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UN ITED ST TE S RMY IN WO

Th e T e chnical S e rvi

THE QU RTERM STER CO













Foreword

This is the fourth and concluding volume of a series whences of the Army's Quartermaster organization in World War II. volumes of this group describe the problems and achievemaster Corps in the zone of interior and the third, still in



The Author

Alvin P. Stauffer holds a Doctor of Philosophy deversity. For seven years he taught history at Simmons Cjoined the staff of the U.S. National Park Service in produced many studies of historic sites administered by



Preface

The object of this volume is to increase the body oeasily available about Quartermaster support of the forin the Pacific. Anyone who writes on military supply venterritory, especially in dealing with Quartermaster suppl



tempted to think that distribution activities were usuall

performance, he will be in error. Quite the contrary, Quin general satisfactory, but since the tasks connected with plishment normally had few lessons to teach, the writer hsuch routine operations in as much detail as he did comcould not be completed either readily or quickly. Only thredge of the bothersome supply problems that are likely toof combat activities can future perplexities be anticipate

in time to cope with probable difficulties.The writer performed virtually all the research for th

the records of overseas commands, pertinent sections of loan from the Records Administration Center, AGO, St.stored before their removal to the Kansas City Records Ce



larly Mr. David Jaffé, the editor, and Mr. Allen R. Clark an

the copy editors, who painstakingly prepared the manuscripMaj. James F. Holly, who provided maps to guide the readto Maj. Arthur T. Lawry and Mr. Henry U. Milne, wcorners for the pictures with which to illustrate this volumMcDonald and Mrs. Anne Mewha, who typed the final co

Washington, D. C.14 February 1955





ContentsChapter

I. THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATI

Quartermaster Preparations for Wa r in the PhilippineQuartermaster Operations in Luzon, 8 December 1941-1Status of Quartermaster Supplies o n Bataan . . . .

Running t h e Blockade . . . . . . . . . . . .Bataan: Last Phase



Chapter

VII. STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKINGQuartermaster Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . .Distribution Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Packaging a n d Packing . . . . . . . . . . . .

VIII. CLASS I, II, I I I , AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMSClass I Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supply o f Subsistence in Advance Areas . . . . . .Class I I an d IV Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . .Class I I I Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I X . MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES . . . . .



Illustrations

Troop Formation o n Bataan . . . . . . . . . . . .Quartermaster Corps Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . .Surrender t o t h e Japanese . . . . . . . . . . . . .Storage Facilities i n Australia . . . . . . . . . . . .Salvage a n d Reclamation Activities . . . . . . . . . .Quartermaster Truck Company Motor Pool . . . . . .Section o f t h e Quartermaster Salvage Depot . . . . .Clothing a n d Equipage Building . . . . . . . . . .Cannery Operations i n Australia . . . . . . . . . . .Storage o f Meat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .









CHAPTER I

The Philippines—The Operations



2 THE QUA

the Philippines thus called for only the pro-tection of the small area about Manila Bayand Subic Bay.

By then, as a result of growing interna-tional tensions, the United States was con-fronted with the danger of an early Japaneseattack in the Far East. But since AmericanArmy strength in that area was rapidly in-creasing, it was possible for the first timeto envision a strong defense of the Philip-

and equipmentthe remote archmained. In fstrike.2

Quartermastin

Working undof the Chief Q



THE PHILIPPI N ES— TH E O PENING OPERATIONS

made elaborate plans for the future defenseof the islands as an independent state, butits implementation of these plans had pro-ceeded slowly and in early 1941 the regularmilitary establishment included only a fewthousand troops. There were somewhatmore than 100,000 reservists, but as a wholethey had received only inadequate training.Creation of a t ruly modern army wouldhave put an almost unbearable strain on

poses, but that action on thisHarbor. 4

All this meanUSAFFE had th e United Stateswealth forces. Wobtain suppliethe hastily assemChief Quarterm



4 THE QUAR

supply deficiencies, created in July by theincrease from 31,000 to 50,000 men, in thebasis of defense reserve stocks for U.S. Armytroops and Philippine Scouts. It also sentin orders for the supplies required by therise in the authorized strength of the Regu-lar Army and the Philippine Scouts from18,000 to 22,000 troops. Among the fooditems requisitioned were dehydrated vege-tables and boneless beef, both of which, re-

serves were lesFilipino forces few Quartermastcould buy localstocks. 9

In the springstart of acceleraOCQM had invthe Philippinesticularly useful



THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATIONS

serves. It stored approximately 300,000 gal-lons of gasoline in 55-gallon drums, 100,000C rations, and 1,145 tons of canned salmon.Fort McKinley and Fort Stotsenburg eachhad about 200,000 C rations and 300,000gallons of gasoline. In addition, Fort Mc-

Kinley had sizable stocks of canned meatand fish.11 The defense reserves, as a whole,lacked rice, the principal food of the Fil-ipinos; canned fruits and vegetables; and

the Regular Arof war gave it tquate stocks foruse. 13 Accordinglmaster Depot supplying the C

the result that almost depleted.

In the few mPearl Harbor,



6 THE QU

August 1941, it, like the O R A N G E Plan, as -signed the U.S. forces only the limited mis-sion of holding the land areas around Ma-nila and Subic Bays. MacArthur quicklypointed out that it gave no recognition tothe wider view of defense implicit in thecurrent mobilization of the CommonwealthArmy and in the recent creation of anAmerican high command for the Far East.He strongly urged that the plan be revised

provided for theregidor for 7,0fenses of Manilasummer MacArtthe OCQM hisof WPO-3. Dra

having determdecided not to plies on Bataabeaches. This




As a result, when M Day arrived for thePhilippines on 8 December, the Corps in-stead of beginning the movement of sup-plies to the peninsula as the discarded planhad directed, accelerated shipments to theadvance depots and to the railheads andmotorheads of the fighting forces.18 Stocksoriginally designed largely for the defense ofBataan were now scattered over much ofcentral and southern Luzon. For some days

army, or commaster units was such into of 1942, and lized when hosset up at Mani

fo r th e instrucvision quartermsupplies, but thfor all division



8 THE QU

master General of his needs, but that officerhad no jurisdiction over this problem andcould do nothing to help him. Drake hadalso asked Philippine Department headquar-ters to make qualified civilians residing inthe archipelago commissioned officers, butthat headquarters likewise lacked authorityto grant his request. When the Japanese in-vaded Luzon, Drake was consequentlyobliged to rely on civilian volunteers and im-

beaches. No fiManila Depot trainloads of estimated to hdepots at TarlacShipments of racomprised a fiv15 December abeen accumulaadvance installa




Rail tank cars from Manila supplied thecenters, which in turn supplied some thirtyissue points set up along the main trafficarteries out of Manila. Tank trucks, drums,and cans were all used in these operations. 22

In Manila, the largest commercial stor-

age center in the Philippines, the Quarter-master Depot exploited local supply sourcesto the maximum. It stressed particularly theprocurement of subsistence, fo r from the be-

if he took the far-reaching imcurement of rsmall military sity, both the Qadvance depots

could from locthey discoveredmoved from thbeen purchased b



10 THE QUA

Alva E. McConnell, Commanding Officerof the Philippine Quartermaster Depot, be-gan the movement of small quantities offood, gasoline, and oil to Bataan some daysbefore th e order for a general withdrawalwas issued on 23 December. 25

An equally important preparatory meas-ure was the dispatch of a Quartermasterofficer, Col. Otto Harwood, to the penin-sula with the mission of dispersing and

over 1,000 tonsCebu City, struland and sankQuartermaster with more thancatastrophe, thcan forces duriippines, left theent upon the Qit could procur




rendered much more difficult by inabilityto move a large quantity of supplies byland. In central Luzon there was almosteverywhere confusion created by defeat—abandoned railways, highjacked trucks, de-stroyed bridges, and roads congested by

hundreds of vehicles and thousands of flee-ing civilians and disorganized troops.Bataan itself was a mountainous regionserved only by primitive roads. For the

gram, Headquartment, disapprovearrangements hmonwealth Govercurement of Constabulary a

that agency to This system pfailure, for onthe Constabul



12 THE QUA

Transport Service vehicles carrying suppliesfrom Manila to motorheads in the combatzone. Unable to halt this practice, Head-quarters, USAFFE, finally sanctioned it byauthorizing division commanders to requi-sition vehicles to meet their immediate

needs. Removal of Quartermaster stocks toBataan therefore depended mainly upon thewillingness of combat officers to load theirtrucks with food, gasoline, and clothing. 31

hoards of thosehis advice. 33

The Manila ships and wareof last-minute remaster stocks. U

General MacAQuartermaster ily useful items ers in the harb




At Manila occasional bombings and airraid warnings hampered stowing operations.Many stevedores fled at the first sign ofhostile airplanes over the port area, andsome never returned. Radio appeals for vol-unteers were made, and about 200 Ameri-

cans and Europeans responded. Most ofthem were unused to manual labor, but theyworked by the side of faithful Filipinosthrough the last three nights of December

The petroleumunluckily for thSi-Kiang was bflour had been

The Japanese2 January ende

from the capitreached the pechiefly those snight from som



14 THE QU

prescribed for both troops and civilians. 40

At best they provided less than 2,000 caloriesas compared with the nearly 4,000 caloriesneeded by combat troops. A few fortunateunits could supplement this scanty diet withthe food taken along during the withdrawal

and never turned in at ration dumps, butsuch supplies were limited and lasted onlya short time. 41 As increasing difficulty wasexperienced in maintaining even a 2,000-

several times. 43 weeks of operatabout 30,000 pless than the amo

Fresh meat the slaughter ofbefore the invasbeen used as farmers.

44 Cavaland pigs and c



THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATION

was a plentiful supply, especially of largepythons, whose eggs are considered a deli-cacy by some Filipinos. 45

Before the war lucrative fishing had beencarried on in Manila Bay, which teemedwith aquatic life, and the QMC naturally

tried to tap this rich source of food. It es-tablished a fishery at Lamao, the center ofthe industry, and sent local fishermen out onnightly expeditions. Daily catches finally

issue of salt modays. 47

The v alue oin prolonging overestimated. wide variety ofsiderable additioof meat and ric

The QMC haclothing than o



16 THE QU




motor fuel oil were on hand at the beginningof January. Although these supplies did notinclude large stocks of the most appropri-ate gasolines and lubricants, they could bemade to last several mo nths with strict econ-omy and careful substitution. Accordingly,

when mid-January reports revealed usage ofgasoline at the alarming rate of 14,000 gal-lons a day, an amount sufficient to depletestocks within a month, or almost two months

Units and laboprovised. Hastilincreased theirmore or less r5,000 Filipino drivers were add

the two truck ctermaster RegimTruck Compantwenty-four pr



18 THE QUA




pluses of most of the meats, fruits, and vege-tables familiar to American soldiers andwhich served as a receiving point for suppliescoming from th e United States; from th eNetherlands Indies, producers of coffee andother tropical products; from Mindanao

and the Visayan Islands in the central Phil-ippines, still almost entirely in Americanpossession, where rice, sugar, tobacco, ba-nanas, and mangoes were available; or even

for they emittedreveal their presfast interislandCol. Manuel A.Quezon as liaiArthur, helped

the Philippinecitizens. A ll togeach with a catons, were secu



20 THE QU

these ports Cebu City was the most impor-tant. The Quartermaster depot at that placesince the start of hostilities had been pro-curing supplies in the Visayan Islands andMindanao for shipment north to Corregi-dor. Established in November 1941, this

installation had originally been scheduled toreceive from the Manila Depot all the stocksrequired to feed and clothe the troops inthe central and southern provinces, troops

out by the GoveDrake, the Lega cargo of foagents at Capiz, aport in northerndelivered its load

other successfuLegaspi, enterinMindoro for ctime, was sight




southern Philippines. Unless American airand naval support was available to convoyships attempting to pierce the apparentlyimpenetrable screen of Japanese naval ves-sels, fur ther blockade-running was almostcertainly hopeless. To attempt it would

probably sacrifice gallant crews in a futilegesture.

Recognizing the realities of the situation,Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, Mac-

to the Philippiwere not mentiosupplies in Austrof them was nein the NetherlanU.S. forces had

pable of quicklvoyage to Luzsuch as they la Most of the s



22 THE QU

Cebu and that they be sent in 1,000-ton lotsto facilitate handling. He made a detailedbreakdown of the required ration in poundsfor each component so that th e specificneeds of the Luzon forces would be known.Having received no reply by the end of

January, Drake sent a personal letter byspecial courier to Lt. Gen. George H. Brett,Commanding General, U.S. Army Forcesin Australia (USAFIA), emphasizing the

shipment of 3supply for 50,00tities of ammumade roughly irations to one to

The task thu

dable one. Thecapable of carryvoyage of 2,500the few which




and headed for Batavia, Java, to pick up acargo of ammunition from Army stocksthere. 65 Rations for both ships were ob-tained from stocks that th e Australian Gov-ernment, in accordance with previous ar-rangements, had sent to Brisbane and

Fremantle, the two ports chosen for use byblockade-runners.

Eventually, about ten or twelve vessels,mostly old and rather decrepit Filipino or

Netherlands In

In the NethRobenson, a cmanded some northern Austra

blockade-runningordered to Javauary, the daymessage stressbl k d



24 THE QUAR

dent Polk, a medium-sized Americanfreighter, arrived at Soerabaja with a fullload of these supplies, and after several daysof discussion Robenson obtained permissionto use them. About this t ime a courierbrought him the report that Drake had pre-

pared for Brett on the plight of theBataan Force. Robenson found it prettyshocking.

70

Early in February, Rear Adm. William A.

landing in forcethe Dutch at freighters, one enson designatedChinese crew, Only by offeri

financial inducemto obtain a creFebruary, the day menced, with




the use of ordinary commercial packing con-tainers incapable of wi thstanding roughhandling and numerous transfers. But fora few days Australian canned meat did givethe troops on Bataan a little more than theirusual meager fare.

The Japanese invasion of the NetherlandsIndies and the accompanying increase ofhostile air and naval strength in that areaserved to make blockade-running from

oped. In accordaquest the destrof rations, 36other ordnancsupplies, and 61happily for the m

there was not eplans, fo r withfell. In any evedubious because



26 THE QUAR

The question naturally arises whetherfood shipments from Australia had beenworth the risks involved. About 1,100 tonsof balanced rations in poor condition didreach Bataan after transshipment fromMindanao, but in all probability the Luzon

Force would have received an equal amountof food from the central and southernPhilippines had these supplies from Aus-tralia been unavailable. One advantage of

As the situatioactually developproblem of foodof more ships toAustralia but iafter the end o

Mindanao and thAs long as thisnot be run, it mtons of rations




was available in any form. On 22 March theration had fallen to 17 ounces, or only abouta third of the 46.2 ounces provided in a fullration, and it was recommended that theissue be further reduced to 12.67 ounces. 79

The Philippine ration underwent a simi-

lar reduction. Daily issues of rice, whichserved the purpose of flour in the Americanration, gradually dwindled from 10 ouncesat the start of rationing to 3 ounces in mid-

tually impenetrapack trails wertion. From earlfense line couarduous procesof densely overg

like the ribs ofMariveles Mouthe front. 81

Limitations



28 THE QUA

inescapable, for the meat had to be trans-ported in unrefrigerated open trucks onhauls that lasted ten or twelve hours duringthe heat of the tropical day. The long trip,moreover, afforded highjackers many op-portunities for plunder. 83

By late March, with the blockade com-pletely shutting off all outside shipments, thesubsistence stocks on Corregidor offered theonly real hope of an increase in the Bataan

no transportationand practically notogether with thtively abundantevitable that thactually received

masters on Bathungry defend

A comparisonCorregidor and




demonstrated to the defenders of the penin-sula by incidents like that of 18 March,when military police halted a truck ladenwith rations for a few Harbor Defenses anti-aircraft batteries, which drew their suppliesdirect from Corregidor, and discovered that

it contained ham, bacon, sausage, raisins,canned peas, corn, tomatoes, potatoes, andpeaches, none of which were available tothe other troops defending Bataan, as well

cer, but since ttute a balanced to retain their stoeral Drake calletion and suggestfor the marine

supplies.89

As the food deteriorated durinsideration was



3 THE QUA

pains that swell and go away again. Break-fast restored a normal feeling for an houror so, but lassitude then followed. 91 Be-tween mid-February and mid-March a tre-mendous increase occurred in the numberof soldiers rendered ineffective because of

malaria, malnutrition, and dysentery.The commander of the I Corps attributed

these alarming developments to the steadyreduction in the quantity and quality of ra-

tempt must beup at Cebu andto Corregidor. plan, motor shiislands since latecome blockade-r

venture would of planes was pto send aircrafwright also plan




shipping and docks at Cebu, against enemyfacilities at Davao, and against NicholsField at Manila. While these attacks werefairly successful, the small number of bomb-ers and the meager protection afforded bythe six battered pursuit planes available on

Mindanao make it fairly obvious that, if theblockade-running enterprise had been un-dertaken, it would have ended in disaster. 90

Rations during th e final two weeks on

of the 45th InScouts, revealtroops exhibiteMore than half edema, night bof dietary defi

surgeon continufrom starvation.

Ill and undecould not effe



32 THE QUA

The capitulation of Luzon Force, itssurgeon declared, represents in many re-spects a defeat due to disease and starvationrather than to military conditions. Physicaldeterioration, he continued, had progressedso far that it became a determining factor

in tactical operations. Even if the Jap-anese had not launched their final attack,surrender in all probability could have beenpostponed only a few days. So bad had

shortage of gasit increasingly volving motor night of 8 April,last twenty days,dumps. In prepa

following mornstroyed except the Americans lize to transport






34 THE QUAR

detailed to the QMC, the Filipinos wereuncomplaining, but as the American soldiersgrew hungrier the more vocal they became.Looking for someone to blame and notknowing where to place the blame theypicked on the QMC. According to Colonel

Alexander, this bitterness continued on intoprison camp and no doubt many survivorsbelieved they were starved on Bataan be-cause of the failure of the QMC to perform

stocks among allHigher authorito the shortageprohibition, in theof the procurepine Government

quired by Filipino lapse of the dwithin two weekdrawal to the




500 tons as compared with the 150 or so tonstransportable by the ordinary torpedo-carrying type. Unfortunately, no cargo-carrying submarines could be obtainedeither in the Pacific or elsewhere. Finally,American weakness in the air rendered sup-

ply by plane impracticable. But had moreairfields, bombers, fighters, and, above all,more transport planes been available,Bataan, as subsequent experience in Burma

protracted defpositions as Batait was anticipatedprobably comethey were to behumanly possib

for unusually lathey foresee thagees would havand Corregidor.



CHAPTER II

Problems in Hawaii, Aand New Zealan



PROBLEMS IN HAWAII, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW Z

entrance of Honolulu Harbor, and theQuartermaster warehouses at SchofieldBarracks, the Army's largest garrison post,20 miles northwest of Honolulu.2 But lackof funds and higher priorities given tobuilding activities more directly related to

combat operations prevented the executionof these plans, and no substantial additionshad been made to Quartermaster installa-tions by the time hostilities began. Even the

disabled in Pearin force on Hgether likely. AArmy was to bastion capablattack. With the

tained by the Midway early anese assault imtive in the follo



38 THE QUA

supply fo r 139,000 men. Comparable in -creases in other overseas areas forced theW ar Department late in January 1942 topromulgate a modified system of supply foral l theaters of operations. Food, gasoline,and oil would be shipped automatically

without requisition by the ports of embarka-tion; clothing, equipage, and general sup-plies would, as in the past, be shipped onlyon requisition, but the requisitioning agency

meantime opengood deal of thDespite the hafrom drenchingpaved streets ooccasionally ut

the end of Juneat the Hawaiian000 to 500,000and open storag




parable Quartermaster establishments else-where in the Pacific.8

The Hawaiian Depot at first sent itemsrequisitioned by field units to a few poststhat distributed them to the proper units.Since these posts were concentrated about

Honolulu, there was danger that a largepart of the supplies directly earmarked fo rfield organizations might be destroyed in airraids. Further complicating the distribution

There were apoints. They dpoints in thatcould be issuedtion system busually consiste

combat rationsgasoline. 10

As troop strethe late spring a



4 THE QUA

most important matter handled by theODQM during the first six months of thewar. For decades the Territory had pursueda specialized tropical economy that re-stricted agricultural production almost en-tirely to sugar and pineapples, the commod-

ities with highest cash returns. Temperate-zone products, the chief elements in the dietof the European and American segment ofpopulation; rice, the staple food of the

The developmture was handicathe turn of theperate-zone frudeclining. Farmprofit commensur

expended, for cuties required csmaller harvestslarge-scale, ind




manding generals of the Hawaiian Depart-ment had therefore increasingly stressed thedevelopment of an emergency food programfor application in a military crisis involvingHawaii.

When the Department Service CommandSection was established at Headquarters,Hawaiian Department ( H H D ) , in August1935, with the responsibility of planning forcivil mobilization in time of war, it was

own, relying alamount availa

As relations 1940 and 1941cused increasinand storage spacland and the labcome from theQueen Pineappleencouraged pla



42 THE QUA

been firmly implanted in the public mind. 20

General Short gave strong support to theTerritorial Committee on Food Storage,which was trying to create a central reservefor the civilian population. 21

In the spring of1941 this committee asked th e Office fo r

Emergency Management in Washington tobuy two million dollars' worth of rice, flour,canned milk, fats, and oil, the essential com-modities imported in the largest volume, but

ers, who raisedavoid monetar

The Office of

Despite extereserves on thlittle larger thanat all. Limitedbles had been



PROBLEMS IN HAWAII , AUSTRALIA, AND NEW Z

ministrator of Crop Production, who namedfour co-ordinators, one for each of the mainislands—Oahu, Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui. 28

These appointments were all made with aview to the possible implementation of theplan for emergency vegetable production.When Lt.

Gen. Delos C. Emmons

suc-ceeded Short, he decided that sugar andpineapple land would not be used for thecultivation of vegetables. He based his de-

semble stocks The OFC advshipping prioritage of the reserv

On 26 Januacame Director bility for the prof both Arm y aUp to this timea rationing nor a



44 THE QUAR

plentiful and scarce. To eliminate these os-cillations, Colonel White set up shippingpriorities, but shortages and surpluses con-tinued to prevail. Actually, Oahu sufferedless from such fluctuations than did the out-lying islands that relied on very infrequentsailings from Honolulu for the bulk of theirfresh food. Apart from the recurrent short-ages of fruit and vegetables, forces pushingprices upward were strongest on Oahu.

vegetables, currentColonel White toas retail ceilingsmodities. To soretailers' demandsale charges. 36

Price regulafair, was a mereof dealing withto increase the




eral factors. One, as already pointed out,was the absence of a large cold-storage build-ing program. Another was the higher pri-ority given to the stockage and withdrawalof Army supplies. A third, and the most im -portant of all, was the steady growth of mil-itary cold-storage requirements as the num-ber of troops in the archipelago and othermid-Pacific islands multiplied. The shortageof perishables in Hawaii would have been

the stock of a ceeded a six-modistributed thrplaced by purchsix-month supstorage. 42

After fear of to wane in the came more andfunction was p



46 THE QUA

Price Control Section. When this action wasfollowed in March 1943 by the transfer ofcontrol over foods, feeds, and agriculturalseeds to the Director of Civilian Defense, therole of the Hawaiian Department Quar-termaster in civilian food supply was termi-nated. 45

The OFC never attained the importanceit would have had if Hawaii had been block-aded by sea, but it nonetheless performed an

can bases at Wstrategically locRabaul in New Bislands in the socould serve as bacquisitions and aadvances.

To halt the souanese the Alliesline from the Un






48 THE QUAR

quarters and the South Pacific Areathrough a subordinate. Both AdmiralNimitz and General MacArthur were re-sponsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff inWashington. 46

Similar defensive and offensive missionswere assigned

to the Southwest

Pacific Area

and the Pacific Ocean Areas. Both com-mands were to hold those islands that wereessential to sea and air communication with

the same fashiofor overseas thea

At the outsetsolved before Aities could be distribution wasinadequate raishortage of comoreover, was nmanufactured




for new or expanding war industries is indi-cated by the fact that at the close of 1942,roughly 85 percent of the men, 26 percentof the women, and 30 percent of the farmpopulation were either enlisted in the armedservices or already engaged in war indus-tries. A vailable labor consisted almost whollyof men over military age, of the physicallyhandicapped, and of women. Farmers andmanufacturers alike had trouble in securing

k A i d t d i lt

months afterwcarried out retions. 51

During its pbility for transpobusied itself witlization of theThat system waswift distributionnally been built

l



5 THE QUAR

Apart from the absence of a single coun-try-wide gauge, the railway system had otherweaknesses. Grading was poor; there werenot enough sidings, yards, workshops, orwater supply points; and signaling was donemostly by hand. Rolling stock was designedto carry loads far below the Americanstandard. Boxcars carried only from about8 to 15 tons. Australian trains hauled onlyabout 500 tons, as compared with the 4,000

approach militlines, capable oran north to Brisbbe devoted exctation for more without cripplingrich region upodepended for coand food.55

Motor roads,




and usually more than five years old. Mostof these trucks, moreover, had power on onlyone axle, making it impossible to use themin rough country where American two- andthree-axle-drive trucks could move easily.Throughout 1942, however, the U.S. forceswere obliged to depend to a considerable ex-

tent on locally produced vehicles. 58

During this period the Corps had prac-tically no means of storing motor vehicles

d h i f bli h hi l

plagued all technichanical equipme

Because of thighway transpoto water transporOnly at the verystill unsafe, did

by land.60

Genports, despite formed the mai

th d d i






portion of old and physically unfit menamong port laborers and from the high rateof absenteeism, which averaged as much as18 percent at Townsville. Since double andtriple rates of pay were given for week-endwork, some longshoremen put in an ap-pearance only on Saturdays and Sundays.So common did this practice become thatthe Commonwealth, with the concurrenceof the U.S. Army, finally stopped all week-

at change-of-gscarcer. Fromproblem of futing military stoin 1943 an exundertaken to m

quirements, atemporary struoperations werthose in the U



54 THE QU

supply organizations and those of the fed-eral and state governments of Australia. 64

In spite of the unprecedented problemsthat it posed, Australia was an invaluableasset to the QMC. For more than two yearsit furnished well over half the food con-sumed in the Southwest Pacific Area anda substantial part of that consumed in theSouth Pacific Area. Until the termination ofhostilities it poured out rations for American

mands. Like Auof inestimable

Australia andvided indispenUnder the prithey also paidplication of thiout in an infoAmerican for



CHAPTER III

Mission and Organizai th P ifi



56 THE QUAR

developed for consumption during a partic-ular phase of combat. 1

The provision of clothing for the Armymeant supply not only of the regular serviceuniform of coat, jacket, trousers, shirt, neck-tie, cap, and shoes, but also of variations ofthese garments intended to meet the specialconditions of climate and terrain encoun-tered in the Pacific. It meant, too, supply ofscores of other articles, such as head nets,

points for issuesupply units. 4

Quartermasterfour classes. Clwere consumeddaily rate. Foodcipal supplies ioverseas languagapplied to rationing, equipment,



MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC

The QMC stored and distributed as wellas procured supplies. When suppliesreached their destination, whether it was amodern base in Australia or a forlorn dis-tributing point in a New Guinea junglewith vines and trees for cover and damp soilfor flooring, quartermasters stored themand, when the stocks were wanted elsewhere,arranged for their distribution. Storage anddistribution, like procurement, demanded a

In overseas tivities were catheater commanService Forcesterior was responbat forces, it s ther than the

side the Unitedmander plannedmanner he cons



58 THE QUA

ply operations than the OQMG could findelsewhere. While all this exchange of tech-nical information helped that office furnishmore serviceable supplies and better trainedunits, it did not give the OQMG any con-trol over the operations of the Corps in thePacific. Each area continued to have aQuartermaster organization independent ofthe Corps in the United States.

these functionFifth Air Force,ported by USAStheir troops thebrought to dismands establisheadminister Quaployed Quartermout the supplyCorps. 7




covered the "communications zone, whichembraced the entire Southwest Pacific Areaoutside combat zones .9 Within the com-munications zone, which was divided fo radministrative and operating purposes intobase sections, USASOS controlled all sup-ply establishments, lines of communication,and other agencies needed fo r satisfactorysupport of troops. To carry out its mission,Headquarters, USASOS, established gen-

the size of thsimilar to thosetermaster agenciStates. There master Generapots had develcapable of dealproblems. The concentrated ocurement of c



60 THE QUA

in Australia and what proportion wouldhave to come from the United States;finally, it arranged for procurement fromthe indicated source. The OCQM also de-termined how many Quartermaster officersand men were needed and, subject to theapproval of GHQ SWPA, requested themfrom the zone of interior. In addition it pro-vided for the establishment of bakeries,laundries, training schools, and storage and

the Quartermasteverman, three listed men. Silverman hiredobtained severtached service Chemical Warfarvise the loading asome weeks trademanded as m




and training a new civilian staff. Because ofthe shortage of officers and space a full-fledged organization with divisions andbranches operating in much the same man-ner as the OQMG did in Washington couldnot be established. It was nevertheless pos-sible to designate a supply officer, a trans-port officer, and a purchasing and contract-in g officer. Not unt i l 17 February could th eOCQM submit to the zone of interior it s

its requests fo rterior and itsUSAFIA instalished schools their courses ofards for training

The Transportmilitary movemIt aimed at themilitary and co



62 THE QUA

Officer. Before its transfer the division en -tered into agreements with local automobilefirms for the assembly of imported Ameri-can trucks at cost-plus-fixed-fee of 5 percent.The division made comparable contracts forthe repair and maintenance of these ve-hicles, but on the basis of a flat fee perman per hour for work actually performed.19

More important in the development ofthe OCQM was the Supply Division, which

mined theater quantities to bUnited States. Tuisitions for supto the San Franciand forwardedthe PurchasingOCQM. 20 Thethe agencies tstockage of Qu




specified quantities of needed items. Untilthese arrangements were made late inMarch 1942, most of the supplies for theU.S. Army were obtained locally throughformal contracts with producers or by pur-chases on the open market. As contractdemands gradually became the ordinarymeans of local procurement, these twomethods of buying fell into disuse and thesections handling them ultimately disap-

Of all the Authe Food Counthe Corps mostask of increasingthe agriculturalAnother agencythe Allied Supseveral AustraliaU.S. representativstimulating the A



64 THE QUA

other new division, the General ServiceDivision, constituted a rudimentary controlagency, whose establishment was broughtabout by the desirability of reviewing andco-ordinating basic functions scatteredthrough the commodity branches of theSupply Division. 28 Its establishment re-flected, too, the wartime trend toward afunctional rather than a commodity organi-zation of the sort characteristic of the peace-

varying volumebase sections. AService Divisiperformed practions except thoseacceptability oprocurement coroutine but imposections as requitory practices,



MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFI

other section. 31 In June it was functioningwith only 33 officers as compared with anauthorized 107. This substantial discrep-ancy stemmed in part from the establish-ment of the independent TransportationService and the consequent loss of about halfthe Quartermaster officers and in part fromthe fact that the War Department for at ime made no distinction between the oldand the new service and often filled Quar-

old office, anddivisions.

In the reorganco-ordinating aing functions, awon recognitionGeneral Servicrecognition in agency, the Planwhich exercise



66 THE QUA

Inspection Division. This new division wasformed by the consolidation of the FiscalBranch of the Administrative Division andthe Inspection Branch and the Field ServiceBranch of the discarded General Service Di-vision. As a fiscal agency, it prepared esti-mates of future expenditures for OCQM

and Quartermaster base section activities;allocated funds; and maintained records oflend-lease transactions involving the Corps.

cluding those oContracting Dto subsistence. other new divAdvisory and curement Divisiprocedures to gthe supplies fofollowed up cspected article




sponsible for the entire U.S. Army food pro-gram in the Southwest Pacific.

39

The Food Production Division did notremain long in the OCQM. On 27 Febru-ary 1943 it s staff and functions were takenover by the newly created Subsistence De-pot, headed by Colonel Hester. This instal-

lation, located at Sydney, operated underthe direct supervision of the Chief Quarter-master and served as the central buying,

others were setand training fugrown so muchtance that theyproperly by smterested primariments, shoes, t

used items in neing in larger andand more Quar





MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFI

wise, the pattern set by the basic changes ofthe previous winter remained unaltered.In October, only six months after ColonelCordiner left USASOS, he, along with theother technical service chiefs, was sent backthere and given the same responsibilities hehad formerly been charged with. Colonel

Landes' office passed out of existence, thedivisions eliminated in the spring were re-vived, and USAFFE became in the main an

adjustment to had barely begby the administrpanying the revmonths these mscinded, and theous spring rest

reshuffling of to a conclusion.



70 THE QU

tivities was the growing belief in the desira-bility of consolidating these activities so asto help eliminate the confusion and theduplication of effort inherent in imperfectco-ordination of USASOS purchasingunits. 44

The transfer of Headquarters, USASOS,

to Brisbane in August 1943 started the proc-ess of consolidating procurement operations.That event at once raised the question of

General Depotdistribution direwas wanted, whenit was wanted. nical services objement as it deprivtions traditionallytheir oppositionabolished, evenment actually



MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIF

as determined by its own staff. Finally, theProcurement Division had the importanttask of obtaining from local sources, not onlynonperishable foods but also fresh fruits,vegetables, meat, fish, milk, bread, icecream, and other perishables, a functionpreviously performed by the base sections.

For the first time all major aspects of thebuying of food were thus concentrated in asingle organization. 47

still in effect wended. 48

Looking baccurement organonel Hester lnumerous admicreased the difsistent policies turnover of ofnot always be



72 THE QUA

activities, distribution activities were under-going a comparable attrition fo r much th esame reason. Early in 1944, when stocks inNew Guinea had sunk to precariously lo wlevels, the Distribution Division was estab-lished under G-4, USASOS, to attain abetter balanced division of all military sup-

plies throughout th e Southwest Pacific. Asan agency untied to any technical service, itwould, presumably, be uninfluenced by the

for an agency what to do about distribution probThese problemous and difficuharder to obtainslowed by lenbases and by shipping. Foodindeed becom




the OCQM when it was moved to Hol-landia. For these reasons the sections han-dling these activities remained in Australiauntil April 1945, when the removal ofHeadquarters, USASOS, to Manila madeavailable both Filipino clerks and repairshops and made possible the return of thesections to the OCQM. At the same timeQuartermaster distribution functions wereagain turned over to that office. Since Aus-

troops landed inmaster office wthese functions.

Each task forequisitions on not furnished of co-ordinating

they were senneeds or the stockthe fact that t



74 THE QUA




manded more fundamental action. By July1942 there were about 60,000 Army groundand air troops in the South Pacific, and sub-stantial reinforcements were on their way.The Americal Division was then in NewCaledonia, the 37th Division was in theFijis, and smaller forces were in New Zea-

land, Efate, Espiritu Santo, Tongatabu,Bora Bora, Wallis, Upolo, and Tutuila. AnArmy territorial command was obviously

and for some wment of USAFImea in late Julystaff was immeexclusion of almevent it was tologistical exper

tively. The majected staff waand arrived in

61



76 THE QUAR

March 1944 with the occupation of Emirau,ninety miles north of New Ireland. The lat-ter operation, in conjunction with that car-ried out at the same time by MacArthurin the Admiralties, gave the Allied forcescontrol of the approaches to the BismarckSea and enabled them to flank the Japanese

stronghold at Rabaul and protect their ad-vance into the waters leading to the Philip-pines. This operation marked the successful

OCQM in USAcontrol over Qu

The joint opand Marine Cocalled for closeduce confusingforts. The form

down in the Bamand Areas IApproved by the




whether for use at sea or on land. Only inthe Samoan Islands and Funafuti Islandwas the Army excluded from any responsi-bility for food. 65

The broad functions given to Quarter-master agencies for provisioning Navy andMarine Corps as well as Army units sharply

increased the dimensions of the Quarter-master subsistence program. Though Armytroop strength alone was usually smaller

with estimates area basis, and ththe amount of eOn receipt of thmaster, SOS,quantity of suppfrom the Unite

The South not only from NStates but also f



78 THE QUA

sitioning and holding rations specifically forthe neighboring command. It recommendedthat Southwest Pacific requirements befilled before any shipments were made else-where and that no stocks be earmarked forother areas. In a conference between the twoareas in late 1943 these recommendations

were substantially accepted.70

Quartermaster procurement for all threearmed services in the South Pacific was not

most chronic shoand soft drinks.in post exchanthe ship's serviNavy, soldiers befied with the A

This disparity

tity of articles ices engenderedamong the men






80 THE QU

rather than for offensive activities of itsown, Quartermaster problems were lesscomplex than those of the southern com-mands. No extensive organization was re-quired for distribution operations or localprocurement as few indigenous items wereobtained and there were no sizable bases

outside Hawaii.The Quartermaster Section functioned

much like similar sections elsewhere, ad-

supply. On Fannwhere the Armyprovided Class

After large-scgan with the attermaster responsiincreased , for

such operationtions to Navy vision these el




The Office o f the Quartermaster, HUS-AFPOA, headed by Brig. Gen. George E.Hartman, inherited the planning, policy-making, and supervisory responsibilities ofthe Office of the Quartermaster, CentralPacific Area. It determined area and basestock levels as well as unit and supply re-

quirements for combat organizations, super-vised the building up of stockpiles by thebase commands, and planned the logistical

territory tasks stral Pacific Basmand operatedsion of the QuIt participatedthe tactical forPacific and supp

130,000 troops oAngaur, and U

Meanwhile



82 THE QUA

that a full-scale Quartermaster organiza-tion existed in the mid-Pacific from theoutset.

The central Quartermaster organizationsin the two areas below the equator probablynever attained as high a degree of efficiencyas those to the north. When American

troops first came to the south, there was inall that enormous territory no central Quar-termaster organization to supervise the ac-

quent shifts inquarters, particalmost impossiblecivilian staff dand thus intening up an effecimportant hampe

peated changes iof central Qumost notably in



CHAPTER IV

Pacific Bases



84 THE QU

technical service depots handling the sup-plies of a single service. Functionally, theymight be in-transit depots, receiving andclassifying inbound and outbound ship-ments; issue depots, storing stocks for unitswithin the base area; or reserve depots, serv-ing as sources of replacement supply for is-sue depots, other bases, and operationalforces.

(Perth), Westtion 7 (SydneyUntil late

invasion was the ing the locatioIt forced the which in turn

the continued nal bases, evesome of them



PACIFIC BASES

ers Towers, Cloncurry, Mount Isa, and Ten-nant Creek between Townsville and theDarwin-Alice Springs railway. 4

As danger of invasion waned and NewGuinea emerged as the center of Alliedoffensive operations, base activities under-went substantial modification. Those bases

which had satisfactory ports and lay com-paratively close both to New Guinea and toindustrial and agricultural centers handled

the particular their missions,quartermaster pervision over Corps. He usuawhom the Quarpossibly the m

stored and dismarked for othareas. His work



86 THE QUA

resources were to be pooled in the commoninterests of all services and all military unitsoperating within the base area. 7 But basecommanders had no power to determine justwhere, within their territorial jurisdiction,supplies reserved for other bases or foroperational forces in other base areas would

be stored or how they would be distributed.These operations were controlled by distri-bution instructions from the OCQM which,

be held and wbe delivered to In complianc

Headquarters, serve depots wand Melbourne, bmander, mainta

reserve installatlayed setting upsituation cause



PACIFIC BASES

In m id-1944 the growing practice of ship-ping direct from San Francisco to advanceinstallations brought about a rapid shrink-age in activities at all Australian bases, andthe bases in the huge undeveloped island ofNew Guinea became increasingly important.In 1942 this island had not a single mile of

railroad and only a few small stretches ofsurfaced roads. There were but three portswith any modern means for handling ship-

came principadistant bases, could not satisfaof advance troo

The first baseat Port Moresby desperate Allie

New Guinea, thpingstone to APeninsula lay l



88 THE QUA

Buna Village and 225 miles northwest ofMilne Bay. Its initial mission was bettersupport for the troops fighting in this areathan could be furnished by the fishing boatsand other small craft that made the longtrip from Milne Bay and discharged theircargo on unsheltered beaches. Following the

successful termination of the Buna—Gonacampaign, Oro Bay developed into a stag-ing area and a supply base for advance

Base F, situeastern end of in November 194anese had beengood natural hveloped as the It replaced Miln

of supplies in thshipments direNew Guinea we



PACIFIC BASES



90 THE QUA

During th e first three years of the warbases in New Guinea in general were begunonly after operations undertaken in partfor the purpose of winning desirable basesites had been substantially concluded.This procedure had retarded the develop-ment of forward installations and rendered

the supply of tactical forces dependent onbases located several hundred miles away.But it was a procedure necessitated by the

up to that timeow n organizatthe Philippinesof Japan calledArmy, Marine Coall areas and nof bases capable

An interarea colandia in Noveproblem, agree



PACIFIC BASES

craft and lighters. As the Lingayen Gulfcampaign progressed, sub-bases were set up.They supported operations until the regionwas cleared of hostile troops. San Fernando,La Union, 30 miles north of San Fabian,then became the permanent headquarters ofBase M .

21

Early in April 1945 another base, R, wasestablished at Batangas, 60 miles south ofManila. A month later Base S was started

long tons. Of to 30 percent waDuring the O

of executing thof supplying tgated to the Isganization, w

Army. Late icompletion of mland Command,



92 THE QU

During the first half of 1942, when it wasfeared that Japanese forces would seize NewCaledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa, the Armyenvisaged Auckland and Wellington, theprincipal distribution centers of New Zea-land, as major supply bases that would serveas rear depots in much the same way as the

leading Australian ports did. But inabilityof th e Japanese to carry offensive warfareinto the South Pacific and the inauguration

a varied menu.depots, furthernomical utilizaities, fo r vesselthe West Coastat several bascargoes. Finall

tions had at timcific Area to hofor th e South



PACIFIC BASES

vision and part of the 37th Infantry

Divisionstopped there in June and July 1942, andthe 2d and 3d Marine Divisions were therefor some months in the following year. Onthe termination of the New Georgia opera-tion, the 25th and 43d Infantry Divisionscame to New Zealand for rehabilitation.

The New Zealand Service Command sup-plied all these forces.27

The French dependency of New Cale-

place the chabases, this depofor the entire Sitems for the cuCaledonia. Befplies had been rtional needs or

ment needs. Ducould be obtaithem from the



94 THE QUA

quantities set from time to time by Head-quarters, SOS SPA. 30 The General Depotalso furnished a substantial part of the sup-plies and equipment fo r combat operationsand for the rehabilitation of combat units.

Next to the base in New Caledonia, theone in Guadalcanal was the largest in the

South Pacific. After the victorious termi-nation of the protracted campaign fo rGuadalcanal in February 1943 that island

anas and the were assigned Pacific Area baseand too remoteshoulder the wthese offensiveSaipan, Guam, a

anas in the sumbases mountedrines provided



PACIFIC BASES

port for operations to the north and north-west. 33

The Fijis constituted a sizable supplybase only in the first year of the war. Be-cause of their strategical location on the airand shipping routes between the UnitedStates and Australia, American troops were

sent there shortly after Pearl Harbor. Sincethe islands were too remote from the sceneof fighting to become a transshipment point,

of ocean. It w ational areas; it wof thousands ophibious warfaspace for operatiHonolulu, wasThese unfavor

terially hamperthe command rather than an op



96 THE QU

render it ranked not far behind Hawaii

inthe volume of Quartermaster tonnage. Itstored a sizable proportion of the suppliesfor the Okinawa operation, and, after be-coming the headquarters of the Western Pa-cific Base Command in April 1945, it main-tained much of the reserve stockage built up

for the OLYMPIC operation.37

In the yearfollowing the seizure of Guam, airstrips werebuilt there; Apra Harbor was developed for

master supplieBay, for many cal operations from San Francisto bases in theor more miles bissue. In terms

San Francisco required as mA trip from Ne



PACIFIC BASES

moved forward over a pre-existing networkof railroads, navigable rivers, and highways.Thus supply in Europe was like a singlerubber hose growing larger in diameter asthe immensity of operations increased. Butin the Pacific each major advance was anamphibious assault on a primitive shore and

each fresh landing a completely new sup-ply operation. Pacific supply was like alawn sprayer with a new stream of supply

Logistical actiacross France almost entirelybat troops, butcific were only this purpose. Mbuilding up thephibious landinwere handled European Thea





LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC

quired supplies during 1942, distress or refugee cargoes also provided a not unim-portant share. These cargoes, originallyconsigned to the Philippines, the Nether-lands Indies, Malaya, and other Asiaticareas, had, because of the Japanese occupa-tion of these regions, been diverted to Aus-tralia and seized by the CommonwealthGovernment. Some 195,000 tons of prod-ucts of various sorts were obtained in this

and means of new task easily

The regularically used by Aing days of thcriticism from ent that one osidered in makAustralian subsistwould be whethe



100 THE QUA

messes, help build up, maintain, and storea ninety-day food reserve for the combinedforces, and present to the proper Common-wealth authorities American suggestions fo rincreasing local food production. The ques-tion of the composition of the ration was notso easily solved. USAFIA was prepared toaccept a money basis but it sought an im-proved ration that would cost 6d. more thanthe Australian ration and that would per-

wealth units wothe latter recetroops attachedserved the U.Swent into effecin April 1942.4

The Austranever truly poFood issues oscribed qu antit




ble to carry out in its entirety the arrange-ment respecting supplementary purchases.But there was protracted delay in the estab-lishment of the canteens from which thesepurchases were to be made, and even afterthe canteens were opened they did notalways carry sufficient stocks to meet Ameri-

can requirements. The partial failure of theattempt to obtain extra ration componentswas attributable to supply shortages and to

From time Chief Quartermcific Area, poipanded productifor better inspectucts. His suggquickly into ef

elapse before proand improved inThe slow rate



102 THE QUAR

Quartermaster General of the AustralianArmy. This method of procurement wouldrelieve the Chief Quartermaster of the ne-cessity of acting through his Australiancounterpart, himself an interested party, inpresenting American claims for higher pri-orities, larger allocations, and increased pro-duction. 12

The provision of food through AustralianArmy channels had never been more than

storage and disfunctions carrietermasters, mosishables, continthrough Commoncies. Another slocally procure

the reverse lendthe United Statessupplies and m




the encouragement of a large agriculturalproduction. As early as February and March1942 Quartermaster officers had surveyedthe producing potentialities of Australianfarms and concluded that except for greencoffee, cocoa, tobacco, and a few minoritems, sufficient food could be obtained fromAustralian farms to meet the needs of 500,-000 troops. 14 But it soon became apparentthat, though Australia could produce vir-

units made the an almost imposning plants wefruit, corned bethey produced ftional marketsployed faulty pr

tion was confifruits, such as rTo meet Quarter



104 THE QUA

strikingly demonstrated the potential use-fulness of the specialists. 17

When the Subsistence Depot began op-erations in February 1943, these specialistswere put in charge of the branches set up tohandle production problems. The most im-portant branches were those in the FoodProduction Division, whose functions in-cluded collaboration with Australian officialbodies, technical advice to farmers, canners,

growing of modevelopment odepended. In thBranch gave inthe Commonwealmittee order thbest American suof hybridized swetralian conditionintervened wit




preparations, utilized them but slightly untila special effort was made in mid-1943 tocall attention to their value.20

Another major achievement of the foodproduction program was a protracted andfinally successful drive for the expansion ofvegetable acreage, an effort carried out inthe main by the Agricultural EngineeringSection of the Subsistence Depot. The favor-able outcome of this drive was attributable

had turned out ament, but in 1had been convtion. Major Seconcluded that,converted to thements and provideAmerican equipmbulk of Australiastumbling bloc



106 THE QUA

ufacturing problems that arose in duplicat-ing mach ines sent as models from the UnitedStates.

Probably the most valuable machine wasthe Farmall H Tractor which, with its at-tachments, made possible the mechanizationof practically every phase of vegetable cul-tivation from plowing to harvesting. Witha single Farmall H Tractor, Seabrook esti-mated, only two men were required for

graders. Sufficibecome available termination ofand part of 194mencing the mment combined labor to make ga formidable shortage of tracthose available an




vesting, and the use of fertilizers and in-secticides were not neglected. Since the de-partments of agriculture in the Australianstates had the closest contacts with farmers,the program aimed chiefly at the indoctri-nation of the key men in these agencies, butit also reached individual farmers throughlectures, radio broadcasts, motion pictures,leaflets, and, above all, through field dem-onstrations carried out by American tech-

vegetables, in of considerablpeas, string beof these populaconspicuous; mtion apparentlywives and othincreased avaiwhole was a hment brought



108 THE QU

growths, more heat had to be applied tothem in order to kill all harmful matter.The canning methods in use were furtherdefective in that they did not insure the re-tention of vitamins and minerals indis-pensable to good health. Preservation ofthese essential substances depended upon anadequate supply of fresh vegetables ofproper maturity, prompt canning after har-vesting, and exclusion of oxygen during the

prominent foodset up a highlcarried out its as laboratories,found unfi t foproperly seamedthe unit was dof any serious its creation. 34

In the meant





110 THE QU

Nevertheless ever larger quantities ofcanned vegetables became available. Of theincreased production the American servicesalone took 56,000,000 pounds, five and ahalf times the total amount turned out inthe last prewar year. Even this substantialquantity did not quite match American re-quirements, but the most serious shortcom-in g was not that the amount furnished tothe U.S. Army often fell below the amount

cabbages, and truly acceptable other hand, favmatoes and comuch smaller pcalled for.39 Abefore supplieStates the vegetaremained unbala

The operation




Depot therefore set up a Meat Section inits Food Production Division to help thepackers. This section was headed by Maj.George V. Hallman, who for twenty yearshad worked in the packing industry in bothNorth and South America. After surveyingexisting plants he concluded that with betterequipment Australia could produce thecanned meats known to Americans—chilicon carne, corned beef hash, ham and eggs,

fell far short oquired. In 1944experience and doubled their co000,000 pound

Despite this delike that fo r cato provide the Corned beef antralian favorite



112 THE QUA

In 1942 there were in use only a few hastilyconverted and unsuitably located fruit-dry-ing plants, which turned out less than 2,-000,000 pounds of dehydrated vegetables,and those of inferior quality. With the es-tablishment in early 1943 of the Dehydra-tion Branch at the Subsistence Depot, tech-nical advice about the selection of vege-tables and the improvement of processingmethods became available for the first time.

year, 36 percent

26 percent of thpercent of the potatoes, allotmican requiremeerous allocatiopercent of wha

Owing to theishables in the Sian canners an




to the United Kingdom, making it impos-

sible to dispose of surpluses. Prices slumped,and producers cut their stocks. Americanentrance into the war completely alteredthis situation, compelling the Common-wealth to stimulate meat production inorder to fill heavy American demands. Be-cause of the scarcity of pork, h a m , andbacon and their popularity with Americansoldiers, the production of these meats was

structed freezenear Townsville.

The desirabspace on boardhands of units nenot merely of caless beef, a prodArmy for the cold-storage ncommodity, un






cilities never became available. This defi-ciency was worsened by the vast increasein demand during the last two years of hos-tilities, when the Australian Army, favor-ably impressed by the product, ordered siz-able amounts. 52

There was also difficulty in procuringpork carcasses c u t , according to Ameri-can custom, into hams, loins, shoulders,spareribs, and bacon ready for cooking

from a carcass

obtained. 54

The Subsistlar cutting rooall the Australiapackers opposedthat the Melbourdirectly with the shortage ofit hard for the



116 THE QUA

stocks. As the number of American troops

in forward areas steadily grew throughout1944, the acquisition of more freezer ship-ping space, rather than an inadequate sup-ply of beef, became the primary problem.In June lack of such space forced the stor-age in Australia of about 30,000,000 poundsof carcass beef. 56

Next to beef, pork products constitutedthe largest group of meats supplied to the

the turkeys seChristmas dinneity of poultry ofimproved, and from only 240,0two years to ab

Flour, Sugar, a

Flour was p




Rice, grown in prewar days only in the

publicly owned Murrumbidgee irrigationarea of New South Wales, was not a majorcrop as were wheat and sugar. B ut shortagesborn of the war dictated that its cultivationbe extended. India, Ceylon, and New Zea-land could not raise all the rice they con-sumed and , when the Japanese occupiedrice-exporting Burma and southeasternAsia, found themselves cut off from their

satisfaction of vailing low wagetions. During ttry steadily lost suppliers of mlosses and the sture lands, operaEven generouswealth did notduction. 63



118 THE QUA

ridding herds of tubercular animals slow,

the QMC agreed to accept milk from ap-proved pasteurization plants even if it camefrom uninspected cattle. Even then it washard to secure an adequate supply. Not untilSeptember 1942 did Townsville become thefirst base section to obtain satisfactory de-liveries, and not until some months later didsimilar deliveries become available in theMelbourne and Brisbane areas. 65

representing most t ion–was obtai

Market Center Proof Perishables

Like milk afresh fruits andcured, not throas were nonperis






120 THE QUA

sible the creation of sizable reserve stock-

ages.69

At times lack of refrigeration afloat andashore made it impracticable to take all thefresh fruits and vegetables offered commer-cially. In the first quarter of 1945, GeneralHester estimated, these deficiencies pre-vented the procurement of 35,000,000pounds of potatoes, 12,000,000 pounds ofother vegetables, and 12,000,000 pounds of

70

more than 47 per

ping space was ssistence than ingroup of supplieQuartermaster.the highest signfood bought waor 28.5 percent$759,369,137 f

Australia pro





procurement of subsistence through the re-

verse lend-lease program was indeed per-haps the most arresting example of suc-cessful Australian-American co-operation.While true that the United States was themajor beneficiary of this joint action,Australia also derived several lasting ad-vantages. Within a few years it obtained n ewfood-processing industries, a more highlymechanized agricultural system, and more

few years many

fill American neAt the outset

of clothing andtaken in an atmofficer succinctlyfollowing words

In February, pouring in, inveplete, planning was

122 THE QUA



122 THE QUA

tools, but this means of relief soon dried up.

General supplies, obviously, had to comefrom the industrial plants of Sydney andMelbourne and from the United States. 76

Late in March the OCQM Purchasingand Contracting Officer presented his firstcontract demand, one for nurses' clothing,to the Australian G overnment. Among otheritems needed at that time were 480,000pairs of shoes, 740,000 pairs of woolen

purchase of ove

tractors.78

Yet there weof which shoe most pressing. Thmanufacturingcam e in full sizewhereas A meriin half sizes anto turn out Am

LOCAL




shoes had been produced, enough to fill asubstantial part o f military needs. 81

The procurement of socks suppliedanother example of successful local procure-ment. Despite the fact that the Australianspinning capacity was limited, the mills pro-duced a total of nearly 8,000,000 pairs ofstandard lightweight Army socks. At itspeak in 1944 production ran at the rate of350,000 pairs a month. This satisfactory

requirements was possible, woby early 1943 thplying the Austenough materialeach male civipublic buying, hArmy to obtainenlisted men. Tit reflected not

124 THE QUA



124 THE QUA

which could be worn either inside the trou-

sers as a shirt or outside as a sweater andwhich could be made with comparativelylittle trouble. 84

Blanket production involved only minordifficulties, and more than 1,000,000 wereprocured at a cost of only about $2.50 each,a price much below that in the UnitedStates. Longer and narrower than Ameri-can-made blankets, they nonetheless were

brooms and bru

strapping; andprinted formsthe U.S. armesupplies, the Codry and dry cleatroops stationedcurement was

frequent delayveloped state o





clothing repair needs of American troops in

Australia itself.89

The statistics of reverse lend-lease pro-curement in Australia demonstrate the im-portance of Quartermaster general suppliesin this program. By 30 June 1945 nearly392,000 measurement tons of these itemshad been obtained. While this was only 23percent of the subsistence tonnage, it ex-ceeded the tonnage of all supplies acquired

Procurem

Procurementtrial products iout under conditiotralia, but withNew Zealand hian requirementsits clothing, equiplies indu striesmore than in A

126 THE QU



126 THE QU

British advice. The New Zealand Govern-

ment also feared that a substantial increaseof local food production might glut the post-war market and cause a disastrous slump inprices of exportable commodities. 93

All these considerations were partly re-sponsible for the almost constant insistencethat no locally procured supplies were to be

used outside the South Pacific Area and forfai lure to carry out the food program quite

ally increased

that of 1941, Uthan 60 percenand lesser amothe very end, perishables remaSouth Pacificbutter, cheese, cured even in stuffs were yet





would relieve the shortage o f fresh meat and

canned vegetables that had developed inthe United States because of heavy ship-ments to American troops overseas and tocivilians in liberated territories.

When Headquarters, ASF, transmittedthese observations to the Assistant Chief ofTransportation, that officer approved thembecause of the saving o f shipping that wouldbe accomplished. 100 But in practice it proved

procurement.102

meats and vegePacific came though that couof all the subsistenmand. 103

LocOutside Aus

128 THE QUA



128 THE QUA

V-J Day, when easier shipping conditions

made possible the movement of candy fromthe West Coast. Since troops preferred themainland product, local procurement wasmaterially reduced until stabilized at 864,-000 nickel bars a month.

105

In the South Pacific Area, New Cale-donia was the chief source of subsistenceoutside New Zealand. With only 60,000 in-habitants, most of whom were engaged in

combs, mirrors,

calicoes were exapples, coconutslimited resourcesleft them little own wants, andsignificance as a

The recoverand 1945 once possession of territo





ployees of the Army. Procurement of Quar-

termaster supplies w as rendered doubly dif-ficult by the stipulation that buying shouldnot cause hardship to the Philippine people,a requirement that automatically precludedthe purchase of such scarce items as beef,pork, fish, chickens, eggs, and dairy prod-ucts. Another hampering stipulation was

the requirement that the Commonwealthschedule of permissible maximum prices be

islands. Unfort

could be procsoldier. 111

In addition commercial cen

QMC attemptedlocal procuremepr ctic ble the

130 THE QUAR



130 THE QUAR

of temperate-zone vegetables in the tropics;

some of them did not even know what varie-ties of seed were best adapted to tropicalenvironments. 113 Inexperienced natives pre-pared the soil poorly and planted seeds be-fore the land was thoroughly weeded. Fre-quently, they could not operate the fewavailable farm machines and knew so little

about keeping records of vegetable produc-tion that these necessary guides to future

preserve the fer

planted in rapid as many as fouutilization of tprotective measurand leaching, andper acre had dwintwo years befoductivity and floods, 11,000,00



132 THE QUAR



132 THE QUAR

height of its productivity in September and

October 1944 the Port Moresby enterpriseharvested in each month more than 100,000pounds of vegetables, mostly of the varietiesgrown on Guadalcanal. During this periodlettuce was grown in amounts that permit-ted the issuance of one pound a week to eachman at the base. With the shift of opera-

tions to the Philippines the Port Moresbyfarm was abandoned, and most of its equip-

ing been harves

weeks.121

The reasonaachieved by thonstrated that vorable conditionstropics could The comparative

that on Guadalexpert supervision




OCU

them to the limit permitted by their agricul-

tural capacity and internal necessities. Bywise abandonment of traditional methods ofbuying perishables and by bold substitutionof the market center system in the midst ofwar, the QMC in the Southwest Pacificcontributed heavily to satisfactory procure-ment operations.

Though home sources provided the bulkof Quartermaster items issued in the Pacific,

nished more Qu

of that theaterDuring the entire wnearly 30 percenthe Southwest Ptem that achiedespite all the dealing with

American requmeet vastly inc



CHAPTER VI

Supply From the Unite

Despite the fact that the South Pacific west of Holland

SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES



overseas area adequate stocks, the War De-

partment determined for each theater theamount of reserve stores i t needed to replacesupplies that units brought overseas withthem and to maintain a margin of safety.These reserves, varying from theater totheater with their diverse requirements,were expressed in terms o f days o f supply,

one day's supply being the amount neededto fill the replacement demands of a theater

tine replacement

In the Soutreserves consisboth together the maximum rcific Area's greCoast enabled than the Southwe

ing reserve wasmaximum rese

136 THE QUA



THE QUA

times special circumstances required the es-

tablishment of levels higher than those nor-mally authorized. The seasonal character ofthe canning industry and the impossibility ofdelivering canned foods at a uniform ratethroughout the year, for example, made itnecessary to permit stockage of more thanformally authorized amounts of these foods

at peak production periods.7

During 1944 two factors—the vastly in-

The War Depa

formally redefa reserve specifforces. Stockage oit declared, envisioquate supplies imoperations to Under this deficould no longerany unforeseen



138 THE QUAR



ing agency. Unfortunately, bases seldom

had sufficient qualified technicians to fur-nish this fundamental information. In theSouthwest Pacific such personnel were lack-ing not only in new advance bases but to aconsiderable extent even in older and betterorganized bases. Writing to QuartermasterGeneral Gregory in mid-1943, Colonel

Cordiner said that Property officers toooften place their weakest men on stock

to do more tha

to combat, shipIn practice the voked many dithe Pacific areaThe War Departmgoing overseaby the replacem

panied them anseas reserves li




that date to the end of the year. Scarcely

had it taken this action when it lowered thebasis to 110,000 men for requisitions on thezone of interior but , somewhat paradoxi-cally, retained the 150,000-man basis forprocurement operations in Australia and fordetermining theater supply levels. Sincethese levels were based on a larger number

of troops than were used for requisitions onthe zone of interior, Quartermaster stocks

pened, the zon

areas used diffeand filling of rprocess. 21

Troop strengjected, was onltion of requiremelement was ac

These factors pressed in frac

140 THE QUA



for the compilation of experience tables. If

these tables were to be accurate, a sharp dis-tinction had to be drawn between replace-ment and initial issues, but such a distinctionwas often impossible since initial issues fre-quently came from the same stocks as didreplacement issues and supply installationsseldom distinguished between the two types

in their stock records. Yet if the War De-partment was to work out its supply plans

Pacific requisition

not only its ownits subports—LosPort Rupert (BOrleans—and which stocked Pacific on its ca

In the Oversea

at San Franciscobarkation, the




or some other western installation usually

served as the primary supply source. ForNew Orleans the sources were southern ormiddle western depots. The QuartermasterBranch instructed the supplying installationto forward the item to the port that it des-ignated as shipper; it also indicated thedate by which the item had to arrive in

order to meet sailing schedules. If the pri-mary source could not furnish th e required

ordinating ove

such purely locatermaster stockshipment, compililowing up ordersto see that spromptly as possibage space, port

moving items, ing supply, base

142 THE QU



Q

Railroad and storage deficiencies were also

in part responsible. During 1942 most Quar-termaster stocks for shipment through SanFrancisco were held in the Utah GeneralDepot at Ogden, nearly 1,000 miles to theeast. Because of the distance between thetw o installations and the fact that shipmentsto and from three other depots at Ogden

congested th e thin railway network leadingto the West Coast, Quartermaster supplies

stocks at suppo

meeting prescribto match demthe slowness of tuisitions that tassignment to eassupply points. Tage, twenty-twtions; it someta single item




pot, and the other depots increasingly be-

came feeders for the port of embarkation.33

These changes, while they made for moreefficient use of existing resources, left un-touched several factors that delayed the fill-ing of orders. Even after Quartermastersupplies arrived in port, thus theoreticallycompleting a requisition, they, along with

many other military items, were often heldup by the need for special loadings for im-

Roland C. Batc

then in the Souit took from Quartermasterfound that as stocks had beenthe South Pacifiwere slightly f

thirty to sixty sister area.

144 THE QUA



1943, for example, expected shipments of

fruit and tomato juice, dehydrated potatoesand onions, peanut butter, dried eggs, andlard had not arrived. Similarly, requisitionssent in November to San Francisco for awide range of canned meats and vegetableshad still not been received by the end ofMarch. 37

At this time there was probably an evenlarger number of tar dy requisitions for cloth-

stock shortages–

than the slow tuticular problem, operations, wascific by the inabcargoes quicklystallations it wequipment, mode

warehouses, dumpin the main ac




the Southwest Pacific Area were being held

in interior depots fo r future movement, 80percent or more of the Quartermaster sup-plies earmarked fo r the Pacific Ocean Areaswere being loaded on schedule.40

On the whole, belated shipments re-sulted from causes beyond the control ofeither port or depots and often from causes

originating in the Pacific commands them-selves. Such shipments, it is true, contrib-

grounded on a

area requisitions.simply, that porintervals shippedties derived frfuture overseas was confined isumed at a fai

ably accurate ethese articles c

146 THE QUAR



conflicting information from Washington. 43

A War Department radiogram of 28 Aprildeclared that automatic shipments of cloth-ing, equipage, and general supplies werebeing made on the basis of 78,000 men inAustralia and 17,000 men in New Cale-donia. Finally, on 12 June, more than fourmonths after the original directive had been

issued, the War Department radioed thatthese supplies were being furnished only on

procurement, it c

ments to reflecBy June themore Australianmatic system class of supply. Tthen needed in qwere coffee, tea

and a few othethe B ration. 47




but several badly needed shipments did not

arrive until July.49

Not until the followingmonth did requisitioning wholly supplantthe automatic system. 50

Shipment of OrganizationalEquipment and Supplies

The movement of organizational itemsconstituted a special form of automatic

stowed in order

ing capacity. primary aim, itand items of the were unavoidablmatters worse, times had to coming freight

into the holds oThese practic

148 THE QU



ried the troops, or at least in the same con-

voy, but this solution in general proved im-practicable. The Transportation Corpsdirected the port of embarkation to applythis method of loading as far as possible, butvariations in the carrying capacity of trooptransports and in the amount of unit sup-plies and equipment were too great to per-

mit it as a standard practice. Since relativelymore troops than supplies could be carried

clared Capt.

observer, it is the men and theat the same portare together. 5

exasperating tomight be unbacumstances un

In the last twthe arrival of




shortages occasionally appeared. These

would not have been particularly trouble-some if units had returned the tents and cotswhen their own equipment finally arrived,but they seldom made such returns. 58

Late delivery of other types of organiza-tional equipment also inconvenienced units.Shortages of mess equipment, for example,

impaired the ability of units to feed them-selves properly, but it did not make as deep

sion of most te

invasion supplyment could notThroughout

Guinea were sage or with tehave been discarspring the arriva

smaller organizaquantities of cl

150 THE QUA



The three newly arrived units had been des-

ignated for early participation in the Philip-pine operations, but inability to carry outtheir assigned task obliged them to stay inNew Guinea for several months. 63

Anothernewly arrived bakery company proceededto Leyte, but lack of standard ovens forcedthe employment of a discarded wood-burn-

ing type in use of which it had no training.64

Truck, like bakery, companies sometimes

base functions

the time rear inthe important to the troops fig

Meanwhile, partment tookproblem of oequipment. It

tinuance of thsignment of ra




miralties operation illustrated how costly in

both time and labor this method of supportcould be. Supplies for that offensive wereloaded in San Francisco, discharged and re-loaded at Brisbane and again at Oro Bay.Part of the cargo even underwent this waste-ful procedure a third time at Finschhafen.There were two major reasons for all this

rehandling. For one thing, since regularcargoes from the United States and Aus-

erational forces

ply was develoardize at least ment items neeafter th e small on their first laThis system wasCoast ports, rath

bases, for shipmwithout rehand

152 THE QU



to ascertain readily from published lists and

stowage plans what was on each vessel andwhere it was loaded. This advantage, as-serted Lt. Col. Fred W. Greene, whose ac-tivities in the Southwest Pacific were con-cerned largely with block movements, isone which, notwithstanding repeated efforts,was not attained throughout the war by any

other method of supply, and is of the utmosti t if ffi i t l i ti l t i

nage handled percent. 71

By then bloportant in themaster items t the backboneoperations. Tported troops

nary sources oQMC carried




petroleum cargo consisted principally of oils,greases, kerosene, and range fuel. At firstmotor and diesel fuel oil were included, butas considerable amounts of these items wereshipped with the initial assault troops anddispensed in bulk by shore installations, theywere eventually eliminated.

Sixth Army experience early revealed a

need for larger quantities of some itemsthan had been originallycarried in standard

mediately a whmost essential s

The standardlar operation carangement knoloading. This virtue of distribwas sunk, all su

not lost.

For this

were utilized

154 THE QUA



which, if properly distributed among thevarious sorts of resupply ships, would givealmost any desired loading. 77

The Pacific Ocean Areas also developeda large number of blocks, but they did notemploy a standard block vessel under thatname. They did obtain, however, the equiv-alent of this vessel by carrying on identically

loaded freighters all classes of supply exceptpetroleum products, which were handled by

entirely of B ra000 were carried90,000 rations ofrations, and 36combat rationsmands of 6,000block, made upounce rations

Okinawan diemade destitute




Okinawan campaign it was planned to ob-tain greater flexibility of shipping move-ments by assembling the vessels at regulat-ing stations on Ulithi in the Carolines andat Eniwetok in the Marshalls and callingthem forward as supplies were needed onshore. Because provision of normal fieldrations was expected to be difficult during

the first few weeks of the operation, twiceas many combat as B rations were to be

speedy dischargetransportation c

The proper rations, was pproblem connecteThe QMC waseasy accessibilitycharge accordin

priorities. But a mere matter o

156 THE QUAR



erational areas remained, however, largelyunsolved. 83

In the Leyte operation standard blockships arrived with heavy deck cargoes andwith miscellaneous equipment placed in theholds on top of Quartermaster supplies.This method of stowage, it was estimated,held up the discharge of rations by as

much as five days.84

Worse still, some of theships arrived without the expected packaged

In addition ing specific kindproblems wereblock ships. Thonot obtainablebase stocks, thof stocks in PaInclusion in the

in block shipsitems obtainable




Maj. Gen. James L. Frink, CommandingGeneral, USASOS, maintained that thisplan would cause delay and unnecessary re-handling in getting food to consumingtroops. 88 Accordingly, it was never put intoeffect. Partial loading in New Guinea wasitself feasible only so long as that island wasthe center of combat activity in the South-

west Pacific. As operations shifted to thePhilippines, where there were a t first no fully

moved northwamore marked. 9

Finally, blocvantage of incralready heaviPort of Embarkato handle alteranents by the orderi

blocks as the depots. Resupply

158 THE QUA



excesses existing at advance installations,and meals became unbalanced. Protestsfrom long suffering troops, declared Colo-nel Longino, brought replies that the baseshad been supposed to do thus and so. Butthere was little or no improvement, hecontinued, until we began to receive bal-ance loaded resupply ships from the U.S.

If credit can be given to any one individualfor that, he should certainly have a DSM. 93

that despite thethe movement Coast the Armytorily supported. delays met in comhandling automshipments, and complishments

those of the Civilcan War, and W




about 16 percent of the 2,802,877 tons ofArmy cargo—a marked decline in the Quar-termaster proportion, probably caused byincreased reliance upon Australian produc-tion. In the following months, as troopstrength soared and local procurement fellin importance, Quartermaster cargoreached much higher levels. In 1944 itamounted to 1,863,654 tons and in 1945 tothe end of June to 1,354,658 tons, represent-

often held in important considspeedily or sloand equipment wPacific areas. curement becamit furnished frothe end of Juneurement tons compared with



CHAPTER VII

Storage, Transportation

Packing Problems

STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PR



162 THE QUA

f k f



based upon a framework of coconut or bam-boo poles and cross bracings, with a gabledroof and with the sides and top covered withnipa strips. They had no floors and at bestfurnished imperfect shelter fo r food andclothing. 4

When imported milled lumber becameavailable, it was utilized instead of thatchand rude local poles to construct sturdierwarehouses. The food warehouses, the best

storage of cautilized chieflitems. 6

Since even prude shacks cothan a fractioproper protectioopen became aYet as late asstocks at Port M



164 THE QUAR

d t i ti f li F d i



deterioration of supplies. Food containersin boxes, improperly piled solidly together,sweated and rusted, disintegrating cannedmeats and vegetables by releasing acids;these acids ate into the tin, seeped out, andcontaminated other cans. Damage from thiscause was appreciably increased when tar-paulins were th row n over the stacks in sucha way as to cover the sides and prevent thepiles from drying out. Another hindrance to

temperatures, wage. Subsistenrated twice as four times as fareason it was sshipments of ralimited to the with the tactical

The disastrousdoor storage on

STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING P

f i l ll h d h H l L t th



fairly well warehoused except at the Hol-landia base, which had been set up only inthe previous June. 11 Here, five months afterGeneral Gregory's visit, 75 percent of theration stocks, mostly canned subsistence, stillremained in open storage. They all had,however, tarpaulin protection, which, in asimilar stage of development at the earlierNew Guinea bases, had been provided fo ronly about half the stocks. Of the rations

Later, they wor in warehousabout 85 feet employed. To pness, floors weings. Ramps ocoming supplitallied in, conn

Refrigeration A

166 THE QUA

250 000 bi f b f i h d b i l f ig



250,000 cubic feet, to be furnished by unitswith a capacity of 220 cubic feet or less; ofdistribution centers at 1,000,000 cubic feet,to be provided mostly by 660-cubic-footunits; and of ports at 2,000,000 cubic feet,to be supplied by units with a capacity ofmore than 660 cubic feet. Actually, atthis time military organizations had lessthan 50,000 cubic feet, or only a fifth oftheir estimated requirements; distribution

larger refrigeramands for 863filled. South P177 small refrfrigerators had Department pr700 units of 26½be allocated frto fill uncompmeant that dem




168 THE QUA

furnished and so wasted manpo er In mid The platoon assign



furnished and so wasted manpower. In mid-1944 the Southwest Pacific Area thereforebegan to procure in Australia larger port-able warehouses having a capacity of 4,300cubic feet, but not many of these new unitshad been delivered before hostilities ended. 20

The American-built, 10-ton refrigeratedsemitrailer with a capacity of 600 cubic feet,enough to store a day's supply of meat forone division, was employed but rarely. De-

The platoon assignbroken up into secto task forces. siderable value doperations befoavailable. Unfonot be made ava

Despite the kinds became larin structure as


not exist in the forward areas Standard lets are availabl



not exist in the forward areas. Standardsolid-rubber-tired fork-lift trucks, the mostserviceable equipment at zone of interiordepots, required fo r efficient operation roadsand floors with concrete or wood surfaces.But as Quartermaster storage areas in thePacific were seldom so surfaced, these truckscould not be used extensively. Pneumatic-tired fork-lifts, which operated fairly wellin soft areas, were, indeed, the only type

lets are availablequipment are

coral. . .24

Once Southwreached the Phirapidly improvewere procurablebetter shipping smaterials and wobtained from

170 THE QUA

ucts clothing and general supplies varied the beginning



ucts, clothing, and general supplies variedfrom place to place, but the trend wasstrongly toward replenishment on the basisof requisitions prepared by the bases them-selves. 26

Whether inventories or requisitions fur-nished the impetus for distribution, approx-imately correct stock records were essentialto satisfactory supply. Yet , owing to thelack of qualified technicians this condition

the beginning supplies to aGuinea, chieflyFebruary 1943,of bases at Milport of troops inbetween the Britions. While Briwith all its Qfilled the compa


virtue of requiring vessels to call at only responsiblefor c



virtue of requiring vessels to call at onlyone port and of thus facilitating prompt andsolid loading. The alternative method ofmaking movements from whatever Austral-ian bases had the largest stocks of neededitems was rejected, for it required that sup-plies be picked up at several ports, with lossof valuable shipping time. 32

The method actually adopted likewiseproved wasteful. Food, for example, was

responsible for cof its own suppliesple, received requures from the Nedirectives to btralia instructingto ship, and whonly until the bnewly establisheddertook the ta

172 THE QU

and even if booked could not always be early 1943 sc



and even if booked, could not always beplaced on board the available ships. For thatreason alone the maintenance of adequatestocks at advance bases was occasionallyvery difficult. Quartermaster shipping sec-tions nevertheless tried to place as many oftheir supplies as possible on the scheduledvessels. 36

When enough ships were not on hand forthe transportation of all supplies awaiting

early 1943 scdischarge filledconditions existeSanto, and theand even later dbat. The navalcongestion at basabout time. In example, vesselssembled at Tow


control center and when ships bearing th e equator of



control center, and when ships bearingQuartermaster items were finally called for-ward, twenty sailed within three weeks. 41

Refrigeration Afloat

Just as lack of refrigerated space ashorehampered Quartermaster supply on land,

so did the shortage of refrigeration

afloathamper the distribution of perishables by

th e equator of plying perishablecombat forces.

The Centralshortage less kresulted princiimity of Honolutor that allowed amounts of perFrancisco. The

174 THE QUA

combat vessels, and ships carrying amphib- rely chiefly on



, p y g pious forces.44

The South Pacific Area depended mostlyon the N avy reefer fleet, which was too smallto maintain regular distribution of perish-ables out of New Zealand. Small refriger-ated vessels fo r transshipping fresh provi-sions to remote points in the northern Sol-omons were particularly scarce. Even thelarge and relatively accessible base in New

y ying 1942 conver

small vessels inot fill even thforces then in following tw o gradually reincraft from the ers, which avfeet in capacit


especially serious at Sydney because of poor X-ships to sup



p y y y pstevedoring. In March 1944 it was reportedthat leave vessels had never once left Aus-tralian ports fully loaded; every month theyhad run with 35,000 to 40,000 cubic feetof cold-storage space, or approximately 25percent, empty. Maj. Gen. James L. Frink,commander of USASOS, therefore orderedthat loading time be extended to five days. 49

A further measure of relief was obtained

s ps supwhich the leave stermined by thAustralian portstaken on mainlbane; and potaMelbourne, tkinds of fresh New Guinea to by fast naval v

176 THE QU

visions from Port Moresby and Oro Bay tion in order to



y yto Finschhafen and Hollandia, neither of

which then had sufficient shore refrigerationto receive large movements direct fromAustralia. But while the ADSOS fleetproved useful, it never became large enoughfo r truly effective operations. 53 For generaltransportation of perishables tw o additionalleave ships and a number of smaller vesselswere acquired late in the year ; yet the

of fresh provisio

shipments indeeperishables thamaster items. 53

Southwest Paciperiods of seveplement to inadbut also as an emlishing and reple


cially book these movements with th e Fifth inaccessible by



Air Force, which handled the transship-

ments at Port Moresby, the supplies wereleft in open storage until all formally bookedcargoes had been cared for. On 6 August1943 an observer at that base found 54,000pounds of Quartermaster supplies awaitingshipment; some of this accumulation hadbeen there since 12 July. When the supplieswere finally started on their way to Dobo-

supplied about

packs containinMany weeks wdeliver these itebut one plane as twenty outponly a few hou

Packa

178 THE QU

in the paper, fiber, and cloth containers of such an exten



retail trade and packed in fiber cartons,

usually without overpacking. Corrugatedfiber containers, which were used mostlyfor packing canned goods, were strongenough to insure safe delivery in the zoneof interior, where there were few handlingsand plenty of covered storage space, mate-rials-handling equipment, and trained em-

ployees, but they lacked the strength to

displacement tons

quired. It wasquantities of lumcoming more scathat, in any evpots had suffiwooden boxes.compelled the

strapping for 63



180 THE QUA

suffered heavy damage in being loaded and Throughout



discharged by sling nets. This damage wasparticularly heavy if cargo vessels were dis-charged as swiftly as possible in order toreduce turnabout time. Containers werethen tossed five or six feet from trucks intoa net spread on the ground, often landingon corners or edges. When the net was liftedor dropped, it crushed and then pushed theboxes in all directions. Diagonal pressures

Pacific quarterma

the outer packi"completely wobetween Hawaiispring of 1942fiber cartons insoon as a heavhumid Fijis theyhouses. 69 On the



182 THE QUA

moisture on arrival at advance points. Sim- Frequently, can



ilarly packaged flour and rice frequentlybecame moldy and full of weevils. Thoughfiber cans furnished more protection, theydid not provide safeguards against exces-sive humidity for the salt, sugar, bakingsoda, and corn starch they usually held.Nor were they structurally strong enough towithstand hard usage and were thereforeoften dented and pierced. 73

certainty as to the

Packing and ever caused, oVeterinary personhours to the sespoiled food. completed, morthe repacking oshipment to advan


Both cartons, it was claimed, surpassed proof solid fiberf 1943 V



nailed wooden boxes in resisting rough

usage. Dropped 50 times in a testing drumto simulate rough handling in a ship's hold,then immersed in water for twenty-fourhours, and finally again tumbled in the drumuntil they broke, two all-kraft containers sus-tained 315 and 526 falls and a sisal-kraftcontainer 569 falls before they failed. Theweatherproof solid fiber container survived

of 1943 were V

volume, and evcommensurate QMC, indeed,boxes it would not been curtailtur ing difficulthad to be used

was preferable

184 THE QUA

saving qualities, ease of handl ing, and, abovei d

peas—a multi



all, resistance to hard usage, more and more

won them acceptance.79

During 1943 the OQMG developed theconception of amphibious packing to in-dicate packing that could be easily carried

and that could withstand exceedingly roughusage and about ninety days of exposure tothe elements. In practice the term implieda relatively low poundage and the employ-

asphalt moistu

products had osnaburg, that furnished only sdling hazards, mcontainers woultory, but the grprohibited their

spring of 1942,

STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PRO

Special Packaging Problems side, began to arh



While the OQMG in Washington grap-pled with packing difficulties, it also triedto solve packaging difficulties. The prin-cipal problem was the shortage of tin, which,though easily punctured and prone to rust,still provided the most generally satisfac-tory packaging material for subsistence.

Even before Japanese conquests cut off thei h ti reso rces f th t A i th

storage they w

whereas unlacqsame time were server in the Soutside as well as oucans should be would, he belieof the can by aci

however, to impl

186 THE QUA

ticularly the year in which the pack was87 b i f f i

ligent labor. 90

l l



made. 87 Embossing of cans for citrus com-

modities created a fresh problem, for theembossing die occasionally fractured thecontainer and permitted acid liquid tospread over and rust the can. A more seri-ous fault was the repeated failure of con-tracting plants to indicate the name of theproduct and the date of packing, omissionsthat rendered identification of contents and

dicate clearly wrong item orright item wereings—and thesePacific quarterjected in particinch lettering and to its appeaone end of the

STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROB

Packing of Clothing, Equipage,d G l S li

The zone ofsolved the proble



and General Supplies

The provision of packing protection forclothing, equipage, and general supplies wasa simpler matter than in the case of food,for they were all much less liable to deteri-oration. In packing these supplies, bales,wooden boxes and crates, plywood cases,and wood-cleated fiberboard containers, allserved as packing containersand except for

solved the proble

clothing and ecustomarily placboxes or wood-carried loads tooand often fell ahours for recooppacking of gener

tory, but expe

188 THE QUAR

ject to this mishap. So were those which heldh l t f these ti l bec se f th i

dry cereals and vegetables fre



helmets, for these articles, because of their

irregular shape, could not be fitted snuglyinto a case and were so heavy they graduallybroke down their containers. If cartonsholding soap became wet, they disintegratedbecause the soap dissolved and weakenedthe interior of the boxes. In the Philippinesin 1944 and 1945 rain damaged socks, uni-

forms, stationery, and toilet paper, if they

vegetables, fre

Since package rigidly standardicontainers snugtainty often prpackages in a co

Outer packs pthan inner conta

more unwieldy



190 THE QUAR

plied in the postwar years to the develop-ment of better air cargo methods

and packing. Acdefects proved



ment of better air cargo methods.

The potential packaging and packingproblems of overseas areas had not beenfully comprehended before Pearl Harbor,but early wartime experience quickly re-vealed the wastefulness of flimsy packaging

defects proved

guides to still postwar era. TV-containers ito much bettertrials the QM



CHAPTER VIII

Class I, II, I I I , an

S l P bl

192 THE QUAR

were running at the rate of 2 percent everymonth 2 In the South Pacific too losses

Though loscreased somewhat



month. In the South Pacific, too, losses

accumulated at a prodigious rate. In thefirst eight months of 1943 the VeterinaryService condemned about 3,500,000 poundsof evaporated milk and enormous quantitiesof canned fruits and vegetables. 3 OnlyHawaii escaped wholesale condemnationsof stored food.

Heavy subsistence losses resulted not only

creased somewhat

mained high. Department essuch food movethe United Stat17 percent of tPacific could ntwelve months be

April 1944 in

CLASS I, II, I I I , AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS

than were given in the estimates. 8 In March1944 condemnations at Port Moresby

ties in that parFrink pointed



1944 condemnations at Port Moresby,

where storage conditions were compara-tively good, amou nted to 2,143,000 pounds,or 16 percent of all the food examined. Yetwholesale condem nations had been made atthis base only nine months before. All but10,000 pounds of the 541,000 pounds ofcanned corned beef and all but 8,000 of the410,000 pounds of canned beets were pro-

Frink pointed

New Guinea noscarce in the whole as becauthe proper places at the proper timcommodities aseral more than am

yet they were r




essential in view of the variety they gave tothe menu 15

short, was almomore deplorab



the menu.

Nonperishables were not much better bal-anced at other bases, and there were notableexamples of maldistribution as betweenbases. In early February Oro Bay had onhand a 71-day supply of lard and butter butonly a 15-day supply of salt. It had a 180-day supply of frui t juices whereas Lae had

but a 1-day supply At Milne Bay corned

more deplorab

vegetables, and egany fresh fruit. tables, and it heMilne Bay and L2-day supply bases had nonelarger but still

Moresby stock

196 THE QUA

products were on hand. 20 Though such lowstock levels occurred but rarely food was

these items thesequently troop



stock levels occurred but rarely, food was

seldom obtainable in the variety needed forsatisfying meals.

Unbalanced stockages were reflected insubsistence issues at bases, but to a slighterextent than at the supply points of the com-bat forces dispersed along the north shoreand on the outlying islands. This disparity,

while in the main a consequence of dis-

sequently, troop

ger but only frwhich they we

When basesprovisions in epacity, they weplus quickly ining. For this rea

tween 22 and 2


that they had come in. 24 Even air organiza-tions, if actively supporting combat opera-

flights resulted tions, but Lt. G



, y pp g p

tions, were no t much better p rovisioned thanground organizations. Early in August, fo rinstance, Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, com-manding the Thirteenth Air Force at Noem-foor Island, reported that his troops hadreceived no perishables by sea for twomonths and only sporadic shipments by

plane His men he declared had to forage

,

mander of the at least fourteesure an ample ward elements. planes be run rnumber to BiaIsland, Noemf

Tactical requir

198 THE QUA

ply during the previous four months had made the use of prepared rations, rather

dia concluded tgetting ample fo



p p ,

than the balanced field ration, necessary forextended periods. Some units, he declared,were forced to eat packaged rations exclu-sively fo r extended periods. Not until theend of June, he added, h ad conditions mate-rially improved. 29

At that very time, however, the surgeon

of the 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion

g g p

are not, as the r'C' ration and can not eat it.for days entirelmilk, butter, salt,tables that thegeants had even

from air servi

CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Naval units occasionally had so much freshfood they bartered their surplus stores with

Meanwhile Cavalry declined



y p

Army organizations. Such marked contrastsbetween the subsistence of the two servicesaroused bitter criticism and angry discon-tent among hungry soldiers. To some ex-tent similar reactions, varying in intensitywith the quality of Army rations, were en-countered among troops nearly everywhere

in the Pacific33

y

ganization, stilweeks after haerations there, previous sixty dat only three meInnis P. Swiftasserted, is si

and corned bee

200 THE QUA

ber, Thirteenth Air Force groups at Sansa-por received only 1½ pounds per man of

41 pounds, andstocks of butter



perishables, nearly all fresh meats, whereasgroups on Guadalcanal in October received115 pounds per man, of which about 27pounds were fresh meats, 69 pounds werefresh vegetables, and 9 pounds were butter.Throughout their stay at Sansapor, Thir-teenth Air Force groups received only small

and fluctuatingquantities of perishables In

mained low.41

. Class

The distribuing and equipaeral supplies, th

ity) was ordin


Chiefly because of procurement difficul-ties in the United States, there were chronic

short-lived, local scpendable items, t



scarcities of some items of jungle clothingand equipment, which had been speciallydeveloped to meet the extraordinary re-quirements of tropical warfare . For that rea-son the issue of these supplies w as confinedto units assigned or attached to the SixthArmy and to a few designated organizations

in operational areas As combat activity in-

use, such as napkinticides, were osixty-five expenfrom the Oro BForce in Novembeon hand in the neone were not ob

one only in qu

202 THE QUA

ation to the unusually heavy demands madeby the Fifth Air Force on the base's limited

return of clothipearance of scar



resources.46

Even after the return to the Philippines,stocks of Class II and IV items, unlike thoseof other Quartermaster classes in the South-west Pacific, remained inadequate. This sit-uation was usually ascribed to the unex-pectedly heavy requirements of Filipino ci-

vilians and the continued slowness of de

Though the items was not fthe Pacific, thesprang from thtered with suctective clothing,terioration af

goods and fro


garments impregnated after that date ar-rived in the Pacific. The apparel handled

most conspicuoprotective clothi



by the QMC was therefore particularlysusceptible to deterioration. The storageproblem was worsened as a result of thefact that many garments issued to indi-vidual troops on their departure from theUnited States or later in the Pacific areaswere turned in to the bases. This addi-

tional burden on the bases was necessitated

warehouses, but thbetter than open no ventilation

Even after plonger issued toparel continuefor issue if chem

there was stron

204 THE QU

Tentage and Tarpaulins

S l f t bi d k

staging and repmaintained at e



Several factors combined to make tentagechronically scarce. In addition to the sizableinroads made on base stocks by issues oftents to organizations coming from theUnited States without those supposed to ac-company them, 54 tents lost through the wearand tear of combat operations had to be re-

placed Whole divisionssometimes had to be

coming to the iunits during theiAt these campsnot, had to remcommodate anyEncampments on leave or on tFinally although



206 THE QU

even under the best storage conditions alltypes of canvas swiftly deteriorated. 62

Australian Armeral were not



Clothing, Towels,Blankets, and Footwear

In unventilated storage places cottonclothing and towels, like canvas supplies,became moldy and developed an unpleasantodor, but extensive deterioration was almost

k i f l

its ally. Moldsgrow on the cottwork of shoe failure of the seAustralian misdeterioration suwaxed linen s

composition of


to organizations requisitioning supplies.Units, indeed, were directed to base requisi-

of unrequisitiand footwear



tions not on published schedules but on thesizes their actual experience showed to beneeded. Sometimes, however, tariffs neces-sarily served as the standard of distribution.They were so employed in the early days ofthe Pacific areas before supply officers hadgained knowledge of the sizes normally in

d d g th i t d h th

ance with estloss of weight regions and thas a result of prshoes might invof requiremenfor small trou

h Th

208 THE QU

the South Pacific Area, and in the divisionspassing through Hawaii revealed that no-

on the experierequested that



where did stocks of clothing and footwearaccurately reflect actual needs. In Hawaiilocal conditions intensified the shortage ofsmall sizes, for native inductees were pre-dominantly Japanese, Filipinos, Hawaiians,and mixed breeds, who were all of slightphysique and required small sizes in much

l g titi th did troops f th

of future shipmeington asked thbarkation to maadjustments innew schedule. lem was not soated as new tr

departed d


formed a major segment of the Quarter-master mission until January 1944, whenth d i hift d h O d

stallations. A simPacific areas. 77

C li d



these duties were shifted to the OrdnanceDepartment. The Corps, however, con-tinued to obtain parts in the United Statesand distribute them to theaters of opera-tions. 74 The importance of materials-han-dling equipment, at times called th ekeystone of the entire supply structure, can

h dl b t t d75

E t h i l

Centralized protage of facilitathousands of mfew depots, but solved. There placement partshad not develope

t t f

210 THE QU

the absence of figures from overseas experi-ence showing probable future requirements.

pletely filled; ohalf filled. On



Another was the inaccurate inventorying ofstocks both in the United States and in thePacific. Because of the large number ofparts, estimated in the thousands, and thelack of an accepted nomenclature applica-ble for identification purposes, these defi-ciencies were almost insoluble. Reliable

i t i ti l l diffi lt t

mitted betweethe end of Auguceived on ninetthe other. A sparts overseas, coby ASF headquadeliveries in the

th l di g d


adequate for parts with high turnover. 82

In mid-1944 maintenance stocks began tointroduced anotUSASOS posse



arrive in slightly larger quantities. Never-theless the Sixth Army reported in Septem-ber that many units still had no field rangeparts and were encountering trouble in pre-paring meals. 83 Shortages in this field in-deed continued to plague troops until thevery end of hostilities.

R f i ti t t d id dl

their parts and them properly. Bplexities shoreable in adequascarcer. 84

Poor packing sion of parts, b

Q t t

212 THE QU

another installation was established, thistime at Manila. 86

generally amplesatisfactory, anmaterials handling



In the middle of that year the conceptof centralized storage was adopted for allQuartermaster spare parts, and a depot forissuing parts to the forces in the Philippineswas being set up in Manila when hostilitiesceased. An installation specializing in In-ternational Business Machines parts was also

b i t bli h d th Th QMC h d th

materials-handlingdemands. 89

All the survmore up-to-dalogues and ththrough the shof complete

O t

CLASS I, II, I I I , AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEM S

artillery could not be operated, generatorscould not furnish power for communicationsequipment field ranges could not bake

their requiremserves and fromof its ally Eve



equipment, field ranges could not bakebread, and combat troops could not be pro-vided with hot food or electric light.

Petroleum products consisted of variouscategories—kerosene, fuel o i l , diesel oil ,lubricants, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline,and unleaded gasoline for field ranges and

d i di id d i i dif

of its ally. EveAmerican forcAustralian Armof tanker shipm55-gallon steel porting and storThese were us

i h i i l

214 THE QUA

U.S. A rmy reduced to a minimum the num-ber of petroleum items it employed.

92

Whereas in Australia with its excellent

they reached sumer. 94 The new



Whereas in Australia, with its excellentcommercial facilities, the storage and han-dling of petroleum supplies by the Common-wealth Arm y offered few difficulties, so thatthe pooling of petroleum products was ap-plied there during the entire war period, inNew Guinea U.S. forces from the beginning

h h h h k d l I

ited areas arounbut a telling arall New Guinea wthat supply thro

gave U.S. forthe reserves it availability of

f


ber 1943 these officers also controlled thefilling, cleaning, and repair of drums, but

Class II I SuppliesTotal

Motor g a s o l i n



after that date these du ties were assigned tothe Corps of Engineers. In New Guinea thatservice was already responsible for the in-stallation, maintenance, and operation bothof bulk storage tanks receiving liquid fuelsfrom tankers and of pipelines carrying thesesupplies from rear to advance establish-

Range fuel for pRange fuel for cAutomotive diesLighting k e r o sPower k e r o s e nEngine oi l . Gear oi l . G



GLASS I, II, I I I , AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS

occasional scarcities of coastal tankers forservice between the northern bases; theshortage of drums; inadequate drum-filling

but 2,068,900 cent of that in 900 barrels we



shortage of drums; inadequate drum fillingplants; and insufficiency of cargo space for55-gallon drums from Australia.

The unsatisfactory means of bulk distri-bution outside the populated regions of theSouthwest Pacific forced sea-going tankersto discharge most of their cargoes at large

l l h h l

900 barrels we900 to aviationoil, and 253,250 t

Even this resalways be utilithe water was socould not appr

h h

218 THE QUA

the war bulk deliveries at most outlyingpoints had to be made by oil barge. 103

The shortage of bulk storage and pipe-

pended drum-fgency, accordingter originated i



The shortage of bulk storage and pipelines everywhere in the Southwest Pacificforced the transportation and storage ofmost petroleum products in containers,which occupied about 75 percent morespace than did an equal quantity of fuelscarried by tankers. In October 1943

ter, originated iing ports and thboth at Advancville, where theyIn order to savmore even distributure exigencie


quence many old containers were in unsatis-factory condition. At Lae early in 1945Quartermaster inspectors found that most

As petroleumnumber of avaadequate, also



Quartermaster inspectors found that mostof th e 21,000 drums held enough sediment,water, and other injurious substances to pre-clude issue to combat units. 10 8

Because of these circumstances drums attimes became so hard to obtain that pre-scribed replacement levels could not be

adequate, also space was allotteBut the full bevelopments couldthe lack of dficiency indeedous handicap weeks it was im

220 THE QUA

ing on the San Francisco Port of Embarka-tion was plainly advisable, but the policy ofexhausting local resources before tapping

bulk transportatiothere were no lotank cars, such



exhausting local resources before tappingthose of the zone of interior led to postpone-ment of this action until the close of 1943,when 250,000 drums were ordered. 113

Of the two principal types of 55-gallondrums—14-gauge, galvanized heavy drumsand light ungalvanized drums—the heavy

tank cars, suchbring gasoline was placed in stinto 5-gallon cService troops afforded the mtransporting fu

advanc


order from the United States the machinetools needed to increase Australian can pro-duction—a decisionbased upon the already

by as much as 9the I Corps alsfrom drums eq



duction a decision based upon the alreadyestablished preference fo r drums and thevital need of conserving local tin resourcesfor the canning of food. 116

The problem of handling bulky 55-gallondrums was solved in various ways. If winchesand fork-lift trucks were available, they were

from drums eqor motor-driven pwhich a nozzlean excessive aline. Filling thfrom cans tookabout thirty

222 THE QUA

where depended upon products shipped inby the U.S. Navy for the use of all armedservices. At the island bases the QMC per-

pacity remainedcanal base coula day and Green



Q pformed much the same functions as it did inNew Guinea, receiving the products fromtankers or supply depots and issuing them toconsumers. The most notable difference wasthe responsibility of the Corps for supply-ing not only Army troops but also shore-

ySouth Pacific Amand and for mexperienced a

In the Centply situation warea to the sou


became an activity of tremendous signifi-cance, and these companies usually operatedas depot agencies rather than as carriers

could gasolineployed in theirity of long-distan



and distributors. 123 The 834th Quartermas-ter Gasoline Supply Company, stationed atHollandia from December 1944 to the endof hostilities, reported that its actual opera-tions differed so widely from those for whichit had been prepared that much of its train-ing proved valueless. It stored as many as

all campaigns as operators oftw o were norroutine distribstocks. The unitsing points and ial l other kinds

224

laboratory tests could resolve the doubtsraised by these possibilities.

At bases petroleum products laboratories

THE QU

Pacific quartermmethod of presself was not ful



inspected samples of all shipments broughtin by tanker, checked the accuracy of mark-ings on incoming containers, and periodi-cally examined stored items for signs ofdeterioration and departures from soundstorage practices. The laboratories evenexamined containers at filling stations. Cap-

articles could portions more needs is doubtnational originearly all thecountry-wide mirror very exa


fighting Japan; in the extraordinary physi-cal conditions under which the Pacific warwas waged; and in the tendency, inevitable

recognized as vof a tactical opdifficulty. A n



when tactical operations were carried outon a shoestring, to cut the number ofservice troops and facilities to a minimum.General circumstances, much more than theshortcomings of any military element, ex-plain most of the supply shortages.

It is a noteworthy fact that the items

the comparativefurnished petrhigher echelons repriorities andto neglect clothtimes even footo smooth the



CHAPTER IX

Morale-Building SerBesides procuring, storing, and distrib- ery, laundry, ba

MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES

units employing heavy trailer-carried ma-chines could seldom function with maxi-mum efficiency even when they were lo-

a readily portabcompany to btions. Each sec



cated not far from th e battle area. The prac-tice of keeping that area as free as possibleof noncombat elements naturally forbadethe operation of service units there. If ac-tivities pertinent to a service had to be con-ducted in the battle zone, they were dele-gated to infantrymen who were assigned

operated indepeflexibility, so other service ustanding feature

Disadvantainvolved in thThey were hard

228 THE QUA

employment of the British unit wouldshorten such costly interruptions. This unitwas a heavy, self-contained, machine-oper-

though they lament, used fiellimited quantities



ated bakery, with three 2-deck ovens, capa-ble of a maximum output of 30,000 poundsa day. It required no crating for shipment,was moved easily by trailer, and was loadedand discharged quickly. Its operation tookfewer men and less gasoline than did that ofthe M1942 oven.5 Though it could be

product. Advanof the Fifth Airbread flown in ery companies didlem of providileviated, but it wathe prescribed


or more of this indispensable ingredientspoiled. 11

Still another hindrance to full production

cut and haul iother duties. Deso poor as to b



was the absence of an abundant supply ofpure water. Many streams were contam-inated, and there was no piped water, suchas forces operating in thickly populatedcountries found almost everywhere. Canswere at first virtually the only water-carry-ing equipment authorized by the War De-

passable, hospitaldiers were eachfresh bread daiounces. Elsewlandings, operatsionally less favery bread was i




pered with Japanese shot and three days be-cause they had no flour. At that time 56,000troops, or more than three times rated ca-

15

ingredients. On Keastern New Gcoconut milk i



pacity, were being supplied. 15 Almostequally remarkable records were achievedat rear bases. In July 1944, for instance,baking was being done at Finschhafen for94,000 soldiers by a unit supposed to supplyonly 40,000. 16

Overtime work did not in itself provide an

was not enoughbase, they used100 pounds ofwheat cereal. Uof the 41st Divbiscuits suitablein New Guinea ba

232 THE QU

mentation and by the addition of air andwater. 19 In the end it was determined tomake no basic change in the system of sup-

l b d h f h b l

Once a tactialerted for comblike bakery ser

h



plying bread in the field. The best solutionto the problem of inadequate issues seemedto be more and better baking equipment—equipment that would be made availablemore promptly than it had been in WorldWar I I.

six to eight wpared for and manew installation.some days aftedelivered, but landed if trailsshore. They we



234 THE QUA

vided a reasonably satisfactory means ofself-service, but in zones of active fightingthey could not be widely utilized. A few

i i l d i f d b

sight as Australiasupply the miwashers hastily

U i d S



organizations employed unit funds to buyhousehold washing machines in the UnitedStates, and some ingenious soldiers evenimprovised washers out of oil drums by rig-ging jeep motors to revolve them. But mosttroops simply used soap and a scrub brush. 24

Troops stationed at bases below the equa-

United States ahospital platoon

Large "fixeding fo r 5,000 tof twenty-five rarely set up at bases were loo

MORALE -B UIL DIN G SERVICES

wartime Hawaiian average for comparablework. Because of this discrepancy there wasa heavy labor turnov er, which caused a con-t t h f i d i

highest proportiance, 65 perlowest, 20 perc

i d



stant shortage of experienced operatives. Special assignments, such as assistance inoutfi t t ing entire divisions, fu r the r delayedlaundering for individuals. Usually, soldiers'wash was not returned fo r about two weeks.Most troops preferred commercial firms,which charged more than Quartermaster

pointed out as arelatively slighthis base did nmethod of indisix to eight mena single bundleload; when the

236 THE QU

morale by clean apparel, he urged the in-creased utilization of fixed laundries as aremedy.

34 During the following summer an

i t ll ti f thi t bl t f

an average of 1full service wa40,000 men, a

b i th



installation of this type, able to care fo r15,000 men, was completed at Saipan, butthe poor water supply prevented its opera-tion.

35 At this t ime several other isolated

bases had authorized fixed laundries, but thehigher priorities given to more urgent proj-

number in thefew were comba

Progress towart rymen was nevwar drew to a

wrote that at O


than did the expedients actually employedin th e field. Certainly, the frequent utiliza-tion of household washers implied that sim-il hi b tt fitt d t fi ld di

freshly sterilizin g laundries.40

Between thei t d f



ilar machines, better fitted to field condi-tions, might have been at least a partialsolution.

Bath, Sterilization,and Fumigation Operations

isted for an amilitary steriliuntil the hectbrought the plice was such termaster stericreated. Equippe




a collapsible fumigation chamber trans-ported on a comparatively small t ruck in-stead of a bulky sterilization chamber trans-

ported on a heavy trailer van The fumiga

ity among soldunits without submitted to tarrived d tr



ported on a heavy trailer-van. The fumiga-tion chamber was intended, primarily, foremployment in combat areas. In rear areasa specially developed rubber bag, abouttwenty-five by sixty inches, was used for de-lousing. The clothes of six to eight soldiers,together with an ampul of methyl bromide,

arrived, and trwash themselvtary, carry wator even bathe ally, enterprisshowers, basedlon drum. Such

240 THE QUA

the Medical Corps found many streams con-taminated, the company depended upon asingle well dug by the Engineers in a rear

area Even then there was water enough fo r

was divided inthe prescribed furnished baths

visions and fo



area. Even then there was water enough fo ronly half the bath equipment. Never wasthe company able to operate all its showersat one time. Its activities, moreover, wereconfined to the area immediately about th ewell. This situation emphasized the needfor the inclusion of a water purifier in the

visions and foice troops, andwhen the sectthe end of Junmen a day. Aswere available, madvantage of th


Salvage and Reclamation

Quartermaster salvage and reclamation

operations in thePacific constituted a help

signed to corpssplit into sectionas an independent

pots were sizabl



operations in the Pacific constituted a help-ful means of replenishing stocks of suppliesand equipment, particularly in advanceareas. Footwear, clothing, and tents werethe chief Quartermaster items handled bysalvage and reclamation units; foodstuffswere handled, if at all, by the Veterinary

pots were sizablalone had the for major repaiby specially traPacific were uCollecting comperating equipme





244 THE QUA

tated the inauguration of these new activ-ities. One collecting company was assignedto the Guadalcanal base, and notwithstand-

ing that it had few trucks and scarcely any

Guinea to transAfter the Austraitems, additional

pair work coul



ing that it had few trucks and scarcely anyequipment for obtaining scrap metals, it gave the island a clean sweep from one endto the other, and assembled a huge massof materials from the former battlefield.

57

The only advantage the Southwest Pa-cific had over its neighbor was that a ma-

pair work coulpostponed for needed articlebases to distriin place of thatotal issues of percent. 59


both the South Pacific and the SouthwestPacific steadily rose as experienced techni-cians and appropriate equipment finally ar-

rived but even then available resources did

Despite the minor repair jobtion was availab

Guinea by mid



rived, but even then available resources didnot match the magnitude of the task. Theproblem of how to maintain min imum sal-vage services with limited means remained aconstant source of trouble. At the end ofApril 1944 there were in the whole South-west Pacific only four repair companies and

Guinea by midshops were ofttroop concentratigether with othmade it imprawearers any a

246 THE QUA

movement, often under circumstances thathastened deterioration. 68

In August 1944 Base F at Finschhafen,

which had just recently become the site of

4 percent of unarticles in needbeen turned in fo

repairs70



which had just recently become the site ofanother major repair installation, reportedthat it operated under conditions similar tothose at Milne Bay. At that time it was re-ceiving a monthly average of 500,000pounds of Quartermaster supplies andequipment. A great portion of this ma-

repairs.Before late 1

rect support oworse than didbeing, as in Gperformed funcomposed of


attached a squad to each of the divisionQuartermaster companies. These squadsemployed Filipino helpers and set up as-

sembly stations on the routes followed by

mediately valuQuartermaster arti1,353 haversa

cases of field ra



sembly stations on the routes followed bythe trucks that carried salvage back from thebattlefield. The platoon also sent out road-side teams to scour bivouacs, dumps, andtrails. Supplies that could not be put to im-mediate use went to a base salvage dump. 72

Procedures like those on Leyte were fol-

cases of field ratities of shoes,helmets, entrencans and drums.ter articles weautomatic rifle15,000 rounds

248 THE QUA

ard repair services in combat areas. Theyparticularly lamented the poor means pro-vided for the renewal of shoes, perhaps

the item of apparel that could least easily be

mated that reclthirty-four monof enough articl

occupied by 72



the item of apparel that could least easily bedispensed with. Task forces could not carrywith them sufficient stocks of footwear. Norcould they provide for the shipment of ade-quate replacement stocks during the opera-tion. Repair shops, which might havealleviated the inevitable shortages, were not

occupied by 72it fur ther reckonwhich otherwisenew supplies. as of 30 Septemof clothing andtively, 6,880,000


terments. Generally, the dead were movedas soon as possible to cemeteries designatedby division commanders. Since graves reg-

istration units were primarily administra-

growth, improviof meeting a seThe first of thes

tralia early in



units primarilytive outfits, they merely supervised burials;th e actual digging of graves and the trans-portation of remains were functions n o r -mally performed by service troops. Everyeffort was made to identify bodies at leasttentatively. This was a simple matter if

t a a early in accumulate andIn the haste oquartering, andpoured into Aubeen given to that problem

250 THE QUA

Even its proper application in Australiawas made difficult by the inadequate mor-tuary standards of commercial undertakers

and by the inability of local manufacturerst l ti f t k t Th b

rather than a ccombat zone in tively small are

tablish temporaryh b i



and by the inability of local manufacturersto supply satisfactory caskets. These prob-lems were in one sense a blessing, for theyobliged USAFIA to create a small provi-sional organization composed of thirty-seven men , most of whom had beenmorticians in civilian life. This group was

p yhave been in a stant troop mForce the gra braved the dsquad of men tothat they would


to furnish combat elements with an ade-quate number of technicians. Throughout1943 they continued to be assigned to tac-

tical units only in pairs or small detach-

In the assault omiralty Islandstration troops

sergeant and fi



y pments. Working under officers designatedby task force commanders, they directed thecollection and identification of the dead,chose sites for temporary cemeteries and iso-lated burials, and supervised interments. Inthe Morobe-Salamaua operation of June-

gto the attackingmore than a dithis size would btoon. The gravnot land until well as its smal

252 THE QU

On both islands the widest departurefrom prescribed practices was found in thedisposal of enemy dead. The small mortuary

details, barely able to care for American

Pacific. An enand one platoonto each divisio

panied assault



, ybodies, could not give Japanese bodies thesame attention they gave their own. Strictadherence to the Geneva Convention pre-scribing equal treatment of the dead,whether friend or foe, was impossible.

Due to the tactical situation at the outset

pphases of the attatake made at Loabundance of however, that the best advantagreport of the 41


A provisional graves registration unit hadto be hastily created on the island itself.Search for technically fitted men unearthed

a field artillery corporal who had been ad h l

burial points, trucks still necon the battlegro

The openingC l P ifi



y pmortician and he was promptly put incharge of the cemetery that had been setup by the Marine Corps. With the help ofsix enlisted men and a crew of native la-borers, he corrected the haphazard plot lay-out in accordance with standard specifica-

p gCentral Pacificberts found thapared to handltw o sister areasunits trained fotachment of 16

254 THE QU

of the dead, now the menace of disease toa victorious force determined the sort ofgraves registration program which should

be addressed to this situation.103

With i k f th d d th

the opportune constituted grathe Central Pa

possible the attatrained men t



With quick recovery of the dead thusimperative, careful plans were made beforethe Gilberts assault to achieve this objec-tive. Combat troops and the 105th Infan-try Band would move remains from thefront to a nearby trail, where labor or re-

ptrained men tthis developmican combat dmoved to islandBut once againmains arose. A


the dead to collecting points. In a pro-tracted battle the number of vehicles wouldprobably have been ample, but the rapid

advances and heavy casualties put too mucht i th l d t t ti

approximate nerected. 110

At this time

ering human remth C t l Pa



y pstrain on the slender transportation re-sources allotted to mortuary units. 108

The evacuation system broke down en-tirely on 7 July when a reckless enemy at-tack left 406 Americans and thousands ofJapanese dead within a single square mile

gthe Central Paater of operationence upon infbodies of those poor results. UJune 1944, attem

256 THE QUA

The campaign for the recovery of thePhilippines introduced new strategic andtactical factors that profoundly modified

graves registration procedures. Lengthycampaigns of maneuver now replaced the

which, for convision collectithrust through

had to be transmiles for burial



campaigns of maneuver now replaced thebattles of position which had characterizedmost of the previous Pacific operations.On Leyte the combat zone was limited, notby the area of a tiny atoll, but by that of acomparatively large island and the battle

miles for burialteries. Accordinwere limited to responsibility frear-echelon organice Command,


were to be assisted as much as possible byfield salvage units. 117

The 96th Division plan for evacuating

remains on Okinawa is noteworthy, for itprovided gravesregistration techniciansin

action that peward early cocorps o r army p

ment of this sorable time and l



y,provided graves registration technicians inzones of action. In all tactical units of thisdivision a burial and graves registrationofficer" was to be appointed. In battalionsand higher echelons he would be helped bya "burial and graves registration section."

able time and lthe final judgheadquarters. tions on Okinranted a larger occurred." U

258 THE QUA

either in permanent overseas m ilitary ceme-teries or in sites selected by the family inthe United States. These tasks might have

been less formidable had graves registrationunits been trained before Pearl Harbor and

inflexible trailelaundry, repair,few instances in

improvised mortional use th



units been trained before Pearl Harbor andshipped promptly to overseas areas and hadthe prewar doctrine that made combattroops responsible for recovery of their ow ndead been modified to permit the use of tech-nicians in areas of actual combat. Certainly,

tional use, thgratifying, but simply went wlessness with wsalvageable matbattle areas made

CHAPTER X



Logistical Support of

260 THE QUAR

the supporting capabilities of the technicalservices to the precise needs of fu ture cam-paigns. Its difficulty was increased by the

strategic necessity for offensive operationsthat followed one another so swiftly as to

to provide as latroops as possiblductions in the

master Section,quarters Sout



that followed one another so swiftly as toafford little opportunity fo r careful prep-arations or for the assembly of supplies in thedesired quantities. Realistic planning wasrendered still harder by the practice of notimmediately revealing to participating or-

quarters, Soutout that the Wcertain numberwhich allotmentobliged to selectvital to the exe

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

to be more fully equipped and trained inorder to carry out combat duties efficiently.As far as possible in the limited time avail-

able, these requisites were provided. When,as often happened regularlyestablished and

and grease, thetanks, trucks, dlanding craft, a

daily demand, exclass of supply



as often happened, regularly established andtrained units were unavailable, provisionalunits were organized to the extent perm ittedby the total allotment of troops. If such unitscould not be formed, task forces were of ne-cessity deprived of some services.

class of supplyconstant revisiand geographicaling accuracy o

Developm

262 THE QUA

submitted requisitions for 750 cooking out-fits, each sufficiently large to provide ho tfood for 20 men. To furnish troops with a

convenient means of washing their messgear the Corps of Engineers in Oahu manu-

ing phase of thpines. In gettingthe division, then

the general dirUSAFICPA. I



gear, the Corps of Engineers in Oahu manufactured 300 hot water heaters. From sal-vaged cots, tents, and tarpaulins the Hawai-ian Quartermaster Depot fabricated 2,000grenade carriers, each capable of holdingfour missiles. Finally, it bought locally 7,000

USAFICPA. Ibegan determiments in Aprilordinated thisneeds, the divlished a special p

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATION

in tactical plans necessitated minor revisionsof supply lists, but in early August, whenYap was finally announced as the opera-

tional objective, clothing and equipmentlists were ready for publication. Shipping

Unitized loads,in the Central Pof containers s

wooden floorinto permit the



y p pp gshortages obliged the task force to limittrucks to half th e number authorized intables of equipment. Once this decision hadbeen made, th e office of the division quar-termaster easily calculated gasoline and

ptruck. Such loadscores of contaship's gear, craother mechanicamoving, and stac

264 THE QUA

their value was materially diminished. 14

Nonetheless they were widely utilized byCentral Pacific forces from the Gilberts to

Okinawa. In the Southwest Pacific theyfound no favor until 1944 and then were

Petroleum prother items pacuniform size an

master suppliesThey were strap



employed but slightly. Palletization, ac-cording to the quartermaster of the CentralPacific Area, should be limited to highlyemergency supplies associated with the as-sault operation. Loss of shipping space, he

y pgular, flat-topstacking and efcal equipment.letize clothing antermaster loads




266 THE QUA

withstanding that the 7th QuartermasterCompany was still busily supporting com-bat activities, part of its members were di-verted

from this task to help man huge

Quartermaster dumps being established on

determined howunits carried ou

Division Quarte



Leyte to supply the division in the new of-fensive. More than 7,000 tons of materialshad been assembled by the beginning ofMarch 1945. On the 4th, shipments to loading out points started, and by the

These units which the QMCtical organizationportant supportimaster company


items from divisional units, arranged for thetime and place of deliveries, and in closecollaboration with G-4 allocated trucksamong divisional activities. Normally, G-4controlled all vehicles used for tactical

pany. The diffito a division forto help the Quform these addethe problem. W



purposes.22

The tasks actually performed by a di-visional Quartermaster company in the Pa-cific varied markedly from those prescribedwhen this type of unit was established, pri-

indeed often wgeneral shortageforced their qument to base insational forces b

268 THE QU

by a unit when the mileage thereon exceeds25,000 miles as the combat performance there-after normally expected must be reduced byhalf. The present fifty-one 2½ ton cargo

trucks authorized a Division Quartermastershould be increased to ninety-nine, providing

they lacked th originate in a tQuartermaster

sion ... are operheadquarters ad



y , p gsix truck platoons of sixteen vehicles each,with provisions for army or corps replacementof a portion thereof, during combat at least,by DUKW's, Amtracks, 1½ ton cargo or¾ on vehicles as the terrain may demand. 27

Owing to the operating problems encoun

must be applicabUnable to o

regular allotmendivisional Quato carry out thei




270 THE QU

Beaches 1 and 2. On D plus 1 a Quarter-master detachment of one officer and sev-enteen enlisted men went to Pim, a villagejust south of White Beach 4 and at theterminus of the road running inland. This

for two or threehillsides, wherplies and equipmenhead was widenment moved th

b l



unit was to receive supplies shipped in smallboats from the other beaches and issue themto the 186th Infantry fighting its way towardthe main objectives, the three Japanese air-fields along the shores of Lake Sentani.

much better ltwo miles fromarrival of mormitted the assigthirty-seven en


and from time to time stretches of this vitalsupply link had to be closed for repairs.Transportation difficulties indeed delayedfor some days the removal of the dumpsfrom Pim to the Lake Sentani region, where

the 186th Infadays mainly onseized Japanese sstock steadily ddown to 300



they could have more easily supplied tacti-cal elements. Finally, the I Corps intensifiedthe transportation woes of the Quartermas-ter detachment by taking over the capturedvehicles, leaving it again short of vital

troops, large qurived in Humbo

Except for aing and general and IV items a

272 THE QUA




sels with a capacity of 50 to 500 tons andshipped to the intermediate bases at Pon-gani or Oro Bay, respectively, about 35 and15 miles below Buna. Here supplies wereagain transshipped, this time to still smaller

f

was large in arlems somewhatsmaller islands.those usually soperated deep in

l A



vessels, usually fishing trawlers, carryingonly 10 to 30 tons. These boats then sailedfor one of the receiving points set up atcoastal villages close to the combat zone.42

As these boats sneaked up the coast, high

jungle. Areas unways located aloeffect, islands.reliance upon Milne Bay fo

274 THE QUA

Use of Landing Craftin Assault Supply

Ordinarily, tactical successes permittedlanding craft to beach and start unloadingtheir cargoes within a few hours after the

cer, who orderedtions or to pick of eight LST'sfashion with a mto be in demandh l k



their cargoes within a few hours after theassault waves went ashore. But even suchswift discharge of supplies and equipmentdid not always insure the availability ofitems needed by combat troops. The better

the latter task,beach designatederations of thissystem of initialstore system. 46


cendiary bombs. One fell in the 7th Quar-termaster Company motor pool, a secondnear the office of the division quartermas-ter, and a third in an ammunition dump,which exploded continually for 9 hours andi i l ft h il b t 1430

immobile stocksued in combat,tion to the corpsrequisitions as port of tactical

ti th



intermittently after that until about 1430on the 26th. An OQMG observer, whostood only about 200 feet from the ammuni-tion dump, reported that he jumped intoa Jap foxhole which was deeper than my

operation the lowed a basic I and III distrof advancing tpoint was no lon

276 THE QUAR

town of Abuyog a dozen miles directly south,and struck across the waistline of Leyte toBaybay on the west coast, most of the di-vision was concentrated in that region. Reardumps were maintained at Dulag and inter-

di i ll i Ab hil

ply line traversLanding craft fcoast to Abuyoferred to truckous roads to Baf d t DUKW



mediate installations at Abuyog; meanwhilelarge stocks were built up at Class I andIII dumps on the west coast in preparationfor a powerful movement northward againstthe stronghold of Ormoc, where the Jap-

ferred to DUKWmechanized) acated at variousnorth to Ormoc

Throughout


company were therefore concentrated onthis run. 53

Air Transportation

b

During the fSalamaua regioin the summerof good qualityods of bundling

k g t th



From the very beginning of combat op-erations in 1942, a ir transportation had beenused as an emergency supplement to othermethods of moving supplies during combatoperations. Since this practice was new to

packages to the needed substantainous and heaing to Col. Archimander of the

278 THE QUAR

pilots found it hard to locate these areas.In densely wooded terrain supplies fell morefrequently in towering trees, 100 to 150 feethigh, than they did on the indicated tar-gets, making discovery of the parachuteshard and their recovery harder 57 Re

and handling ittral Pacific Areup similar orga

Air supply eqcedures, though l t dil i



hard and their recovery harder. Re-trieval of cargoes was further complicatedby lack of troops for protracted searchesand by heavy losses incurred in detachingpacks from parachutes caught in tall trees.

less steadily impCargo parachutes tainable in largtion of droppingby aerial photog


over-all proportion of recoveries amountedto about 87 percent, a figure that indicateda notable advance in retrieval techniques.Supplies were not only dropped but werealso landed in substantial quantities on air-strips 62

pounds, not mments of 510,00

Supply Operati

After the ret



strips.Although the emergency food reserve set

up on Leyte for the Luzon campaign wentuntapped, a similar ten-day reserve for 5,000men served as a main source of replenish-

After the retditions governingcombat operationbetter than inunits had becom

280 THE QUA

moved quickly in order to keep pace withcombat divisions swiftly pursuing retreatingJapanese. In the twenty-two days afterthe landing at Lingayen Gulf the Class Iand III dumps of the 6th Division werepushed ahead three t imes; the last shift

During the pDivision throughnorthern Luzopushed its dumpsionally as far fifteen or twe



pushed ahead three t imes; the last shiftmoved them forward about sixty miles fromtheir first location. In the next eighteen daysfour moves, covering about 100 miles, werecarried out. The fourth shift required a

fifteen or twefour hours. 67 quate supply, hof divisional dfront but their


indeed arrived with less than twenty cargovehicles. Far-flung supply lines forced theemployment of all available trucks fo r pro-tracted periods without needed repairs andmaintenance, a practice that in the long runseriously reduced the number of usable

ties, which werabout 1,000 naof them Igorotgion. Teams, cmen, each bearspeciallydesign



seriously reduced the number of usablevehicles. In mid-February the demand formore conveyances became so insistent thatcombat units loaned some of theirs to BaseM so that it could carry out its logistical

specially designand for some dbacks ammunisupplies for thsuch tortuous

282 THE QUA




master used about 300 of these workers inhandling supplies on the beach and the re-maining 150 in burying battle casualties.As the division advanced inland, the em-ployment office moved with it, but in theinterior fewer Filipinos could be hired.

served as the sFilipinos were small-sized shoeparticularly bigitems o f issue weseveral weeks,



interior fewer Filipinos could be hired.Luckily, need for them temporarily slack-ened. From A plus 10 to A plus 23 the divi-sion obtained a daily average of only 125laborers, who were employed mainly in the

several weeks, pelago the chintensified.77

Supply Operation

284 THE QUAR

the establishment of efficient supporting op-erations. Frequent interruptions in the un-loading of rations further unbalanced foodstores. Such stoppages were caused mostlyby the higher priority assigned to ammuni-tion which was consumed in prodigious

and forward suto support both Min the north asouth. Becausestructing bulk block shipments



tion, which was consumed in prodigiousquantities. The discharge of a single shipwith a cargo consisting mostly of rationsoccasionally took days. The subsistence sup-ply on shore became so limited for a time

block shipmentswell as the inin by newly arof packaged itemcame in 55-gallo




286 THE QUAR

plaint that Them bastards in the backareas get all the good stuff."

Class II and IV Problems

Extremely restricted issues of Class II

farther behindmanding generaclared that thpered both cooperational rreplacement fa



yitems—and even more of Class IV items—generally characterized operational supply.This situation was caused partly by the ship-ping shortage which limited both initial

replacement famost markedlyBAR (Brownzine belt, issue

ith W


bags by unit, and in an unsegregated statethey were dumped on the beaches. 86

During the New Georgia operation, theafter action report of the 43d Division de-clared, so many bags were discharged notlong after the assault waves had landed that

to the units at tbags that werbeen pilfered byripped open padland removed scarcalways cease with



gthe beaches became badly congested and thehandling of other supplies was slowed. Inpractically all campaigns substantial lossesof luggage occurred on the beaches because

ythe appropriateenemy of necedumps where thferage. Lackin

288 THE QU

operational period were also placed in thesquad bags. By doing away with the use ofinterchangeable pouches and individualduffel bags, the number of bags needed by adivision of 20,000 men was reduced to3,000, a quantity that obviously could be

according to prlivery of clothlays, together wshortages in so

tents. These scacare of the ill



handled and guarded more easily thancould 20,000. Yet even this compromise didnot correct all faults of the older system. 92

Pilferage and unexplained losses, though on

establishment oinstallations allevation. 94


less prodigality of combat troops themselves,pilferage assumed the proportions of a de-vouring wolf pack in the wake of which ranthe spectre of insufficiency at the front. Itseems incredible that commanders, usually sowatchful against waste of food in mess kits,were not more concerned about the far more

Biak operation,after the Hollandinflicted on fivsixty-three casuQuartermaster more telling tes



serious losses elsewhere. This applies to ClassII supplies as well. Austerity at the f ront couldbe accounted for partially, at least, by over-stocked foot lockers of personnel at everystopping point along the pipe line of supply. 96

casionally befeAt times the

tack forced unfenses for their

290 THE QUAR

head by a case of beans and another whowas killed in a rush to a chow line. 9

Emergency digressions into tactical tasks

may have made the Corps seem a bit less safe than tradition pictured it, but only

terials and servneeded to meetsupply and maorities, mud, general lack orailroads, and



by satisfactory performance of the logisticalresponsibilities that ordinarily took up all itstime and energy could the Corps truly fulfillits mission. The effective manner in which

available in elands, the CorpAfter the fall oican advanc

CHAPTER XI



Supplies and Equipment

U

292 THE QU

the main coloring agent. 3 In the UnitedStates the OQMG, aware of the problemspresented by bleached supplies and equip-ment in an age of air warfare, began to

procure olive-drab rather than white under-wear, socks, handkerchiefs, and towels. Pro-

easily portable utilization of cit was claimed, mthrough the mo

stantly infiltraloaded opponent



duction bottlenecks for some months re -tarded the delivery of these new materials,but as 1943 progressed, larger and largershipments of the colored items arrived in

by unsuitable flaged garmenequipment thatout disclosing t

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE

heeled and soled. Both this shoe and theproposed jungle boot, it was believed, wouldrender leggings unnecessary. Leggings atbest were unsatisfactory, for, being laced,they required eyeholes and so permitted theentrance of insects. Tightly rolled puttees,

or animal-drasigned fo r jung

MacArthur'sington at a tim

just starting witems with the h



g y p ,smeared with soap or tobacco juice, werethought to afford better protection.

Finally, GHQ informed the Chief Quar-t t th t i tropical jungles ldi

Kearny, a forworked fo r yearsand since the sumdesigning and

294 THE QU

British, and Australian practice of wearingonly shorts and open-necked, short-sleevedshirts. Though Australian officers insistedthat this custom kept their men cooler and

more comfortable, the idea of adopting itfo r American use was abandoned when re-

locally procuredcamouflaging m

Since enemypicking off sol

clothing and insigons, camouflage



ports were received that 30 percent of theAustralian troops in New Guinea were suf-fering from malaria or from body scratchesand infections that could have been pre-

work suits but and other canvasonal equipmentpearance whic




296 THE QUA

shoes. 15 Service shoes, converted into hob-nailed footwear for the sake of firmer footingon slippery, stony, and mountainous terrainand provided with heel plates and rawhidelaces, were a common foot covering. Aftertroops of the 32d Division had their regular

pectations and for general use bon roots and wesufficient protect

support for anthe canvas tops



shoes hobnailed, they discovered that thehobs quickly fell out of old leather soles.As far as practicable new shoes were accord-ingly issued to soldiers about to go into the

vision in the infantry outfitsclaimed that thtection for the


void of swamp and similar terrain, or whereany sort of load was carried in thepack. 18 But since it allowed water to runout as rapidly as it entered and dried quickly,the boot had substantial value unde r condi-tions where troops' feet were nearly always

f l

tain, for few United States went mainly to

A tropical c

cleated soles anveloped by the

ll d



wet. Soldiers discharging landing craft ly -ing in the surf, Engineer troops working inwater for hours while they constructedbridges, and men operating in swampy areas

well received wThose w ho worcism—the extremthe cleats facil

298 THE QUA

lections of abandoned web equipment.Once soldiers, in violation of sanitary regu-lations, had cast them aside, they had noadequate protection against mud, whether

they were marching, fighting, or workingin wet dumps. To provide a substitute, theOQMG d l d b h h

Light though itto be carried eait proved impraFront-line soldported, did nobecause of posh til i filt t



OQMG developed a combat shoe whosedistinctive feature was a cuff and buckletop that gave it a height of ten inches ascompared with the six inches of the service

hostile infiltratline wanted shrapnel. In copointed out, it


ited their life, according to Dill, to aboutforty-five days. 27

The poncho, a rectangular, blanketlikecloak made from raincoat material with an

opening in its center for the wearer's head,provided some of the services that the jun-gle hammock had been developed to sup

value that he oprocure enoughsupply all soldinstructions were

and by the closwas being issueall troops embar



gle hammock had been developed to sup-ply but seldom did. Normally regarded asa makeshift substitute for a raincoat, it wasactually a garment that served many varied

all troops embarSouthwest Pac

Front-line fmainly as a ten

300 THE QUA

Somervell and Colonel Dill was not fullyshared by corps troops, division servicetroops, artillerymen, and base supply troops,all of whom operated in rear areas under

comparatively favorable conditions. Unlikeinfantrymen, they did not live for days inclose contact with the enemy and the

cured in Austraments from thedesigned to guhead, was mea

sleeping and ethere was no waway from the



close contact with the enemy and theground. Their work consisted mainly ofdriving trucks, working in supply dumps,and handling ammunition at artillery posi-

away from theit. Soldiers, attenet, felt suffoWorst of all, it


through thick vegetation. Not until thePhilippines were reached and fighting tookplace more and more in the open countrywas it much criticized. Soldiers found little

need for the machete under these circum-stances and began to discard it, claiming itwas so long when suspended from their belts

to hold a soldiing, and rations.opening sack fogear, and other

itself was not bags, which couldveloped One was



was so long when suspended from their beltsthat it hit their legs and caught on brush.Some units in consequence issued only onemachete to a squad. 34

veloped. One wasdrical in shape,twelve inches itwo ounces, whic

302 THE QUAR

towels, and perhaps a few personalpossessions.

The jungle pack itself, contrary to theoriginators' broad conception of its employ-

ment, was utilized only for the few essentialarticles needed in a combat zone. In theSouthwest Pacific troops normally carried

The lower part,the equipmentwaterproof clotcalled the comba

actually neededthe end of the Oand-combat p



Southwest Pacific, troops normally carriedin their packs only a poncho, one or twopairs of socks, a pair of trousers, handker-chiefs, tw o waterproof food bags, one flota-

and combat pquantities, andpraised it. 40


trails to the troops actively engaging theenemy. But if there was much shelling, thiscould not be done. 41

Because of all these difficulties special

operational rations that could be carriedby combat troops themselves were exten-sively employed These rations individually

Overseas aretions on the basisand portability.value characterize

somewhat fromdiffering calorictents Palatability



sively employed. These rations, individuallyboxed or canned, contained long-lastingfoods that troops would be able, if circum-stances dictated, to consume unheated. But

tents. Palatabilityhighly desirable,of bad taste waall. Since ration

304 THE QUA

the stew units, and potatoes in both thehash and the stew units. Only two othervegetables were used—carrots for the stewand onions for the hash. There was even

less variety in the B units, which all con-tained the same kind of cracker, hardcandy, and soluble coffee in the same quan-

tion to give all the rice ration wBuna-Sananandasisted of C biscui

haps mixed, if hable, with cooration; and sup



candy, and soluble coffee in the same quantities. The cracker, called the C SquareBiscuit, was of a special noncommercialtype, reinforced with vitamins and calories

ration; and supagain mixed, iIf the rice ratioited stocks were


distasteful in appearance that soldiers re-peatedly threw the whole mass of food away.With age the onions, carrots, and meats ac-quired new and less acceptable flavors and,

according to some consumers, came to lookand taste like dog food. Most troops foundthe soluble coffee unpalatable. Had utensils

mating that cuWhile some othparable to it in content, they d

cient bulk ancraving food. hand, if entirely



the soluble coffee u pa atab e. Had utensilsbeen available fo r heating the hash andstew, these components would have beenvastly improved, bu t front-line troops sel-

a d, ywith a normal amallayed the sensan empty or p

306 THE QUA

cooked rice could obtain it by the simpleexpedient of using canned heat to prepareit in their canteen cups. 51

The concentrated richness of D rations,

the third major element of the rice ration,temporarily assuaged hunger, often beforea whole cake was eaten. Some men, partic-

Papuan force. times unobtainlargely on C rationly food availab

after the initial Kilmartin, a stDivision, termed



ularly if they ate rapidly, could not consumemuch of a cake without being nauseated.The chocolate, moreover, made troops

He claimed thamany to get intocomponents w


hydrate the dry components, the developersof the ration, assuming that drinking waterwould at all times be available for this pur-pose in ample quantities, anticipated no

need to carry any along.56

Each ration fur-nished about 3,500 calories a day—all thatwould normallybe required—and a more

card them. Thethat the weighpounds by remfrom their pack

waterproof footions this methable than the o



would normally be required and a morevaried selection of food than did the Cration. Besides substantial amounts of seed-less raisins and dried peaches and prunes,

able than the omore items to b

Even more oof the jungle r

308 THE QUA

erous an issue. The defects of the packagingwere plainly manifest during th e final phasesof the Buna offensive, when isolated troops in slit trenches could be fed only by hav-

ing rations tossed to them by soldiers whocrawled forward to within throwing range.

A man might end up with a whole can of

The problembat rations was mthe K ration, wbreakfast, dinn

packaged compowere put up in asix inches long,



g ppeanuts for a meal or a can of powderedmilk. 58 Such disheartening results were in-evitable as long as the components were all

g,inches deep. Ththese cartons mto carry than t


tion was looked upon as one that would beutilized only during the first day or two ofan offensive. Its composition in 1942 and1943 also lent a certain justification to the

description of picnic lunch. Though itcontained more than 3,000 calories in scien-tifically approved proportions of fats, carbo-

reported that tsooner than thejungle ration. 62

that K rations,

packaged withteriorated fastetions. After a y



y pp p p ,hydrates, and proteins, these constituentswere in a highly concentrated form that fur-nished little bulk. After eating them, most

yerally were in b

The exact ptroops used the

310 THE QUA

worse by the fact that, normally, the meatin both rations was corned beef. From thisunsatisfactory situation sprang most of thenumerous complaints that units had been

fed nothing but C rations fo r months onend. 63

Criticism of the C ration was aggravated

vation was theeach holding twchewing gum, thalazone tablets

tial in Pacific ono other way ofwater. Combat



by soldiers' tendency to confuse it with theunbalanced B's. In the Southwest PacificArea troops alleged that Australian-pro-

tion of the cylindof the ration, acessory kit of salt a


hydrated meats and vegetables and avoidedthe daily repetition of the same fare that hadbeen the curse of the old C's. Another fa-vorable feature, which the 10-in-l ration

shared with the new C's, was the inclusionof accessory kits. 66

Sixth Army organizations, after they had

days of the Newply officers partwhich they couldexceeding 200

lack of regular rto prepare it focontemplated b



tested the 10-in-l ration in forward areas forperiods of more than 45 days, pronounced itwell suited either for unit messing or as an

were less pleasimerous small groups demand

312 THE QU

cially prodigal, for they were too small toconsume the entire contents of cans, whichheld enough subsistence for ten men for oneday. Since they ordinarily required food

for only one or two meals, the percentageof loss was at times very high, particularlyif they left partly used containers behind

which troops remodified formthe whole not uS-4 noted that

troops refused tMeanwhile master, Central



when they moved to a new location—unfor-tunately, a common practice.

Though the 10-in-l was the most popu-

a ration specifthe opening phtions. It took


ing sequence: assault rations (used only byPacific Ocean Areas organizations), K ra-tions, C rations, 10-in-l rations, and Brations. Pacific Ocean Areas troops on Leyte

had about a 20-day supply of 10-in-lrations, 7 days of C, 3 days of K, and 2 dayseach of D and assault rations. By A plus 4,

Other

Combat, loairmen as well cial

rations. Be

cal or strategictense, had littlef f d



many troops were eating 10-in-1's, but thisproved premature, for they then had practi-cally no cooking equipment and could not

of the food set they needed spewere also require

314 THE QUA

In the Southwest Pacific in November 1942extra issues included fresh fruit juices orpowders, coffee, evaporated or powderedmilk, oatmeal or prepared cereal, sugar,

and pickles. Fresh eggs and meat, thoughdesirable, were not included because theycould be secured only in very limited

occasionally mising supplementarthem not meretheir men. Food

might actually the result that needed the extra



amounts. As food stocks rose and Air Forcesneeds were more fully recognized, the listof added issues was expanded to embrace

benefit. In Febpointed out thpractice caused


ashore by medical units, provided both fluidand soft foods. It contained bouillon cubes,oatmeal, canned fruits and juices, dehy-drated soups and eggs, canned boned

chicken, evaporated milk, beverages, sugar,and salt. These components, requiring onlywater and heating equipment for their prep-

kind, it requisitmaster stocks; ifood in the worked unsatis

means of superequisitions, afrom commerci



aration, were packed in small cans and as-sembled in large units, which contained 200rations weighing altogether about 900

amount of perArmy segmentslic. In mid-1943

316 THE QU

Special rations were required not onlyfor American troops but also for nativesserving as stevedores and construction andstorage workers at bases and with tactical

forces. The precise elements composingnative rations varied slightly in line withdiffering dietary habits and availability of

l ll b

small quantitiesto the Solomons

Rice, as the native laborers, o

tion in all thesestituted the maTonkinese and



foods. In territories controlled politically byan Allied power the U.S. Army utilized thecolonial governments as its agents in deal-

Caledonia and tcacies preparedvillages the mo


In 1945 the necessity of feeding largenumbers of liberated Filipinos put heavypressure on rice stocks throughout the Pa-cific an d brought about a lowering of the

daily issue in the Solomons from one poundto three fourths of a pound. The ensuingdiscontent speedily forced the restoration ofh li ll N l

fruits, 8 ouncecanned fish, 1egg, and smallard, tea, curry

of these compontions were freetion, or its roug

f di J



the earlier allowance. No program employ-ing native labor, a board of officers investi-gating this situation maintained, could suc-

88

in feeding JapOriental laborerother Asians, n

318 THE QUA

This ration had been introduced on theAmerican return to the Philippines to meetthe requirements of the CommonwealthArmy, which was then reconstituted from

the guerrilla units that had carried onharassing operations against the occupyingJapanese forces. The new ration had a dual

b h l f

whose low wageing additional fsuperiority of thenow more ma

weakened civiin Manila reporwere suffering h h



objective. One purpose was the elevation ofFilipino morale by the provision of most ofthe nonperishables found in U.S. field ra -

that the consequculminated in nations. Moneta


wealth Army ration. As a result of their dis-satisfaction, they were finally given abouthalf the amount of fresh meat issued to theirAmerican comrades. 97

The liberation of the Philippines broughtwith it still another food problem—that ofsupplying an Occidental ration to severalth d A i d E i ili

did not have them on a relie

Better plannin

confusion that

repatriates in the ning might also deficiencies fo



thousand American and European civilianswho had been interned when the Japaneseoccupied the islands. As the advancing U.S.

deficiencies foequipment througitems furnishe

320 THE QUA

fighting. Even at the end of July OQMGpreparations for experimental production ofjungle items were just getting underway.The hastily assembled equipment rushed to

the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacificin the following year to help support jungletroops usually represented, not the productsof careful testing but rather of quick de

fered from thewhich did not arelatively late itics peculiar toaffect

the servfew instances thstandard itemtheaters posed



of careful testing, bu t rather of quick de-velopment of relatively untried items basedon imperfect understanding of the tactical

theaters posed combat troops.ample of such

CHAPTER XII

Problems of Victo



Problems of VictoThe sudden surrender of Japan officially fident that historia

322 THE QUA

BLACKLIST operation, as the occupationof Japan and Korea was called. Since thenumber of troops outside the occupied coun-tries would steadily decline and stocks built

up at the older bases to provide for a largernumber of men would then fa r exceed de-mands, this program envisioned the maxi-

l t f stores l d i th

on Luzon, otherpoints were to b1946; for the serve as a war

most stocks wManila. 4

The chief Quclosing of bases



mum employment of stores already in thePacific; only articles otherwise unobtainablewould be requisitioned from U.S. sources.

closing of basesneeded supplies.tion to the num

PROBLEMS OF VICTORY

ingly wi thdrew most of its requisitions onAustralia and New Zealand for food, cloth-ing, and general supplies. It retained in forceonly a few contracts completion of which

was necessary in order to provide cold-weather apparel for men going to Japan andKorea. The Corps also withdrew requisi-tions on the continentalU it d St t fo r

property as surplying governmeshortage of waStates, surplusturned there

wiASF headquafrom this genbadly needed b



tions on the continental United States fo ritems already available in adequate quanti-ties and canceled the sailing of many block

badly needed band burlap bagQuartermaster

324 THE QUA

responsibility for this task, at first turnedover surplus supplies to the CommonwealthDisposals Commission for sale in small lotsto merchants and manufacturers. This pro-cedure, one G-4 officer complained, was soslow that it would keep Americans in Aus-tralia for years. Increasingly, therefore, theproperty was sold in bulk lots to the Com-

docks for disposidation Commissbuyers were wifor they could oat other bases wtransporting thein much largemethod of dispo



property was sold in bulk lots to the Commonwealth or to agencies of India, China,and the Netherlands Indies. 11

method of dispoquarters, U.S. Aaccordingly ord

PROBLEMS OF VICTORY

Closing-out operations at Guadalcanal,though no t unrepresentative of those foundat the more remote rear bases, did notwholly typify such operations in the Pacific.The proportion of abandoned or destroyedproperty in particular reached higher levelsthan at any but the most isolated installa-tions Moreover few if anybases outside the

governments byabout to be so disCommonwealthment were themethod

of sale.a large part of pines and on Othis property at



tions. Moreover, few if any bases outside theSolomons and New Hebrides were as se-verely handicapped in the sale of surplus

this property atmaterially aide

Aside from

326 THE QU

preparing for the future in a world livingunder the dark shadow of an apparently in-terminable cold war relentlessly waged inall quarters of the globe. The necessity ofpreparing for a future clouded by incalcula-ble hazards confronted the QMC, like allother components of the A rmy, with a com-plex problem of preparedness such as the

so hastily sold and would certin its depots. Thficient troops norepel the invathe North Koreable strength, three months t



plex problem of preparedness such as theservice had never before faced in peacetime.The uncertainties surrounding future Com-

three months t38th parallel.

In spite of

Bibliographical N

Records and studies about Quartermaster of all, some Q



Corps activities in the war against Japanfall into three general classes—U.S. Armyofficial records p blished works and manu

apparently destground that thtion Certainly

328 THE QUA

were brought to the Office of The Quarter-master General (OQMG) in Washingtonto prepare their reports from memory andfrom notes they had made dur ing their cap-tivity. These accounts eventually becameAnnex XIII of Gen. Jonathan M. Wain-wright's voluminous Report of Operationsof USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine

a total of seveination of the ofor shipment oWashington abt inent materialswere photostatedto have exact copiproduction was



of USAFFE and USFIP in the PhilippineIslands, 1941-1942. This annex, entitledReport of Operations, Quartermaster

pinches for the sakand handling.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

which both contain many documents origi-nally part of the files of former base sectionsin these territorial areas. The records of theU.S. Army Forces, Pacific ( A F PA C ) , con-tain information on supply matters that re-quired collaboration with Australian agen-cies or co-ordination between G-4 andthe Office of the Chief Quartermaster,

tivities in the year after Pearl

The Arm y Rtorical Recordsords Branch, AGtains historical tions that operataction reports



Q ,USASOS.

The best source of documents for the

pSixth, Eighth, tactical corps,

330 THE QU

Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areasfiles in the Technical Records Section, De-partmental Records Branch, AGO, at Alex-andria, Va. Most of the observers' reportsare filed under 319.25.

Papers in this and other bodies of over-seas documents wherever located were ordi-narily arranged in accordance with the War

signs, patterns, letting of contrtransactions cabuying supplies.pensable to a sof inspecting, mbefore shipment.the handling, s



y gDepartment decimal file system. Bulletins,circulars, manuals, and other general direc-

gfrom one point torials relating to

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Quartermaster activities are not even men-tioned. Pertinent magazine articles are con-fined in the main to The QuartermasterReview and the Quartermaster TrainingService Journal.

Among the published books utilized instudying events associated with the fall ofthe Philippines were Gen. Jonathan M.

ber-December Help for the mopolitan, CX1945), an articlnished by Col. detailed accououtfit blockadIndies for the



ppWainwright, General Wainwright's Story,edited by Robert Considine (New York,

Indies for the Published s

nificance fo r

332 THE QUA

Quartermaster operations in the SouthwestPacific, it gives considerable information noteasily accessible elsewhere. For the SouthPacific there is no general study of Quarter-master activities quite as rewarding as arethose for the Middle and Southwest Pacific.But th e manuscr ipt History of the United

States Army FDuring World August 1944 G-2 HistoricalForces in the SSouth Pacific some useful dat



List of Abbrevia

AA F Arm y Air ForcesABC OM Australian Base Com mand



ABC OM Australian Base Com mandABSE C Au stralian Base SectionAC ofS Assistant Chiefof Staff

334 THE QUAR

Br BranchBS Base SectionBtry BatteryBull BulletinC and E Clothing and equipage

CE Corps of EngineersCG Commanding GeneralCINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Paci



CTNCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific OcCINCSWPA Commander in Chief, Southwes

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DUKW Amphibian, 2/2-ton, 6x6 truck, ship to shore

Ech EchelonEM Enlisted manEngr EngineerEquip EquipmentETO European Theater of OperationsExO Executive Officer



FA Field artilleryFEAF Far East Air Force

336 THE QUARTE

Interv InterviewIR S Intraoffice Reference Sheet, Offic

GeneralJAG Judge Advocate GeneralJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJPB Joint Purchasing BoardLab LaboratoryLCM Landing craft, mechanized



LCT Landing craft, tankLdry Laundry


OPD Operations Division, W ar DepaOpn OperationOQMG Office of The Quartermaster GeneraORB Organization Records Branch,

Center, AGO, St. Louis, MissouOrd OrdnanceOSRD Office of Scientific Research andOSW Office of the Secretary of War



P&C Purchasing and ContractingPac Pacific

338 THE QUARTE

S-4 Supply section of regimental orS&D Storage and DistributionSalv SalvageSB Supply bulletinSEASFD Seattle Army Service Forces DepoSec SectionStf StaffSFPOE San Francisco Port of Embarkation



SG Surgeon GeneralShpmt Shipment


Trk TruckTrp TroopTWX Teletype messageUSAFFE U.S. Army Forces, Far EastUSAFIA U.S. Army Forces in AustraliaUSAFICPA U.S. Army Forces in Central PaciUSAFINC U.S. Army Forces in New CaledoUSAFISPA U.S. Arm y Forces in South Pacifi

A M iddl P ifi



USAFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, M iddle PacifiUSAFPOA U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean



UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORL

The following vo lumes have been published or a

The War DepartmentChief of Staff Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942



Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics an d Strategy: 1940-1943

342 THE QUAR

The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI



The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

Index

Abuyog, 275,

27 6Administrative Division, OCQM, USASOS, 61, 63,66

Admiral t ies Operationdisadvantage of support of , f rom island bases,

Arrakan, 20, 22Auckland, 92, 12Austral ia . See

sections (Aagencies of, fo



150-51graves registration in, 251i i f i

efforts to supplyprocurement of QQ

344 THE QUA

Base sections (Australia)—Continuedcontrol of QM supplies by, 85-86distr ibution to advance bases by, 170 -71market centers in, 119-20mission of, 83organization of, 83-84

procurement of perishables by, 118-19Quartermaster sections of, 85-86, 171-72reduction of activities in, 71, 87, 322storage at, 861 (Darwin)

Bases (New Gu inephysiography arise in importanc roll-up of, 32variations in foA (Milne Bay)

redesignationAugust storage at, supply of B

B (Oro Bay)



( )decline of, 85establishment of, 84

( y)Army farmdeter iorati on

INDEX

Bases (New Gu inea ) -Con t inuedUnited States Advance Base (Port Moresby) —

Continuedestablishment of, at Milne Bay, August 1943,

87removal of, to Milne Bay, 87storage at, 87support of Buna forces by, 272-73

Bases (Philippines)K (Tacloban)

establishment of, 90h f li 217

Batchelder, Lt. ColBaten, 283Bath units. See

ilization and Baybay, 276Beef, boneless

advantages of, 1difficulties in proshortage of, 193

Beli Beli Bay, 88Biak Island Operati



shortage of gasoline at, 217work of, in Leyte O peration, 275, 279

( b l d )

bakeries in, 22use of landing c



INDEX

Darwin, 21, 23, 24, 30, 50. See also Base sec-tions (Australia).

Darwin-Alice Springs railway, 85Defense reserves, 3-5, 6, 10, 28, 34, 35Dehydration

advantages of, 103

application of, 111-12, 126growth of, industry in Australia, 112Dehydration Branch, Subsistence Depot, 112Department of Commerce (Australia), 63Department of Supply and Shipping, 63

Engineers, Corps oconstruction of Qresponsibilities o

Eniwetok, 265Equipment, indivi

description of, 5shipment of, in

Equipment, jungleitems.

demand for, 292development of

l f 294 95



Department of War Organization of Industry, 63Depots

value of, 294-95,Equipment, organi

348 THE QUA

Footwear-Continuedlack of proper sizes of, 206, 207, 208repair of, in combat areas, 244, 247-48

Foreign Economic Administration, 128Foreign Liquidation Commission, 324Fort Armstrong, 36, 80

Fort Kamehameha, 263Fort Stotsenburg, 4, 5, 7, 12Fort William McKinley, 4, 7, 12,13Forward Area (SPA), 94Fremantle, 22, 23, 24F i k M j G J L 157 175 193 194

Graves registrationinfantrymen useinfluence of tactiorganization of,program for, in Aprogram for, in S

use of civilian moGraves registrationactivities of, in Nfunctions of, 24improvisation of, 17

ti f i



Frink, Maj. Gen. James L., 157, 175, 193, 194Fumigation and bath units

operations of, inshortage of, 249,

INDEX

Hilo Quartermaster Depot, 39Hollandia. See Bases ( N e w Guinea).Hollandia Operation, 152, 301, 302

destruction of QM supplies during, 271graves registration in, 252Quartermaster supply in, 268-71

Honolulu, 37, 44, 95Horses. See Animals, pack.Humboldt Bay, 197, 269, 271 , 296Huon Gulf, 88Huon Peninsula, 88H l B i G P i k J 25

Java, 23, 46John Foster, 207Joint Administrati

( U S A F I A ) , 22Joint Chiefs of StJoint Logistical BoJoint Purchasing

functions of, 7procurement of Quartermaster role of U.S. Navt f f d



Hurley, Brig. Gen. Patrick J., 25 storage of food Joint Working Boa

350 THE QUA

Lend-lease, 67, 101, 104Lend-lease, reverse

beginning of, 54, 62declaration of reverse lend-lease property as sur-

plus, 323procurement of supplies under, 102, 110, 116,

120,121,125,127,128,213services provided under, 54, 228, 234, 244value of , 102, 125, 127

Lend-Lease Administration, 67Lever Brothers, 316L 20 88 89 90

MacArthur, Gen.plea for change protest on lack o

McConnell, Col. AMacKechnie, Col.McKenzie, Brig. G

Machete, 300-301Madang, 87Maintenance factoMalaya, 99, 292Malinta Hill, 33M li t T l



Leyte, 20, 88, 89, 90Leyte Operation, 153

Malinta Tunnel, Manila, 4,6, 7, 8,

INDEX

Meats, fresh—Continuedrefrigeration for, 113shortages of, 13, 14, 27-28, 113, 115, 193, 196

Medical Corps, 125, 240, 248Melanesia, 253Melbourne, 30, 50, 60, 65, 67. See also Base sec-

tions (Australia).Memorial Division, OCQM, USASOS, 63Mess equipment, 124, 149Messes

lack of trained cooks for, 115, 192monotonyof 193 196 198 199 200

New Georgia Operair supply in, 2consumption of

New Guinea. Seedescription of, 8as supply center,

New Hebrides. SNew Ireland, 76New Orleans PortNew South WalesNew York Port of New Zealand 36



monotony of, 193, 196, 198, 199, 200Methyl bromide, 237

New Zealand, 36, comparison bet

352 THE QUA

Office of Food Control-Continuedfunctions of, 42price regulation by, 43,44, 45

Office of the Military Governor, Territory of Ha-waii, 42, 45

Office of Price Administration, 45, 46

Office of the Quartermaster, Central

Pacific Base

Command, 81Office of the Quartermaster, USAFPOA, 81Office of the Quartermaster, USASOS, 67, 69Office of The Quartermaster General, 3, 59, 177,

178 182 183 184 185 186 205 208 209

Pack, jungle—Conti nneed for, 293objection to, 30

Pack troops, QM65th, 766th, 7

Packaging, definitioPackaging, subsis

deficiencies of cefforts to improvmethods of, for

Packing definitio



178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 205, 208, 209,291, 292, 293, 296, 297, 298, 301, 302, 304,

Packing, definitioPacking, clothing,

INDEX

Pilferage, 27, 177, 32 2as factor in food losses, 192prevalence of, in combat zones, 287, 288-89

Pim, 270, 271Planning and Control Division, OCQM, USASOS,

65Plant, Col. Thomas G., 61Polynesia, 47Poncho, 299, 30 0Pongani, 273Port Augusta, 50Port-Depot System. See Quartermaster Branch,

Procurement, locabeef, 100,113, beer, 129beets, 107, 110blankets, 124cabbages, 110,candy bars, 127carrots, 104, 10clothing, cottonclothing, wool,coffee, 5,40, 12corn 107 110



Port Depot System. See Quartermaster Branch,OSD, SFPOE, h and l i ng of requisitions by.

corn, 107, 110corned beef, 11



INDEX

Refrigerated vessels—Continuednaval, 174shortage of, 39, 44, 45, 173-76turnabout time of, 174, 176 X-ships ( lakers ) as, 174, 175

Refrigeration companies, QM, 168

Regiment, QM, 12th, 7, 17Reid, Lt. Col. Clarence E., 196Replacement factors

accuracy of, 139-40definition of, 137improvement in 288

Salvage repair uneffect of lack ofequipment and hindrances to oimprovisation o

Samar, 20Samoa Islands, 46, 47San Fabian, 91San Fernando, La USan Francisco Por

139, 146, 151,master Branch,



improvement in, 288inadequacy of, for Class II and IV supplies, 286,

master Branch,automatic suppl

356 THE QUA

Size tariffsdeficiencies of, in supply of clothing, 206, 207,

208establishment of local, 208inadequacy of national, 206-07relation of, to distribution requirements, 207-08value of, 206-07

Soerabaja, 23, 24Soles, rubber, 297Solomon Islands, 94, 279, 316, 322Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 299, 300South Pacific Area, 143, 299, 308, 314

Stock inventoriesinadequacy of, use of, for de ter

Stock levelscomputation of establishment oimportance of ain Pacific areas,relation of replastatus of, after

Storage and DistSOS, 66



South Pacific Area, 143, 299, 308, 314boundaries of, 47

,Storage facilities.

INDEX

Supply points, 194, 196, 274, 275, 276 , 279-80Supply system, European, contrast between, and

that in the Pacific, 96-97Surplus property, 323-25Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Richard K., 21Suva, 93Swift, Maj. Gen. Innis P., 199Swift an d Company, 9Swope, Lt. Col. Lawrence E., 281Sydney. See Base sections (Australia).

Taiyuan, 24

Transportation, vessels.

commercial loadcongestion of, acontrol of shipmenconvoys for, 17difficulties of m

by, 147-51discharge of ships distances as factohindrances to, iimportance of, i



y ,Tanahmerah Bay, 197, 198 lack of, as factor

f ili i f

358 THE QUARTE

U.S. Army Forces, Far East—Continuedcontrol of shipping priorities by, 69, 176establishment of, 2reconstitution of, in SWPA, 67, 69

U.S. Army Forces, Far East Board, 297U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, 81, 321, 324.

See also U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas.U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, 80, 81

U.S. A rmy Forces, South Pacific Area, mission of,75U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 321U.S. Army Forces in Australia. See also U.S. Army

Services of Supply,establishment of 58

Vegetables, fresh—Contproduction of, in Ausprovision o f seeds foshortage of acceptable

Vella Lavella, 94Veterinary Corps

establishment by, of inspection of animal

118inspection of fruits ainspection of stored role of, in salvage,

Victoria, 50Visayan Islands 2 19 2



establishment of, 58organization of QM activities in, 59-65

Visayan Islands, 2, 19, 2Visayan-Mindanao Fo



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