Classifying Natural and Social Theories (Szostak, 2003)

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Current Sociology

DOI: 10.1177/00113921030510017792003; 51; 27Current Sociology

Rick SzostakClassifying Natural and Social Scientific Theories

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Rick Szostak

Classifying Natural and SocialScientific Theories

C lassifi cation has been said t o be the essential fi rst step in science. Wecannot analyse chemical reactions w ithout fi rst distinguishing onechemical element from another, comprehend atomic reactions w ithout somesense of subatomic particles, nor identify the characteristics associated with

creativity w ithout some sense of personality dimensions. Yet w e seldom turn

our classifi catory zeal tow ards the study of science itself.

In this article, a simple classifi cation of scientifi c theories is developed,

and it is shown how theories in natural and especially social science can be

placed w ithin this classifi cation. The insights that can be gained from such an

endeavour are then discussed. O ne of these involves guiding us to a more

precise defi nition of w hat a scientifi c theory is. We, in the meant ime, take a

pragmatic approach and treat as theories what is generally thought to be atheory. In the larger research project o f w hich this article forms a part, clas-

sifi cations of scientifi c methods, the phenomena that scientists study and

(critiq ues of ) scientifi c pract ice, have been developed. These classifi cations in

combination allow an exhaustive typology of types of science.

A Simple Classificatory Guideline

O ne attr ibute to be sought in any classifi cation system is that it aid recall: we

should ideally be able to remember diverse classes and w here they fi t in the

broader scheme. This art icle uses perhaps the simplest o f all classifi cato ry

guidelines: it asks of any theory the 5W questions: Who, What, Where, When

and Why.

In addition to the 5W questions, scientists often ask H ow ?. But

philosophers often d istinguish scientifi c approaches as to w hether they

are focused on Why? or H ow ?. This suggests that H ow ? is actually a

C urrent Sociology, January 2003, Vol. 51(1): 2749 SAG E Publications

(London, Thousand O aks, C A and N ew Delhi)

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combination of (some of) the other four Ws. When interview ers ask a H ow ?

question, they are generally rew arded w ith a chronology of When and Where

a process occurred (G oldenberger, 1992: 118). Nevertheless, we briefly

consider in the follow ing whether answ ers to H ow ? have been adequately

subsumed within the 5W analysis.

Who?Most theories deal w ith how one or more phenomena infl uence one or more

others. Less commonly, but importantly, theories discuss the nature of, or

internally generated transformations in, one phenomenon. In either case,

scholars investigate how changes, perhaps just relative to some hy pothesized

alternative, in one (set of) phenomenon affect either itself or other phenom-

ena. In asking Who?, then, we are asking Who is effecting change?. Any

theory must grapple with agency at this level. If w e say racist at titudes affectX , w e w ill have a vague theory indeed unless w e specify w hat type of agent

holds such attitudes. If we speak of the effects of aggressive behaviour, we

should specify whose behaviour. We must also, in most instances, concern

ourselves w ith the ty pe of agent that responds to the initiating change.

Four broad categories of agency can be identifi ed:

N on-I ntentional Agent This is, in a sense, the easiest case to deal w ith. In

study ing the effects of tornadoes on social cohesion, the question of w hy tor-

nadoes choose to strike a particular locale can be ignored. Tornadoes can betreated as exogenous, or the reasons for their spatial and temporal distri-

bution explored. Along with natural phenomena, various non-intentional

societal aggregates such as level of income or population distribution or

gender d ivisions exert infl uences on diverse phenomena. While the scien-

tifi c community as a whole should be curious about the generation o f these

phenomena, and intentionality obviously plays some role here, particular

scientists may well wish to posit theories focused on only their effects,

though there may again be intentionality in how people react.

Tw o ty pes of non-intentional agency are particularly import ant.

Though institutions, the formal rules by which our societies are governed,

are put in place intentionally (to at least some degree), they are intended

thereafter to place constraints on human behaviour. An especially import-

ant type of institution is the organization: a formally constituted body of

people that collectively pursues particular goals. While the intentional acts

of those involved in organiz ations are an important infl uence on their behav-

iour, if this w as the w hole story people w ould not bother to form organiz-

ations in the fi rst place.

I ndivi dual Agents Theories here commonly focus on a typical individual.They may also explore how different types of individual will act in a

28 C urrent Sociology Vol. 51 N o. 1

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particular situation. Theories may emphasize the effects of individual acts,

though these theories should engage the possibility of feedback effects, such

that the individuals actions or beliefs are themselves conditioned by the

effects these are deemed likely to have. To und erstand w hy an individual

behaved or believed as they did, it is necessary to look within the individual.Various theories thus look at genetic tendencies, abilities, personality dimen-

sions and so on. While theories of individual agency must cope with inten-

tionality, they can embrace both subconscious motives of w hich the agent is

consciously unaware and also accidents in which neither the agents con-

scious nor subconscious minds imagined the outcome.

Groups of I ndivi duals Talcott Parsons hypothesizes four t ypes of social

group w orthy of scientifi c analy sis (see Freidheim, 1982). The fi rst is the

primary group or family. While some theories may reduce familial behaviourto some weighted sum of the actions and wishes of individual family

members, many theories posit that families are not just the sum of their parts.

Parsonss second type is the organization. As hinted earlier, an understand-

ing of organizations may require a mix of non-intentional and intentional

theorizing; again, organizations are not just the sum of their parts. Parsons

also speaks of community and society . The fi rst of these refers to groups

operating in a no n-formal fashion, as w hen a group develops clear cultural

guidelines. In the study of society, which operates through formal insti-

tutions, intentional analy sis must be merged w ith non-intentional insights.

Relationships Some interactionist scholars argue that what happens

between people is more important than what happens within them: indi-

viduals are reconstituted through their interaction w ith others (Barnes, 1995).

Interactionists thus theorize about the effects that various types of human

relationship have. While there are overlaps with the study of groups, the

focus is on personal interactions rather than group processes.

Many scholars would w ish to simplify this classifi cation by arguing that only

some of these ty pes of agency are legitimate. This is generally done by arguing

that only individuals or, alternatively, societal aggregates play an independent

causal role.1 The goal of this article is to classify scientifi c theories, not pass

judgement on their relative utility. Moreover, it is q uite possible for both indi-

viduals and society to be important. Individuals may generate organizations,

cultural attitudes and technologies that have effects quite different from any

they imagined. In turn, while individuals operate within a complex web of

societal and interpersonal infl uences, we each have personalities and abilities

that infl uence our actions and beliefs. While individual scholars may empha-

size one sort of agency within particular research projects, they need notdecree that the entire scientifi c enterprise should do likewise.

Szostak: C lassifying N atural and Social Scientific Theories 29



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What?H aving identifi ed the agents of change, a theory must then cope with the

question of What do change agents do?. In the case of non-intentional

agency, agents usually cannot actively doanything, though tornadoes provide

an obvious exception. They are thus generally restricted to a passiveform ofaction wherein they provide constraints and/or incentives. It should be

emphasized that these effects can be of huge importance despite their passive

nature.

Individuals and especially groups can also act passively. They also share

w ith natural phenomena such as tornadoes the capacity to act actively: to do

something in common parlance. They can also act in a way that by their

nature non-intentional agents cannot: they can form beliefs or attitudes or

intentions (which in turn infl uence actions). And these thoughts can be

analy sed at the level of individuals and at the level of groups; in the latt er casewe can speak of culture or public opinion or ideology or nationalism.

Relationships are oft en posited to affect mostly att itudes, but can also induce

actions and provide constraints.2

In the literature, a focus on actions is often associated w ith a positivis-

tic approach to science that emphasizes the analysis of only that which we

can observe, and the focus on attitudes with an interpretive perspective that

emphasizes how agents interpret their situations. The critical role of passive

action is largely ignored in this dichotomy, at least explicitly, tho ugh advo-

cates of both approaches may examine various constraints and incentives. Asin almost every scientifi c debate among opposites, there are legions of posi-

tivist scientists and philosophers who condemn the practice of interpretive

science, and legions of interpretivists who argue the opposite.3 Again, the

purpose here is to classify all theories, not seek to exclude some from con-

sideration. I would, though, join Potter (2000) in hoping that this long-

standing debate is lessening in the face of recent developments, including the

emergence of critical realist philosophy which advocates a mix of interpre-

tivist and positivist approaches.4

Why?Why d id the agent(s) act (react) as they did? In the case of a non-intentional

agent, analysis must proceed in terms of the constraints and incentives

inherent in its nature. In the case of intentional agents, the decision-making

process involved must be investigated. There are fi ve w ays in which agents

might make any decision.

Rational/Consequentialist Agents focus on desirable consequences, and try

to rationally calculate the best w ay to achieve those goals. Their ability to do

so depends on their ability to accurately perceive how the world works.Agents may be selfi sh or altruistic, and focused on a diverse set of basic drives




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or personal desires, and these latter may reflect sociocultural infl uences to

varying degrees.

Intu i t ive Agents act on w hat their gut tells them, w ithout much conscious

thought. Their intuition may guide them tow ards satisfying various drives. Itmay act upon various subconscious schemas about how the world works,

the accuracy of w hich depends on the agents lifetime experience, and part icu-

larly of traumatic events. It may thus guide agents towards acts they would

not consciously countenance.

Traditional/Cultural Agents are guided to do what is done around here.

This can at t imes occur intuitively, if they have internalized their groups att i-

tudes and will feel guilt for breaking them, but generally has some conscious

element.

Rules/N orms Agents follow a set of rules or norms, which they have pre-

viously determined to be socially desirable. These may or not accord with

cultural guidelines. Agents have devoted some thought to them (which in

turn may be infl uenced by any of the fi ve decision-making processes).

C ommon examples are the G olden Rule, K antian Imperative, or a belief in

Rights. B ut a host of more specifi c rules (regarding, say, how to treat

strangers) are also possible.

Process/ Vir tues Agents again act consciously, but may be concerned more

with how they act (the process) than what they achieve. Agents will gener-

ally evaluate their behaviour in terms of what are commonly called virtues.

They may for example be determined to behave honestly, or responsibly, or

punctually.

These decision-making methods are complementary: in judging what is

responsible behaviour, one may have recourse to cultural guidelines, evalu-

ation of likely consequences, the G olden Rule, and/or gut feelings. Theorists

focusing on any one of them should be attentive to (and ideally speak to) the

possibility of other infl uences. The fi ve-way classifi cation system captures a

variety of distinctions made in the theoretical literature, such as conscious vs

subconscious, and process vs outcome-oriented. Most importantly, it has

room for both individual-level and societal-level infl uences. And w hile each

of the fi ve broad types can be disaggregated, each is nevertheless character-

ized by a w ell-defi ned decision rule.

With respect to group or relationship agency there are additional

concerns. Is decision-making democratic, or do some individuals exert dis-

proportionate infl uence? Are there formal or informal guidelines for decision-making? Is decision-making consensual, or are there dissatisfi ed minorities?




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Where?Where does whatever the agent d oes (and the reactions to this) occur? This

question can be interpreted bo th literally and fi guratively. Literally, one can

wonder where in the real world it happens. There are two broad possi-

bilities: that it can happen any w here, or that it can only happen in certainspecifi ed situations. Figuratively, one can think of a map of the potential set

of links among the diverse phenomena studied by scientists (see Szostak,

2000, 2003) and ask w here on that map it occurs. Again, a theory that speaks

to a very small set of links can be distinguished from one that implies that the

same effect is felt along a w ide array of links. Since different sorts of phenom-

ena exhibit different sort s of agency, no theory could posit that any one sort

of agency w as directly refl ected along all links; other links might neverthe-

less encompass reactions to the particular type of agency being studied.

Both in the literal and fi gurat ive cases, a search for general regularitiescan be distinguished from a search for particularities. Philosophers have

since the turn of the last century used the words nomothetic and idio-

graphic to refer to these two types of analysis. There has been a fair bit of

confusion about w hat exactly these terms mean, w hat it is that they refer to,

and where the boundary lies between the two. The apparent answer to the

second q uery is that they represent different sort s of answ er to the question

of Where? the relationship under examination occurs.

As for the fi rst query, literal and fi gurative readings of the question

provide different interpretations. The literal interpretation refers to realiza-tions of other phenomena. That is, if we say that it can only happen in

home or offi ce, w e need to carefully specify w hat aspects of relationships,

family structure, occupation, or several other phenomena are in fact

crucial. N omothetic theory can thus be defi ned as that w hich posits a general

relationship among tw o or more phenomena, w hile idiographic theory is that

w hich posits a relationship only under specifi ed conditions.

The fi gurative reading refers instead to links among phenomena. A

nomothetic theory is one that suggests a relationship that operates along

many links. Idiographic theory refers instead to a relationship that affects a

small number of links: a perfectly idiographic theory would embrace only

one link.

D efi ning a boundary betw een nomothetic and idiographic theory is

problematic in both cases. There is instead a continuum: in the fi rst case

running from specifying no external cond itions to specifying these in terms

of all other phenomena, in the second case running from application to one

set o f phenomena to application to all sets. Fortunately, w ell-defi ned bound-

aries are not essential for a classifi cation to be useful. N omothetic and idio-

graphic can be helpful classes, even if every theory cannot be fl aw lessly placed

into one class or another. Theories of both sorts should struggle to be asexplicit as possible about their breadth of applicability. Indeed, this is one of




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the primary goals of science, and one area in w hich natural science excels over

social science: social scientists can be quite careless about specifying where

their theory w ill hold and w here it w ill not.

Answers to the What and Why questions were related to answers to

the Who question in the earlier section. D o nomothetic and idiographictheories differ in importance depending on w ho the change agent is? If nomo-

thetic theory is defi ned in terms of covering law s, the answer would surely

be yes. For as L itt le (1998) forcefully argues, covering law s are best suited to

non-intentionality. A covering law stipulates a necessary relationship: if A

then B . This can be observed in the natural w orld, as in the Law s of Thermo-

dy namics. But if human agency is involved anyw here in the process, there will

almost certainly be exceptions to any rule, and thus it can only be said that

A usually or almost always results in B. But such a regularity would still

qualify as nomothetic under any but the most narrow of defi nitions. Alterna-tively, Bunge (1998) notes that there are idiosyncrasies even among atoms,

though much less than among complex organisms. There is thus a place for

both types of theory across types of agent, though the scope for idiographic

analysis w ill tend to increase w ith the role of intentional agency.

When?When does it happen? Interpreted literally, this question can y ield the

same answer as the Where q uestion, for it w ould guide scholars to look at

what conjunction of realizations of other phenomena must be in place for agiven relationship to hold.5 Instead the time path of the process needs to be

investigated. There are four bro ad possibilities:

There are negative feedback effects such that the original impulse is

exactly negated and the system of phenomena as a w hole is unchanged.

The original change induces changes in a variety of other phenomena, but

the system of phenomena moves towards a new equilibrium where the

system w ill only change in response to further shocks.

There are positive feedback effects such that certain phenomena continue

to change in a particular direction. The effects are stochastic, and thus quite different outcomes are possible.

We could at the level of a comprehensive cluster of theories which encom-

passed all phenomena suggest that some at least of these ty pes of theory must

be misguided: a world of positive feedbacks would spin out of control, a

theory w hich posits no change seems inherently unrealistic, and even a series

of equilibria may seem an unrealistic description of reality. But individual

theories almost inevitably deal with a limited system of phenomena. Even at

that level certain types of theory might seem suspicious. Indeed, all but the

last time path can arguably only be posited by ignoring links between thesystem in question and all other phenomena. Still, all types of time path can




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likely shed some light on particular q uestions. We should, y et again, be open

to insights from more than one type of theory.

Theorists should carefully specify w hich ty pe of t ime path they envision.

Freidheim (1982), for example, discusses eight group processes. Some of

these, such as socializat ion, coordinat ion and the response to individual devi-ations, appear to fi t best w ithin the fi rst time path, but only if it is thought

that these processes are successful. C onversely, differentiation w ithin the

group and strat ifi cation may be essential to maintaining the group as is, or

could lead to group fragmentation, w hich may in turn be perceived as a new

equilibrium, or part of a dy namic or even chaotic process. G roup formation,

innovation and social change are processes that w ould fi t poorly w ithin the

fi rst time path, but might characterize any of the remaining three.

While theorists should specify w hich of the four ty pes of time path they

intend, they should not be forbidden from appealing to combinations ofthese. A theorist might think that one of the fi rst three time paths is the likely

outcome, but admit that the more uncertain fourth type is a possibility. O r

they might imagine circumstances in which two or more time paths are

possible. O f course, they should strive to identify the circumstances in

question.6

How?As noted earlier, the H ow ? question can be used as a check on the exhaus-

tiveness of our 5W questions. H ow does something happen? In answ eringsuch a question, scholars w ould w onder w ho instigated the change, w hat they

did, and perhaps w hy they did w hat they did. They w ould also w onder what

other conditions had to be in place for it to have happened as it did. And

how precisely did it occur through time and space? All elements of the

H ow ? q uestion have been captured in asking our 5W questions.

Types of Theory and the Five Types of Causation/ Influence

Szostak (2003) argues that all links betw een phenomena can be understood

in terms of fi ve ty pes of causation or infl uence: strict causation , as when

sodium and chlorine react; intentional causation, as w hen a person o r group

acts purposefully; hermeneutic causation, when meaning is transmitted;

functional/structural causation , w hen a particular realizat ion o f one

phenomenon is necessitated by a particular realization of another phenom-

enon; and evolutionary causation , involving some transmission mechanism

and selection criteria. Szostak (2003) notes that the relationship betw een these

is unclear: some but not all scholars treat intentional as a subset of strict

causation, or hermeneutic as a subset of intentional, and some questionw hether functional explanations are not reducible to intentional arguments.




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The 5W ty pology of theory allow s these fi ve ty pes of causation or infl u-

ence to be identifi ed much more precisely. Strict causation applies to non-

intentional agents. Intentional and hermeneutic causation apply to

intentional agents: the former deals with their actions, the latter with their

thoughts. The fi rst three types of causation, then, can be defi ned in terms ofanswers to the Who and What questions. It would, in this formulation,

clearly be a mistake to view any one of these as a subset o f the others.

Elster (1989) and others have worried that it is too easy to assume func-

tional relationships. The theorist must go a step further, and ask how the

functional relationship emerges: how, for example, do intentional agents of

the state establish an army? The question is thus raised of whether the only

sensible part of a functional relationship is the intentional part. B ut w hy is an

army necessary for the maintenance of a state? This can only be so if the army

creates appropriate constraints and incentives. Functional arguments, then,must combine the passive action of a non-intentional agent with the inten-

tional acts of intentional agents.

What sorts of agents evolve? The 5W typology suggests this unusual

question. And the answer is that only non-intentional agents evolve. Indi-

viduals and groups do not evolve, though elements of these, such as genes and

beliefs, may evolve. Evolutionary theories focus not on w hat part icular non-

intentional agents do but on how they become what they are. The analysis

proceeds in terms of the inherent nature of the agent itself (the possibilities

for mutation) and the effects of a selection environment that comprises otheragents. These in turn may be non-intentional, as when genetic evolution is

conditioned by climatic change, or intentional, as when technologies are

selected by individuals or groups. Since a theory of evolution should specify

the relevant selection environment, evolutionary causation may involve

intentional as well as non-intentional arguments.

Classifying Individual Theories (see Table 1)

We can ask of any theory fi ve questions: Who are the agents? What sort o f

action is involved? What d ecision-making process is employ ed? H ow gener-

alizable is the theory (literally and fi guratively)? What sort of time path is

followed? Most theories in natural science outside biological science involve

non-intentional agents, passive reaction and no active decision-making

process. They can be distinguished in terms of where they occur (in both

senses of w here) and w hat sort of time path is involved. Evolutionary theory

in biology, as discussed earlier, also involves non-intentional agency and no

active decision-making. H ere, though, there is non-passive action, for

mutation is an inherent quality of the organisms under study. Evolution isthought to apply to all organisms. While nominally no mothetic, evolutionary




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Ta ble 1 Typology of Selected Theories

Why?

Theory Who? What? D ecision-M ak ing

Type Agency Action Process

Most natural N on-intentional P assive Inherent Va

science

Evolutionary N on-intentional Active Inherent N

biology eq

Evolutionary Individual Active Various N

social science (group) (aAction theory Individual Action Various; Va

(relationship) (attitude) often rational

Sy stems theory ; Various Action and Various; N

functionalist attitude emphasizes eq

constraints

P sy choanaly tic Individual Attitudes Intuition; Va

(look w ithin) others possible

Sy mbolic Relationships Attitudes Various St

interactionist emphasized

Rational choice Individual Action Rational UP henomenology Relationships Attitudes Various Va

(individuals) (actions)

2003Inte

rnationalSociologicalAssociation.Allrightsreserved.Notforcommercialuseorunauthorizeddistribution.

byAlbertoConde-FloresonJanuary23,2008

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calculations are, of course, the most common type of consequentialist

analysis. Personal passions in turn suggest a role for intuition. And social

meaning and culture imply an appeal to tradition, but also raise the possi-

bility of appeals to virtues or rules.8 Weber emphasizes the importance of

value-oriented decision-making w here one strives to achieve a value. Actiontheory, then, neither dictates nor excludes any single decision-making

process, though individual examples of action theory generally do. Indeed,

C ohen (2000: 74) applauds the recognition that there is no one right answ er

here (but is critical of the fact that action theorists have ignored certain

internal and external infl uences on behaviour, such as pow er relations).

Theories of praxis discuss how individuals both receive and transmit

signals that allow them to interact habitually. By recogniz ing the importance

of habit, praxis theorists open the door to passive reaction. But theories of

praxis realize and in general applaud the exercise in free w ill inherent in thefact that people do not always act out of habit. While the decision-making

process may be subconscious, and the outcome imperfectlypredictable, some

scope for decision-making remains.

Where? Very litt le mention is made of either the literal or fi gurat ive spatial

dimension in C ohen (2000). G iddens is hailed fo r recognizing that spatial

context matters: it is hard to talk on a crowded bus, for example. But less

attention is paid to w hat sort s of actions or decision-making might occur in

some places, or betw een certain participants o r phenomena, but not others.This in turn reflects the tendency o f theorists in this tradit ion to speak as if

one answer applied to all situations, rather than seek the limits of particular

theories. C ohen (2000) reasonably suggests that different types of action

theory likely apply to different situations.9

When? Talcott Parsons posits that social order results from individuals

pursuing integrated ends: there is some process through which individuals

choose largely complementary goals, and then act to achieve these. This is

clearly an equilibrium process. G iddens too implies some sort of equilibrium

process in maintaining that practices support structural patterns. But G iddens

like D ew ey celebrates those times at w hich individuals break free from habit,

and recognizes that in doing so they may encourage cultural change. G iddens

and D ewey thus envisage a more dynamic process than P arsons: pursuit of

habit maymaintain social stability, but individuals making conscious decisions

will induce societal change. If these acts are rare, the system may move

between equilibria; otherwise it may be constantly changing.

Comments While Who? and What? are fairly w ell specifi ed, act ion

theories embrace a very w ide range of answers to the other three questions.It is perhaps not surprising that many action theorists believe that it is the




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emphasis on praxis or meaning that is central to their theory, but many

especially those w ho emphasize relationships instead argue that the What?

is quite secondary to the Who? (see C ohen, 2000; those w ho emphasize

relationships thus borrow pragmatically from theories of act ion and praxis).

The fl exibility w ith respect to Where? has not led theorists to identify com-plementary ranges of applicability for different theories w ithin this family, or

encouraged a general appreciation for theories outside the family.10 The

ty pology developed here w ould encourage the identifi cation of range of

applicability.

Systems Theory and FunctionalismWhat? Lechner (2000) describes the core element of systems theory as a

recognition that pat terns in social life are not just accidents. When people act,

they are enmeshed in relationships, institut ions and/or societies that maintaina distinct unity.11 While systems theories must thus deal with actions, these

are generally seen as guided by attitudes.

Why? The emphasis in systems theory is on constraints that encourage indi-

viduals to act in complementary w ays. There is, though, considerable room

for disagreement over the form that these constraints take. Talcott P arsons

argued that American capitalism depended upon cultural values which sup-

ported economic activity but also a sense of community. Many w ere scepti-

cal of his emphasis on actors and actions as if individuals can simply carrystructure with them (Lechner, 2000). Sceptics doubted that internalized

norms alone could maintain a system, and emphasized instead such phenom-

ena as institutional constraints.

Where? Talcott P arsons thought of society as composed o f subsystems

which served different purposes in the maintenance of societal stability.

Within this view, all phenomena were part of one and only one subsystem.

O ther sy stems theorists have been less inclusive, suggesting that certain

phenomena or links may serve only to effect change in systems of w hich they

are not part. And still others have emphasized sy stems that may embrace only

a handful of phenomena. Thus, while systems theory is often (fi guratively)

all-encompassing, it need not be so.

Systems theorists often use a language that suggests that the systems they

discuss are (literally) universal. Parsonss treatment of American capitalism,

however, stressed the uniqueness of that system. The common emphasis on

culture in systems theory suggests that a system observed in one society

cannot function in a society w ith q uite different values.

When? The very idea of a system implies that multiple causal links interactin such a way as to ensure system stability. This does not necessarily mean




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that the system as a w hole is unchanging. Some theorists explicitly recognize

that external forces may force change. A few note that dynamics internal to

the system might also generate change. Systems theory can be characterized,

then, as involving movement between equilibria. In the hands of some

theorists, external shocks are downplayed such that it seems that a stableequilibrium is being examined. I n the hands of others, either external shocks

or internal dynamics may be such that some sort of dynamic change is

implied. From the time of H erbert Spencer in the 19th century, some theorists

have spoken of systemic evolution through a process of differentiation and

integration (this is also a key component of Boynes [2000] discussion of

structuralism). Yet while systems theorists can recognize confl ict and change,

they will agree that change can only be appreciated after the system has been

identifi ed (Lechner, 2000).

Who? This question is hardly engaged by systems theory. Parsons empha-

sized individuals (though also relationships), but he was in turn criticized for

downplaying institutions. Since systems can potentially embrace any

phenomenon, systems theorists could potentially deal with every type of

agency. Arguably, a common fl aw in systems theories is that one or tw o ty pes

of agent are emphasized, even when the system clearly embraces others. If

these others are simply reactive, this should be clearly stated and justifi ed

within the theory.

Comments As with action theory, systems theory is w ell specifi ed in terms

of a couple of our 5W questions, and poorly specifi ed w ith respect to others.

Interestingly, many scholars have questioned whether systems theory is

really a theory or just a frame of reference. We can join such critics in urging

greater attention to the Who? and What? questions. It is noteworthy,

though, that similar denigration has not occurred w ith respect to theories that

specify Who? and What? but not When? and Where?.

Psychoanalytic TheoryWho? Psychoanalytic theory looks within the individual for desires, fan-

tasies and repressed feelings from our dependent childhoods. Still, some

theorists emphasize how relationships or institutions affect our subcon-

scious. H abermas, L acan and many feminists stress relationships, w hile

Marcuse emphasized the effects of capitalist institut ions (Elliott, 2000).

What? By focusing on the internal workings of our minds, psychoanalytic

theorists are naturally concerned primarily with how individuals develop

attitudes.




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Why? G iven that none of us can know our subconscious perfectly, and y et

this infl uences our decisions, at least some of our decisions cannot be strictly

rational. Intuitive decision-making will dominate in at least some circum-

stances.

When? Althusser defi nes ideology as a discourse which leads individuals

to see themselves and others in a way that supports the existing social struc-

ture. H is version of psychoanaly tic theory suggests an equilibrium orien-

tation. O thers such as D eleuze and Lyotard have objected to the implication

that human beings are creatures of social forces to such an extent; they have

wondered, albeit pessimistically, if by changing people society can be trans-

formed (Elliott, 2000).

Where? While there is little explicit discussion of this question, there seemsa presupposition that our subconscious is widely infl uential. Moreover,

psychoanalytic theorists have generally eschewed empirical investigation for

broad theorizing.

Comments Psychoanalytic theory gives very fi rm answers to the Who,

What and Why questions. Implicit consensus on Where may unfortu-

nately refl ect a preference for theoriz ing over empirical analysis. There is

scope for considerable disagreement on When.

Symbolic InteractionismWho? As the phrase interactionism suggests, the focus here is on relation-

ships. P lummer (2000) identifi es four key themes of sy mbo lic interactionist

theory. The fi rst celebrates the human ability to create symbo ls, and through

these defi ne both ourselves and our situat ion; these meanings evolve through

relationships. The third theme is interaction itself: The focus of all inter-

actionist w ork is neither w ith the individual nor the society per se; rather its

concern is w ith the joint acts through w hich lives are organized and societies

assembled (Plummer, 2000: 195). While theorists may ask questions about

individuals or groups they w ill strive to understand these in terms of relation-

ships. D etracto rs have criticized symbolic interactionism for having little

place for the essence of the self: subconscious, emotions and so on. Some

symbolic interactionists have attempted to incorporate a more detailed vision

of the self.

What? The fi rst of P lummers themes stresses the negot iation of meaning.

Symbolic interactionism can thus be seen to emphasize attitudes. Especially

in the hands of Blumer, symbolic interactionism could involve analysis of

how attitudes infl uence actions.




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When? P lummers second theme stresses change, fl ux and the emergence of

new properties from interaction. This indicates a stochastic perspective on

dynamics.

Where? Plummers fourth theme expresses a concern with empirics.Symbolic interactionists may explore any aspect of the social world, but are

expected to do so with close attention to detail. A great deal of modern

research was presaged by the work of Simmel, who sought richly textured

vignettes rather than abstract generalizations (Plummer, 2000: 199). While in

some sense symbo lic interactionists believe that their type of theory has uni-

versal application (at least among intentional agents), their efforts tend to be

solidly idiographic. There is, though, some discernible effort by some

scholars to draw generalizat ions across studies.

Why? There is little explicit discussion of how meaning is negot iated. The

stress, though, seems to be on the intuitive: humans have inherent abilities to

create and interpret symbols.

Comments Symbolic interactionism (or perhaps Plummer) does a better job

of identify ing answers to each 5W question than w as the case w ith previous

theories. Still, there is room for d isagreement amo ng individual theorists w ith

respect to both Where and Why .

Plummer (2000: 196) suggests in passing that since symbolic interaction-ism holds that meaning is constant ly being negotiated, scholars cannot hope

to pin dow n precisely w hat symbolic interactionism means. H e is, of course,

correct in noting that any theory will evolve in subtle ways through time.

N ote that the 5W ty pology can serve to identify such changes. But P lummer

nevertheless manages to identify fairly precise answers to the 5W questions.

A general lesson can be draw n here: the scholarly community can and should

essay to identify the characteristics of any theory at any point in time.

P lummer also remarks that symbolic interactionism, tho ugh a minority

view in modern social science, nevertheless has wide but generally un-

recognized influences on w riters as diverse as Bourd ieu, G iddens and

H abermas. An effort to identify theories typologically should make it easier

to recognize when elements of particular theory types are being applied

elsewhere.

Rational Choice TheoryWho? Individualism is the key assumption of rat ional choice theory (Abell,

2000: 231). Abell, though, sees game theory as an offshoot o f rat ional cho ice

theory that investigates strategic interaction among rational actors. G ame

theorists thus emphasize relationships, though in a w ay that these are under-stood in terms of the individuals involved.




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Why? As the name suggests, emphasis is upon rational decision-making.

Abell (2000) identifi es tw o o ther key assumptions self-regard and opt imal-

ity of decision-making but notes that all are relaxed on occasion. D iscussion

of cultural norms or altruism is usually in terms of explaining these as

outcomes of rational decision-making. Abell suggests that if cultural normseffectively limit us to one choice, rational choice theory collapses into func-

tionalism. H e also recognizes that in some stra tegic situations the best

strategy for an individual to pursue is to mimic others; this bears some simi-

larity to decision-making according to tradition.

What? The general focus is upon actions. Individuals are assumed to

proceed rationally from preferences and schemas to decisions about actions.

Abell w orries that rat ional choice theory is generally unclear on w here ones

preferences come from. H e suggests that insights from o ther theories regard-ing learning and emotions could be useful here. Recently rational choice

theorists have begun to investigate the tricky question of how individuals

decide w hether it is w orthw hile to obtain additional information, w hen by

defi nition they cannot know how useful it w ill be.

When? Economists have found it easier to generate equilibrium outcomes

in models with rational agents than have sociologists such as Parsons who

investigate multiple infl uences upon decision-making (Abell, 2000). Still,

equilibrium outcomes are not inevitable. G ame theory in particular has longsought to identify equilibria, though not alw ays successfully .

Where? Rat ional choice theorists have not only striven to explain all indi-

vidual-level behaviours, but also to reduce social behaviours to individual

actions.

Comments Like symbolic interactionism, rational choice theory provides

answ ers to all 5W questions. In the case of What? and Why? this precision

may be achieved by ignoring the genesis of preferences and schemas. This is

no great problem if, as Abell recommends, rational choice theory is viewed

as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, other theories. If so,

rational choice theorists would have to revise their answer to Where? as

well.

PhenomenologyThose chapters in Turner that embrace philosophical perspectives rather than

theories have been eschewed here. Phenomenology is an intermediate case.

According to Vaitkus (2000), phenomenologists celebrate the fact that there

has never been a satisfactory answer to the question of w hat phenomonologyis. This must render classifi cation diffi cult. Moreover, in urging scientists to




19/24

directly explore individual phenomena and to free themselves from pre-

suppositions unjustifi ed by prior examination, phenomenology takes a

(laudable) position on philosophical issues, rather than a position on theor-

etical questions. There is an emphasis on the problem of intersubjectivity, and

thus the Who? question can tentatively be answered in terms of relation-ships and What? with attitudes, though there seems to be much concern

w ith actions (and at least one modern phenomenologist, N atanson, has

explored the reflective ego contemplation of the w orld). Answers to the other

three questions are even more tenuous.

What Is a Theory?

The vexed q uestion of defi ning the word theory has been avoided to thispoint . Try ing to give a basic comprehensive account of the concept of a

theory is an invigorat ing but fruitless w alkabout in metaphy sics (Ziman,

2000: 117). Ziman goes on to assert that scholars generally know a theory

when they see one, and that theories are social institutions that conform to

the standards of scholarly communities. Such a defi nition hardly indicates

what a theory should contain. By identifying the various key dimensions

along w hich theories can differ, a more precise defi nition of theory can be

developed. Theories, in other words, are attempts to specify in a logically

consistent manner agency, action, decision-making processes, location andtime path, with respect to interactions among phenomena. As we have seen,

many theories fail to specify answers to each of the 5W questions (though

variants of these often do). Such theories could and shoulddo so; they thus,

at least potentially, qualify as theories w ithin this defi nition.

G rand theories especially, but many narrow er theories as well, combine

theoretical analyses of different types. These might usefully be thought of as

theory clusters. Such theory clusters could be evaluated theory by theory.

The similarities and differences between theory clusters can more readily be

appreciated at the level of individual theories. Identifying which theories

within a theory cluster accord best with empirical reality, or involve argu-

ments that are hard to examine empirically, is also possible. So too is identi-

fy ing theories within a theory cluster that are poorly specifi ed in terms of one

or more of the 5W questions.

Advantages of a Typology of Theory

Turner (2000) identifi es four major problems w ith social theory. The

ty pology developed here can provide a partial or complete solution to eachof these. First, Turner w orries that there is no obvious progress in theory.




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w rong because norms are manipulated rather than taken. As w ith all who argue

for o nly o ne ty pe of causal agent, he dow nplays the simple fact that the w orld is

a complex web of causal links.

2 O ne might also make a distinction betw een w hether agents are acting or

reacting. Yet every phenomenon infl uences and is infl uenced by hundreds ofothers. Every act, whether passive or active, action or attitude, is necessarily

conditioned by the numerous infl uences upon the phenomenon in question. A

scholar studying reaction is explicitly taking these into account. A scholar

studying action is treating these as exogenous for t he momentand fo cusing upon

effects.

3 I jo in Seale (1999: 22) in decrying t he oversimplifi cation involved in terms like

positivist, which tend to lump together scholars with diverse perspectives on

many issues. N evertheless, certain co mmon or average tendencies can be

identifi ed.

4 Bunge (1998) provides numerous examples of the productive mixing of positivistand int erpretive approaches. Bunge emphasizes in particular how neuroscience

the analysis of physical changes in the brain has aided and will aid our under-

standing of how w e think and act. O ur human fallibility means that individuals

cannot attribute the results of their actions entirely to their intentions, and must

thus pay heed to the unforeseen consequences of their actions. But nor can they

ignore those intentions, and treat their actions as the unmediated responses to

certain stimuli.

5 While it may seem counter-intuitive that Where and When q uestions y ield the

same answ er, scientists and philosophers tend to address questions of t ime and

space in concert. An example is U rry (2000).6 To claim that a certain result w ill inevitably follow from a set o f causes is to assert

that t his set o f causes is suffi cient. R agin (2000: 103) urges scient ists to seek

suffi ciency, w hether the posited result is discrete (such as a movement t o a particu-

lar eq uilibrium) or continuous (such as movement in a part icular direction). H e

thus appears to underestimate the importance of the fourth type of time path.

Ragin (2000: 108) recognizes that especially in social science suffi ciency is an

elusive q uarry : he suggests that social scientists speak of almost suffi cient in cases

w here only a small number of exceptions occur but many successes are observed;

ideally circumstances w ould be identifi ed that distinguish the exceptions. Ragin

notes that the strategy for identify ing suffi ciency is to loo k across a w ide range ofcases in w hich the posited set of causes w as in place, and ask w hether the result

always followed; he regrets that scientists often ignore this simple strategy. The

reverse strategy for identifying necessity is equally neglected.

7 The selection w as not entirely random. C hapters w ere chosen that seemed fo cused

on o ne type of theory (or a closely related family of theories). C hapters on anthro -

pology, feminism and postmodernism were ignored, being judged to cover too

w ide a range of theorizing. N ote that P lummer (2000) stresses the similarity

betw een symb olic interactionism and much postmo dern theory. The chapter on

structuralism overlapped signifi cantly w ith that on functionalism. Marxian theory

is treated only in passing in Turner.

8 Action theories that emphasize cultural infl uences on individual behaviour can in

the extreme port ray individuals as merely reacting to o verwhelming cultural infl u-

ences. C ohen (2000) thus details confl icts within action theory concerning both




23/24

the scientifi c and ethical implications (w ith respect to free will) of individual-level

vs societa l-level agency.

9 Yet later C ohen (2000)expresses doubt that theories of action and praxis can be

linked. Why no t view these as complements w ith different ranges of applicability ?

10 C ohen (2000) notes that netw ork theorists tend to ignore the fact that individualsspend much t ime alone not w orry ing about relationships.

11 According t o B oy ne (2000), the essence of structuralism is similar: a belief in

structures in w hich every element is necessarily related to o thers in a similar w ay.

Saussure, for example, had stressed how w ords only exist in relationship to each

other w ithin the structure of a language.

12 Rule (1997: 32) warns us against glory ing in the simple application of a theory to

a new d omain, and then calling this progress. It must be established that t his appli-

cation has some empirical validity.

References

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Turner (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Social T heory, pp. 22344. O xford:

Blackwell.

B ARNES, Barry (1995) The Elements of Social Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

U niversity P ress.

B O Y N E, Roy (2000) Structuralism, in B ry an S. Turner (ed.) The Blackwell

Companion to Social Theory, pp. 16090. O xford: B lackw ell.

B U N G E, Mario (1998) Social Science under D ebate: A Phi losophical Perspect ive.Toront o: U niversity of Toront o P ress.

C O H E N , Ira J. (2000) Theories of Action and P raxis, in B ry an S. Turner (ed.) The

Blackwell Companion to Social T heory, pp. 73111. O xford: B lackw ell.

ELLIOTT, Anthony (2000) P sycho analy sis and Social Theory , in B ry an S. Turner (ed.)

The Blackwell Companion to Social T heory, pp. 13359. O xford: B lackw ell.

ELSTER, Jon (1989) N uts and Bol ts for the Social Sciences. C ambridge: C ambridge

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G O L D E N B E R G E R, Sheldon (1992) Think ing M ethodologically. N ew York: H arperC ollins.

LE C H N E R , Frank J. (2000) Systems Theory and Functionalism, in B ry an S. Turner

(ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Social T heory, pp. 11232. O xford: B lackw ell.

L ITTLE, D avid (1998) M icrofoundati ons, M ethod, and Causation. N ew Brunsw ick,

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P LUMMER, Ken (2000) Symbo lic Interactionism in the Tw entieth C entury , in Bry an

S. Turner (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Social T heory, pp. 193222. Oxford:

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P O TTER , G arry (2000) The Phi losophy of Social Science. H arlow : P rentice-H all.

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RU LE, James B. (1997) Theory and Progress in Social Science. C ambridge: C ambridge

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SEALE , C live (1999) The Q ualit y of Q ualit ativ e Research. Lo ndon: Sage.

SZO STAK , Rick (2000) Tow ard a U nifi ed H uman Science, I ssues in I ntegrat iv e Studies

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Documents

Classifying Natural and Social Theories (Szostak, 2003)