Combat Lessons 1

8/9/2019 Combat Lessons 1

1/62

$ OMBATLESSONS

NUMBER 1

Rank ar/d file in combat:What theyre doing

H ow they do it

ISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER.-tricted documenta and the essential characteristics of.__._.

restricted material may be give> to any person known to be in the 6erv1ce of the UnltedStates and to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are ccoperating_in Gov-ernment work. but will not be communicated to the public or to the prees except by

authorized military public rcla?ions agencies.(See also par. 18b. AK Ml-S,28 Scp 1942.)


2/62

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Combat Lessons is to give to ourofficers and enlisted men the benefit of the battleexperiences of others. To be of maximum benefitthese lessons must be disseminated without delay.They do not necessarily represent the carefully con-sidered views of the War Department; they do, how-ever, reflect the actual experiences of combat and,

therefore, merit careful reading. For this reasonalso no single issue can cover many of the phases ofcombat; lessons will be drawn from the reports asthey are received from the theaters of operation andquickly disseminated so that others may apply them.The suggestions which are made or implied are not.intended to change t,he tactical dogtrine by which mrArmy has been trained but rither to elaborate

thereon. Much of the subject matter has been cov-ered in training literature, but the comments showt,hat shortcomings continue to manifest themselveson the battlefield.


3/62

The paramount~ comba,t lesson learned from everyoperation is the vital importance of Zeaclcrship. Ourequipment, our supply, and, above all, our men, are

splendid. Aggressive and determined leadership isthe priceless fact,or which inspires a. command andupon which all success in battle depends. It is re-sponsible for success or failure.

Chief of Staff


4/62

CONTENTS

SECTION ONE-INFANTRY P WC

B a t t l e L e a d e r s h i p _ _. _______________________Junior Offiocr iu UaLt,lc~--___-_-._____-__________Hate Yollr l~nc~ny_~_~___.___---_-_____-________Leaders in Front___---~--_---__--_____-____-____Keep Them hlovinR_____-_-__---_---_-_--_-_____NC0 Lcaclcrship___--~_------__---____--___-____Keep Your Xlisrion ill Mi~~tl______--____-__-_-___Team Ups_________.-__-_-----_--____---__-____Rally Ioillt_____._-_-__-_---._.-_ .___ ___.______Fear is Kormal___~-_-__-_-_-__---_______._-____

Si c i ly -I t a ly -At t u __________-_--___-____--___ 7Nigl~tAt,t~ack____...~...--___-_-_--_----____-_-___ 7

Surprise Saves Livcs.~._-_-_-__-_-_____-___-_.__ 7

1

122333666

Sniall Arms Agailbst Arn~or__________--_-~_-_____Platoon Action ~._~__________________________ 9

Knocking O\lt lillboscs~...__-_-_--____-_-_____-__ 12Individual Illit,iativc____--___-_-_-_-__-_-____-____~ :QAction on Attic________--_-_-______-_____ ___. __.~.

The So ut h Pa c i f ic ._______-_-_-_-__-_--_----__ 19Security in tlw Jungle_ ~. _ ________________________ 19

111 Bivorlnc_______._.~____--_--_-_-__----_-_-____ 19On t,hc ~larch_________-.-_--_-_- ____ _ ____ ______ 20

Jungle Not,Cs__-_._--__--~_--_-_-__-___.-.________ ;;Aggrcssivc Action, Flexible Plans. ________________Feeding tile Troops_______-_-__-__-__.._____-____ 20Coul~tcril,tclli~cl~c~~ _m_____________. ____________ 20

Sc out ing and Pa t ro l l in g__________-__---___-_ 21Pat,rolling in tlw Jun~lc____. _____________________ 21

Dont, Forget, the \Vherc!__._____-______-___I 21


5/62

SECTION ONE-INFANTRY-C~~I~~~~U~~Scout ing and Pa t ro l l ing-Col l t in r l ed rasc

- or t,hc Whal!___ ._________. _. ._:__________lal,rol Til~s_______~____~____-------~_---~_-____

Size of Patrols__._____________~~_..__~_-_-___---_Say It Nith Pict~~~r~s________-------___________

2122

2222

In fa n t ry We a po n s_--____----_--__---________ 23I I I Jungle Warfare-----..--.________---_-_---______ 23

Unsic Woal~or~s______~_____-_-_-_---------_-____ 234.2 Chemical Rlorl.ar____________________________ 26

In Sicily__~~~____~.~ ~_-.~ . . .._._.._. ____________ 27A~lvanccG~~ard______~_~_~______________________ 27Pyrotechnics.__________________._____________-_ 27Miscella~~cor~sCo~~~~~~e~rt.____.____________________ 27

At~Saler~~o______~__~~~._~ ______._____ ____________ 28The Bazooka Worked_____._.__..____________--__ 28

In fan t ry -Ar t i l l e ry Te a m .-____-- ______________Artillery Close Support____._.___________________

- and How it Worked____________._____________Massed Iires______~_ .---__________________.____..

In fa n t ry -Ta n k Te a m _-__ ____________________Opportunity Lost__~~___~_______________________Lesson Learned_________________________________

Infantry-Tank Attack_________________--________Ranger Training________________-_--__-_--.._

Buddy System___________________________. _____Itealism_______________________________________Recognition_________________..______________-___Formations_________---________________________Cookirrg____________----__________________~____Physical Conditioning________________________---Discipline_________---_--______..________-_______

29

292930

31

3131

3233

33333434353535

SECTI ON TWO-FIELD ARTI LL ERYArt i l le ry in t h e J u ng le ______________--_______

Antipersonnel Fire_________________________---__Dealing with Tree Snipers _._._________ __________Adjustment of Fire--_-_- __..___._______ ________

37

373738


6/62


7/62

Prepared from Combat Reports and

published by direction of t he Chief of

Stag by Operations Division i n collab-

oration with other Divisions of the

W ar Department General Staf f, Army

Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and

Army Service Forces.


8/62

SECTION IINFANTRY

BATTLE LEADERSHIP

Again and again reports from the battlefieldsconfirm the importance of leadership in every grade,

whether it be Corporal or Colonel. Other combatlessons are important; the exercise of leadership inbattle is vital. Leadership has often been defined intheory. Here are some instances of its application orits absence on the battlefield. These are but a. fewexamples; there are many others.

*

J u n i o r Off i c e r i n B a t t l e Cc@& WiZ Eiun z T. Gor-don, In fant ry, S icily: S in ce November 8, I have hadseventeen office~my company, and I am the only


9/62

one who started out wit.11 it who is left in the fight.In Tunisia, from troops pinned down in ,Lhe dark,I have heard enlisted men call out such things asWhere is an officer to lead us?-We dont want. tolie here-we want to attack-where is an officer?. . . In each case an officer or officers have risen tothe occasion, but this nevertheless shows beyondanyt,hing else the demand for battle leadership.

A conlpany officer must build a legend abouthimself. He must. take calculated risks. He must,on the other hand, do what he expects his men to do:

he must always dig in ; always take cover. His menmust know that when he ducks they must duck; onthe other hand, they must not believe thsit. when theofficer ducks they must run away. The officer mustcome through every barrage and bombing with asheepish grin and a wry remark. Masterly under-statement of hardship and danger endured plus a.grin always pays dividends.Hate Your Enemy! Our men do not ordinarilyhat*e. They mus t hate. They are better soldierswhen they hate. They must not fraternize withprisoners-must not give them cigarettes and foodthe moment they a.re taken. Hate can be taughtmen by meticulous example. The Rangers are sotaught.

*

Leaders in Front Staff Sergeant Richard E. Deland,Infantry, Sicily: We want our Cal;tain out front;we dont care much about the position of our bat-talion commander.2


10/62

K e e p T h e m M o v i n g ! Operation Report, SeventhArmy, Sicily: During an attack officers and non-commissioned officers must, never allow men to lie 8

prone and passive under enemy fire. They mustbe required to move forward if this is at all possible.If movement is absolutely impossible, have the troopsat least open fire. The act of firing induces self-confidence in attacking troops. The familiar expres-sion Dig or Die has been greatly overworked.Attacking troops must not be allowed t.o dig in untilthey have secured their final objective. If they dig

in when momentarily stopped by enemy fire, it willtake dynamite to blast them from their holes andresume the advance.

*NC0 Leadersh ip St aff Sergeant Robert J. Kemp,Plat oon Sergeant , Infant ry, Sicily : NC0 leader-ship is important.. Leaders, NCOs, and officersshould be taken to an OP for terrain instruction and

study before an attack. This has been possible inmy outfit about. one-fourth of the time. We havewha,t is called an Orders Group, which consists ofthat group of officers and NCOs that must be as-sembled for instruction before any tactical move.

*

K e e p Yo u r M i s s i o n i n M i n d ! Lieutenant ColonelE. B. Thaycr, Field A rtil lery , O bserv er W it h Fift h

Army, Italy: Difficulty was experienced in makingpatrol leaders realize the importance of bringing backinformation by a. specified hour, in time to be ofvalue. Patrols often returned, after encountering

3


11/62

resistance, zoithout a c c o mp l i s h i n q t h e i r v z i s s i o n .Sending them back to accomplish their mission, de-spite their fatigue, seemed to be t*he most effective

solution to the traiuiug problem iuvolved,, althoughthe iuformatiou required ofteu arrived too late.

*

Lieutenan t Colonel T . F. Bogart, Infan try, Ob-server With Fifth Army, ItyZy:. Greater emphasismust be placed ou iuculcatuig 111 unior officers andNCOs the will to accomplish assigned missions de-spite opposition. A few accounts of patrol actionsillustrate this point:

( 1) A reconnaissance patrol consisting of a pla-toon was sent. out, at about 1900 one evening t,o de-teriniue the strength if any of the Germaus in twosmall towns, the first about. t,wo miles away and thesecond about three miles farther 011. The patrolreached the outskirts of the first t,own and met. an

Italian who told them there were no Germans inthe town and then started to lead the patrol intotown. A few hundred yards farther a Germaninachiue gun opened up, the Italinu disappexed,three of the patrol were killed, and the others dis-persed. They drifted back to our battalion duringthe night, and it was not until uearly daylight t,hatthe practically valueless report of the actioii wasreceived. Not the slightest conception of thestrength in the first town was obtained aud no in-foriuatioii of the secoiid town. It was uecessary tosend out another patrol with the same mission.

4


12/62

(2) A patrol was sent out with the mission ofdetermining the condit,ion of a road, especiallybridges, over a three-mile stretch to the front. When

this patrol had covered about a mile it ran into amotorized German pa.trol. Two of the Americanswere killed, and the platoon leader claimed six Ger-mans. The patrol lea.der forgot his mission, re-turned to the battalion Cl? with the remainder ofhis patrol, and had to be sent. out. again with a greatloss in time in getting the information desired.

(3) On several occasions patrols were sent outon reconnaissance missions with instructions to getcertain information by a specific time. The hourwould pass arid sometimes several others without aword from the patrol. Sometimes it was due todifficulties encountered, sometimes to mistakes incomputation of time and space factors, but in allcases there was no good reason why Some informationdid not get back by the specified time.

C O MM E N T: T h e fa i l u r e o f p a t r o l s i n t h e s e i n -s t a n c e s s t e m s f r o m a la c k o f a p p r e c i a t i on o n t h ep a r t o f N C O s a n d j u n i o r o ffi c e r s o f t h e i r m i s s io n s .I n p a t r o l a c t i o n s , a s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f l a r g e ru n i t s, t h e m i s si on m u s t b e k e p t u p p e r m o s t i n t h em i n d s o f a l l r a n k s , a n d no a c t io n s h o u l d b e u n d e r -t a k e n w h i ch d o e s n o t c o n t r i b u t e d i r e c t ly t o t h ea c c o m p l is h m e n t o f t h a t m i s si on . C o n v e r s e l y, n o

i n c id e n t a l o r i n a d v e r t e n t c on t a c t w it h t h e e n e m ys h o u l d d e t e r o r d i v er t p a t r o l s f r o m t h e c om p le t e

5


13/62

a c c o m p l i sh m e n t o f t h e i r m i s s io n s , t o i n c l u d e c o m -p l i a n c e w i t h a l l i n s t r u c t i o n s g iv e n , w h e r e h u m a n l y

poss ib le . -*

Team Up! Captail l. W illiam T. Gordon, Infant ry,

Sicily.: I have found that ineu in position mustfight 111 pairs; an order that 50 per cent stay awakei s t , h u s e a s i l y enforced; it bolsters morale and nerves.

Ral ly Point I n every coinpauy attack order areserve force must be prescribed; I always do eveuthough sometimes this force consists ouly of myselfand my First Sergeant. Often a soldier who a ino-inent before has run away is converted into a fighterby leadership. A reserve force gives him a rallyingpoint.

*

Fear i s Norm al Cobod George Taylor, Injantry,Sicily: Fear oj being afraid is the greatest obstaclefor the new man in battle to overcome. There is noreason for shame iu being draid. Men who havehad excellent battle records freely admit they arescared stiff in battle. The important thing is thatevery soldier must be taught all he ueeds to know sowell that battlefield thinking is reduced to a iniui-n~unl; automatic, disciplined reactions to battlefieldproblems must be the rule.

% battle the worst eleineut is mental andnervous exhaust,iou. There is no real rest under fire.The ability to withstaud fire is more importalit thauall the kuowledge in the world.6


14/62

SICILY-ITALY-ATTU

NIGHT ATTACKSurprise Saves Lives h4u jor J ohn R . Patterson, In-falltry, S icily: The mission of our battalion afterlanding south of GELA in Sicily was to ca.pture theairport at BISCARI. The battalion used the silentnight attack. The three rifle companies were in linewith the hea,vy-weapons company in reserve. Toreach its line of departure, the battalion crossed two

precipitous ridges using two control lines, thenclimbed the cliff at the airport bo the line of depar-t.ure. A&l this was done silently under cover ofdarkness.

The a.ttack was started with a hand grenade.We didnt fire until the Germans counterattacked.

We went, in with bayonets and hand grenades andcaught some of the Germans undressed and dressing.The MI< IV tanks fired their guns but wouldnt close011 us. The enemy knew their men were all about, sofired their machine guns and rifles mainly into theair.

7


15/62

The first counterattack came in two hours, andthere was one about each hour thereafter until 1600.They had all emplacements wired and fixed with

t,rip-wire booby traps. We removed the traps andused the emplacements during counterattacks.We found a line of airplane bombs wired to

blow up the area; we dc-activated them. A Germanplane landed just as we were ready to leave theliue of departure. Later, one of our men grenaded it.

The battnliou took no transportation. I hadwith me the S-3, one runner, and one 511 radio.*The wire came up thirt,y minutes later, but was notnecessary.

I estimate the enemy had a reinforced bat-talion. His tauks and self-propelleds came up later.Some of the enemy were air personnel, and therewere about eleven AA guns set up for antipersomreluse.

Our attack lasted thirty minutes. We had nocasualties during the attack; two were killed duringthe counterattacks.

*

Hand-to-Hand Fight ing Captain Jarrold, Infantry:At BISCARI AIRPORT I used my trench knife twice.One of my men got three with his bayonet. He shotone, theu another tried to grab his bayonet. He gotthis one with the bayonet. That. got him started, sohe got t(liree in all before it was over.


16/62

Sma l l Arms Aga in s t Ar mor We found that caliber.30 AP pierces enemy armored half-tracks a,t closeranges.

*

Pla toon Ac t i on Lieuterann t Hollerich, In fant ry:Company A, moving forward in darkness to par-ticipate in the BISCARI AIRPORT fight, ran right intothe enemy position. Before the fight started, myplatoon crossed the road just above a culvert andreached the south edge of the airport, but I wa.sordered to take it back to a position just east. of the

culvert. I wish I could have stayed where I wasbecause it was a. perfect place from which t.o envelopthe resistance in front of my company.

When the enemy machine guns opened up wethrew grenades. The machine guns pulled back outof grenade fire. Then NCOs and Browning Auto-matic Riflemen went up over the embankment,through and beyond the initial enemy positions.

Eventually we had a, base of fire of about twentymen including the BARs.

During the enemy counterattacks we did prettywell with other fire, too. Lead was flying fast andfuriously at twenty t,o thirty yards. We fire atflashes. In this kind of firing you learn to fire androll to one sid e or th eyll soon get you.

One of the corporals sneaked up on a dug-in

vehicle and got it. with an 03 rifle grenade at 25yards.

9


17/62

The bazooka mm of my platoon heard Tanksto the right, went around a bend in t.he road, andfired at about 35 yards. He got the first of a pairof vehicles. A German officer tried to tiaptdre hini

with a pist.01, but he gave the officer au uiqlercut and

theu killed him with his helmet. I dont know howthe other vehicle was knocked out, but one of theBAR men got its driver.

COMMENT: I n t h e s e a c c ou n t s o f a s u c c e s sfu ln i g h t a t t a c k b y a s m a l l u n i t t h e a p p li ca t i o n o ft h e fo ll ow i n g p r i n c i p l e s i s w o r t h y o f n o t e :

a . C lo s e c on t r o l d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h b y t h e

u s e o f c o n t r o l l in e s a d j u s t e d t o d i ffi c u l t t e r r a i n

f e a t u r e s .b . D e s ig n a t i o n o f a L i n e o f D e p a r t u r e a s

c lo s e t o t h e o b je c t i ve a s p o s s i b le a n d a f t e r a l l m a j or

10


18/62

t e r r a i n ob s t a c le s h a d b e e n p a s s e d . T h i s i s e s s e n -

t i a l t o a s s u r e p r o p e r o r g a n i za t i on o f t h e u n i t im -m e d i a t e l yp r i o r t o t h e a s s a u l t .

c . At t a i n m e n t o f t h e v it a l e le m e n t o f s u r -

p r i s e (G er m a n s c a u g h t u n d r e s s e d a n d d r e s s in g ,a i r p l a n e s l a n d i n g o n t h e fi e ld ) .

d . U se o f t h e b a y o n e t a n d h a n d g r e n a d e s

w i t h n o w e a p o n fi r i n g p e r m i t t e d . I t m a y o ft e n

b e a d v i s a b l e t o p r o h i b i t t h e l oa d i n g o f r i fl e s.

e . U s e o f f r o n t a l a t t a c k o n l y. An y a t t e m p t

a t e n v e lo p m e n t ,t e n d s t o c a u s e d i s or d e r a n d c o n -

fu s i o n . N ot e t h a t o n e p l a t o on w h i c h h a d a d -

v a n c e d a h e a d o f t h e g e n e r a l l in e w a s p u l le d b a c k

t o c o n f o r m .f . A d e f i n i t e a n d l im i t e d o b je c t i v e -c a p t u r e o f

a n a i r f i e ld , i n t h i s c a s e -i n w h i c h t h e e n t i r e f r o n tc o u ld b e c ov e r e d b y m a n p o w e r r a t h e r t h a n fi r e -

p o w e r .T h e s e a r e t h e m a jo r e le m e n t s o f a s u c c e s sfu l

n i g h t a t t a c k b r o u g h t o u t i n t h e fo r e g oi n g a c c ou n t .O t h e r s n o t m e n t i o n e d b u t w h i ch w e r e u n d o u b t e d ly

c o n t r i b u t i n g fa c t o r s in t h i s o p e r a t i o n a r e :

C a r e f u l p la n n i n g i n m i n u t e d e t a i l.P r e c i s e , s p e c i fi c o r d e r s .

C a r e fu l a r r a n g e m e n t s fo r m a i n t e n a n c e o f

d i r e c t i o n .T h o r o u g h d a y l ig h t r e c o n n a i ss a n c e b y a s

m a n y o f t h e l e a d e r s a s p o s s i b le .U s e o f c om p a c t c o lu m n s i n t h e a p p r o a c h

fo r m a t i on u n t i l t h e L in e o f D e p a r t u r e i s r e a c h e d .

11


19/62

K NOCK ING OUT PILLBOXES

Colonel Rogers, Znfcmtry, Sicily: The neutrali-zation and reduction of concrete pillboxes played

an important part in the Sicilian campaign. In theinitial landing phases alone, this regiment cleanedout over thirty of these pillboxes. They were locatedall over the place as we went inland.

They were cleverly constructed and elab-orately camouflaged. Many were covered withbrush, grass, straw, or other natural stuff. Othershad ca.uc houses built over them to represent peasant

outbuildings or huts. All those we encountered inand about, villages and towns were covered over withsome kind of house to conceal them. Most of thesewere cane or wood shacks, though some were actuallycovered with plaster or stucco to represent realhouses. Many had dummy houses built right overthe pillbox, and windows a.rranged to give full free-dom of fire from the embrasures of the pillbox iuside

the shell of the building. In the open country anumber were also built with hay ricks and strawstacks over them, all very natural and imlocentlooking.

Reduction of these often proved very simple,and in many cases the enemy simply dug hisown grave in his efforts at camouflage. When welearned not to be surprised by them and recognized

them for what they were, we developed a very simplemethod of dealing with the ones concealed by straw,hay, caue, and other inflammable material. We

12


20/62

dosed them freely with white phosphorus, especiallyfrom the nttachcd chemica.1 mortars, and this did thework to perfection. We set the camo,ufla.ge on fire,

blinded the gunners inside, and choked them withthe phosphorus and the smoke from the burning ha.y,straw, and other materia.1. The fire and heat, too,made the interiors untenable, and the occupantswould become t.errified and come out. a.nd surrenderin a bunch.

In one place near LICATA there were severalof these straw- and hay-covered pillboxes, also someconcealed with cane huts, arranged at key positionsin country covered with wheat fields and terracedgrain plantings. We simply set a first-class prairiefire with our white phosphorus, and burned out aposition over 2,500 yards long. We waited until thewind was right and let t.hem have it. Every pillboxwas burned out. The more difficult pillboxes thatwouldnt burn we attacked with massed fire frommortars of all types, AT guns, and heavy machineguns. In the case of very t,ough ones that were re-inforced, we used bazooka rockets and at times sentmen up close under heavy covering fire and knockedthem out with bangalore torpedoes.

COMMENT: The u s e o f fi r e i s , o f c o u r s e , d e p e n d -e n t o n fa v o r a b l e w e a t h e r c o n d i t i on s . C a r e fu l co -o r d i n a t i o n i s a l so n e c e s s a r y t o i n s u r e t h a t t h er e s u l t in g s m o k e d o e s n o t in t e r fe r e w i t h t h e o p e r a -t i o n s a n d ob s e r v a t i on o f a d j a c e n t u n i t s .


21/62

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE

The following cases of individual iuitiative andheroism during t,he SALERNO landing were reportedby i.llC -tll Infmtry:

S crgcm t M a~n ucl Gonxales; upon landing, dis-covcrcd the posit.ion of a German 85 in the sanddunes iicar the beach. This gun was firing on the:m3nult~ boatrs as they lauded. The Sergeant creptaround the position under machine-gun fire whichset his pack on fire, and despite the hand grenadesbeing thrown at him. He then calmly tossed severalhand grenades into the gun emplacement, killing thecrew and blowing up their ammunition.

Ncsr PAESTUM Sergeant John Y. McGill,jumped ou an enemy tank aud dropped a hand gre-nade into the open turret, killing all the crew.

PrivdC Clnytm . I. T allm an, 011 HILL 424, ob-scrvcd that t,hc encnly was attempting an euvelop-inent of the left flauk of his company. Taking up abcttcr position, he killed an enemy machine-gun crewwith three carefully aimed shots. In a few minuteshe rcpeatcd the same action when another enemy ma-chine-gun crew appeared. He alone protected theleft ilank of t,hc coiupauy until the rest of the platoonarrived.

Priva te Burrell B. R eitch discovered that heand a. group of five men had been cut off from hiscollilmly. He inmcdiately organized them in a de-14


22/62


23/62

ACTION ON ATTU

Opcmtims report, Regimental Combat Team:To fight the Japs in this country our troops muststick to the high ground and not only outflank butout-altitude the enemy.

Continuous movement is necessary tq k&p thespa.rk in an. attack. If a machine gun covers onepoint, then a group not at that point must continueto advance. When fire is shifted, the original groupmust move. If even a platoon is entirely halted bythe fire of cncmy guns, then the commitment of ad-ditional troops results, whereas by proper coordina-tion some portion of the platoon can be kept movingand the force committed kept. to a minimum.

The tendency of lower commanders to commitreserves too early must be curbed.

Security cannot be overemphasized. Anymovcmc~lt~ or group on the battlefield, even in rearareas, is subject to enemy action. In this connection,considcra.tion must be given to the protection ofmedical installatiohs. At present these are left un-protected, without cvcn individual arms for theirpersonnel. In the event of any enemy penetrationthrough our front-line positions.it is practically cer-tain that these installations will be hit.

Aggressive patrolling, particularly to mai;ltain

active contact, is of vital importance and can meanthe difference between defeat and victory. However,mere numbers of patrols will not solve the problem.Special training in patrolling and organizing patrols

16


24/62

must be initiated. Commanders must pla,n to havereasonably fresh men available for night contact..It, is vital to organize patrol activity carefully to in-

sure tha.t all lines are familiar with the routes ofret.urning patrols so that the danger of mistakenident,it.y in the darkness will be minimized.

*

Lieutenan t General S im on B. Bu ckn er, Com -malldiny General, Alaskan Department: It wasapparent t.hat the enemy was particularly vulner-

able to att.ack by units of our infantry which pushedforward vigorously while the enemy was held downby artillery fire. Those units which had learned toadvance closely behind their own artillery sup-porting fire had the greatest! success.

The Japs do. not like our coordinated art.illeryfire nor do t.hey like our atta.cks with the ba.yonet.When under fire from small arms they stay down

in their holes and are easily approached. When at.-tacking small groups of foxholes, our troops were ableto keep the Japs down by fire from rifles and theBrowning Automatic Rifle while some of our menapproached and dropped hand grenades into theirholes. This was our favorite mop-up method.

When about to be run out of a, position, the Japsseemed to feel it necessary to counterattack. These

attacks were not well coordinated and were welcomedby our,troops, who were able then to shoot down theenemy in great. numbers. These Jap counterattackswere of a suicidal character and were pressed home

,jcii.751--4J--~P4 17


25/62

regardless of losses until practically all of the coun-t.erattacking troops were exterminated.

The euemy may believe that, in such terrain,he can hold up the advance of a.11 entire battalion

with three men and a light machine gun. In fact,however, he is critica.lly vulnerable to intelligent ac-tion by officers and men who understand the neces-sity for immediate maneuver against small partiesof the enemy seeking to hold them up. The factwas that small maneuvering patrols easily disposedof machine-gun positions on reverse slopes behindmountain spurs, whereas any tendency to lie down

and call for artillery support would have resultedonly in tremendous wastage of artillery fire in at-tempting to seek out targets which, in fact, were in-accessible to artillery fire.

The ATTU action likewise indicated that stand-ard Japanese infiltration tactics can be offset bya system of anti-termite patrols organized behindour lines, protecting our artillery, command posts,

nnd supply lines. Wherever troops know that thesefriendly patrols are behind them, fire in their rearwill mean to them simply that our patrols are ex-terminating the infilt.rating Japs. This feeling waswell expressed by General Nathan Bedford Forrest[Confederate cavalry commander, Civil War], whenoue of his staff officers approached him in great ex-citement and said, General, the enemy is in our

rear. Forrest calmly replied: If theyre in ourn, wemust be in theirn.


26/62

THE SOUTH PACIFIC

SECURITY IN THE J UNGLE

In Bivouac Report of Comm anding General, 43dDiv ision, N ew Georgia Campaign: Security inbivouac was a big problem in this New Georgia oper-ation. The Japs conducted harassing raids againstour bivouac areas with some success for a period ofabout a \veeli. Our initial plan had been atloptetl onthe advice of other units experienced in jungle war-fare. It callctl for complete immobility at night,with grenades and bayonets as the only defenseweapons. Gun crews were directed to fire only inthe event of a major attack. However, we foundthat, small parties of Japs were able to filter into thebnttlc arcas alrtl cause so~nc cusdtics without b&gseriously opposccl.

This situation was effectively corrected by us-ing a, close perimeter defense. Men occupying theseperimeter lines were ordered t.0 fire at known targets.

Machine guns were so laid that, final protective linescovered the perimeter. The nature of the terrainand the type of night tactics employed by the Japa-llese made the establishment of outposts for securitypurposes inadvisable as visibi1it.y w as limited to a fewfeet, from any given outpost. Two men occupiedeach foxhole, one remaining awake and alert to allactivity in his vicinity. Within the perimeter,

machetes were used from the foxholes against anyenemy raiders who were able to penetrate. Thissystem effectively tliscouragctl night raids.

19


27/62

On the March March security adhered to estab-lished doctriue except that distances betweeu theelements of the colun~n were greatly reduced. Ex-tremely limited visibility and the difficulty of movingthrough the jungle off the trails nearly always pre-veu ted close-in security de tachmeu ts.

*JUNGLE NOTES

Aggress ive Ac t ion , F lex ib le Plans Repor t o f 43dDivisioll, New Georgia: Aggressive ac tiou is iiec-cssery. Never relax the pressure. Maneuver of

small units at the risk of temporary loss of com-munications is important. Plaus and orders mustbe so flexible as to permit prompt inaneuver change.

Feed ing the Troops The serving of auy hot mealsin jungle fighting is often impracticable. A hotdrink or hot soup serves the same purpose aud is~nuch more withiu the realm of possibility.

An issue of two canteeus per mau relieves the

water problem a lot in jungle operatious.

*

C o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e First Marine Division, Gu,ada.l-ca.mb: Due to the amount of vital iuforlnatiou wehad taken from captured Japanese message centers

* we decided at ouce that, we wouldnt make the samemistake. Comnaud post iustallatious were usually

in the foxhole of the unit commander. *Papers ofpossible value to the euemy were destroyed or seutto the rear.

20


28/62

SCOUTING AND PATROLLINGPa t r o l l i ng i n t h e Jung l e A11 officer wit.11 consider-able experience in jungle patrolling gives this a.dvice :

Patrols are most likely to give away theirpresence in an area. by their footprints.

Shine from the smallest metal surface, such asa belt buckle, or a watch, must be avoided. Aluminous watch constitutes a. real danger.

A white skin is most conspicuous, and thepractice of som e pat rol members marching st rippedt o t he w aist is invit ing trouble.

Dark clothing is essential.Any noise, such as talking, coughing, spitting,

etc., has to be treated as the greatest of all dangers.A man on patrol must. learn to move silently,

making every possible use of natural cover.

*

Dont Forge t the * Where ! Colonel Liversedge,

U. 8. Marit le Corps, N ew Georgia: II I many casespatrol leaders were able to report. wha.t they saw, butnot where it was seen. In general, such informationwas valueless as locations could not be plot.ted on amap or aerial photo. This should be emphasized intraining programs and is worth a special directive.

*

----or t he d4What pv! Seventh Army Report, Sicily:Men must. be taught to recognize w hat t hey seewhen they are scanning the landscape. Unless

21


29/62

properly traiued they will uot recognize enemy guueinplacements, strong points, and machine-gunn e s t s .

*

Pat ro l Tips Stnf l Sergeant R ichard E. Dehtd , In-

fantry, Sicily: I was not. taught to observe properlyuor how to use the message blauk.

Position aud camouflage are more import.antthan I learued in the States. In training bear downou cover aud couccahneut; bear down 011 the avoid-auce of the blundering approach, ou patrols, ou fireaud nxmeuver-which are equally important.

Battles move slowly; patrols caut dash about.My battalion, instead of usiug Scouts Out, used

a full squad iu wedge formation to do the job.

*

Size of Patrols Lieutenant Colonel TV. A. W alk er,

Tank Destroyer Batt alion Comm ander, Tunisia:

Ma.uy meu were lost in Tuuisia by using squad

patrols. The Germaus used stronger patrols aud justgobbled them up. A patrol should be either a sueakpatrol, small enough to escape detection, or a combatpatrol, large enough to fight its way out of difficulty.Never allow oue mau to go out alone.

Say I t Wi t h P ic tu res ! The value of hasty sketchesillustrating recouuaissauce report,s was proved mauy

times during this caulpaign, but it is difficult to getsuch sketches out of uutrained personnel. Allreconnaisance personnel should receive sketchiugt,raiuiiig.

22


30/62

INFANTRY WEAPONS.

IN JUNGLE WARFARE

The following commentls on t,he use and effec-tivencss of infantry weapons in jungle warfare ap-pear in the report of the 43d Division on the MUNDACampaign-NEw G E O R G I A

Basic Weapons The I I L l rifle is doubtless the bestall-around weapon possessccl by our troops. Its serv-iceability under existin g campaign condit.ions is ex-

cellent. Ammunition supply was adeqate, since therifle was normally fired only a.t observed targets.The Japs possessed a number of our Ml rifles, appar-ently considering them a superior weapon to theirOWll.

The fragmentation grenade was used fre-quently against suspected areas of heavy junglegrowth and on some occasions for the destruction of

booby traps around perimeter defenses. Its effectwhen used as a booby trap is cmestionable becauseof the long fuze time. lhc Jnps used our grenadesextensively in their night harassing raids against ourbivouacs. Rifle grenades were used on some occa-sions with success against enemy pillboxes.

% spite of its handicap of sounding like a. Jap.25-caliber light machine gun, the Thompson sub-

machine gun proved very satisfactory for speckpersonnel such as linemen, artillery forward ob-servers, vehicle drivers, and reconnaissance person-

23


31/62

nel. Its limited rauge made it especially useful iucombat in rear areas.

The Browning auto rifle gave excellent service.This weapon has high jungle mobility aud providesexcelleut fire power for the short-range targets fre-yueutly encountered. It has beeu used mauy times toreinforce the fiual protective liues at night, to estab-lish trail blocks, to cover patrol advances, aud todestroy snipers.

The light machine guu proved very effective inthe uight security of bivouacs. At other times, it wasused to cover the advance of attacking echelous by

placing heavy fire in the directiou of suspected pill-boxes. Siuce fields of fire aud visibility were solimited the effectiveucss of such support was ques-tionable.

We did uot use the heavy machine guu to auyexteut in the attack in the jungle. This was mainlydue to its weight and to its heavy ammunition supplyrequirements. It was used primarily for the defense

of beachheads aud water passageways, also t,o someext,eut in the defeusc of regiineutal aud battalioucouuuaud posts.

The 60mn mortar was uot, effective aga,iustenemy pillboxes, a.lthough it uuquestiouably coutrib-uted by its demoralizing effect ou the enemy. Afterwe reached the outer taxiways of the airfield, we hadexcellent visibility from ideally situated OPs, and the

disorganized enemy presented many profitable tar-gets for this weapou. The except ional accum cy of t hew capo,l ma.de it very va luable in close support , and


32/62

its use during the assault 011, he revetments albd shellcraters at MUNDA FIELD and KOKENGOLO HILL iscredited with saving ~nur~y lives.

The Blmm mort,ar proved to be one of the most

important single weapons contributing to the successofthis offensive. Because of the difficulty of supplyonly two mortars were taken forward with eachheavy-weapons company, the balance of tl1e person-nel being used as ammunition carriers. Troops fre-

quently remarked that if given the choice of rations

or Slmm mortar ammunition, they would gladly taket,he latter.

While the 37111111 AT gun is a,dnlittedly awea.pon of opportunity in jungle wa.rfare, there weretwo occasions on which it served us handsomely. TheNips had a field piece located where it could interdictour beachhead at LAIANA. Scouts located the gun,but our mortar fire couldnt silence it. We disassem-

bled a 37111111 un and carried it forward under coverof the dcnsc foliage. The gun was then assembled under cover and moved rapidly to a point in the open

25


33/62

from where it could con~nmncl t,he tar&. Three ac-curately aimed romds dcstroycd the pm alld killedits crew .

On another occasion we picked up an enemy oc-cupiecl pillbox about 600 yarrl~ from one of our OPs.The 37111m gun was manhancllecl to a position on the.forward slope in only partial concealment. It placedaccurate and intense fire on the pillbox and com-pletely destroyed it.

The value of the 371111n gun was also provedby two episodes when the enemy attempted to makenight lanclings. First, one enemy barge was fired onas it neared a lancling on BOMISOE PENINSULA. BothHE and AP ammunition were used, and the bargewas hcarcl to limp away, sputtering badly. On an-other night a group of Japs approached the northcoast of SAGEKARASAS SLAND in an assault boat.Antitank gunners helcl their fire until the boat wasnearly ashore, then fired scvcral rounds of canister.The boat. was seen to sink and several boclies floated

ashore the next clay.

4.2 C h e m i c a l M o r t a r The. 4.2-inch chemicalmortar company was placed under the control of theDivision Artillery and the fires of the chemical mortarscoordinated with artillery fires. These mortars, em-ploying a 25-pou11d high-explosive shell, were usedsuccessfully wit,11 the artillery in firing preparationsprior to an attack ancl in firing prearranged fires suchas area bqrrages to block enemy routes and to disruptba.rge traffic near WESTERN SAGEBARASAS SLAND.One prisoner stated that. the mortar barrages were26


34/62

more feared by thein than artillery. The ouly criti-cism of the weapon is that the shell has no delayedfuze; couscqueutly, a great mauy tree bursts resultfrom its use.

*

IN SICILY

Advance Guard Cu.ptch Reed, Infan.try: We havehad cousidcrable success in using a platoou ofheavy machiue guus with each advance or assaultcompany. You ueed this increase of fire power rightup there iii front. With the advance guard we puta platoou of machiue guns right .up in the forwardsupport. We also put a section of 37mn AT gunsrig11 behind the advance party. The remaining sec-tiou of AT gulls is placed behind the support of theadvance guard. We place the 57111111s and the canlioncompany in the center of the main body.

*

Pyrotechnics S taff S ergccm t R obert J . Kem p, In-funtry: We waiit lots of pyrotechnics for use iiiall kinds of situations to include bedeviling the enemy.Sometimes Jerry puts 011 a pyrotechnic show that justscares hell out of us; it. would work on him too.

*

Miscellaneous Comment Various Small Infantry

Unit Conamcmders: %lum mort,ar: A perfectwea,pon. I like to use the alternate traversingmethod.

27


35/62

6Omm mortar: We kept them right up jn frontand used them often.

Bazooka: We have had no trouble with ourbazookas. Have gotten several tanks with them.

37mm AT gun: Very mobile. Its artillery;good against a,nything-vehicles, pillboxes, person-nel, houses. Gets in faster than the mortar. If Ihad to throw away any heavy weapons, the 37would be t,he last. to go.

75mm self-propelled cannon : Excellent for co-ordinated attack-perfect. Too vulnerable to getvery close initially. _

*

AT SALERNO

The 4ABazookaTp Worked Operations report, _thInfantry: .Several tank attacks occurred which theInfantry fought off with their bazookas. It becamemore and more apparent that this was really aneffective weapon. During this one day it destroyedseven enemy tanks.

COMMENT : Numerous reports i n d i c a t e t h e e ffe c -t i v e n e s s o f t h e B a z o ok a w h e n used b y t r a i n e dp e r s o n n e l . I t h a s b e e n u s e d s u c c e s sfu l ly a g a i n s tp i l lb o x e s , m a c h i n e -g u n n e s t s , a n d p e r s o n n e l .

28


36/62

INFANTRY-ARTILLERY TEAM

Art i l lery 6AClosev Suppor t Lieutenant ColonelMcCor,kck , Field Art illery, N ew Georgia: Our in-fant,ry, finding themselves wit.h a mobile enemy onthree sides and a swamp on the fourth, called fordefensive fires. A horseshoe of concentration fireswas laid down around them. Infantry commandersstated their willingness to accept8 responsibility forany casualties resulting from these fires, which were

adjusted so close to the defensive positions that frag-ments were received within the perimeter. The fireswere continued throughout the night tiith no casual-ties to frienclly troops. T his fire wa s credit ed withprolmbly savi,z.y th e force from d isaster. For sometime Concentration 110 became a by-word with all _.infall t,rymen.

*

--and How I t Worked R eport of Operations,Mm da Cal,lpaign, N ew Georgia: The best cure forthe whistle-blowil;g, howling night attack was aclosely adjusted system of night fires placed aroundour troops. The all-night firing of single batteriesand sometimes a single gun discouraged these at-tacks. What few were attempted after this systemwas inaugurated were quickly stopped by short burstsof fire at maximum rate in the vicinity of the unitbeing attacked and along the front of adjacent units.

29


37/62

Massed Fi res hut crralrt Colonel Jam es, 1~

jnn try, Sicil.7~: Our division artillery was neverout of support for more than five minutes throughoutthe whole campaign. Weve got a wonderful set of

battalions in our divisionartillery, and we haveworked so closely toget,herthat, they are as much apart of our outfit, as ourown battalions. Theykeep right up on our heelsall the time, and that is

just what we ha.ve got toha.ve. I dont, know what

we could have done without them. They leap-frogged their batteries continually and went intosome of the damndest. positions I ha.ve ever seen,am1 delivered the goods. We just. cant praise themt,oo 1nuch. They were always right there when youneeded them.

713 one place where we just couldnt get forwardbecause t,he Heinies were on superior ground and hadus pinned down with rifle, machine-gun, and mortarfire, the division artillery massed nine batt.eries onthem and plastered them with 1,500 rounds in lessthan thirty minutes. We then walked through that,position without a scratch, and the German deadwere all over the place.

30


38/62

INFANTRY-TANK TEAM

O p p o r t u n i t y L o s t Captain Putnam, I?zfa?rtry,Sicfly~: The infan tr y should be giveu pr acticaltr am mg in cooperat ion with ta nks. I dont m ean th ear mored infan tr y-th eyre pa rt of th e ar mored divi-siou aud work with th em all th e time. I mean ordi-nary iiifaiitry like us. I kn ow our regiment didntha ve a ny tr aining with ta iiks in prepar at ion for coin-bat. At BRANIERI we just didnt know how to workwith the at tached tan k uni t . When our tanks cameup t o support us after we ha d broken up th e Germa nat ta ck, we did not follow up th e ta uk s properly asthey weut forward. Had w e done so w e could haveclecrl,ed out almost a battaliolz of Germans. We hadiiot been trained to work with tanks, and we re-ma ined in position after they went forwa rd. Zf wehad know?~. how to go forw ard w ith t hem w e couldhave done a much bett er job and could have got t enall of t he Germans v ehicles and mat Crie1. After thisexperience, we str ongly recomm end th at al l infantrybe given pra ctical t ra ining in coopera tion with t an ksin action. Get th e infan tr ymen used to ta nks andhow t o fight togeth er wit,11 ,liein.

Lesson Learned First Marine Division, Gundal-calI al: The initia l assa ult by our five tan ks acrossth e field east of our 3d Bat ta lion lines at th e Bat tle

of Bloody Ridge on GUADALCANAL as ent irely su c-cessful. They caused mu ch ha voc am ong the enemyand retu rn ed un lmmed. With in an hour, th ey

31


39/62

attacked again over the same terrain. Meanwhile,the Japs had had time to move 37mm AT guns intoposition along the edge of the woods at the eastern

side of the field. These guns knocked out three ofour tanks during the second assault. It thus provedextremely unwise to launch a second attack over thesame route and terrain. This is especially true ifthere is sufficient elapsed time for the enemy to moveAT guns into position.

*

In fan t ry -Tank At t ack Lieutenant Colonel Perkim,Taltk Battalion Cormnader, Italy : Shortly afterlanding at SALERNO we attackedhill south of thetown of OLIVETO. The attack was up a winding road.The medium tanks moved down into the bottomsat the foot of the hill into a covered posit.ion andcovered the light tanks as they went up. As t.helight ta.nks went up the hill both the lights andmediums fired on the enemy infantry. When theyspotted enemy soldiers going into buildings themediums took care of the buildings, leaving the lighttanks to take care of the infantry and the machineguns. Both the lights and mediums stayed untilthe infantry took over.

The rush-to-battle idea is wrong. Here wecreep up. Each tank should overwatch another

tank; each section should overwatch another section;each platoon another platoon.

32


40/62

RANGER TRAININGBuddy Sys tem Lieutena fat Colo?tel Wilk cm 0.Ba rby, Com m an din g Oficer of R an gers, Itaby: In

our work we use the Buddy system-the men alwayswork in pairs. They live in pairs, eat in pairs, doguard in pairs-even do 19 in pairs. Confidence ineach other is developed. They can pick their ownbuddy from within their platoon.

Real ism In our training we never do anythingwithout battle noises and effects. We always use liveammunition. We use mines, barbed wire, and pro-tective bands of machine-gun fire extensively. If theproblem is to ca.pture a machine-gun nest, there isalways a machine-gun nest there with a machine gunfiring in a fixed direction. The men very quickly getaccustomed to having live ammunition flyiug aroundthem.

Captured Italian and C&man machine gunsand machine pistols are used by the enemy in ourl~roblenls. Our men quickly learn to distinguishbetween t.he fire of our own weapons and that ofenemy weapons. Also the enemy makes constantuse of flares.

We always carry our normal load of ammuni-tion with weapons loaded. If a man knows hiswenl~on is loaded he will be more careful in handlingit. Accidental discharge of a weapon automatically

meaus a. fine and immediate reduction to the gradeof ljrivate. In our work, we must take drastic meas-ures to guard against accidental discharge of weap-

33


41/62

ens. We learned our lesson in Tunisia, yherc lheaccidental disclzargc of a rifle queered u. raid andcaused a d/t -hour delay in. opera tiom . [See commenton this subject following Night Attack.]

Recogn i t ion We LISP colorcrl flashlights with thelight dimmed down for recognition purposes in nightwork. Different colors are used, and we usually havea cert,ain light signal for recognition; for instance,A which would be a dot, dash. It gives a mangreat comfort and confidence when workingat. night,especially in towns, to receive a recognition signal

when he needs one.

Format ions We use a column formation for ap-proach and assault movement. at night. From experi-ence, I believe it is the best, formation to use at night.We do not attempt, to use prominent terrain fea.turesto keep direction. We use pacing, compass bearing,and stars. Usually in advancing to attack at night weha,lt to check position every 1,000 yards. We start

moving again by radio signa. over the SClt 536 orby rrinner.

It is necessary to arrange for collecting yourmen together again after t.he raid is over. To dothis I have men stationed along a line through whichmen will pass at intervals in their withdrawal. Thesentinels on this line stop and collect. the men intogroups as they withdraw.

*A ~~,b~~~und Handy-talkie trallsmitter-receiver.

34


42/62

Cooking 1 prefer to have men cook their own mealswith their mess kits. We did not have kitchens inSicily, and we have been here 8 month without them.Even though the kitchens are available I always havemen individually cook at least one meal a day.

Phys ica l Condi t ion ing One of our best means ofphysical conditioning is speed marching, finallyreaching a point where we march ten miles at a rateof six miles au hour. To keep in condition we usecalisthenics aud a daily five-mile speed march.

Disc ip l ine Disciplinary drills are all important.We have a retreat formation daily, conditions per-mitting. At this formation meu are inspected andsome manual of arms performed, followed by retreat.Every Sunday morning there is a review, followedby inspection in rauks, and then inspection of campor quarters. We have at least four periods a week ofclose-order drill and manual of arms, and one periodevery week is devoted to military courtesy.

Infractions of discipline, military courtesy, anduniform regulations are dealt with quickly and se-verely. The officers must bear down on these things.The Army in general has not stressed strict disciplineenough. Without it you are lost.

35


43/62

.Lo-ng Tom in Actio n


44/62

SECTIQN II

FIELD ARTILLERY

ARTILLERY IN THE JUNGLE

Antipersonnel Fire Report oj Operations, ArundelIsband: It was apparent that the Japs were con-%%&ng their forces on STIMA PENINSULA. . . .The area was divided by coordinates and assigned tovarious artillery and lnortar elements. Heavy fireswere placed ou then1 throughout the night. . . .During the advauce down the peninsula the next day *.nunlerous enemy dead were noted, verifying the effec-tiveness of the previous nights concentrations.

*

Dealing with Tree Snipers R eport of Operations,&Id Division, New Georgia.: We effectively curedthe Jap of his liking for sniping frown trees by theconnnand, Fire Mission. All Battalions. . . .

37


45/62

Fuze Quick. Three Volleys. The quick fuze resultedin bursts in the tree tops. After a. week of this treat-ment the Jap sniper movccl from t,he trees to thear0u11d.

Adjus tm en t s f F i re All close support adjustmentswere made by sound and fragment method until thelatter part of the campaign, when ground observationwas obtained. l~orward observers were always in themost forward posiGon possible-in some cases in ad-vance of the lines. Adjustments were time-consum-ing, starting a.t a range surely over friendly troopsa,nd working gradually closer to our front lines.Some smoke was used but not very successjull~ ill theju/zgle. Tree tops were not used for observation be-cause of the limited Gezo cmd the fact that our troopswere susjuicious of all uctivity in trees. Prisoners ofwar inquired about our automatic artillery.

Mora le Effec t The incesssnt firing of our artilleryduring the six-week period produced contrasting ef-

38


46/62


47/62

I Except. for thetinue our defense.

*

Amm uni t ion and Fuzes

artillery we could con-

First Marine Division,Guadalcanal: The super-quick fuze is more effectivethan the delay fuze against troops in wide areas, par-ticularly in the cocoanut groves of the tropics. Areport from prisoners indicated that in one unit ofapproximately 100 men, all but six were casualtiesas a result of one artillery concentration. The37mm canister proved to be a devastating type of

ammunition.

Disposi t ion In jungle warfare the artillery of thedefensive set-up should not be placed too close to theinfantry line. The added range thus obtained is ofno value unless observation of the terrain permits itsuse, which will very seldom be the case. Artillery tooclose to the infantry is not only needlessly exposed,but is actually less effective because of the limits im-

posed by minimum-range considera.tions, and, in thecase of 105mm howitzers, because of the impossibilityof using high-angle fire at, ranges less than 2,000yards.

Liaison The liaison officers with infantry regiment.should be officers with as much experience as possible,preferably of the rank of captain or above. Whenpossible, either the artillery battalion commander orhis executive officer should be sent to the infantryregimental CP at. first sign of enemy act,ivity.


48/62

IDEAS FROM ITALY

Reinforc ing F i re Lieutem m t Colonel R. D. Fun k,

Field Artillery, B attalion Com m an der: If I cmspare the radios I am going to scud oue to the artillerybattalion that reinforces me the uext time we are indirect support. Theu wheu oue of our observers callsin a fire mission we cm simply tell the radio at theother battalion to take the mission direct fromthe observer. This will eliminate a relay throughour Fire Direction Center aud speed thiugs up

considerably.

Transpo r t a t i on We keep ouly seven 2$&toutrucks with each howitzer battery. The three sparesstay in the Service Battery ready to replace damagedoues in any howitzer battery. This also allows themaiutenauce section to have vehicles available forG,OOO-mile checks. When one is finished they sendit out to replace auother that is due for check.

Fi re Di rec t ion Cente r We are usiiig two sLa-toutrucks for the CP section of Headquarters Batt,ery.Each has a teut aud a fire direction group. Whenwe move the CP we send out oue truck with the S-3.He takes over the operation of the Fire DirectionCenter wheu he gets set, up, aud the rear Cl? canthen close down aucl move.


49/62

Uses of he Pack Board


50/62

Pack Boards for Observers We use pack boards*for forward observers a11d liaison parties. They area woliderful help in hilly or mountainous country

when these parties have t&o eave their vehicles andhoof it. Two for each party adds up to six per how-itzer battery and six in Battalion HeadquartersBa.ttery.

43


51/62

PP

PoTcGRAP BY . s. ARMY SlGNAL CORPS

Patrol of the 25th Division, New Georgia Campaign


52/62

SECTION IIIMISCELLANEOUS,

Booby Traps Seven.th Army Report, SicilTJ: AGermnu Luger pistol was booby trapped~table.A uew replacement picked it up. Two were killedaud fourteeu wounded in the resultiug explosion.

*

First Division Report, Tmisia.: A Luger pis-tol was fouud lying 011 the ground. Au Americauiufautry lieuteuaut carefully tied a loug cord to itand then, getting iuto a hole, pulled it to him audput it iii his pocket,. Later in the day while exam-ining the pistol he attempted to remove the maga-zine. The explosiou killed the lieuteuaut aud twoother meu aud wounded six soldiers.

*Timeliness of Orders Ma.jor Kinney, Infant ry ,S i c i l y : Our chief difficulty throughout the cam-

45


53/62

paign was the lack of time given for the execution oforders. Frequently we received operations orderswhich did not, allow enough time for proper prepara-tion and execution.

At SANFRATELLO, we

receivedan order after 11 PM to attack at 6 AM the nextmorning. The battalions were in sssembly areassome five or six miles from the line of departure.The terrain over which they had to move to get inposition in the dark was the roughest, most ruggedmountain country you could imagine, and all theammunition. weapons, a~$ supplies had to be takenby hand and by mule pack. Although it might seemthat from 11 PM to 6 AM was sufficient time, theactual conditions were such that it was less than halfenough, because of the terrain, darkness, and trans-port difficulties. Also, the men had just completedmarches over mountain trails of nine to fourteemiles and were not fresh for the new movement.

*

Maps Seventh Army Report, Sicily: Instill in allpersonnel an appreciation of the value of maps. Thesupply of maps will never be adequate to the demand.Training in the care ad preserva.tion of maps is asimportant as t,raining in the care and preservation ofmaGrie1. I

AA Fire It was found necessary to issue instruc-tions that ground troops, with the exception of AA

units, would not fire at airplanes unless the planesattacked them or were close enough to be identifiedbeyond a possible clcubt.46


54/62

S ecur ity 1st Division, G-2 R eport, S icily: Iuter-rogatiou report of a captured Germast includesthe following: About the cud of June, 1943, Germau

air crews were shown a report aud given a lecture outhe t,actical aud technical details of the P-47 Thuu-derbolt, alleged to be based upou the statemeutsmade by a captured U. S. Army Air Force captain.

C O MM E N T: T h e m o r a l o f t h i s s t o r y i s o b v i ou s .H a m m e r h o m e t h e n e c e s si t y fo r s a y in g a b s o -l u t e l y n o t h i n g b u t , M y n a m e i s .. . . . . ; m yr a n k is. . . . . . . . ; m y s e r i a l n u m b e r i s. . . . . , .

*

St ra f ing Ai rc ra f t ,Fifth Arlny Report, Salerno:During lauding operatious at SALERNO, mauy mem-bersof the -th Division would staud up to fire theirrifles, carbines, aud eveu pistols at strafing and bomb-iug German aircraft. This resulted in mauy uuuec-cssary casualties.

C O MM E N T: P e r s o n n e l n o t a s s i g n e d t o a d e f i -n i t e AA m i s s io n s h o u l d d i s p e r s e a n d t a k e c o ve r ,fi r i n g t h e i r i n d i v id u a l w e a p o n s fr o m su c h c o ve r a ta t t a c k i n g a i r c r a f t o n l y, a n d e v e n t h e n o n l y w h e nt h e s e c o m e w i t h i n t h e e ffe c t i ve r a n g e s o f t h e i rw e a p o n s .

*,

66Gas! Cobolae l M. E. Barker, Chemical, WarfareS ervice, S alern o: 011 the third day of the operationwe had a big gas scare. A Gerinau airplane came inaud released two or three radio-controlled bombs,which gave off considerable smoke when released aud

47


55/62

while on the way down. Severai men on the beachessaw this smoke and concluded that an air gas attackwas being started. At t.he same time some.vehicles

climbing the sand dunes from the beach to the de-waterproofing area, had become so hot that theirga.s-indicat.or paint turned red. The two incidentstogether convinced everybody on the beach that agas attack was being launched. By this t.ime, ofcourse, there were plenty of battlefield smells, in-cluding that always-prescn t smell of rotting animaland human flesh. The gas alarm ran up and downthe beaches and the roads inland.

There was no panic. Everybody simply puton his gas mask and carried on. The MPs stoppedall personnel going into the area who didnt havegas masks. Those individuals who had misplacedtheir gas masks were really troubled for a while.Both Colonel Guild and I investigated and then gavethe all clear signa.1. I think we ,would have carriedon in exactly the same way without much loss oftime or eficiency if gas had actually been present.

*

C o u n t e r a t t a c k F o i l e d Lieutenant Colonel Taylor,Infantry, Italy: We had just relieved the -thInfantry amt had had numerous casualties froma.n enemy tank attack against our beachhead atSALERNO. We were occupying a defensive, wired-inposition. The Germans counterat,tacked with tanks,but, because we were occupying a different positionfrom that used by the preceding unit the enemy first48


56/62

started across our front, apparently believing thatwe were in the old position. So it was duck soup.WC knocked out eight tanks with our 37s, 57s, TDs,and tanks.

*

R o o m f o r I m p r o v e m e n t The following comments,indicating weaknesses which must be corrected, weremade by the Comm anding General, -th Division,Italy: Sometimes units failed to dispose them-selves properly for all-around defense when halted onan objective or when placed in a position for defense.

[In the attack, riflemen frequently failed to pro-vide fire that would cover the movement of adjacentunits, merely because they were not able to pin-point definitely the location of the enemy rifle andmachine-gun elements firing on our t.roops.

Some small unit commanders selected positionsapparently with cover arid concea,lment as .the pri-ma,ry objective rather than positions from which

effective fire could be brought to bear on the enemy.Due to the enormous division frontage in the

second phase of the landing at SALERNO sonze com-mand ers att empted to stretch t heir units excessively,and as -a result pcrmit tcd faulty dispositiolas.

49


57/62


58/62

SECTION IV

NOTES ON THE NIPS

Japanese Pillboxes Lieu tenan t Colonel McCor-m ick, Field Art illery, N ew Georgia: In most casespillboxes were built in two decks to permit the occu-pants to drop through a trap door during heavyshelling. They were used for heavy-weapons firingand had communication trenches which concealedlight machine guns protecting the pillboXes. All weremutually supporting a.nd very well concealed.

*

Superman Myth Exploded Operations Report, 4SdDivision, New Georgia: Our troops here came t)oregard the Superman stories about the Japanese asridiculous. The Jap is tricky bit not so tricky asmany have been led to believe. He is not nearly soingenious or adaptable as the average American,, andthe truth of the matter is hes afraid of us, of our

51


59/62

ertillcry, and of our sea and air power. Our troopsmust learn this and never forget, it.

l ap Trap We soon learned that. the Japanese per-

mitted small leading elements of the column toproceed past their effectively camouflaged fortifica-tions and would not open fire until our main bodycame along.

Defens ive Ac t ion Operat ioll Report, @d Divi.sio~z,Arundel Islarad: (Our first contact with t.he enemywas made by patrols, which encountered small groupsof Japs equipped with automatic weapons. Theirresistance consisted of a fluid delaying action and,during the ea.rly phases, could not be effectively fixed.After a short skirmish the Japs would withdraw sev-eral hundred yards and re-establish their temporarydefense. The denseness of the jungle made such adefense quite effective in delaying our progress.

*

Vine Fn tang lem en t s Co lo l l e l Liv ersedge, U. S .Marine Corps, New Georgia: The Japanese useda prickly native vine for entanglements. The vineswere interwoven and used to protect. defensive posi-tions in lieu of barbed wire. Results were effectiveand impeded at tack. Vines had to be cut beforeprogress could be made.

Our 0~12 troops should be instru cted in. the u seof these v&es as a means of improvisation when wireis not, available.

52


60/62

SECTION VHIN TS ON THE HEINIE

Reverse Slope Tactics Second Lieutemunt S. TV.Mall&, Infantry, Platoon Leader, Sicily: Enemymachine guns, inorta.rs, and auto%ZKrifles werelocated on the reverse side of the hills so as to catchour advancing infantry as they came over the slry-line.

*

Dont Gawk! Private George Scott, Injantry,Sicily: Several times German planes p&endedthat they were involved in a dog-fight to secure theatteut.ion of the ground troops. Then they swoopeddown in a strafing run.

*

Traps and Mines P&ate First Class Edward.Borgcx, Infantry, Sicily: The enemy abandoned

53


61/62

his tanks with motor running. When we tried to stopthe motors they blew up.

The Germans would put a mine in a. road with

another mine a sufficierit~ depth under it so that, it,would not be seen if the top mine were removed..For a while our sappers did not run t.he mine detectorover the area again where the first mine had beenfound. But. after the dirt became packed down suf-ficiently by traffic, the second mine would go off.

*

M i n o r Ta c t i c s Stafl Sergeants Richard E. Delaltdand Robert d. Kemp, Infant ry, Sicily: Never. leta.n apparently lone machine gun sZFj&i into a trap.The Germans will usually not fire on the individualbut will wait, watch where he goes, and get a, wholeflock.

Germans always approach their positions fromt,he end and under cover so as not to give them away.

(111 he counterattack the Jerry machine gun isalways well forward. German weapons are fasterbut are less accurate than ours; they scare you morethan they hurt. you. The German Slmm mortar isthe worst, goat-grabber; it gives you no notice whenit is coming in.

Germans use tanks to maneuver and fire froma. distance in attack. When the going gets hot they1~111 he tanks in and, after a minute, bring them outagain.

54


62/62

Typicalllel P.Italy:

Attack and Withdrawal Lieutenant Col.o-H. Perkins, Tan k Battalion Com m and er,

The standard Gernlan attack here consistsof three or four tanks in line in the lead. They arefollowed by infantry in trucks at four to five hundredyards. The rest of the tanks follow the infantry.When fire is drawn the infantry dismounts. Theleading tanks nlill about, fire, and withdraw. Wehave never seen the reserve tanks committed.

In their withdrawals the Gerlnans use tanks togood advantage. They do not have to contend withlnines and blown bridges. Their tanks fire a fewshots and withdraw, then lnove up again, fire a fewInore shots and withdraw, and so on.

*

Rearguard Action Lieuten,an.t Colonel T aylor, In-far&y, Battalion Commander, Italy: My experi-ence has been that we first nleet two arnlored vehicleswhich open fire for a few minutes with everythingthey have on the first nlan of ours they see; theythen withdraw rapidly down the road.

Next we hit their outpost, which, I estimate,consishs of about two squads. This outpost, pro-tecting the road, has groups on the sides of the inoun-tains on the flanks. It takes four to six hairs todrive this outpost in due to its fine observation overus and the difficulties of maneuver.

COMMENT: It should be remembered that thisis the experience of one battalion commander inone theater.

55

Documents

Combat Lessons 1