Clanci - KiM-konacni status.pdf

7/29/2019 Clanci - KiM-konacni status.pdf

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KOSOVO AND METOHIJA FINAL STATUS


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1244 ()UN SC RESOLUTION 1244 (extract)

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The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations, and the primary

responsibility of the Security Council for themaintenance of international peace and security...,

Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo

crisis shall be based on the general principles in

annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles

and other required elements in annex 2;


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1 ANNEX 1 -

8, , 06. 1999.

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Statement by the Chairman on theconclusion of the meeting of the G-

8 Foreign Ministers held at thePetersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted thefollowing general principles on thepolitical solution to the Kosovocrisis:

Immediate and verifiable end ofviolence and repression in Kosovo;

Withdrawal from Kosovo of military,police and paramilitary forces;

Deployment in Kosovo of effective

international civil and securitypresences, endorsed and adoptedby the United Nations, capable ofguaranteeing the achievement ofthe common objectives;


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1 ANNEX 1 -

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Establishment of an interimadministration for Kosovo to be decidedby the Security Council of the United

Nations to ensure conditions for apeaceful and normal life for allinhabitants in Kosovo;

The safe and free return of all refugeesand displaced persons and unimpededaccess to Kosovo by humanitarian aidorganizations;

A political process towards theestablishment of an interim politicalframework agreement providing for asubstantial self-government forKosovo, taking full account of theRambouillet accords and the

principles of sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and the othercountries of the region, and thedemilitarization of the KLA;

Comprehensive approach to theeconomic development and stabilization

of the crisis region.


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2 () ANNEX 2 (extract)

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5. Establishment of an interimadministration for Kosovo as a part of

the international civil presence underwhich the people of Kosovo can enjoysubstantial autonomy within the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, to be decided bythe Security Council of the UnitedNations. The interim administration toprovide transitional administration whileestablishing and overseeing thedevelopment of provisional democraticself-governing institutions to ensureconditions for a peaceful and normal lifefor all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number ofYugoslav and Serbian personnel will bepermitted to return to perform thefollowing functions:

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Liaison with the international civil mission

and the international security presence;

Marking/clearing minefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb

patrimonial sites;

Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

Safe and free return of all refugees anddisplaced persons under the supervision of

the Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees andunimpeded access to Kosovo byhumanitarian aid organizations.

A political process towards the establishment of aninterim political framework agreement providingfor substantial self-government for Kosovo,

taking full account of the Rambouillet accordsand the principles of sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaand the other countries of the region, and thedemilitarization of UCK. Negotiations betweenthe parties for a settlement should not delay ordisrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

2 () ANNEX 2 (extract)


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THE MEETING


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VICTIM - FATHER CHARITON


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CHURCH OF THE HOLY VIRGIN IN MUUTITE

- 1315. .

1999.

The endowment of the

main accountant JovanDragoslav and his family

was built in 1315.

Destroyed in 1999.


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SPECIAL REPORT 91

Kosovo Final StatusOptions and Cross-Border Requirements

Briefly... Kosovo's final status, left undecided at the end of the Yugoslavia-NATO war in June 1999,

will need to be discussed sooner than the international community anticipates; aroadmap will need to be drawn and the issue decided within the next three to five years. , - , ; , 3 5 .

This discussion should begin with an examination of a wide range of options, includingthose described and evaluated in Part II of this report. , II

Two options can be ruled out as unrealistic: immediate independence, and return ofKosovo to Belgrade's rule.

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A third option should be ruled out as inimical to international peace and security: a

regional rearrangement of borders in an attempt to accommodate ethnic differences. : .

There remain a range of outcomes and procedures, none of which stands out asobviously preferable to others. ,

Negotiations over final status should include direct discussions between governingauthorities in Belgrade and Pristina with international facilitation. .

U.S. leadership is essential if negotiations are to succeed. .

Improved security and economic development are required in the interim, as provided for

in UNMIK's benchmarks. , , - .

Whatever the decision, cross-border arrangements will be required to ensure Kosovo'sinterests as well as those of its neighbors and other international partners. , - ,

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Option 1: Kosovo Remains a ProtectorateIndefinitely

UNMIK or the European Union wouldcontinue to oversee increasing Kosovoautonomy in the absence of any process todetermine final status. No decision point orprocess would be specified for deciding onsovereignty, independence, or UNmembership.

Implications for U.S. Policy Continuation of UN protectorate requires

U.S. engagement indefinitely, but possiblylower troop levels if the situation calmsfurther.

The United States would have to deliverboth Albanian and Serbian agreement to

EU protectorate. Difficult negotiations with European Union

might lead to continuing U.S. commitments.

The United States would have to acceptend of EU protectorate on terms decided bythe Europeans.

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Option 2: Cantonization/DecentralizationSerb enclaves govern themselves under de

facto (not necessarily de jure) Yugoslavsovereignty, regardless of Kosovo'sstatus; this is a "soft" partition scenario.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Efforts to consolidate Bosnian andMacedonian states should be redoubled.

The United States should not press forreunification of Mitrovica or UN authorityin the north.

Establishment of multi-ethnic Kosovoadministration not important.

Belgrade efforts to maintain authority inthe north should not be resisted.

Return of Serb internally displacedpersons (IDPs) and refugees toAlbanian-majority areas should nolonger be encouraged.

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Option 3: Loose Federation

Belgrade retains nominal sovereignty,

but Kosovo functions as an

independent state within current

borders although without separate

UN membership (like Montenegro)


The United States should emphasize

that independence and sovereignty

can be separate issues.

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Option 4: CommonwealthBelgrade retains nominal sovereignty,

but Kosovo functions as anindependent state within currentborders and with separate UNmembership (like Canada or

Australia).


The United States would have toconvince Russians and Chinese toallow UN flag for Kosovo.

The United States shouldemphasize that independence andsovereignty can be separate.

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Option 5: Decision by an InternationalPanel by a Date Certain

An international panel would determine finalstatus within a fixed period (for example, threeyears); there would be no guarantee ofeventual independence. The outcome would beconditional on the performance of Serbs andAlbanians with respect to specific criteria.These could include democratic self-governance, participation in Kosovo

institutions, respect for human rights, return ofrefugees and displaced persons, andresponsible regional behavior.


Rather than focusing on the final statusoutcome, the United States would participate ina process that will allow a reasonable decisionto be made.

If the United States wants more control overthe outcome, it could seek to name the chair ofthe panel, as it did with the Brcko arbitration.

Incentive for both Serbs and Albanians tobehave well would reduce burdens on theUnited States and international community

generally.

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Option 6: Conditional IndependenceWith unchanged borders, Kosovo would

progress toward independence, contingenton demonstrated democratic self-governance, respect for minority rights, andresponsible behavior in the region. Theguarantee that Kosovo will not return toBelgrade rule would match a commitmentthat Kosovo will not seek to expand itsboundaries or de-stabilize neighbors. Theinternational community would providesecurity guarantees for minorities andrefugee return. Independence would be theultimate endpoint, including Kosovo controlof foreign policy, budget, public security,and the judicial system. The UN specialrepresentative would retain veto power

over issues relating to protection of minorityrights and external borders during thetransition period. An international forcewould still be needed indefinitely forexternal security. A small, local armed civildefense force would back up the KosovoPolice Service.

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The United States must remain

engaged, both to ensure properfulfillment of conditions and to backcontinuing international presence.

The United States will also have toconvince China and Russia to go along.

Consultations on this approach shouldbegin with the Europeans as soon aspossible.

The United States would have to insiston this approach with Belgrade, whichwill resist.

UNMIK efforts to establish authoritythroughout Kosovo, establish Kosovo-

wide administration, and return IDPs andrefugees home should be redoubled.

Efforts to consolidate Bosnian andMacedonian states should be redoubled.

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Option 7: Independence WithinExisting Borders at a Date

CertainAfter an agreed period (perhaps three years) of

increasing self-rule under internationalsupervision, Kosovo would become anindependent state within its current borders.Kosovo Serbs would get internationallyguaranteed rights and broad local autonomy.Before independence, Kosovo would establishcooperative trans-border political, economic,and security relationships with neighboringstates. International monitoring would continuefor a limited period after independence.

Implications for U.S. Policy U.S. leadership required to sell the idea to

Russia, China, and some Europeans.

Active U.S. engagement in negotiation andimplementation.

Need to counter possible anti-reform backlashin Belgrade and possible regional spillover toneighboring hotspots, such as Macedonia andRepublika Srpska.

Successful accord vindicates U.S.-led

intervention and allows reduced U.S. presence.

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Option 8: Independence withPartition

Three northern municipalitiesZvecan,

Zubin Potok, and Leposavicas well as

Mitrovica north of the Ibar River would go to

Serbia. The other 26.5 municipalities would

constitute an independent Kosovo state.

Albanian-dominated areas of southern

Serbia would become part of Kosovo.Willing Serbs and other minorities would be

assisted in moving. Kosovo Serbs who stay

(and others who want it) would be granted

dual citizenship. The KFOR mission would

support this movement, then redeploy

along new Kosovo borders. Key Trepca

mining components would go to Serbia, butparts would remain under Albanian control.

UNMIK would become a smaller advisory

mission.

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Implications for U.S. Policy Efforts to consolidate Bosnian and

Macedonian states should be redoubled.

The United States should not press for

reunification of Mitrovica or UN authority

in the north.

Implementation of southern Serbia

agreement not a priority.

Establishment of multi-ethnic Kosovo

administration not a priority.

Belgrade efforts to maintain authority in

the north should not be resisted.

Return of IDPs and refugees to their

homes in Albanian areas should not beencouraged.

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17. 2004PRIZREN, MARCH 17, 2004


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17. 2004

CATHEDRAL CHURCH IN PRIZREN AFTER MARCH 17, 2004


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Kosovo: Status with Standards WASHINGTONApril 15, 2004

The anti-Serb rioting by Albanians in KosovoMarch 17-19, which resulted in Serb and

Albanian deaths as well as substantial damage

to Serb property and churches and the removal

of thousands of Serbs from their homes,

requires a U.S. and international community

response. So far, discussion has been

polarized between those who advocateimmediate independence for Kosovo and those

who want to shut off that possibility. The former

argue that the rioting demonstrates that Kosovo

cannot be kept in limbo for much longer and

that the international protectorate has to give

way to self-determination. The latter argue that

misbehavior should not be rewarded, that multi-ethnicity in Kosovo has failed, and that the only

prospect for maintaining the Serb population in

Kosovo comes from physically separating

Serbs and Albanians and maintaining Serbian

sovereignty.

: 15. 2004

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In order to prevent future violence,

an effective response strategy

should aim to:

Discourage extremism and reward

moderation;

Provide youth hope for a better

future through employment and

educational opportunities; and

Give renewed momentum to the

process of determining final status.

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Any new resolution should

include ironclad international

guarantees of Serb and other

minority rights and safety as

well as the following four "no's":

No return of Kosovo to

governance from Belgrade; No partition of Bosnia or

Macedonia;

No alienation of Serb property

or monuments in Kosovo; and

No violence.

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PLACE FOR RETURN?

17. 2004.

akovica before and after March 17. 2004


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IS THIS THE ALBANIAN VISION OF FUTURE


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? AND SERBIAN?

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Clanci - KiM-konacni status.pdf