Harding directed Smith to ignite the other end of hisflare. Orrell again reported that they could not see the survivor,so Smith decided to take action on his own and began runningto an open area. Reaching the clearing, he saw the helicopter

Capt Bennie Orrell received the Air Force Cross, second only to the Medal of Honor

in prestige, for the daring rescue of Bengal 505A, Maj Clyde Smith, USMC.

Photo courtesy of Dale Stovall

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about 60 yards away and heading away from him. Smithscreamed on his survival radio for the helicopter to turn around.Orrell reversed course and, almost immediately, his flight engi-neer spotted Smith. Orrell ordered his engineer to lower the jun-gle penetrator. When Smith saw the rescue device, he ran for hislife as the totally exposed helicopter gently moved toward him.

Above, Harding and the other A-1 pilots knew that this wasthe critical moment. They formed an aerial “wheel” around thehelicopter and laid down a withering field of fire on any enemy who dared contest the rescue.

Reaching the penetrator, Smith remembered the warningthat survivors should let it touch the ground to discharge any static electricity before grabbing it. Static electricity was not high on his list of concerns at that moment. When the penetra-tor was still five feet above the ground, he tackled it. There wasno shock. The device had a “horse-collar” and fold-down legson which he could sit and secure himself. But he did not pulldown the legs or wrap himself with the collar. Smith was still wearing his ejection harness, which had a metal clip that could be used to physically lock him to the hoist. He quickly snappedit to the connection ring and gave a “thumbs up” signal.

When the flight engineer, A1C Bill Liles, saw that Smith wasattached, he began reeling the penetrator back on board. Orrellheld his hover, and the A-1s continued to swarm above. AsSmith reached the door, Liles pulled him in and then shoutedfor him to “get [expletive deleted] out of the way” as he swunghis minigun back into place and resumed firing at the enemy below. He also told Orrell that the survivor was on board andcleared him to resume forward flight.8

Orrell relayed to Major Harding that Smith was on board.Harding directed him to “stay low” and egress the same way

that he had come in. Orrell turned to the escape heading as the A-1s fell into a loose escort pattern for the flight out. Accelerat-ing and climbing, the gaggle of aircraft took fire from severalmore enemy gun sites before clearing the area. The A-1s de-stroyed the sites with their remaining rockets and bombs.

The rest of the 90-minute flight back to NKP was uneventful. A huge reception awaited their return. As he climbed out of thehelicopter, Smith was overwhelmed by the pride and profes-

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sionalism exhibited by the rescue crews and truly humbled by the gratitude he felt for their selfless actions.9

After taking care of his injured crewmember, Captain Orrellinspected his helicopter. He found bullet holes throughout theaircraft. Several were in the cockpit area. Two rounds had gonethrough the main rotor blades, and one of the external fueldrop tanks was peppered with shrapnel from a larger-caliber gun. They were stark reminders of the vicious battle. But that was what he was paid to do.

Dale Stovall congratulated Orrell for an outstanding job. They debriefed the mission and began preparing for whatever was next.Soon, both were back on the flying schedule. The war went on.

For his actions that day, Capt Bennie Orrell was awarded the Air Force Cross, second only to the Medal of Honor in prestige.

Dale Stovall’s moment came six weeks later when he wascalled to fly “low bird” for the recovery of Air Force Capt Roger Locher. Locher had been shot down over North Vietnam, near Hanoi. After evading for 23 days, he made contact with US air-craft. They alerted the rescue forces, and another armada waslaunched. It encountered combat equally as intense as the Smithrecovery, but fighting through the enemy defenses, Stovall wasable to recover Locher. It was an epic mission, for which Stovall

was also awarded the Air Force Cross.10 Bennie Orrell and Dale Stovall were deeply affected by these

missions. Their harrowing experiences solidified in both men a keen realization of what helicopters could and could not do when confronted by well-armed and alerted enemy forces. They would not forget these hard-learned lessons.

The medals awarded to Orrell and Stovall were not that un-common among rescue forces. In fact the men of rescue werethe most highly decorated group of airmen in that war. Thereason was simple. As documented by historian Dr. Earl Til-

ford, the Air Force was responsible for the rescue of 3,883 per-sonnel from all varieties of “at risk” situations during that longconflict.11 In addition to combat rescues, this included troops who were medically evacuated or rescued from entrapped posi-tions like the Citadel at Quang Tri in 1972.

This data is incomplete, for it does not include the thousandsof US Army and Marine aircrews who were shot down andquickly recovered by sister ships and crews. Nor does it include

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the number of Navy or Air Force crews who were picked up by helicopters from other services. The stories are anecdotal, suchas that told by former Air Force chief of staff, Gen Ronald Fo-gleman, retired, who as a young captain ejected from a flamingF-100 on 12 September 1968 and was immediately picked up by an Army AH-1 Cobra helicopter.12

In 1979 BioTechnology Inc. of Falls Church, Virginia, did a morefocused study for the Naval Air Systems Command on combat losses. Specifically looking at what is now considered CSAR, thestudy indicated that the rescue forces of the Air Force and Navy rescued 778 downed aircrewmen throughout Southeast Asia.13

Included in the BioTechnology study was a note that in prose-cuting those rescues, 109 aircraft of all types were shot down,and 76 rescue personnel were killed or captured. That meant that for every seven men saved, one rescue or support aircraft waslost, and for every 10 men saved, one rescue troop was lost.14

That study also included more startling numbers, whichlooked specifically at rescues within the high-threat areas of North Vietnam, where 125 aircrewmen were rescued. In theprocess, 41 rescue or support aircraft were lost for a rate of three saves per aircraft lost. More importantly, 34 personnel

were lost for a rate of 3.7 saves per person lost.15

Those are sobering numbers. If the war in Southeast Asia taught one thing about rescue, it was that the helicopters—regardless of the amount of covering fire—were extremely vulnerable to enemy guns, missiles, and aircraft. Recognizing this, the men of rescuesought a better and safer way to conduct their mission.

Anecdotal evidence from several recoveries suggested that res-cue operations under the cover of darkness could significantly re-duce the danger of enemy defenses. Noting this, Air Force designengineers went to work to develop a night-recovery capability.

As in any engineering project, there were fits and starts, but by late 1972, the new system was ready for field-testing. Desig-nated the Limited Night Rescue System, it combined a Doppler navigation system and both an approach and hover coupler. The prototype kits were shipped to NKP, Thailand, and installedon two 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron HH-53 Jolly Greens. The aircraft were also modified with a low-light-leveltelevision system.

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The crews immediately began training with the new technol-ogy. The test came on a dark night in late December when an AC-130 gunship, Spectre 17, was downed, again along the Ho

Chi Minh Trail southeast of a deadly place called Saravane. Only two of the crew of 16 got out, and they were down along a heavily defended section of the road. It was a replay of Bengal 505.16

Jolly Green 32, an HH-53 modified with the Limited Night Rescue System, took off from NKP. The aircraft commander was Capt Jerry Shipman. Using the new technology, Shipman was able to fly straight to the first survivor and hover the bighelicopter directly over him. Shipman sent one of his PJs downon the hoist. He easily found the man and brought him up. Thesystem worked perfectly. Shipman then flew to the second sur-

vivor. He was in dense brush and took longer to recover. With both men on board, the crew of Jolly Green 32 hovered briefly to insure that no other crewmen were alive. Satisfied that they had the only survivors, they returned to NKP. Shipman was im-pressed. Even though they had been right along the dangerousroad, they had encountered only minor ground fire.17

The tactical advantages of operating at night were obvious toall involved. Captain Shipman commented on the new system.

The Jolly Greens were legendary in Southeast Asia, creating high expectations

for combat search and rescue in Operation Desert Storm.

Source: Darrel Whitcomb

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“The ability to go in there blacked out at night gives you a defi-nite advantage,” he understated.18

These rescue stories, as compelling as they are, were far tooroutine in our nation’s costly war in Southeast Asia from 1964 to1975. But they were part of combat, and every aircrew member who flew in the war held the hope that if he went down, the Jolly Green was coming. As one fighter pilot mused, “These Jolly Green boys are a breed all by their lonesome. As happy as we were toget picked up, the Jolly Greens were even happier to have doneit.”19 Those feelings became part of the folklore of that conflict.

As the war ended, the conviction that whenever our aerialforces were dispatched to combat, the rescue forces would be

there was imprinted on the minds of the combat aviators. For many, the extensive aerial bombing of Hanoi during Christmasof 1972 was actually seen as a huge rescue mission designedto free our POWs.20

But even that was not the end. In the spring of 1975, a joint US Air Force, Navy, and Marine task force was quickly assembled from the remnants of our forces still in the theater to res-cue the crew of a hijacked freighter, the SS Mayaguez . The shiphad been seized by Khmer troops off the southern coast of Cambodia, and intelligence believed that its crew was being held

near the island of Koh Tang. Several large HH-53 and CH-53helicopters were shot down by the massed guns and rockets of the enemy troops in a short and intense engagement. Comingalmost as a footnote to the Vietnam War, this operation waslittle remembered except by the helicopter crews who knew that rescues in daylight visual conditions into areas controlled by massed enemy troops were no longer feasible.21

As one rescue troop later wrote, “[During] the last stages of the war in Southeast Asia conflict the enemy acquired moremanpads [heat-seeking missiles] and better AAA. . . . The tragic

losses during ‘Mayaguez’ seemed to mark the end of helicopterson a modern battlefield.”22

The numbers of those rescued and those lost in rescue mis-sions were sobering and pointed to a need to find a better way to do it. The Limited Night Rescue System looked promising. Asour nation withdrew from and then moved beyond that war, thestatistics and lessons hard learned got little notice. What en-dured instead were the memories of the heroism of the rescue

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crews. One A-1 pilot captured the essence of those memories when he wrote after one particularly brutal rescue effort, “Themission of the Sandy/Jolly team is to extract downed airmenfrom the clutches of the enemy. We have been reasonably suc-cessful in the past. Our proven capability to accomplish thismission has made a significant contribution to the high moraleof the combat pilots in Southeast Asia.”23

As the years passed—at places like Nellis Air Force Base,Nevada; Ramstein Air Base, Germany; Osan Air Base, SouthKorea; and hundreds of other bases and airfields—the veterancombat pilots of Southeast Asia passed those stories to a new generation of young tigers.

The helicopter pilots counted the patches on their aircraft and remembered the battles at places like Tchepone, Saravane,and Koh Tang.24

Notes

1. Lt Col Clyde Smith, USMC, retired, “That Others May Live,” Proceed-

ings , April 1996, 82–88.

2. CAPT Michael T. Fuqua, USN, “We Can Fix Combat SAR in the Navy,”

Proceedings , September 1997, 57.

3. Smith, “That Others May Live,” 86.

4. Col Gary Weikel, USAF retired, e-mail to author, 20 May 2003.

5. Ibid.


7. Narrative of Capt Bennie Orrell, “Rescue of Bengal 505A,” SEA Rescue

and Recovery Files, file number 1118832, US Air Force Historical Research

Agency (USAFHRA), Maxwell AFB, AL. The crew of Jolly Green 32 consisted of

Capt Ben Orrell, aircraft commander; 2d Lt Jim Casey, copilot; A1C William

Liles, flight engineer; A1C Ken Cakebread, PJ; and Sgt William Brinson, PJ.


9. Ibid.

10. Air Force Cross data supplied by Mr. Terry Aitken, USAF Museum,

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.11. Earl H. Tilford Jr., Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975

(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980), 155.

12. Chris Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses (Hinkley, UK: Midland Publishing,

2001), 162.

13. Martin G. Every, “Navy Combat Search and Rescue,” BioTechnology

Inc., Falls Church, VA, September 1979, 21.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

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16. Project Checo, Southeast Asia Report Search and Rescue Operationsin SEA, 1 April 1972–30 June 1973, K717.0414-1, 48.

17. Capt Jerry Shipman, interview by the author, undated; and Hobson,Vietnam Air Losses , 244.

18. Shipman, interview.19. Howard Sochurek, “Air Rescue Behind Enemy Lines,” National Geo-

graphic Magazine , September 1968, 364.20. John Darrell Sherwood, Fast Movers: Jet Pilots and the Vietnam Expe-

rience (New York: Free Press, 1999), xix.21. See John F. Guilmartin, A Short War, The Mayaguez and the Battle of

Koh Tang (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), and Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle, The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Viet-

nam War (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2000) for excellent descrip-tions of this event. See also Col George Gray, interview by the author, 3 May

2001.22. Lt Col Joe E. Tyner, AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalries

for Combat Rescue Partnership Tomorrow , National Defense Fellows Program,Headquarters United States Air Force and Air University, undated, 27.

23. Maj John Walcott, Sandy report, History of the 56th Special Opera-tions Wing, January–March 1971, vol. 3, US AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

24. Shipman, interview.

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15

Chapter 2

The Interim Years

They pulled all the HH-53s and crews down to Hurlburt over-

night. [Eventually] they were permanently transferred to

SOF.

—Brig Gen Dale Stovall

The war in Southeast Asia was a long and divisive one for the

nation. During the lengthy period of withdrawal, aerial forcesassigned primarily in Thailand covered the retreat of our sol-diers and marines. The rescue units were among the last toleave. Personnel from the 3d Air Rescue and Recovery Groupand the 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron departed Thai-land in January of 1976 on some of the last aircraft.

Returning to the United States, they were assigned to unitsflying the HH-53 and HH-3 that belonged to the Aerospace Res-cue and Recovery Service (ARRS). It was part of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and controlled all active and reserve

component rescue units. Located at Scott AFB, Illinois, it alsoran the collocated Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC). This center was the clearinghouse for all continentalrescues. It was authorized to coordinate with the Departmentsof Defense, Transportation, and Commerce; the National Aero-nautics and Space Administration (NASA); and state and localauthorities to direct and run civil search and rescue (SAR).

There was a large market for their services. Traditionally, Air Force rescue units stationed in the United States also sup-ported civil SAR. Almost daily, the veterans of Southeast Asia

were called upon to rescue lost hikers and foundering boatersor search for overdue aircraft. By 1981 the units of the ARRShad recorded their 20,000th rescue. Additionally, several of itsmembers had received prestigious Cheney and McKay Trophy awards for some incredible recoveries.1

Refocused now on routine peacetime duties, little innovativethought was given to combat SAR, at least for the first few postwar years, but the value of the Limited Night Rescue System

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had been clearly recognized and had spawned some advocates.One advocate was a veteran of the 40th Air Rescue and Recov-ery Squadron. Finishing his tour at NKP in April 1973, Capt Jerry Shipman was transferred back to Scott AFB. The assign-ment was not happenstance. After the Spectre 17 rescue, hisunit had been visited by MAC commander, Gen P. K. Carlton. The general was very proud of his rescue troops and took every opportunity to visit them. He had also been briefed on the LimitedNight Rescue System and wanted to see it operate.

Captain Shipman was picked to take General Carlton on a night demonstration ride. They flew a mission into northeast Thailand and, using the Limited Night Rescue System, picked

up some PJs. The general was impressed. At the debriefing,Shipman began to cover the strengths and weaknesses of thesystem. The general stopped him and, with a wave of his hand,acknowledged that the system did have some capability. Signal-ing for Shipman to be seated, he took the floor and proceededto tell the assembled aircrews of other exciting technologicaldevelopments which appeared to have utility in rescue. These were advancements in infrared night-vision capability andnewer forms of precision navigation. Saying perhaps more thanhe should have, General Carlton shared exciting news of a new

concept being developed at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: a com-plete modification for the HH-53 called Pave Low.2

Pave Low was the successor to two earlier programs, PaveStar and Pave Imp. Both programs had attempted to develop a night and all-weather capable aircraft for worldwide SAR use, but both had been cancelled because of severe cost overruns.Pave Low was a new concept optimized from the mistakes of these programs and the promises of newer technologies.

The conversations with Shipman and other aircrewmen at NKP convinced General Carlton of the need. Returning to the

States, the general threw his full support behind the Pave Low project and directed the ARRS to go forward with the proposedextensive modification for the big HH-53 helicopters to givethem a full night and foul-weather rescue capability.

As conceived, it called for mounting a stabilized forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system, a new Doppler navigation sys-tem and computer, projected map display, terrain-following ra-dar, and numerous improvements in self-protective capability.3

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The Pave Low concept went through extensive conceptualdesign and modification before it was brought to fruition as thePave Low III. The concept was shown to be feasible, and a pro-totype was modified in 1976. That aircraft went through anextensive operational test and evaluation that validated theconcept. To fund the initial batch of modifications, GeneralCarlton diverted funds from the C-5 fleet to modify the first 10aircraft. The Air Force then dedicated funds to modify sevenmore aircraft and place them in the rescue fleet by 1980. This would give the ARRS a true day/night, all-weather rescue ca-pability.4

As the development proceeded, the design engineers and offi-

cers in other tactical fields could not help but realize that thePave Low had capabilities well beyond just combat recovery. In-deed, it possessed the ability to penetrate into high-threat areasfor all manner of special operations at acceptable levels of risk.5

Holding a series of positions at ARRS headquarters, Jerry Shipman was intimately involved with the development of PaveLow and put his enthusiastic support behind it. Constantly seeking funding sources, he was a member of an ARRS briefingteam that traveled to several Tactical Air Command (TAC) basesto sell the Pave Low concept for the modification of the CH-53s

that TAC possessed. Almost identical to the HH-53, these air-craft had been used by Air Force special operations units inSoutheast Asia to insert commando teams behind enemy lines.Some of them had participated in the Mayaguez mission.

Shipman and his teammates were convinced of the value of the Pave Low and zealous in their approach, but the reception,in most cases, was less than encouraging. They traveled toBergstrom AFB, Texas, where TAC kept a unit of CH-53s and a numbered air force. Shipman and his team briefed the staff. The senior commander was unimpressed and only wanted to

know when they were going to get those helicopters “the hell off of my ramp.” They traveled to Langley AFB, Virginia, and briefedthe TAC staff. Support was not forthcoming.6

In the end, though, it made no difference. The decisive andtimely support of General Carlton ensured the success of theprogram.

The disdain that Shipman found in TAC for anything that had to do with helicopters reflected a larger distaste for special

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tances involved and the turmoil sweeping Iran, these were as-sessed to be very high risk missions and were not flown. Therescue crews sat by helplessly as the bloody events took placeand Iranian students seized the American Embassy and took 54 Americans hostage.9

In an effort to gain the release of the hostages, Pres. Jimmy Carter initiated several political and diplomatic initiatives. Healso directed his secretary of defense to propose a military option.Given the lack of US forces or assets in the region, a conventionaleffort of any size would have taken quite a while to organize anddeploy. Instead, the secretary decided upon a special operationseffort, which was given the title of Operation Eagle Claw.

Several of the 1st SOW MC-130s and AC-130s were assignedto the mission. The helicopters of the 1st SOW were judged in-adequate for the tasking because of the operational require-ments. Instead, the planners decided to use RH-53 helicoptersassigned to the Navy, for two reasons:

1. The helicopters would launch from an aircraft carrier,and the RH-53 was designed for that.

2. The RH-53s were also capable of carrying the heavy loadsneeded for the mission and operating in desert sand.

Initially, Navy pilots were selected to fly the helicopters, but they were replaced when several violated security rules and openly discussed mission details with family members. Evaluators alsofelt that the pilots lacked the tactical expertise for the mission. They were replaced by USMC pilots who also flew the aircraft.10

The rescue crews in Turkey were not pleased at what they were hearing. They were more than prepared to fly the mission with their HH-53s, regardless of the risk, yet they did not get the call. This would be an operation run by a select, hand-

picked group of individuals drawn almost exclusively from thespecial operations community. It was completely compartmen-talized, and they were not part of it.

The mission, initiated on 24 April 1980, was aborted whenseveral of the helicopters broke down at an interim refuelingsite, Desert One. Then an RH-53 helicopter collided with anMC-130 aircraft as the helicopter tried to take off. The resultingexplosion and fire were a horrible debacle.

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The rescue crews in place in Turkey felt cheated. One crew-man observed, “The Air Force Rescue Service is trained andpractices and daily uses equipment that would have been far superior to what was used there. Why they were not used ishard to understand.”11

The rescue forces had been the recovery element of choice at the Son Tay Prison in North Vietnam in 1970. That combinedspecial operations and rescue force mission had also been a failure, but not because of the helicopters or aircrews. It hadfailed only because of a lack of timely intelligence. (The Ameri-can POWs had been moved to a different location.) Had the Ea-gle Claw mission been delayed a few months, perhaps the highly modified Pave Low HH-53Hs finally coming out of the modifica-tion facility could have been dedicated to the operation.12

This failure showed a shocking lack of capability on the part of the special operations forces. They had no long-range heli-copter capability. The hodgepodge combination of Navy air-craft with Marine pilots had failed. As one of the commandersof the ill-fated mission stated afterward, “You cannot take a few people from one unit, throw them in with some from another,give them someone else’s equipment and hope to come up with

a top-notch fighting outfit.”13

Perhaps if TAC had kept its CH-53s in special operationsunits instead of putting them in communications units, they could have been the nucleus of such a force, especially if they had made the decision to modify them to the Pave Low configu-ration, but when Jerry Shipman and his team had tried to sellthe concept, TAC had refused to do so.14

As US troops were being pulled out, unit commanders deter-mined that some had possibly been left behind in Iran. Anemergency order was sent to the 1551st Air Rescue and Recov-

ery Squadron at Kirtland AFB to load two Pave Lows and crewson C-5s for immediate shipment to the Gulf so that they could be used in recovery operations for the stranded troops. Ship-man and his troops quickly put together a package of aircraft and men and loaded them aboard the giant aircraft. The trans-ports got as far as Dover AFB, Delaware, before the Eagle Claw commanders completed a detailed accounting of all troops andascertained that their men were accounted for in full.15

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Following the failure of Eagle Claw, President Carter orderedthat a second operation be prepared. Code-named Honey Bad-ger, this time the new Pave Low HH-53s would be included aspart of a vastly increased armada of Army helicopters and theentire 1st SOW, but instead of including the rescue forces inthe mission preparation, a new Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) under the command of the Joint Special Opera-tions Command (JSOC) was formed.16

To support it, the chief of staff of the Air Force ordered thetransfer of the Pave Lows from the Air Rescue and Recovery Service to the 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), a sub-unit of the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field. This unit, equipped with

HH-3s and UH-1Ns, had a long and distinguished record. Many of its crewmembers were veterans of Southeast Asia and hadseen combat at places like Koh Tang and Tchepone. They wereamong the first in any operational unit to fly with night-visiongoggles (NVG).

Lt Col Dale Stovall was amazed at how quickly the transfer happened. “[D]uring the Desert One mission, they had all theHH-53s down at Kirtland,” he explained. “When . . . they lost the Marine birds, . . . they put JSOC together and started thesecond attempt. They pulled all the HH-53s and crews down to

Hurlburt overnight. [Eventually] they were permanently trans-ferred to special operations.”17

At Kirtland AFB, Jerry Shipman was shocked by the turn of events. His aircraft and crews were taken from him with practi-cally no explanation. Because of security concerns, he had not been “read in” on the Honey Badger operation. He knew that his troops were training hard for a special operation but did not know the details. Intuitively though, he was able to read be-tween the lines and had a pretty good idea what was going on.His troops were involved in very high risk operations, and he

had no control over any aspect of the mission. It made him very uncomfortable.

Shipman’s concerns were realistic. As the Honey Badger ar-mada grew, it began intensive training. At times as many as 40helicopters would fly in mass formations with the pilots usingNVGs. Accidents occurred, and an Army CH-47 and a PaveLow were lost. Four fliers were killed, but the preparationscontinued.18

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Unfortunately, Honey Badger was never executed. After thefailed Eagle Claw operation, the Iranian government dividedthe American hostages into several small groups and movedthem constantly. Unsure of the hostages’ location and facingunfavorable launch windows because of the short nights dur-ing summer months, US leaders were not willing to launch thesecond attempt until the fall. Eventually, diplomatic efforts ledto the release of all personnel. Politically, President Carter paida heavy price for the failed mission. He was defeated by RonaldReagan in the 1980 election. The hostages were released asPresident Reagan took the oath of office.

The Pave Lows and crews stayed in the 20th SOS at Hurlburt.

This abrupt series of moves stripped the ARRS of its best, most capable combat rescue asset. The ARRS still had a small fleet of HH-53s. Some did have the old Limited Night Rescue System;most were unmodified and their numbers were shrinking.19

To address this shortfall for the rescue community, the sec-retary of the Air Force, later that year, approved plans to pur-chase a fleet of modified HH-60D Nighthawk helicopters as theprimary combat recovery asset. These aircraft would have someof the newer technology and arrive modified for night and all- weather operations. They would replace the aging HH-3s and

HH-53s as they were taken for Pave Low modification. Except for a handful of aircraft, they would not begin to roll off theproduction lines until 1986.

In 1981, after a long hiatus, NASA resumed conductingmanned space flights. In its mission statement, the ARRS wastasked to support NASA’s space flights. As NASA’s missiontempo increased, it put a heavy drain on ARRS resources andfocused the command on noncombat operations. At the sametime several after-action reports from Operation Eagle Claw andinternal Air Force inspections suggested that, to increase em-

phasis on special operations forces, the Air Force should con-solidate all of its helicopters under one organization. For unity of command, this organization would absorb both the ARRSand all Air Force special operations forces. The commander of the ARRS concurred and suggested that this would provide for force packages, which could then be placed at various loca-tions around the world for both rescue and special operationstasking. The proposal was not acted upon that year.

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The next year continued pressure from the National Com-mand Authorities forced the Air Force to seriously consider theproposal. A combined Air Staff team from the Inspector Gener-al’s office and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plansand Operations conducted a thorough inspection and review of the Air Force’s special operations capability. Their report con-firmed earlier findings and recommended that all special opera-tions forces and rescue forces should be consolidated into a single unit, preferably a numbered air force.20

Now assigned to the Air Staff, Lt Col Jerry Shipman did not concur with the report and tried to fight it. He feared that if rescue and special operations were merged, rescue would get

sucked into the ebb and flow of special operations and eventu-ally be subsumed by them.

The rescue forces required specialized equipment to operateeffectively. Minor items such as modern survival radios for theaircrews, “Madden” survival kits designed to be dropped to survivors, and location devices such as the downed airman loca-tion system (DALS), all needed advocates. They had advocatesin the rescue community. Shipman feared that in a merger, that advocacy would disappear.21 His concerns were lost in the bu-reaucratic wrangling that swirled around the proposal. After a

full Air Staff review, the chief of staff concurred with the studiesand ordered the consolidation of the ARRS and the Air Forcespecial operations forces under a newly activated numbered air force. After discussions between the commanders of TAC andMAC, the chief of staff directed that the new numbered air force would be assigned to MAC and would be the Twenty-third Air Force. The MAC commanders were happy with the arrangement because it gave them a way to protect their weather reconnais-sance forces and rescue units in a numbered air force equal instature to its Twenty-first and Twenty-second Air Forces that

commanded the airlift units.22 Reporting to the Twenty-third Air Force would be the ARRS,

which would still command all of the rescue forces, and a newly activated 2d Air Division located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, that would command all special operations forces units. Each entity would maintain its distinct identity.

This meant that Air Force special operations forces were be-ing moved from TAC to MAC. To the airmen of special opera-

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tions, this did not go down well at all. They had always felt asif they were the “lost children” of TAC, but at least there they were in a command that was focused on combat. MAC was theairlift command, and they were not happy.23 Regardless, thetransfer took place on 1 March 1983.

The first commander of the Twenty-third Air Force, Maj Gen William Mall, was pleased with the arrangement. Even thoughthe two “communities” would maintain a separation, he felt that a natural synergy existed between them. This synergy had been exhibited many times, especially during combat opera-tions like the Son Tay raid in Southeast Asia, the Mayaguez rescue operation, and numerous operations along the Ho ChiMinh Trail. In an interview with MAC’s A irlifter Magazine , hestated:

We created 23rd Air Force primarily to enhance the special operationsforces (SOF) mission. The move capitalized on the synergism that exists

between the special operations forces and the combat rescue forces because their mission, training, and equipment is similar. . . . The bigpayoff has been between special operations forces and combat rescue.Combat rescue has always augmented the special operations forces mis-sion, but now we are training these forces in special operations tacticsto a greater extent than ever before. Additionally, some special opera-tions forces equipment is compatible and can serve both roles. The spe-

cial operations forces Pave Low helicopters, for instance, have the capability to rescue a downed pilot in combat and still perform a specialoperations function without extensive modification of equipment or crew changes.24

As the consolidation took place, the Air Staff developed a long-term plan to acquire new helicopters to replace the agingfleet of HH-3s and disappearing HH-53s and upgrade existingequipment. During 1982 the ARRS received nine production-model UH-60A aircraft for rescue duty. Eventually upgraded tothe HH-60G model and called the Pave Hawk, they were as-

signed to the 55th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron and werealso considered special operations forces–capable. This was thefirst of an extensive projected aircraft buy. Already, 60 HH-60Ds were programmed with a total project purchase of 243aircraft. The HH-60Ds came equipped with an inertial naviga-tion system (INS), terrain-following-and-avoidance radar, andFLIR, and reflected the advances in technology stimulated by the Pave Low program.

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Money had also been programmed to modify 20 HC-130s togive them in-flight refueling capabilities for the helicopters. This designed buy was intended to satisfy the worldwide rescueneeds of the Air Force. As part of this process, aircraft weredesignated for peacetime rescue and for wartime tasking. Todifferentiate the two, peacetime rescue was now formally calledSAR, and wartime rescue was now called CSAR.25

Later that year, the Air Force Council on the Air Staff, uponreviewing the program, decided to cut the buy to 69 HH-60Dsand 86 HH-60Es. This was quite a reduction in capability. Not only were 88 aircraft removed from the purchase; in reality, theE-model aircraft was not nearly as capable as the D-model. TheHH-60E was basically the same as the UH-60A. Then, as a final blow, Congress cut procurement funds for the program for an-other year in the FY 84 Appropriations Bill.26

Keying off the actions of Congress, the Air Force Council, inthe spring of 1984, further scaled back the program from 155total aircraft to 99 HH-60Ds. The Air Staff then reduced these99 HH-60Ds to 90 HH-60As. Their reason was financial—theHH-60D cost $22 million; the HH-60A cost $10 million, but it was a much less capable aircraft. Even this was lost the next

year when the Air Force Council again reviewed the programand decided to cancel the buy altogether.Col Tony Burshnick was at the meeting when that decision

was made. Serving at that time as the chief of plans for MAC,he attended the council meeting with several younger staff of-ficers and recalled the discussion:

Our case was being presented by a rescue guy from the Air Staff. . . . The Vice-Chief [of the Air Force] . . . listened to this pitch and he said,“That [HH-60] is a great, great helicopter.” And then, of course, the pricetag came up. [The board members] yakked about it around the roomand they finally decided that they were going to kill it. It was too expen-

sive. I said, “Wait a minute. You’re killing rescue service.” And the guy said, “If we put all that money into the H-60, there won’t be any money to buy fighters so there won’t be any fighter pilots to rescue.” . . . Sothere was no [HH-60].27

The commander of MAC, Gen Thomas Ryan, challenged thisdecision, but his priority at that time was the new C-17 heavy lift cargo aircraft, and his efforts on behalf of the ARRS were tono avail. His staff began work on another rescue helicopter

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master plan, but at this point, there was no money and littlesupport for new helicopters for rescue.

At the same time, the special operations forces were also fac-ing some danger. In November 1984, the Army and Air Forcesigned an agreement called the “Thirty-one Initiatives.” Thisagreement was designed to resolve certain long-standing dis-agreements between the services on a wide range of issues.Initiative 17, as agreed to, called for the transfer of the specialoperations heavy lift mission to the Army. One option consid-ered was to transfer the Pave Lows to that service.

The Air Force and Army began to work through the agree-ment. Another option called for the Army to perform the mis-

sion with heavily modified MH-47 helicopters. After three air-craft accidents, the Army realized that whatever aircraft wasselected for this mission would have a huge operational andlogistical tail and, to be properly utilized, would have to havedirect access to a tanker fleet of HC-130s. They began to recon-sider Initiative 17.28

The chiefs of the Air Force and Army held a meeting to review the entire initiative. After a spirited discussion, they agreed to sus-pend the initiative and leave the Pave Lows with the Air Force.

That decision was reaffirmed by Congress when it passed

legislation directing the Air Force to keep the long-range heli-copter support mission instead of giving it to the Army for bothcombat recovery and special operations missions. Additionally,the Air Force was given a green light to modify the remainingrescue HH-53s and the TAC CH-53s to the enhanced Pave Low III configuration now called the MH-53J.29

Above the services, there was another wind blowing. Power-ful members in Congress—upset with the recurring problemsin the military, as exhibited by the failure of Operation EagleClaw and subsequent operations in Grenada and Lebanon—

decided that the services needed to be fundamentally reorga-nized. Perhaps the solution was to create a new special opera-tions force or command as a new “sixth service.” One of theleading proponents of this was Cong. Dan Daniel (D-VA), chair-man of the powerful House Armed Services Committee (HASC).In August 1985 he stated, “the current administration has beenpursuing the revitalization of our SOF capability. The Secretary of Defense has assigned the highest priority to this effort. Con-

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gressional support has been strong (and is growing); media at-tention has been intense (and generally favorable); and thepublic interest is intensifying.”30

The new commander of the Twenty-third Air Force, Maj GenRobert Patterson, also sensed the winds of change. He directedhis staff to do a study called “Forward Look.” Following Con-gressman Daniel’s lead, that study recommended quickly grow-ing the Air Force special operations forces from one wing-equivalent to three. To do so without any aircraft procurement,they would have to take aircraft from the rescue forces, further weakening ARRS’s capability to perform combat recovery.

General Patterson briefed the plan to the new MAC com-mander, Gen Duane Cassidy. He approved it, as did the Air ForceCouncil, in May 1986. The plan would direct the transfer of all of ARRS’s HC-130 tankers and remaining HH-53s to the Air Forcespecial operations forces for the creation of overseas wings.

Subsequently, the 2d Air Division staff did an assessment of combat rescue capability after the transfer of assets. Their find-ing stated that “all the assets remaining in rescue units werenon-combat capable.” It continued on to say that special opera-tions forces could “conduct combat rescue on a relative priority

basis. . . . [D]owned aircrews and other personnel requiring re-covery must plan to survive and evade until air forces can comeand get them.”31 In fact, during this period when all of our war-fighting planning was focused on the big European war, combat rescue was almost not discussed. The reason was simple: thethreat was so overwhelming that planners did not feel that themeager rescue forces would be able to survive penetrating theprojected heavy Soviet forces. Hence the aircrews were told that if they were downed, they were to evade and move to certainspecific locations. At predesignated times, special operations

helicopters would fly by and pick up any crews there.32

And it seemed, at least from the tactical unit perspective,that CSAR skills were allowed to atrophy. CSAR was not prac-ticed at the “Red Flag” exercises that took place constantly at Nellis AFB, Nevada, nor at Fort Irwin, California, where tacticalaircraft deployed on two-week stints to fly close air support with Army units. There was no formal training for A-7 or A-10pilots to develop skills as “Sandy” on-scene commanders to

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tactically direct rescue operations, as so many A-1 pilots haddone in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, though, the men in the HH-3–equippedrescue squadrons trained earnestly for combat recovery. They took part in exercises when they could and suffered losses interrible accidents. The instructors at the HH-3 school at Kirt-land AFB, New Mexico, pushed their students and demandednear perfection. Regardless of what the “official” studies con-cluded, they considered themselves ready for combat with what they had and fully intended to do so. They were the men of res-cue. If their services were needed, they expected to go.33 They did not intend to be left out of the action as the rescue forceshad been in Iran.

Working with Congressman Daniel in Washington was an ag-gressive staffer on the HASC, Ted Lunger. Ted was a former Army Green Beret and “A” team leader and operations officer with the CIA. He had served several tours in Vietnam and Leb-anon and moved to the legislative branch of government in thelate ’70s for “family reasons.” There, he quickly developed a solid reputation as someone who could get things done. Con-gressman Daniel relied on him to oversee issues related to spe-

cial operations and rescue. Working quietly behind the scenes, Lunger carefully studiedthe history of special operations and rescue in Southeast Asia and the Desert One and Grenada operations and concludedthat both mission areas suffered from benign neglect. He notedthat, “The parent services will not resource the mission if left tothemselves. They won’t fly the mission, they will not package it. They won’t train for it. They won’t spend the money. The closest equivalent you had in the AF in peacetime was the [ARRS]. Itraveled around and studied what the [ARRS] did in peacetime

and there wasn’t any training. . . . Now, were these guys doing wonderful things with minimal resources? You bet . . . .”34

Based on his findings, Lunger crafted a proposal to create a National Special Operations Agency (NSOA) similar in scope andauthority to the CIA. It would include components from all of the services. In the proposal, the NSOA would be responsible for maintaining a CSAR capability, although he labeled it theater SAR, or TSAR, because it would belong to a theater commander

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in chief. The Air Force component would consist of three wings.Lunger explained:

In the NSOA legislation, theater SAR (TSAR) was a special operationsforces mission under the law. TSAR was the same as CSAR. What thedeal was—the CINC was supposed to get an augmented special opera-tions forces package, a combined Wing, out in each of the unified com-mands under the legislation. In each, there was a heavy rescue compo-nent because we were dual tasking them for the insertion and exfiltrationfor the special operations forces missions. The CINC was given the ca-pability and assets and was given command of the assets under that concept. . . . Under the NSOA, the theater CINC was to have his ownheavied [sic ] up special operations forces wing. Inherent in that wing

was a squadron-plus of Paves. The follow on units would be MH-60s.35

The House of Representatives passed his proposal as part of the 1987 Defense Authorization Bill. This alarmed Senators Sam Nunn and Bill Cohen, who had

been instrumental in passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act in1986. That landmark law had given commanders of unified andspecified commands operational control over all assigned combat forces from any service. In reviewing the NSOA concept,they felt that the agency would be too easily manipulated by the various service chiefs. Instead, they wanted to create a separate unified command for special operations with a com-

mander who had his own command and budget authority sepa-rate from the service chiefs. In a series of meetings, they andCongressman Daniel were able to craft legislation creating theSpecial Operations Command (SOCOM) as an amendment toGoldwater-Nichols.

Working behind the scenes, Ted Lunger pushed hard to makethe force as strong as possible. He wanted to include the prin-ciples behind the NSOA concept in the SOCOM legislation, es-pecially the TSAR forces. Working closely with Mr. Jim Locher,the assistant secretary of defense for Special Operations/Low

Intensity Conflict, Lunger was able to incorporate most of hisproposals into the legislation.36 That summer Congress passed, and President Reagan signed,

the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, which included languagecreating the US Special Operations Command. TSAR was listedas the ninth of nine primary missions.

As a unified combatant command, SOCOM would have com-ponents from each of the services. The Air Force portion would

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be the Twenty-third Air Force. It would be comprised of threeSpecial Operations Wings (SOW): the 1st at Hurlburt Field,Florida, the 39th in Europe, and the 353d in the Pacific. Toalign his command to the new reality, General Patterson movedthe Twenty-third Air Force to Hurlburt Field and deactivatedthe 2d Air Division. Its special operations units immediately began to work and train with the other elements of SOCOM.

The effect of all of this on the rescue community was dis-heartening. Except for one unit in the Pacific, they had beenstripped of their most capable combat rescue helicopters and

tankers and had shrunk to one wing-equivalent in total forcestructure. The assets taken away were being used to build upthe three special operations wings. What aircraft remained werenot considered combat-capable.37

More importantly, their owning command had completely changed its character—they were orphans in a command witha much different focus. And most importantly, their future, asrepresented by the procurement program for new helicopters,

Brig Gen Rich Comer was a young lieutenant when he flew on the Mayaguezrescue in 1975. He followed the rescue mission when it was moved to thespecial operations forces between Vietnam and Desert Storm.

Photo courtesy of Rich Comer

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had been cancelled. Of course, the troops did not miss thechanges. They began to transfer over to special operations.

Administratively, the Twenty-third Air Force was still part of MAC and still owned distinctly non-special operations forces ele-ments like weather reconnaissance and aeromedical airlift unitsalong with the ARRS. The first commander of SOCOM, Gen James Lindsey, was unhappy with that arrangement. He wantednothing to do with these units and asked the Air Force chief of staff, Gen Larry Welch, to transfer them back to MAC and to re-designate the Twenty-third as a major command, as it had been when originally transferred to SOCOM. General Welch agreed. The non-special forces units were transferred back to MAC, and

the Twenty-third Air Force was slated to become the Air ForceSpecial Operations Command (AFSOC) in May of 1990.38

At about the same time that the Twenty-third Air Force wasmoving to Hurlburt, a stocky, slow-talking young major wasreporting to McClellan AFB, California, for duty as an HH-53rescue pilot. Maj Rich Comer was an old hand at rescue. As a young lieutenant, he had served in the 40th Air Rescue andRecovery Squadron at NKP and was there in 1975 when they flew in the Mayaguez effort. On that fateful day, he was copilot on one of the HH-53s that went back in to rescue one of the

crews feared left behind. They searched along the beaches untilthey were notified that all personnel had been accounted for.Comer could still hear the sound of the enemy rounds rippingthrough his lumbering helicopter.

Arriving in June from an assignment on the faculty at the Air Force Academy, where he had shown great promise as an aca-demician, he began his HH-53 checkout only to learn in Sep-tember that the unit would be closing and all aircraft would besent to Pave Low conversion. Comer was offered a job flying thePave Low at Hurlburt in the 20th SOS. The squadron com-

mander, Lt Col Bo Johnson, personally offered him the job be-cause he needed a few rising field-grade officers with some up- ward potential. Comer took it and became a special operationspilot. He had already done some work with them and was in-trigued by the variety of missions they flew.39

Starting his Pave Low transition, Comer found the flying to be very challenging, especially the night pattern work while wearing the night-vision goggles. Some of his training sorties

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were deeply frustrating, as he struggled to learn the “specialops way” of doing things.

Comer saw immediately the difficulties of combining crews inthe squadron from two different backgrounds. There was defi-nitely animosity between the rescue guys and the special op-erations guys. He was struck by the arrogance of the specialoperations pilots and could feel their disdain for the rescue“pukes.” The special operators had high performance stan-dards and did not feel that the rescue crews met them. Trans-ferring in, the rescue guys had a choice: they could pick either the “special ops way or the highway.”40 Several of the rescueguys could not handle the flying and did ask to leave.

This process of blending the crews became Comer’s task. Bo Johnson had specifically hired him for his maturity and orga-nizational leadership skills, and Comer worked closely with allthe crews to form them into one cohesive group as the unit rapidly expanded to 20 aircraft and 30 fully formed crews.41

AFSOC needed the transferees because it was growing rap-idly in an ever more dangerous world. Many of the “old head”rescue guys did make the transition, but just as many decidedthat they had seen enough, had enough, whatever. They trans-ferred back to what was left of rescue or retired. To many, it

was the end of an era.Gary Weikel, then a lieutenant colonel and a former rescue

pilot, made the transition into Pave Lows with the 20th SOS.He described what it meant to be assigned to the unit duringthis difficult transition when he wrote, “It became . . . clear if you came to fly Pave Lows in the 20th SOS, be prepared to fly all night, scare yourself . . . on innumerable occasions, live onthe road in absolutely [expletive deleted] conditions, go on a moment’s notice and be unable to contact your family for weeks/months on end, and be satisfied that you were doing

something good for the country that no one else could do and you were part of that ‘band of brothers’ that would fly throughthe gates of hell for/with you.”42

With its creation SOCOM was almost immediately involvedin operational missions that involved direct action, unconven-tional warfare, and antiterrorism actions. Its assigned forces,including those from the Air Force, were quickly engaged inOperation Earnest Will in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1989.

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This intense operation involved protecting oil tankers duringthe Iran-Iraq War. In late 1989 they were thrust into Operation Just Cause in Panama, which tasked them to the limit. Withreal-world concerns and operations, little time or effort wasspent on TSAR.43

In fact, just the opposite was occurring. Senior planners at SOCOM realized what a tremendous capability they had in thePave Low. It finally gave them the ability to clandestinely taketheir troops deep into enemy territory. They spent vast sums of money to give the aircraft all of the latest technological advances such as satellite-based communications and naviga-tional devices. The idea of solely dedicating these aircraft to

rescue or of having them sit idle on rescue alert was anathema to them. It just had too many other capabilities that needed to be utilized on an almost daily basis.44

Then, in late 1988, the Air Staff directed that combat recov-ery would not be included in the designed operational capabil-ity (DOC) statement of special operations units. This formalstep severed any official connection between the special opera-tions forces units and combat recovery.45

Buster C. Glosson, then an Air Force colonel serving in thelegislative liaison division of the Air Staff, watched this process

from the inside and was dismayed by the turn of events. Hesaid, “I was appalled at the situation with CSAR prior to [Desert Shield/Storm]. . . . I thought that the Air Force leadership had been shortsighted. . . . The decision made by the corporate Air Force was to spend the absolute minimum on SAR or CSAR,and we would leave that responsibility to somebody else.”46 Inthe not-too-distant future, he would have to deal directly withthe results of those actions and decisions.

Several events occurred that convinced Air Force leaders that they needed to revitalize the service’s combat recovery capabil-

ity. First, the commander of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) notedthat two rescue units assigned to his command were slated to be converted to special operations units. Effectively, this wouldleave him with no combat rescue capability in his immensetheater. To fix this he pushed for a rejuvenated and enhancedrescue service.47

At almost the same time, the Air Staff published a RescueForce Structure Plan (RFSP). Almost two years in the making

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and reflecting the monumental changes to the rescue forcesthroughout the decade, this document laid out a comprehen-sive program to rebuild an Air Force combat rescue capability.Its stated goal was the recovery of 65 percent of all aircrewsdowned in combat. Reflecting the new realities of commandand control dictated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the plandirected that the Air Force would retain operational control of its recovery helicopters through a rescue coordination center (RCC) and discussed both preplanned and immediate responsemissions in a variety of threat situations.

In a classified section, the plan addressed shortfalls and sug-gested equipment necessary to achieve the goal of the plan and

a timetable to do so. Signed by the vice chief of staff of the Air Force, the plan was given wide dissemination throughout therescue community.48

In response to these events the MAC commander, GeneralCassidy, resolved to take action on two fronts. First, he wantedto fully reclaim the ARRS. He had his staff develop a plan tohave it revitalized, rebuilt, and in place by 1995. He briefed it to the senior Air Force leadership and was directed to have it up and running by August 1989. Additionally, the leadershipagreed to remove the ARRS from the disbanding Twenty-third

Air Force, rename it the Air Rescue Service (ARS), and relocateit to McClellan AFB, California. From there, it would, like the ARRS, command and control all active duty air rescue unitsand the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, still at Scott AFB, Illinois. It would also serve as the gaining command for allreserve component rescue units upon call-up.

The ARS was activated at McClellan on 8 August 1989 andassigned directly to MAC. Upon activation, the rescue forcesand special operations forces were separate. Since the war inSoutheast Asia, the rescue community had come full circle. Un-

fortunately, in making the journey, it had lost its best combat rescue aircraft. It would take time to correct the shortfall.49

To address the aircraft issue, General Cassidy revitalized theold initiative to procure new helicopters. This effort began to pay off when the Air Staff programmed money to buy 16 UH-60As, which could then be modified for rescue duty and fielded asHH-60Gs, which were technologically upgraded HH-60Ds. These aircraft were to be delivered by 1989 as the first part of

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a steady buy of 10 aircraft a year for several years. They would be used to equip active, Guard, and Reserve units.

With such strong support, the newly reconstituted ARS set out to rebuild. It took control of HH-3–equipped rescue squad-rons in Japan and Korea that had been slated to transfer to the353d SOW, as well as squadrons in Alaska and Iceland, anddesignated them as combat rescue units. In February 1990,the ARS began to receive its first HH-60Gs. They were assignedto the units in Korea and the Air National Guard. Additionally,the ARS made plans to stand up a rescue squadron equipped with HH-60Gs at Nellis AFB, Nevada. It would be the “first com-

bat mobility unit based in the continental United States” and would activate on 1 January 1991.50 Upon activation, the ARS published its mission statement. It

stated, in part:

Air Rescue Service (ARS) is the focal point for USAF rescue. . . . The mis-sions of ARS include combat rescue, peacetime SAR, humanitarianSAR, support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,and worldwide USAF Rescue Coordination Center activity. . . . The pri-mary mission of ARS is combat rescue which traditionally involves thehelicopter recovery of downed aircrew members from a hostile environ-ment, usually supported by HC-130 tankers and dedicated fighter air-

craft.51

At that point, the staple aircraft of the ARS units was stillthe venerable HH-3. Since the remaining HH-53s had beentransferred for the Pave Low modification, the HH-3s and a few UH-1Ns were the only helicopters available until the new HH-60s arrived.

Maj Mark Tucker was in a unit as a combat-ready HH-53pilot when the aircraft were taken away, and he had to convert to the HH-3. He was appalled because the HH-3s were not ca-

pable of operating in a high-threat environment. He remembered that “[the HH-3] did not have any defensive systems onit. There was no radar to allow it to fly low level. There were nothreat defensive systems like we had on the ’53. It was all ‘planthe mission and go fly.’ The first you would know of a threat was when the rounds started impacting the aircraft or visualidentification of a missile launch. So crews trained to that, but it was all based on ‘Hey, anybody ever seen this?’ ”52

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Some HH-3 units did have flare-dispenser units on their air-craft, but it was not much when considering all the modernthreats that HH-3s would have to face in a high-threat conflict.Considering this, the HH-3s could practically be used only inlow- or no-threat environments.53 Regardless, the men in theunits trained diligently and were ready if called.

There was one more issue that needed to be resolved with thetransfer of assets from the ARRS/Twenty-third Air Force to ARS. Under the Twenty-third, all Air Force pararescuemen had been assigned to the squadrons belonging to the 1720th Spe-cial Tactics Group (STG). With the activation of the ARS, onesquadron, the 1730th Pararescue Squadron, would be split out and transferred to McClellan AFB, where it would collocate with the ARS. Detachments of PJs from the 1730th would then be assigned to the various rescue units around the world. The1720th STG would remain at Hurlburt as part of AFSOC.54

Navy

The US Navy also maintained rescue units, which carried a long and rich heritage written, in part, by the men of HC-7 who

flew SH-3s off ships in the Tonkin Gulf. Its crews flew count-less recovery missions for flyers down in the waters of the Gulf or in North Vietnam.

After the war, the Navy deactivated that unit and transferredthe aircraft and mission to HC-9, a Naval Reserve unit. Many of the HC-7 personnel also transferred over, and they kept thecorporate CSAR memory alive in the Navy.

Still flying the SH-3, HC-9 maintained a small but well-motivated cadre until 1989 when it was split into two new re-serve units, HCS-5, based at NAS Point Mugu, California, and

HCS-4, based at NAS Norfolk, Virginia. Both squadrons couldperform combat rescue and naval special warfare operations,and each was assigned eight new HH-60H Seahawks. Every aircraft was equipped with the latest in navigation gear, com-munications, and armament, and was a huge improvement over the older aircraft it replaced.55 Additionally, all helicopter units that deployed with the fleet had the ability to assume re-covery alert if needed on an ad hoc basis.

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Survival Radios

Since the Korean War, the US military had recognized the value of equipping airmen with survival radios. These small,handheld devices served two purposes:

1. They allowed the downed personnel to make voice contact with covering and rescue forces to facilitate rescue.

2. They also had a “beacon” mode that sent a loud, piercing wail that could be homed in on by rescue forces, provid-ing another way to find survivors.

These radios were key to the recovery of hundreds of crew-

members from the jungles of Vietnam. In the later years of the war, all crewmembers carried two URC-64 radios. These werereliable four-channel radios. Most flyers carried extra batteries.

To home in on the signal quickly and accurately, the Air Forcehad developed an Electronic Location Finder (ELF). This devicecould pick up the survival radio signal and give the helicopter crew accurate guidance to the survivor, but it did not have a way of measuring the distance to the man. Hard experience inSoutheast Asia highlighted the need for this capability.56

After the war, as the URC-64s wore out, the Air Force and

Navy replaced them with the PRC-90. The new radio had simi-lar capabilities, but broadcast on only two frequencies.57 Likethe URC-64, it could guide helicopters using the ELF.

The radios broadcast on well-known international frequen-cies, and over time, the tactics and techniques of rescue be-came common knowledge. Any potential adversary of the UnitedStates could easily figure out how to exploit them—either broadcast false signals or home in on the signals themselves.

By the time of Desert Storm, a new radio had been designedfor the aircrews, the PRC-112. This radio had the ability to

transmit on three common international frequencies and twoprogrammable frequencies. It also had a new feature built intoit—a discrete capability to precisely guide an aircraft to it if theaircraft had been equipped with a homing device called theDowned Airman Location System or DALS. This was a vast im-provement over the ELF.

The Navy HH-60s had this homing capability, as did the AF-SOC MH-53s. None of the residual Air Force helicopters had it.

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Approaching the conflict, the Navy had begun to replace itsPRC-90 radios with PRC-112s, as had the Special OperationsCommand. The Air Force had not, although the Rescue ForceStructure Plan had clearly recognized the need to do this.58 Theradios cost about $3,000 each, and TAC had chosen not tospend the money.59 It would send its crews into combat in any near-term conflict with radios easily exploitable by the enemy.60

And each crewmember was issued only one radio.61 Understanding the importance of quickly locating downed

airmen, the Air Force had programmed the ability to listen for and locate any emergency calls into several of its intelligenceassets. Each asset, however, had an error factor in it, an “error

probable” in military terms. This meant that a radio might belocated, but instead of a precise fix, the location report wouldsay “location is within an X-mile circle of Y latitude and Z lon-gitude.” For example, one of the assets for locating survivors was the Search and Rescue Satellites (SARSAT) system. Thisconstellation of satellites in polar orbit could quickly pick upany emergency signals, but its “error probable” was 20 km or about 12 miles.62

The rescue forces needed a more accurate position than thisto commit for a recovery, especially in a high-threat area. In South-

east Asia, traditionally, either forward air controllers or fighters would quickly pinpoint a downed aircraft’s location. If this werenot possible, a flight of A-1 Skyraiders would roar into the area and use homing techniques to locate the survivor before com-mitting a vulnerable helicopter for the pickup. This was dan-gerous business. During that war, 191 Air Force A-1s were lost to enemy guns and missiles, most on rescue missions. NineHH-53s met the same fate.63 To operate in high-threat areas,fighter-type aircraft would be needed to perform this function, but neither the Air Force nor the Navy modified any fixed-wing

aircraft with the DALS. The Air Force planned to use other assets instead to locate

its survivors. The airborne warning and control system (AWACS)aircraft with their excellent radar and intelligence capabilitiesand the “Rivet Joint” RC-135 electronic collection aircraft ap-peared to have the ability to locate downed survivors. The RC-135s and AWACS aircraft had been equipped with global posi-tioning systems (GPS) for accurate navigation. These devices

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Air Force and Navy were equipping their aircrews with a singlesurvival radio that was inferior to those used in the last days of the war in Southeast Asia.

In the summer of 1990, CSAR in toto was not in the best of shape. Regardless, it would soon be time to go to war.

Notes

1. Lt Col Joe E. Tyner, “AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalriesfor Combat Rescue Partnership Tomorrow,” National Defense Fellows Pro-gram Study (Maxwell AFB, AL: Headquarters US Air Force and Air University,undated), 8.

2. Capt Jerry Shipman, interview by the author, 13 June 2002.

3. Letter to author from Col Gary Weikel, USAF, retired, subject: Unofficial White Paper on the US Air Force Pave Low, 2000.

4. Shipman, interview.5. Weikel, letter.6. Shipman, interview.7. Tyner, study, 12.8. Col James H. Kyle, USAF, retired, The Guts to Try (New York: Orion

Books, 1990), 24–27. Amplifying comments by Col Tom Samples, 24 July 2003.

9. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 1946–1981: An Illustrated Chro-

nology , pamphlet, undated. Amplifying comments by Col Tom Samples, 24 July 2003.

10. Tyner, study, 13; and comments to the author by Col Tom Beres,USAF retired, 15 October 2003.

11. Tyner, study, 14.12. Kyle, Guts to Try , 224.13. Ibid., 360.14. Shipman, interview.15. Shipman, interview; and Kyle, Guts to Try , 254.16. Tom Clancy with Gen Carl Stiner, Shadow Warriors (New York: G. P.

Putnam’s Sons, 2002), 9.17. Stovall, interview by the author, 3 September 2001.18. Sid Balman, “Second: US Force Planned to Invade Tehran to Free 52,”

Air Force Times , 25 September 1989, 24.

19. Weikel, letter; and Stovall, interview.20. Tyner, study, 18.21. Shipman, interview.22. Ibid.23. Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Brook-

ings Institution Press, 1997), 77.24. Maj Gen William J. Mall, “Commander Shares Insights,” Airlift Maga-

zine , Fall 1984, 1–3.25. Shipman, interview.

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26. Stovall, interview; and Tyner, study, 24.27. Col Anthony Burshnick, interview by the author, 13 September 2002.

28. History of the Twenty-third Air Force pamphlet; and comments by Col Tom Beres, retired, 15 October 2003.

29. Weikel, letter. This issue came up numerous times and is, in fact, a simmering disagreement between the Army and Air Force special operationscommunities. Also, Lt Col Richard Comer, interview by the author; and e-mailfrom Gary Weikel to author, 5 September 2002.

30. Tyner, study, 28.31. Ibid.32. Ibid.33. E-mail from Lt Col John Blumentritt to author, 28 August 2002.34. Mr. Ted Lunger, interview by the author, 23 July 2002.35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.37. Tyner, study, 31.38. US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 10th Anniversary History,

HQ USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, MacDill AFB, FL, November 1999.39. Comer, interview.40. Kyle, Guts to Try , 89.41. Comer, interview.42. Weikel, e-mail to author, 8 August 2002.43. SOCOM History, November 1999, 17–20.44. Stovall, interview.45. Military Air Command (MAC) History CY 90, vol. 1, 10.

46. Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson, interview by the author, 25 September 2002.47. MAC History CY 89, vol. 1, xxxv.48. US Air Force Rescue Force Structure Plan (RFSP), Support Document

I-79 to MAC History CY 89.49. Tyner, study, 33.50. Ibid., 35.51. History of the Air Rescue Service, 1 January 1989–31 December 1990.52. MAJ Mark Tucker, USA, interview by the author, 6 June 2002.53. RFSP, B-2.54. MAC History CY 89, vol. 1, 37.55. CAPT Michael T. Fuqua, USN, “We Can Fix SAR in the Navy,” Proceed-

ings , September 1997, 57.

56. Shipman, interview.57. Michael S. Breuninger, United States Combat Aircrew Survival Equip-

ment (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1995), 160.58. RFSP, 6-1.59. Stovall, interview.60. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War:

The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Co.,1994), 250.

61. Reported by several pilots who flew in Desert Storm.

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62. International Civil Aeronautical Organization (ICAO) Circular 185,Satellite-aided Search and Rescue—COSPAS-SARSAT System (Montreal, Can-

ada: ICAO, 1986), 17.63. Summary of US Air Force Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, 12 Janu-

ary 1962–31 August 1973, K417.042-16.64. Comer, interview. See also RFSP, 6-1. For an explanation of the GPS

and its use in Desert Storm, see Michael R. Rip and James M. Hasik, The

Precision Revolution GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD:Naval Institute Press, 2002).

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43

Chapter 3

Desert Shield

We came to do a job, and it’s a worthwhile job. So as far as I

am concerned, we will all stay until that job gets done.

—Lt Gen Chuck Horner

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 came as a surprise to most Americans. It had been a pleasant summer

and most thoughts were on vacation, baseball, and football— anything except war. The graphic news reports caused peopleto stop and wonder what this all meant. Would there be gas linesagain? Would this mean war? Would this mean a military draft?

But to those individuals charged with protecting Americanlives and interests in that part of the world, it came as no sur-prise at all. In fact they had expected it for some time. The USCentral Command, or CENTCOM, had been reporting that thepossibility of such an Iraqi move was steadily increasing. Theprior day GEN Norman Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM commander,

had briefed Secretary of Defense Richard “Dick” Cheney that an attack against Kuwait was imminent.1

Our nation’s response was swift in coming. Pres. George H. W.Bush immediately took economic and political steps to punishIraq. In discussions with his senior advisors, he establishedclear political objectives:

1. Remove the Iraqis from Kuwait.

2. Eliminate production and storage of weapons of mass de-struction.

3. End Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbors over the next five to 10 years.

4. Ensure that the full conventional military capabilities of the United States would be used.

They also established a crucial limiting factor: the desire tohold American military and Iraqi civilian casualties to a mini-mum.2 This last factor was critical because recent history had

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shown that the American public had little tolerance for the lossof American lives. This would put a premium on having a CSAR capability in-theater.

As the president was making these decisions, orders went out to military units across the land to prepare for deployment. Two aircraft carriers, the USS Independence and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower , and their supporting task forces imme-diately sailed for the area.

Almost unnoticed in the rush of events was a report that GPSsatellite PRN-021 had been successfully launched into orbit from Vandenberg AFB, California. Its orbit would specifically cover the Persian Gulf area.3

Due to growing concern that Iraq might take drastic steps,CENTCOM had recently held a war game at Hurlburt Field,Florida, to explore how such an event would unfold—and itsrepercussions. Called Internal Look, it presupposed such anIraqi attack against Kuwait. This was a radical change for thecommand, because for years its fundamental war plans had as-sumed the main threat of war in the region would be an attack by Soviet forces through Iran to seize ports in the Gulf region.

Fortuitously, Internal Look forecast how such an Iraqi attack could occur and suggested that CENTCOM needed to make

major changes to its primary war plan, OPLAN 1002-90. It would also require a complete recalculation of the force deploy-ment plan called the time-phased force and deployment list, or “TPFDL,” as the planners called it. Such changes took time. The staff at CENTCOM began the lengthy process of changingit. The process was expected to take about a year.4

An annex buried within the massive plan laid out broad plan-ning for CSAR operations. Its author was Army LTC Pete Har- vell. He was a career special operations officer and worked inthe J-3 operations branch of CENTCOM, where he was the pri-

mary staff contact for CSAR. Using the changes generated by Internal Look, he updated the CSAR annex to the war plan.5

On 5 August Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Secre-tary of State James Baker traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet withKing Fahd. They graphically laid out for him the danger that faced his nation. Two days later the government of Saudi Ara- bia formally asked for US military assistance.6 General Schwarz-kopf was directed to execute his war plan. The current TPFDL

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was activated to direct the scheduling and flow of forces to thearea. It identified the units, personnel, and equipment that would deploy. Over the next several months, more than 500,000troops, 1,800 aircraft, and millions of tons of supplies andheavy equipment would flow from around the world to the Gulf

region.7Units of all services were identified for deployment to CENT-

COM. Air Force units deploying would be assigned to the CENT-COM air forces component, or CENTAF; Army units to the army component, ARCENT; Navy forces to the naval component,NAVCENT; and Marine forces to MARCENT.

Since the creation of SOCOM, the Central Command now alsohad a sub-unified command assigned from SOCOM. This was

45

Col George Gray was selected to be the commander of AFSOCCENT, the AirForce component of SOCCENT.

Source: 16 SOW History Office

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called the Special Operations Command Central or SOCCENT and was commanded by Army COL Jesse Johnson, a veteran of the failed Eagle Claw operation in Iran in 1980.8

Forces were designated to be assigned to SOCCENT for con-tingency operations from the special operations branches of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Air Force units were fromthe newly created AFSOC at Hurlburt. As the TPFDL began torun, orders went out to units across the land. Some of the first to receive orders were the units assigned to the AFSOC, pri-marily in the 1st SOW, also at Hurlburt. In fact, its commander,Col George Gray, was also designated to be the commander of AFSOCCENT, the Air Force component of SOCCENT. As suchhe would be Colonel Johnson’s head airman and would alsoassume the operational duties of the joint special operationsair component commander or JSOACC. Colonel Gray took withhim Col Ben Orrell, his director of operations—the same BenOrrell who had received the Air Force Cross for the Bengal 505rescue in Laos in 1972. When it came to combat rescue, he wasthe expert.9

As per the war plan, personnel from the various units at Hurl- burt were quickly recalled and ordered to prepare for deploy-

ment. Maintenance and support personnel worked feverishly toget the aircraft and equipment ready to go. Personnel process-ing and vaccination lines were set up to take care of the neces-sary last-minute details prior to leaving. Several squadrons fromthe 1st SOW were identified to go: the 8th SOS with its MC-130E Combat Talons, the 9th SOS with its HC-130P/N Combat Shadows, the 20th SOS with its MH-53J Pave Lows, the 55thSOS with its MH-60G Pave Hawks, and the 1720th STG that commanded combat control teams and pararescuemen.10

As the TPFDL ground on and identified the units to be alerted,

one deficiency jumped out at the planners—the rescue unitsidentified to support OPLAN 1002-90 were not available. They had either been deactivated or were not shown as combat-capable. In fact the Air Rescue Service was deep into its conversion from HH-3s to the vastly improved HH-60Gs comingoff the production line. With personnel from several unitstraining on the new aircraft, ARS did not have any deployable,combat-ready HH-60–equipped units to send. As one rescue

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pilot noted at that time, “The Gulf War could not have occurredat a worse time for the Air Rescue Service.”11

At least one HH-3 unit was ready though. The 71st Air Res-cue Squadron in Alaska was combat-ready and willing to go, but its commander, Lt Col Larry Helgeson, never learned why his unit was not called. He noted,

The special operations forces units were more combat ready in that they were better funded with better equipment and were better capable of going in and doing it [combat recovery]. It [HH-3] was an older airplane.It did not have the capabilities of what the special operations forcesaircraft had. . . . The HH-3 was a dated bird. It had its mission, but it

was in its prime back in the ’60s. It filled a gap and did provide a capability. But it was not the combat deep-penetration rescue vehicle. The

crews trained in it so they would keep those skills alive. But the ma-chine was no longer viable.12

Regardless of the state of readiness in the ARS, CENTCOMneeded a force to do the combat rescue portion of CSAR. Fortu-nately, there were Air Force officers in both CENTCOM andSOCOM who knew that the combat rescue capability still re-sided in the AFSOC helicopter and HC-130 communities. At the time, Brig Gen Dale Stovall, who as a young captain hadreceived the Air Force Cross for the dramatic Roger Locher res-cue in North Vietnam in 1972, was serving as the vice com-

mander of AFSOC. Since his days as a fired-up young HH-53aircraft commander in Thailand, he had continued to matureinto another noted giant in the combat rescue community. Herecalled that “the physical equipment capability and the opera-tional training and experience all resided within the MH-53community.”13

There was still some skepticism about the efficacy of CSAR at the highest levels of the Air Force. The future chief of staff, GenMerrill McPeak, made the comment—apparently more thanonce—that in a high-threat war, combat rescue was perhaps

too dangerous. He was worried that the rescue crews wouldtake too many risks and become casualties themselves. “I don’t want to trade three for one,” he stated, apparently thinking back to his Vietnam days when he erroneously recalled that a helicopter crew generally consisted of a crew of three.14

Earnest discussions took place between the various head-quarters, both in the United States and in the theater. GeneralStovall described how it worked:

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When you go into theater under the 1986 Congressional Act [Goldwater-Nichols], the theater commander owns all the assets. Period. He can do

anything he wants with those assets. So they made the decision in thetheater that they were going to use them [the AFSOC helicopters] for combat recovery . . . probably [General Horner] was involved in it or somebody else there who said, “Hey, we have to have SAR. We don’t have SAR capability within the Air Force. We need to go to Special OpsCommand and get them involved in it.”15

Other agendas played into the assignment. At CENTCOM J-3,LTC Pete Harvell knew that Schwarzkopf harbored some hardfeelings towards special operations troops and had no enthusi-asm for moving them quickly into the theater. Well familiar withthe war plan, he knew that significant special operations forces

were not due in until 90 days after the initial deployment of troops. Harvell saw combat rescue as a way to get special op-erations forces in early and pushed for SOCCENT to get thetasking.16

This mission assignment to SOCCENT met some resistancein SOCOM. Some Army officers in particular were upset about using the MH-53s and MH-60s for combat recovery. Severallamented the fact that SOCOM had put a lot of money into up-grading and operating these helicopters to support their spe-cific missions. All of that had paid off handsomely the previous

year in Panama during Operation Just Cause. Now it appearedthat a little “sleight of hand” was being used to grab them for the combat recovery mission at the expense of other classicspecial operations missions. General Stovall listened to the bickering and then responded, “Okay, you tell the President that you want to hold these back for special ops missions that we are currently not flying rather than going out and pickingup somebody who has gotten shot down. You tell him.”17 That ended that discussion. Col George Gray at the 1st SOW re-membered it another way. “We got the rescue mission by virtue

of our being the only ones left out there that had the weaponssystem that was capable of doing it,” he recalled.18 None of that really mattered to the men of the 20th SOS at

Hurlburt. Their instructions, as relayed by their commander,Lt Col Rich Comer, were to get their aircraft ready to go and get on the big cargo planes for the ride over. Comer knew that combat recovery would be their priority mission. As an old rescueguy, it suited him fine. He knew that, initially at least, about

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the only significant US combat power in the region would beairpower. It would be responsible for providing the initial de-fense of Saudi Arabia. His MH-53s would be the initial combat recovery force.19

The forces for combat recovery would be under the com-mand and control of SOCCENT. That was the command rela-tionship that the combatant commander, General Schwarz-kopf, wanted, and under the laws of the United States, it washis call to make.20

As the AFSOC forces began to flow into the theater, the AF-SOC commander made a courtesy call to the ARS commander to inform him that Schwarzkopf had decided that the specialoperations units being attached to SOCCENT would be assignedthe responsibility for combat rescue.21 This did not sit well withmany in the now-regenerating rescue community. Even thoughtheir HH-53s had been taken away and replaced with older HH-3s, they trained diligently for the mission and were enthu-siastic to go. They knew that their old aircraft had limitations, but they still wanted to deploy and provide what services they could. After all, it was their job. Regardless of what the opera-tional orders might say, THEY were the rescue guys. If rescue were going to be needed, they wanted to be sent. A few HH-60shad been delivered, and crews were being trained. Additionally,some HH-60s had been delivered to Air National Guard units. Already, members of those units were volunteering to go. Lt ColMark Tucker, now on the Air Staff, recalled that,

I was in SAF/AQL, classified acquisition. . . . I was appalled when Iheard that we were not sending any rescue units over. We could havetaken crews and aircraft from several units and sent them over to forma provisional unit. ARS [commander John Woodruff] said, “No, we arenot going to do that.” We could have taken the lead crews . . . in order toform a combat-capable unit. . . . I will never forget being absolutely ap-palled at the decision not to take those crews and aircraft to marry them

together to form a combat-capable unit. Following 10 plus years after Desert One, having watched that, I just couldn’t conceive that rescue[ARS] would be willing again not to ante up the forces to go where thefight was.22

Still, it wasn’t that simple. SOCCENT was glad to take themission. Like Comer, their commander Colonel Johnson knew that the war would include some form of air campaign and that projections showed that many aircraft would be downed. He

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intuitively understood that his troops were the right asset for rescue. There was a larger issue, too. He knew that Schwarz-kopf had an inherent distrust of the special operations forcesand was hesitant to give them any significant missions. Com- bat rescue was their way of getting into the theater early, eventhough it was not one of their primary missions.

General Schwarzkopf acquiesced to their deployment, but heforbade Johnson from launching any cross-border operations without his express approval because he feared that such ac-tions could trigger a war before he was ready to fight it.23

Receiving the tasking, Colonel Johnson saluted smartly andmade combat rescue his command’s top priority.24 In fact, the

first assigned mission to the Army Special Forces teams andNavy SEAL teams was to be ready to conduct recovery opera-tions.25

On 9 August AFSOC was directed to begin sending advancepersonnel to CENTCOM and SOCOM to do the endless coordi-nation necessary for deployment. That evening, Lt Col J. V. O. Weaver, Lt Col Randy Durham, Maj Robert Stewart, and Capt Randy O’Boyle—all from the 1st SOW—left for MacDill AFB,Florida, to assume positions on the CENTCOM staff. Within a few days they had all departed for Saudi Arabia as part of the

initial contingent. The first was a 40-man team from all threecomponents. Arriving in Saudi Arabia, each group went its own way and began looking for a place to bed down its followingunits.

Colonel Weaver coordinated to have the arriving AFSOC unitsplaced at Dhahran International Airport, Saudi Arabia. Unfor-tunately, that word did not get back to Hurlburt, and the first contingent of four MH-53s, crews, and support personnel left on two C-141s and a C-5 headed for Riyadh. Upon landingthere in one of the C-141s, the team leader discovered his mis-

take and diverted the other two aircraft to Dhahran. After they landed and unloaded, he talked one of the C-141 crews intocoming to Riyadh to pick up the rest of his team and deliver them to the correct location.

The CENTCOM staff also began to deploy from its peacetimeheadquarters in Tampa, Florida, to Dhahran. One of the first togo was LTC Pete Harvell along with other J-3 personnel aboardan early C-141. Upon arrival they immediately began to set up

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the huge command center necessary for combat operations.Harvell also began setting up the necessary CENTCOM structureso that arriving SOCCENT-assigned units could immediately assume rescue alert.26

Working feverishly in temperatures as high as 125˚F, 20thSOS maintenance crews used borrowed tools and cranes to get the MH-53s ready to fly by 16 August. Within days, two aircraft a day were flying support for SOCCENT Army and Navy teamsalong the Kuwaiti border. Additionally, one aircraft was con-stantly on combat recovery alert, because intelligence indicatedthat, at any time, the Iraqi forces in Kuwait could attack acrossthe Saudi border. In that case the MH-53s would need to fly upimmediately and extract the special forces teams along the bor-der. The helicopters were also available for any in-country SAR work. This was a major consideration because the number of coalition aircraft in the region was increasing daily, and moreand more aircraft were flying local training sorties. Located not far from a Saudi helicopter unit, Comer had some of his mencoordinate with the Saudis on local and regional recovery pro-cedures.27

F-15s were now flying defensive patrols overhead daily to

guard against surprise Iraqi Air Force attacks. The MH-53 crews were ready to mount necessary recovery efforts, even thoughthey had not yet received machine guns or ammunition for theaircraft.28 Four more MH-53s were in place by early September,and by midmonth the 20th SOS had it full complement of toolsand spare parts.

In mid-August CENTAF activated its Tactical Air ControlCenter (TACC) in Riyadh. It rapidly began to fill with personnel who were initially focused on developing an immediate plan todeter and, if necessary, to stop an invasion of Saudi Arabia by

the Iraqi military. They had to set up the TACC outside of theRoyal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) headquarters in an inflated mod-ule that was immediately labeled “the Bubble.”29

The commander of CENTAF, Lt Gen Charles Horner, at thedirection of General Schwarzkopf, deployed to Riyadh to act asthe “front man” for CENTCOM as the entire process kicked intohigh gear. He monitored the initial efforts to develop a defensiveforce and capability, but his mind was on offensive operations.

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At Schwarzkopf’s request an initial strategic air campaignplan had been developed by Col John Warden, the head of the“Checkmate” division on the Air Staff in Washington. Warden briefed the concept to Schwarzkopf and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Colin Powell, and was then sent to Saudi Arabia to brief General Horner. Horner accepted the briefing asthe basis for an offensive campaign plan; but to turn it into anexecutable plan, he needed a planning staff in Riyadh. Hegrabbed Brig Gen Buster Glosson, a career fighter pilot, to headthat effort.

Glosson had been assigned as the vice commander of a joint task force in the Gulf and jumped at the chance to join Horner

and the growing CENTAF team. Glosson was a bit of an enigma.Personable and slow talking, he had spent time working in legis-lative liaison. The gentle demeanor that he had developed there belied the driven, hard-charging fighter-pilot attitude within. The responsibilities that he was accepting would require theuse of both skill sets as he immediately began to build a smallstaff called the Special Planning Group. The group met behindclosed doors, and the workers immediately dubbed it the “Black Hole.”30

Lt Col Randy Durham and Maj Robert Stewart deployed from

MacDill to serve as the SOCCENT liaison element in the TACC.Capt Randy O’Boyle was detailed to the CENTAF staff to act asthe special operations liaison there. O’Boyle was a young MH-53pilot and had grown up in the 20th SOS. The big Irishman wasnever at a loss for words on any subject. Some interpreted thisas bombast, but those who spent time around him soon cameto realize that he knew his stuff. He was intense in all he did— work, athletics, flying, partying—it was rumored that he con-sidered any party a failure if the police did not arrive at least twice. He was, as another unit pilot said, “a piece of work,” and

he was ready to go to war.Before leaving Hurlburt, O’Boyle was grabbed by Colonel

Comer. He knew that Randy would somehow end up in thethick of things and made him promise that he would not com-mit the 20th SOS to anything until he discussed it with Comer.O’Boyle saluted smartly and headed out.

Between 20 and 22 August the 9th SOS arrived with four HC-130 aircraft. They settled at King Fahd International Air-

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port (KFIA). Nine days later, Col George Gray, commander of the 1st SOW, arrived to assume his duties as AFSOCCENT and JSOACC.31

George Gray was another classic individual. Stout with a shock of red hair, he initially started out as a cargo pilot andtransitioned to special operations assignments back in the ’80s.He loved his job as commander of the 1st SOW and flew in allof the assigned aircraft as much as he could. He took a sternline with his troops and pushed them hard, but he also lovedthem and gave them the best care he could. Their fights werehis fights. He knew that his unit would soon face hard combat. That was as it should be. But he did not intend to lose any of

them—at least not needlessly.Prior to leaving MacDill, O’Boyle had reviewed the command

CSAR guidance currently in effect for CENTCOM. Arriving inthe TACC, he set up a desk and, not having anything else to do,started working on a detailed combat recovery plan for the the-ater. He put up a map and began drawing lines into Iraq. Hismap caught the attention of one of the planners in the planningcell, Lt Col Steve “Foose” Wilson. Another career fighter pilot,Fuss was assigned to the fighter plans shop on the Air Staff inthe Pentagon. When significant air units started heading for

Saudi Arabia, he was dispatched to act as an Air Staff liaisonto the CENTAF staff, where Glosson grabbed him and threw him into the Black Hole.

What went on in the Black Hole was a big secret because any planning for offensive action against Iraq was forbidden at thistime. That was why the lines on O’Boyle’s map drew Wilson’sattention. Why, Foose asked, was O’Boyle doing what he wasdoing? O’Boyle flashed his best Irish smile and replied that hefigured that they would eventually need an overall CSAR plan,and since he had been the plans officer in the 1st SOW at Hurl-

burt and knew a few things about CSAR, he would start theprocess.

Wilson then asked Randy increasingly detailed questionsabout the capabilities of various aircraft and how they wouldconduct combat rescue missions. Randy continued to explain.Finally, Wilson said, “Follow me,” and took the young captaininto a classified room, where he introduced him to Lt Col DaveDeptula. Deptula had come over with John Warden and had

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also been hijacked by Glosson for his team. He asked more

questions. Sensing his moment, O’Boyle started talking. Dep-tula liked what he was hearing and said to O’Boyle, “We need you,” and took him in to see Glosson. The process was repeated,and Glosson told O’Boyle that he was now part of the planningteam in the Black Hole. O’Boyle was briefed into the detailed Top Secret planning to design an air campaign plan against Iraq and directed to step up his rescue planning and fit it intothe larger effort.32 In short order Glosson came to consider O’Boyle his “right hand man or even alter ego” for rescue.33

Captain O’Boyle was not working in a vacuum. CENTCOM

had addressed CSAR in its theater war plan. The overall war plan for CENTCOM was USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90. It had been recently reviewed and updated by Colonel Harvell and thetroops in J-3, and was dated 18 July 1990. ANNEX C specified basic policies and procedures for participation of US military forces in SAR activities within the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). It also noted that no SAR forces were apportionedto CENTCOM for the plan.

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Capt Randy O’Boyle and Brig Gen Buster Glosson

Photo courtesy of Randy O’Boyle

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It presented several key definitions:

1. Search and Rescue (SAR)—Use of aircraft, surface craft,submarines, personnel, and equipment to locate and re-cover personnel in distress on land or at sea.

2. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)—A specialized SAR task performed by rescue-capable forces to effect recov-ery of distressed personnel from hostile territory duringcontingency operations or wartime.

3. Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC)—A primary SAR facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel of

two or more services and equipped for coordinating SAR operations.

4. Rescue Coordination Center (RCC)—A primary SAR facili-ty suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equippedfor coordinating and controlling SAR operations at com-ponent level or higher.

5. SAR Coordinator (SC)—The designated SAR representa-tive of the area commander, with overall responsibility andauthority for operation of the JRCC and for joint SAR op-

erations within the assigned geographical area. (For thisOPLAN, the SAR coordinator was General Horner).34

The concept of operations stated that General Schwarzkopf asthe area commander had primary responsibility and authority for SAR in the CENTCOM AOR and would ensure the develop-ment of plans and procedures for the effective employment of allavailable SAR resources.

The various component commanders—COMUSARCENT, CO-MUSCENTAF, COMUSMARCENT, COMUSNAVCENT, and COM-SOCCENT—would provide organic SAR forces as appropriate

and would provide supervisory liaison personnel to the JRCC toeffect required coordination of the SAR effort for all US forces. All component commanders could use organic resources for ini-tial efforts to recover personnel.

Additionally, component/supporting commanders would

1. Be prepared to support and/or conduct SAR operations when feasible or as directed by the SC.

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2. Establish an RCC to facilitate the execution of SAR opera-tions.

3. Provide the JRCC with SAR liaison officers (SARLO) asappropriate.

As the SC, Horner had different tasks. Specifically, he could

1. Direct components to conduct SAR operations on a mis-sion priority basis. He also had authority to use assetsfrom any component for SAR operations, assuring that assets required for SAR were not diverted from compo-nent commander missions with a higher USCINCCENT-

established priority.2. Maintain the JRCC at the TACC and, through MAC, pro-

vide the nucleus of SAR controllers. Provide the senior ranking officer facilities and communications for the US-CENTCOM.

3. Establish an RCC, as appropriate.

4. Coordinate with the JRCC for SAR requirements and ad- vise the JRCC of any unilateral actions taken by forces inthe prosecution of SAR missions.

Under his direction, the JRCC had the authority to

1. Control and coordinate SAR operations within the AOR.Operational control was exercised by the SAR coordina-tor through the JRCC and the component RCC/SAR con-trollers.

2. Task supporting/component commanders with SAR mis-sions, as directed by the SAR coordinator.

3. Maintain close liaison and coordination with forces of

other nations, international agencies, and appropriateDOD or CENTCOM representatives on SAR activities inthe AOR. Where international SAR forces were availableand capable of lending assistance in SAR operations, co-ordination would be effected by the JRCC to incorporate/utilize the assets made available by these forces.

4. Develop SAR plans.35

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Cascading down from this, COMUSCENTAF had published anOPLAN 1002-90 and OPLAN 1021-90 BASE CASE that ampli-fied and clarified more specific procedures.36

Captain O’Boyle was also not the only AFSOC troop workingon CSAR. In August Maj Ken Black of the 8th SOS worked withseveral CSAR specialists to develop an initial plan directingCSAR operations during Desert Shield. It was, in part, consoli-dated into the long-term CSAR planning that Captain O’Boyle was doing. That plan divided the AOR into four regions: north, west, central, and east.

At the same time, SMSgt Dan Hodler and TSgt Scott Morrisonfrom the 1720 STG, and TSgt Ken Matney, an Air Force survival

instructor from the Survival School at Fairchild AFB, Washing-ton, began physically setting up the JRCC within the TACC. They also began another effort to build a theater CSAR plan.37

As these efforts were progressing, CENTAF sent a request tothe ARS for augmentation to fill the JRCC. In early September,these men were joined by a team of nine officers and enlistedpersonnel from the AFRCC at Scott AFB. The leader was Lt Col Joe Hampton, a navigator and career rescueman, currently as-signed as the chief of rescue coordination operations. They were joined by another group from Ninth Air Force out of Shaw

AFB, South Carolina. It was headed by Maj Joe Stillwell. As the senior officer, Hampton would be the overall director.

He had to meld the two groups into a team. He did not antici-pate that this would be a problem since most of the personnelhad long rescue backgrounds. Yet none had any actual CSAR experience. Hampton himself had entered the Air Force in theearly ’70s but missed any service in Southeast Asia.

Hampton was a little worried because there was so much todo. He took steps to get all of his people the necessary security clearances, requested the communications and phone lines

that they needed, and instituted an internal CSAR trainingprogram. Overall, Hampton was comfortable with the setup. Hehad worked with the men and women from Shaw on severalexercises focused on the Middle East and was very familiar with the theater.38

Hampton assumed that prior to actual combat operations,his team would have opportunities to take part in several war games and local exercises. Given the joint and ultimately com-

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bined nature of their work, Hampton also went to work to get representatives from each of the services to work directly in the JRCC. He also asked for a Saudi and a British representative.Over the next months all of his requests were met.

After conducting a physical inventory of the JRCC set up by the AFSOC troops, Hampton was not satisfied. The center hadonly one phone, and it could not be used for classified calls. They had to go to another section to make radio calls. Their dedicated equipment pallet had not arrived.

Shortly after arriving, Hampton met with Horner. The gen-eral made it clear that Hampton worked for him and that hepersonally put a lot of priority on CSAR. He also told Hamptonthat anytime he needed anything, he was to go directly to thecolonel running that shift. If that did not solve the problemHampton was to come to him. Hampton saluted smartly andgot back to building his operation.39

At about the same time Hampton and his men were unpack-ing their bags, the 55th SOS began arriving with their eight MH-60 Pave Hawks. Within a week, the crews were taking ori-entation flights. A few days later they were working with groundteams from the Navy and Army. The SOCCENT fleet of helicop-ters continued to expand and settle into their missions.40 They

were steadily augmented, not only with PJs arriving from the1723d Special Tactics Squadron, but also with troops fromunits all over the globe.

In early September, as Hampton and his team were gettingsettled in, he called for a meeting in Riyadh of all units andpersonnel who would be involved in CSAR. O’Boyle calledComer from the 20th SOS and told him about it. Comer at-tended as did several other commanders and planning repre-sentatives. He was pushing his squadron hard to be ready andneeded to know what their particular combat rescue responsibilities were going to be. He knew that the JRCC had beenformed and needed details so he could plan, allocate assets,and assign troops. The meeting did not answer his questions.He recalled,

I was talking to Joe Hampton, the guy holding the meeting. What heinitially had was Saudi Arabia cut up into sectors, sections, and circles.Circles were based on aircraft ranges from bases, where the Saudis

were, and Air Force and Army helicopters. It was, “You guys are going

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to do this and you guys are going to do this, and you guys are going tohandle it if it is here,” and it was basically a peacetime SAR [plan]. . . .

There were no capabilities-based divisions to that. It was just, “If you’vegot a helicopter, will it go this far?” THERE WAS NOTHING COMBAT ABOUT IT. It was all peacetime. I said, “Well, this is all well and good. Where is our combat plan?” I think he said, “We don’t have anything, wearen’t ready to do that yet.”41

Comer left the meeting very frustrated. He did not have theguidance he needed and would have to improvise. There wasstill so much to do.

Joe Hampton and his troops begged and scrounged for mate-rial. They lacked everything. In fact, about all that they hadinitially were a few laptop computers for administrative items.

While building his operations center, he discovered that theplanning efforts of O’Boyle and the others were well advanced. Working with them, he completed a theater CSAR plan by lateOctober. Additionally, SOCCENT had formalized its plans.

In November the JRCC published the detailed instructionsfor CSAR in the AOR titled, Operation Desert Shield Combat Search and Rescue Plan , dated 1 November 1990. It was signed by Horner and his Saudi counterpart, Lt Gen Ahmed Behery.Its purpose was to “provide a combined Personnel Recovery (PR)/Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Plan which will inte-

grate into a cooperative network available to Saudi Arabian,US, and other capable and interested parties. The available re-sources will be coordinated by a single combined agency inorder to afford greater protection of life and ensure efficiency and economy.”42

In this plan the JRCC was designated as the combined agency for SAR operations in Desert Shield. It listed, in detail, its ownresponsibilities and those of its tasked units. The JRCC wouldconsider search missions in which the location and conditionof the objective(s) [survivor(s)] were unknown, or rescue mis-

sions in support of survivors or other persons in distress whoselocations and nature were known. Additionally, they were pre-pared to coordinate rescues throughout the AOR, which in-cluded Iraq, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf and its adjacent coun-tries, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and a slice of the ArabianSea down toward Diego Garcia.

Each service component was then tasked by the higher head-quarters’ OPLANs to establish its own RCC and be prepared to

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handle intracomponent rescue missions. Those missions beyond any component’s abilities would be referred to the JRCC.Each component was also expected to have organic forces avail-able for rescue missions at the JRCC’s request, yet each wouldmaintain operational control for launch of its own forces. Hamp-ton explained that,

They [each component] had launch authority. They had command andcontrol of each asset for the mission. . . . As far as the tactics, thelaunching, what crews to use, how to use them—that was up to thecommand who owned and trained them like the [SOF] forces or the Ma-rines if we tasked them or the Army, if we tasked them for this. It may have been different than what was in Vietnam, but at the same time,the environment, the way things were operating, rather than try to build

up an organization saying “we own this stuff,” well, we didn’t haveenough assets to do that. And it would take away from [their] opera-tions.43

SOCCENT received the same tasking. But it would also be theprimary combat recovery force theaterwide since its specially modified MH-53s and MH-60s were widely recognized as the best asset for recovery in enemy territory.44 SOCCENT wouldmaintain operational control (OPCON) over the launch of its as-signed helicopters.

In coordinating this plan, Colonel Harvell fought hard to en-

sure that SOCCENT maintained operational control of the heli-copters. He harbored an inherent fear that the Air Force opera-tions officers in the TACC did not have a realistic feel for what the special operations forces could and could not do.45

Taskings were also included for each of the participating coali-tion forces. The Air Force RCC was, in fact, the JRCC. The Army RCC was located with ARCENT headquarters. The Marine RCC was located in the Marine Tactical Air Control Center (MTACC)at Shaikh Isa, Bahrain. Since the Marines as a service did not “officially” do CSAR, they had no specific RCC. In fact, they had

TRAP (tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel) teams desig-nated and some H-46 and UH-1 helicopters. They were kept oncall by the MTACC.46

The Navy had its NRCC (naval rescue coordination center) with NAVCENT aboard the USS Blue Ridge in the Persian Gulf.Under the NRCC, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 served asthe regional SAR controller for Battle Force Zulu in the PersianGulf and was responsible for planning CSAR operations over

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water. It had the authority to directly coordinate with SOC-CENT. CTF 155 operated as Battle Force Yankee in the RedSea. There, a SARC (search and rescue coordinator) was lo-cated aboard the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy and co-ordinated the rescue actions of that area.47

The Saudi military had its RCC equivalent in its air combat operation center (ACOC). The Royal Saudi Air Force had heli-copter squadrons throughout the country and was primarily responsible for in-country rescue.

The British had a rescue center set up with its Nimrod detach-ment at Seeb, Oman. Coordination took place through the Mari-time cell in the CENTCOM combined headquarters in Riyadh.

The French Air Force kept a liaison officer in the TACC whocould immediately contact his forces. They had a detachment of Puma helicopters at Al Ahsa Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

Every service component except the Air Force had helicopter assets in-theater that could be used for recoveries. Since the JRCC did not have operational control of any of the component assets, neither Hampton nor his controllers could order themto launch. They could ask, but they could not order.

Colonel Gray became a little concerned during the detailedCSAR planning. He was being told that SOCCENT was respon-

sible for CSAR. That was impossible. CSAR is a process that includes locating survivors, marshaling forces, and then goingin and making a recovery. His forces could not locate survivors. They did not have control of the assets to do that. Nor did they have the authority to direct other forces for rescue operations. All of that had to be done by the JRCC. He made it clear that the helicopters and crew under SOCCENT were CR (combat rescue) assets.

While the DALS equipment was on board some helicopters, it did not work well at low altitude, which is where the helicopters

had to operate in high-threat areas. CSAR history clearly showed that helicopters were at high risk of being shot down inhigh-threat areas if they attempted to remain there for any amount of time. Neither he nor his commander, Colonel John-son, was going to allow his helicopters to be sent into high-threat areas to run search patterns. Colonel Gray said that, “If you run across a platoon of deployed guys, they can shoot your butt right out of the sky and God only knows we couldn’t track

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divisions, much less platoons. A squad could put maybe a cou-ple of rounds in you. Hell, a platoon, 35 or 40 guys with AK-47s, would just eat you up.”48

He explained that before committing one of his helicopters for a combat recovery, he needed to have an accurate location for the survivor(s). It was a critical factor in deciding whether or not to commit an aircraft and its crew.49 Additionally, he told Horner that if someone were down in a high-threat area, he wanted thedowned crewmembers to evade/hide until night when the heli-copters would have a reasonable chance of recovery and survival.50

He and Colonel Johnson laid out three criteria for commit-

ting a helicopter for a combat rescue:1. The location of the survivor(s) is known.

2. Evidence of aircrew survival:

a. Visual parachute sighting, and/or

b. Voice transmission from the crewmember and au-thentication.51

3. A favorable enemy threat analysis.52

Capt Tim Minish, another Pave Low pilot, had been assigned

to work with the intelligence section in the TACC. He joined with O’Boyle to write the SOCCENT annexes to the CSAR plans. They designed a series of “spider routes” or predesignated rout-ings for use by the SOCCENT helicopters for flying into Iraq and Kuwait. These routes and the points that defined themcould be preloaded into the navigation computers of the heli-copters. This could save precious minutes when helicoptershad to be scrambled to recover downed crews.53

Capt Corby Martin, an MH-53 standardization and evalua-tion pilot from the 20th SOS, joined O’Boyle and Minish in their

efforts. Together, they continued to refine helicopter operations. The Iraqi-Kuwaiti portion of the AOR was split into four sec-tions: west, central, east, and north. SOCCENT helicopters would cover the west, central, and east. In the west sector, he-licopters would be kept at Al-Jouf and forward at ArAr. In thecenter section they would be placed at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and Rafha. In the east, they would reside at Ras AlMishab on the coast.54 CENTCOM had assurances that US air-

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crews would be safe in Iran, but nobody put much stock inthat. Jordan was considered hostile, with intelligence indicat-ing that downed crews there would either be turned over to theIraqis or possibly be at physical risk because of the hostilitiesof the Palestinians.55

The north sector was almost 900 miles away. They realizedthat to cover that section, SOCCENT would need augmenta-tion, preferably by rescue elements in Turkey. That was a prob-lem that they could not solve. Captain O’Boyle did express hisconcerns to Glosson, who listened but had neither the author-ity to commit forces there nor the forces available to commit.56

Meanwhile, the helicopter crews were feverishly training for

their missions. This included extensive night operations to in-clude refueling as low as 500 feet above the ground. This gavethe crews ample opportunity to get comfortable flying with their terrain-following radar and night-vision devices across the broad expanses of Saudi Arabia.57

Continuing to build up the JRCC, Colonel Hampton was con-cerned about their ability to locate downed airmen. He was not comfortable with the PRC-90 radios issued to the flyers and ad-dressed his concerns to one of the colonels on the TACC staff.Hampton told him,

If we are going to locate these people, we have to do certain things. ThePRC-90 sucks. Get rid of it. I want PRC-112s for all the guys going incountry. And I want to get some sort of [RC-]135 or a [British] Nimrod,or maybe an A-10 or somebody who is going to have the interrogator [DALS] on board that aircraft. I want him up there, flying around, onthe border if necessary so that when a guy goes down, we’ve got somekind of location. [I was told] we can’t afford it. . . . So there was a prob-lem there of being able to locate a guy. So we would rely on Rivet Joint,

AWACS, wingman reports, [or] intelligence gathering from Iraqi commu-nications.58

As the air campaign plan developed, the ever hard-charging

O’Boyle proposed to Colonel Gray that they set up “laagers,” or protected camps, at various locations in Iraq. These defendedpositions would be staging points for helicopters and crews sit-ting on alert for recovery missions. They would reduce responsetime for what were expected to be heavy losses. The idea wasdiscussed with LTC Pete Harvell on the CENTCOM staff. Heliked the idea, but in considering its ramifications, he realizedthat to do so on any kind of permanent basis would be extremely

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costly in terms of personnel, logistics, and wear and tear on thehelicopters just ferrying everybody back and forth. Colonel Gray considered it too, but eventually turned it down, deciding that it was far too risky and put the crews at too high a risk. Yet he waspleased at the aggressiveness of his young airmen.59

Navy Reserve

In November President Bush directed his commanders to be-gin making plans for offensive operations. This would necessitatean increase of US forces in the region. Using the authority grantedthem by President Bush in his presidential selected reserve call-

up, the Navy activated its two reserve rescue units, HCS-4 (Red Wolves) and HCS-5 (Firehawks). The reservists reported for duty at their respective bases 30 November. In early December, 97 of-ficers and enlisted troops departed with four of their SH-60Hs for Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, where they would operate as a consoli-dated unit, HCS-4/5 Spikes (specially prepared individuals for key events), and collocate with an RSAF rescue unit.

In place and set up by 14 December, the unit was under theoperational control of CTF 155, the Red Sea battle group. Their first assigned mission was to sit alert with Navy SEALs (Sea,

Air, Land—US Navy special forces) from SEAL Team Two as a maritime interdiction force. Several exercises were held, but noactual missions were flown.

On 16 January the unit was assigned to tactical control (TA-CON) of SOCCENT and redeployed to Al-Jouf. Immediately, twoaircraft were dispatched to the forward field at ArAr to sit CSAR alert. Colonel Comer from the 20th SOS started working withthem and was immediately impressed with their enthusiasmand professional approach to their duties. Additionally, the unit was augmented with a SEAL detachment equipped with fast at-

tack vehicles (FAV) for possible land operations or to serve asaugmentees on the helicopters. The Spikes maintained this sta-tus with aircraft on alert 24 hours a day for the next 51 days.60

Air Force Reserve

Under the same presidential recall authorization, the Air Force in December directed the call-up and mobilization of the

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HH-3–equipped 71st SOS located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Ari-zona. This was a first-class unit, which had traditionally trainedhard to include becoming proficient flying with night-visiongoggles (NVG). Its 150 personnel reported for duty on 21 De-cember and were immediately processed onto active status. While waiting for deployment, the unit HH-3s received severalequipment modifications that greatly upgraded their capabili-ties. Consequently the aircraft were changed from an “H” des-ignation to an “MH” designation. Under the command of Lt ColRobert Stenevik, unit personnel began deploying to Saudi Ara- bia on 10 January. Four days later the unit was in place with

five MH-3 aircraft ready for tasking under the operational con-trol of SOCCENT. For the next 51 days, unit aircraft and crews would be on alert for combat recovery tasking, either out of their bed-down base at King Fahd International Airport or at the recovered Kuwaiti barge Sawahil docked at Ras Al Mishab.

They were also available for any other tasked missions. Giventheir ability to land on water, they were especially sought out for missions in support of SEAL teams.61

Army In early September the 3d Battalion of the 160th (3d/160th)

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) deployed its MH-60s to KKMC. Attached to and under the operational control of SOCCENT, they were tasked by Col George Gray, the JSOACC,as were the assets of AFSOC as they arrived. Experts at night-time small-team insertions and extractions, they could also beused on combat recovery. This was not normally a mission as-signed to them, but working with men from the 20th SOS, they

began to train to the mission. They were reinforced with a se-curity and medical detachment from the 2d Battalion of the 5thSpecial Forces.

During Desert Shield the unit trained for combat rescue anddeveloped the capability, especially at night, using NVG. Addi-tionally, during the initial phase of Desert Storm, they main-tained 50 percent of their aircraft on combat rescue alert and were responsible for the central sector.62

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Global Positioning Systems

In late November the US Space Command (USSPACECOM)launched another GPS satellite. This was the 23d launch in theprogram. Sixteen of the transmitters were now in orbit and ca-pable of providing guidance in the Gulf region. This would en-sure 22 hours of coverage a day. Unfortunately, three of thesatellites began to develop mechanical problems. Working con-tinuously, the men and women of the 2d Satellite Control Squad-ron, located at Colorado Springs, Colorado, kept all 16 of theGPS transmitters online and providing accurate navigationalguidance.63

In the United States, crash orders had gone out for smalllightweight GPS receivers (SLGR). More than 10,000 were de-livered before Desert Storm. Almost half were shipped to thedesert.64 There the fielded forces of the coalition quickly be-came adept at using them. Navigational kits were also shared with coalition forces, who immediately realized how the devicesmade accurate navigation over the trackless expanses of thedesert much easier.

The coalition aircraft had other navigational systems avail-

able, such as the long-range aid to navigation (LORAN) system,inertial navigation systems (INS), or Doppler as their primary navigational instruments. They were not nearly as accurate asGPS and/or had significant drift rates. Those using the GPSnoticed that the maps issued to them were based on old sur- veys and had errors of as much as three miles.

As more and more units, ships, and aircraft were equipped with these advanced devices, commanders at all levels began torealize that GPS gave them unparalleled ability to navigate rap-idly and accurately throughout the theater. But to be properly used, GPS had to be set to a common navigational reference or datum. In reviewing this, USSPACECOM directed that all unitsshould use the World Geodetic Reference System 1984 (WGS84)as the common datum. This would ensure that two GPS unitsat the same location would read the same coordinates. This would not necessarily be the same as coordinates read withLORAN, INS, or other navigation systems.65

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The Campaign Plan

By December Glosson and his team in the Black Hole haddeveloped the overall air campaign plan. It would consist of four phases:

I. Strategic Air Campaign. This phase was designed to gaincontrol of the airspace and attack Iraqi leadership; nuclear, bio-logical, and chemical weapons; Scud missiles; and electric andoil infrastructure. By seizing control of the theater airspace,aerial forces could then prosecute the rest of the campaign. This would involve attacking the Iraqi Air Force, both in the air andon the ground, and destroying its command and control facili-

ties and radars.II. Air Superiority over the KTO (Kuwaiti Theater of Op-

erations). This was, in fact, redundant with Phase I but in-cluded at the specific insistence of General Schwarzkopf.

III. Preparation of the Battlefield. This called for direct attacks on Iraqi fielded forces such as tanks, vehicles, and ar-tillery. It also meant degrading the fighting morale of the Iraqitroops. The specific goal was to destroy 50 percent of Iraqi ar-mor and artillery before the initiation of a coalition ground of-fensive.

IV. The Ground War. In this phase, the focus would be onproviding direct support to the massive coalition ground unitsas they attacked and destroyed the Iraqi army—especially theRepublican Guard units in and near Kuwait.66

Implicit in the planning was the expectation that SOCCENT helicopters would be available, even eager to go in and rescuethe downed aircrews.67 CENTAF had its CSAR plan in place. The necessary force was available and the troops were honingtheir skills.

CSAR Exercises

Over the next several months, the JRCC and SOCCENT con-ducted a total of six CSAR exercises, or CSAREXes. The first was in September and focused on command and control is-sues. Subsequent exercises increased in sophistication and in-cluded survivors placed in the desert and in the Gulf. Elementsfrom all services and allies were involved. They worked dili-

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gently to iron out command and control issues and allow the various components to work together.68

Different scenarios were used. Some involved single-seat air-craft; others used larger crews replicating the loss of somethinglike a C-130. Exercise Desert Force in December focused oncommand and control. Exercise Search and Rescue in January exercised all units and control elements.69

The exercises took place in the desert and the Persian Gulf and involved all allies. A-10s worked at leading in rescue heli-copters. Navy SEALs practiced stealth operations. Air Force PJsand Army Special Forces troops practiced overland recovery techniques. In this scenario, an MH-53 would drop off a groundelement at an offset delivery point. The team would then infil-trate, make the recovery, and exfiltrate to another point for re-covery by the MH-53s. This technique could be used if an air-crew were down in an extremely dangerous area where coalitionaircraft could not survive at low level. Most of these operations were conducted at night when the lumbering helicopters hadthe best chance of success.70

Rich Comer thought the exercises were very useful, recalling:

We had one full scenario CSAR with the A-10s. . . . It was daytime. . . . We expected to do CSAR at night. We wanted to wait until darkness if possible. We felt that the air threat was such that we pretty much hadto for survivability purposes. . . . And those heat-seeking missiles wereout there. If they saw us in the daylight, we were toast. We had IRCM[infra-red countermeasures] and all of that but we did not feel that wecould go cruising around in the open desert with no cover. . . . I wantedto use MH-60s in the day. The MH-53 loses its advantage in the day, too

big a cross section. The MH-60s were smaller. The 55th SOS and theNavy reserve unit had them. They [HCS-4/5] were an impressive bunchof guys. They really wanted to go. They were willing. But they were illequipped, no FLIR, no night capability.71

Each exercise was digested and critiqued. Everybody was sensi-

tive to the possibility of coalition troops being taken as POWs. The president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, sensed this too. Inthreatening the “mother of all battles” if we attacked, he said tothe US ambassador, “Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 deaths in one battle.”72

The fear of significant American casualties was overridingand drove the planners and commanders in Riyadh. Early air campaign planning suggested coalition losses as high as 300

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aircraft. The planning for the first night suggested that 10 per-cent of the aircraft sent would be lost. The wing commander of the F-111Fs expected to lose more because of the type of tar-gets that his crews were being sent against.73 General Glossonestimated that they should not lose more than 50 fixed-wingaircraft. If the losses were heavier, he felt that it would be theresult of their failure, and in that case, President Bush wouldhave been more than justified in firing all of them.74 GeneralHorner himself predicted the loss of 42 USAF aircraft alone.75

The planners also noted that when the Iraqis invaded Ku- wait, the Kuwaiti air defenses—consisting of modern I-Hawk missile batteries and massed antiaircraft artillery (AAA)—had

downed 39 Iraqi aircraft in that short but intense battle.76 Theprincipal author of the initial air campaign plan for the war,Colonel Warden, estimated that 10 to 15 aircraft would be lost the first day and then no more than 40 overall.77

Reasonable people could logically or rationally disagree onpredictions. Their concerns though were based on solid intelli-gence data on Iraq. First, stung by the destruction of its nuclear plant by Israeli aircraft in 1981, Iraq had gone on a multibillion-dollar spending binge and had built an extensive air defenseforce. It consisted of an integrated series of modern radars, com-

munications centers, airfields, and fighter-interceptors. The American planners had a healthy respect for the system andcalled it “KARI,” backwards for the French spelling of Iraq.

Second, historical data showed that 85 percent of all aircraft shot down were downed by AAA and shoulder-fired SAMs.78 Intelligence data showed that KARI also included over 8,000 AAA weapons in both fixed and mobile sites. Additionally, theIraqis had almost that many heat-seeking (infrared) SAMs. These two weapons combined were especially dangerous to he-licopters.79

Before the coalition aircraft could have much of an impact against Iraq, they had to deal with KARI. Phase I of the air cam-paign was intended, in part, to eliminate Iraq’s ability to shoot down our aircraft. Traditionally, this was done through a “roll- back” effort designed to systematically destroy enemy air de-fenses. But the Black Hole desired to try a new approach withsome tactical innovations. Using the latest in stealth and cruisemissile technologies, they proposed attacking the heart of KARI

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at the beginning. A fleet of F-117s and cruise missiles wouldstrike into the heart of Iraq and destroy their command andcontrol centers. Then, when the various sectors had been bro-ken down into independent operations, they would destroy se-lected radar sites, which would create a corridor for waves of conventional strike aircraft to enter Iraq and begin hitting thedesignated strategic targets. As they did, they would be sup-ported with electronic jamming aircraft, accompanied by F-4G“Wild Weasels” and F-18s, both firing HARMs that would thenfind and destroy the individual enemy radars.80

To do the sophisticated and highly technical planning for the“electronic war,” Horner brought over an expert in that busi-

ness, Brig Gen Larry Henry. Henry was a career electronic war-fare specialist and had acquired the nom de guerre of “Poobah.”He set out to determine the best way to strip Iraq of its ability to defend itself from the onslaught of the coalition air effort. Heand his small but highly specialized planning team began tolook for ways to blow holes through the enemy radar picket lines along the Saudi-Iraqi border.

Task Force Normandy

Thinking along the same lines, Capt Randy O’Boyle made a novel suggestion. Intelligence showed that the Iraqis had placedearly warning radars as close as one mile to the Saudi border.He suggested putting in Army SOF teams to attack and destroy the sites. SOCCENT worked up a plan to accomplish that. But to be successful, the teams needed precision navigation gear.None was available, so the mission was assigned instead to theMH-53s of the 20th SOS.

Meanwhile the Iraqis moved the radars 20 miles back intoIraq and hardened the sites. Noting this change, Colonel Comer

did not feel that his MH-53s would be able to destroy the sites without being detected and reported to Baghdad. He discussedit with Col Ben Orrell. Orrell suggested that Comer bring insome Army Apache helicopters to attack the sites with Hellfiremissiles and rockets. The MH-53s could use their GPS to get them to the correct firing positions because they were muchmore accurate and reliable than the Doppler systems on the Army helicopters.

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They took the suggestion to Colonel Johnson at SOCCENT.He backed it and took the plan to General Schwarzkopf, whoapproved the use of Apaches from the 101st Air Assault Divi-sion and cleared them to begin training. Comer then met withLTC Dick Cody, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 101st Aviation Regiment, and they began planning the mission.Meanwhile, the Iraqis shut down one of the sites. Comer andCody then developed a simple plan where two MH-53s wouldlead a small team of Apaches to each remaining site and provide combat recovery support. The two units trained for themission through the fall. They also received permission to live-fire six Hellfire missiles in the Saudi desert.81

In late October Colonel Gray personally briefed GeneralSchwarzkopf that the joint team was ready to execute its mis-sion. When Gray assured him that the mission would be 100percent successful, Schwarzkopf replied, “Okay, Colonel, then you get to start the war.”82 The joint team held a final rehearsalin January, and it went perfectly.

Poobah’s Party

Another approach to the problem has come to be known as

“Poobah’s Party,” so named for the man who planned it. Gen-eral Henry, using detailed intelligence of the Iraqi air defensesand an intense study of Israeli tactics against the Syrians, developed a plan to bloody the noses of the Iraqi gunners andmissile crews and dampen their enthusiasm for shooting downcoalition aircraft.

His plan was simple in concept but challenging in execution,for it depended on a closely orchestrated series of events. First,stealth F-117s and BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missileslaunched from US Navy ships in the Gulf would saturate tar-

gets around Baghdad and thoroughly intimidate the Iraqi de-fenders. Some of the cruise missiles would carry special carbonfilaments that would lie down over electrical lines and short them out causing all manner of unpredictable results.

With the enemy confused but fully alert and cocked to fight,he would then flood the skies over Baghdad and western Iraq with BQM-74 unmanned drone aircraft. Seeing what appearedto be such easy targets, the Iraqi radars would go to full power

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and radiate their signals. These signals would be easy to identify and locate. Then Henry would send in a wall of F-4G Wild Wea-sels and F-18s loaded with specially designed antiradiation mis-siles tuned to home in on those active radars and destroy them.

The plan would, to the limits of available resources, provideevery package of aircraft going in to attack any heavily defendedsite with jamming support from EF-111s or the Navy’s EA-6Bs,F-4Gs, or F-18s. They would attack SAM sites or radar-controlledguns that might threaten any coalition aircraft.

Additionally, Henry was betting that when the AAA gunnerssaw what happened to the SAM sites during Poobah’s Party they would not turn on their tracking radars. This would mean

that they would be much less effective. To take advantage of this turn of events, General Horner di-

rected his aircraft to stay above 10,000 feet. Since traditionally,most aircraft shot down are lost to guns, this meant that fewer aircraft would be lost.83

This was a radical departure for the Air Force. For the last 15 years, it had based its tactics upon low-level operations. Thosetactics were based on the assumption that in facing the Soviet Union, the predominant threat would be the preponderance of SAMs and radar-controlled guns. History suggested that the

only way to maintain any effectiveness in such an environment was to operate at low level and use terrain masking.

Years of training, though, made some resistant to change. Sev-eral of the fighter wing commanders requested a waiver to thispolicy. They argued that they needed to operate at low altitude because their tactics, specialized navigation/targeting equip-ment, and weaponry were optimized for low-altitude operations.Based on these arguments General Horner allowed exceptions tothe F-15Es, the F-111s, and British, Italian, and Saudi Torna-does. Most pilots though could clearly understand the need for

the change and trained for the medium-altitude tactics.84 Of course fewer aircraft shot down would mean fewer res-

cues. Additionally, Army and Marine ground units stood pre-pared to support the air operations. Some artillery units didfire on enemy AAA and radar sites during the air campaign. At one point the US Army VII Corps had its artillery fire an ATACMSsurface-to-surface missile to completely destroy an SA-2 mis-sile site.85

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At the 20th SOS, Colonel Comer and his men attacked therescue problem from a more practical aspect. He said, “When we looked at the air war . . . we came to the realization that there were going to be more shoot downs than we could shakea stick at. And we would really have liked for none of thoseshoot downs to be us, so how do we do that, and how do weexecute the mission successfully and get out of there? We hadall kinds of think tank kind of sessions where we said, ‘What do we tell the fighter guys to do if they are out there on the ground?How do they signal us?’ ”86

At the squadron level, their concerns were more practical.Grandiose plans were wonderful, but they had to actually fly

the missions. And missions could succeed or fail on the small-est of details.

Proven Force

Within days of the initial deployment of US forces to the Gulf regions, senior US commanders in Europe began conceptual-izing a force that could open a second front against Iraq. As the war plan against Iraq continued to mature, planning was goingon in Europe to design an aerial force that would strike Iraq

from the north. Based in Turkey, it would be multifunctional. The concept for the plan actually originated with tactical plan-ners in the 52d Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.

Throughout the fall of 1990, as the various elements of USand coalition power came together in the Gulf, a small group of aircrewmen designed a notional package of aircraft and sup-port units that could quickly deploy to air bases in Turkey andconduct sustained operations against the northern portion of Iraq. This force would be designed to attack the same array of

targets as the forces in the south. It would also have a robust electronic warfare capability and a special operations task forceincluded for combat recovery. These special operations forces would be able to extend combat recovery coverage across thenorthern half of the country.

This plan was refined and passed up the chain of commandto General Powell. He was generally supportive and had theplan briefed to the Turkish General Staff. But the plan needed

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the approval of the Turkish government, and that was prob-lematic because of the political realities in the region. The Turk-ish government and its leader, Pres. Turgut Özal, supportedthe United Nations and US actions and had taken several po-litical and economic steps in parallel. But allowing combat sor-ties to be launched against a neighbor was another matter.87

Regardless the European Command (EUCOM) progressed todetailed planning. Since this was in support of CENTCOM, that command was designated as the “supported” force and EU-COM was the “supporting” force. Planners at EUCOM designeda joint task force named Proven Force. It would be commanded by USAF Maj Gen James Jamerson. From a CSAR perspective,

this was fortuitous because Jamerson was a career fighter pilot and had flown a tour in Southeast Asia in A-1s. He had par-ticipated in or led many rescue missions and understood themission intuitively.

By late December a formidable array of fighter, attack, andsupport aircraft, equipment, and personnel had been assembled at Incirlik Air Base in eastern Turkey. All aircraft remainedunder the control of their parent units, but plans were pub-lished to quickly establish a provisional wing and initiate combat operations as soon as political permission was granted. In

support, a special operations sub-element made up of troopsfrom the 39th SOW and the 10th Special Forces Group wouldassume combat recovery alert with MH-53s and support MC-130s at Batman Air Base.88

But the implementation of the plan still needed Turkish ap-proval. And as combat approached, it did not seem to be forth-coming.89

Eastern Exit

Ready to perform the combat recovery mission and the open-ing night raid, the 20th SOS was now alerted for a mission in a totally different area. Serious internal unrest was sweeping thenation of Somalia on the eastern coast of Africa. CENTCOMalerted the unit to be ready to fly there on 10 January to evacu-ate US and coalition personnel. This threw the unit into chaossince it was now faced with the possibility of having three si-multaneous missions in, literally, different parts of the world.

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Fortunately, the orders were changed. CENTCOM decided tosend a Marine expeditionary unit instead. Launching a rescueforce of 55 marines and Navy SEALs off of the USS Trenton , they recovered 281 Americans and other nationals from the USEmbassy. Released from the Somalia tasking, the 20th SOS was able to refocus on the Task Force Normandy mission andits combat recovery alert.90

Eve of Battle

On the eve of battle, the CSAR capability of CENTCOM was

extensive. General Horner was the overall SC. Through his JRCC he could coordinate with other components for CSAR. The JRCC, working through the TACC, had the authority totask any asset under the general’s control. This could be any-thing from fighters to communications to reconnaissance, but he had no dedicated combat recovery forces assigned, and hecould not directly task other components.

Each service or ally had unique forces or capabilities for CSAR.Each had its own RCC and was expected to prosecute its ownrecovery missions to the maximum extent possible. Situations

beyond its abilities or control had to be passed to the JRCC. The US Army and Marines each had hundreds of helicopters

that could quickly respond. The British, French, and Saudiforces had helicopters and other support aircraft available. TheUS Air Force had none.

SOCCENT had the most capable recovery forces in the the-ater, but it retained OPCON of its forces even though GeneralHorner was the SC. It had 37 Air Force, Navy, and Army heli-copters and eight Air Force tankers plus US Army Special

Forces teams and US Navy SEAL teams. Those assets were ar-rayed over a number of airfields from ArAr to Ras Al Mishaband on ships in the Gulf ready to answer the call.91

Additionally, SOCCENT anticipated that if Turkey approved thedeployment and activation of the Proven Force task force, they would have recovery assets available to support them from thenorth. Surveying the overall operation from his perspective, ColBen Orrell at SOCCENT said, “We were pretty well prepared.”92

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Notes

1. Andrew Leyden, Gulf War Debriefing Book [hereafter GWDB ] (GrantsPass, OR: Hellgate Press, 1997), 104.

2. Williamson Murray with Wayne Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf

(Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America,1996), 32.

3. Michael R. Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and the

Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 132.4. GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero

(New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 310.5. LTC Pete Harvell, interview by the author, 29 January 2002.6. Leyden, GWDB , 106.7. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 10.

8. Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Air Force Special Operations Command (AF- SOC) in the Gulf War [hereafter AFSOC in the GW ] (Hurlburt Field, FL: History Office, Air Force Special Operations Command, 1992), 13.

9. Col Ben Orrell, 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW), 16th SOW History Office, Hurlburt Field, FL, interview by the author, undated, [hereafter Orrell,1st SOW interview].

10. AFSOC History Office, AFSOC in the GW , 14.11. Maj Joseph J. Falzone, Combat Search and Rescue: CSEL Enhance-

ments for Winning Air Campaigns (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,December 1994), 55.

12. Lt Col Larry Helgeson, interview by the author, 2 September 2002.13. Brig Gen Dale Stovall, interview by the author, 3 September 2001.

14. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War:The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Co.,1994), 250.

15. Stovall, interview.16. Harvell, interview.17. Stovall, interview.18. Col George Gray, interview by the author, 3 May 2001.19. Lt Col Richard Comer, interview by the author, 19 July 2000.20. Tom Clancy with Gen Carl Stiner, Shadow Warriors (New York: G. P.

Putnam’s Sons, 2002), 449; and Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 238.21. Lt Col Joe E. Tyner, AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalries for

Combat Rescue Partnership Tomorrow , National Defense Fellows Program (Max- well AFB, AL: Headquarters US Air Force and Air University, undated), 37.

22. Maj Mark Tucker, interview by the author, 6 June 2002. Many rescuetroops who were interviewed for this book expressed the same sense of be-trayal. They wanted to go. The bitterness was intensified by subsequent events in Bosnia and Serbia in the late 1990s, and these feelings still exist.One career rescueman, Col Ken Pribyla, served as the director of operationsat Air Rescue Service after Desert Storm. He remembered that, “The frustra-tion was great throughout Rescue as I was told numerous times that there

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were a number of options available from single units to a merging of units, both active and reserve component, that could have provided the needed

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) units. Conventional wisdom said that since Rescue did not make the war, its requirements remained mostly un-known. Additionally, special operations forces became the visible force of choice when rescue was needed in any theater. This paradigm became theultimate catch-22 for ARS forces. You couldn’t get to the war/fight if youhadn’t been to the war/fight. The pattern continued well into the decade andcreated a considerable amount of confusion as to which organization wastruly the Air Force rescue force.”E-mail from Col Ken Pribyla, USAF retired, to author, 8 September 2002.

23. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 243.24. Gray, interview.25. Al Santoli, Leading the Way, How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S.

Military: An Oral History (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 206.

26. Harvell, interview.27. Comer, interview.28. Capt Tom Trask, interview by the author, 16 February 2000.29. Perry D. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti

Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Pro-gram, 2001), 20.

30. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 22.31. History of the Air Force Special Operations Command , Hurlburt Field,

FL: [hereafter History of AFSOC ], 1 January 1990–31 December 1991, 37.32. Capt Randy O’Boyle, interview by author, 20 March 2000; and History

of AFSOC, 26.33. Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, interview by the author, 25 September

2002.34. Appendix 6 to Annex C to USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, 18 July 1990.35. Ibid.36. Appendix 6 to Annex C to COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-90, 30 March

1990.37. History of AFSOC , 27.38. Lt Col Joe Hampton, interview by the author, 12 March 2000; and

Joint Review, JCS.39. Hampton, interview.40. History of AFSOC , 37.41. Comer, interview.42. Operation Desert Shield Combat Search and Rescue Plan , USCENT-

COM/JRCC, 1 November 1990.43. Hampton, interview.44. Operation Desert Shield Combat Search and Rescue Plan , USCENT-

COM/JRCC, 1 November 1990; and Gray, interview.45. Harvell, interview.46. Capt John Steube, interview by the author, 9 January 2002.47. CNA Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Volume II: Strike Warfare , Oc-

tober 1991, 5–52. [hereafter CNA ]48. History of AFSOC , 374.

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49. Tyner, AF Rescue and AFSOF , 40; and Gray, interview.50. Gray, interview.

51. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 250.52. Gray, interview; and US Special Operations Command History , MacDill

AFB, FL, HQ USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, November 1999, 36. [hereafter SOCCOM

History ]53. History of AFSOC , 28.54. Ibid.55. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 251.56. O’Boyle, interview.57. Comer, interview.58. Hampton, interview.59. Harvell, interview.60. Detachment Summary Report, Helicopter Combat Support Special

Squadron 4, (HCS-4), Desert Shield/Desert Storm , 9 December 1990–20 March1991. Includes attached aircraft and personnel from HCS-5.

61. History of the 919th Special Operations Group, 1 January 1990–31December 1991.

62. 3d/160th SOAR Desert Storm AAR, file 525.63. CDR Patrick Sharrett, USN; Lt Col Joseph Wysocki and Capt Gary

Freeland, USAF; CPT Scott Netherland, US Army; and Donald Brown, “GPSPerformance: An Initial Assessment,” Fairfax, VA, September 1991. Paper procured from the Institute of Navigation, 395.

64. Ibid., 396.65. For a full explanation of GPS in Desert Storm, see chap. 5 of Rip and

Hasik, Precision Revolution .66. Tom Clancy with Gen Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999), 274.

67. Ibid., 271.68. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Summary Report , vol. 5 (Washing-

ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 180.69. Ibid.70. Trask, interview.71. Comer, interview.72. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 58.73. Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War , Department

of Defense, April 1992, 120.

74. Glosson, interview.75. Clancy with Horner, Every Man a Tiger , 559.76. Col Ali Abdul-Lateef Khalifouh, Kuwait: Air Force, retired, Kuwaiti Re-

sistance as Revealed by Iraqi Documents , Center for Research and Studies onKuwait, 1994, 36.

77. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 90.78. Ibid., 111.79. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 70.80. Ibid., 43.

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81. First Special Operations Wing (SOW) History, 1 January–31 December 1991, and support documents, 121.

82. Gray, interview.83. Clancy with Horner, Every Man a Tiger , 351.84. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 137.85. Maj Mason Carpenter, Joint Operations in the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB,

AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, February 1995), 57.86. Comer, interview.87. Joint Task Force Proven Force, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/

ops/proven_force.htm.88. Clancy with Stiner, Shadow Warriors , 411.89. Joint Task Force Proven Force.90. First SOW History, 122.91. General briefing, CSAR file, SOCCENT, undated.

92. Orrell, interview; and 1st SOW, interview.

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Chapter 4

Desert Storm Week One:17–23 January 1991

We were honor bound to do our best to rescue them if they

were shot down.

—Lt Gen Chuck Horner

You just can’t go trundling into some place in a high-threat

environment without knowing exactly where the guy is. —Capt Randy O’Boyle

As preparations for war were proceeding, national leaders anddiplomats made last-minute efforts to forestall what appearedto be inevitable. In Saudi Arabia events were taking place at breakneck speed as final changes were made to the overall war plan, and units redeployed to the best tactical locations as a prelude to combat.

Were the aircrews ready? Many of the older pilots had flowncombat and generally knew what to expect. Among the younger guys, though, there were the inevitable doubts.

Said young A-10 pilot Capt Lee Wyatt, “You always wonder if you’re going to be ready for the real test. I had just reread Thud

Ridge , and I thought about those guys that flew through the hellin North Vietnam and I wondered if I was ready to be shot at.”1

His unit was visited by Lt Col Greg Wilson, a member of the706th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), an Air Force Reserveunit activated for the war. Wilson had flown as a forward air

controller in Southeast Asia and had extensive combat experi-ence. He laid it out for the young guys. “You will have doubts, but you are ready for it. You’re prepared, you’re trained for it,and you’ll do what you are trained to do.”2 The pilots werestrengthened by his words.

Brig Gen Buster Glosson visited the units to fire up the air-crews. Based on his experiences in Southeast Asia, he felt anobligation to look each of them in the eye and tell them why

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they were fighting. He told them that the nation was behindthem. He explained to them that what they were doing wasimportant and talked them through the initial air campaignplan. He cautioned them to be careful and pointed out that thefighting could last awhile and that resources needed to be husbanded. He said, “There is not a . . . thing in Iraq worth youdying for.”3

It made “the hair stand up on the back of your neck,” accord-ing to Capt Bill Andrews of the 10th TFS at Abu Dhabi.4 Severalof the pilots recalled that General Glosson also made an ap-pealing and specific promise. As per Saudi law, the troops hadnot been allowed to have alcoholic beverages in Saudi Arabia.

Glosson promised them all that after the shooting was over, he would revisit all the bases with a planeload of cold beer. That cheered them up.5

The British pilots’ approach was a bit more pragmatic. Oneremembered, “The brief that I’d been given was that we werethere to use our assets as efficiently as possible, without losingaircraft or lives. I think our outlook was slightly different to how it would have been had we been defending British territory. We were there to do a job and we were quite happy to do it, but none of us intended to die in the process.”6

As combat approached, some of the wing commanders wanted to know what procedures the flyers should follow for CSAR. Glosson had Randy O’Boyle prepare a briefing for theunits on what to expect. O’Boyle conferred with Colonel Comer on what to say and then split the duty with Capt Corby Martinand Capt Tim Minish. O’Boyle described what he told the flyers:“I said, ‘This is how we are going to try to come and get you.’ And I talked all about the SEALs, their desert vehicles, and . . .some of the things that we were going to use . . . and basically gave them the plan which was a real rah-rah speech but, I

thought, realistic. I don’t think that I overstated it. Before I got back, one wing commander called General Glosson and said,‘That was . . . hot. That was what the guys needed to hear.’ ”7

One pilot, a Marine F-18 jock, recalled, “Representatives fromthe Air Force MH-53 helicopter units who would do the actualrescue work came to brief us. These folks and their equipment were impressive. Much of the briefing was classified, but we were comforted somewhat by the material they were putting

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out. One interesting point was made: there would be no repeatsof the rescues from the Vietnam War, where all stops werepulled. There, all-out efforts were made without much regardto the cost in lives or machinery, just to rescue a single pilot.Neither the people nor the equipment could be afforded now.”8

Another Marine pilot remembered a more severe message.His commander told their unit, “Let me tell you something. When you get shot down, you are on your own. If you go out with that attitude, you’re going to be okay. But when you get out of your aircraft, it is one million BC. Expect that no one isgoing to help you . . . and you’re going to be okay.”9

One unit seemed to have heard a different message. WhenGlosson visited the 4th Wing at Al Kharj, one young pilot re-membered him saying that, “If you get shot down, you [won’t]have to spend the night. If it’s a night sortie, we’ll be in the next day to get you, but you are not going to spend 24 hours on theground.”10

Glosson himself remembered saying more than once, “Don’t worry about it. We’ll pick you up if we have to stack helicopterson top of each other and get them all shot down. But we are not going to leave you out there.”11

The crews were also given escape-and-evasion briefs. They were checked out in the use of all of their survival equipment and brought up-to-date on the theater CSAR procedures. There were some items of concern. The terrain over which they would be flying was, for the most part, dry and flat. There were few places to really hide. The area was teeming with snakes, spi-ders, and all forms of biting creatures, and the Bedouin tribesroamed freely and randomly. They had been promised big re- wards by Saddam if they captured any coalition personnel.

Aboard the USS Saratoga in the Red Sea Battle Group, LT Rick Scudder was a helicopter pilot assigned to the staff of theair wing commander. One of his many duties was CSAR coordi-nation. He remembered the visit by Captain O’Boyle.

Randy came out to explain two new features of the air task-ing order:

1. where to go each day to find information germane toCSAR—the safe areas, other time-critical and perishableinformation, information that was subject to change and

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what the procedures would be should there be suspectedcompromise, etc.; All the “what-if” stuff.

2. the importance of SPINS [special instructions for CSAR].O’Boyle reviewed them in detail and said, [paraphrasing]“Every pilot on the ship has to commit this absolutely,positively to memory because obviously you can’t takeit with you. We really don’t want you condensing it intokneeboard cards. You just have to know this stuff. Youhave to know before you go.”12

According to Scudder, O’Boyle laid it out for the flyers and was well received. He spoke to nearly every crewmember in the wing.

He was also realistic about the chances of rescue. O’Boyle pointedout that opportunistic missions in a medium- or high-threat environment were very problematic and that helicopters were very vulnerable in daylight, especially in a wide-open area likeIraq. Scudder said of O’Boyle, “There wasn’t any blanket promise:‘You go down, we’re inbound right away’ kind of thing.”13

One young Saratoga flyer was not impressed with the brief-ings. LT Jeff Zaun, a bombardier/navigator in A-6s with VA-35said, “We had plenty of CSAR briefings. The difficulty was that there was a lot of new information. We were focused on flying

our mission. You want to be professional and make sure youhave all the CSAR stuff you need. But it’s like, somebody iscoming to town with a new project and you think—look, I havea place to bomb and you are telling me all this stuff about CSAR?”14 Simultaneously, a team of personnel from life sup-port, rescue units, and the JRCC traveled to all the units in Turkey and briefed them on CSAR procedures and SPINS pre-paratory to their being authorized to fly against Iraq.

One pilot from the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron, flyingthe OA-10 as a forward air controller, had low expectations of

rescue. He and his cohorts would be flying over Kuwait. He saidin looking at Kuwait that, “We were on a pool table out there. There were a couple of hundred thousand Iraqi troops. My im-pression was that if I was ever shot down, I was going to be a POW because there really wasn’t any way to get me out. . . .Most guys were convinced that we were going to be grabbed im-mediately because in A-10s we were working right there on the border or 40–50 miles across. It was fairly densely populated

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a meeting between SOCCENT and Proven Force representativesand knew that any special operations actions out of Turkey would be in support of SOCCENT. This suggested to him that for rescue, they would set up an RCC that would then respondto the CENTAF JRCC. Then he started receiving calls on hissecure phone requesting CSAR data, but he did not have a good secure data communications link with them and couldnot pass classified information in a timely manner. Subse-quently, the Proven Force RCC began to work more and moreautonomously, like a JRCC. Joe Hampton and his crew scrambled to improve the communication links with the rescue forcesin Turkey. Given their remoteness, it was obviously going to be

a challenge to work with them if and when they got all the po-litical approvals necessary to begin operations.19

On 16 January all SOCCENT units were notified that combat operations against the Iraqis would commence at 0300L (localtime) on 17 January. With that, they moved several aircraft to Al Jouf and ArAr as per the Task Force Normandy plan and theCENTCOM CSAR plan.

On the 16th General Schwarzkopf visited the air planners inthe Black Hole to get a final update on the air plan. Horner hadGlosson and Deptula give the briefing. Methodically, they took

Schwarzkopf through the intricate and complicated flow of air-craft. When Schwarzkopf heard that no B-52s were scheduledto hit the Republican Guard units in Kuwait the first day, heerupted. The general had a healthy respect for the B-52s be-cause he had seen their devastating power in Vietnam. He de-manded that they be refragged (rescheduled) to hit the Iraqiunits from the beginning.

Glosson was taken aback. He knew that putting the bombersinto such high-threat areas before the air defenses had beenattacked put his aircrews at great risk. He envisioned a repeat

of the B-52s shot down over Hanoi during the Christmas raidsof 1972. Perhaps uncivilly, Glosson asked Schwarzkopf, “Tellme how many airmen you are willing to lose, and the air war commanders could redraft [their] plan to attack the RepublicanGuard in the first hours of the war.”20 Horner interceded at that point and led the commander into his office where they dis-cussed the issue privately. After Schwarzkopf left, Glosson as-signed reconnaissance units to closely watch the Republican

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Lieutenant Zaun of VA-35 recalled that, “The day before [the beginning of combat operations] they came in with the new ra-dios. I basically said, ‘No, I am not carrying a new radio. I never used it and don’t know how it works. I am sure I could figure it out but I’ve got other things to do right now. So I am taking thePRC-90.’”27

The commander of the air wing on the Saratoga , CAPT DeanHendrickson, also talked to his flyers. The veteran of aerialcombat in Southeast Asia said, “You are going to come back. Then you’re going to look around . . . and one of you won’t behere.”28 That sent a shiver through the flyers and focused themon the stark reality of what they were about to do.

Over in the Gulf, the admiral aboard USS Midway broadcast a message to all hands, “We have received the execute order tostrike targets in southeastern Iraq as part of what will be calledOperation Desert Storm. At this point, I do not know how longthis conflict will last. I do know that the men of the Midway willdo their utmost to defeat this enemy with dispatch. In a few short hours, we will launch our first strike at the enemy. To thesailors and crew, keep alert and let’s run the tightest of ships;and to the aviators, let’s make each bomb count.”29

One young flyer who heard the announcement recalled hisfeelings. “The adrenaline was flowing through our veins and we were ready to do what we had trained so hard to do; strikeand win.”30

The first waves of the attacks would be directed against theIraqi air defenses. This was critical to the entire air campaign.“The systematic destruction of Saddam’s eyes and ears was theone precondition necessary to implement the remaining phasesof the air campaign,” noted the executive officer of another of the Navy electronic warfare squadrons.31 He and his squadron

mates of VAQ-136 flew EA-6Bs and had the dangerous task of suppressing the Iraqi SAMs. They understood their missionperfectly. One young pilot, LT Sherman Baldwin, noted, “Our squadron’s job was to ensure that every Midway aircraft that launched came back safely. If we did our job of suppressingIraqi air defenses, their surface-to-air missiles would be ineffec-tive, their fighters would not have the support of ground-basedradars, and our guys would get in and out unharmed.”32

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the designated area of responsibility. This could be anything— an emergency beeper activation (called an emergency locationtransmitter/ELT), a loss of radio communications or flight fol-lowing with an aircraft, an aircraft disappearing from radar contact, an aircraft squawking the emergency code, or an ac-tual report of a downed aircraft from any source. All of the in-cident declarations were based on one or more of these factors.Mission numbers (M###) were applied once an effort was be-gun to dispatch a rescue mission.

17 January

Combat operations in Operation Desert Storm commencedon 17 January (H hour was 0000Z) and lasted until the cease-fire at 0500Z on 28 February. The JRCC log that begins below with Task Force Normandy provides an excellent tool for reviewing the CSAR events of Desert Storm. Prior to the cease-fire, there would be a total of 89 logged incidents. Since many were false squawks or beacon activations, they are not men-tioned.

(Note: At the time of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Iraq/Kuwait

local time (L) was ZULU + 3 [i.e., Greenwich Mean Time plusthree hours]. Saudi Arabia local time was ZULU + 3:30. All timesin the log extracts that follow are referenced to ZULU time.)

Task Force Normandy

The time over target (TOT) for the helicopters was 0238L or 2338Z. The time was carefully calculated so that the huge wave of aircraft set to fly through the hole could then take maximum advantage of the chaos being caused by the first F-117 strike, cruise

missiles, and the drones being launched (Poobah’s Party). At 0100L, the group of helicopters now called Task Force Nor-mandy lifted off, led by the 20th SOS commander, Lt Col RichComer, who flew as one of the copilots. The aircraft command-ers were Capt Corby Martin and Capt Ben Pulsifer. The secondsection was flown by Capt Michael Kingsley and Maj Robert Leonik. Each flight of two MH-53s led four AH-64s.36 Trailing incombat rescue support were two HH-60s from HCS-4/5, led by

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their skipper, CDR Neil Kinnear, from the cancelled deceptionoperation, and two MH-60s from the 55th SOS.37

As the Task Force Normandy helicopters crossed into Iraq,they observed some small arms tracers, but they were inaccu-rate and of no consequence. Guided by their GPS units, the

crews on the Pave Lows flew to the prebriefed drop-off points, where they threw out a bunch of green chemical sticks andthen turned south. As they departed, the Apaches slowly passedover the chemical lights and, using prebriefed coordinates, up-dated their Doppler navigational systems for the final 10-milerun to their individual targets.

Slipping through the clear, dark night, they pulled into fir-ing position exactly 90 seconds early. The gunners could seethe sites. They matched the intelligence pictures that they had been shown. They could also see enemy troops around them.

Suddenly the lights began to go off. One of the pilots mused,“I think they know we are here.” Thirty seconds prior, the Apache crews turned on their ranging lasers. At exactly 0238L,they began firing their Hellfire missiles. Twenty seconds later,the deadly weapons began to detonate against the structures. The generators were first, then the command bunkers, andfinally, the radar dishes themselves. The enemy soldiers diedin the melee.

The Apaches of Task Force Normandy were among the first manned aircraft toenter Iraq, led by MH-53s from the 20th SOS.

Photo courtesy of Bob Reed, HCS-4

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blanket push. They reached a certain point, switched off their IFFs [identification, friend or foe] and in they went.”43

It was a perfectly clear night. The troops at ArAr watched theshow. One helicopter pilot said, “I turned back to the north and was looking over where H2 and H3 [Iraqi airfields] were and off to the east toward Baghdad . . . when all hell broke loose. With

s i r g i T

s e t a r h p u E

Lake Urmia

Balad

Tallil

Jalibah

Ar Rumaylah

H1H2

H3

Al Asad

Al Jouf

Shaibah

Al Taqaddum

Al Sahra

K2

Al Fatah

Mudaysis

Targets of TF Normandy

Al Bussayyah

Ar Rutbah

As Salman

UmmQasr

Batman

CizreHakkari

Zakho

AlFaw

Ar Ramadi

Irbil

Ad Diwaniyah

As Samawah

Al Kut

An NasiriyahAr Ar

Rafha

Diyarbakir

Urfa

Ba'qubah

Hadithah

Al Qa'im

An Nukhayb

Al Jahra

Hafar AlBatin

Ras Al Khafji

Tikrit

Karbala'

Kirkuk

Najaf

Baghdad

KuwaitCity

Al Basrah

Mosul

45°

30°

35° 35°

45°40°

42° 43° 44° 46° 47° 48°

34°

33°

32°

31°

28°

36°

37°

38°

39° 41° 42° 43° 44° 46° 47° 48°

34°

33°

32°

31°

29°

28°

36°

37°

38°

Ras Al Mishab

0 50 100 150 km.

0 50 100 mi.

Known radar SAM coverage, pre-D/S

Airfields

Major roads

International boundaries

I R A Q

I R A N

T U R K E Y

S Y R I A

N A D R O J

S A U D I

A R A B I A

KUWAIT

Hostage 75

Norwich 02

Bergan 23

Norwich 21 Tbird 56

Caesar 44

Jackal 11

Quicksand 12

Sunliner 403

Stroke 65

Clap 74

Newport 15

Corvette 03

Slate 46Stamford 01

Wolf 01

© Darrel Whitcomb, 2002

WEEK 1

17-23 JAN

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the naked eye, you could see the tracers coming up. If you put on your [night-vision] goggles you could really see them. There were tracers and crap flying everywhere. We were sitting there watching this and you could see the flashes of light everywhere.Directly north about 60 miles, you could see a pattern of bombsgoing off. A B-52 strike.”44

Poobah’s Party

The Iraqis had quite a time as they downed most of the decoyslaunched by the Air Force and Navy. The drones appeared asmanned aircraft on the enemy radars and soaked up an esti-mated nine missiles per drone or TALD (tactical air-launched de-coy).45 The F-4Gs were right behind them, and their antiradiationmissiles destroyed dozens of radars and, undoubtedly, their crews as well. The desired effect was achieved. Within two daysthe enemy’s use of its tactical radars had dropped by 80 per-cent.46 The enemy developed a deep respect for the F-4Gs. They continued to fire SAMs, but their radars were not turned on. Without radar guidance, the missiles were just bigger bullets andmuch easier to evade.

Colonel Hardziej led his flight of three EF-111s to their orbit point west of Baghdad without F-15 escorts. They had a 10-minute window during which they had to radiate toward severalsites in the Baghdad area as waves of F-117s attacked the most dangerous targets. Watching over them, the AWACS crews be-gan to call warnings that “bandits” (Iraqi fighters) were airborneand hunting for vulnerable coalition aircraft.

Finishing his mission, Hardziej turned his flight south. Hesensed a presence and saw an Iraqi fighter with a bright spot-light planted a few feet off his right wing. He tried to take eva-

sive action. As he was approaching the Saudi border, the inter-ceptor fired an air-to-air missile that missed and exploded inthe desert. Hardziej and his other two aircraft safely returnedto Taif. They told others about their run-in with the Iraqi bandit and the spotlight.47

As the air campaign began to sweep across Iraq and Kuwait,things were beginning to get busy in the JRCC. Some of theactivity was just the chaos of war. Any indication of a downed

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I005 – Sunliner 403/F-18, USN

LCDR Michael Speicher of VFA-81, deployed aboard theUSS Saratoga, launched as part of this strike.54 Proceedingthrough Saudi airspace, his aircraft suffered a series of elec-trical malfunctions that degraded his ability to employ hisHARMs. His radar warning system also failed, denying himthe ability to detect enemy radars. Regardless, he pressed on with the mission.55

En route, Iraqi MiG-25s were reported airborne and activesouth of the formation near the airfield at Mudaysis. As Speich-er’s unit turned toward the MiG-25s, several pilots reported

AAA near the airfield. A few minutes later a pilot in the strikepackage spotted an explosion and reported it as an air-to-air engagement. Two minutes later, the same pilot reported a larger ground explosion. He had not observed an ejection. Subse-quently, Speicher was noted as missing when he failed to an-swer radio calls.

One of the pilots in Speicher’s unit recalled the event. “I re-member us all saying at that time, ‘Where’s [Speicher]?’ . . . Wechecked a couple of times, tried different frequencies and got nothing. We called the AWACS to see if they had him. Nothing.

I got on the radio with the JRCC in Riyadh via AWACS and toldthem we were missing an airplane.”56 The JRCC records do not show that such a call was received.57

Returning to the ship, one of the pilots immediately went tothe intelligence center to report the loss. He stated that the ex-plosion that he had witnessed did not appear to have been“survivable.” Additionally, neither he nor anyone else had heardany calls on the emergency frequencies. But the pilots had been briefed that the Iraqis had the ability to “DF” or home in onsurvival radios, and it was possible that, if Speicher were down,

he might have avoided using his radio for this reason. As more aircrews recovered from the strike and nobody re-ported hearing from Speicher, hopes ebbed. Unbelievably, hisloss was not immediately reported to the NRCC. Additionally,the coordinates finally reported were wrong.58

On this first strike, two aircraft were reported down. Thesecond one was logged as incident I006 and was supposedly an A-6. It took several hours of hard work by the SAR control-

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ground for maximum effect against the enemy guns. As they pulled up in their attack, though, their weapon release com-puter failed and did not release their bombs. They turned away from their target and jettisoned their ordnance. In the turn, theaircraft was struck by a suspected SA-16 heat-seeking missile.It hit the right tailpipe and destroyed that engine. Flames en-gulfed the right side of the aircraft. Flt Lt John Nichol called onthe radio that they were on fire. The AWACS aircraft in that area monitored that call. Nichol then radioed that they wereejecting, but nobody heard that call.

Simultaneously, both men pulled their ejection handles. They landed close together and rapidly joined. Lieutenant Nicholtook out his survival radio and made several radio calls; none was acknowledged. Their beacon was detected, but without voice contact, rescue forces were not dispatched.

There was no place to hide on the flat desert. They walkedaway from the crash site for close to an hour before about 30enemy troops surrounded them and took them prisoner.71

Not long afterwards, Horner called General Schwarzkopf toupdate him on the air campaign. He told him of the loss of the Tornado and the earlier loss of Speicher. Schwarzkopf re-marked, “My God, that is an order of magnitude better than what we expected.”72

A-10s were also active, hitting remaining radar sites alongthe border. Other coalition forces were hitting targets in Ku- wait. The French Jaguar units had received notification fromtheir government just 15 hours before the start of the war that France would participate in the campaign. Hastily, they weregiven intelligence data so that they could participate in the first attack on Al Jaber Airfield in Kuwait. Trained in low-level tac-tics, they refused to coordinate with the American units hittingthe field. Instead they went in at 100 feet and attacked just aspreceding American flights were finishing. Every French air-craft was hit by ground fire, and one pilot was wounded.73

I009/M001 – Jupiter 01/Jaguar, FAF

The eastern sector AWACS detected an emergency radar squawk and a voice report of a bailout.74 They reported it to the JRCC who requested the Marine RCC to launch two CH-46s.

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It was not quite that simple, though. Batman did not havesecure access to the intelligence sources back at Incirlik. Thecrews had brought some data on the Iraqi threats with them.

They quickly began planning possible operations into the north-ern sector. One of the MH-53 pilots, Capt Steve Otto, was involved in the process and recalls:

We figured out early on that the threats and the terrain of northern Iraq were much different than southern Iraq. Down south, we anticipatedthat we would be able to drive around the Iraqi threats, to use our refuel-ing and range capability, if not to defeat detection, then certainly to de-feat the threat systems. Up north we realized that we were not going tohave that luxury, that there were only 13 mountain valleys that went from Turkey into Iraq. The threats were pretty robust up there, and we

were going to have to fly at night. . . . We knew from the threat that there

was a great concentration of Iraqi threats, a lot of ground divisions, AAA,and SAMs down in the tri-border area where Iraq, Turkey, and Syria meet. We knew that because of threat considerations, we would have tofly far east if we were going to fly through Iraq.79

Regardless, the men at Batman were now ready. But as an-other of the MH-53 pilots, Capt Grant Harden, recalled, they intended to make their flights into Iraq at night for obvious tac-tical reasons.80

One of the MH-53 pilots assigned to Proven Force, Capt Steve Otto, was in-volved in the rescue attempt of Corvette 03.

Photo courtesy of Steve Otto

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That afternoon a strike force of 32 F-16s hit the Al Taqaddum Airfield and a nearby petroleum refinery. They were supported by 15 F-15s, eight F-4Gs, and four EF-111s. This was followed by massive B-52 strikes on Republican Guard divisions in Ku- wait. As darkness set in, F-117s attacked air defense sites in western Iraq. Unfortunately, bad weather had moved in, andseveral targets were not damaged at all.

Starting at 2200L, a series of raids hit targets in the Basra area just north of Kuwait. The strikes were heavily supported with jamming and SAM suppression. There were still some losses.

I011 – Norwich 21/Tornado, RAF

This was a strike by four Tornadoes against the Shaibah Air-field in southern Iraq using the JP.233 cluster weapon specifi-cally designed to destroy runways.81 The crew of Wg Cdr NigelElsdon and Flt Lt Robert Colier had apparently made a success-ful run on the airfield but was engaged by a SAM site uponegressing the target. Another crew in the flight observed an ex-plosion and asked its controller on AWACS how many radar returns he was tracking. The controller replied that he had only three. No contact was ever made with the crew, and intelligence

later determined that both men had been killed. Elsdon was themost senior coalition officer killed in the air campaign.82

It was becoming rapidly obvious to the operations plannersthat southern Iraq was a dangerous place. Regardless, the tar-gets had to be hit.

I012 – T-Bird 56/F-15E, USAF

A flight of six F-15Es attacked another airfield west of Basra in southern Iraq.83 Each aircraft made a run over the target insequence. The number three aircraft (T-Bird 53) had to abort

his run-in because of heavy enemy AAA. Coming around for another attack, the pilot made a radio call to inform the crew of the sixth aircraft that they would not be the last ones off thetarget. Lining up for his attack the pilot heard the crew of T-Bird56 call that they were clear of the target. As the pilot of T-Bird53 pressed his attack, he observed a large explosion. No Mayday call was heard. On egress from the target, T-Bird 56 did not check in. This was reported to AWACS with a general location of

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where the explosion occurred. AWACS notified the JRCC. Withno indication that the crew was alive, no rescue effort wasmounted, but the JRCC directed search operations in the area for several days. Contact was never made with the crew of Maj Tom Koritz and Maj Donnie Holland. In fact they had beenkilled in the engagement. Koritz was dual-rated as a pilot andflight surgeon.84

Strikes were also being flown in western Iraq, primarily by US Navy units in the Red Sea. Most were large packages that included aircraft for MiG protection, general antiradar jam-ming, and SAM suppression. They would precede the attack

aircraft, which would then deliver bombs against the actualtargets. This tactic was not always completely successful.

I013 – Quicksand 12/two A-6s, USN

These two aircraft from VA-35 launched from the USS Sara-

toga and were part of a large strike package hitting the heavily defended H-3 airfield in western Iraq.85 Leading the force wereF-14s for air-to-air protection and F-18s and EA-6Bs to attack and suppress SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missile sites in the area.

The A-6s made low-level attacks at 400 feet from different attack axes. One of the aircraft, crewed by LT Rob Wetzel andLT Jeff Zaun, set up to deliver a load of Mk-20 “Rockeye” on thePOL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) storage facilities near theairfield. The Iraqis had been alerted and flooded the skies over the airfield with parachute flares, creating a bizarre and disori-enting scene. The pilot, Wetzel, described the run-in: “We turnedat the IP [initial point] 30 miles away at 450 knots, flying at 500feet. It was almost a daytime scenario. SAMs flew around thestrike force. There was heavy AAA. I saw a missile go off in front of us. I saw a missile to the right at two o’clock, turned into it and dropped chaff. We were hit.”

The aircraft was hit by either an SA-6 or Roland missile andcrashed north of the airfield. Wetzel continued, “The back of the airplane was on fire. We ejected through the canopy at 500feet and 400 to 500 knots. Our helmets were ripped off. We hadflail injuries.”86

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To Zaun it was all just a blur. Neither he nor his pilot wasable to make an emergency radio call before the aircraft beganto come apart. He said that,

[The missile] threw us to one side. Made a loud sound. It hit my side. Theright engine ate itself. I looked to see how high we were. There was a lot . . . going on. When I punched, I was sure it was the right thing to do. Iremember looking at the altimeter. I could not figure it out. So I ejected

just as they taught us. . . . I do not remember being in my parachute. Iremember being in the sand and going “Whoa, . . . . It’s war and I am inthe desert.” . . . I actually did calm myself down. I got up and pattedmyself down for injuries. The first thing I looked for was my radio. I hadlost it in the ejection. That was a bad thing. That demoralized me asmuch as anything else. . . . I carried my parachute for some time be-cause I thought the radio was in it. I heard my pilot calling me. He was

hurt. He took off his LPA [survival vest] and did not have a radio either.I asked him where it was. . . . He was hurt, and in taking off his LPA hadlost it [PRC-112 radio]. I was not happy. . . . I did not have a radio andcould not tell anybody I was alive.87

Lieutenant Wetzel had a badly wounded shoulder. Realizingthat there were enemy troops in the area, the two men startedto evade to the west, away from the airfield. Zaun intended tofind an open area and lay out some kind of signal that couldhopefully be picked up by imagery intelligence.88

A USAF AWACS was in the area but did not establish any

contact with the crew. After a short period of time, estimated to be no more than an hour, they were found and captured by a team of Iraqi soldiers who took them to the dispensary on theairfield.89 Saudi intelligence subsequently reported that thecrew had been captured.

The second A-6 was also heavily damaged. It managed to divert to Al Jouf Airfield in western Saudi Arabia. There, analysts deter-mined that it had, in fact, been hit by a Roland missile. The crew was safe and uninjured, but the aircraft never flew again.90

This night had not gone as well as the first. Three aircraft

were lost to either SAMs or AAA. All three crews had been killedor captured. Thirteen other aircraft had been damaged but managed to return to friendly control.

18 January

In place and operational, the aircrews of Proven Force, in Tur-key, entered the campaign with strikes against strategic sites in

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the international principle that emergency signals should not be used for tactical purposes. The operation was never run.108

Studying the results of this strike, Navy intelligence deter-mined that the Iraqi navy was already bottled up because of mines that it had laid itself. After realizing how dense enemy air defenses were in the area, VADM Stanley Arthur, com-mander US Naval Forces Central Command, decided to cancelany further mine-laying flights.109

Admiral Arthur also had his staff look at the efficacy of low-level operations overall in the first two days of attacks. The two A-6s shot down had been lost on low-level attacks. Addressingthis and the losses of the Tornadoes and the F-15E—all on low-

level operations—he stated to his commanders:Gentlemen, far be it from me to dictate specific combat tactics. But Imust inject my early observations relative to the age-old argument of low-altitude delivery versus high. With a quick look at what has happened tothe multinational forces to date, one cannot escape the fact that current

AAA environment makes the low-level delivery a non-starter. I want youto take a hard look at how your air wings are handling the issue. Welearned a hard lesson in Vietnam relative to AAA and then later many told us we learned it wrong—I think not. There is a place and time for low-altitude delivery and it usually involves surprise. We can no longer count on surprise. That went away shortly after [midnight on D-day].110

The air wing commanders from the carriers directed their air-crews to switch to medium-altitude operations. This had a dra-matic impact on mission effectiveness because the crews had not trained to deliver ordnance from higher altitudes. Additionally, thecarriers only had limited numbers of laser-guided bombs, which were the most effective weapons for medium-altitude operations. What laser-guided bombs were available were to be carried by the A-6s. The Navy had not brought any Maverick guided missilesthat could also be effectively used at the higher altitudes. Conse-quently, the only ordnance available for the F/A-18s were the old

Vietnam-era “dumb” bombs that were much less accurate whendropped from higher altitudes.111

I021 – Falstaff 66/F-4G, reported as a lost communications, USAF

The Iraqi gunners were not the only threat to the coalitionaircraft. In the winter the Persian Gulf nations are occasionally covered with dense fog. The cover can be so thick that the pilots

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In planning the missions, some of the unit commanders com-pared these to the mass raids against heavily defended Hanoiin the war in Southeast Asia. The raw numbers of SAM sitesand AAA guns were alarming, but the Baghdad area defenseshad been so heavily pummeled in the last two days that an air of cockiness was working its way through some of the unitsand fighter crews.119

The geographical arrangement of the new targets meant that the enemy defenses would be fully alerted as the strikes pro-gressed. Perhaps more critical, the mission change had not reached the crews until they were almost ready to go, so theflight leads could not make any fundamental changes to their tactical plan prior to launch.

To some, the last-minute changes introduced a healthy doseof risk to the mission. The package included several F-4Gs for SAM suppression. That heartened the strike pilots becausethey knew how effective the Weasels were in suppressing thesites with their HARMs. Because of the distance to the target,each F-4G carried only two HARMs instead of the usual four,reducing their capability by half. The flight leads were unawareof this critical fact.

Once airborne all aircraft had to be in-flight refueled. Here,too, there were problems. There was rough weather in the re-fueling track. Some of the tankers had to throttle back becauseof winds so that they could refuel all the aircraft prior to theend point of the track. Things got so fouled up that some flights were unable to refuel and had to return home with their bombs. Those that were able to refuel pressed on north and broke out into open skies over Iraq.

I023/M003 – Stroke 65/F-16, USAF

Maj Jeff Tice of the 614th TFS was leading a flight of four F-16s in the last wave of this 72-plane attack force sent to hit targets in the Baghdad area.120 The flight was preceded by eight F-15s for air superiority and eight F-4G Wild Weasels for SAMsuppression.

Weather caused delays en route, and by the time the F-16s were approaching their targets, the F-4Gs had already fired allof their SAM-suppression missiles and were departing the area.

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118

This was the first time that the Pave Low had been fully used as de-signed—Vietnam lessons learned, adverse weather, night capability,

etc. It was actually the first time the airplane had ever done what it wasdesigned to do. We never considered turning around because of the weather. We just continued north. Tim [Minish] had already configuredhis airplane to set up his hover coupler to descend through the weather had he needed to once we got into the area, had Tice come up on theradio.126

Colonel Comer was also impressed with the ability of theMH-53 to operate through the low clouds in enemy territory with relative impunity. The ability of the Iraqi defenses to ef-fectively DF the survivors’ radios and even partly track aircraft through their radio communications concerned him, however.

That was a dangerous development and portended great dan-ger for his helicopter crews. He pointed out that,

You have a helicopter with six or eight people—which is a tasty morselall its own—taking the risk to pick up the single person who might beout there . . . or two people. It is not a rescue, it’s a war. . . . When yousay rescue you think about a Coast Guard guy who went out there andpicked up some guy who is in trouble. That is a worthy and worthwhilemission. But doing it while there is somebody out there trying to shoot

you—that is a war. And that is what we were thinking. How do we deal with the war? How do we deal with the desert? How do we deal with allof these things that seem to be threatening to us while at the same time,

we have to have the communication and wherewithal to know where a

person is? Now we did launch and we did end up searching.127

The effort for Major Tice had been valiant if unsuccessful. Un-fortunately, he was not the only pilot lost in Force Package Q.

I024 – Clap 74/F-16, USAF

Capt Harry Roberts of the 614th TFS was flying in the strikepackage with Major Tice.128 In the same melee, Roberts’ flight was engaged by an SA-2 battery but was able to evade its mis-siles. Weather had moved over their target, and they were not

able to drop their bombs. Instead they turned south to egressand were engaged by a newer and much more lethal SA-6.Roberts’ F-16 was specifically targeted by the enemy site. Hisradar-warning receiver lit up, telling him that he was locked in by the tracking radar. He maneuvered his aircraft and jetti-soned his bombs and external fuel tanks in an effort to evadethe threat. He was unsuccessful, and the battery launched twomissiles at him. One missile guided true and detonated near

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ing lights. The aircraft had been fatally wounded. In the back-seat, Tom Griffith tried to make a Mayday call on the radio.Instinctively, Eberly pulled the ejection handle, ejecting himimmediately. Griffith ejected quickly thereafter.142

Both men floated down through the bitterly cold night air.Griffith landed uneventfully. Eberly lost his helmet and oxygenmask in the ejection. Aloft in the thin air, he succumbed to hy-poxia and passed out. He woke up on the ground but was men-tally confused. He had not taken any refresher courses in combat survival during Desert Shield. Additionally, he had not taken the time to develop a pre-mission evasion plan with theintelligence section back at the base. As his head cleared, he

grabbed his parachute and moved away from his ejection seat,leaving the rest of his survival kit behind.

The two men could not see each other. Eberly took out hisPRC-90 radio and made an emergency call, “This is Chevy . . . .”He stopped and remembered that Chevy had been his call signon a previous mission. He started over, “This is Corvette 03 onguard. How do you read?” There was no answer. Sensing that his WSO was not too far away, he called Griffith, who also hada PRC-90. Visibility was good, so using various distinctive land-marks, they were able to rendezvous after only 15 minutes and

immediately started looking for cover.Griffith had all of his survival gear. Together they moved off

to the southwest. As the sun came up, Griffith could see that Eberly had a gash in the back of his head and a bad scrape onhis face. He tended to him as best he could, then they wrappedthemselves in the parachute and got some sleep.

Corvette 01 reported to AWACS that Corvette 03 was missing. They immediately notified the JRCC. It had been a hectic night with numerous reports of aircraft down and emergency beaconsdetected. The JRCC controllers had to sort through the data

coming in to them. Initially, they checked with all the airfields where an F-15E could have landed. When controllers could not account for the aircraft, they had to assume that they weredown and then attempt to locate them. Returning to base, onemember of the Corvette flight reported that the aircraft had gonedown at approximate coordinates of latitude 34˚13' N, longitude040˚55' E, about 10 miles southwest of the target. That was a start, but considering that it came from an aircraft moving at

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more than 500 miles per hour and under fire at the time, it wasnot accurate enough to launch highly vulnerable helicoptersinto such a high-threat area. Data came in from the SARSAT, but its CEPs were too large to commit any helicopters.

Colonel Hampton monitored the inflow of data and recalled,“We knew they punched out. We had intel on them from theRC-135 that the Iraqis were looking for them for a while andone ground group said that they had captured them.”143

Hampton wanted to launch helicopters immediately, but hedid not have the authority to do so.144 Following the CSAR plan,they passed that data on to SOCCENT. There, Col George Gray began to intensively study the situation. He could stage MH-

53s out of ArAr, and indeed, crews there were directed to beginmission planning. But they would need tanker support, which was problematic because that whole section of Iraq was one of the most highly defended areas in the entire country. Sendingin tankers would put a large number of aircrew at risk.145 The JRCC had not reported an accurate position on the men or even that they were alive and still free. Gray would not send hishelicopters in to do a search. It did appear that the men, if they were there, were above the dividing line with the combat rescueforces in Proven Force. He suggested to his boss, Colonel John-

son, that they pass the mission to them.146 They sent an alert message to the guys in Turkey, who began initial planning.147

Throughout the night and next morning, the JRCC worked with various intelligence assets to determine the status andposition of the survivors and alerted them to be vigilant for any radio calls from the two men. But such signals were dangerous because the Iraqis were known to have excellent homing capabilities to track any calls from the PRC-90 radios. Intelligencesources also suspected that the Iraqis themselves were settingoff beacons as decoys.148 All of this had to be resolved.

Additionally, General Glosson indicated that some things were going on behind the scenes. Other government agencies were working to get the two men, possibly by passing “opera-tives” through Syria. Such a plan was discussed at SOCCENT,and the JRCC guys were aware that some possible options were being considered.149

Colonel Gray suggested to Colonel Johnson that they request access through Syria for a possible helicopter mission. They sent

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128

But that was exactly what the F-15E crews expected. WhenEberly did not return, his assistant, Col Bob Ruth, became theacting director of operations for the wing. He had flown OV-10sover the Ho Chi Minh Trail and recalled, “When we were over inSEA [Southeast Asia], if an airplane went down, we dedicated just about any air we could to try to suppress the area to try toget the survivors out.”155

But that was not happening here. The F-15Es were held for the anti-Scud missions. Colonel Ruth said, “Everybody just kept doing his mission and everything was handed over to the[C]SAR folks.”156

During the day, several strike flights flew through the area.

As each would pass, Eberly or Griffith would attempt to makecontact. One of the groups was a flight of four F-16s from the10th TFS led by its commander, Lt Col Ed Houle.

As with Corvette the previous night, his mission had been a last-minute change from a 40-aircraft package of F-16s, F-15s,and other assorted support aircraft against a target in theBaghdad area to the Scud sites out west. In preparation for thenew mission, he had not been briefed that any crews had beenshot down in the Al Qaim area. Approaching his target he heard,“This is Corvette 03. Does anybody read?”

Not expecting such a call, he let it pass and struck his target. That fully taxed him since it was well defended and the AAA and SAM sites were active. Leaving the area, he checked out with the AWACS. He asked them, “Hey, who is Corvette 03?”

The controller responded, “Why, did you hear something?”Houle replied that he had. The controller thanked him and

directed him to return to his base.Landing back at his base and now fully suspicious, he walked

into intelligence for the mission debrief. “Who . . . is Corvette03?” he demanded. The intelligence officer informed Houle that

Corvette 03 was an F-15E shot down in the Al Qaim area theprevious night and that rescue forces were trying to locate themfor rescue. Houle’s cockpit mission tape was pulled and for- warded to the 4th Wing, where unit members identified the voice as that of Colonel Eberly.

All of this came as a complete surprise to Houle because noone in the flight had been briefed that there was a downed air-crew in that area. If they had, they would have been on the

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138

into harm’s way just to say you did it. But many times . . . you can as-sist the CSAR effort with distractions in a way that a helicopter can

sneak in and not have near the exposure. During Desert Storm, AFSOC[SOCCENT] wanted to look at everything in isolation. They wanted tosay, “Oh, a helicopter can’t get in.” Randy and I had a few conversationson this. I said, “Randy, stop letting those guys look at this in isolation.I can make all hell break loose a quarter of a mile from where we want to pick the pilot up. I can make sure the people on the ground are only concerned about survival.” Bottom line, you can’t look at CSAR or any-thing else during a war in isolation.185

Neither Horner nor Glosson could launch the rescue helicop-ters across the FLOT [forward line of own troops] because Gen-eral Schwarzkopf had given that responsibility and authority to

the commander of SOCCENT, Col Jesse Johnson. Johnson’sair commanders, well schooled in the realities of rescue behindenemy lines, delayed the effort until they felt that their crewshad the best chance of rescuing the men and not being shot downthemselves. It was an unfortunate misunderstanding fueled by the fog of war. The fighter guys expected to be picked up. For years, they had heard the motto of the rescue forces, “That Others May Live.” They knew that the rescue guys would come.But when the helicopters did not, for reasons that they couldnot know or even understand, they lost faith and condemned

those responsible. Yet, Col George Gray was adamant in his logic. “I wasn’t go-ing to send guys into a situation where we were automatically going to lose a helicopter and 5 more guys.”186

At CENTCOM, Colonel Harvell watched all of this and wasdismayed at the attitude of the Air Force officers in their enthu-siasm to so quickly send the SOF helicopters into such a high-threat area. He said, “This is an issue of recurring special opera-tions concern in that non-SOF people have a tendency to commit special operations forces in unrealistic ways. This is a theme

that the special operations forces guys have got to fight. They [Air Force] say ‘Send the special operations forces guys.’ It’s not a special operations forces mission. It’s easy for them to say,‘Mount up the special operations forces guys and have them dothis.’ They don’t understand what our strengths and weaknessesare and what we can and cannot do.”187

Concerned about the failure, the commanders in CENTAF tried to address the problem. Analysis indicated that the PRC-90

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144

With voice contact established with the pilot Jones, a re-ported location, and intelligence showing that the area aroundthe survivors was not high-threat, Moccasin 05 commanded by Capt Tom Trask took off at 0505Z to recover the two-man crew

of Slate 46. As they launched, the command center at ArAr notified the JRCC that their estimated time of arrival at the survivors’ loca-tion was 0630Z.207 The helicopter lifted off and was immedi-ately swallowed by the thick fog. Heading north, they flew di-rectly over an Iraqi outpost just across the border. Within a few minutes, Trask and his crew began to get warnings that IraqiSAM and AAA sites were going active in their area.

The crew of Slate 46, Navy lieutenants Larry Slade and Devon Jones, had theirF-14 shot down while escorting a strike against the Al Asad Airfield west ofBaghdad.

Photo courtesy of Peter Mersky

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146

The enemy helicopters did not concern Trask since he wassure he could defeat them in an air-to-air engagement. Beforehe could confront them, they turned around and landed back at their airfield.

Approaching the reported area of the survivors, the crew of Moccasin 05 began searching for the two men below and theF-15s above. They could not establish contact with either. AnEA-6B that was part of the original strike package was still orbiting in the area and reported that the survivors were actually 50 miles north and that the initial coordinates reported by AWACS were terribly inaccurate. This caused some discussion between Trask and his crew and the headquarters at ArAr as

they pressed SOCCENT for location data on the survivors. The terrain in the area was almost completely flat. To avoid

the enemy defenses as much as possible, Captain Trask kept his aircraft low and pressed on. The weather had cleared out considerably, and the visibility was now about 30 miles. Thecrew could not see any enemy activity or even any settlementsnearby and felt relatively safe.

Flight at low altitude, though, reduced the range for the he-licopter crews to hear the survivors’ emergency radios. After searching unsuccessfully for 25 minutes, Moccasin 05 turned

for home base. As it was leaving, one of the A-10 pilots inSpringfield flight contacted Trask and reported that he thought he had made radio contact with a survivor. Trask returned tothe area, but this effort was also unsuccessful, and Moccasin05 had to return to ArAr for fuel.211

At approximately 0730Z, Lieutenant Slade spotted a whiteDatsun truck. Inside were two civilians, both armed with rifles. They saw Slade and took him prisoner.212 He was not able tocommunicate to the rescue forces that he had been captured.Consequently, the rescuers remained on the lookout for any-

thing that might signal the status of Lieutenant Slade.Lieutenant Jones never heard his mate on the radio. He also

moved away from the burning wreckage, initially east, and thennorthwest. He observed many tire and foot tracks. Walking for quite a while, he finally found a small mound that affordedsome protection. Not too far away was a small wadi with a blue water tank. Using his knife, he dug a small trench in the hardground and tried to cover himself as best he could.

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147

Remembering what the rescue briefers had said, he did not expect a rescue attempt until night. At about the same timethat Slade was being taken captive, Jones watched a smalltruck pull up to the tank. He sprinkled sand on himself to try to conceal his dark flight suit and boots. A few minutes later the truck drove off. Relaxing a little, Jones noticed a black scor-pion crawling on his sleeve. He jumped out of his hiding place,flung the scorpion to the ground, and killed it.

High above, the AWACS controller working the mission in-structed Sandy 57 and 58 to proceed directly to the survivors’estimated position. As they approached, the controller toldthem that the rescue helicopter had been unable to locate thesurvivors and had returned to base for fuel. He also gave themnew instructions to head southeast and search for some sus-pected Scud missiles. Assuming that the CSAR had been ter-minated, they reluctantly complied. After 90 minutes of fruit-less Scud searching, they rendezvoused with a KC-10 and took on another load of fuel. They checked back in with the AWACs,fully expecting to be sent home, but were diverted back to theCSAR effort.

Captain Johnson acknowledged his instructions and once

again turned his flight north. As they flew into the estimated area, Johnson began calling on the radio, “Slate 46, this is Sandy 57.” Jones had been calling on his PRC-90 radio at the top of ev-

ery hour. None of his calls had been acknowledged, but whenhe called at 0905, Capt Paul Johnson answered. With voice con-tact, Johnson could steer to Jones’ radio. The bearing he wasreceiving indicated that Jones was north. Johnson followed the bearing and began to close the distance. As his navigation gear indicated he was close to the survivor, Johnson asked Jones if he could hear an A-10. When Jones replied negatively, Johnson

started a descent through the clouds. Eventually, Jones couldhear the aircraft and began to give vectors to his location. To aidthe process, the pilot expended a bright flare. Jones saw theflare and then the aircraft and directed Johnson right over hisposition. As he passed overhead, Johnson locked the positioninto his INS, quickly scanned the area for visual cues, and climbed back above the clouds. Anticipating rescue, Jones described hislocation to the pilots overhead.

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162

116. Scudder, interview.117. Michael R. Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and

the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 147.118. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 156.119. Ibid., 150.120. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.121. History of the 614th Tactical Fighter Squadron in Desert Shield/Des-

ert Storm, 29 August 1990–29 March 1991 [hereafter 614 TFS History], His-torical Research Agency (HRA), Maxwell AFB, AL.

122. Capt Paul Harmon, interview by author, 16 February 2000.123. Ibid.124. From TSgt Ray Cooper, 1723d Special Tactics Squadron: Alert log

notes for 19–20 January 1991 (Stroke 65 Mission).125. Jeff Tice to Paul Harmon, letter, 12 November 1991.

126. Harmon, interview.127. Lt Col Richard Comer, interview by author, 19 July 2000.128. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.129. Harry M. Roberts, US Air Force Academy oral history interview, 30

August 1991.130. History, 614 TFS.131. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 161.132. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.133. Ibid.134. GAWD, 227; Allen, Thunder and Lightning , 80; e-mails from Flt Lt Mary

Hudson, RAF/AHB, 21, 23, and 27 March 2006; and http://www.raf.mod.uk/gulf/loss.html.

135. Glosson, interview.136. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 164.137. Schwarzkopf with Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero , 416.138. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 169.139. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.140. Dave Eberly, e-mail to author, 14 April 2002.141. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War

(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 126.142. Ibid.143. Hampton, interview.144. Ibid.145. “Desert Storm, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War, 1991,” Military History Magazine (Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, April1992), 177; and Capt William LeMenager, HQ SOCOM, “A Gulf War Chronicle,”unpublished manuscript, January 1998.

146. Gray, interview.147. Capt Matt Shozda, interview by the author, 12 September 2002.148. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 258.149. Ibid., 259; O’Boyle, interview; Hampton, interview; and Comer, inter-

view.150. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 258.

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and responded to recover the crew. This was a classic SAR situ-ation. In this case, US assets recovered a Saudi crew.8

26 January

As the air campaign progressed, the coalition ground combat units were training and repositioning for the coming groundcampaign. All US Army and Marine units had large fleets of helicopters. The Army RCC and the Marine TACC were the im-mediate points of contact for any SAR or CSAR efforts regard-ing their aircraft.

I045 – Bulldog /OH-58, US Army

The aircraft crashed in a sandstorm near Al Qaysumah,Saudi Arabia.9 The Army RCC responded and sent a recovery force to safely recover the crew.10

***

Early that afternoon the CENTAF commander, General Horner,

sat down and reviewed the first nine days of combat. Looking back at the effort expended thus far, he felt that the objectivesof Phase I and II of the air campaign had mostly been met. Heroughly calculated how many sorties would be needed over the next several days to complete the campaign and sustainthe damage. He then turned to the next phase, the prepara-tion of the battlefield. That would require a refocusing of theair effort.11

Horner commented to the CENTAF staff, “We are where weneed to be to shift the emphasis to the Republican Guards.”12

This fit in with what his boss wanted. General Schwarzkopf was thinking ahead to the ground battle. He wanted the air ef-fort to refocus on the Iraqi army, and specifically, the Republi-can Guard divisions.

To facilitate the flow of aircraft over a relatively small area,the area between the Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and Basra and east of Hafar al Batin was divided into kill boxes. Each900-square-mile box was defined by specific latitudes and lon-

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I048/M010 – Jaguar, Omani Air Force

This aircraft was reported missing 12 miles south of Dhah- ban, Oman.20 A SAR effort was initiated. Local forces, USAF C-130s, and an RAF Nimrod searched. The pilot was the stationcommander. He was found dead by Omani rescue personneland classified as a noncombat loss.21

***

Intelligence sources indicated that the focused attacks onthe Iraqi forces in Kuwait were beginning to take a toll. Saddam

and his military leaders appeared to have believed that any ground attack would be preceded by no more than three toseven days of focused air attacks specifically on their forces. They were shocked at the relentlessness of the campaign. They appeared equally shocked when this newly focused air attack did not seem to be a prelude to the ground attack either but a sustained attack in its own right. They were also alarmed at the effectiveness of the shelter-busting attacks by the F-111Fsand the lack of desired effects from their Scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps desperate, the Iraqis decided to launch a “spoilingattack” in Kuwait with three divisions: the 1st Mechanized, the5th Mechanized, and the 3d Armored. It would be supported by commandos coming south along the coast in small boats. Suchan attack would have two objectives: first, to cause Americancasualties that would stir up political opposition in the UnitedStates; and second, to provoke the coalition into initiating a ground war on the Iraqis’ terms. This would turn the war to what was their primary strength, their powerful ground units.22

Having been provided US intelligence during the Iran-Iraq

war, the Iraqis knew the times when US reconnaissance satel-lites were overhead. They timed their moves so that they hadthe least chance of detection. That evening a brigade-size task force from Iraq’s 3d Armored Division began moving towardthe Saudi border. Moving quickly, its lead units were almost tothe border before US Marine outposts spotted them. The ma-rines called in air support and began to decimate the attackingelements.23

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184

port of the now marauding teams throughout the area of opera-tions. NVGs made them especially effective at night.58

The efforts of the British SAS and the US JSOTF paid dra-matic dividends. Since the Scud launches began 18 January,the Iraqis had launched 29 missiles from the western desert. After 7 February, they only launched 11 more, and two of thosefell harmlessly into the desert.59

Flying support for the operation kept the helicopter crews of SOCCENT busy. Still, at no time did it keep them from havinghelicopters on alert at several locations for combat recovery.60

The dual tasking was at times confusing to the aircrews.Capt Paul Harmon explained that often crews on rescue alert

were kept busy planning for SOF support missions. “One of thethings that I think is important—even though we were tasked with other missions, we never came off alert,” he noted. “Wemight have been pulling CSAR alert when we were doing plan-ning cells. That’s one of the gross misconceptions over the last 10 years, [that we] were too busy doing these other things, that we didn’t have time to do CSAR. [It’s] not the case.”61

Subsequently, he and the other Pave Low crews flew support missions for the JSOTF operations in western Iraq but werealways on alert for combat recovery. In some cases, this meant

that crews had to violate crew rest rules. When faced with com-plaints, 20th SOS commander Colonel Comer granted “squad-ron internal waivers,” knowing full well that what he was doing was clearly illegal. But war was war.62

9 February

I064/M014 – Jump 57/AV-8, USMC

On his 17th combat mission, Capt Russell Sanborn was hit

by what appeared to be a heat-seeking missile as his flight of two AV-8s attacked an artillery battery in Kuwait.63 He was the

wingman in the flight. His flight lead was the Marine Air Group(MAG) 13 commander, Col John Bioty.

When the missile slammed into the AV-8, the aircraft flippedover and entered a spiral. Realizing that the aircraft was no lon-ger flyable, Sanborn ejected. Upon landing he quickly spread out his orange and white canopy so aircraft above could spot his

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sources determined that Sweet had been captured and Phylishad been killed.8

These were not the only enemy successes that day. They hadfired a total of eight observed heat-seeking missiles. Another struck the aircraft of the A-10 wing commander himself. His air-craft was severely damaged, but he was able to fly home. Cross-ing the border he noticed a flight of F-16s hitting targets just north of the line. Returning to base, he called Glosson and chal-lenged the efficacy of sending the A-10s deep and the F-16s shal-low when the F-16s were much more capable of surviving in thehigh-threat areas. Glosson took the matter to Horner, who de-cided to restrict the A-10s to targets along the border. Addition-

ally, he directed that they had to stay above 10,000 feet and not use the 30 mm gun. This dramatically decreased their effective-ness, but it also reduced the loss rate. Besides, the F-111s werenow flying in the area steadily, and their tank plinking was dra-matically reducing the number of usable Iraqi tanks.9

16 February

I077 – UH-60, US Army

The aircraft was on a routine resupply mission and crashed60 miles southeast of Rafha.10 The Army RCC responded andsent a recovery aircraft. The crew was recovered uninjured. This was a noncombat loss.11

17 February

Since early February, targets in the Baghdad area had only been attacked by cruise missiles. When a missile was capturedon CNN video being shot down, General Powell ordered the ces-

sation of all daytime cruise missile launches. Combined withthe restrictions on F-117 missions, this meant that targets inthe Baghdad area were no longer being hit.12

Coalition air units had also targeted Iraqi bridges, but there was never a sustained interdiction campaign that came close tomatching the effort being put forth to destroy the enemy unitsin Kuwait. The focus of the interdiction was to isolate the bat-tlefield.

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were able to actually preplan the mission, only pausing for last-minute updates before launching for the recovery. A postwar report explained how basically simple this was using GPS. It said that, “with start and end points available to the user, navi-gation could be accomplished without the need for charts or observation of any object or reference point other than the re-ceiver display.”34 The key was in having a known “end point.”

The absolute value of GPS was also highlighted in another small incident that, in the larger swirl of the war, was probably not noted by anybody at the command level. It occurred on a Navy SEAL mission that took place off the coast of Kuwait at roughly the same time as the Balwanz mission. The small teamhad completed its tasks and was awaiting extraction. As therecovery vehicle approached, the team inadvertently dropped a valuable piece of equipment into the water. They could not de-lay their pickup to retrieve it. Instead, they marked the position with their GPS receiver. The next night, using their GPS for navigation, they slipped back in and recovered it. The report went on to state that, “The [SEAL] team’s vulnerability to expo-sure (surveillance or fire) was directly reduced by GPS naviga-tion accuracy.”35

It was a simple act, a small footnote to a much larger war.But these two events showed the potential that GPS offered for safely recovering isolated personnel behind enemy lines.

Notes

1. Murray Williamson with Wayne Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf

(Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1996),

204.

2. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log, DS box, Joint Personnel Re-

covery Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, n.d. [hereafter USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/

Mission Log].

3. Stan Morse, ed., “Gulf Air War Debrief” (hereafter GAWD), World Air Power Journal (London, UK: Aerospace Publishing, 1991), 227; and Charles

Allen, Thunder and Lightning: The RAF in the Gulf: Personal Experiences of

War (London, UK: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1991), 117.

4. Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword (Washing-

ton, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), 197.

5. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.

6. Robert J. Sweet, oral history interview (Colorado Springs, CO: Air Force

Academy, 28 June 1991).

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Headquarters elements were to lead so forces could be quickly reconstituted as they moved north of the Euphrates River.30

At the TACC, General Glosson personally called the 4thFighter Wing. He wanted to get its F-15Es into this battle.Speaking directly with the vice wing commander, he orderedhim to get 12 aircraft airborne as soon as possible and up tothe Basra area. The aircraft had just returned from night mis-sions and needed to be rearmed and refueled. The crews were beyond their legal limits for crew rest. Glosson waived that andtold them to fly, noting to himself that the poor weather and oilfires would force them to work dangerously low. Privately, heexpected as many as three would be shot down.31

The American press learned of the jammed highway andnamed it the “highway of death.” In fact, few people were actu-ally killed there, but the spectacle of the uncounted wreckedand burned vehicles became a metaphor for the fate of theIraqi army.32

To the east, the 1st Marine Division steadily advanced toward the Kuwait International Airport and then Kuwait City itself. After destroying another Iraqi armored force, they se-cured the outskirts of the city. Then they coordinated with theSaudi and Qatari forces of JFC-E and the Egyptian forces in

JFC-N to allow their units to pass through the Marine lines andenter Kuwait City in the van of coalition forces.33

To the west, VII Corps had gotten off to a slow start and wasnot through the barriers at sunrise. After some heated phonecalls, the pace of VII Corps picked up as their heavy unitspressed through the gates cut in the Iraqi defenses. Enemy forces began to react. A large force was detected advancing west toward the town of Al Busayyah. The leading element of VIICorps was the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). They slammed into enemy forces near the town and, after calling in

A-10s and other fighter aircraft, destroyed them.34 Following the 2d ACR was the 1st Armored Division. It as-

saulted the town and, after an all-night battle, secured it andits huge munitions storage area the next morning.35

On the right the other divisions of the corps were in ever-increasing contact with enemy units. Some surrendered. Many did not. To the right of the VII Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division was the strategic reserve for CENTCOM. It was initially assigned

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26 February

In the early morning hours, Marine helicopters lifted off theamphibious assault ships USS Nassau, Guam , and Iwo Jima to conduct feint operations against Iraqi units located on is-lands at the northern end of the Gulf. Escorted by AV-8s off the same ships and A-6s from larger aircraft carriers, they at-tacked enemy units to support the feint. While in the area, thepilots reported an increasing flow of vehicles moving north out of Kuwait.41

Far to the west, elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps hadmoved into the Euphrates River valley and were turning east to

attack along Highway 8. With massive air support, the 24thInfantry Division seized the major Iraqi airfields at Tallil and Jalibah. Its powerful armored forces then continued east asthe left flank of the entire operation. To their right the 101st Airborne Division was moving its forces forward and preparingfor large air assault operations toward Basra.

To the south the VII Corps with its four heavy divisions andan armored cavalry regiment was beginning to turn east andattack into the heart of the Iraqi force. Throughout the day andnight its forces would destroy, piecemeal, several Iraqi armor

and infantry divisions in sharp battles with heavy support from A-10s, F-16s, and AC-130s.42

That afternoon General Schwarzkopf received a call fromGeneral Powell, who had become concerned at the tone of worldpress since the coalition forces had begun destroying the Iraqiarmy. The JCS chairman told the CENTCOM commander that a cease-fire was being discussed in many quarters. Schwarz-kopf called his commanders and told them to speed up their attacks against the Republican Guard and begin planning waysto bring the combat to an end.43

As the enemy forces fled from southern Kuwait, the units were crowded into an ever-shrinking area around Al Basra.Both air and ground commanders wanted to get at them, but there were some complications. The weather was terrible. Low clouds and billowing thunderstorms continued to hang over the area, and the smoke from the oil fires just made it worse.

The enemy forces may have been retreating, but they weremaintaining some unit cohesion and were still heavily armed

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High above and a few miles to the north, the four F-16s of Mutt flight arrived over the assigned coordinates. The flight lead, Capt Bill Andrews, flying his 35th combat mission, split his flight and took his number two man down below the cloudsand smoke to look for targets. Scanning through the smokeand haze, Andrews did not see anything that appeared lucra-tive. As he added power to climb back above the clouds, hisaircraft was wracked by a violent explosion. Andrews saw warn-ing lights illuminate in the cockpit. He could see a bright yellow glow in his rearview mirror and knew that his aircraft was onfire. As it pitched over and started to dive at the ground, he

ejected.

54

Descending in his parachute, Andrews took out his emer-gency radio and made several panicked calls as he driftedthrough the smoke of the raging battle below. Captain Fitzsim-mons heard him loud and clear. His response was automatic:

I stuck my nose up and responded. I didn’t know how close Andrews was. I could hear him well on the radio. . . . Somebody came on theradio and gave a bulls eye call, “Randolph 200 degrees for whatever it

was.” I whipped out my smart pack and found Randolph, punched inthe coordinates in the INS and according to the INS, I was pretty close.So I just started heading north thinking that I could help him out. What

I did not know was that the line of tanks that I was working over only extended about 3 or 4 miles to the north. He was about 12 miles north. As the tanks moved east they weren’t, I don’t know if they were securingtheir flank or what, but as I went more than about 4 miles north, I was

back in enemy territory, but I did not know it. . . . I was at about 2,500to 3,000 feet. I got hold of him [Andrews]. He was in his chute, near “thefactory,” which was an F-16 geo-reference point. It was unknown to me.He said that he was coming down just north, just west of the factory.55

Hanging in his parachute, Andrews winced as large-caliber rounds from the numerous AAA guns flew past him. As heneared the ground, that firing stopped, only to be replaced by

the whizzing of rifle bullets. Andrews hit the ground hard and broke his right leg. He re-leased his parachute and watched several Iraqi soldiers runtowards him. Several were firing their AK-47s. He laid down hisradio and raised his hands. They stopped firing. Fitzsimmonsflew overhead, unaware of Andrews’ situation.

When the soldiers were about 30 feet away, Andrews saw a SAM being fired behind them. It was tracking the OA-10 flown

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234

for site security.80 All were totally pumped up at the thought of performing a rescue. Major Cornum later wrote, “This was thereal thing, combat search and rescue. There was no missionthat we trained for that was more important, more exciting, or more dangerous. My heart beat faster, and my stomach tight-ened. This was it. We were doing it for real.”81

When everybody was ready, Bengal 15 flight lifted off. Garvey contacted AWACS, and the controllers began giving them vec-tors to the survivor’s location. The crew did not contact the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan, who had been

listening to the F-16 pilot as he descended in his parachute.Bryan had a unit plan for such pickups and could have rendezvoused with them for a larger effort.

While these preparatory events were taking place at Viper, inthe skies over Andrews’ position, AWACS had started divertingstrike flights for the CSAR. One of the first was a flight of four F-16s, also from the 10th TFS. It was led by Capt Mark Hebein.Checking in, the forward air controller, Nail 51, asked him to go

The crew of Bengal 15 included, left to right, CW3 Gary Godfrey, CW3 Phil Gar-

vey, SGT Dan Stamaris, and SGT William Butts.

Photo courtesy of Bill Bryan

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236

flight. Additionally, his radar warning receiver was barking at him constantly as new SAM sites tried to track their aircraft.

Captain Day took his flight down below the weather. They broke into the “clear” at about 8,000 feet. “Clear,” though, wasa relative term. In actuality, the visibility below the clouds wasabysmal because of the oil fires and burning wreckage. As they cleared the clouds, the enemy gunners and SAM site operatorsspotted them and took them under constant fire. After franti-cally searching, Captain Day found what he thought was the wreckage. Pointer 75 told him that AWACS had said that a he-licopter would be approaching from the west for a rescue at-tempt. Captain Day decided to attack anything that they could

find extending west from the target area. Both men then droppedtheir CBUs and bombs on several targets. This was done with-out any apparent coordination with the elements of the 24thInfantry Division that were just west of the survivor’s locationand were, in fact, being overflown by Bengal 15. With their ord-nance expended and now critically short on fuel, the two F-18sdeparted the area. Captain Day checked out with Pointer. Healso informed him that the area was much too hot for a rescueattempt and recommended that they not try it.83

Back below the clouds, the flight of helicopters headed for the

downed pilot. The Black Hawk was faster and moved into thelead. The Apache pilots had their aircraft at maximum power but steadily fell behind. They used the turns to close on theBlack Hawk.

AWACS initially took the flight north. With no coordination,they were taken through the sector of the 24th Infantry Divi-sion. They overflew its lead unit, the 2d Battalion of the 7th, a mechanized infantry unit that was in contact with enemy forces. The visibility was poor due to all the oil fires and burning en-emy vehicles.

The AWACS controllers turned them east to approach thesurvivor’s location. As they neared the enemy lines, the flight began to take fire from enemy positions. Just then, the AWACScontroller told them that they were “entering a red zone,” andseveral larger-caliber weapons firing green tracers opened upon them. One of the Black Hawk pilots called, “Taking fire! Nineo’clock! Taking fire!” Simultaneously, several rounds slammedinto Bengal 15. That was immediately followed by a plaintive

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call from the stricken helicopter, “Don’t put the rotor in theground. Don’t put the rotor in the ground, Phil!” The fatally

wounded aircraft pitched forward and crashed into an earthen berm. Landing nose first, the aircraft dug into the soft sandand flipped over. Five on board were killed in the explosion. Within moments Iraqi soldiers were upon the surviving three, who were now prisoners.84

Killed: CW4 Philip Garvey

CW3 Robert Godfrey

SFC William Butts

SGT Roger Brelinski

SSG Patbouvier OrtizCaptured: MAJ Rhonda Cornum

SSG Daniel Stamaris

SP4 Troy Dunlap

The enemy guns also found the Apaches. One of them washit, with damage to the left engine nacelle and fuselage. Cap-tain Thome watched the Black Hawk roll up in flames.85

MAJ Rhonda Cornum, flight surgeon for the 2d/229, was captured when Bengal

15 was shot down. She is shown in an earlier photo with an unidentified Kuwaiti

officer.

Photo courtesy of Bill Bryan

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239

Had I been there when this mission came up, the first thing I wouldhave done would be to insist on knowing something about the ground

situation. That information was non-existent because of the “rout.” But what WAS known was that the Iraqis had shot down an F-16, the pilot had ejected and was talking on his radio going down . . . and the Iraqis

were shooting at him in his chute. Knowing these facts (or lack of them) would have led me to conclude that the pilot had either survived and was now a POW or he was dead—murdered by Iraqi cowards who shot him before he hit the ground or shortly thereafter.

For me the next decision would have been easy. I would not put another 3–4 aircraft and 10–15 of America’s sons and daughters at risk! Some

would scoff at that but I remain firmly convinced that that rationale was valid then and is valid today.

CSAR is like any other military mission. It takes planning, coordination,

and resources. Because we are dealing with life and death here andextreme urgency, many overlook the planning, coordination and re-source requirement.90

In the JRCC, Maj John Steube shared the same thought when he remembered that, “People just wanted to get this guy. They stopped thinking about what the consequences were for the people who had to go in there. It cost a bunch of peopletheir lives.”91

The day was not over. With all units now in heavy action,more losses were almost inevitable.

I088 – Avenger 11/AH-64, US Army

The aircraft went down because of fuel starvation. The Army RCC dispatched a task force to recover the crew and aircraft, but the crew had been killed.92

I089 – Cyclops 47 and 48/2 OV-1s, US Army

The two aircraft could not safely land at Hafra Al Batin whenthe runway lights went out.93 One aircraft crashed on the runway. The other crew did not have enough fuel to divert to another airfield and ejected a few miles from the base. The Army RCCdispatched helicopters. Two crew members were wounded.94

Throughout the night, the forces of VII and XVIII Corps con-tinued to attack into the Iraqi units. The battles were fierce andone-sided. Iraqi units were destroyed piecemeal with minimalcoalition casualties.

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240

In Washington President Bush convened a meeting of his topsecurity advisors to determine when to end the war. Ever so-

licitous of the opinions of his military leaders, he asked Gen-eral Powell for his opinion. The general replied that GeneralSchwarzkopf had indicated to him that he needed just a few more hours to achieve his assigned goals. After asking all theothers present for their views and reviewing the political situa-tion, he realized that the decision was his to make. With that the president determined that the cease-fire would take effect at 0500Z/0800L on the next day, 28 February.

That evening the president addressed the nation. Proudly, heannounced: “Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army is defeated. Our

military objectives are met. . . . At midnight tonight, EasternStandard Time, exactly 100 hours since ground operationscommenced and six weeks since the start of DESERT STORM,all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensivecombat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension onthe part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.”95

But there were still a few hours to go. As the fighting contin-ued, in the TACC, General Glosson got permission to hit a few more targets in the Baghdad area. Concerned that Saddam andhis family might try to flee, he had aircraft at several airfields

around the capital destroyed. He added some previously un-identified nuclear sites to the target list.

Getting the missions, the F-117 pilots were concerned. They had heard the president’s speech. With the end near, nobody wanted to be the last casualty. Additionally, bad weather hadmoved into the Baghdad area. This would force them to maketheir bomb runs at much lower altitudes. So far, no F-117s had been lost.

That last night though, their luck almost changed. One F-117had its bomb bay door stick open after bomb release. The inte-

rior metal was not shielded with the special ablative paint andpresented a radar return. An SA-3 SAM suddenly locked on tothe aircraft and launched a missile. Fortunately, the pilot wasable to get the door closed before the missile could hit the air-craft. Another F-117 flying at lower altitude was almost hit by AAA.96

In the last hours of combat, four B-52s and an F-16 weredamaged by Iraqi air defenses, but there were no more losses.

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241

Avenger and Cyclops were the last recorded incidents prior to

the cease-fire at 0800L on 28 February.97

As hostilities ended, rescue forces were still standing alert at

several locations. The JRCC showed the following recovery as-

sets available:

RSAF – 20

US Navy – 10 (SOCCENT)

US Army – 12 (SOCCENT)

USAF – 25 (SOCCENT)

FAF – 2

RAF – 198

The next day, a task force from the 2d/7th Infantry Battalion

of the 24th Infantry Division moved forward and secured the

Bengal 15 crash site. They found the remains of the five sol-

diers killed and indications that the rest of the troops had been

taken prisoner. Later that day, LTC Bill Bryan of the 2d/229th

Attack Battalion was able to fly into the site and help recover

the bodies of his men.99

Very quickly, the JRCC started working with CENTCOM to

identify crash sites so that other teams could move in and se-cure them too—at least in those areas where coalition ground

forces were in control. Three days later, General Schwarzkopf

met with Iraqi military commanders at the Safwan Airfield to

review the terms and conditions of the cease-fire. Item one was

the return of all coalition POWs and bodies. There would be no

repeat of the lingering national wounds of the MIAs from South-

east Asia. By 6 March, all coalition POWs were returned.

Then the forces started going home. Desert Storm was over.

Notes

1. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The

Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1994),

245.

2. Ibid., 340.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 348.

5. Ibid., 349.

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242

6. History, 3d Marine Air Wing (3 MAW), Marine Attack Squadron, VMA-542, Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1 January–28 Febru-

ary 1991.7. Dale B. Cooper, “Young Guns, Harrier Pilots in the Persian Gulf,” Sol-

dier of Fortune , May 1991, 52.8. History, 3 MAW, 145.

9. CDR Patrick Sharrett et al., “GPS Performance: An Initial Assessment,”Navigation Journal 39, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 411.

10. Michael R. Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and

the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002),chapter 5.

11. Williamson Murray with Wayne Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America,

1996), 276.

12. “Desert Storm, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 1991,” Military History Magazine , April 1992, 147.

13. Barry D. Smith, “Tim Bennett’s War,” Air Force Magazine , January 1993.

14. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 286.15. History, 3 MAW, 151.

16. Ibid., 152.17. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 362.

18. Ibid., 379.19. Lt Col Charles H. Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–

1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Wash-

ington, DC: History and Museums Division HQ USMC, 1993), 93–95.

20. Ibid.21. History, 3 MAW, 159.22. This was not logged on the USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.

23. Col John Bioty Jr., interview by the author, 6 January 2000.24. Dale B. Cooper, “Young Guns,” 52.

25. History, VMA-542; History, 3 MAW, 161; and Capt John Walsh, inter-

view by the author, 6 October 2000.26. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log, DS box, Joint Personnel Re-

covery Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, n.d. (hereafter USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log).

27. Robert Dorr, “POWs in Iraq Survived Thanks to Training, Courage,Faith,” Naval Aviation News , May–June 1991, 6.

28. History, 3 MAW, Marine Observation Squadron 1 (VMO-1) (Washing-ton, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1 January–28 February 1991).

29. Col Charles J. Quilter II, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991:

The Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (hereafter History, MEF) ( Washington, DC: HQ USMC, History and Museums Division,

1993), 88; and History, 3 MAW, 166. 30. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 369.

31. Ibid., 370.32. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 288.

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243

33. History, MEF, 102.34. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 386.

35. Ibid., 385.36. This was not logged on the USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.

37. MAJ Kevin Smith, United States Army Aviation during Operations Des-

ert Shield and Desert Storm (Fort Rucker, AL: US Army Aviation Center,

1993), 93.38. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.

39. Message, JRCC A/R 251430Z, FEB 1991.

40. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 387.41. Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword (Wash-

ington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), 297.42. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 393.

43. Ibid., 396.

44. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 292–94.45. Capt Scott Fitzsimmons, interview by the author, 28 February 2002.

46. Lt Col Craig Mays, interview by the author, 22 March 2001.47. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.

48. History, 3 MAW, 166.49. ARCENT G-3 Aviation After Action Report (Fort Rucker, AL: 5 April

1991).50. Ibid.

51. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.52. Fitzsimmons, interview.

53. Ibid.

54. William F. Andrews, Oral History Interview (Colorado Springs, CO: US

Air Force Academy, (USAFA), 25 September 1991).55. Fitzsimmons, interview.56. Ibid.

57. Capt Bill Andrews, USAFA oral history. Note: Capt Andrews wasawarded the Air Force Cross for his actions on that day.

58. Fitzsimmons, interview.

59. Capt Gerry Stophel, interview by the author, 21 February 2002.60. Capt John Steube, interview by the author, 9 January 2002.

61. Maj Lornie Palmgren, interview by the author, 2 May 2001.62. Col George Gray, interview by the author, 3 May 2001.

63. Gray, interview; and e-mails by the author and Jim Blackwood on 25February and 14 March 2002.

64. Lt Col Joe Hampton, interview by the author, 12 March 2000; andSteube, interview.

65. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 412; and Maj Mason Carpenter, Joint Operations in the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air-power Studies, Air University, February 1995), 61.

66. Hampton, interview; and Durham, interview.67. CW2 Steve Rogers, interview by the author, 2 May 2001.

68. James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire: The History of Army Attack

Aviation (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 206.

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244

69. Rogers, interview.70. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire , 208.

71. Ibid.72. MAJ Mike Rusho, interview by the author, 10 April 2001.73. Edward M. Flanagan Jr., Lightning: The 101st in the Gulf War (Wash-

ington, DC: Brassey’s Press, 1993), 211.74. Lt Col Richard Comer, interview by the author, 19 July 2000.75. lLT Al Flood, interview by the author, 15 January 2001; and e-mail

from Al Flood to the author, 22 April 2002.76. Ibid.77. Ibid.78. E-mail from LTC Bill Bryan to the author, 12 March 2002.79. CPT Mike Thome, interview by the author, 14 July 2000.80. MAJ Rhonda Cornum, interview by the author, 20 February 2001.

81. MAJ Rhonda Cornum with Peter Copeland, She Went to War: The Rhonda Cornum Story (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 7.

82. Mark Hebein, interview by the author, 25 July 2001.83. Jay A. Stout, Hornets over Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute

Press, 1997), 219–23; and History, 3 MAW, 166.84. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire , 211.85. Thome, interview.86. Ibid.87. Rogers, interview.88. Stout, Hornets over Kuwait , 219–23; and History, 3 MAW, 166.89. Hebein, interview.90. Bryan, e-mail.

91. Steube, interview.92. Message, JRCC A/R 281430Z.93. USCENTAF/JRCC Incident/Mission Log.94. Message, JRCC A/R 281430Z.95. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword , 305.96. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 410.97. Perry D. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti

Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: AF History and Museums Program,US G.P.O., 2001), 160.

98. USCENTCOM/JRCC (Colorado Springs, CO: USAFA, Report for 28February 1991).

99. Col Chuck Ware, USA, retired, phone conversation with the author, 21

January 2002.


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Chapter 8

Postscript

The magic compass

—Nickname given to GPS receivers by Arab ground commanders

Desert Storm was a short but violent conflict. In just 43 days,coalition forces destroyed Iraq’s air force, a major portion of its

army, and a large portion of the national infrastructure. Most importantly, they forced Saddam to pull his forces out of Kuwait.Our losses were relatively few, with 43 aircraft lost in combat.

Numerous potential loss incidents occurred throughout theconflict. JRCC personnel worked tirelessly to resolve every re-port and account for all aircraft and crews. For example, on 17 January, a signals intelligence agency reported an F-16 down. The JRCC controllers on duty called every F-16 unit in-theater to verify that all of their aircraft had safely returned from theday’s missions. This was a routine and thankless task, but vi-

tally necessary to account for all aircraft and personnel.Given the total number of sorties flown, there were relatively

few CSARs. What can be learned from this conflict? The recordsuggests the following:

1. The theater of operations was a challenging one for

CSAR.

First of all, the area was mostly barren, affording little cover for evaders to exploit or for low-flying aircraft to terrain-mask.

The terrain in the theater (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait) was

a critical factor in this conflict. From the perspective of a shot-down airman, most of the terrain was flat or gently rolling, withalmost no vegetation and nearly as hard as stone. This was inmarked contrast to our experiences in Southeast Asia where somuch of the area was covered in thick, triple-canopy jungle that afforded an evader excellent opportunity to hide if necessary.

This directly affected the survivors. As Col Ben Orrell pointedout, “Those guys over there—when they get shot down, they’re

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standing out in the middle of a thousand miles of flat ground. There’s no hiding.”1

One British SAS trooper inserted into Iraq noted that, “Theground beneath us was dead flat and consisted of hard-bakedclay, . . . and under that lay solid rock. There was no loose ma-terial with which to fill our sand bags.”2

Both crew members of Slate 46, Lieutenants Jones and Slade,mentioned that they had a difficult time digging even smalltrenches in which they could recline. Several other survivorssaid that when they landed on the ground, there was just no- where to hide.

There were a few exceptions. In northeast Iraq, there were

some spectacular mountains, but no significant combat took place there. There were also some salt marshes along the Ku- waiti coast and one significant ridgeline just west of Kuwait City. And in the west, there were some valleys and wadis.

But for these exceptions, the terrain was generally level,sandy, and hard. This was great for interdiction, close air sup-port, and the maneuver of mechanized forces, but not the best for downed airmen trying to hide.3

It was also a challenge to the helicopter rescue crews. Colo-nel Orrell explained, “In Vietnam, you had trees to protect you,

hills and valleys. The stuff up there [Iraq] was just flat. They could see you coming from 100 miles away.”4

The helicopter pilots talked of feeling naked as they flew over the vast expanses of the desert. Most felt compelled to fly as low as 10 feet to get any advantage at all from any irregularities inthe terrain. That would afford them some protection from en-emy threats, but also made it hard for them to electronically contact survivors.

The Iraqis took advantage of the openness. Knowing that we would try to rescue our aircrews, they sent fast-moving roving

patrols over vast stretches to capture our men or ambush our helicopters.5

Secondly, the weather was harsh, and the local populace wasgenerally supportive of Saddam. At this time of the year it wasalso extremely cold. Several British commandos were killedfrom exposure due to the cold temperatures, constant winds,and lack of cover. Additionally, the local people could not betrusted. Said one British officer, “You meet a Bedouin and you

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have got a fifty percent chance he is going to turn you in.”6 Maj Jeff Tice (Stroke 65) discovered this firsthand.

Additionally, Saddam published to his people a standing reward of $35,000 for the capture and presentation of any coali-tion airmen or soldiers to the Iraqi police or military. This wasa fortune to most indigenous Iraqi people and strong incentiveto most to comply.7

Thirdly, Iraqi air defenses were extensive and lethal. Iraq hadone of the most sophisticated and intense air defense systemsin the world. Composed of radars and communication equip-ment from several countries, it had almost 4,000 radar-directedSAMs, 7,500 heat-seeking SAMs, 972 fixed AAA sites, and over 8,500 AAA guns. Additionally, every tank and armored person-nel carrier had at least one machine gun, and every troop hada rifle.8 In toto, the skies of Iraq were a dangerous environment for coalition airmen.

2. This conflict reinforced the fundamental truth that the

best CSAR device is to not get your aircraft shot down in the first place.

Given the realities of the theater noted above, this was a challenge, and some of the initial projections were that the co-

alition aerial forces would suffer horrendous losses. It did not happen. Several things helped to enable this.Stealth Technology . The investments made in the 1980s in

stealth technology paid off. No F-117s were shot down. They flew most of the missions into the most heavily defended areas.Brig Gen Buster Glosson noted, “As a result of our stealth tech-nology, the Iraqis fired their AAA weapons at aircraft noise, not a visual or radar target.”9

On 17 January F-117s attacked targets in Baghdad and suf-fered zero losses. More importantly, only one pilot per attack-

ing aircraft was put at risk. Contrast this with a large packagethat attacked the Al Taqaddum Airfield that same day. Thirty-two F-16s dropped bombs supported by four EF-111s, eight F-4Gs, and 16 F-15s for MiG CAP. Seventy-two aircrewmenrisked their lives in that one raid.10

Precision Weapons. The revolution in precision weapons was also a large factor. The ability to guide a single weapon todestroy a target instead of having to send numerous aircraft to

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try to hit it meant, quite simply, that fewer aircraft and air-crews were put at risk. The historical trends in weaponry areclear. In World War II, B-17s had a CEP (circular error probable—a statistical term meaning the radius from the target in which 50 percent of the bombs would fall) of 3,300 feet. To en-sure the destruction of a specific target, 9,070 bombs had to bedropped. That required several hundred aircraft, each with a crew of 10 men. By the time of Desert Storm, an attack aircraft using laser-guided bombs had a CEP of 10 feet and could claimalmost a 100 percent certainty of destroying the target whilerequiring just a few men.11

Better yet were the cruise missiles. Essentially unmanned air-

craft, they could attack and destroy targets without putting any coalition aircrews at risk. Noted one campaign planner, “We usedthose weapons because . . . it seemed the logical thing to do.Plain and simple . . . it saved lives. If we had lost a half-dozen A-6s attacking those targets, it would have been unforgivable.”12

Global Positioning System. The impact of the GPS on Des-ert Storm is just now being recognized. While not yet fully op-erational in 1991, the 16 satellites in orbit at the beginning of hostilities gave the coalition forces precision navigation capability for up to 22 hours per day. Unheralded are the efforts of

USSPACECOM in general and the 2d Satellite Control Squad-ron in particular to keep the system functioning throughout the conflict, especially when three satellites suffered mechani-cal problems at various times and were in danger of losing their ability to transmit accurate signals.

Once the system was in place and a common reference da-tum had been applied, it gave our forces the ability to movethroughout the theater quickly and accurately. It also providedour reconnaissance and intelligence forces—specifically theRC-135, AWACS, and E-8 Joint STARS aircraft—the ability to

precisely determine the location of almost anything observableto 10-meter accuracy.13

The 72 Block 40 F-16C/Ds sent to the Gulf were noted for their bombing accuracy. GPS, combined with other highly spe-cialized sensor pods on the aircraft, enabled them to accurately bomb day and night in all kinds of weather. All in all, GPS wasone of the great enablers of our victory in Desert Storm and islabeled by many as “the unsung hero of the Gulf War.”14

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General Horner recognized this when he said, “During DES-ERT STORM, we used the Global Positioning System to solve thesoldiers’ most nagging battlefield problem—where am I? . . . While Iraqi forces were confined to charted roads and trails, Co-alition forces had the run of the field. If you moved, or were inanything that moved in-theater, you wanted GPS with you.”15

Electronic Warfare. The investments made in the area of electronic warfare—like the creation of the F-4G Wild Weaselfleet; the creation of the EF-111 fleet; electronic jamming podslike the ALQ-119, -131, -184, and -135; and the new antiradia-tion missiles—also paid off. It gave the coalition forces the abil-ity to suppress the highly sophisticated Iraqi defenses to the

point where aircraft could operate at medium levels with rela-tive impunity.

Most aircraft were also equipped with the latest versions of radar-warning receivers (RWR). These devices could pick upenemy radar signals, thus warning the crews that they were being tracked by enemy radars. Such critical warning gavethem a tremendous advantage in reacting to the threat.

Discussing the low losses, Horner said, “I would have to say it’s one of the highlights of the war, especially if you look at thenumber of sorties we flew and the intensity of the air defenses.

Our losses to surface-to-air missiles were something like tenplanes.” Horner went on to explain the value of area-jammingaircraft, “like the Air Force EF-111 and the Navy EA-6B, whichpour electrons into the enemy’s target-acquisition radars so he just doesn’t know where you’re coming from.”16

But the airmen still had to deal with the guns. As one vet-eran of Desert Storm wrote, “USAF electronic superiority al-lowed air supremacy to be quickly achieved above 10,000 feet, but the numerous Iraqi AAA pieces and shoulder-fired surfaceto air missiles denied low-risk operations at lower altitudes.”17

There is just no way to calculate how many aircraft were not shot down because they could stay high.

Night Exploitation. Tremendous advances in night-visiontechnology and techniques allowed coalition forces to operatealmost unrestricted at night. As one British pilot noted, “Thefirst air strikes were to be carried out at night because of thesuperior night vision capabilities of the coalition aircraft. . . . It hid air activity on an enormous scale.”18

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Enemy gunners had a low probability of hitting what they could not see. This was another way of avoiding the AAA.Equipped with the latest generation of night-vision goggles, thePave Low crews in particular were able to take advantage of this night capability.

Tactical Innovation. The airmen leading the coalition air effort showed great tactical flexibility. General Horner told hisstaff and the men in the TACC, “If you have a good idea about tactics or target selection or things of that nature, they are always welcome. . . . [There are] no bad ideas here. . . . Everybody has experience in one form or another in tactical aviation and we need to talk to one another about it.”19 For example, “Poobah’sParty” was a brilliant operation that had a direct and decisiveeffect on the air campaign.

At several points the commanders were quick to adjust op-erations to increase effectiveness and avoid casualties. The re-strictions on large-package attacks against Baghdad-area tar-gets and the altitude restrictions were prime examples.

During the first three days of combat operations, one of theprimary targets was the Iraqi air defense system. As that was being attacked, coalition losses were significant, with 17 fixed-

wing aircraft downed, but the campaign was a success. OneF-4G Wild Weasel pilot noted, “Our mission was accomplishedin the first 48 hours of the war, especially that first night at Baghdad. We went in and destroyed so many of their surface toair missile/radar sites that they had a healthy respect for HARMs and Weasels. They were real hesitant to turn on their radars. After that, we basically just had to show up. They [Iraqiradar operators] would stay off the air when they knew we werepresent. They knew our call signs.”20

In the last week, when the ground campaign was being con-

ducted and all aircrews were instructed by the JFACC to “do what was necessary” to provide close air support, eight aircraft were lost.21

The British were also adept at changing their tactics. After the horrific losses suffered by their Tornado pilots on the dan-gerous but so necessary airfield attacks, they re-roled their air-craft and crews to operate in the medium-altitude regime. They lost only one more aircraft after that.

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The AFSOC helicopter crews were also adaptive. They pre-ferred, and intended, to do their rescue work at night. But whenshoot downs occurred during the day, they quickly adapted todaylight work as part of a rescue task force, as seen with theSlate 46 recovery. To reduce response time, they would, in cer-tain instances, launch to the border or hold in a safe area whilethe search process proceeded.

Training. In the 1970s, the USAF Tactical Air Commandstarted a continuing series of “Flag” exercises. Red Flag was the best known. Conducted on the massive weapons ranges northof Las Vegas, Nevada, these exercises were initially designed togive each young fighter pilot his first 10 combat sorties in a forgiving environment where the price of failure was not death but learning.

One F-111 pilot said, “Training saved our lives. We trained for low and medium altitude war. . . . We fought like we trained.”22

A Wild Weasel pilot noted, “I had trained eight years for this.. . . When the SA-2 launched, I didn’t feel scared at all. I knew exactly what to do. The reason that we are all doing so well inthis war is the fact that we are all so well trained.”23

Red Flag helped the aircrews develop the critical situational

awareness necessary to quickly and accurately understand what was going on around them in any combat situation. That dramatically reduced losses and saved lives.24

But the exercises did more that just train the young pilots. They trained commanders, too. They provided them with theopportunity to experiment with new tactics and techniques. They allowed them to mix combinations of aircraft to see what worked and what didn’t. Red Flag was a giant laboratory for tactical tinkering, testing, and learning.

As Red Flag expanded, aircraft and crews from the Navy, Ma-

rines, and even the Army joined in, and the wealth of knowl-edge continued to expand. Eventually, even allies were in-cluded, and the experiments just grew.

There were others. Green Flag was just like Red Flag except the emphasis was on electronic warfare, specifically using Wild Weasels, EF-111s, and other electronic assets. Scenarios weredesigned so that they could practice and perfect their sophisti-cated electronic dances. It paid off over Iraq.

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There was Maple Flag where various US, Canadian, and other air forces came together at Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada, and took advantage of the vast expanses to stage huge war games. In BlueFlag at Hurlburt Field, Florida, commanders and their commandand control teams staged huge war games focused on ironingout the difficulties of trying to orchestrate such massive cam-paigns. The Internal Look exercise, where the Gulf War was pre-fought, was conducted at Blue Flag in the summer of 1990.

The author of the air campaign plan used in Desert Storm, Col John Warden, had predicted that overall losses would be about 40 aircraft. He stated that the Air Force (actually all joint andcombined aerial forces) would use mass, shock, and the destruc-tion of enemy command centers to gain air superiority and keepcasualties low. His prediction was the most accurate.25

Overall, the low loss rate reinforced a trend reaching back to World War II, where the loss rate (expressed as number of air-craft lost per sortie) was 1.0 percent.26 It dropped to .17 percent in the Korean conflict.27 In the war in Southeast Asia, the over-all loss rate was .081 percent.28 The Gulf War rate fell to .055percent.29 All of the investments in stealth technology, preci-sion weapons, and training had paid off.

3. Going into Desert Storm, Air Force CSAR capability had been dramatically reduced from the peak reached dur-ing the war in Southeast Asia.

Traditionally, the Air Force had been the primary supplier of air rescue capability, but between the Vietnam War and Desert Storm, this capability had been allowed to wane. This resultedfrom a series of force reductions, budget decisions, and reorga-nizations that culminated in the creation of the Special Opera-tions Command (SOCOM), which absorbed some Air Force res-cue elements. The Air Force leadership had taken steps to rectify

the situation by initiating a rebuilding program in the newly established Air Rescue Service (ARS) just prior to Desert Shield/Storm. The ARS mission statement clearly indicated that it hadCSAR responsibility worldwide, but it had only older assets of limited capability to perform the recovery part of the mission. The all-weather, night-capable helicopter that its predecessor had identified as critical to the mission after the war in South-east Asia had been taken away and given to the AFSOC. New

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helicopters were being procured but were only available in lim-ited numbers.

When the Klaxon rang for Desert Shield/Storm, the reconsti-tuted ARS was able to provide some personnel for command andcontrol (in the JRCC), but it had no force structure that couldsafely and reliably perform the combat recovery mission in high-threat areas. A provisional unit of HH-60s could have possibly been formed, but the ARS commander chose not to do so.

For this and other reasons, the mission passed to SOCCENT.Fortunately, there was a reservoir of individuals among the he-licopter and MC-130 crews in the AFSOC community that had

rescue experience. They were able to take the tasking and develop the capability for SOCCENT.Navy combat recovery capability had been moved almost

completely into its reserve component, but the two reserveunits were well trained and filled by earnest men who wouldanswer the call. When the Navy was granted authority by thepresident to recall reservists, activating and employing themmade a great deal of sense and added to SOCCENT’s combat rescue capability. They did not get any rescues, but did par-ticipate on numerous missions.

4. At the same time, the expectations among the flying crewsfor CSAR were very high.

This was based on the recorded history from Southeast Asia and war stories passed down by the veterans of that conflict tothe young troops in the Gulf. These expectations were rein-forced by specific comments of some senior Air Force officers.

The Vietnam generation of air warriors trained the Desert Storm crews. Around debriefing tables and bars from Korea toGermany, the “vets” inculcated the idea in the younger men

that if they were shot down, the “Jolly Green” would be there.It was almost an article of faith.But in the ’80s, the specter of war across the plains of Europe

caused a de-emphasis of CSAR. The crews realized that a war there would have been a war for survival, and the loss of wholesquadrons could be expected. In Europe there were no rescuesquadrons except for a unit in Iceland that was optimized for overwater rescue. The crews were taught that if downed, they

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were to evade to specific points. At specified times, SOF helicop-ters would fly by and pick up whoever was there.

Desert Storm was not a war for national survival. The crewssaw that a combat rescue force was in place, and six CSAR ex-ercises were conducted. So the old Vietnam stories were rein- vigorated.

As combat loomed, Brig Gen Buster Glosson personally went out to speak to the aircrews. From his experiences in the last days in Southeast Asia, he felt an obligation to look them all inthe eye and tell them why they were fighting. He told them that the nation was behind them. He told them that what they weredoing was important and talked them through the air cam-paign plan. But then he cautioned them to be careful. Thiscould last a while and we needed to husband our resources. Hesaid, “There is not a . . . thing in Iraq worth you dying for.”30 Healso told them that he would “stack helicopters on top of eachother,” to rescue them if they were shot down.31

This was an exact replay of the feelings among the aircrewsin the last days of the Vietnam War. As one squadron com-mander there told his young pilots, “Guys, there is nothingover here worth an American life.”32

Then the young captains from AFSOC went around and toldthem that if they got bagged, the rescue forces were coming— although with restrictions, and preferably at night. The history suggests that they also explained the necessary procedures.

One unit seemed to have gotten a different message. WhenGlosson visited the 4th Wing at Al Kharj, one young pilot remembered his saying that, “If you get shot down, you [won’t] have tospend the night. If it’s a night sortie, we’ll be in the next day to get you, but you are not going to spend 24 hours on the ground.”33

5. The non-rescue of an F-15E crew early in the conflict

caused a morale problem among the F-15E units. As the narrative of the Eberly and Griffith incident makes

clear, the men of the 4th Wing were dramatically affected by theloss of Corvette 03 early in the war. This was a bad time for them. Just two nights prior, they had lost a crew (T-Bird 56)near Basra. Additionally, they were being whipsawed from tar-get to target, often on the shortest of notice, as CENTAF tried toget a handle on the Scud missile dilemma. Such chaos was

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disconcerting to say the least. What is not clear is what specificCSAR briefings they were given before the war concerning loca-tion and authentication procedures or what classified intelli-gence they had available to them explaining the difficulty of getting rescue forces into that area of Corvette 03.

Colonel Gray at SOCCENT had what intelligence data wasavailable and had to make the difficult decision on whether or not to send a helicopter in for them. The British commandershad to wrestle with the same issue when their team, Bravo 20, was compromised and split up.

But the men of the 4th Wing were not privy to any of that.Consequently, the rumors spread that the AFSOC guys wouldnot go. Those feelings have made their way into the histories of the war and occasionally resurface in discussions about CSAR.

6. CENTAF did not have a quick, accurate, and reliable

way to locate downed airmen or discretely communicate

with them. There were several parts to this:

Obsolete Survival Radios. The PRC-90 survival radio most commonly issued to the aircrews—a holdover from the war inSoutheast Asia—was far too limited in its capabilities and tooeasily exploited by the enemy. It was rugged and durable, but

it was nothing more than a two-channel transmitter that couldalso transmit an emergency beacon signal. That signal waseasily tracked by anyone who had direction-finding gear andknew the two internationally identified frequencies. It had nodiscrete capabilities either for communication or position iden-tification. One planner at CENTCOM, LTC Pete Harvell, thought that the radio itself was a threat to the aircrews. He said, “Thepilot becomes his own worst nightmare in that by trying to sig-nal his position, he’s jeopardizing himself and whatever rescueforce could come to get him.”34

Apparently, the RAF crews were carrying survival radios which were tuned to different frequencies than those used/monitored by US crews and rescue forces. Several RAF crew-members mentioned that they made emergency calls or initi-ated their beacons with no response.

A new radio was available, the PRC-112, which had somediscrete communication and location capabilities. The SOF community and the Navy had bought some and had them in

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the Gulf region in limited numbers for their troops. The Air Force had chosen not to purchase them before the war.

Additionally, to fully utilize the PRC-112, search aircraft hadto be equipped with the DALS receivers to home in on the dis-crete signal it emitted. The Navy and AFSOC had installedDALS on their helicopters, but no service had installed it onany aircraft that could operate in a high-threat area. Two Navy fliers, LT Rob Wetzel (Quicksand 12 Alpha) and LT Larry Slade(Slate 46 Bravo), had PRC-112s when they went down. Wetzelleft his behind when he tried to evade. Lieutenant Slade appar-ently had radio problems. That was particularly unfortunate because an MH-53 was in the area looking for him and had his

discrete codes. After the debacle with Corvette 03, Brig Gen Dale Stovall, the

vice commander of AFSOC, personally called his counterpart at TAC and told him:

I said, “Hey, we need to put one of these direction interrogators on anF-15E so we can get a fast mover out there and we can pick up wherethe guys are who get shot down. . . . The [HC-130] tankers can’t be flyingaround at 10,000 to 15,000 feet out there, searching with their equip-ment for some guy on the ground and the helicopters can’t pick up thesignals when they are at 50 feet AGL.” . . . I was told, personally told, “Wedon’t have room to put it on the F-15E model. . . . You have to have fast

movers doing the searching. . . . Once you find him, get him located,then you can launch the [rescue] force. . . . It doesn’t do any good to havethem [DALS] on the helicopter until you get into the terminal area.”35

Perhaps a better plan would have been to use the Block 40F-16C/Ds that had GPS. They were much more survivable in a high-threat area than any of the AFSOC aircraft. Modifyingthem with DALS receivers could have created a capability toaccurately locate survivors with PRC-112s. This would alsohave been more effective for survivors with PRC-90s, sincethese aircraft could have marked the survivors’ location with

GPS. As noted, they were much more accurate than any INSused by most fighter aircraft. But the Block 40 F-16s were inhigh demand for attack missions. There is no indication that their use for CSAR search duties was ever considered.

AWACS, Rivet Joint, and Satellites. SARSAT satellites wereavailable for survivor location, but their best accuracy was about 20 kilometers or 12 miles.36 AWACS and Rivet Joint RC-135salso monitored for downed airmen, but their plotted positions

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were inaccurate, as seen in the Corvette 03 and Slate 46 shoot downs.37 Their collection systems used GPS to establish their position. They were good at plotting enemy radio or radar trans-mitters, but accurately plotting the location of low-wattage PRC-90 and PRC-112 radios proved to be beyond their capabilities.

Limited Number of Survival Radios. Apparently, Air Force,Navy, and Marine aircrews were issued only one radio each. Uzi11, Capt Dale Storr, had another radio in his personal survivalkit, but it was tuned to the training frequencies. General Glos-son did not make it a policy to have all crew members carry tworadios. He said, “I did not know that my people were flying withone radio and it certainly was not my policy, I can assure you

that. I left that solely up to the wing commanders and I in-tended to do that. . . . I just never thought that anybody would be short-sighted enough to fly with one radio in his vest. I just never thought that.”38

Given the critical importance that the radio plays in the CSAR process, a repeat of the practice of issuing all aircrewmen tworadios, as in the later years of the war in Southeast Asia, might have given some downed airmen at least a chance of being res-cued in Desert Storm.

Failure to Exploit GPS for CSAR Purposes. Considering

the impact of GPS on our overall operations in Desert Storm,the failure to extend that exploitation to CSAR was a missedopportunity. The overall GPS structure was in place. A com-mon WGS datum had been applied. The primary combat recov-ery aircraft—the MH-53—had GPS navigational capability. But,as pointed out, accurate GPS navigation needs a known start point and end point . The recovery efforts for Corvette 03 andSlate 46 showed that the PRC-90 and PRC–112 radios couldnot be located that accurately with the assets in-theater andthat coordinates reported by INS were not necessarily useable

for GPS. The recovery of ODA 525 showed how beneficial it wasfor anyone being rescued to have the ability to report their GPSposition. This was recognized by some; a few B-52 crews flyingin Desert Storm had SLGRs packed in their ejection survivalkits.39 There is no indication or record that any tactical crewsin Desert Storm were issued any model of GPS receiver.

Colonel Comer of the 20th SOS had perhaps the clearest vi-sion of this. He recalls, “We didn’t have the technology on our

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people who might be survivors to know their location. We hadGPS. But GPS was brand new. We didn’t understand that it

changed the world: that it changed how you fly, that it changed where you fly. We did not know that yet.”40

As one post–Desert Storm report said, “A glaring lessonlearned in this conflict, and projected to be fixed by GPS tech-nology, was the lack of precise position determination for downed pilots.”41

The AFSOC helicopter pilots agreed with this overall assess-ment. As one later said, “This [issue] should constitute thenumber one lesson learned.”42

7. Regardless, personnel from the service components andSOCCENT executed numerous joint missions and severalSAR missions. Additionally, there were several intraser-

vice rescues of note.

The JRCC log (table 1) shows 20 missions actually attemptedfrom the beginning of hostilities until cessation on 28 February.But, as previously mentioned, not all rescue efforts were notedon the log.

Table 1. JRCC Log

Number Call Sign Recovery Element Outcome

JM001 Jupiter USMC None, safe landing

JM002 Hostage 75 USN/RSAF/RSN Search, nonrecovery

JM003 Stroke 65 SOC CSAR, nonrecovery

JM004 Dark 15 Saudi SAR, recovery

JM005 Stamford 11 Saudi SAR, recovery

JM006 Slate 46 SOC CSAR, one recovery

JM007 Corvette 03 SOC CSAR, nonrecovery

JM008 Wolf 01 USN CSAR, recovery

JM009 Cat 36 USMC Search, nonrecoveryJM010 (Jaguar) RAF SAR, non-event

JM011 Spirit 03 SOC/USN/Saudi Search, nonrecovery

JM012 Uzi 11 SOC Nonrecovery

JM013 Millcreek 701 USMC SAR, nonrecovery

JM014 Jump 57 SOC Search, nonrecovery

JM015 Hunter 26 SOC/Saudi Search, nonrecovery

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Number Call Sign Recovery Element Outcome

JM016 Enfield 37/38 SOC Search, nonrecovery

JM017 Benji 53 SOC CSAR recovery

JM018 Pride 16Jump 42(AH-64)

AF/USMCUSMC Army

Search, nonrecoveryCSAR, ground team recoveryCSAR, ground team recovery

JM019 Magic 14 SOC Search, nonrecovery

JM020 Mutt 41

Bengal 15

Army

Army

CSAR, nonrecovery

CSAR, nonrecovery

Overall, coalition combat losses were 43 aircraft, recorded asfollows:

Fixed-wing aircraft 43 Rotary-wing aircraft 44

USAF 14 US Army:

USN 6 AH-64 1

USMC 7 OH-58D 1

RSAF 2 UH-1 1

RAF 7 UH-60 2

Italy 1 TOTAL 5

Kuwait 1

TOTAL 38

Table 2 analyzes those combat losses for which any amount of significant data is available. It shows that, in fact, 87 coali-tion aircrewmen were downed in combat. Of that total, 48 werekilled (55.1 percent), one remains classified as MIA (1.1 per-cent), and 38 survived the shoot down (44.1 percent). Of the 38 who survived the shoot down, eight were rescued (9.3 percent of total) and 30 were POWs (34.4 percent of total).

Table 2. Analysis of combat losses

Table 1. (continued)

Date Aircraft/Service Call Sign/Crew Size Result/Target/Rescueable

17 Jan F-18 /USN Sunliner 403/1 1 KIA (MIA*)/escort

17 Jan Tornado/RAF Norwich 02/2 2 POW/airfield attack/no

17 Jan A-4/Kuwait AF Bergan 23/1 1 Evade-POW/enemy forces/no

17 Jan Tornado/RAF Norwich 21/2 2 KIA/airfield attack

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Date Aircraft/Service Call Sign/Crew Size Result/Target/Rescueable17 Jan F-15E/USAF T-Bird 56/2 2 KIA/airfield attack

17 Jan A-6/USN Quicksand 12/2 2 POW/airfield/possible

18 Jan Tornado/Ital. AF Caesar 44/2 2 POW/airfield attack /no

18 Jan OV-10/USMC Hostage 75/2 2 POW/enemy troops/no

18 Jan A-6/USN Jackal 11/2 2 KIA/enemy port

19 Jan F-16/USAF Stroke 65/1 1 POW/Baghdad/no

19 Jan F-16/USAF Clap 74/1 1 POW/Baghdad/no

19 Jan Tornado/RAF Newport 15B/2 2 POW/airfield attack/yes

19 Jan F-15E/USAF Corvette 03/2 2 POW/Scud sites/possible

20 Jan F-14/USN Slate 46/2 1 POW, 1 Save/ escort/possible

22 Jan Tornado/RAF Stamford 01/2 2 KIA/radar site

23 Jan F-16/USAF Wolf 01/1 1 Save (fratricide)

24 Jan Tornado/RAF Dover 02/2 2 POW/airfield attack/no (fratricide)

24 Jan F-18/USN Active 304/1 1 Save/interdiction

28 Jan AV-8/USMC Cat 36/1 1 POW/enemy troops/no

31 Jan AC-130/USAF Spirit 03/14 14 KIA/enemy forces/no

02 Feb A-6/USN Heartless 21/2 2 KIA/crashed at sea

02 Feb A-10/USAF Uzi 11/1 1 POW/enemy forces/no

05 Feb F-18/USN WarParty 01/1 1 KIA/crashed at sea

09 Feb AV-8/USMC Jump 57/1 1 POW/enemy forces/no

13 Feb F-5/RSAF Hunter 26/1 1 POW/enemy forces/possible

13 Feb EF-111/USAF Ratchet 75/2 2 KIA/support/no

14 Feb Tornado/RAF Belfast 41/2 1 POW, 1 KIA/airfield/no

14 Feb 2 A-10s/USAF Enfield 37 & 38/2 1 POW, 1 KIA/enemy forces/no

16 Feb F-16/USAF Benji 53/1 1 Save

19 Feb OA-10/USAF Nail 53/1 1 POW/enemy forces/no

20 Feb OH-58/US Army Tango 15/2 2 KIA/recce/no

23 Feb AV-8/USMC Pride 16/1 1 KIA/enemy forces/no

25 Feb OV-10/USMC Pepper 77/2 1 POW, 1 KIA/enemy forces/no

25 Feb AV-8/USMC Jump 42/1 1 Save/enemy forces

25 Feb AH-64/US Army Unknown/2 2 Saves/enemy forces


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Date Aircraft/Service Call Sign/Crew Size Result/Target/Rescueable

27 Feb UH-1/US Army Unknown /4 3 KIA, 1 Save/support

27 Feb UH-60/US Army Unknown /6 6 KIA

27 Feb AV-8/USMC Magic 14/1 1 KIA/enemy forces

27 Feb F-16/USAF Mutt 41/1 1 POW/Rep Guard/no

27 Feb UH-60/US Army Bengal 15/8 3 POW, 5 KIA/Rep Guard/no

Among the POWs, who was rescueable? The official SOCOMhistory of the war states: “How many guys were ‘rescueable’?Many [aircrewmen] landed in areas of heavy Iraqi troop con-centrations or even airfields and the enemy troops were able tograb them before any effort could be made in their behalf.”45

Yet, one of the RAF pilots, Flt Lt Rupert Clark, stated that 30minutes after he was shot down, he was in the base command-er’s office.46

The A-10 pilots and AV-8 pilots were almost all shot down

right over enemy field units and captured within moments of landing. One AV-8 pilot remembered that, “Based on our tar-gets, we knew that we were going to be right in the midst of a bunch of . . . people.”47

There is no military definition of what “rescueable” means.Perhaps an objective definition would be that for a period of time, they were down in an enemy-controlled area but not un-der enemy control. It is hard to determine in each case what that period was, but there were a few cases where survivors— for some period of time—were in this situation.

Using that criterion, the recovered data shows that possibly eight of the 30 crew members who became POWs were rescue-able. That is 9.2 percent of the 87 crew members shot down.Each situation deserves a review:

Hunter 26 (RSAF F-5). The pilot was down just north of theIraqi border. Rescue forces were in the area but did not makecontact for an unrecorded reason. He was reportedly captured by the Iraqis.


*In 2001, Pres. Bill Clinton changed the status of the pilot, LCDR Michael Speicher, to “Missing In Action.” See http://www.nationalalliance.org. In 2002, the secretary of the Navy changed Speicher’s status to “Missing/Captured.” See http://www.nationalalliance.org/gulf/secnavmemo.htm.

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Quicksand 12 (A-6 with a crew of two). The loss of their tworadios took away their ability to communicate with the rescueforces before they were captured within an hour. They weredown in a dangerous high-threat area. Any attempt to do any type of visual search would have been extremely risky.

Newport 15B (RAF Tornado with a crew of two). The crew wasin enemy territory for an estimated 14 hours, much of it at night, before they were captured. Repeated calls on their sur-

vival radios and emergency beacons were not detected.Corvette 03 (F-15E with a crew of two). The inability to ac-

curately locate the crew, coupled with the political problems of the overflight of Syria, delayed the rescue forces. Once the po-litical hurdles were cleared, the rescue forces tried valiantly toget them. A Pentagon review of the Corvette 03 mission noted:

Complicating the entire effort were unreliable intelligence inputs. There was never an accurate position fix and only one radio call was ever

262

Capt Tom Trask, who led one mission to rescue the crew of Slate 46, is shown

here as a lieutenant colonel and commander of the 20th Special Operations

Squadron. He is one of several squadron leaders who gained valuable experience

flying CSAR in Desert Storm.

Source: 16 SOW History Office, Hurlburt Field, FL

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received authenticating 03’s status (on night two). This is the result of no reliable, secure, radio/position locating device issued to aircrew or

compatible aircraft mounted locating equipment with any range andaccuracy.

Syrian intransigence on over-flight delayed any effort at least 2 days.Had they been amenable, search aircraft would have at least beenlaunched to Syrian airspace in night two to fix 03’s position and initiatea possible rescue.48

Slate 46 (F-14 with a crew of two). The pilot was rescued. The RIO (radar intercept officer), Lieutenant Slade, could not contact the rescue forces with his radio. MH-53s from the 20thSOS entered the area twice but were unable to contact him.

In a best-case computation, if all eight above were truly res-

cueable, then adding in the number who actually were recov-ered totals 16 crew members. That means eight out of 16, or 50percent, of those who were rescueable actually were rescued.

Of the eight who were rescued:

• Two were recovered by helicopters on land (Slate 46 Alpha and Benji 53)

• One was rescued by special operations forces at sea (Wolf 01)

• One was rescued by the Navy at sea (Active 304)

• One was recovered by a USMC ground team (Jump 42)• One was recovered from a UH-1 by a US Army ground

team

• Two were recovered from an AH-64 by another helicopter

8. At no time were SOF aircraft “not available” for rescuemissions.

The initial mission assigned to SOCCENT was combat recov-ery. Immediately upon arriving in-theater, MH-53s were put onalert. Additionally, the first mission given to the Army Special

Forces teams and the Navy SEAL teams was combat recovery. The AFSOCCENT, Col George Gray, and his director of opera-

tions, Col Ben Orrell, both stated emphatically that their heli-copters were on alert at several locations throughout the war. At no time did other SOF tasking interfere with this alert sta-tus. That included helicopters from the Navy (HCS-4/5) and the Army (the 3d/160th).49 The 3d/160th had come over expectingspecial operations missions and had, at one point, complained

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about being held on combat rescue alert at the expense of other tasking. The rescue of Benji 53 changed their thinking.50

Specifically, Colonel Orrell said, “There were times when wehad a certain number of aircraft committed to [rescue] and Col-onel Johnson would be planning a Special Ops mission. We’dhave to pare down the number of aircraft we would have used based on the fact that we had to have them on standby for CSAR.”51

When asked if combat rescue was a secondary mission for JTF Proven Force, Capt Steve Otto, from the 21st SOS at Bat-man, stated, “That is absolutely false. For my firsthand experi-ence with the 21st, we never came off of CSAR alert. We never

had any special operations forces tasking. [Combat rescue] wasour mission.”52

As for SOCCENT’s dedication to the combat recovery mis-sion, Col George Gray stated after the war, “It was understood. That was my thing. I was the Czar. I was the guy. We set every-thing up as best as we thought we could do it. . . . When wedeployed out of Hurlburt for Desert Storm, our first and fore-most mission was [combat rescue]. We developed a briefing andtook it to Horner. He blessed it. We took a crew around and briefed every single unit in-theater that was going to be flying a

combat mission up north.”53 On some occasions, though, SOF aircraft were not dispatched

by the SOF commanders because they assessed the mission as just too dangerous. Although coalition forces had quickly at-tained air superiority in-theater, this had different meaning for fixed-wing aircraft that can operate above 10,000 feet and heli-copters that, by their nature, have to operate at low levels. Notedone helicopter pilot, “Anytime you’re below 1,500 feet or abovethree feet, you’re in what we call the ‘dead man’s’ zone.”54

Lt Gen Fred McCorkle, the deputy commandant of the Ma-

rine Corps for aviation, said, “Unlike jet bombers and fighters,choppers often have to hover or land in hostile territory to dotheir jobs. It is a pretty dangerous place to be, and you’re vul-nerable. When you can fly 30,000 feet over the enemy, you canfeel pretty confident that you aren’t going to be shot. That isn’t true when you’re flying at 1,000 feet or coming into an LZ [land-ing zone]. You never know who’s going to be down there that can do you in.”55

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Col Bennie Orrell understood the problem. He said:

I’m not kidding you; you could see those Paves [MH-53s] 50 miles off. There was no hiding them. That’s a big ol’ slow moving target—I wasreluctant to go cruising in there in the daytime. There certainly may have been a situation where we would have done it, but if you don’t have a guy talking to you on the radio, it’s pretty hard to convince meto send another two or three crews in there. . . . The only way we weregoing to survive as a rescue force in that environment was to fly at night. And I don’t think that the fast movers [fighter pilots] ever ac-cepted the fact that we were not just going to come plunging in there indaytime like we had done in Vietnam. Had we done that, we’d have lost more than just that one [Bengal 15]. We would have lost lots of them.It’s a tough call to make—whether George [Gray] is making it or whom-ever is making it—to say that we can’t go until dark. . . . I salute George

for making those calls because there simply was no way to survive inthat environment.56

But helicopters were dispatched into Iraq for search pur-poses when the threat assessment allowed, as was done for theBravo 20 team. All in all, Bennie Orrell felt that George Gray was calling the missions just about right.57

It should be noted that during the conflict, zero personnel

were lost or killed on rescue missions directed by SOCCENT .Bengal 15, a line Army crew, was shot down on a rescue mis-sion, but they were dispatched from the TACC.

Recalling the BioTechnology study cited in chapter 1, Air Force and Navy rescue forces rescued 778 downed aircrewmenthroughout Southeast Asia. In the process, 109 aircraft of alltypes were shot down and 76 rescue personnel were killed or captured. That meant that one rescue or support aircraft waslost for every seven men saved, and one rescue troop was lost for every 10 men saved. That was a high price to pay for rescue.

Col Jesse Johnson and Col George Gray personally oversaw any commitment of SOCCENT assets to combat recovery mis-sions. Most, they approved; some were turned down. Did they

call it right? Does this mean that they were far too quick to withhold committing helicopters and crews?

As opposed to Southeast Asia, where the losses of rescuepersonnel were significant, SOCCENT had a zero loss rate. Thismet President Bush’s objective of minimum casualties.

Bengal 15 was shot down on 27 February when an Army crew tried to rescue USAF Capt Bill Andrews. What is instruc-tive about that mission is that when the SOCCENT commanders

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were called, they analyzed the mission and turned it down, rea-lizing it was far too dangerous for a daytime rescue. The rescuesystem was then short-circuited, and a helicopter—not from a combat-recovery-trained and dedicated unit, but from an Army line battalion—was launched from within the TACC into anarea that several people had said was too dangerous. The re-sult was predictable. What George Gray and Jesse Johnsonknew would happen did, in fact, happen. This seems to indi-cate that they were calling the missions about right.58

It all had to do with air superiority, of which General Horner said:

[A]ir superiority is not a precise concept. And the process of gaining it isno less fuzzy. What do you mean by air superiority, and how do youknow when you have got it? There is no handy chart that lets you plot the x- and y-axis and find where the two lines cross. What I wanted todo was operate freely over Iraq and not lose too many aircraft. Okay,

what does that mean? What is too many? . . . Free operation over Iraq raises other issues. For starters, not every aircraft could be expected togo everywhere. Or if it could go everywhere, it might not do that all thetime. . . . In other words, control of the air is a complex issue, filled with

variables.59

To the fighter guys and anyone else who could operate above10,000 feet, the suppression of enemy MiGs and radar-guided

SAMs allowed them to do their jobs with relative impunity. But the helicopter guys had to operate down low. They weren’t nearly as worried about MiGs and SAMs as they were about enemy guns and rifles or heat-seeking SAMs. That was their threat. Colonel Gray had tried to make this point to the plan-ners during Desert Shield.

As one rescueman wrote, “If you run across a platoon size of deployed guys, they can shoot your butt right out of the sky,and God only knows we couldn’t track divisions much less pla-toons. A squad could put maybe a couple of rounds in you. . . .

a platoon, 35 or 40 guys, would with AK-47s just eat you up.”60

The AFSOC guys seemed to have a better understanding of

the elements of risk and reward in the combat recovery mis-sion. One of them wrote, “If I thought the crews were doinganything unsafe I would stop them. . . . Be . . . sure you recog-nize the difference between taking an acceptable risk and anoutright unsafe situation. That is where common sense and judgment are critical and experience must be your guide.”61

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One of the downed airmen himself, LT Jeff Zaun, understoodthe problem clearly. He said of rescue, “the place that we were— I could not get there at 400 knots. So how is a CSAR [helicop-ter] going to get in at 50 or 100 knots? . . . You are telling methat somebody is going to come in in a helicopter?”62

It was expressed even better by a fighter pilot who wrote after the war that, “USAF electronic superiority allowed air suprem-acy to be quickly achieved above 10,000 feet, but the numerousIraqi AAA pieces and shoulder-launched [heat-seeking] surfaceto air missiles denied low-risk operations at lower altitudes.”63

The man who wrote that was Maj Bill Andrews in his thesisat the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) at Maxwell AFB in 1995. He had license to write it; he had flown as Mutt 41 on 27 February 1991. It was his F-16 that was blown out of the sky by a heat-seeking SAM. It was his rescue helicopter that was destroyed by Iraqi AAA.

The history of CSAR in this conflict seems to suggest that there are gradations to air superiority—that air superiority for an F-15 is far different than air superiority for an MC-130, MH-53, or UH-60. This history also seems to suggest that the AF-SOC guys had the best comprehension of what the rescue

forces (helicopters) could and could not do, and they exercisedcontrol over them to prevent what they felt would be unneces-sary losses.

But Brig Gen Buster Glosson felt differently:

If I’m willing to lose [helicopters] as the commander, I should have theprerogative to send that helicopter in there or send two or three inthere, understanding I may lose one of them. That’s my decision. It should not be someone else’s decision. Who . . . anointed AFSOC andpromised them that they would have no losses in war? That the only losses were going to come from the bomber pilots and the fighter pilots?

Where . . . did this philosophy come from? I am not saying you sendpeople into harm’s way just to say you did it. But many times . . . you

can assist the CSAR effort with distractions in a way that a helicopter can sneak in and not have near the exposure.64

9. Making CENTAF responsible for CSAR and then with-

holding operational control of the combat recovery assets

violated the principle of unity of command.

Under USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, General Horner, asCOMUSCENTAF, was the designated SAR coordinator (SC) with

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overall responsibility and authority for operation of the JRCCand for joint SAR operations within the assigned geographicalarea. As such, he was responsible for CSAR. His JRCC, located within the TACC, had the authority to call upon any asset that they controlled to do what needed to be done to rescue coalitionpersonnel down in enemy territory. This specifically includedall of the reconnaissance and intelligence assets needed to lo-cate the survivors, but they did not have operational control of the recovery helicopters. That operational control resided withSOCCENT and the other service components.

This greatly concerned Buster Glosson. He recalled, “You may say to Horner, ‘you have the responsibility for CSAR and SAR,’ but let there be no doubt, he was not confused about being to-tally in charge when he had to call somebody and say, ‘Would you please do the following?’ You are in charge when you callsomebody and say, ‘I want three helicopters on the island in thecenter of the lake, 27 miles on the 236° radial from the center of Baghdad, and I want them there tonight at 11 o’clock.’ ”65

The operational orders and supplements confused the issue,for they seemed to imply that SOCCENT was responsible for CSAR overall. This concerned Col George Gray. Several times,he pointed out that his helicopters were combat rescue assetsand that SOCCENT could not accomplish any of the other func-tions necessary to prosecute CSAR. All of that needed to beaccomplished by the JRCC working with the TACC. He and theSOCCENT commander, Colonel Johnson, established three cri-teria for launching their helicopters:

1. A location of the survivor(s).

2. Evidence of aircrew survival:

a. Visual parachute sighting, and/or

b. Voice transmission from the crewmember and au-

thentication.3. A favorable enemy threat analysis.

Practically speaking, this meant that the JRCC did not havecontrol of all the assets it needed to recover personnel in enemy territory, because SOCCENT would not launch helicopters un-til it was satisfied that the mission was doable and surviveablefor its crews. This caused ill feelings between the JRCC and

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SOCCENT. The JRCC guys, Colonel Hampton in particular, wanted to launch helicopters immediately. He said that, “Dur-ing Desert Storm, I would have liked to have the authority tolaunch recovery assets immediately. But we did not own theassets, so you couldn’t just say ‘go launch.’ . . . Our concern was to get the guy, to get there as soon as possible.”66

At several points during the Corvette 03 and Mutt 41 events, JRCC personnel felt that the SOCCENT guys were not beingresponsive or, worse yet, saw the JRCC, not as an overall the-aterwide headquarters, but just an RCC for the Air Force.

The SOCCENT guys resented that point of view. They recipro-cated the ill feelings. One SOCCENT commander noted, “We

didn’t like JRCC because they didn’t seem to know what . . .they were doing. We did not understand what was going on intheir minds and they did not understand us. They didn’t trust our judgment.”67

Yet it must be noted that none of the JRCC personnel had any CSAR experience or had received any significant CSAR trainingprior to deployment.68 To Lt Col Rich Comer, this was one of themain deficiencies in our CSAR program in Desert Storm.69

Supporting this, Maj John Steube, the USMC augmentee tothe JRCC, said, “In the JRCC, nobody had any combat experi-

ence. There wasn’t a single person there who was a combat SAR type. They were all the Scott AFB guys and they had two Navy liaisons and two Marine liaisons and none of us had any combat SAR experience. . . . There were a lot of shortcomings there.It was obvious to me that CSAR was an afterthought in the whole DESERT STORM experience.”70

Additionally, the JRCC commander, Lt Col Joe Hampton, wasnever able to get the necessary communications links into the JRCC or clearances necessary so that they could directly ac-cess more highly classified information.71

Whether or not General Horner and hence the JRCC shouldhave had operational control of the helicopters for CSAR is a valid question. The JRCC was also the Air Force RCC. If the Air Force had deployed helicopters to the Gulf that were combat-recovery capable, they could have been directly tasked by them,and this issue would not have arisen. However, in the 1980sthe Air Force moved the aircraft most capable of doing that mission to the AFSOC. That command now belonged to the

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SOCOM, and its units were deployed to the Gulf under SOC-CENT. The ARS had less-capable aircraft and had just receivednew aircraft, which could have been deployed in provisionalunits. Its commander chose not to do so.

So the question hangs: If the JRCC had direct tasking au-thority over the SOCCENT helicopters, would that have made a difference for the crew of Corvette 03, or Quicksand 11, or New-port 15 Bravo, or Slate 46 Bravo? Would this change have im-proved the capability of the JRCC to locate its survivors?

To one helicopter pilot, LT Rick Scudder on the USS Sara- toga, having the special operations forces guys do the combat recoveries made a lot of sense. He remembered that:

It’s everybody’s job but there is a great gulf between normal operatingforces which was—then and now—the conventional forces, AF rescue,

Army to a certain extent—they teach personnel recovery. It’s not really a hard core mission of [the Army’s], but they have tremendous capa-

bilities. . . and then there is [sic ] the capabilities of SOF. They train to it. They do it. They have aerial refueling capabilities. They have integrationcapabilities with other types of special operations forces that are a total

breed apart in terms of philosophy, in terms of the threat they can le-gitimately and prudently counter, in terms of the risk they are willing tomitigate because of their extra training, their specialization, their spe-cial equipment, the tactics and techniques that they have and use. Ihave no bones with that.72

The fact remains that during Desert Storm, there was not oneheadquarters responsible for and in control of all the assetsnecessary for CSAR—location, authentication, and recovery. ToBuster Glosson, this was a travesty. He commented,

I think that not having the CSAR under the direct tasking order of theair component commander is the dumbest thing I have ever seen. Giveme a break! We chop [assign] all air related weapons systems in a the-ater to the air component commander except CSAR? Now how stupid isthat? . . . If those assets are going to be used for other than CSAR pur-poses, they should be under the special ops commander. But whenthere is a CSAR requirement whether they go or not should be at the

discretion of that air component commander and not at the discretionof some other commander. It is just not right. It defies all logic of chainof command and jointness.73

In retrospect, General Glosson offered a sober summation.Regarding the SOCCENT helicopter crews, he said, “I want tomake this abundantly clear: there has never been a situation where there were more forward-leaning, tougher and braver people than the guys flying the CSAR [missions] in Desert Storm.

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I have nothing but the highest, total respect for them and their willingness to do anything that I asked.”74

Addressing the command and control problem, he continued,“The problem is at the commander level or the number two guy that wanted assurance before they would generate much effort. You can’t do that in CSAR if you are going to expect to be suc-cessful. You will minimize the losses of the people trying to dothe CSAR but you will lose a lot of people you should have pickedup. And that is exactly what we did in Desert Storm.”75

So who was right, General Glosson or Colonel Gray? The lossof Bengal 15 seems to support Gray. He and his senior airmen were the experts on combat rescue. Within their community

resided vast amounts of “hands-on” experience hard learned inthe killing zones of Southeast Asia. Guys like Dale Stovall,Benny Orrell, and Rich Comer had been there. They had beenin the hover while the bullets ripped. They knew what helicop-ters flown by the bravest of crews could and could not do. Yet General Glosson had a theater air campaign to wage and of-fered another perspective: “You can’t always be so precise andso regimented that you never have confusion or, as they say,‘fog of war.’ If you do, you are going to become so regimentedthat you are predictable. Commanders must keep the correct

balance.”76

Placing all of this historically, Glosson offered, “CSAR was broke before the war because of a mismanagement and a failureof the Air Force leadership. It was broke during the war becauseof the CINC’s acquiescence to not use his fist and an anvil tocorrect it, in the interest of harmony.”77

His commander, General Horner, seems to share his views.But even though Horner was himself critical of the overall CSAR effort in the war, he offered what appears to be the best singleassessment of CSAR in Desert Storm when he wrote, “In fair-

ness to the special operations forces [SOCCENT] commanders,the paucity of CSAR missions can’t be blamed entirely on them.First, the density of Iraqi air defenses has to be taken into ac-count. Flying a helicopter into a near-certain shoot-down obvi-ously made no sense. Second, several pilots were capturedshortly after parachuting over the Iraqi Army units they’d just attacked. Third—and most important—few aircraft were actu-ally lost in combat. Thus, little CSAR was actually needed.”78

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In addressing the lack of unity of command, he seemed tosupport the feelings of Buster Glosson when he added, “Thenext Chuck Horner to fight an air war had better pay close at-tention to the way he (or she) organizes and controls the em-ployment of his or her combat search and rescue efforts.”79

Overall in Desert Storm, CSAR appears to have been a mixed bag. Because of advances in precision weaponry, satellite-basedGPS technology, countermeasures, and training, relatively few coalition aircraft were shot down. Forty-three coalition aircraft were lost in combat, mostly over high-threat areas. Eighty-seven coalition airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines were iso-

lated in enemy or neutral territory. Of that total, 48 were killed,one is still listed as missing, 24 were immediately captured,and 16 were exposed in enemy territory. Of those who survived,most landed in areas controlled by enemy troops. Of the few actually rescueable, eight were not rescued for a host of rea-sons, but primarily because of limitations in CENTAF’s ability to locate them accurately and in a timely manner. Additionally,a lack of unity of command over all CSAR elements caused con-fusion and a strained working relationship between the JRCCand SOCCENT, which operationally controlled the actual com-

bat rescue assets. Regardless, the men who actually carriedout the rescue missions displayed a bravery and élan so com-mon to American rescue forces in earlier wars.

After Desert Storm, these issues were examined in detail andmany changes were or were not made. In the not-too-distant future, though, AFSOC forces would be used again to performthe combat recovery mission in conflicts in the Balkans. Like a phoenix, many of these same issues would resurface. But that is another story to be told by another author.

Notes

1. Col Ben Orrell, interview by the author, 17 January 2002.2. Chris Ryan, The One That Got Away (London, UK: Century Press, 1995),

41.3. Perry D. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti

Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: AF History and Museums Program,Government Printing Office, 2001), 8.

4. Orrell, interview.

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5. GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 418.

6. Tom Clancy with Gen Carl Stiner, Shadow Warriors (New York: G. P.Putnam’s Sons, 2002), 437.

7. Amy W. Yarsinske, No One Left Behind : The Lt. Comdr. Michael Scott

Speicher Story (New York: Dutton Books, 2002), 106.8. “Desert Storm, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War 1991,” Military History Magazine , April 1992, 177.9. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Bos-

ton, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 259.10. Williamson Murray with Wayne Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf

(Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America,1996), 128.

11. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War:

The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Co.,1994), 189.

12. John Tirpak, “The Secret Squirrels,” Air Force Magazine, April 1994.13. Michael R. Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and

the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 188.14. Ibid., 121.15. Ibid., 117.16. James W. Canan, “The Electronic Storm,” Air Force Magazine, June

1991.17. Lt Col William F. Andrews, Airpower against an Army (Maxwell AFB,

AL: Air University Press, 1998), 35.18. Charles Allen, Thunder and Lightning: The RAF in the Gulf: Personal

Experiences of War (London, UK: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1991), 52.19. Andrews, Airpower against an Army , 57.20. Tim Ripley, “Desert Weasels,” United States Air Force Yearbook 1992 , 60.21. “Desert Storm, Final Report,” 179.22. Murray with Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf , 79.23. Ibid.24. Tom Clancy with Gen Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: G.

P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999), 355.25. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 90.26. Clancy with Horner, Every Man a Tiger , 502.27. Ibid.28. Ibid.

29. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey (here-after GWAPS ), Summary Report , vol. 5, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 116.

30. Al Santoli, Leading the Way , How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S.

Military: An Oral History (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 205.31. Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, interview by the author, 25 September

2002.32. Darrel D. Whitcomb, The Rescue of Bat 21 (Annapolis, MD: Naval In-

stitute Press, 1998), 142.

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33. 1st Lt Jeff Mase, interview by the author, 9 April 2001.34. LTC Pete Harvell, interview by the author, 29 January 2002.

35. Brig Gen Dale Stovall, interview by the author, 3 September 2001.36. ICAO Circular 185-AN/121, Satellite Aided Search and Rescue–The

COPAS SARSAT System (Montreal, Canada: International Civil AeronauticalOrganization, 1986), 17.

37. Lt Col Richard Comer, interview by the author, 19 July 2000; andGordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War , 263.

38. Glosson, interview.39. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution , 146.40. Comer, interview.41. CDR Patrick Sharrett et al., “GPS Performance: An Initial Assess-

ment,” Navigation Journal, vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring 1992), 405.42. Comments by Maj Gen Rich Comer on this book, 2 February 2003.

43. GWAPS , 114.44. Mr. James Williams, Info paper (ATZQ-AP-G), Subject: Aviation Units

deployed (Fort Rucker, AL: US Army Aviation Center, 17 April 1991).45. Capt William LeMenager, HQ SOCOM History, “A Gulf War Chronicle,”

unpublished manuscript, January 1998, 37.46. Maj Thomas E. Griffith, “Improved Combat Search and Rescue,” un-

published position paper procured from Lt Col John Blumentritt (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 15 October 1991), 2.

47. Capt John Walsh, interview by the author, 6 October 2000.48. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War , 263.49. Col George Gray, interview by the author, 3 May 2001; and Orrell,

interview.

50. Orrell, interview.51. Ibid.52. Capt Steve Otto, interview by the author, 30 April 2001.53. Gray, interview.54. Richard Whittle, “Missions Keep Choppers Flying in Face of Danger,”

Dallas Morning News , 8 March 2002.55. Ibid.56. Orrell, interview.57. Ibid.58. Ibid.59. Clancy with Horner, Every Man a Tiger , 346.60. Col James H. Kyle, USAF, retired, with John R. Edison, The Guts to

Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 90; and History of the Air Force Special Operations Command (Hurlburt Field, FL: [hereafter AFSOChistory], 1 January 1990–31 December 1991), 86.

61. Kyle with Edison, Guts to Try , 96.62. LT Jeff Zaun, interview by the author, 17 March 2002.63. Andrews, Airpower against an Army , 35.64. Glosson, interview. Numerous of the AFSOF helicopter pilots were

shocked at this statement. As one responded, “Amongst the fighter guys,

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there is an attitude of ‘die to prove you are brave . . . and stupid;’” Comments by Maj Gen Rich Comer on this book, 2 February 2003.

65. Ibid.66. Lt Col Joe Hampton, interview by the author, 12 March 2000.67. Comer, interview.68. Steube, interview; and Hampton, interview.69. Comments by Maj Gen Richard Comer on this book, 2 February

2003.70. Steube, interview.71. Hampton, interview.72. Scudder, interview.73. Glosson, interview.74. Ibid.75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.77. Ibid.78. Clancy with Horner, Every Man a Tiger , 394.79. Ibid., 410.

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Appendix

Comparison of British and US Officer Ranks

NATO/US rankcode

British Army & Royal Marines

US Army/ USAF & USMC

Royal Air Force(RAF)

Royal Navy US Navy

OF-9/O10 General (Gen) General(GEN/Gen)

Air ChiefMarshal (ACM)

Admiral (Adm) Admiral (ADM)

OF-8/O9 Lieutenant-General(Lt Gen)

Lieutenant-General(LG/Lt Gen)

Air Marshal(AM)

Vice Admiral(VADM)

Vice-Admiral(VAdm)

OF-7/O8 Major-General(Maj Gen)

Major General(MG/Maj Gen)

Air Vice-Marshal(AVM)

Rear-Admiral(RAdm)

Rear Admiral(Upper Half)(RADM)

OF-6/O7 Brigadier (Brig) BrigadierGeneral(BG/Brig Gen)

Air Commodore(ACdre)

Commodore(Cdre)

Rear Admiral(Lower Half)(RDML)

OF-5/O6 Colonel (Col) Colonel(COL/Col)

Group Captain(Gp Capt)

Captain (Capt) Captain (CAPT)

OF-4/O5 LieutenantColonel (Lt Col)

Lieutenant-Colonel(LTC/Lt Col)

WingCommander(Wg Cdr)

Commander(Cdr)

Commander(CDR)

OF-3/O4 Major (Maj) Major(MAJ/Maj)

SquadronLeader(Sqn Ldr)

LieutenantCommander(Lt Cdr)

LieutenantCommander(LCDR)

OF-2/O3 Captain (Capt) Captain(CPT/Capt)

Flight Lieutenant(Flt Lt)

Lieutenant (Lt) Lieutenant (LT)

O1

OF-1/

O2

Lieutenant (Lt)

SecondLieutenant(2Lt )

First

Lieutenant(1LT/1st Lt)

SecondLieutenant(2LT/2d Lt)

Flying Officer(FO)

Pilot Officer(PO)

Sub Lieutenant(SLt)

Lieutenant,

Junior Grade(LTJG)

Ensign (ENS)

Note: Some services may use additional or alternate abbreviations. Those above are used throughout this publicationfor standardization and clarity.

Appendix A.indd 277 11/6/06 3:48:45 PM




chap1.indd 12 11/27/06 10:43:01 AM



279

Abbreviations

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control center ACOC air combat operation center ACR armored cavalry regiment AFRCC Air Force rescue coordination center AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command ALO air liaison officer ARCENT Army component to CENTCOM ARRG Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

ARRSq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron ARS Air Rescue Service ASOC air support operations center ATO air tasking order AWACS airborne warning and control system

BCE battlefield coordination element

CAFMS computer-assisted force management systemCALCM conventional air-launched cruise missilesCAS close air support

CBU cluster bomb unit CENTAF Air Force component to CENTCOMCENTCOM United States Central CommandCEP circular error probable, a statistical measure of

weapon accuracy CINC commander in chief of a unified or specified

command; a combatant commander CSAR combat search and rescue

DALS downed airman location systemDASC direct air support center

DOC designed operational capability

ELF electronic location finder EUCOM European Command

FAF French Air ForceFAV fast attack vehicleFOL forward operating locationFSCL fire support coordination line

abbreviations.indd 279 11/6/06 3:49:07 PM



280

GPS global positioning system

HARM high-speed antiradiation missilesHASC House Armed Services CommitteeHMA Helicopter Attack Squadron, USMCHMM Helicopter Medium Squadron, USMC

INS inertial navigation systemIRCM infrared countermeasures

JFACC joint forces air component commander JFC-E Joint Forces Command East JFC-N Joint Forces Command North

JOC joint operations center JSOACC joint special operations air component commander

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command JSOTF joint special operations task force JTF joint task force

KFIA King Fahd International Airport KKMC King Khalid Military City KTO Kuwaiti theater of operations

MAC Military Airlift CommandMAG Marine air groupMARCENT Marine component to CENTCOMMEF Marine expeditionary forceMLRS Multiple-launch rocket systemmm millimeter, a designation for the size of a

weaponMTACC Marine tactical air control center

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NAVCENT Navy component to CENTCOMNRCC Naval rescue coordination center NSOA National Special Operations Agency NVG night-vision goggles

OPCON operational controlOPLAN operational plan

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

ABBREVIATIONS




ABBREVIATIONS

281

RAF Royal Air ForceRCC rescue coordination center

RSAF Royal Saudi Air ForceRWR radar warning receiver

SAM surface-to-air missileSAR search and rescue

SARSAT search and rescue satellitesSARTF SAR task force

SLGRS small, lightweight GPS receiversSOCCENT Special Operations Command component to

CENTCOM

SOCEUR Special Operations Command component of EUCOM

SOCOM Special Operations CommandSOF Special Operations Forces

SOS special operations squadronSOW special operations wing

SPACECOM United States Space CommandSPINS special instructions

STG special tactics groupSTS special tactics squadron

STU secure telephone unit

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACC tactical air control center TACON tactical control

TALD tactical air-launched decoy TFS tactical fighter squadron

TFW tactical fighter wing TOC tactical operations center

TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list

TRAP tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel TSAR theater search and rescue

VA Attack Squadron, US Navy VAQ Electronic Warfare Squadron, US Navy

VF/A Fighter/Attack Squadron, US Navy VMA Attack Squadron, USMC

VMF/A Fighter/Attack Squadron, USMC




WGS World Geodetic System—the reference framedefined by the National Imagery and Mapping

Agency and used by DOD for all its mapping,charting, surveying, and navigation needs,including its GPS “broadcast” and “precise”orbits

WSO weapons system officer

282

ABBREVIATIONS




283

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291

1st Armored Division, 174, 219, 222–24

1st Battalion of the 101st Aviation Regi-

ment, 71, 229

1st Battalion of the 227th Aviation Regi-

ment, 220

1st Battalion of the 5th Special Forces

Group, 202

1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, 216

1st Cavalry Division, 219–20

1st Marine Division, 209, 215, 217, 219,

242

1st Mechanized Infantry Division, 2141st Special Operations Wing, 18–19, 21,

30, 46, 48, 50, 53, 76, 79, 127, 140

2d Air Division Staff, 27

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 219

2d Battalion of the 229th Aviation Regi-

ment (2/229), 230

2d Battalion of the 5th Special Forces, 65

2d Marine Division, 209, 213, 216, 218

2d Satellite Control Squadron, 66, 248

2d/7th Infantry Battalion, 236, 241

3d Air Rescue and Recovery Group, 15

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 213

3d Armored Division (Iraqi), 173–76, 213

3d Battalion of 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment, 65, 95, 117, 229

3d Marine Air Wing, 188, 208, 214, 242

4th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 181

6th Light Armored Division (French), 213

6th Squadron, Royal Air Force, 186

7 Squadron, Royal Air Force, 171

8th Special Operations Squadron, 46, 57

9th Special Operations Squadron, 46, 52

10th Special Forces Group, 74

10th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 82, 128,

206, 224, 234

17th Armored Division (Iraqi), 184, 193

20th Special Operations Squadron, 21– 22, 31–32, 46, 48, 51–52, 58, 62, 64– 65, 70, 73–75, 90–91, 116, 171, 184,257, 262–63

21st Special Operations Squadron, 85,264

23 mm guns, 523d Tactical Air Support Squadron, 24

24th Mechanized Infantry Division, 213

30 mm fire/guns/cannons, 92, 151, 213,224

37 mm guns, 5

39th Special Operations Wing, 74

40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron,1, 9, 15–16, 31

48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), 155

52d Tactical Fighter Wing, 73, 112

55th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron,24

55th Special Operations Squadron, 46,58, 68, 91, 143, 175, 179, 185

56th Special Operations Wing, 1, 13

71st Air Rescue Squadron, 4771st Special Operations Squadron, 65,

109, 179

101st Airborne Division, 71, 213, 221,224, 228

353d Special Operations Wing, 30, 35

390th Electronic Combat Squadron, 92

401st Tactical Fighter Wing, 113

614th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 114,

118, 157–58706th Tactical Fighter Squadron AF Re-

serve unit, 81

1551st Air Rescue and Recovery Squad-ron (ARRS), 18, 20

1720th Special Tactics Group, 36, 46, 95

1723d Special Tactics Squadron, 58, 162

1730th Pararescue Squadron, 36

Index

index.indd 291 11/6/06 3:50:13 PM



INDEX

292

1986 Congressional Act, (Goldwater-

Nichols), 29, 34, 48

1987 Defense Authorization Bill, 29

7440th Composite Wing (Provisional), 85

A-1 Douglas Skyraiders, 2

A-6, 1, 87, 97, 106, 109–10, 142–43, 161,

178, 211, 262

A-7, 27

A-10, 27, 63, 81, 146–47, 150, 158, 167,

178, 186, 189, 194–95, 200, 208, 261

AAA, antiaircraft artillery, 11, 69, 72,

96–97, 100, 102–7, 110–12, 114, 117,

119–20, 124, 128, 131, 133, 135–36,

144, 155, 157, 171–72, 178, 182–83,

191, 210, 212, 217–18, 223, 225, 240,

247, 249–50, 267

Aberg, John, 197

AC-130 gunship, Spectre (See also Thug),

10, 174

ACOC, air combat operation center, 61

Acree, Cliff, 108, 161

Active 304/F-18, USN (I040), 169, 263

ad hoc task force, 110, 153

aerial wheel, 7

AFRCC, Air Force Rescue CoordinationCenter, 15, 34, 57

AFSOC, Air Force Special Operations

Command, 31–32, 36–39, 46–50,

57–58, 65, 76–78, 134, 138, 140,

159–60, 164, 251–56, 258, 266–67,

269, 272, 274

AFSOCCENT, AF component of SOC-

CENT, 45–46, 53, 263

AG4 kill box, 178

AH-1, Army/Marine Cobra helicopter, 9,

108, 210, 215

AH-64, Apache helicopter, 70, 91, 220,228, 230–31, 233, 236, 239, 259, 263

air campaign plan, 52, 54, 63, 67, 69,

82, 108, 121, 252, 254

Air Force Council, 25, 27

Air Force Cross, 3, 6, 8, 12, 46–47, 243

Air Force RCC, 60, 269

air liaison officer, 61, 213, 224

Air National Guard, 18, 35, 49

Air Staff, 9, 21, 23–25, 27, 31, 33–34, 47,49, 52–53, 83, 274

air superiority/supremacy, 67, 114, 154– 55, 168, 172, 249, 252, 264, 266–67 AK-47s, 62, 109, 204, 225, 266 Al Ahsa Air Base, Saudi Arabia, 61, 102 Al Asad Air Base, 142, 144 Al Busayyah, Iraq, 219 Al Firdos bunker, 185, 191 Al Hammar bog, 230al Jabayl, Saudi Arabia, 169 Al Jaber Airfield, Kuwait, 101, 215 Al Jahra, Kuwait, 218 Al Kharj Air Base, 122 Al Qaim, 128, 130–36, 155, 171, 183 Al Tallil Airfield, 120 Al Taqaddum, 96, 104, 191, 247 Alaska, 35, 47 Ali Al Salem Airfield, Kuwait, 98 Al-Jouf, Saudi Arabia, 62, 64 ALO (air liaison officers), 61, 213, 224 ALQ-119/131/184/135 jamming pods,

169, 249 Amman, Jordan, 127 Andrews, Bill, 82, 158, 205–6, 225–31,

234, 243, 265, 267, 273–74 Ankerson, Robert, 167antiradar jamming, 105antiradiation missile, 5

AOR (area of responsibility), 54–57, 59,62, 90, 141

Ar Rumaylah Airfield, 100, 167 Ar Rutbah radar site, 156 ArAr, Saudi Arabia, 62, 64, 75, 86, 89,

93, 116, 126, 136, 143–44, 146, 148,171, 176, 186, 209

ARCENT, US Army Central Command,45, 60, 208, 243

Army RCC, 60, 169–70, 183, 195, 199,201, 223–24, 239

Army Special Forces teams/troops, 50,68, 75, 134, 198, 263

ARRS (Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service), 15–18, 22–25, 27–28, 31, 34,36, 40

ARS (Air Rescue Service), 20–21, 34–36,39, 41, 46–47, 49, 57, 77, 252–53, 270

Arthur, Stanley, 111, 175 As Shuaybah, port of, 218 ATO (air tasking order), 85, 136 AV-8, 157, 172, 184, 211, 216–18, 223,

261

index.indd 292 11/6/06 3:50:14 PM



INDEX

293

Avenger 11/AH-64, US Army (I088), 239 AWACS (airborne warning and control

system), 38–39, 63, 85, 89, 94, 97,101–2, 104–6, 115–17, 119, 125, 128,142–43, 145–50, 152, 157, 171, 175,179, 187, 194, 196–99, 204, 226,233–36, 248, 256

Az Zubayr River, Iraq, 109

B-52, 87, 94, 104, 113, 180, 257Baghdad Billy, 187–88Baghdad, 70–71, 85, 93–94, 96, 113–14,

119, 121–22, 128, 136, 142, 144,149, 185, 187–88, 191, 195, 199,218, 240, 247, 250, 268

Baker, James, 44

Baldwin, Sherman, 88, 159, 189Balkans, 272Ball, Jon, 157–158, 186, 222Balwanz, Richard “Bulldog,” 170, 202–8Barksdale AFB, LA, 98Barretta 11, 200Basra, Iraq, 104, 178Batman Air Base, Turkey, 74Batson, Peter, 141Battle Force Yankee, (aka: CTF 155), 61,

64Battle Force Zulu, (aka: CTF 151), 60,

109

Battle of Khafji, 176BCE (battlefield coordination element),

180, 228–29Beard, Mike, 179Bedouin camps, 95, 132Bedouin tribesmen, 116Behery, Ahmed, 59Beirut, Lebanon, 18Belfast 41/Tornado, RAF (I072), 191Bengal 15/UH-60, US Army (I087/

M020), 224, 230, 232–34, 236–38,241, 259, 265, 271

Bengal 505, 1, 10, 46, 139

Benji 53/F-16, USAF (I078/M017), 196,198, 202, 228, 259, 263–64

Bergan 23/A-4, Kuwaiti Air Force (I010),102, 259

Berryman, Michael, 172BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 71BioTechnology Inc., 9, 12Bioty, John, 161, 184, 242Black Hawks, UH-60s, 169, 195, 223–

24, 231–32, 259, 267

Black Hole, 52–54, 67, 69, 86, 122Black, Ken, 57

Blackwood, Jim, 227, 243Block 40 F-16C/Ds, 39, 139, 248, 256 blood chit, 132Blue Flag, 252Boomer, Walter, 218Boorda, Jeremy, 100Bosnia, 76BQM-74 unmanned drone aircraft, 71Bradt, Douglas, 186Bravo 10, 132, 155Bravo 20, 155, 171–72, 255, 265Bravo 30, 155Brazen , British warship, 174

Brelinski, Roger, 237Brinson, Bill, 5, 12British forces, 75, 140, 155Bryan, Bill, 205, 230–31, 233–34, 237–

38, 241, 244Buccaneers, 169, 191Burgan oil field, 215Burshnick, Tony, 25, 41Bush, George H. W., 43, 64, 69, 85, 87,

107, 167, 240, 265Butler, Mike, 220Butts, William, 234, 237

C-130, 18, 68, 140

C-141, 50C-17, 25C-5, 17, 50Caesar 44/Tornado, Italian Air Force

(I015), 107CALCM (conventional air-launched cruise

missiles), 98CAP, combat air patrol, 117, 145, 247Carlton, P. K., 16–17Carter, Jimmy, 19, 21–22Cassidy, Duane, 27, 34Cat 36/AV-8, USMC (I047/M009), 172,

258

CBU-87 cluster bombs, 205CENTAF (Central Command Air Force),

45, 51–53, 57, 67, 86, 89, 116, 129,138–42, 153–54, 158, 170, 176–177,187, 189, 212, 254–55, 267, 272

CENTCOM (Central Command), 43CEP (circular error probable), 121, 248CH-3, 18CH-46, 201CH-47, 21, 155, 171

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INDEX

294

CH-53, 11chaff (radar confusion reflectors), 105,

120, 172, 187Checkmate division, 52Cheney and McKay Trophy awards, 15Cheney, Richard “Dick,” 15, 43–44, 99–

100, 185Chevy 06, 129chief of staff, 9, 21, 23, 31, 34, 47, 164,

189Chinook, See CH-47Chowder 21, 224CIA, 28CINC (commander in chief), 28–29, 122,

271Clap 74/F-16, USAF (I024), 118, 121Clark, Rupert, 193, 261Clem, J. D., 131, 133–34, 163close air support, 27, 201, 246, 250CNN (Cable News Network), 136–37, 195Cobras, See AH-1sCody, Dick, 71, 229, 231Cohen, Bill, 29, 160, 188, 273Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada, 252Colier, Robert, 104Combat 13, 12, 216–17Combined Task Force, 60Comer, Rich, 30–32, 41–42, 48–49, 51–

52, 58–59, 64, 68, 70–71, 73, 76–79,

82, 90, 116, 118, 152, 155, 162, 164,171–72, 184, 188–89, 244, 257, 269,271, 274–75

COMSOCCENT, 55COMUSARCENT, 55COMUSCENTAF, 55, 57, 77, 267COMUSMARCENT, 55COMUSNAVCENT, 55Connor, Pat, 178Cooke, Barry, 178Cornum, Rhonda, 233–34, 237, 244Corvette 03/F-15E, USAF (I028/M007),

103, 122–25, 128, 131–33, 135–37,

139, 141, 163, 187, 254–58, 262,269–70

Costen, William, 110Cox, Bruce, 115–16CR (combat rescue), 61Crandall, Richard, 130crowd control weapons, 2cruise missiles, 70–71, 89–90, 98, 119,

195, 248CSAR plan, 44, 53–54, 57, 59, 67, 86,

110, 126CSAR (combat search and rescue), 3, 9–

10, 12, 25, 27–29, 33, 36, 39–40, 44,47, 53–55, 57–62, 64, 67–68, 74–77,79, 82–86, 89–90, 99, 102, 110, 126,129, 138, 141, 145, 147, 149, 152– 53, 155, 158, 164, 170, 176–77, 184,196, 198, 202, 205, 211, 226, 232,234–35, 239, 245, 247, 252–59, 262,264, 267–72, 274

CSAREXes (CSAR exercises), 67, 254CTF 155, Red Sea Battle Group, 64Cyclops 47 and 48/2 OV-1s, US Army

(I089), 239

Daily, Dell, 15, 20, 33, 51, 85, 99, 136,

197, 229daisy-chain flying pattern, 150–51DALS (downed airman location system),

23, 37–38, 61, 63, 139, 256Daniel, Dan, 26–29, 237Dark 13/Tornado, RSAF (I026/M004),

13, 119Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, 65Day, Otis (Pointer 75), 235, 238de la Billière, Peter, 140, 164Decuir, Slammer, 137Delta Force commandos, 209Demers, Paul (Pointer 75), 235, 238

Department of Defense, 78, 164Deptula, Dave, 53–54, 86Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Op-

erations, 23Desert Hawk 102/UH-60, RSAF (I042),

102, 169Desert One, 19, 21, 28, 49, 81, 92, 161,

249, 258, 266, 270DF (direction finder/ing), 97, 117–18, 130Dhahban, Oman, 173Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 50Diego Garcia, 59, 113, 180Diyarbakur, Turkey, 200

DO (director of operations), 137DOC (designed operational capability),

33, 39Dodson, Eric (Benji 54), 196–97Doman, Al, 227Doppler navigation system, 9, 16, 66Dover 02/Tornado, RAF (I039), 167drones, 90, 94, 96dumb bombs, 111Dunlap, Troy, 237

index.indd 294 11/6/06 3:50:14 PM



INDEX

295

Durham, Randy, 50, 52, 243Dustoff 229, 183

Dwyer, Robert, 181E-2 Hawkeye, US Navy, 109–10, 186E-8 Joint STARS, 248EA-6B, 142, 146, 249east-west highway, from Baghdad to Jor-

dan, 149Eberly, David, 122–25, 127–28, 130, 132–

33, 136–37, 139, 162, 254Edwards, Jon, 180EF-111 jammers, 92Egyptian forces, 214, 219Eichenlaub, Paul, 186electronic war, 70, 267ELF (electronic location finder), 37Elsdon, Nigel, 104ELT (emergency location transmitter

[beeper activation]), 90emergency exfiltrations, 202Enfield 37 and 38/A-10s, USAF (I073/

M016), 193error probable, 38, 121, 248EUCOM (European Command), 74Euphrates River/valley, 221Exercise Desert Force, 68Exercise Search and Rescue, 68

F/A-18, 169F-100, 9

F-105, 5F-111, 98, 187, 251F-111F, 182F-117, 89–90, 112, 195, 240F-14, 87, 132, 142–44, 263F-15, 94, 117, 127, 186–87, 267F-15E, 104, 111, 122, 125, 128–30, 163,

208, 254, 256, 262F-16, 114, 118–19, 157, 196–97, 200, 206,

224–25, 227–28, 232, 234–35, 239–40,245, 267

F-16C, 39, 139, 248, 256F-18, 82, 87, 97, 141, 169, 172, 181,

216, 223, 259F-4G Wild Weasels, 70, 72, 85, 114, 124,

182F-5, RSAF, 185, 261factory, the (F-16 geo-reference point), 225Fairchild AFB, WA, 57Falstaff 66/F-4G (I021), 111fast forward air controller (FASTFAC),

182, 216, 223fast mover aircraft, 172

FAV (fast attack vehicles), 64Faylaka Island, Persian Gulf, 178

Fitzsimmons, Scott, 159, 222–26, 243FLIR (forward-looking infrared system),16, 24, 68, 182

Flood, Al, 71, 232, 244FLOT (forward line of own troops), 138FMU-139 electronic fuses, 157–58FOB (forward operations base), 232Fogleman, Ronald, 9FOL (forward operating location), 197, 216Folse, Dan, 95Force Package Q, 113, 118Fort Campbell, KY, 196Fort Irwin, CA, 27

Fort Rucker, AL, 230, 243, 274forward air controllers, 2, 4, 38, 109,171, 181, 213, 215, 222

Forward Look, 27, 108Fox, Jeff, 199–200French Air Force, 61, 101–2, 241FROG, free rocket over ground, 108,

172, 175FSCL (fire support coordination line),

222, 228FY84 Appropriations Bill, 25

Gabram, Doug, 230Gale, Al, 130

Garlington, Jerry, 143, 148Garvey, Philip (Bengal 15), 232–34, 237GBU-15, laser-guided bombs, 167G-day, beginning of the ground attack,

201Gee, George, 87Germany, 12, 73, 156, 253Ghost 02/AC-130, USAF (I033), 153–54Glosson, Buster, 52, 54, 77, 81, 200,

247, 254, 267, 273Godfrey, Robert, 232, 234, 237Goff, Randy, 145, 148Goldwater-Nichols Act, 29, 34, 48

GPS (global positioning system), 38–39, 42,44, 66, 70, 76, 78, 91, 113, 139, 149,153, 162, 198, 202–4, 206–8, 211–12,242, 245, 248–49, 256–58, 272–74

Gray, George, 13, 45–46, 48, 53, 65, 76,102, 126, 130–31, 138, 140, 161,189, 243, 263–66, 268, 274

Green Flag electronic warfare training,251

Grenada, 26, 28

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INDEX

296

Griffith, Tom, 122–23, 125, 127–30, 132,136–37, 139, 254, 274

Gulf of Aden, 59Gulf of Tonkin, 1Gunfighter 126/UH-1N, USMC (I056),

126, 181

H-2/H-3 airfields, 121, 183Hafar al Batin, 170Hampton, Joe, 57–61, 63, 77–78, 85–86,

126, 129–32, 156, 159, 161–64, 180,189, 198, 208, 226–28, 243, 269, 275

Hanoi, Vietnam, 8, 11, 86, 114Harden, Grant, 103, 131, 133–36, 161,

163Harding, Jim (Sandy 01), 4–7

Hardziej, Dennis, 92, 94HARM (high-speed antiradiation missile),

138, 142, 182, 267Harmon, Paul, 115–16, 162, 184, 189Harris, Bill, 2Harvell, Pete, 44, 48, 50–51, 54, 60, 63,

76–78, 138, 161, 163, 255, 274Harward, Don, 95HASC (House Armed Services Commit-

tee), 26, 28HC-130, 2–3, 27, 35, 47, 52, 256HC-130P/N Combat Shadows, 46HC-7, US Navy helicopter squadron 7,

1, 36HC-9, 36HCS-4, Red Wolves, 64HCS-4/5, Spikes, 64HCS-5, Firehawks, 64Health 67/Dalphin, RSAF (I085), 67, 220Heartless 531/A-6, USN (I052), 178Heath, Mike, 141heat-seeking missile(s), 11, 68, 99, 101–2,

108, 172, 178, 184, 194–95, 212, 214,216–18, 222–23, 226, 267

Hebein, Mark, 234–35, 238, 244Helgeson, Larry, 47, 76

Hellfire missiles and rockets, 70Hendrickson, Dean, 88Henry, Larry “Poobah,” 70–72HH-3 school, Kirtland, NM, 28HH-3, 15, 28, 35–36, 47, 65HH-53 Jolly Greens, 9HH-60A, 25HH-60D Nighthawk, 22HH-60E, 25HH-60G Pave Hawk, 24

HH-60H Seahawk, 36Hicks, Stephen, 193

high bird, backup, 4highway of death, 219HMS Brazen , 174HMS Cardiff , 174HMS Gloucester , 174, 218Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1, 5, 10, 24, 128, 140Hodler, Dan, 57Holland, Donnie, 105Homan, Mike, 151home in/homing in, 37, 72, 97, 145,

151, 178, 256homing missiles, 2Honey Badger, 21–22

Horner, Charles A. “Chuck,” 43, 48, 51– 52, 55–56, 58–59, 62, 69–70, 72, 75,78–79, 81, 85–86, 99, 101, 112, 121– 22, 137–38, 154, 159–60, 163–64,167, 170–71, 174, 189–90, 195, 209,212, 249–50, 264, 266–69, 271–75

Hostage 75/OV-10, USMC (I016/M002),108–9, 258

Houle, Ed, 128–29, 131, 163HSL-44, 157HUD (heads up display), 157Hulk 46/B-52, USAF (I055), 180HUMINT (human intelligence), 202

Hunter 26, 160, 185–86, 258, 261Hunter, Guy, 108Hunter, Russ, 95, 160Hurlburt Field, FL, 76–77, 159, 262, 274Hussein, Saddam, 68, 83, 88, 107, 121,

167, 173, 193, 211, 240, 245–47

Iceland, 35, 253IFF (identification, friend or foe), 93, 96Iguana 70/MH-3, USAF (I019), 109I-Hawk missile batteries, 69III Corps (Iraqi), 215imagery intelligence, 106INS (inertial navigation system), 24, 66,

113, 147, 149–50, 153, 225, 256–57Incirlik Air Base (AB), Adana, Turkey, 74,

85, 102–3Indian Ocean, 180Initiative 17, 26Inspector General’s office, 23Internal Look, war game/exercise, 44, 252Iran, 18–20, 28, 44, 46, 63, 121, 155, 176–

77, 274Iran-Iraq War, 33, 173

index.indd 296 11/6/06 3:50:14 PM



INDEX

297

Iraqi air defenses/defenders, 71, 88, 222,

240, 247, 271

Iraqi Air Force, 51, 67, 85, 112, 142,155, 157, 168

Iraqi civilians, 191

Iraqi ground units, 108, 193

Iraqi gunners, 71, 108, 111, 213

Iraqi interceptors, 96

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 43

Iraqi military commanders, 241

Iraqi SAMs, 88, 135, 145, 210

Iraqi tanks, T-72 tanks, 67, 182, 194–

95, 209, 213, 224

Iraqi units, 67, 86, 108–9, 177, 193, 195,213, 220–21, 224, 228–29, 239, 271

Iraqi-Syrian border, 134

IRCM (infra-red countermeasures), 68

ISOPREP (isolated personnel report), 131,

229

Israel, Israelis, 107, 121, 141, 173

Italian Air Force, Italians, 107, 186

J-3, 44, 48, 50, 54

Jaber Airfield, Kuwait, 101, 215

Jackal 11/A-6, USN (I020), 109–10

Jaguar, Omani Air Force (I048/M010),173

Jaguars, French Air Force, 102, 213

Jalibah, Iraq, 221

Jamerson, James, 74, 136

Japan, 18, 35

JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 52, 77, 221

JFACC, 250

JFC-East (Joint Forces Command East),

213

JFC-North (Joint Force Command North),

213 Johnson, Bo, 31–32

Johnson, Jesse, 46, 133, 138, 227, 265–

66

Johnson, Paul, 145, 147

Joint Special Operations Task Force, 21,

176

Jolly Green 32, 3–5, 10, 12

Jolly Green 62, 4–5

Jolly Green(s), collective term, 3–5, 10–12,135, 253

Jones, Devon, 142–44, 146–53, 246 Jordan, 63, 127, 132, 149, 192 Jordanian border, 183 JP.233 cluster weapon, 104 JRCC (Joint Rescue Coordination Cen-

ter), 55–61, 63, 67, 75, 77, 84–86,89–90, 94–95, 97, 99, 101, 105, 107,109, 116, 119, 125–27, 129–32, 137,141–45, 156–57, 160–62, 164–65,175, 185, 188–91, 194, 196, 198–201,207–8, 220, 223, 226–28, 239, 241– 45, 253, 258, 268–70, 272

JSOACC (joint special operations air

component commander), 46, 53, 65 JSOC (Joint Special Operations Com-mand), 21

JSOTF (Joint Special Operations Task Force), 21, 176, 183–84, 196, 209

Jump 57/AV-8, USMC (I064/M014),184, 258

jungle penetrator, 7 Jupiter 01/Jaguar, FAF (I009/M001), 101

KARI, Iraqi air defense force nickname,69

Kayo 01, 117KC-10 tanker, 147, 149, 152

KC-135 tankers, 85, 145Ketchie, Scott (Bengal 505 Bravo), 1KFIA (King Fahd International Airport),

65Khafji, Saudi Arabia, 174Khalid, Lieutenant General, 62, 214Khalij Al Kuwayt (bay in middle of Ku-

wait), 218Khmer troops, 11Kibrit Airfield, Saudi Arabia, 180kill box(es), 170, 178, 181–82, 193, 199Killer Scouts, 181–82, 189King 27, 3

King Abdul Aziz AB, Saudi Arabia, 216King Fahd AB, 152Kingsley, Michael, 90, 92, 143, 148–49,

151Kinnear, Neil, 91–92, 159–60, 190Kirtland AFB, NM, 18, 20–21, 28KKMC (King Khalid Military City, Saudi

Arabia), 62, 65, 95–96, 145, 179, 196– 98, 222, 228, 238

Klingele, Mike, 220

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INDEX

298

Koh Tang, island of, 11–13, 21Korea, 12, 35, 253

Korean War/conflict, 37, 252Koritz, Tom, 105KTO (Kuwaiti theater of operations), 67,

77, 113, 159, 181, 193, 244, 272Kuwait City, 43–44, 51, 59, 62, 67, 69, 78,

84, 86–87, 90, 94, 98, 101–2, 104, 107– 8, 154, 157–59, 167, 173, 176, 178,182–84, 193, 195, 206–7, 209, 211–15,217–21, 223, 240, 244–46, 259

laagers, or protected camps, 63Lady Ace 03/CH-46, USMC (I080), 201Laos, 1, 46laser-guided bombs, 98, 111–12, 157,

167, 191, 248Lebanon, 18, 26, 28LeMenager, William, 162–63, 171, 188,

274Lennon, Tom, 182Lennox, Garry, 156Leonik, Robert, 90Libya, 1986 raid, 96Liles, A1C Bill, 7, 12Limited Night Rescue System, 9–11, 15–

16, 22Locher, Jim, assistant secretary of de-

fense, 29

Locher, Roger, 8, 47Locks, Joel, 197, 208LORAN navigation system, 66low bird, 4, 8low-light-level television, 9LPA survival vest, 106Luck, Lieutenant General, 229Lunger, Ted, 28–29, 41LZ, landing zone, 264

M-1 tanks, 224M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles, 224MAC (Military Airlift Command), 15–16,

18, 23–25, 27, 31, 34, 41, 56

MacDill AFB, FL, 41, 50, 52–53, 78Madden survival kits, 23MAG (Marine Air Group), 184Magic 11/AV-8, USMC (I036), 157Magic 14/AV-8, USMC (I086/M019), 223,

227, 259Magnum, 182Magnus, Mike, 167Mall, William, 24, 40Maple Flag, training exercise, 252

MARCENT (Marine Forces Central Com-mand), 45

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 224, 1Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squad-ron 369, 181

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165,201

Marine RCC, 60, 101, 170Marine Tactical Air Control Center, 60,

156Marks, John, 213Martin, Corby, 12, 62, 82, 90, 115, 171Masirah, Oman, 157Mason, Herb, 79, 243Matney, Ken, 57

Maverick guided missiles, 111Maxwell, Dave, 231Mayday, 104, 108, 125, 127, 129, 157,

175MC-130, 18–19, 116, 133, 136, 152,

183, 253, 267MC-130E Combat Talons, 46McCarthy, Eugene, 180McClellan AFB, CA, 31, 34, 36McCorkle, Fred, 264McPeak, Merrill, 47Medal of Honor, 6, 8MEDEVAC (medical evacuation), 180,

183, 209, 223Medina Division, 182MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force), 218MH-3, 65, 109MH-47, 26, 95, 185, 223MH-53 Pave Low, 47, 51–52, 62, 68, 82,

103, 118, 127, 130, 136, 148, 151,155, 171–72, 256–57, 267

MH-53J Pave Low III, 26MH-60, 58, 206, 209MH-60G Pave Hawk, 46MIA (missing in action), 160, 259Middle East, 57

Millcreek 701/AH-1J, USMC (I054/M013), 180, 258

Miller, Eric, 178–79Mina Abd Allah, Kuwait, 217miniguns, 5–6Minish, Tim (Moccasin 05), 62, 82, 116–

18Mission/Incident numbers (M###/I###),

90MK 36, 109

index.indd 298 11/6/06 3:50:15 PM



INDEX

299

MLRS (multiple-launch rocket system),214

Mobil 41, 132Moccasin 04, 149Moccasin 05, 116–17, 144–46, 149, 151–

52Montgomery, Tom, 197–98, 208Moore, Royal, 214Morrison, Scott, 57Motorola, 157MTACC (Marine Tactical Air Control

Center), 60Mudaysis Air Base, 171Mushait Air Base, 186Mutt 41/F-16, USAF, 205, 224, 228,

259, 267, 269Nail 51, 230, 234–35Nail 53, OA-10, USAF (I079), 199Nail 55, 179napalm, 6NAS Norfolk, VA, 36NAS Point Mugu, CA, 36NASA (National Aeronautics and Space

Administration), 15, 22Nasiriyah, Iraq, 202National Command Authorities, 23National Special Operations Agency, 28

NATO, 85Naval Air Systems Command, 9naval rescue coordination center, 60NAVCENT (Naval Forces Central Com-

mand), 45, 60, 111Navy SEALs. See SEALS.Nellis AFB, NV, 12, 27, 35Newport 15B/Tornado, RAF (I027), 120,

262Nicaragua evacuation missions, 18Nichol, John, 100–101, 160night-recovery capability, 9Nimrod, RAF Nimrod Detachment, 61,

63, 109, 173, 180Ninth Air Force, 57NKP (Nakhon Phanom) Air Base, Thailand,

1–2, 4, 7, 9–10, 16, 31North Vietnam, 8–9, 20, 36, 47, 81, 135North Vietnamese, 2, 130, 140Norwich 02/Tornado, RAF (I008), 100,

259Norwich 21/Tornado, RAF (I011), 104,

259

NRCC (naval rescue coordination cen-ter), 60, 97, 109

NSOA (National Special Operations Agen-cy), 28–29Nunn, Sam, 29NVG (night-vision goggles), 21, 31, 65,

94, 141, 180, 184, 197, 250

O’Boyle, Randy, 50, 52, 54, 70, 77, 81– 83, 120, 127, 137, 158

OA-10, 84, 199–200, 222, 224–26ODA 525, Army Special Forces team,

202, 205–6, 257OH-58, 170, 201, 220OH-58C, 220Okinawa, Japan, 18

Olson, Pat, 222–23OPCON (operational control), 29, 34, 56,

60–61, 64–65, 75, 106, 196, 267–69Operation Desert Storm, 10, 88, 90, 177Operation Eagle Claw, 19, 22, 26, 46Operation Earnest Will, 32Operation Just Cause, 33, 48OPLAN 1002-90, 44, 46, 54, 57, 77, 267OPLAN 1021-90 BASE CASE, 57Orrell, Ben, 3–8, 12, 46, 70, 75–76, 79,

127, 163, 198, 208, 245–46, 263–65,271–72, 274

Osan Air Base, South Korea, 12

OSC (on-scene commander), 4, 117, 135,194, 196, 223, 274Otto, Steve, 103, 130–31, 133, 161, 163,

264, 274OV-10, 108, 215, 217–18Özal, Turkish President Turgut, 74, 85

P-3 Orion, 109, 156PACAF (Pacific Air Force), 33Pachmayr 03 and 04, 194Palmgren, Lornie, 227, 243Patriot missile, 85, 193Patterson, Robert, 27, 30, 208Pave Hawk, HH-60G, 24

Pave Imp, 16Pave Low III, 17, 26Pave Low, 16–18, 20–22, 24, 26, 31, 33,

35, 40, 62, 85, 92, 118, 131, 151,184, 250

Pave Star, 16Pentagon, 53, 139, 262Pepper 77/OV-10, USMC (I084), 217Persian Gulf War, 76–79, 159–64, 188–

90, 207–8, 242–43, 273

index.indd 299 11/6/06 3:50:15 PM



INDEX

300

Persian Gulf, 32, 44, 59–60, 68, 76–79, 89,111, 157–64, 167, 169, 178, 181, 188–

90, 201, 207–8, 223, 242–43, 273Peters, Dan, 211, 216Peters, John, 100, 160Phylis, Steve, 194–95PJs, pararescuemen, 5, 10, 16, 36, 46,

58, 68, 102, 116, 134, 151plinking, See tank plinkingPointer 75, See Day/DemersPOL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), 105Poobah’s Party, 71–72, 90, 94, 96, 250Powell, Colin, 52, 73, 185, 195, 221, 240POWs, 11, 20, 68, 109, 139, 161, 241–

42, 259, 261PR (personnel recovery), 15, 27, 55, 59–

60, 160, 188, 207, 242, 270PRC-112, 37, 87, 106, 112, 139, 143,

145, 200, 255–57PRC-90, 37–38, 63, 88, 125–26, 138,

143, 147, 179, 185, 196, 204, 206,255, 257

Pribyla, Ken, 76–77Pride 16/AV-8, USMC (I083/M018), 211,

259PRN-021 satellite, 44Proven Force, 73–75, 79, 85–86, 102–3,

106, 126–27, 130–31, 133, 159, 161,191–92, 199–200, 264

Pulsifer, Ben, 90Puma helicopters, 61Python 50/MH-47, 160th SOAR (I003), 95

Qatari forces, 219Quang Tri, Citadel at, 8Quicksand 12/two A-6s, USN (I013),

105, 256, 262

radar-controlled guns/sites, 72, 182radar-warning receiver (RWR), 118, 124,

150, 172, 198RAF Nimrod, See Nimrod/Nimrod de-

tachment

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 12Ras Al Mishab, 62, 65, 75Ratchet 75, EF-111A, USAF (I071), 186–

87RC-135 “Rivet Joint,” 38, 110, 126, 130,

152, 248RCC (rescue coordination center [all

forces]), 15, 34, 55–56, 59–61, 75, 86,101, 157, 169–70, 181, 183, 191, 195,199, 201, 208, 223–24, 239, 269

Reagan, Ronald, 22, 29Red Flag exercises, 27, 251

Red Sea, 59, 61, 64, 83, 87, 89, 105, 158Republican Guard, 67, 86, 104, 113,139, 170, 211–13, 215, 220–21, 223– 24, 227, 232

Rescue Force Structure Plan, 33, 38, 41RH-53 Navy helicopter, 19RIO (Radar Intercept Officer), 263Rivera, Manuel, 157Rivet Joint, See RC-135Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 50–52, 58, 61, 68,

97, 137, 156, 185Roberts, Harry, 118, 162Rockeye, aka: Mk-20, 105

ROE, rules of engagement, 135Rogers, Steve, 229, 238, 243–44Roland missile, 105–6, 120roll-back technique to destroy enemy air

defenses, 69Royal Air Force, 51, 61, 100, 104, 120,

141, 156, 158, 162, 167, 169, 171,173, 188, 191, 207, 241, 255, 258– 59, 261–62, 273

Royal Navy, 109, 174RSAF (Royal Saudi Air Force), 51, 61,

64, 109, 119, 169, 185–86, 220, 241,258–59, 261

Rusho, Mike, 231–32, 244Ruth, Bob, 128, 131, 137, 139, 163RWR (radar warning receiver), 198, 236,

249Ryan, Chris, 155, 164, 188, 272Ryan, Thomas, 25

S-2, 229SA-2, 2, 72, 105, 118, 124, 142, 191, 251SA-3, 98, 105, 115, 124, 240SA-6, 98, 105, 118, 134, 154SA-7, 96, 102, 178SA-8, 154, 171–72SA-16 heat-seeking missile, 101

SAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 267

Saddam, See Hussein, SaddamSafwan Airfield, Iraq, 241Salman Air Base, Iraq, 201Salmonson, Eric, 213SAM sites, 2, 72, 89, 96, 114–15, 122,

124, 128, 133, 144, 171, 182, 191,199, 236

SAM suppression, 96, 104–5, 114

index.indd 300 11/6/06 3:50:15 PM



INDEX

301

Sam’s Town, 122, 133SAMs (surface-to-air missiles), 69, 72, 88,

94, 103, 105–6, 110, 112, 135, 140,145, 150, 155, 178, 210, 226, 235,247, 249, 266

Sanborn, Russell, 184–85Sandy 01 (Maj Jim Harding), 4Sandy 57 and 58, (Paul Johnson and

Randy Goff), 58, 145, 147Sandy on-scene commanders, 27SAR controllers, 56SAR, civilian or peacetime, 12, 15–16, 18,

25, 28–29, 33, 35, 41, 48, 51, 54–56,59–60, 97, 108, 128, 132, 136–37,139, 170, 173, 235, 258, 267–69

Saravane, Laos, 10, 12SARC (search and rescue coordinator), 61SARLO (SAR liaison officers), 56SARSAT, Search and Rescue Satellites,

38, 126, 256, 274SAS (Special Air Service, [UK]), 140–41,

155, 171, 177, 183–84, 246SATCOM (satellite communication), 102,

134Saudi Arabia, 44, 49–53, 58, 61, 63–65,

81–82, 90, 100, 102, 106, 119, 142,149, 170, 173–75, 180, 193, 216, 245

Saudi-Iraqi border, 70, 89, 140, 176Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, 170

Saudi-Kuwaiti border, 178Saudis, 51, 58, 141, 153, 186Sawahil, Kuwaiti barge, 65SC (SAR coordinator), 55–56, 75, 267Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 43–44, 48–52,

55, 67, 71, 76, 85–86, 92, 99, 101,107, 121–22, 138, 140–41, 154, 158– 59, 162, 170, 172, 191, 211, 214,220–21, 240–41, 273

Scott AFB, IL, 15–16, 34, 57, 269Scott, Scottie, 124Scud missiles, Scuds, 67, 107, 113, 121–

22, 128, 139–41, 147, 153, 173, 177,

183–84, 193, 254Scudder, Rick, 83–84, 87, 112, 159, 162,

270, 275Sea Skua missiles, 174SEALs (Sea, Air, Land, US Navy special

forces), 64, 68, 75, 82, 157, 169Seeb, Oman, 61Serbia, 76SH-3 US Navy helicopter, 2, 36, 169, 180Shaibah Airfield, southern Iraq, 104

Shaikh Isa, Bahrain, 60, 214Shaw AFB, SC, 57

Shawnee, 117Shelton, Hugh, 231Shipman, Jerry, 10, 13, 16–18, 20–21,

23, 40–41Shotgun 212, 217Shott, 229Shozda, Matt, 131, 135–36, 162–63Silkworm, 218Slade, Larry, 142–47, 246, 256, 263Slate 46/F-14, USN (I031/M006), 132,

142, 144–45, 147, 151, 164, 246,251, 256–58, 262–63, 270

SLGRs (small lightweight GPS receivers),66, 257

Small, Joseph, 217SOAR (Special Operations Aviation Regi-

ment), 65, 78, 95, 117, 183, 229SOCENT (Special Operations Command

Central), 46SOCEUR, 133SOCOM (Special Operations Command),

21, 23, 26, 29–33, 38, 41, 45–48, 50,76–78, 141, 162–63, 188, 252, 261,270, 274

SOF (special operations forces), 1, 15, 18,20, 22–24, 26–27, 29–30, 33–34, 47– 48, 50, 60, 68, 70, 73, 77, 92, 138–39,

158, 184, 186, 197–98, 254–55, 263– 64, 270–71

Somalia, 74–75Son Tay Prison, North Vietnam, 20, 24Southeast Asia conflict, 11, 18, 252Soviet Union, 72, 121SPACECOM (Space Command), 66, 153Spade 50, 157Spain, 180Special Planning Group, 52Spectre 17 rescue, 16Speicher, Michael, 97–99, 101, 141, 159–

61, 189, 261, 273

Spellacy, David, 217–18spider routes, 62SPINS, special instructions for CSAR,

84–85Spirit 03/AC-130, USAF (I051/M011),

175, 258spoiling attack, 173Springfield 17 and 18, 145SS Mayaguez , 11Stamaris, SSG Daniel, 234, 237

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INDEX

302

Stamford 01/Tornado, RAF (I035), 156Stamford 11/Tornado, RAF (I030/M005),

141, 258Stenevik, Robert, 65Steube, John, 77, 156, 164, 239, 243–44,

269, 275Stewart, Robert, 50, 52, 120Stillwell, Joe, 57Stiner, Carl, 40, 76, 79, 141, 161, 164,

189, 273Stophel, Gerry, 158, 226, 243Storr, Dale (Uzi 11), 178–80, 257Stovall, Dale, 1, 3–6, 8, 15, 21, 40–41, 47–

48, 76, 134–35, 163, 256, 271, 274Strategic Air Campaign, 52, 67, 108

Stroke 65/F-16, USAF (I023/M003), 114– 15, 117, 121, 143, 162, 247, 258Stumpf, Bob, 96Sunliner 403/F-18, USN (I005), 97, 99,

259Sweet, Bob, 191, 193–95, 207Syria, Syrians, 71, 103, 126–27, 130–35,

155, 262

Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, 64 TACON (tactical control), 51, 60, 64, 156 Tactical Air Command, 17 Tactical Air Control Center, 51–53, 56–57,

60–63, 75, 85, 99, 113, 120–21, 127,

129, 143, 156, 169–70, 174, 180, 185,217–20, 226–29, 240, 250, 265–66,268

Taif Air Base, Saudi Arabia, 94, 187 TALD (tactical air-launched decoy), 94 Tallil, 120, 221 Tango 15/OH-58, US Army (I081), 201 Tanjib, Saudi Arabia, 216tank plinking/plinking, 182, 195 Task Force Normandy, 70, 75, 86, 89–

91, 96 Task Force Papa Bear, 215 Task Force Ripper, 215–16

Tawakina Division, 193 T-Bird 53, 104 T-Bird 56/F-15E, USAF, 104, 254 Tchepone, Laos, 1 TELS mobile launchers, 122terrain-following-and-avoidance radar, 24 Thailand, 1, 9, 15–16, 47 Thelin, Todd, 197 Thomas, Scott (Benji 53), 202, 228 Thome, Mike, 233, 237–38, 244

Thug, North Vietnamese nickname for AC-130, 140

thunder run missions, 183 Tice, Jeff, 114–18, 162, 247 Tiger 53/F-15, RSAF (I070), 186 Tiger Brigade, from 2d Marine Division,

213–14, 218 Tilford, Earl, 8, 12 TOC, tactical operations center, 232 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 71, 89 Tonkin Gulf, 1–2, 36 Tornado/JP.233 combination, 168 Tornadoes, (British, Italian, and Saudi),

72, 100, 104, 107, 111, 120–21, 156,167, 169, 186, 191, 213

TOT, time over target, 90, 122 TOW (tube-launched optically-tracked

wire-guided) missile, 215 TPFDL (time-phased force and deploy-

ment list), 44, 46tracer rounds, 119–20 TRAP (tactical recovery of aircraft and

personnel), 60 Trask, Tom, 77–78, 143–46, 148–52,

160, 164, 262 TSAR, theater SAR, 28–29, 33 Tucker, Mark, 35, 41, 49, 76

Turkey, 18–20, 63, 73–75, 84–86, 102–3,106, 126, 130–31, 136, 149, 199–200

Turkish-Iraqi border, 131 Turner, Charles, 110 Turner, Steve, 129 Twenty-third Air Force, 23–24, 27, 29–

31, 34, 36, 41

UH-1, 18, 60, 183, 223, 238, 259, 263UH-1N, 181UH-60, 169, 195, 223–24, 231–32, 259,

267UH-60A, 24–25Umm Qasr Naval Base, Iraq, 109Underwood, Reginald, 223URC-64 radios, 37US Army Rangers, 183US Army VII Corps, 72US Congress, 25–26, 29, 78, 162, 242,

273USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, 54, 77,

267

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INDEX

303

USCINCCENT, Commander in Chief, USCentral Command, 54, 77, 267

USS Blue Ridge, 60, 109USS Bunker Hill , 181USS Caron , 169USS Coral Sea , 1USS Dwight D . Eisenhower , 44USS Guam , 221USS Independence , 44USS Iwo Jima , 221USS John F. Kennedy , 61USS Leftwich , 109USS Midway , 88USS Nassau , 157, 201, 221, 223USS Nicholas , 157, 165, 175

USS Paul F. Foster , 89USS Ranger , 109USS Roosevelt , 169, 178USS Saipan , 18USS San Jacinto , 89USS Saratoga , 83, 96–97, 105, 270USS Tarawa , 193USS Trenton , 75USS Wisconsin , 169, 218Uzi 11/A-10, USAF (I053/M012), 178–

79, 193, 257–58

VA-35, 84, 88, 105 VA-36, 178

Vandenberg AFB, CA, 44 VAQ-136, 88 Venom 505, 169 vertical-assault aircraft, 201 VFA-81, 97 Vietnam War, 11, 13, 36–37, 83, 109,

252, 254 VII Corps, 72, 199, 213–14, 219–21,

223–24, 228, 239

Viper, 229–34 VMA-331, 201

VMFA-314, 235 VMO-2, 108–9, 161

Waddington, David, 120 Wadi al-Batin, 220 wadi, 145–46, 220 Walsh, Scott, 159, 216–17, 242, 274 Warden, John, 52–53, 252 Warmonger, 224 Warparty 01/F-18, USN (I061), 181 Warparty 02, 181 Weaver, J. V. O., 50 Weaver, Paul, 175 Weeks, Kevin, 156

Welch, Larry, Air Force chief of staff, 31 Welsh, Mark, 181, 189 Wetzel, Rob (Quicksand 12 Alpha), 105–

6, 256 WGS-84, worldwide geo-referencing sys-

tem 1984, 39, 153 Wilbourn, James “LZ,” VMA-542, 211 Wild Weasel, See F-4G Wilson, Greg, 81 Wilson, Steve “Foose”, 53 Wolf 01/F-16, USAF (I038/M008), 157,

169, 258, 263 WSO (weapons system officer), 98, 125,

132 Wyatt, Lee, 81

XVIII Airborne Corps, 202, 209, 213,221, 223–24

Yeosock, John J., 214 young tigers, 12

Zaun, Jeff, 84, 88, 105–6, 159, 161, 267,274

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chap1 indd 12 11/27/06 10:43:01 AM