COBECOS Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007

COBECOS COBECOS Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007

David AgnewDavid Agnew

Imperial College/MRAGImperial College/MRAG

CFCA project tasksCFCA project tasks

A full description of existing MCS capacity and A full description of existing MCS capacity and costs for each MS;costs for each MS;

To establish the views of MS, the Commission, To establish the views of MS, the Commission, third parties (fishery partner counties and third parties (fishery partner counties and Regional Fisheries Organisations) and other Regional Fisheries Organisations) and other industry stakeholders on the operation of the industry stakeholders on the operation of the Agency indicators of MS ‘interest’;Agency indicators of MS ‘interest’;

To examine options for joint deployment plans, To examine options for joint deployment plans, their efficiency and cost/benefittheir efficiency and cost/benefit

To examine options for Agency activity, and costs To examine options for Agency activity, and costs from case studies and other meansfrom case studies and other means

To examine options for Agency structureTo examine options for Agency structure

Current costs are related to EEZ Current costs are related to EEZ areaarea

PT

BE

SI

LTMT

CY

FI

PL

EE

DK

DE

LV

IT

SE

UK

NL

FR

ES

IE

EL

y = 0.7372x + 5.1735

R2 = 0.712

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

ln(total operational costs, M €)

ln(N

umbe

r of

ves

sels

>10

m)

PT

BE

SI

LT MTCY

FI

PL EE

DK

DELV

IT

SE

UK

NL

FR ES

IEEL

y = 1.0505x + 9.7733

R2 = 0.7714

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

-4 -2 0 2 4 6


ln(E

EZ

, km

2 )

PT

BE

SI

LT

MT

CY

FI

PL

EE

DK

DELV

IT

SE

UK

NL

FR

ES

IE

EL

y = -0.1641x + 4.6406

R2 = 0.0213

-

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

-4 -2 0 2 4 6


ln(t

ota

l ca

tch

pe

r ve

sse

l, to

nn

es)

PT

BE

SI

LT

MTCY

FI

PL

EE

DK

DE

LV

IT

SE

UK

NLFR

ES

IE

EL

y = 0.5367x + 9.5725

R2 = 0.1452

-

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5


ln(t

otal

cat

ch,

tonn

es)

Table 3.20 Inter regional differencesTable 3.20 Inter regional differences

Cost / inspection (€)Cost / inspection (€)

SeaSea LandLand AirAir

BalticBaltic 91.491.4 3.63.6 77.477.4

DenmarkDenmark 285.9285.9 12.512.5 00

SwedenSweden 774.7774.7 25.425.4 77.377.3

GermanyGermany 41.941.9 0.50.5 NaNa

Poland Poland 14.114.1 29.229.2 00

EstoniaEstonia 17.717.7 2.62.6 00

North SeaNorth Sea 101.0 101.0

15.4 15.4 1,650.7 1,650.7

DenmarkDenmark 190.6190.6 19.219.2 00

UKUK 351.4351.4 273.7273.7 716.5716.5

GermanyGermany49.649.6

0.7 0.7 00

FranceFrance 12.412.4 20.620.6 3.03.0

Cost / inspection (€)Cost / inspection (€)

MediterraneanMediterranean 43.143.1 22.722.7 30.430.4

FranceFrance 22.822.8 10.210.2 19.119.1

SpainSpain 114.5114.5 25.925.9 4.04.0

CyprusCyprus 5.45.4 11.011.0 0.00.0

MaltaMalta 175.0175.0 NaNa 100.0100.0

AtlanticAtlantic26.926.9 13.413.4

8 8

UKUK 262.8262.8 76.376.3 6161

FranceFrance 25.925.9 15.015.0 3.03.0

SpainSpain 12.912.9 4.14.1 55

Table E.1 Sea patrol costs per patrol day by region

Baltic Med North Sea Atlantic

Fixed and operational costs / day

4,517 4,095 6,416 5,764

Operational costs / day 3,414 3,411 5,862 4,579

Table E.1 Sea inspection cost efficiencies


Sea inspections 8,137 3,665 5,883 4,800

Cost per inspection € 2,380 € 5,633 € 6,826 € 7,565

Infringements detected 471 280 532 741

Cost per infringement detected € 41,096 € 73,768 € 75,469 € 49,017

Table E.1 Shore-based cost efficiencies


Land inspections 9,905 3,010 12,218 3,274

Cost per inspection € 496 € 2,118 € 1,402 € 5,718

Infringements detected 401 281 609 1,141

Cost per infringement detected € 12,257 € 22,667 € 28,157 € 16,407

Efficient implementation Efficient implementation requires:requires:

uniform and effective inspection uniform and effective inspection probability on sea and landprobability on sea and land

uniform quality of inspectionuniform quality of inspection uniform deterrent effect of uniform deterrent effect of

inspectionsinspections

Different models for compliance Different models for compliance coordinationcoordination

Model 1: Model 1: Partial information exchange and no Partial information exchange and no coordinated activity. DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTScoordinated activity. DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS

Model 2 Model 2 MS engage in joint patrols and extensive MS engage in joint patrols and extensive information exchange. PARTIALLY SATISFIES CFP, BUT DOES information exchange. PARTIALLY SATISFIES CFP, BUT DOES NOT ENSURE EQUAL INSPECTIONS NOT ENSURE EQUAL INSPECTIONS

Model 3 Model 3 JDP with equivalent levels of inspection JDP with equivalent levels of inspection created by MS within their EEZs. DOES SATISFY JDP created by MS within their EEZs. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES MAY NOT BE AS EFFICIENT REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES MAY NOT BE AS EFFICIENT AS MODEL 4 BUT IS EASIER TO IMPLEMENTAS MODEL 4 BUT IS EASIER TO IMPLEMENT

Model 4 Model 4 MS achieve uniformity through full pooling of MS achieve uniformity through full pooling of resources. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME resources. DOES SATISFY JDP REQUIREMENTS. IN SOME CASES WILL BE MORE EFFICIENT THAN MODEL 3 BUT MORE CASES WILL BE MORE EFFICIENT THAN MODEL 3 BUT MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENTDIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT

Compliance – the essential Compliance – the essential building blocksbuilding blocks

The Agency will need to develop quantitative risk-based The Agency will need to develop quantitative risk-based assessment of JDP requirements to ensure efficient deployment – assessment of JDP requirements to ensure efficient deployment – this is not being done in any MS.this is not being done in any MS.

1.1. How is the amount of compliance related to the amount of How is the amount of compliance related to the amount of inspection effort? inspection effort?

2.2. Is there an optimum level of inspection effort that yields the most Is there an optimum level of inspection effort that yields the most cost-effective benefits – minimum costs and maximum cost-effective benefits – minimum costs and maximum compliance?compliance?

3.3. What is the optimum distribution of inspection effort within a JDP?What is the optimum distribution of inspection effort within a JDP?4.4. What is the optimum distribution of inspection effort between What is the optimum distribution of inspection effort between

inspection means?inspection means?

Theory: compliance = 1 – (n. infringements / n. inspections)Theory: compliance = 1 – (n. infringements / n. inspections)• i.e. proportion of inspected events that do not have infringements, i.e. proportion of inspected events that do not have infringements,

assuming an equal detection probability in all inspection systems. assuming an equal detection probability in all inspection systems.

Question 1 – answer: yes there is a Question 1 – answer: yes there is a relationship between inspection effort and relationship between inspection effort and

compliancecompliance optimum optimum

complianccompliance is e is achieveachieve

Calculated using ICES catch data and total inspections

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Inspections/1000 t catch

% c

om

plia

nce

Maximum compliance is at high levels of inspection coverage (1-infringements/inspection)

Inspection rate is expressed as sea inspections per 1000 tonnes of demersal catch

This relationship will need to be developed for each JDP and inspection means by the Agency

inspection level --->

Co

mp

lian

ce: b

en

efit

to c

on

tro

l (re

d)

--->

cost

(b

lue

) --

->

differentoptima

maximum

Question 3: the optimum distribution of Question 3: the optimum distribution of inspections is in direct proportion to fishing inspections is in direct proportion to fishing

effort (catches)effort (catches)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

% departure from ideal distribution of control effort

pe

rce

nta

ge

of

infr

ing

em

en

ts

density of inspection: 1 /1000 tdensity of inspection: 5 /1000 tdensity of inspection: 10 /1000 tdensity of inspection: 20 /1000 tdensity of inspection: 50 /1000 tdensity of inspection: 150 /1000 tdensity of inspection: 350 /1000 t

A 20% discrepancy between the current distribution of inspections, and the distribution of the catch, is predicted to lead to a 10% higher level of infringements than a perfectly distributed system

idealcurrent

Northern Northern HakeHake

Southern Southern HakeHake

Baltic (22-32) Baltic (22-32) codcod

MediterraneaMediterranean bluefin tunan bluefin tuna

NAFONAFONEAFCNEAFC

IVa

IIIa

IIa

27

24

IVc

IIId

IIIc25

23IIIb

VIIIa

VIIk VIIj

VIIdVIIe

VIIIb

VIIg

VIIc VIIb VIIa

VIIf

IVb

XII

VIIIe

VIIId

VIIIc

VIIh

IXbIXa

Vb1

Vb2

VIbVIa

Va

Case studiesCase studies

Testing the application of criteria for Testing the application of criteria for allocation of responsibility (“interest”) allocation of responsibility (“interest”)

from the proposed regulationfrom the proposed regulation the quantity of fish landed on its territory as a proportion of the quantity of fish landed on its territory as a proportion of

the total landings from the fishery that is subject to the JDP;the total landings from the fishery that is subject to the JDP; the relative number of community fishing vessels flying its the relative number of community fishing vessels flying its

flag (engine power and gross tonnage) that are actively flag (engine power and gross tonnage) that are actively involved in the fishery that is subject to the JDP in relation involved in the fishery that is subject to the JDP in relation to the total number of vessels that are actively involved in to the total number of vessels that are actively involved in that fishery;that fishery;

the relative size of its quota allocation or, in the absence of the relative size of its quota allocation or, in the absence of a quota, its catch in a given reference period in respect of a quota, its catch in a given reference period in respect of that fishery;that fishery;

the relative extent of the waters subject to its sovereignty the relative extent of the waters subject to its sovereignty or jurisdiction, if any, that are covered by the plan.or jurisdiction, if any, that are covered by the plan.

Hake case studyHake case study

Cost-benefit: Baltic codCost-benefit: Baltic cod

0

50

100

150

200

250

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

thou

sand

ton

nes

Baltic cod agreed TAC ACFM landings (22-32)

Baltic codBaltic cod

Predictions: continued imbalance in Predictions: continued imbalance in inspections will lead to continued inspections will lead to continued IUU!IUU!

Baltic cod –cost/benefit of JDPBaltic cod –cost/benefit of JDP Value of a JDP is the catch value accruing to legitimate vessels due to the elimination of Value of a JDP is the catch value accruing to legitimate vessels due to the elimination of

illegal (unreported) catches through better control in a JDPillegal (unreported) catches through better control in a JDP

Estimated JDP cost to the agency is €0.5 annually, included in these calculations.Estimated JDP cost to the agency is €0.5 annually, included in these calculations.

Improvements in compliance achieved byImprovements in compliance achieved by• Equalisation of inspections (current 17% imbalance: equalisation should reduce infringements from Equalisation of inspections (current 17% imbalance: equalisation should reduce infringements from

5% to 4% of inspections, i.e. reduction in IUU from 40% to 30%)5% to 4% of inspections, i.e. reduction in IUU from 40% to 30%)• Increasing inspections from 125/1000 tonnes to 175/1000 tonnes (reduce infringements from 5% Increasing inspections from 125/1000 tonnes to 175/1000 tonnes (reduce infringements from 5%

to 2.6%))to 2.6%))• Combined effect: IUU from 40% to 15%Combined effect: IUU from 40% to 15%

Answer 2: Cost benefit of a JDP – Answer 2: Cost benefit of a JDP – Baltic CodBaltic Cod

COST/BENEFIT OF THE ADDITIONAL COST OF A JDP

€ 0

€ 2,000,000

€ 4,000,000

€ 6,000,000

€ 8,000,000

€ 10,000,000

€ 12,000,000

€ 14,000,000

0 50 100 150 200 250

inspections / 1000 t cod

net

bene

fit o

f a

JDP

ove

r 5

year

s

Benefit of implementing a JDP (equalising inspections)retaining current levels of inspection.

optimum

inspection level --->

bene

fit (

incr

ease

s w

ith

com

plia

nce)

---

>

cost

(in

crea

ses

linea

rly)

--->

benefit from compliance cost of compliance

optimum

Starts and ends of JDPsStarts and ends of JDPs

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

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20

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20

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08

20

09

spa

wn

ing

sto

ck b

iom

ass

(t)

0%

22%

40%

100%

Bpa (cod 22 - 32)

A JDP is in force from the time that a stock drops below Blim, until the time that it reaches Bpa (ie. Until it is recovered)

Efficient JDP Inefficient JDP

Significant problemsSignificant problems

Quantifying relationshipsQuantifying relationships Predicting results of qualitative Predicting results of qualitative

improvementsimprovements• Baltic cod – real problem is Baltic cod – real problem is

ineffectiveness of Polish inspections, not ineffectiveness of Polish inspections, not just equalisationjust equalisation

Review of impacts of IUU Review of impacts of IUU fishing on developing country fishing on developing country

fisheriesfisheries

Case Case StudiesStudies

-poor/good MCS-High/low vulnerability-High/low ecosystem impact

-Tuna/shrimp/pelagics-High seas/domestic issues

case studies of developing countries with

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Namibia

Kenya

Seychelles

Liberia

Sierra Leone

Papua New Guinea

Mozambique

Angola

Somalia

Guinea

ca

se

stu

die

s

$m loss to illegal/pirate fishing

Photos courtesy Kieran Kelleher (top)and Jon Klepsvik (bottom)

Estimates of total world valueEstimates of total world value

Extrapolation to Extrapolation to sub-Saharan sub-Saharan Africa = $0.9bn Africa = $0.9bn landed valuelanded value

95% range $0.4 - 95% range $0.4 - $2.3bn$2.3bn

IUU is an IUU is an additional 19% of additional 19% of declared landed declared landed valuevalue

R2 = 0.8078

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

-3 -2 -1 0 1

Governance score

%IU

U $

Governance IUU catchGovernance IUU catch

IUU as % of declared catch

Targeting Targeting resourcesresources

Country IUU as prop of FAO calculated totalIUU value potential increase based on %GNP to fisheries - outside calculationrank

Guinea 50% 105 0.9% 10Sierra Leone 37% 47 1.3% 6Liberia 71% 19 2.1% 2Angola 19% 49 0.8% 11Namibia 0% 0 0.0% 30Mozambique 19% 51 0.7% 12Kenya 20% 4 0.0% 29Somalia 75% 94 1.5% 4Seychelles 5% 8 1.0% 9Papa New Guinea 11% 34 0.1% 26

Morocco 9% 73 0.3% 21Mauritania 10% 21 1.2% 8Senegal 9% 40 0.2% 22Cape Verde 0% 0 0.0% 31Gambia 13% 3 1.5% 3Guinea-Bissau 32% 6 1.2% 7Cote D'Ivore 49% 48 0.4% 17Ghana 5% 15 0.1% 25Togo 35% 11 1.4% 5Benin 13% 2 0.1% 28Nigeria 43% 374 0.5% 15Cameroon 32% 17 0.3% 19Equatorial Guinea 41% 1 0.2% 23Sao Tome & Principe 13% 1 0.7% 13Gabon 18% 12 0.3% 20Congo 40% 18 0.5% 14DR Congo 59% 5 0.1% 27South Africa 0% 0 0.0% 32Madagascar 7% 18 0.5% 16Comoros 30% 10 4.6% 1Tanzania 18% 20 0.2% 24Eritrea 35% 7 0.3% 18Mauritius 0% 0 0.0% 33BIOT 25% 1112 0.0% 0Saint Helena & Ascension0% 0 0.0% 0Fisheries as % GDP

Documents

COBECOS Salerno 22-23 Feb 2007