Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research Appendix

5/28/2018 Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research Appendix

http:///reader/full/coercion-and-persuasion-in-coin-approaches-research-app

The Effectiveness of Coercive and Persuasive Counterinsurgency Approaches since 1945

Stephen Pampinella

Based on the case selection discussed at the end of this document, 47 conflicts include the

universe of relevant cases for this study. These are:

Case # Case Name Year Started

1 f!hanistan "antiSoviet$ 1%7&

' l!erian (nde)endence 1%*4

+ l!eria "($ 1%%'

4 n!olan (nde)endence 1%-1

* Ban!ladesh 1%71

- Yu!oslavia 1%%1

7 Burma/yanmar 1%4&

& Burundi 1%%1

% Chechnya ( 1%%4

10 Chechnya (( 1%%%

11 Colomia "23C$ 1%-4

1' aire "anti/outu$ 1%%-

1+ Cua 1%*+

14 5ast Timor 1%7*

1* 5ritrea 1%74

1- uatemala 1%-0

17 uineaBissau (nde)endence 1%-'

1& (ndia "Na6alites$ 1%&0

1% (ndia "ashmir$ 1%&%

'0 (ndochina 1%4-'1 (ndonesia "ceh$ 1%7-

'' (ndonesia "8aru (slam$ 1%*&

'+ (ra9 "urdistan$ 1%-1

'4 enya "/au /au$ 1%*'

1

3esearch ))endi6 Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella



'*



"2eifer '00', 10'10+$,@elmand in 2all 1%&1 "(id. 1--$, @erat in )ril 1%&+, @elmand in 1%&+

"aeef '00%, '+'4$.

- Eemplary 2orce present"03e!ular use of intimidation, torture, and murder of ordinary

f!hans "2eifer '010, 104$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement.

, Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Soviet nion did ne!otiate ?ith s)ecific commanders

"such as /assoud$ to declare ceasefires in s)ecific areas. Fhile conducted in !ood faith

initially, hostilities resumed over time and these ne!otiations did not ever lead to

counterinsur!ent victory. Soviets and 83 en!a!ed in a reconciliation initiative after Ganuary

1%&7 that sou!ht ne!otiations ?ith the mujahideen durin! the Soviet ?ithdra?al. These

ne!otiations led to the Bilateral !reement et?een f!hanistan and ;aAistan, ?hich the S and

Soviet nion si!ned as interested )arties "rau '00', +04+0*$.

E ,evelopment Assistance present"0 The Soviets )rovided si!nificant economic assistance to

the 83 in su))ort of the military effort to su))ress the mujahideen. These efforts at forced

moderni=ation ?ere consistent ?ith the socialist ideolo!y of the Soviet nion and military.

Soviet develo)ment )ersonnel conducted mass )roEects aimed at im)rovin! infrastructure

"alinovsAy, '010$.

2 Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence found.

. Algerian 'ndependence# start $ 1954

'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"

A-C,E2

A /assacres present"0 ccordin! to @orne, mass murder and the elimination of entire

villa!ers did ha))en, althou!h it ?asnHt official !overnment )olicy. Fhen Soustelle comes to

)o?er, he says ITo send in tanA units, to destroy villa!es, to omard certain =ones, that is no

lon!er the fine comJ it is usin! a sled!ehammer to Aill fleas.K "Duoted in @orne 1%77, 107$ The

SaAiet massacre "2eruary 1%*&$ a))ears to e the ?orst case, ?here 2rench omers ?i)ed out

the villa!e after a neary amush and then shots fired at overhead aircraft "@orne 1%77, '4%

'*0$. @o?ever, 8e aulle ?as adamantly o))osed to all forms of such rutal o))ression and

reiterated in 1%*& that no such atrocities ?ere to taAe )lace. 3etaliatory, not official )olicy, ut

no )unishment a))ears to follo? massacres.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0ServanSchreier "1%*7$ discusses the Aillin! of l!erians

drivin! a trucA sus)ected of su))ortin! the 2



it ?as nonetheless effective. This method effectively comatted the 2



lose faith in the 2rench over time. Fhile the )rotests callin! for the end of the 2ourth 3e)ulic in

1%*& include loyalist l!erians, the riots at Barricades FeeA includes no l!ierans "@orne

1%77$.

6. Algeria 7'A"# start $ 199

'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in"

a-c,E2

A /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are re)eated lar!escale massacres durin! the 1%%-%7

)eriod, these are attriuted to ( and the (slamist reels "alyvas '000$. There is some

sus)icion that reels committin! massacres may in fact have een colludin! ?ith the re!ime

since the military did not intervene. Yet there is no direct evidence that the re!ime did actually

direct or commit such atrocities "3oerts '00+, '07, +11$. 2or e6am)le, ervyn and =e "'004,

4+$ discuss massacres committed y the army, ut do not )rovide any s)ecific e6am)les.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0 there are re)eated instances of e6traEudicial murder, torture,

and intimidation y the re!ime "see 3oerts '00+, +1* for an e6am)le$. This re)ressive )olicy

?as )ushed y one faction in the military Ano?n as Othe eradicatorsO, they included smallerscale

massacres of 10 to 14 )eo)le "3oerts '00+,1*01*7$.

C! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement of civilians.

, Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ;resident eroual and other moderates did seeA to

ne!otiate ?ith the (slamist reels and find some ?ay to reincor)orate 2(S acA into the )olitical

system. These talAs and other initiatives lead to some o)enin!s for )eace includin! the 1%%%Civil 8iscord



;ress.

3oerts, @u!h. '00+. The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-00.



enou!h educationhealthcare to I)roduce any marAed chan!e in the 9uality of life.K fricans are

really chea) laor for coffee )lantations. "Bender 1%7', ++&$ (n 5ast, none of the services

)romised y the !ovHt ?ere )rovided, at least y 1%70. "Bender 1%7', ++%$

, Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0No evidence of ne!otiations. @o?ever, ;ortu!uese sou!htto turn ca)tured insur!ents and recruit them into their military forces. This is offered as an

alternative to )unishment, not as a form of for!iveness follo?in! voluntary surrender, so ( do not

code this as amnesty.

E ,evelopment Assistance present"0 ;ortu!uese seeA to moderni=e n!ola throu!h

resettlements and )rovide health and educational services. rmy em)loyed as teachers in many

cases, su))orted uildin! schools, health clinics. ccordin! to Cann "1%%7, RR$, ;ortu!al ado)ts

F@> standards for doctor)o)ulation and meets them. @o?ever, accordin! to Bender "1%7'J

1%7&, 1-7$, economic develo)ment )ro!rams fail c of social disru)tions to ordinary life.

fricans livin! in settlements faced declinin! standards of livin!, not im)rovn!. So, efforts atdevelo)ment ?ere incom)lete at est.

2 ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0lthou!h ;ortu!uese incor)orate fricans into military

forces, there is no evidence that they ally or su))ort local indi!enous leadershi) amon! tries

contested y insur!ents. @eavyhanded tactics involvin! mass use of air)o?er as ?ell as

resettlements a))ear to )revent any move to?ard elite coo)tion.

5. -angladesh# start $ 19%1

'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ 8in:override;") *A+, $ loss"

A-cdef

A /assacres present"0 ;aAistani rmy committed multi)le massacres of unarmed civilians. These

include massacres at 8haAa niversity and at villa!es ?hich had een the site of insur!ent attacA. The

latter involve the Aillin! of all men from some villa!ers, ?hose odies are then immolated. "Bose '00*$.

These acts of violence are considered !enocide y some scholars "Amam '00'$.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0 ;aAistani rmy and sym)athi=ers use e6traEudicial murder, torture, and

harassment a!ainst sus)ected )roinde)endence Ben!alis. These uses of e6em)lary force also include

se6ual violence a!ainst ?omen "/ooAherEee '00-$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear )olicy of resettlement.

, Amnesty3+egotiations0 a(sent"0 no evidence durin! the conflict, althou!h military and

?ami f course, these reaA

do?n.

E ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance.

7




2 Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ?hile there ?ere ;aAistani loyalists in Ban!ladesh, the

;aAistani rmy failed to cultivate these relationshi)s amid the massacres of Ban!ali civilians and

conventional comat ?ith the (ndian rmy and ir 2orce.

.



- Eemplary 2orce present"0Burmese forces have re!ularly )ressed the )o)ulation into

service as )orters. Beatin!s and intimidation of civilians are common, as ?ell as ra)es and se6ual

crimes a!ainst ethnic minorities.

C *esettlement present"0 Burmese military begins to forcibly resettle ethnic minorities in

1996 in its campaign against the Karenni National Progressive Party, continues for several yearswith thousands resettled.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Burmese military is constantly negotiating with different

rebel groups, leading to many cease-fires. Yet, many of these fail (like the cease-fire prior to the

1996 offensive) and as a result, fighting recommences.

E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance or civic action to

win over ethnic minorities.

F Elite Local Relationships (present):The Burmese military has co-opted some rebel groups

to fight others, like the 20,000 strong United Wa State Army.

References

Cline, Lawrence, E. 2009. Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar. Small

Wars and Insurgencies. 20(3-4), 574-591.

&. -urundi# start $ 1991

stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"

A /assacres present"0 follo?in! @utu massacres of Tutsis ?ho ?ere an!ry that the Tutsidominatedarmy held a cou) a!ainst the first democratically elected )resident in 1%%+ "a @utu$, the army Ailled

et?een *0,000100,000 @utus to restore order "vin 1%%%, '-'$.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0 liAely to e )resent !iven e6treme nature of violence in the civil ?ar.

C *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear attem)ts at resettlement, oth sides o)t for very lar!e massacres

instead comined ?ith ethnic cleansin!, liAe the clearin! out of @utus y Tutsis around the ca)ital.

, Amnesty3+egotiations present"0Ne!otiations et?een loyalists of the elected @utu )resident and

the army continued follo?in! the )ostcou) massacres. But ?hen ne? @utu )resident dies in )lane crash

?hich also Ailled @ayarimana, ne!otations follo? re!ardin! a ne? !overnment, and cainet )ositions

are s)lit et?een @utu and Tutsi factions "vin 1%%%, '-'$.

E ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance.

2 Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence of elite local relationshi)s, althou!h elite factions of

each ethnic !rou) moili=e their o?n militias.

%




*eferences

vin, ;eter. 1%%%. I5thnicity and ;o?er in Burundi and 3?anda: 8ifferent ;aths to iolence.K

Com*arative +olitics +1"+$: '*+'71.

9. Chechnya '# start $ 1994incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft :*usso!Chechen; $ loss) *A+, $ mied"

A-c,ef

A /assacres present"0 Russian used of heavy firepower (artillery) against Chechen

communities, attacking civilian targets. Led to widespread civilian casualties, eventually

alienated the civilian population as well (Kramer 2005, Renaud 2010).

B Exemplary Force (present): Russian forces treated Chechen civilians harshly. MVD used

cordon-and-sweep ops to harass Chechen civilians, even kidnapping some for ransom (Kramer

2005).

C Resettlement (absent): No active policy of resettlement of entire regions, although refugees

were created by the fighting.

, +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 hasavYurt ccord si!ned et?een 3ussian and

Chechen reels in u!ust 1%%-, )rovidin! for a ceasefire and the end of the ?ar, ut also

allo?ed for de facto inde)endence until ne? delierations in '001 "3enaud '010$.

E ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0No maEor )olicy of develo)ment assistance or civic

action.

2 ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 1%%4 3ussian invasion of Chechnya alienates e6istin!

Chechen allies and leads all Chechens to turn a!ainst the !overnment "3enaud '010$.

References

Kramer, Mark. 2005. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North

Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict,Europe-Asia Studies

57(2), 209-290.

Renaud, Sean. 2010. A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency

During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications. Massey University, unpublished

Master's Thesis.

10. Chechnya II, start = 1999

incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing :override $ *ussian state 8in;"

A-cdE2

10




A /assacres present"0 3ussian military attacAs ro=ny in >ct 1%%% and nearly levels the

entire city ?ith air and artillery omardments, taAes full control in 2eruary '000. 3ussian

military re!ains control over most of Chechnya y mid'000, ut causin! immense destruction

?ith indiscriminate violence "3enaud '010$.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0;ro3ussian Chechen !overnment estalished after 3ussian

invasion ruled mainly throu!h violent coercion, re!ularly rutali=ed the )o)ulation "3enaud

'010$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0 Fhile refu!ees ?ere created durin! the ?ar, no evidence of a

focused resettlement )olicy.

, Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 Several amnesties occur durin! 3ussian attem)ts to

estalish !overnance. 7,000 taAe amnesty y '00*.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 3econstruction occurred durin! the initial second

invasion in '000, ut slo?ed after this. reas in southern Chechnya that ?ere destroyed in the

fi!htin! ?ere necessarily reuilt. So, this is incom)lete reconstruction "3enaud '010, ramer

'00*$.

2 Elite ocal *elationships present"0 3ussia identifies ne? )ro3ussian allies ?ho

successfully uild local su))ort, )articularly the adyrov family. 8es)ite the assassination of the

father, the son tooA over as the re!ionOs )ro3ussian leader and !uided the end of the

counterinsur!ency "3enaud '010$.

*eferences

ramer, /arA. '00*. Iuerrilla Farfare, Counterinsur!ency, and Terrorism in the North

Caucasus: The /ilitary 8imension of the 3ussianChechen Conflict,Kuro*e-Asia "tudies

*7"'$, '0%'%0.

3enaud, Sean. '010. I ie? from Chechnya: n ssessment of 3ussian Counterinsur!ency

8urin! the t?o Chechen Fars and 2uture (m)lications.K /assey niversity, un)ulished

/asterOs Thesis.

11. Colom(ia# start $ 194

incum(ent 8inArreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing) override (y =14# 2A*C is very

8ea>"

A-c,E2

11




A /assacres present"0 /ilitary does not )ur)osely use mass fire)o?er to ?i)e out villa!ers

or )o)ulation centers. @o?ever, air)o?er is used alon!side military o)erations, and there are

incidents ?here air)o?er is used on individual homes.;aramilitaries that ?orA closely ?ith the

!overnment do commit lar!escale massacres in the 1%%0s, includin! the /a)ri)ian /assacre in

1%%7 involvin! +0 civilian deaths, the lto Naya massacre in '001 involvin! at least 40 civilians

deaths, and others.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0 56em)lary force is common throu!hout the ?ar. S military

advisors instruct Colomian military to develo) )aramilitary or!ani=ations in late 1%*0s to

intimidate sus)ected insur!ents, includin! memers of le!al )olitical )arties, unions, other civil

society or!ani=ations "StoAes '00*$. /ilitary or )aramilitary forces re!ularly intimidate, torture,

and murder civilians sus)ected of insur!ent su))ort. !ain, !ro?th of massacres due to

)aramilitaries. 1' deaths at



E ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance ?as common durin! the

counterinsur!ency efforts s)earheaded y ;lan



*rovincial $econstruction Teams in #ra7./asterOs Thesis. /onterrey: Naval ;ost!raduate

School.

1. ?aire anti!/o(utu"# start $ 199

incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss"a-cdef

A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacres ?ere committed y the 3; and 28< a!ainst @utu

refu!ees ?ho fled into Con!o from 3?anda follo?in! 3;2Hs defeat of @utu re!ime. 2urther, the

2orces rmees airoises "23$ is so ureaucratically ine)t that it is seen as not even fi!htin! the

?ar. >nly com)osed of 7*,000 troo)s. "10&$

@o?ever, /outu does hire merceneries to fi!ht that do commit atrocities. These include

Serian mercenaries ?ho commit atrocities a!ainst civilians at isan!ani, ut then they leave the

country "no additional details )rovided$ "3eyntEens '00%, 11*$. No other evidence.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0 airean military does )rey on civilians, en!a!es in lootin! and

harmin! civilians. (n oma at the end of >ctoer 1%%-, Tutsi ?ere Ivictims of ause y certain

LautochthonesH ?ith the a))roval, if not u)on the incitement of, local authoritiesK "3eynEtens

'00%, 1+1$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement y airean re!ime. /ost (8;s created

y 28< and 3?andan military ?hich attacA @utu refu!ees ?hich had )reviously fled 3?anda

after their defeat y 3;2.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 N and > seeA to foster ne!otiations throu!hout the

?ar, ut these never really come to fruition. The /arch '7 ne!otiations that start follo?in! the



Thom, Filliam. 1%%%. ICon!oaireHs 1%%-%7 Civil Far in the Conte6t of 5volvin! ;atterns of

/ilitary Conflict in frica in the 5ra of (nde)endence.K The !ournal of Conflict "tudiesR(R"'$.

htt):Eournals.hil.un.cainde6.)h)GCSarticlevie?rticle4+*&*01*,last accessed 2eruary

10, '014.

/cNulty, /el. 1%%%. IThe Colla)se of aire: (m)losion, 3evolution or 56ternal Saota!eQK The

!ournal of odern African "tudies+7"1$: *+&'.

16. Cu(a# start $ 1956

incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"

a-c,ef

A /assacres a(sent"0No evidence of massacres, mass atrocities, destruction of )o)ulationcenters.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 BatistiaOs relatively un)rofessional army re!ularly harassed and

rutali=ed civilians, ultimately alienatin! them "Goes '010, 1411-4$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0No evidence of resettlement, the insur!ency ?as initially or!ani=ed

in the already de)o)ulated Sierra /aestra mountain ran!e.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Batista does offer an amnesty early on in his rule to reels

includin! Castro in 1%**. @e himself is )ardoned, ut then ecomes an insur!ent yet a!ain "Goes

'010, 1411-4$.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0No evidence that Batista !overnment ever offers civic

action or develo)ment aid to ?in over rural Cuan )easants.

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 Batista never ?ins the loyalty of )easant leadershi) in

Cua, leavin! them to e coo)ted or controlled y Castro and the insur!ency.

*eferences

Goes, nthony Games. '010. /ictorious #nsurgencies) our $e(ellions that "ha*ed :ur World.



A /assacres present"0 Searchanddestroy o)erations Aill thousands of civilians from 1%77

1%&1. /ore than 100 Ailled in Santa Cru= massacre at funeral in 1%%1. ;aramilitaries commit

massacres leadin! u) to vote for inde)endence in 1%%% and after.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 (ntimidation, Aidna))in!, e6traEudicial murder ?as common

in the 1%%0s amon! )ro!ovOt militias and )aramilitaries a!ainst anti(ndonesian activists, )ro235T



C Resettlement (present): Civilians were cleared from a six-mile area running alongside the

Keren-Asmara road in 1970 to reduce attacks, cleared from other areas as well (Tareke 2002).

D Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Ethiopian military government held talks with the EPLF

in 1977 in Berlin, but then broke them off as they instead launched a new military offensive.

Negotiations between mid-level officers guided by Jimmy Carter also begin in 1989 (Pateman

1990).

E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance.

F Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence of local relationships.

References

De Waal. Alexander. 1991.Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine In Ethiopia.New York:

Human Rights Watch.

Pateman, Roy. 1990. The Eritrean War.Armed Forces and Society 17(1): 81-98.

Tareke, Gebru. 2002. From Lash to Red Star: the pitfalls of counter-insurgency in Ethiopia,

1980-82.Journal of Modern Africa Studies 40(3), 465-498.

1. 7uatemala# start $ 19=

'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in"

A-C,Ef

A Massacres (present): military resorted to annihilation of at least 450 villages and

inhabitants in 1981-1983.

B - Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, harassment, torture, and murder of individual

suspects was common practice by military.

C - Resettlement (present): More than 1 million Gualemalans forcibly displaced during the

period from 1981-1983 in a deliberate policy of removal and displacement, then reorganized in

'model villages' controlled by gov't (Streeter 2006).

17




D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Amnesty offered in 1982 for those returning from Mexico,

or other insurgents, who had to sign an appeal for amnesty (Streeter 2006).

E - Development Assistance (present): Much assistance available via USAID and the Alliance

for Progress, but the Guatemalan gov't never adopts a firm policy of development to implement

programs. Oligarchy always shirked from supporting socioeconomic reform. Military doesimplement its own civil affairs program known as the National Plan for Security and

Development, offering both guns and beans.

Elite Relationships (absent): Military doesn't build new alliances among local elites, 'model

villages' enable complete surveillance and monitoring of the population. No move to use local

elites for control. More direct form of intervention in civil society (Streeter 2006).

References

Streeter, Stephen M. 2006. Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency:

Guatemala and the contradictions of the Alliance for Progress. Third World Quarterly 27(1): 57-

68.

1%. 7uinea!-issau 'ndependence# start $ 19

'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"

A-C,Ef

A ! /assacres present"0 ;ortu!uese use heavy air)o?er in areas controlled y ;(C,

omin! villa!ers and usin! na)alm a!ainst reelheld villa!es "8hada 1%%&, *&'$. /ilitary

under S)inola innovates heliorne attacAs in freefire =ones, Aillin! scores of villa!ers and

destroyin! villa!es, destroyin! livestocA "Chaal 1%&0, &+$.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 3e!ular use of violence a!ainst civilians in raids and

o)erations.

C *esettlement present"0 (N in other countries, ;ortu!al uses

aldeamentosto resettle )o)ulation and distriute economic assistance and develo)ment. These

?ere increased after S)inola came to )o?er, ut ?ere used in the first )hase as ?ell "8hada

1%%&, *&4$.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 /ilitary and ;(C ne!otiate inde)endence follo?in! the

1%74 cou) to end the conflict.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 Fhen S)inola ecomes overnoreneralmilitary

commander in 1%-%, he enacts a develo)ment )ro!ram called O Better uineaO y increasin!

food )roduction, uildin! infrastructures "hos)itals, schools$, etc. "Chaal 1%&1, &+$.

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0

1&




lthou!h fricans are incor)orated into ;ortu!uese military forces, no evidence e6ists that the

;ortu!uese form allies amon! local elites. This is consistent ?ith direct rule throu!hout the

colonial )eriod.

*eferences

8hada, /, 1%%&. IThe



Misra, Amalendu. 2002. Subaltern and the civil war: An assessment of left-wing insurgency in

South Asia. Civil Wars, 5(4): 56-76.

Andhra Pradesh/Naxalite. GlobalSecurity.org, accessed December 12, 2012.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/naxalite.htm

19. 'ndia @ashmir"# start $ 19&9

stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) ongoing"

A-cdef

A ! /assacres present"0 multi)le lar!escale massacres have een committed y (ndian forces

follo?in! attacAs a!ainst them ?ithin )o)ulated areas. These include *0 deaths in So)ore to?n

in Ganuary - 1%%+, +1 deaths in BiEehara to?n on >ctoer '' 1%%+, +* SiAh deaths in

Chattisin!h)ura on /arch '0,'000. @o?ever, BS2 court of in9uiries have held some of those

res)onsile for these attacAs. But not for all. 2ire has also een directed at cro?ds of mourners at

funerals of those slain y security forces. Thus, the !ovHt Eust )unish all instances of massacres

leadin! to char!es of state terrorism "Gafa '00*$.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 security forces have used intimidation, ra)e, torture and

e6traEudicial murder on civilians and sus)ected insur!ents re!ularly "Gafa '00*, Bhatt '00*$.

C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 maEor dis)laced )o)ulations have included ;andits from ashmir,

driven out y /uslim militants. "



Bhatt, ShaAti. '00+. IState Terrorism vs. Gihad in ashmir.K!ournal of Contem*orar% Asia

++"'$: '1*''4.

Telford, @amish. '001. ICounter(nsur!ency in (ndia: >servations from ;unEa and ashmir.H

The !ournal of Conflict "tudies RR("1$:

htt):Eournals.hil.un.cainde6.)h)Ecsarticlevie?4'%+4&&&, last accessed 2eruary 14, '014.

an!uly, 3aEat. '001. I(ndia, ;aAistan and the ashmir (nsur!ency: Causes, 8ynamics and;ros)ects for 3esolution.KAsian "tudies $evie2'*"+$: +0%++4.

Gafa, Yateendra Sin!h. '00*. I8efeatin! Terrorism: Study of >)erational Strate!y and Tacticsof ;olice 2orces in Gammu ashmir "(ndia$.K+olice +ractice and $esearch-"1$: 1411-4.



alliances ?ith Cao 8ai and @oa @ao sects, they form militias to defend a!ainst iet /inh. But

no local elites in North ietna. ">OBallance 1%-4, &+&4$

*eferences

>OBallance, 5d?ard. 1%-4. The #ndochina War, 19;



incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in

a-Cdef

A /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military.

B - Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military pressed civilians into militia service andparticipation in cordon-and-sweep operaitons known aspagar betiswhile under threat.

C Resettlement (present): Indonesian military does evacuate and resettle villagers who live in

Zone C, whose villages were then destroyed.

D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of amnesty or negotiations, DI insurgency

ends with decapitation.

E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence found.

F - Elite Relationships (absent): Few elite relationships, Kilcullen (2000) argues that local

military commanders were the real powerbrokers and exercised de facto control over civil

administration and civil society.

References

Kilcullen, David. 2000. The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 1945-

1999. Dissertation. Syndey: University of New South Wales.

----. 2006. Globalisation and the Devleopment of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics. Small

Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 44-64.

----. 2010. Counterinsurgency. London: Oxford University Press.

6. @urdistan# start $ 191

incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"

A-C,ef

A ! /assacres present"0 (ra9i re!ime has a lon! history of indiscriminately attacAin! urdish

civilians from 1%-1 on?ard. This includes omin! of urdish villa!es follo?in! 1%-1 u)risin!

">HBallance '00', 1&*$.



urdistan Ano?n as mujamma?at, or collectivities that (ra9is referred to as modern villa!es.

"@3F 1%%'$

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 (ra9i re!ime and urds si!n a ceasefire in 1%70 that

!rants urdish autonomy in four years. @o?ever, a!reement doesnHt really hold as order

dis)utes and conflicts are endemic.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance )rovided y (ra9

to urdish )o)ulations.

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence that (ra9i re!ime uilds local urdish

allies.

*eferences

>HHBallance, 5d!er. '00'. I(ra9.K (nAra(s at War) ilitar% ffectiveness, 19;8-1991.@ ed. y

enneth >. ;ollacA.



- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 Bennett "'007a$ ar!ues that rutality ?as re!ularly used

indiscriminately a!ainst the civilian )o)ulation. These included eatin!s, torture, and murder. @e

ar!ues that these )ractices ?ere mostly committed y the enya ;olice 3eserve "civilian

settlers$, in!Hs frican 3ifles, @ome uard. 2ormer modeled on rmy attalions, latter used in

Eoint o)s ?ith the rmy. "(id., 1**$ British strate!y used )unitive force, fear and intimidation.



E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance a))eared to e used selectively,

and not all iAuyu received the same enefits from ne? schools, infrastructure, and other ne?

services. !ain, )atrona!e ?as used to uild net?orAs of clients, and British assistance ?as

funneled throu!h their loyalists.

2 Elite ocal *elationships present"0 British ties to enyan loyalists ?ere dee), local chiefshad een incor)orated into selfrule throu!hout the colonial )eriod, they favored their clients. (n

fact, these relationshi)s to local elites are ?hat drove the reellion, as many fricans ?ere

e6cluded and ecame tenants ?ho lost their land and suffered under lo? ?a!es. /au /au led the

cause of the dis)ossessed "nderson '00+, **$ These loyalists ?ere recruited into the @ome

uard as ?ell, they ?ere the tar!ets of /au /au. @o?ever, British res)ond y )rotectin! and

)rovidin! iAuyu loyalists ?ith resources to uild their o?n )atrona!e throu!h ne? local

institutions: Ilthou!h not usur)ed entirely, chiefs and headmen ?ere demoted and re)laced in

the u))er echelons of )atronclient net?orAs y frican le!islators and administrators a))ointed

as enya e!an to )re)are for decoloni=ation.K "Branch '007, +14$ Thus, there is the erosion of

the old net?orA throu!h /au /au attacAs and the construction of a ne? one in the emer!in!

edifice of the enyan state.

*eferences

nderson, 8avid. '00*.=istories of the =anged) The irt% War in en%a and the nd of

m*ire.

Bennett, @u?. '007"a$. IThe /au /au 5mer!ency as ;art of the British rmyOs ;ostFar

Counterinsur!ency 56)erience.Kefense "ecurit% Anal%sis. '+"'$: 14+1-+.

Bennett, @u?. '007"$. IThe >therSide of the C>(N: /inimum and 56em)lary 2orce in British

rmy Counterinsur!ency in enya.K 1&"4$: -+&--4.

Branch, 8aniel. '007. IThe 5nemy Fithin:



- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 C(funded and trained Lsecret armyH of @mon! troo)s ?orAed?ith C( to neutrali=e ;athet



initially settin! out s)ecific !uideliens on the use of force.K "Bennett '00%, 4+1$. 2orms of

re)ression used descries sus)ects as Oshot ?hilst attem)tin! to esca)eO, liAe at the Batan! ali

massacre in 8ecemer 1%4&. lso mass arrests in cordonands?ee) o)s. "Bennett '00%, 4+-$.

Nonetheless,these actions alienated the )o)ulation from counterinsur!ents "@acA '007$.

C *esettlement present"01&,*00 resettled y /arch 1%*0. 8one in an adhoc asis. /aEor

resettlement )ro!rams e!in after that "Bennett '00%, 4+&%$. enerally occurred follo?in!

insur!nt attacAs )re1%*0, follo?ed y urnin! of homes, )ro)erty destruction "Bennett '00%,

4+%$. Bri!!s ;lan of )ril 1%*0 resettles over *00,000 s9uatters, re!rou)s -00,000 laorers.

Starts in Gune, done y 1%*1. 3esettlements involve food controls, denyin! resources to

)o)ulation. By the end of the 5mer!ency, almost onetenth of entire )o)ulation ?ere resettled in

Ne? illa!es "omer 1%7', *--1$.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 re?ard for defection )ro!ram e6ists after 1%4&, offers

)ayment to /N$ and /alayan Chinese

ssociation "/C, )reviously formed in 1%4% ?ith su))ort from urney and /ac8onald

"Smith '001, -*J omer 1%7', -*$, ?hile the alliance itself ?as formed in 1%*' "Smith '001, 71$

?ins elections in 1%**. 8emonstrates elite relationshi)s formed amon!st leaders of Chinese

minority @acA "'00%$. 5lections ecame an incentives for these !rou)s, liAe /C, to challen!e

/C; for )o)ular su))ort. "Smith '001, 71$.

*eferences

Bennett, @u?. '00%. I ery Salutary 5ffect: The CounterTerror Strate!y in the 5arly /alayan

5mer!ency, Gune 1%4& to 8ecemer 1%4%.K!ournal of "trategic "tudies. +'"%$: 41*444.

'&




@acA, arl. '00%. IThe /alayan 5mer!ency as counterinsur!ency )aradi!m.K!ournal of

"trategic "tudies. +'"+$: +&+414.

omer, 3oert F. 1%7'.The ala%an mergenc% in $etros*ect. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: 3N8

Cor)oration.

Smith, Simon. '001. Ieneral tem)ler and counterinsur!ency in /alaya: hearts and minds,

intelli!ence, and )ro)a!anda.Kefence and #ntelligence Anal%sis. 1-"+$: -07&.

Na!l, Gohn . '00'.&earning to at "ou* 2ith a nife) Counterinsurgenc% &essons for ala%a

and /ietnam. Chica!o: niversity of Chica!o ;ress.

%. /oam(iBue *E+A/"# start $ 19%stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"

a-C,e2

A ! /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are many cases of e6traEudicial murder, no evidence foundof lar!escale massacres.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 once in )o?er, 235 uilt state )o?er y identifyin!internal enemies to e re)ressed in the defense of the nation. This re9uired the use of mass

detention, torture, e6traEudicial murder of tar!eted /o=amicans "/achava '011$.

7

C ! *esettlement present"0 ?hile 235 did relocate individuals to )rison or ?orA cam)s

?ho sus)ected of or ?ere convicted of treason or some ty)e of crime a!ainst the state "/achava

'011$, it did not relocateentire civilian )o)ulations as a means of controllin! them. Fhile a

villa!i=ation )ro!ram ?as enacted y 235 after the defeat of the ;ortu!uese, it ?as laterused as )art of the res)onse to 35N/>Hs reellion "



Lunstrom, Elizabeth. 2009. Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization: Landscapes of Terror and

the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican Civil War.Annals of the Association of

American Geographers99(5): 884-892.

Machava, Benedito Luis. 2011. State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of

Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975-1983).Journal of Southern AfricanStudies 37(1): 593-609.

@uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%0.=uman $ights Watch World $e*ort 1990. Ne? YorA: NY.

htt):???.hr?.or!re)orts1%%0F3%0inde6.htm#To)>f;a!e, last accessed 2e. '1, '014.

&. /oam(iBue 'ndependence# start $ 19


A-C,Ef

A /assacres present"0 ;ortu!uese ado)t a OscorchedearthO )arty alon! Tan=anian order in

Cao 8el!ado ?ith simultaneous re!rou)in! in 1%-*. "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 100$.

3eferences are made in historical sources to the use of defoliants and na)alm /o=ami9ue, ut

these are often mentioned ?ithout reference to s)ecific incidents. nother e6am)le is the

Isystematic a))lication of officially sanctioned violence a!ainst noncomatants consisted of the

strafin! of trails and ?ater holes and the na)almin! of !uerrilla forest ases.K "@enriAsen 1%&+,

1+1$. /issionaries leave (nhamin!a ;lateau to )rotest mass Aillin!s, '00 dead from u!ust 1%7+

to /arch 1%74 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. I2rom the e!innin! of the conflict there e6isted a

marAed indifference to?ard /o=amican life.K "1+1$ Torture, intimidation, and mass Aillin!s

used to com)el )o)ulation intoaldeamentos. "(id., 1+1$. lthou!h no s)ecific incidents arementioned, ( assume these ?ere common)lace amon! ;ortu!uese C>(N.

>ne noted massacre occurs in the villa!e of Firiyamu, south of Tete, ?here ;ortu!uese

forces Ailled 400 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'0$. ;ortu!uese forces also attacAed civilians out of

frustration follo?in! insur!ent attacAs, ?ith murders of sus)ected mine layers and su))orters in

/ocumura in /ay 1%71 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'%$. lso thre? !renades into cro?ded huts as

retaliation for allo?in! insur!ents to set u) attacAs "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'%$.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 Torture, intimidation, and mass Aillin!s used to com)el

)o)ulation intoaldeamentos "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. ;ortu!uese used civilians as human mine

detectors, forcin! them do?n sus)ect roads to clear them "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+'$. Civilian hutsand cro)s destroyed ?hen they did not ?illin!ly move into resettlements "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+'$.

;ortu!uese )olice torture and use e6traEudicial murder a!ainst detainees "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+-$.

;olice also use ?ide dra!nets and mass detention re!ularly, lar!est ?as in 1%7' ?here 1&00 ?ere

detained "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+7$. 5stimated 10,000 re!ime o))onenets ?ere arrested et?een

+0




1%-71%7+, ?ith ;(85 usin! torture on )risoners "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10+$. lechas

"native frican s)ecial forces includin! turned insur!ents$ Ano?n to Itreat ?ith a a sava!e

ruthlessness the villa!ers amon! ?hom they o)erated...to )rove their ne? commitmentK

"@enriAsen 1%&+, 107$.

C *esettlement present"0 3esettlement schemes ?ere modeled after British in /alaya"@enriAsen 1%&+, 1*4$. s Bender "1%7'$ )oints out in n!ola, ;ortu!uese use three ty)es of

resettlements, includin! militaryrun aldeamentos, reordenamento rural for socioeconomic

develo)ment, and colonatos de soldados But, reordenamentos are used less in /o=ami9ue, and

more colnatos used in areas ?ith !uerrilla activity. "Gundanian 1%74,*'0$

Aldeamentos first )ro)osed in 1%-*, im)lemented south of Tan=anian order in Cao

8el!ado, usin! scorched earth )olicy "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 100J Gundanian 1%74, *'+$. 1

million resettled y 1%70. >fficals admit that )o)ulation not so involved in resettlement

construction, and Ithe amenities of the villa!es are minimal.K (nfrastructure and services to

follo? after ra)id re!rou)in! "*'-$. "Gundanian 1%74, *40$ eneral rria!a does too much too9uicAly, uilt all settlements fast, vie?ed ne!atively y the )eo)le . "Cann 1%%7, 1*7$

3esettlements often done forcefully, had hardshi)s on the )eo)le and didnHt account for frian

desire to remain in their o?n lands. "Cann 1%%7, 1-1J @enriAsen 1%&+, 1-1$

, ! +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 ;ortu!uese did su))ort efforts to !et 235 )ersonnel

to defect, as military )ulished offers of amnesty efore, durin!, and after lar!e cam)ai!ns,

offerin! money for ?ea)ons. "@enriAsen 1%&+, 10+$. Fhen rria!as comes to )o?er, he orders

that ?ounded 235 troo)s !et flo?n out for medical care first to encoura!e defection.

"@enriAsen 1%&+, 104$

Ne!otiations eventually leadin! to inde)dence e!in on * Gune 1%74. nofficial ceasefires emer!e throu!hout the ;ortu!uese rmy. ;ortu!ual si!ns handover of )o?er to 235

on 7 Se)temer 1%74 "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'7$.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 >nly s)oradic develo)ment )roEects in the asence of

maEor reordenamento rural)roEects "*'0$. These )ro!rams IhavenHt een ?ell financed nor have

they hel)ed a si!nificant numer of fricans.K "*'1$ /aEor develo)ment initiatives centered

around construction of the Caora Bassa 8am "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1-*$. But, the dam ?asnOt

intended so much for /o=amican develo)ment, ut to attract more settlers, foster mineral

e6traction in Tete, and )rovide electricity to South frica "(ssacon and (ssacson 1&+, 104J

/unslo? 1%&+, 114$.

lso, ;ortu!uese settlers ?ant to use fricans as a laor source, less em)hasis on actually

)rovidin! develo)ment for them as o))osed to the 5uro)eans. frican cro) )urchases fell,

indicatin! a declinin! standard of livin!, ?hile statistics sho? hi!her economic !ains for

+1




5uro)eans "Gundanian *+-*+7 1%74$ Bisho)s also com)lain not enou!h schools, 9ualified

teachers "Gundanian 1%74, *+&$.

Social )ro!rams: Cann )rovides data su!!estin! increases in admitted students and

teachers in n!ola "*6$, uinea "'6$, and /o=ami9ue "1.&6$. "Cann 1%%7, 147$ rmy )layed

Aey role, uildin! schools, ecame teachers if necessary. "Cann 1%%7 ,14&$ >n health,;ortu!uese ado)ted F@> standards for )ro)er health care re!ardin! numers of )rofessionals

)o)ulation, military ecame )rime im)lementer. "(id., 14%$ /ilitary ?orAed to ensure

doctorsnurseshos)itals ?ere availale to meet standards. "(id., 1*0$. But military had to fill in

a massive !a) since not enou!h teachers ?ere availale. ll these su!!est a mi6ed a))roach

to?ard develo)ment.

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ;ortu!al al?ays sou!ht to )it tries a!ainst each other,

su!!ested 235 ?as dominated y the /aAonde trie and an enemy of the /aAua trie., all

in Cao 8el!ado "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'1$. (n Niassa, ;ortu!uese )it the ;ao and NyanEa, the latter

?as 235 "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10'$. (n aldeamentos, local chiefs are moili=ed toraise a 101' man militia, su)ervised y the army ut )aid y administration "/unslo? 1%&+,

1''$. But over lon!term, the ;ortu!uese fail to develo) a Imoderate /o=amican

constituencyK "@endriAsen 1%&+, 47$, limited efforts to include fricans in the colonial state ut

are never serious "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10&$. No )ro!rams to train local leaders and youth to lead

local !overnment "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10%$. (N the last )hase, ;ortu!uese do su))ort the

emer!ence of the 6ru*o 4nido de oam(i7ue, ?hich advocated for continued ties to

metro)ole, ut this is too little and too late to affect ?ar. "@endriAsen 1%&+, 110$.

*eferences

(saacman, llen and Barara (saacman, 1%&+.oam(i7ue) rom Colonialism to $evolution,1900 198.Boulder, C>: Fesvie? ;ress.

@enriAsen, Thomas @. 1%&+.$evolution and Counterrevolution) oam(i7ues War of

#nde*endence, 19;-19>;.Fest)ort, CT: reen?ood ;ress.

Cann (((, Gohn ;. 1%%7. Counterinsurgenc% in Africa) The +ortuguese Wa% of War, 191-19>;.

Fest)ort, CT: ;rae!er.

/unslo?, Barry. 1%&+.oam(i7ue) the $evolution and its :rigins.



A /assacres a(sent"0 iolence used a!ainst civilians, ut no evidence of mass Aillin!s or

massacres.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 ;olice tortured ca)tured insur!ents, res)onsile for C>(N from

1%--1%74 "3ichard '007, 10$. Then South frican 8efence 2orces ecome involved./istreatment of )risoners and civilians continues y S82 )ost1%74 "(id., 14$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0No evidence of resettlement.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0No evidence of amnestyne!otiations.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance present" S82 does em)loy civic action )ro!rams su))lyin!

)ulic !oods, indicatin! )rovision of develo)ment assistance, social services "(id., 14$.

2 ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0No evidence of elite relationshi)s.

*eferences

Baines, ary. '007. IBreaAin! 3anA: Secrets, Silences and Stories of South fricaOs Border

Far.K rahamsto?n: 3hodes niversity.

8ale, 3ichard. 1%%+. I/eldin! Far and ;olitics in Namiia: South fricaOs Counterinsur!ency

Cam)ai!n, 1%--1%&%.KArmed orces and "ociet%. '0"1$: 7'4.

6=. +epal# start $ 199%stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"

A-c,ef

A ! /assacres present"0 in later )hase, state violence ?as more intense than insur!ents. fter

failure of '001 ceasefire and use of military, more indiscriminate violence a!ainst civiliansoccur. (n u!ust '00+, 3; Aills t?enty /aoist sus)ects near the villa!e of 8orama "Norris

'011, 14$.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 3oyal Ne)alese rmy re!ularly Ailled civilians as )art ofre)ressive strate!y a!ainst insur!ency. Caused more casualties than insur!ents throu!hout most

of the conflict "Battacharya '01+$.

C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of use of resettlements.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ne!otiations and successful ceasefire held after death of

royal family in '001, ut fail later on as state )ushes more violence. +,000 deaths in '00'. /ostceasefires thus lead to failed ne!otiations, e6ce)t for last ne!otiated settlement that leads to the

dissolution of the monarchy "Battarcharya '01+$.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence that develo)ment assistance ?as used y

++




Ne)alese re!ime as )art of counterinsur!ency strate!y.

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 state did try to coo)t local )atronselites y )rotectin!

their o?n economic interests "Goshi '01+$. But the Ne)alese re!ime !radually alienated most

se!ments of the )o)ulation ?ith violence as /aoists rose in )o?er, eventually forcin!

dissolution of the monarchy. No relationshi)s )resent or sustained.

*eferences

Norris, Gohn. '011. I@o? not to Fa!e a Counter(nsur!ency: Ne)al, the /aoists, and @uman

3i!hts.K=uman $ights Bulletin, 11"'$: 1+1*.

Goshi, /adhav. '01+. I



*eferences

Close, 8avid. 1%&%. I3es)ondin! to



Feathers, Bynum, 5. 1%&+. Iuerrilla Farfare in Nicara!ua,K ir niversity 8ocumentary

3esearch Study. /ont!omery, !oni antioil )rotests are met ?ith ei!ht e6traEudicial

e6ecutions in 1%%* "2rynas '001, 4%$.

C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 amnesty !ranted in '00% to all militants ever involved in

8elta insur!ency in e6chan!e for handin! over arms "5!?emi '010$.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 in 1%%', the >il /ineral ;roducin! reas 8evelo)ment

Commission is estalished to launch a!ricultural develo)ments in areas ?hile oil is e6tracted,

mostly usin! oil revenues. 3e)laced y Ni!er 8elta 8evelo)ment Commission "2rynas '001,4+$.

2 ! ocal Elite *elationships present"0Ni!erian !overnment seeAs to coo)t local actors in the

8elta y devolvin! local !overnmental res)onsiilities, enalin! access to state )atrona!e.

*eferences

2rynas, eor!e GedrEeE. '001. ICor)orate and state res)onses to antioil )rotests in the Ni!er

8elta.KAfrican Affairs. 100: '7*4.

5!?emi, . '010. I2rom /ilitancy to mnesty: Some Thou!hts on ;resident YarHaduaHs

))roach to the Ni!er 8elta Crisis.K Current $esearch !ournal of conomic Theor%'"+$: 1+-

141.

+-




64. Papua +e8 7uinea# start $ 19&&

stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"

A-C,Ef

A ! /assacres present"0 ;N military forces fired !renades into villa!es, indiscriminately shot

u) villa!es ?ith machine !uns, fired mortars at civilian areas usin! ?hite )hos)orous rounds

"



FelseySmith, Terence. 1%%1. I;a)ua Ne? uinea in 1%%0: Year in Crisis.KAsian "urve%.

+1"'$: 1&&1%*.

65. Peru# start $ 19&=

'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"

A-cdE2

A /assacres present"0 (n 1%&&, massacre at Cayara y ;eruvian army Aills -0 civilians

"mnesty (nternational, 1%&&$. t ccomarca in 1%&*, -% civilians Ailled "Truth and

3econciliation Commission '00+, -*+$. >ther massacres y the rmy and death s9uads are

sus)ected althou!h less hard evidence e6ists to demonstrate )roof they ha))ened.

B Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and harassment of civilians by Peruvian

military and police was common throughout the conflict.

C Resettlement (absent): While refugees were created by COIN and insurgent operations, no

systematic policy of resettlement.

D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): amnesty is offered to Sendero fi!hts after the ca)ture of

u=man in 1%%'. Thousands res)ond )ositively.

E - ,evelopment Assistance present"0 lthou!h no detailed develo)ment )lan ?as ado)ted,

;eru successfully uses smallscale )roEects

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships present"0 in 1%%0s, ;eru ?ins su))ort of villa!e leaders of

;eruvian )easants to encoura!e formation of cam*esinos, local villa!e militias. >ccurs after

rutal violence of Sendero and earlier indiscriminate violence y the ;eruvian state.*eferences

Taylor,



6. Philippines Du> *e(ellion"# start $195='ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"

A-c,Ef

A /assacres present"0 (n 1%*0, ;hili))ines rmy Aills 100 civilians in Bacalor, ;am)an!a

and urn over 100 homes in retaliation for death of one of their officers y !uerrillas "8ou!las

1%*+, 11&$. *0 farmers Ailled in



A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacre of )rotesters y Civilian @ome 8efense Cor)s unit does

ha))en in 5scalante in 1%&*, ut they are tried for murder. Nonetheless, !overnment retains

C@8Cs "van der roef 1%&-$.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 ;hili))ine forces, es)ecially the /ilitary ;olice Command,

asued villa!ers, intimidation and harassment, eatin!s ?ere common. /any )olitical o))onents

?ere summarily e6ecuted individually. ;aramilitary forces and !an!s allied ?ith re!ular military

and )olice en!a!ed in re!ular e6traEudicial murder, e6tortion, and intimidation "van der roef

1%&-$

C ! *esettlement a(sent"0No evidence of resettlement of civilians in ne? locations to enale

se)aration from insur!ents.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0Ne!otiations occur throu!hout the late 1%&0s and early

1%%0s, includin! the )ros)ect of sustantial autonomy for /uslim areas.



6&. Philippines /'2"# start $ 19%%

incumbent win Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in"

A /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are cases of e6traEudicial murder, no cases found of lar!e

scale massacres.

- Eemplary 2orce present"0 aritrary arrests and torture of civilians occur on several

occasions in late '000s "mnesty (nternational '00%$.

C *esettlement a(sent"0 ?hile (8;s are created y fi!htin! et?een military and /(ld 8ynamics, Ne? ConEecture.KAsian "urve%

4-"1$: 1&71%+.

41

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-offhttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-offhttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-offhttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-off



Bertrand, Gac9ues. '000. I;eace and Conflict in the Southern ;hili))ines: Fhy the 1%%- ;eace

!reement is 2ra!ile.K+acific Affairs7+"1$: +7*4.

69. Senegal# start $ 19&=

incum(ent stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"

A-c,e2

A ! /assacres present"0 military violently dis)erses t?o 1%&' )rotests y firin!

indiscriminately into cro?ds, in Aillin! many civilians "@um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*,

'*0$.

- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 violence and harassment used a!ainst civilians as )art of

e6tortion for economic !oods "5vans '00+$. Torture ?as also common throu!h the late 1%&0s

"@um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*$.

C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement found.

, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0multi)le ne!otiations throu!hout conflict, includin! the

Bissau ccord of 1%%1, resultin! in shaAy )eace treaty si!ned on '00* et?een Casamance

reels and state re)resentatives "de Gon! and asser '00*$.

E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence found.

2 ! Elite ocal *elationships present"0 Bissau ccords led the 2ront Nord ?in! of the

reellion to maintain )eace ut Aee) ?ea)ons, en!a!e in elicit trade, ut ultimately su))ort the

!overnment. "/um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*$. They ?ere effectively coo)ted y

)ermittin! their o?n access to the ?ar economy.

*eferences

@um)hreys, /acartan and @aaye h /ohamed. '00*. ISene!al and /ali.K (n 4nderstanding

Civil War, /ol #. 5d. y Nicholas Samanis and 8avid Collier. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: The Forld

BanA, '47+0'.

4'




5vans, /artin. '00'. INi )ai6 ni !uerre: the )olitical economy of lo?level conflict in

Casamance.K @; BacA!round ;a)er.



8in;) *A+, $ ongoing :8ar ends in =1=;"

A-C,ef

A /assacres present"0 overnment forces shelled densely )o)ulated areas in Northern Sri



References

DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. 2010. Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's Counter-

Insurgency Operations. Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International.

Jalal, Malik Ahmad. 2011. Think Like a Guerrlla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka.

Harvard Law School National Security Journal. June: 1-10.

Shahnewaz, Abdullah. 2010. Military Solution of Political Crisis in Sri Lanka: Questions to be

Asked. Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs Working Paper.

Smith, Neil. '010. Inderstandin! Sri



46. Ti(et# start $ 195

'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"

A-c,ef

A /assacres present"0 Chinese omed villa!es and monasteries to su))ress reellions from1%*-1%*% "Tha)a 1%&', &%$. 3e)eated mentions of atrocities leadin! u) to and durin! the mass

u)risin! in 1%*%. Chinese then shell and assault



6,153 hamlets evacuated or destroyed by the military(Jongerden 2001, 80). Systematic cleansing

and evaculation occurred after 1991, leading to 2664 villages emptied by July 1995 (McDowall

2000, 440). Civilians were expected to be resettled in village-towns, which were constructed

along urban planning models but did not accommodate the agricultural/pastoral lifestyle of the

Kurds. These were mostly rejected. (Jongerden 2001, 80-84).

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Turkish military adopts purely military approaches

toward dealing with the PKK and never considers real political reforms of alleviate causes of the

rebellion. Army was seen as the only means of suppressing the rebellion, and negotiations were

never considered, but government of AKP announces a new Kurdish initiative in 2009, which

presumes civilian negotiations not dominated by military influence (Bacik and Coskun 2011,

251-252). Government brings home exiled Kurds, restores Kurdish names of villages and cities,

has amnesty for low-middle ranked PKK fights, allows for Kurdish language in education,

campaigns. (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 252).

E - Development Assistance (present): Military controlled all large constructed projects andmilitary enterprises by 1990 employing 40,000, but no overall plan for implementation. MGK

declares itself as lead agent for development in SE through the Southeast Anatolia Project

(GAP), to bring hydroelectric power to the region but no consideration was given about how to

connect it to the Kurdish peasant capacity (Morgado 2006, 56; McDowall 2000, 434). In the

course of resettlement of displaced Kurds into village-towns, hospitals and clinics were

constructed alongside new homes for civilians. However, few civilians returned to live in such

village-towns and utilize the available social services.

F - Elite Local Relationships (present): Following the initial PKK offensives, the government

passed the Village Law in 1985 to organize militias in each Kurdish village in SE Turkey. These

militias were organized against tribal clans led by elders, these tended to identify with the

rightwing parties and were in conflict with PKK already. Also, aghas (local landowners)

collected salaries for village guards and controlled distribution, took a cut of the pay. (McDowall

2000, 422). Aghas also had close relationships with security forces, these were used to obtain

construction contracts to build things like police complexes and schools.

References

Bacik, Gokhan, and Bezen Balamir Coskun. 2011. The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey's

Failure to Develop a Political Solution. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 34(3): 248-265.

McDowall, David. 2000.A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Morgado, Andrew. 2006. Turkish Culture and its Influence on the Counterinusrgency Campaign

Against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Thesis manuscript, US Army Command and

General Staff College. Leavenworth, KS: Department of Defense.

47




Jongerden, Joost. 2001. Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The case of the Kurds in

Turkey. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. 1(1): 80-86.

Jongerden, Joost, Jacob van Etten, and Hugo de Vos. Forst burning as a counterinsurgency

strategy in Eastern Turkey. Paper presented at the Kurdish Studies Conference, organized by the

Kurdish Instite of Paris and Salahaddin University, Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, September 6 toSeptember 9, 2006.

an Bruinessen, /artin. 1%%-. ITurAeyOs 8eath S9uards.Kiddle ast $e*ort. )rilGune: '0

'+.

45. ganda *A"# start $ 19&

incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing :override# *A driven out of

ganda"

A-C,E2

A /assacres present" 8urin! resettlement )ushes, !andan military forces fired artillery at

villa!ers and villa!es that did not leave their homes "Branch '00*, 2innstrUm '00&$. /any

deaths follo? from such attacAs and other massacres, includin! 40 civilian deaths at NamoAora

in 1%&- ">tunnu 1%%&, -$.

B - Exemplary Force (present): Acholi were regularly harrassed intimidated by Ugandan

forces, leading to human rights violations, tortured, extrajudicial murder (Branch 2005,

Finnstrm 2008).

C Resettlement (present) Ugandan military forced the Acholi to leave their homes forprotection camps in late 1980s (Utunnu 1998, 6). In 2002, forces civilians into IDP camps,

eventually leading to 95 percent of Acholi population becoming IDPs (Branch 2005).

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): LRA and Ugandan government engage in negotiations

from 2006 2008, which end with LRA agreeing to leave Uganda for safe areas in the DRC,

however, these are then attacked by Ugandan, the DRC, and South Sudan (Finnstrm 2008).

E - Development Assistance (present): Ugandan government under Museveni initiates Peace,

Recovery, and Development Plan in northern Uganda to provide new livelihoods and

opportunities for reconstruction. This is widely supported and coordinated with bilateral and

multilateral donors (Finnstrm 2008).F Elite Local Relationships (present): Acholi are incorporated into the Ugandan government,

including as members of parliament. The lack of a political program by the LRA has driven

many Acholi civilians and leaders into finding supportive arrangements with the government.

4&




References

Otunnu, Ogenga. 1998. The Path to Genocide in Northern Uganda. Refuge17(3): 4-13.

Branch, Adam. 2005. Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in

Northern: Uganda, 1986-1998,African Studies Quarterly 8(2): 1-31.

2innstrUm, SverAer. '00&.&iving 2ith Bad "urroundings) War, =istor%, and ver%da% oments

in 'orthern 4ganda. 8urham, NC: 8uAe niversity ;ress.

4. Fietnam# start $ 19=


A-C,Ef

A /assacres present"0 S rmy conce)t of achievin! victory throu!h fire)o?er is dominant,

sa? the conflict as a oreastyle conventional ?ar. This creates many o))ortunities for the

destruction of )o)ulation centers, civilians. 2ire)o?er ?as used Oas a crutchO for a

counterinsur!ency strate!y and alienated the )eo)le from the army "re)enevitch 1%&-, 1%&$.

rmy destroys hamlets to remove C from )o)ulation "re)enevitch 1%&-, 1%%$. B*' omers

made availale in >)eration rc



to Thompson's own work (1965), the Hamlet program was expanded too quickly by Diem's

brother, which made each hamlet difficult to defend, poorly located, and failed to adequately

develop them over time and spread successfully.

D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Alongside Strategic Hamlets was an anmesty program

called 'Open Arms', or Chieu Hoi, but it had a small budget, and money wasn't actively spent, butorganized under ARVN. 11,000 communist defecting in 1963. But, South Vietnamese leadership

never expressed any interest, only draining enemy manpower, didn't see the political potential

of the program. (Hunt 1991, 24) not interested in sharing power, including former enemies into

political system.

E - Development Assistance (present): US policy-makers conceived of development as a tool

to use in COIN and drive forward the modernization of South Vietnam (Latham 2006). In 1966,

Westmoreland adopts pacification, creates Office of Civil Operations (OCO) led by Dep. Amb.

William Porter, unties all civilian agencies under one chain of command but still doesn't include

military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer pushes for a single manager, and CORDS iscreated in May 1967 with Westmoreland as commander with three deputies (Andrade et. al.

2006, 14). Integration of development and military operations occurs with AB 143, combined

campaign plan for 1968 (Hunt 1991, 101). But, SVN didn't integrate with new Ministry of

Revolutionary Development and CORDS advisers, and Ministry of RD never has any capacity to

implement to address development priorities or implement US-provided aid programs (Hunt

1991, 103). Lack of ownership of development and state building initiatives by SVN. But,

US creates more destruction than development: The alleviation of social and political

dislocations which were the inevitable result of military operations in populated areas was

impossible (Cable 1991, 130).

F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): From 1961 to 1962, Special Forces and CIA do close

pop-centric COIN in Buon Enao, two hundred villages participating in (Krepenevitch 1986, 70-

71). Army takes over from CIA in April 1962, Gens. Rosson and Yarborough reform Special

Forces program. New Army-led Special Forces execute Operation Switchback in 1962 for

offensive operations against VC, no longer building local militias (Krepenevitch 1986,72)Elite

relationships are also hard to form after Diem's coup in the political instability following it. Each

time a new ruler came into power, adminstrative turnover was the result as they promoted their

own loyaltists (Ibid., 37). Over time, no experience could develop among SVN pacification

cadres.

References

Cable, Larry. 1991. Unholy Grail: The US and the wars in Vietnam, 1965-8. New York:

Routledge.

*0




Hunt, Richard A. 1991. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Kocher, Matthew Adam; Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, 2011. Aerial Bombing

and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,American Journal of Political Science.

Latham, Michael E., 2006. Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the failure of nation-

building in South Vietnam. Third World Quarterly. 27(1): 27-46.

Krepenevitch, Andrew F. 1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press.

Turse, NicA. '01+.ill An%thing That oves) The $eal American War in /ietnam.Ne? YorA:

/etro)olitan BooAs.

4%. ?im(a(8e# start $ 19%

'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss"A-Cdef

A /assacres present"0 3hodesian military forces re!ularly committed atrocities, focused

e6clusively on an enemycentric C>(N strate!y that )rioriti=ed Ohi!hody countsO at the tactical

level "Cilliers 1%&*$.

B - Exemplary Force (present): Rhodesian military forces regularly beat and intimidated

civilians, regularly executed prisoners (Cilliers 1985, De Boer 2011).

C - Resettlement (present): In July 1973, Rhodesian government initiates Protected Village

programme, resettling Africans in new locations, eventually becomes key part of RhodesianCOIN, leads to establishment of the Guard Force, local militias to police Protected Villages (De

Boer 2011).

D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Amnesty was announced twice in 1979, about 6,500

insurgents accept, but not fully implemented by Rhodesian military. Rhodesian military was

worried that the war effort would be undermined by amnesty for rebels and this drove executions

of prisoners, which ultimately cancelled any amnesty policy at the tactical level (Cilliers 1985).

E - Development Assistance (absent): Proposals for farms, bakeries, even a national pension

plan for Africans were floated but never funded. (Cilliers 1985).

F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite relationships.

References

Cilliers, J.K. 1985. Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia. London: Croom Helm.

*1




8e Boer, /arno. '011. I3hodesiaOs ))roach to Counterinsur!ency: ;reference for illin!.K

ilitar%-$evie2Novemer8ecemer '011, +*4*.

*'




*+


Documents

Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research Appendix