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No. 1
Cl, FM 100-5HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 29 April 1477
OPERATIONS
FM 100-5, 1 July 1976, is changed as follows:
REMOVE INSERT
Page i Page i
Index 1 -9
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
).7 ~,’
wOfficial:
PAUL T. SMITHMajor General, United States Army
The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, AR/VG, and WAR: Two (2) copies to each12-1 1A, Requirements for Avn Co, Bn, Gp and Bale;
BERNARD W. ROGERSGeneral, United States Arm y
Chief of Staff
DA Form 12-11 account, plus DA FormEngr Bn, Armored, Inf, and Inf Mech
Div; Engr Bnj Airborne and Airmobile Div; FA-Tactics; The Rifle Co, Plt and Squads; The Inf Bn; TheInf Bale; Med Spt in Div, Sep Bde and Armored Cav Regiment; Tactical Sig Comm Systems, Army,Corps and Div; Sig Bn, Armored, Inf, Inf Mech and Airmobile Div; Sig Bn, Airborne Div; Tank Units,Pit, Co & Bn; The Armored Bale; Div Armored andAjr Cav Units; The Armored Cav Regiment; andMil Police Spt Army Div and Sep Bde (Qty rqr block nos. 3,28,29,39,78,79,80, 82, 106,110,111,129, 130, 131, 133, and 134) and DA Form 12-11 B, Requirements for Supply and Services in Divand Sep Bale; Combat Intelligence; Denial Opns and Barriers; Desert Opns; Jungle Opns; NightOpns; River Crossing Opns; USA ADA Employment; The Div Spt Cmd and Sep Bde Spt Bn; The Field
I
Army Spt Cmd; USA/AF Doctrine for Airborne Operations; The Division; Operations of ArmyForces in the Field; Combat Service Spt; Tactical Nuclear Operations; and Army Airspace ControlDoctrine (Qty rqr block nos. 267,273,293,306,307, 308,312,348,380,381, 399,404,405,406,;411, and 426).
3-:-- ‘W
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Field Manual
~No 100-5 I
OPERATIONS
FM 100-5*HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYWashington, D.C. l July 1976
THIS MANUAL sets forth the basic concepts of US Armydoctrine. These concepts form the foundation for what istaught in our service schools, and the guide for training andcombat developments throughout the Army. Mostimportant, this manual presents principles foraccomplishing the Army’s primary mission—winning theland battle.
FM 100-5, the capstone of the Army’s system of fieldmanuals, covers the relationships among operations.Details of those operations are described in other manuals.This manual is intended for use by commanders and trainersat all echelons.
Table of ContentsPAGE
CHAPTER 1. US Army Objectives 1-1
2. Modern Weapons on the Modern Battlefield 2-1
3. Howto Fight 3-1
4 Offense 4-1
5. Defense 5-1
6, Retrograde . 6-1
7 Intelligence 7-1
8. The Air-Land Battle 8-1
9 Electronic Warfare 9-1
10, Tactical Nuclear Operations 1o-1
11. Chemical Operations 11-1
12. Combat Service Support 12-1
13. Operations within NATO 13-1
14, Special Environments 14-1
APPENDIXA, Relevant STANAGs A-1
B. “HowtoF ight’’Manuals B-1
i‘This manual supersedes FM 100-5, 6 September 1968, including all changes.
—
Field Manual
No. 100–5 ICl, FM 100-5
OPERATIONS
THIS MANUAL sets forth the basic concepts of US Armydoctrine. These concepts form the foundation for what istaught in our service schools, and the guide for trainingand combat developments throughout the Army. Mostimpok%ant, this manual presents principles for ac-complishing the Army’s primary mission-winning theland battle.
FM 100–5, the capstone of the Army’s system of fieldmanuals, covers the relationships among operations.Details of those operations are described in other manuals.This manual is intended for use by commanders andtrainers at all echelons.
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 1 July 1976
‘This manual supe
Table of ContentsPage
CHAPTER 1. US Army Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1—1
2. Modern Weapons on the Modern Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . 2—1
3. How to Fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3—1
4. Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..4—1
5. Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..5—1
6. Retrograde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..6—1
7. Intel ligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..7—1
8. The Air- Land Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..8—1
9. Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..9—1
10. Tactical Nuclear Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..10—1
11. Chemical Operations . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1 1—1
12. Combat Service Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..12—1
13. Operations within NATO ..,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..13—1
14. Special Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..14—1
APPENDIX A, Relevant STANAGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..A—1
B. “HowtoF ight’’Manuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..B—1
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Index 1
?des FM lUU-5, b >-eptember lYb& mclud!ng all changes
i
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k_ .
CHAPTER 1
US Army Objectives
WIN
THE ARMY’S primary objective is to win the land battle–tofight and win in battles, large or small, against whatever foe,wherever we may be sent to war. We cannot know when orwhere the US Army will again be ordered into battle, but wemust assume the enemy we face will possess weapons generallyas effective as our own. And we must calculate that he will havethem in greater numbers than we will be able to deploy, at leastin the opening stages of a conflict. Because the lethality ofmodern weapons continues to increase sharply, we can expectvery high losses to occur in short periods of time. Entire forcescould be destroyed quickly if they are improperly employed.
CONTENTSPAGE
WIN 1-1FUTURE BATTLE 1-2AUSTERITY 1-2WEAPONS AND MEN 1-3COMBAT DEVELOPMENT 1-3DOCTRINE 1-3TRAINING DEVELOPMENT 1-3UNIT TRAINING 1-4READINESS 1-4CONFIDENCE 1-5
Therefore, the first battle of our next warcould well be its last battle: belligerents couldbe quickly exhausted, and internationalpressures to stop fighting could bring aboutan early cessation of hostilities. The UnitedStates could find itself in a short, intensewar—the outcome of which may be dictatedby the results of initial combat. Thiscircumstance is unprecedented: we are anArmy historically unprepared for its firstbattle. We are accustomed to victory wroughtwith the weight of materiel and populationbrought to bear after the onset of hostilities.Today the US Army must, above all else,prepare to win the first battle of the next war.Once the war is upon us, we shall aim atemerging triumphant from the second, third,and final battles as well.
1-1
.
– FM 100-5
+-.---”
FUTURE BATTLE
The US Army may find itself at war in anyof a variety of places and situations, fightingopponents which could vary from the highlymodern mechanized forces of the WarsawPact to light, irregular units in a remote partof the less developed world. Wherever thebattle begins, the US Army is equipped,organized, and trained to undertakeappropriate military missions. The purposeof military operations, and the focus of thismanual, is to describe how the US Armydestroys enemy military furces and secures ordefends important geographic objectives.
.
b
.
Battle in Central Europe against forces ofthe Warsaw Pact is the most demandingmission the US Army could be assigned.Because the US Army is structured primarilyfor that contingency and has large forcesdeployed in that area, this manual isdesigned mainly to deal with the realities ofsuch operations. The principles set forth inthis manual, however, apply also to militaryoperations anywhere in the world. _ , =Furthermore, the US Army retainssubstantial capabilities in its airborne,airmobile, and infantry divisions forsuccessful operations in other theaters of waragainst other forces.
AUSTERITY
Our Army must expect to fight its battles atthe end of a long, expensive, vulnerable, lineof communications. Forward deployed
PREPARE TO FIGHT forces, and thosereinforcements immediatelyOUTNUMBERED, AND WIN available, must therefore be prepared to
accomplish their missions largely with theresources on hand. They must anticipatecombat against forces with ultra-modernweapons, greater numbers, and nearbysupply sources. Winning will restpredominately with commanders of engagedforces. The US Army mustprepare its units tofight outnumbered, and to win.
,
.
1-2
FM 100-5 –
~
WEAPONS AND MEN
To win, our soldiers will need the bestweapons that industry and technology canprovide. But weapons, no matter howpowerful, are ineffective in the hands ofinept, ill-trained, unsure operators. And even POWERFUL WEAPONS,proficient crewmen can be rendered impotent PROFICIENT PERSONNEL, AND
if improperly employed by the battle leader. BEST EFFECTIVE USE OF BOTH
Overall battlefield effectiveness depends onweapons capability, the proficiency of teamsor crews, and the tactics or techniques of thecommander. Thus, the US Army must obtainpowerful weapons, develop fully theproficiency of the men who man them, andtrain leaders capable of employing weaponsand crews to best effect.
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
US Army combat development seeks toincrease the Army’s ability to fight decisivelyby searching combat experience,experiments, tests, and technology for waysto provide better weapon systems,organizations, tactics and techniques.Success in combat developments is vital forour success in battle.
DOCTRINE
Success will also depend on our ability toassess correctly the dynamics of modernbattle; to reassess them continually, in pacewith the everchanging nature of the modernbattlefield; and to communicate an effectivebattle doctrine throughout our forces.
TRAINING DEVELOPMENT
The service schools and training centers ofthe Army constitute a prime resource forreadying our soldiers for combat. The serviceschools are the Army’s source of combatdevelopment and doctrine, and an importantmeans by which we inculcate leaders andtrainers with the tactics and techniqueswhich will contribute to battle success. Theservice schools express standards fortraining throughout the Army by the waythey teach, by the manuals they write, by
1-3
- FM 100-5
tests for evaluating individual skills of Jsoldiers Army-wide; and by the Army
STANDARDS AND TECHNIQUES q-y “aming and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).THAT MATCH REALITIES ~ . .ammg development must provide training
standards and techniques matched closely tothe realities of the modern battlefield.
UNIT TRAININGThe soldier receives most of his individual
training in a unit. It is in his unit where hewill have his greatest opportunities to gainconfidence-with his weapons, as a memberof a team, and by training under conditionsapproximating battle. Thus, his unitcommander plays the preeminent role indeveloping the resolve and the competence towin outnumbered. The commander mustassure each of his officers, noncommissionedofficers, and soldiers, the opportunity toimprove military proficiency and to preparementally and physically for battle. Everyunit commander of the US Army isresponsible for the progressive professionaldevelopment of every soldier in hiscommand.
.
.
Collective training in units should aim atmaximum effectiveness with combined arms. ~X
BATTLE DEMANDS EFFECTIVE Wherever possible, commanders should pressCOMBINED ARMS TEAMWORK beyond ARTEP standards. Consistent with a
judicious regard for safety, training mustsimulate the modern battlefield. Training forbattle demands forging effective combinedarms teamwork.
READINESSSince combat developments and doctrine
are dynamic, since weapon systems areconstantly evolving, and since tactics andtechniques are continually changing,training methods must change apace.Readiness for modern battle means trainingaimed at payoff now. Constant readiness forthe early battles changes the presumptionspreviously governing the US Army training:post-mobilization training, annual cycles,cadre development, and the like.
Rather, the commander must manage histraining with a sure knowledge of the presentstate of individual and collective proficiencywithin his units, and with programsespecially designed to bring them up to
1-4
.
FM 100-5—
- prescribed individual and unit performancestandards. To paraphrase Josephus onRoman training methods, our drills must be“bloodless battles” and our battles “bloodydrills.” Even in wartime, in the midst ofcombat, training must continue. Trainingmust be a full-time job for all commanders,regardless of other operations or missions.
Moreover, US Army commanders mustrecognize that battlefield success isdependent to a major degree upon US AirForce, US Navy or US Marine Corps support,and our ability to work with our allies. In allof our 20th century wars, we have fought as amember of an international coalition,alongside the other US services, and so weare likely to fight again. Teamwork in jointand combined operations is integral toreadiness for land combat.
The Army’s need to prepare for battleoverrides every other aspect of unit missions.This urgency derives from the danger presentin the world scene, the lethality andcomplexity of modern war, and theeverpresent possibility that a unit in trainingtoday may be in action tomorrow. Thecommander’s first concern must be to orderall the activities of his unit to meet hisprimary obligation to the Army, his unit, andhis soldiers: produce a unit ready to fight andu)in now.
CONFIDENCE
Success in the critical early battles of warwill depend mostly upon the courage and skillof our soldiers, the quality of our leaders, andthe excellence of our techniques and tactics.It will also depend upon our resolve: the USArmy must be convinced that it will win. Thisconfidence can only come from a thoroughappreciation of the dynamics of modernbattle; our soldiers must not only understandwhat to do, they must also understand why itmust be done. With such an understandingembedded in the officer and non-commissioned officer, American leaders willemerge who can apply techniques and tacticsapt for each unique situation of thebattlefield, and who can tap the ingenuityand imagination of the American soldier.
THE US ARMY MUST BECONVINCED IT WILL WIN
PRODUCE A UNIT READY TOFIGHT AND WIN NOW
I(
Additionally, success depends onthe ability and willingness ,ofleaders at all levels to operateindependently, to follow mission-type orders, and to employ allavailable resources in pursuit of theobjective. Confidence is theCOrT14??V3tOiW Of 8ucce88 in battle:each soldier’s belief in his owncompetence, his trust in that ofother members of his unit, and theircollective pride, cohesion andeffectiveness.
1-45
.
CHAPTER 2
Modern Weapons on the Modern Battlefield
OVERVIEW: NEW LETHALITY~
DIJRING the past several decades, the nature of battle haschanged—not abruptly but nonetheless significantly. Today’sbattle fieldpresents challenges beyond any the USArmyhas ever faced. Great numbers of weapons of advanceddestructiveness have been provided by major powers to clientstates; arms purchased by minor but affluent nations havefurther spread the latest military technology throughout theworld. Recent wars between small nations have developedintensities formerly considered within the capabilities of largestates only.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Overview: NEW LETHALITY 2-1
Trends:
TANKS 2-2
INFANTRY 2-7
FIELD ARTILLERY 2-12
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY 2-18
AIR POWER 2-20
ARMY AIRCRAFT 2-21
NIGHT COMBAT 2-23
MINE WARFARE 2-25
WAR IN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 2-26
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 2-28
MOBILITY AND TEMPO 2-30
2-1
—FM 100-5
TRENDS: TANKS
ALL GREAT ARMIES REST THEIRLAND COMBAT POWER UPON
THE TANK
The war in the Middle East in 1973 mightwell portend the nature of modern battle.Arabs and Israelis were armed with the latestweapons, and the conflict approached adestructiveness once attributed only tonuclear arms. Use of aircraft for close supportof advancing armor, in the fashion generallypracticed since 1940, was greatly reduced byadvancing surface-to-air missiles and airdefense guns. In clashes of massed armorsuch as the world had not witnessed for 30years, both sides sustained devastatinglosses, approaching 50 percent in less thantwo weeks of combat. These statistics are ofserious import for US Army commanders.
All great armies of the world rest their landcombat power upon the tank. The armies ofthe Warsaw Pact, fashioned on the Sovietmodel, incorporate masses of tanks, backedby an impressive industrial base producinglarge numbers of quality armored fightingvehicles. Warsaw Pact doctrine anticipatesuse of nuclear weapons in the future war, butteaches preparedness to fight without them.For both conditions, it emphasizes heavyconcentrations of armor.
Similarly, tank strength is the foundationof NATO defense: the armies of the FederalRepublic of Germany, the IJnited States,Great Britain, and their Allies maintainstrong tank forces in Central Europe. France,Sweden, Japan, the Chinese People’sRepublic, and nations of the Middle East andSouth Asia have all made significantinvestments in tank design, or procurement,or both. Few states, even among the poorernations, are without armored forces.
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FM 100-5—
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Firepower. Modern tanks are tank of World War II could fire 13rounds, andsignificantly more lethal than the armored would still have only a 50-50 chance ofvehicles which fought in World War II. hitting. The standard IJS medium tank of theTrying to hit another stationary tank at a mid-’7Os commanded the same hitrange of 1500 meters, the IJS Army medium probability with a single shot.
I WORLD WAR II MEDIUM TANK– HAD TO FIRE 13 ROUNDS I
I KOREAN WAR MEDIUM TANK—HAD TO FIRE 3 ROUNDS I
[SHERMAN _ ~
TANK -AIIWORLD WAR I
I
CURRENTUS MEDIUM
TANK‘“:.y --%...’‘ .. ““ “’”J----
I I.,
The Sherman tanksof General Patton’s Third Army hadto closeto within 500 metersof the German PzV Panther tank before the American 76mm gun could punchthrough the German’s 4.8 inches of frontal armor. Current US medium tanks canpenetrate nearly twice that much armor at four times the range.
2-3
—FM 100-5
These charts plot characteristics of the mainbattle tanks of the major tank-producing nationsover three decades. Each point records the year inwhich a significant improvement was introduced.
120 “— —
TANK GUN SIZE
Modern tank guns are largerby one-third than the guns of1945.
MUZZLE VELOCITY
The muzzle velocity of tankprojectiles has more thandoubled. Rounds travel nearlyone mile per second.
i“’
~T’””’”* ‘s o USSR
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FM 100-5—
Improvements in gun accuracy and range havebeen significant.
\ I I
o
ACCURACY OF RANGEFINDERS
Since most tank misses arecaused by inaccurate rangeestimation, the unaidedoptical sights of WW II werereplaced first by stereoscopicrange finders, then bYcoincidence rangefinders, andfinally, in the mid-70s by laserrange finders.
I .0
.5
,-
ADVANCE IN TANKCANNON TECHNOLOGY
Taken together, theseadvances have increased hitprobabilities ten-fold—andfuture tanks will mount gunsof even greater range andaccuracy.
* Ph =Probability of hit.
2-5
—FM 100-5
Armor Protection and Mobility. World War II tanks. Nonetheless, the chiefModern tanks have not only bigger guns, tank-producing nations have designed theirimproved ammunition, and more main battle tanks to constrain bulk, and tosophisticated fire control apparatus, but balance increases in engines, track andarmor protection roughly double that of suspension systems.vWW 1[ TANK + MODERN MAIN BATTLE TANKI
,. .........,.; ..,,! ,., ,~,, . ~“ WEIGHT (+)
&-:-:>% j ,;!.:”.’:!;:..,‘“;~~%-iy<- :.: . ~: ,. ,..t*,:;,.:”‘.’ ENGINE POWER (+)
IGROUND PRESSURE (–)
While the modern US main battle tank is one-third heavier than its World War IIpredecessor, it’s equipped with an engine more than 2 times as powerful. Its agilityhas actually increased: its horsepower-to-ton ratio has increasedby one-fourth, its
I ground pressurehas decreasedby one-fourth, and its maximum cruising range has
1 increasedby three times.
MISSILE-TANKS CAN SCOREHITS 9 OUT OF 10 TIMES AT
3000 METERS
Tank development accelerated in the ’70swith emphasis on increasing firepower andimproving armor protection. Tanks appearedwhich can fire antitank guided missiles aswell as cannon rounds. The missiles havemuch higher accuracy and greater rangethan cannons—50-100 percent greater. Suchmissile-tanks can hit tank-size targets 9 outof 10 times at a range of 3000 meters.
Also, most modern tanks have beenequipped with night vision devices. Activesights let soldiers see targets illuminatedwith invisible infrared beams out to ranges of1500 meters. More significant, there arepassive sights, with comparable rangecapability, that let the operator see targetsby natural light; e.g., starlight, or bydetecting the heat emitted by the target(thermal imagery sights). Thermal imagerysights are effective out to and beyond 3000meters.
Not the least of modern developments aretanks with stabilized turrets which
2-6
materially aid gunners acquiring a target,and facilitate firing on the move.
In sum, the capabilities of modern tankshave been extended to as far as the tankercan see. What he can see, he can hit. What hecan hit, he can kill. The tank, with its cross-country mobility, its protective armor, and itsformidable firepower, has been and is likelyto remain the single most important weaponfor fighting the land battle. Armored ormechanized forces (organized around tanks,infantry, field artillery, air defense artilleryand tactical air) have demonstrated on themodern battlefield the capability to mass andmaneuver rapidly, to break through defenses,to strike deep into the enemy’s rear, toencircle his flank, and to win decisive battles.
THE TANK, WITH ITS CROSS-COUNTRY MOBILITY, ITS
FORMIDABLE FIREPOWER, HASBEEN AND IS LIKELY TO REMAINTHE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT
WEAPON FOR FIGHTINGTHE LAND BATTLE
FM 100-5—
TRENDS: INFANTRY
Modern infantry is significantly morecapable than its World War II counterpart.Through new weapons, equipment,techniques, and tactics, the infantry remainsa versatile fighting force.
Antiarmor Weapons. Tanks wereinvented to defeat the infantry defenses ofWorld War I, and remained, for nearly 50
INFANTRY CAN INFLICT HEAVY w=% the nemesis of infantry. During WorldLOSSES ON ARMORED FORCES War II, shoulder-launched rockets withAT LONG AND SHORT RANGES shape-charge explosives (e.g., bazooka,
panzerfaust) began to erode the tank’sinvincibility. Now, well-trained infantry caninflict heavy losses on armored forces at bothlong and short ranges. Mechanized infantryequipped with TOW and Dragon can fight inboth the offense and defense against tank-heavy enemy forces.
2-7
—FM 100-5
US infantry antitank weapons have not onlyittcreased in range but, as of the mid- ‘70s, theirability to penetrate armor has outpaced armordevelopment.
ANTITANK VS. TANKRANGES
The line across the middle ofthe chart shows the trend forthe principal Warsaw Pactmedium tanks. The other lineshows the trend in rangecapability for the antitankweapon of the US Armyinfantry in the same timeframe. The leaping crossoverwas the result of introducingthe tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW)missile in the early ‘70s.
PENETRATION VS. ARMORTHICKNESS
Increasesin armor penetratingcapability kept pace with theincreases in range andaccuracy. This chart showsthe trend in penetrating powerof US weapons comparedwith the growth in themaximum thickness of armorof the Warsaw Pact tanks.
-US INFANTRY *
1 I 1 1 1 IAhTITANK thIEApON
1 b>
1 1 1 1 i
I I I
I l..
.
I I* I1 I I 1 1 I[ PENETR~TING POWER I I I.
\
I * I
Ml%XIMUM ARMORTHICKNESS
A
I! I I 1 I J
WARSAW PACT -
2-8
FM 100-5—
. Other nations, notably the USSR, haveprogressively fielded infantry weapons ofcomparable range, accuracy, and hitting power.Additionally, both the US and the USSR haveimproved shorter range weapons, so as to achievehigh accuracy with light, man-packed, hand-heldweapons.
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
rrrrtl_ 500
Ph” FOR CREW-SERVEDWEAPONS
US and USSR crew-servedinfantry antitank weaponshave tripled their range in lessthan 20 years.
ph* FOR INDIVIDUALWEAPONS
US and USSR individualantitank weapons haveincreased significantly inrange and accuracy.
USSR~u’m!!!!!!!!
2-9
—FM 100-5
MECHANIZATION OF INFANTRY
By the mid-’7Os, one out of everytwo infantrymen in the US Armyactive forces was a member ofan armored personnel carrier
mounted force,
�In Soviet-equipped forces, armoredpersonnel carriers were 37 times
more numerous than in the1945 Red Army.
GREATEST ADVANCES ININFANTRY MOBILITY DUE TO
COMBAT USE OF THEHELICOPTER
\
—
~ob~l~tY. By the end of WW II, most armieshad concluded that armored vehicles forcarrying infantry into battle had limitedutility on the battlefield. However, as thetank increased its mobility—its operatingrange, its agility, its ability to cross softground-the inability of infantry on foot (oreven in trucks) to keep up with tanks began toinhibit exploitation of the tank’s full combatpower. Moreover, as armies considered theuse of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, itbecame apparent that infantry on foot or intrucks were much more vulnerable than thosein armored vehicles.
Additionally, advances in conventionalartillery munitions, particularly those whichcause casualties among unprotectedpersonnel from air-burst weapons, indicateda need for overhead armor protection foradvancing infantry. In the ‘50s, apronounced trend developed toward“mechanize tion’’-armored vehiclesespecially designed for carrying infantry.
By the early ‘70s, these vehicles wereequipped with both the new antitank guidedmissiles and large automatic weaponscapable of suppressing enemy infantry atranges of 1,000 meters and beyond.Doctrinally, emphasis shifted from armoredvehicles for taxiing troops into battle to an cinfantry combat vehicle which fights as partof the mechanized infantry squadthroughout its operations.
Mechanization provides infantry unitsadvantages in tactical mobility over foot ortruck-borne units. But the greatest advancesin infantry mobility have been brought aboutby the helicopter emerging as a fully capablemember of the combined arms team.
The US Army, which has had moreexperience with helicopters in battle thanany other army in the world, has exploitedthe helicopter in its organizations, weaponssystem design, tactics, and techniques.Provided helicopters, the commander on themodern battlefield possesses tacticalflexibility, command means, and logisticsmarkedly better than those at the disposal ofhis predecessors in WW II or Korea.
2-1o
FM 100-5—
HELICOPTER IMPACT
TIME TO DISTANCE COVEREDCOVER 30 Km IN 1 HOUR
5 HOURS 6 Km
2 HOURS 15Km I
Today, heliborne infant~ can move about the battlefield20 times asfast asfoot-mobile troops, and 8 times as fast as mechanized forces.
Flexibility. During the past decades,infantrymen have developed battlefieldtechniques and tactics enabling them tosurvive against the most lethal conventionalweapons and to continue as a versatilecomDonent of the combined arms team. Infac~ in compartmented places wherearmored or mechanized forces cannot WHERE ARMORED OR
maneuver freely (sections of swamps, MECHANIZED FORCES CANNOT
mountains, jungles, or cities), and where MANEUVER
observation and fields of fire are limited, MAINTAINSFREELY, INFANTRYTHE CENTRAL ROLE
infantry maintains the central role.
The infantryman of airmobile, airborne, orinfantry type divisions fights afoot, but, in~some cases, his mobility can be greater thanthat of his mechanized counterpart.Strategically, he is easier to deploy. Airborneforces can be introduced directly into thebattle area over very long distances byparachute. On the battlefield, he and hisweapons can be moved about by helicopter.He can often achieve surprise more readilythan armored task forces, and more quicklydevelop critical mass. Dug in, he is difficult todislodge. He can ambush advancing armor,seize and hold key terrain, block against abreakthrough, and slow and canalize apenetration.
The mechanized infantryman can fightfkom his armored carrier while maneuveringacross the battlefield, adding his suppressivefires and observation to armored task forces.When tanks cannot advance, he often takesthe lead. He can, by fire and movement,eliminate antitank gunners concealed inwoods or buildings, breach minefield, andemploy stealth or airmobility to seize keyterrain.
2-11
—FM 100-5
TRENDS: FIELD ARTILLERY
,<... ,., ,.,!, ,
During WW II, the necessity for massedand sustained firepower closely integratedwith large and mobile maneuver forcesaccelerated artillery developments. Artilleryemerged as the greatest casualty producer ofthat war, causing more than half of the
ARTILLERY CAUSED IUlORE THAN casualties sustained by all armies. ModernHALF OF THE CASUALTIES artillery weapons and munitions and
DURING WORLD WAR II techniques for their employment have
significantly improved in the last thirtyyears, and all major armies hold substantial’artillery inventories. And almost all of thesmaller nations have been provided modernartillery weapons by the larger world powers.
‘..
1941 MOSCOW 10
I 1942I
STALINGRADI
2
II1943KURSK 2
1945 VISLA-ODER 2
30 3
340 170
460 230
500 I 250 IIn WW 11,the Soviets relied increasinglyon massive concentrations of towed artillery of simple andrugged design, backedby rocketlaunchersequally simpleand inexpensiveto produce. As the Sovietsdeveloped their breakthrough offensive tactics, they began to increase their artillery in support ofbreakthrough areas.
2-12
FM 100-5—
Sovietoffensive. .
doctrine continued to stressbreakthrough tactics into the ‘70s,
requmng artillery densities of 70-100 tubesper kilometer in support of the leadingmaneuver forces. Nations using Sovietequipmentand doctrinehave adopted similartechniques, as evidenced in the 1973 MiddleEast War.
US techniques for concentrating artilleryduring WWIIreliedon firecontrol proceduresto mass the fires of separated units onto asingle target area. With these techniques andimproved radio communications, one
forward observer couldthe fires of all of the
request and receiveartillery battahons
operating within the corps and in range of thetarget. Time on target (TOT) surprise firetechniques produced high shock effectamong unprepared and exposed infantry.Responsiveness and lethality weresignificantly increased in 1943 with theintroduction of the variable time (VT) fuze.And US artillery increasingly emphasizedself-propelled weapons to maintain the fasttempo of mobile warfare. Thesedevelopments were further refined followingWW II and remain significant elements of USartillery doctrine. –
. .
I
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
—
In the years since WVV 11,artillery developmentsproduced new models of gunsand rocket launchers, slowlymodernizing older artillerysystems. Maximum ranges forall field artillery weaponsystems increased signif-icantly. By the mid-’7Os,Soviet artillery attained thelongest ranges, reachingalmost 40 km with rocket-assisted projectiles.
SPOI
\TOWED ~ I
2-13
–FM 100-5
ARTILLERY IN US ARMORED ANDMECHANIZED DIVISIONS ISENTIRELY SELF-PROPELLED
Artillery Munitions. Since 1945, newexplosives and munitions have greatly Jincreased the firepower lethality per shell.Improved conventional munitions, whencompared to ordinary high explosive rounds,provide up to 4 times the amount of casualtyeffect against personnel targets. Projectileswith time-delay submunitions extend thesuppression capability of a single round overa considerable period of time after impact,and small scatterable antitank mines can beemployed by indirect artillery fire.
In the mid-’7Os, IJS artillery maderevolutionary advances in lethality, and willsoon add a point destruction capability to itstraditional role of suppression. Precisionguided projectiles fired from standardcannon will be able to kill single tanks with avery high probability of first round success.These projectiles are guided to either amoving or stationary target by a forwardobserver illuminating the target with a laserdesignator. Multiple targets can be hit inquick succession.
Mobility. Improvements in artilleryground mobility, particularly in Westernarmies, increased the capability of artillery tokeep pace with the increasing tempo of ~modern mechanized warfare. Artillery in USarmored and mechanized divisions isentirely self-propelled, enabling it to movewith fast armored thrusts, or displacelaterally to concentrate fires quickly in athreatened defensive sector. The Soviets, incontrast, support their mechanized forceswith extensive numbers of towed cannon andmotorized rocket launchers. In the early ‘70s,the Soviets recognized the mobilitylimitations of towed artillery to support theirdoctrine of fast and deep offensiveoperations, and began to increase theirinventories of self-propelled guns.
Fire Control and Coordination. SinceWW II, advances in fire direction,observation, and coordination have similarlyadded to the responsiveness, flexibility, andaccuracy of modem artillery firepower. In the‘60s, small tactical fire direction computers inIJS battalions and batteries eased themassing of surprise fires and the transfer tonew targets. In the ‘70s, laser range findersused by US forward observers reduced initial
2-14
FM 100-5-
target range estimation errors from 400meters, common to earlier map and binocularmethods, down to as close as 10 meters. Sincethe forward observers range estimation is thekey to fast and accurate adjusted fire, laserranging produces significant increases infirst round effect.
Also in the ‘70s, the US Army devised newtechniques to improve responsiveness.Response times to provide suppressive fireagainst ATGM or other infantry weaponswere reduced horn minutes to seconds bystreamlining fire control procedures in thefire direction center (FDC) and at the guns,and by dedicating batteries to maneuvercompanies moving to contact.
Soviet artillery continued to rely on olderfire direction techniques and coordinationprocedures. Fire planning and coordinationwas centralized at very high levels, reducingresponsiveness to the maneuver units, butproviding very effective massed firepower insupport of breakthrough operations. US fireplanning techniques were more decentralizedand adaptable to rapid and unexpectedchanges in the course of a battle.
Automated fire control systems, like— TACFIRE, will play an increased role inartillery gunnery, planning, andcoordination. The TACFIRE system willimprove IJS artillery support to the maneuverforces significantly. TACFIRE automatesmost of the procedures which were previouslyaccomplished manually, and providesgreater accuracy, reduces firing datacomputation times, and speeds the flow ofintelligence, survey and metrological data.
Artillery Suppression. Increasedranges, improved firepower, and better firecontrol underscore the importance of artilleryas a prime suppressive weapon againstopposing infantry weapons, tanks, artillery,and air defense artillery. Artillery suppressesantitank guided missiles by using highexplosives to drive the gunners from theirsights or smoke to block or obscure theirvision. Smoke munitions can also block thevision of attacking tanks; HE (highexplosive) fired at tanks causes them tobutton-up, reducing the crews’ effectivenessby as much as 50 percent. Artillery can now
RESPONSE TIMES TO PROVIDESUPPRESSIVE FIRE WEREREDUCED FROM MINUTES TOSECONDS
SYSTEMS LIKE TACFIRE PLAYA SIGNIFICANT ROLE INIMPROVED SUPPORT TOMANEUVER FORCES
2-16
—FM 100-5
reach farther to suppress air defenseweapons. Artillery improvements joined with /
better locating systems also increase thepotential of modern artillery to counteropposing indirect fire weapons, particularlythose that shoot indiscriminately or do nottake measures to avoid detection.
C’ozmterfire. Field artillery counterfire isthe attack of enemy indirect fire systems andincludes all activities necessary to direct theattack of enemy mortar, cannon, and rocketor missile systems. During WW II and theKorean Conflict, the counterfire function wasperformed at the corps artillery level. On themodern battlefield, greatly increased corpsfrontages, extended communicationrequirements, and the expected density oftargets make the division artillery a morelogical echelon to conduct counterfire.Divisions have been given the assets requiredto do this job in the form of a targetacquisition battery organic to divisionartillery and by habitual assignment of corpscannon battalions to support the division.Types and amounts of FA allocated thedivision will be in accordance with thetactical situation and the opposing threat.
Direct Support Fires. Larger weapons ~introduced at the direct support level in USarmored and mechanized divisions movedthe lethal reach of the maneuver commanderbeyond that of his WW II or Korean Warcounterpart.
UNIT AMT WEAPON
Soviet equipped armies use smaller caliber direct
supportweapons, but they havehigher ratesof fire,
and are available in greater numbers.
.
2-16
FM 100-5—
Firepower immediately responsiveto the maneuver battalion has doubled inlethality, while range has increasedalmost 60 percent.
_- —- -_
1970’s /“ -- -- \ \/
*
\,4. \
/ \/0 ,0/0
SP0
(6 GUNS)
9N3finm ~- —-=/ \
0 \
0 \
TOWED/
/(6. GUNS) Z
KILOMETERS 5
COVERAGE AREA:
1970s: 25,000SQ METERS
Ww 1/:7,500 ~SQ METERS
I50M
I
TI
I10)M
I
II
9.,
.’
4 —— ——–150M– ———–
Overall, the increased numbersand capabilities of artilleryweapons in all armies indicatethat, when compared to pastconflicts, the modern battlefieldwill be greatly expanded in size,lethality, and complexity.
2-17
-FM 100-5
A
,..,+,
s},f:p~l.:~.g: . . .,.. . .,
TRENDS: AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY
Since World War II, the range, accuracy,and lethality of air defense weapons hasincreased dramatically. The antiaircraftweapons of 1945 were guns, some radarcontrolled, but all limited in range to about 10km. In contrast, today an air defense complexin a forward divisional area is made up of gunand missile systems covering the battle areaforward and behind the area of contact for asmuch as 40 kilometers (an increase of 36times as much volume of air spacecontrolled). Moreover, these weapons aremobile, capable of moving with maneuverunits, and providing a continuous air defense—umbrella. -
RANGE IN METERS + O 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000
Modern air defense artillery weapons arecontrolled by automatic guidance systems,plus improved radar and optical sights.
MODERN SURFACE-TO-AIR Probabilities of hit have increased greatly.MISSILE SYSTEMS ARE HIGHLY Modem gun weapons are automatic cannon
ACCURATE AND RELIABLE (aided by radar), some capable of firing from40 to 60 rounds in a single one-second burst.Surface-to-air missile systems are highlyaccurate and reliable.
2-18
FM 100-5—
In all advanced armies, infantry, armor, Soviet SA-7 are relatively simple to use and,and artillery units are equipped with although small and light, have high hit sweapons which can knock jet aircraft out ofthe sky. Therefore, besides the air defense
probabilities against low-flying, high-performance aircraft or helicopters.
, artillery weapons and a multitude of directfire weapons in maneuver units, attackingair forces must contend with soldier- The addition of such weapons to maneuveroperated, surface-to-air missile systems. units significantly increases the capability ofWeapons such as the US Redeye and the modern air defenses.
A
A
In 1945, a US divisiontypicallyhad 64 air defense weapons, allinaccurateand short range. In themid-’7Os the number of weaponswith marked advances inaccuracyandrangehadincreasedto113; Soviet-equippeddivisionsinclude an even larger number.
Air defense is integral to thecombined arms team. All means toprevent suppression of our airdefense weapons and ways tosuppress enemy weapons must besought. No modern army can expectto win in battle unless its maneuverforces operate under a cohesive,extensive, and mobile umbrella ofmodern air defen8e.
2-19
—FM 100-5 *
TRENDS:
... y.”- .
AIRPO WER
,, ~-:.;,.j *4
Close Air Support.decades has changedpractice of close air
Experience ofthe concept
support. In
threeand
someadvanced forces, including ‘those of the US,aircraft are dedicated to the support of themaneuver arms in recognition of the fact thatthe battlefield will provide an abundance oftargets that can be destroyed by close airsupport.
US tactical aircraft are far morepowerful than those of 1945. TheUSAAF P47 of WW 11,for instance,could fly 100 miles to a target, stayforless than half an hour, deliver .50 cal.machinegun fire and two 250 poundbombs, and returnto itsairbase.Today,the USAF/1 10 carries30 timesasmuchordnance—about 16,000 pounds ofcannon ammunition, bombs ormissiles. The Al O can fly to a target250 milesfrom home base,monitor thetarget areas for as much as 2 hours,deliver its ordnance, and return. Inaddition, the ordnance itself isfar morelethal. The GAU-8 Gatling Gun in theAl O for example fires a 1.5 poundprojectilecapable of destroying tanks,armored personnel carriers, and otherarmored targets.The GAU-8 is 7 timesmore lethal than conventional 20-mmguns and for the firsttime combinestheaccuracyand flexibility of a gun with atrue tank-killing capability.
m
I
!!=.
� f
I
*,Al O
’44 ’51 # ’64 ‘7 -
F80 IP47
I I
2-20
FM 100-5—
Modern Air Force tactical aircraft carry avariety of ordnance including guided andunguided bombs and missiles. Guidedbombs, those with electronic steering, andguided missiles, such as the Maverick, canachieve high probability of hit and kill.Operational tests clearly demonstrate theeffectiveness of the most modern fightersagainst tanks. Moreover, both guidedmissiles and guided bombs provide standoffcapabilities which combine their greatlyincreased accuracy with sharply reducedexposure of the attacker to opposing airdefenses.
Modern tactical aircraft with improvedordnance are now considered components of MODERN AIRCRAFT AREthe Army/Air Force combined arms team. In COIVIPoltl ENTS OF THEaddition to close support missions for ground COMBINED ARMS TEAMunits, the aircraft of today permits rapiddeployment of destructive force beyond theimmediate battlefield to deep-lying targets.
TRENDS: ARMY AIRCRAFT
INTEGRATION OF ARMYAVIATION UNITS INTO THE
COMBINED ARMS TEAMPROVIDES A NEW CAPABILITY
TO THE LAND BATTLE
Firepower. Thehigh mobility and armor-killing capability of attack helicopters makesthem unique to the battlefield. Their weaponsystems are capable of defeating the entirespectrum of battlefield targets. Ongoingdevelopment of the advanced attackhelicopter (AAH) includes an advanced firecontrol system to provide extended rangetarget acquisition and engagement and alaser HELLFIRE missile system which willhave commonality with cannon-launchedguided munitions and USAF/Navy missilesand bombs. In addition, productimprovement of the existing 2.75-inch aerialrocket and the introduction of the 30mm
2-21
–FM 100-5
-—
cannon will further enhance the stayingpower and killing capability of the attackhelicopter. These improvements spell greateraccuracy against point and area targets onthe future battlefield.
Attack helicopters can fire at extended ranges more often than
their ground counterparts since they can rise above the mask toincrease both target acquisition and firing range. The difference of
only 5 feet in elevation could convert an 800-meter shot on theground to a 3,000-meter kill from the air.
.
AREA MASKEDD HELlCOPTER FROM
TANK LEVEL----” VIEW
I RANGE IN METERS 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 I
lfo/!)ilitY. Firepower and mobility areinseparable. By increasing the mobility ofground forces, helicopters simultaneouslyextend the ground forces area of influence.Examples of increased mobility includemoving ground firing units and airassaulting maneuver forces. When speed isessential, distances great, and terrain aboutthe battlefield restrictive, air assault forcesmake a significant contribution towardwinning the battle.
Intelligence, Command, andcontrol. To win battles, awareness ofenemy capabilities and intentions is aprerequisite. Intelligence-gathering aircraft,to include air-cavalry, provide a source forthis essential information. Observationhelicopters can provide commanders anaerial look at the terrain on which the battle
2-22
may take place so that they may more rapidlyevaluate and plan the effective use of thecombined arms team and directly influencethe flow of the battle.
Combat Service Support. Modernforces with their unprecedented mobility andcomplex equipment consume vast quantitiesof supplies. Therefore, a highly responsive,yet flexible logistics system is a necessity andis indispensable. One medium lift helicopter,for example, can carry almost two times theload of a 5-ton truck, five times as fast.Further, aerial resupply is not affected byroad trafficability or congestion. Usingexternal loads makes loading and unloadingalmost instantaneous at the point of need.Responsive logistics lighten the basic combatloads of maneuver units and increase theirmobility.
FM 100-5–
-
TRENDS: NIGHT COMBAT
Thirty years ago the most advanced aids toinfantry vision at night were infrared deviceswhich required an infrared light source toilluminate the target area. Such devices wereemployed for pointing infantry weapons (andfor driving at night as an aid to mobility), buttheir range was limited. They also sufferedthe disadvantage that an enemy equippedwith infrared detectors could see the lightsource.
In the mid-’6Os, image intensifiers becameavailable which operated with existinglight—starlight, moonlight, sky glow fromcities, or battlefield fires. At about the sametime, the US Army fielded crew-sewedweapon sights using image intensifiers withcapabilities of 1200 meters under starlight,and 2,000 meters under moonlight. And forthe same weight, these devices had over 4times the range of earlier infkared equipment.
Image intensifiers are completely passive;NIGHT VISION AIDS PERMIT that i% it iS impossible for theenemY tOdetect
NIGHT MAN EUVERS AND them in use. By the mid-’7Os, this technologyENGAGEMENT SIMILAR TO led to small, night vision aids so that soon
DAYTIME tanks, mechanized infantry, and helicopterswill be able to maneuver and engage theenemy at night much as they can in the day.
Also emerging in the mid-’7Os werethermal sights, entirely passive like theimage intensifiers, but which detect heatradiation and construct images basedthereon. These sights are particularly usefulin penetrating smoke, atmospheric haze, fog,snow or rain clutters, light foliage, andcamouflage. These devices are small,relatively lightweight, and can be used atnight or in daylight. The detectioncapabilities of these sights for use in the darkor limited visibility corresponds to theeffective range of their weapons.
2-23
.
–FM 100-5
The IJS Army is transitioning from a nightcombat capability oriented on both activeand passive weapons sights with ranges lessthan weapons capability to a full maneuverand engagement capability for armor,mechanized infantry, and attack helicopterunits. The Army will further expand thisnight combat capability to conditions ofadverse visibility such as smoke, fog, rainand haze. The nature of night combat ischanging from static weapons employmentin the defense to battle in which integratedcombined arms teams will fight at night asthey can in the day. Among the technologicalraces the US Army must run and winagainst potential enemies, few will havehigher combat payoff than an edge in night-fighting capability.
ENGAGEMENT
MANEUVER
* Open hatch only.
NOTE: Night vision devices may permit targetZICqUISltlOrI at greater ranges than shown;however, the optimal point is when weapon sighteffectiveness coincides with weapon rangeeffectiveness.
2-24
FM 100-5—
1,
TRENDS: MINE WARFARE
During WW II, extensive use of mines by dispensers, artillery, and helicopter systems.defending forces contributed significantly to IJsing hand-emplaced mines, the averagethe destruction of attacking tank forces. infantry company takes nearly eight hours toHowever, the requirement to hand-emplace lay a 350 by 250 meter minefield. Usingmines severely hampered tactical scatterable mines, this same minefield can beemployment. Because of the time, manpower, layed in a matter of minutes. This rapidand logistic support required, mines were delivery system allows the tacticalemplaced before an enemy attacked and commander to quickly emplace minesminefield locations were based on the directly in front or on top of an advancingcommander’s analysis of how the enemy enemy.would attack and use the terrain, rather than As enemy forces approach and come withinon the enem y’s actual movements. range of our ATGM and tanks, mines can be
During the past few decades, mines were delivered to canalize and slow the attack.relatively inefficient because of the large Thus, the use of mines now provides neededamount of explosives required to impair the time for our tank and ATGM gunners to
mobility or destroy a tank. In the mid-’70s, engage the massive array of targets.
however, the IJS made dramatic advances in These improvements in mines have madeincreasing mine lethality while decreasing them a more dynamic part of modern battle,size. This decreased size now permits the and have significantly enhanced our anti-rapid delivery of scatterable mines by ground armor capability. -
I M15
GROUND DISPENSEDSCATTERABLE MINES
This chart depicts almost a fourfold increasein the mine laying capacity of oneengineer platoon.
2-25
—FM 100-5
TRENDS: WAR IN THEELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
In the mid-’7Os, there were very fewweapon systems or military organizationswhich were not dependent to an extent uponusing portions of the electromagneticspectrum. As modern armies strive for moreefficient command and control, betterbattlefield surveillance, and increased targetacquisition capabilities, they have bothopened new opportunities for battle successand created new vulnerabilities. Thefollowing diagram illustrates howextensively the military uses the spectrum:
+-- 3 MHz TO 300 GHz .—)1 i~m “..’*’. ~
,,
,..,,
“:fii&Mi;w@kPm$,.,
.’
Use of the electromagnetic environment future, an invisible, yet crucial struggle willhas added a new dim-ension to battle— be waged to attack or defeti the means ofelectronic warfare (EW). The lessons of command—the key to concentrating forces—World War II, and every military action or to suppress or to deceive weapons andsince, stress that combat power is useless surveillance systems. Countermeasures willunless it can be brought to bear quickly—at be met by countermeasures. Battles may bethe right point, and at the right time. In the won or lost by the fight in this medium.
2-26
\
FM 100-5—
The effects of EW can result in significantcasualties among an enemy force. In theattack and defense, EW can locate and jamenemy communication emitters associatedwith CPS, maneuver battalions, and fire
ACQUISITION SYSTEMS CAN BE quest nets, thereby disrupting commandTOTALLY DISRUPTED THROUGH and control movement Of reserves> and
DECEPTION AND JAMMING reducing effective fire support. Other enemyOF EMITTERS emitters associated with acquisition systems,
such as radar and lasers, are equallyvulnerable to total disruption throughjamming and deception. EW can reducefriendly casualties by locating attackingenemy elements so they can be fired upon,and by countering enemy target acquisitionand jamming.
1All modern armies possesspowerful transmitters fordeliberate jamming or blockingparts of the spectrum. Moreover,all have equipment for locatinganemitter. Using direction finding(DF) procedures, it is possible topinpoint a radaremitter within 50meters and a UHF communica-tions emitter within a CEP of 1km. Effective OF targetacquisition range tends to be lessthan US VHF radio communica-tions ranges. but all radiosoperating within a US forwardbrigade are vulnerable to OF. Ifthere is an unobstructed line-of-sight betweenthe OF stationsandany radio in the brigadearea,thatradio can be intercepted andlocated.
I I.-. , ,.
a .
VHF DF TAR-GETING RANGE
VHF VOICECOMM RANGE
KILOMETERS 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
The Middle East War of 1973 showed the systems which controlled opposing surface-payoff for EW. Both sides were well-equipped, to-air missiles. Electronic sensing devices,and both used electronic measures and radar, and infrared were used to locatecountermeasures in conjunction with combat ground forces, even foot patrols, and to takepower. For example, suppression of air them under fire. Tank attacks were met withdefenses featured concerted direction barrages of radio jamming designed to blockfinding, extensive electronic jamming, and effective use of tactical radios foruse of homing missiles to eliminate the radar coordinating movement and fires.
/
Any commander is prone to defeat, whatever hisstrength in numbers and weapons, if EW denieshim the means to convey orders, provide for firesupport, or to arrange for logistics andadministration. EW is now a form of combatpower.
2-27
——
—FM 100-5
/’
TRENDS: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
At the close of WW II, the IJS became thefirst nation to develop and employ nuclearweapons. Following the war and into the ‘50s,many persons thought that all future warswould be strategic nuclear conflicts. As morenations became nuclear capable and a viablesecond strike option became a reality, theadvantage to be accrued from the use ofstrategic nuclear weapons diminished.Recognizing this transition and to meet theneeds of lower levels of conflict and flexibleresponse, the IJS began to focus on the
FROM COIUVENTIONAL WAR TO development of battlefield nuclear weaponsNUCLEAR WAR TO to support the forward defense and flexible
CONVENTIONAL-NUCLEAR WAR response strategy. With these developments,the pendulum has swung from conv&tionalwar to nucIear war and now to the presentconcept of conventional-nuclear war.-
C1
rHERMONUCL TEGIC ARMSATION TR EATY
(SALT)
‘R(:T>*,.*4 .!*<
.
BEGINNING OF LOW YIELD TESTS
\~~””””” -, :+1 !’[
�
This chart depicts the strategicand tacticalemployment capabilityof the US and theSoviet Union. While parityexistsin the strategicweapons, the US retainssuperiorityin the capability to tacticallyemploy nuclear weapons.
2-28
FM 100-5—
New battlefield nuclearweapons are being developedwhich will enhance the effectof initial radiation toincapacitate enemy forces.These weapons reduce thedamage radius for blast andthermal casualtiesand presentless potential for damage tofriendly force or nearbycommunities.
Other weapons beingdeveloped for attackingmateriel and fixed, hardenedtargets will produce increasedblast, while decreasing theproduction of radioactivedebris and fallout.
To improve the responsive-ness of nuclear weapons onthe modern battlefield, newweapons will require fewerpersonnel, less supportequipment, and will facilitatemore rapid assembly andcheck out by delivery unitpersonnel.
The current US arsenal of nuclear weaponsincludes numerous medium to very low yieldweapons delivered by short and mid-rangesystems. To provide for maximum utility on thebattlefield, while at the sam~ time minimizing riskto friendly forces, civilian personnel andstructures, the development trend of battlefieldnuclear weapons is toward tailored effect
I .,~..;..? P?EOICTEDSIGN~,,,.,
l,. (SAME YIELO,WINDSH
.“,
y...-- ..;
,, .,.. ,
;. #
Advances are being made in nuclear delivery units. Over the past decade, theweapons survivability- in a conventional, tremendous increase in tem-orist activity haschemical, or nuclear environment. Command resulted in increased requirements forand control systems and devices are weapons security. These requirements arecontinually being improved. These being met while retaining availability andimprovements permit a safer, more secure responsiveness of nuclear weapons to thedispersal of battlefield nuclear weapons to tactical commander.
2-29
—
—.
–FM 100-5
TRENDS: MOBILITY AND TEMPO
-
TacticaJMobility. Since World War II, allarmed forces have pursued heightenedmobility through advanced technology andorganizational forms adapted to new meansof moving, shooting, and communicating. Bythe mid-’7Os, there was a pronouncedorganizational trend toward increasing thepercentage of armored and mechanizedtroops in Soviet-equipped ground forces.Airmobility was also being stressed,although less prominently than in {JSdoctrine. There are, however, increasingindications of added reliance on attackhelicopters in an antitank role in directsupport of maneuver elements.
US organizational trends since 1945 haveevidenced an army striving to increasetactical mobility. While the percentage ofarmored or mechanized forces has risen in
THE “AIRMOBILE” CONCEPT IS ‘he ‘s .ArrnY~ the most dramaticTHE MOST DRAMATIC wwnlzatlonal advance has been the
ORGANIZATIONAL ADVANCE IN adoption of the “airmobile” concept. WithTHE US ARMY combat experience in Southeast Asia, the US
Army is the world’s foremost exponent ofairmobility. By the mid-’7Os, the US hadfielded organizations designed to moveinfantry and artillery about the battlefieldrapidly by helicopter, plus air cavalry andattack helicopter forces. The US, almostuniquely, regarded air cavalry as beingimportant for reconnaissance and economyof force, a way for a commander to exertinfluence over large areas. Attack helicopterunits provided a ground commander anaerial antitank force with a day and nightmobility differential 10 to 20 times greaterthan armored reserves.
Strategic Mobility. A nation’s ability toproject combat forces rapidly to any place inthe world may shape its national power.Since future conflicts are likely to be short
2-30
FM 100-5—
and violent, the need for a swift build-up ofcombat units is greater than ever before.Forces must not only be trained forimmediate commitment to battle, but theymust be provided the means to transportthem to the scene of the conflict.
Sealift has long been the traditional meansfor projecting US combat power abroad. Andit remains today the backbone of strategicmobility. Without it, very large forces cannotbe deployed or continuously resupplied. Theadvent of modern roll on\roll off shippingand containerization has significantlyreduced the time required to deploy largeforces. The US Navy, responsible for keeping The most dramatic increase, however, inthe sea lanes open, and American and allied strategic mobility for US land forces hasshipping can provide US land forces come about via airlift.significant capabilities to operate overseas.
Iul!Lg!s$ 1000 2000 3000 4000
C47 - ~
C130 ~
c5*~
Aircraft designedfor inter-theaterairlifthave a 13-fold increasein payloadand a6-fold increase in capacity over theirWW II predecessors. With the C5,tanks, APCS, artillery pieces, andhelicopterscan be aidanded overseasinhours. All in all, considering payload,range, and speed, the C5 is 100 timesmore productive than its World War 11counterpart, the C47.
‘SPEED MORE THAN 500 MPH– More than
twice that of the C47
2-31
—FM 100-5
Fifty years ago, a highly trained armydivision was considered capable ofadvancing only 2 to 4 km per day. In 1939, theGerman Army introduced the world to“lightning war,” the Blitzkrieg. In France,after three days spent penetrating the thickArdennes forest and closing up to the RiverMeuse, Guderian’s XIX Corps covered 250 km
to the English Channel in 8 days, averaging —30.5 km a day (its best drive in one day was 90km). Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division covered177 km in 8 days at 22 km average per day. InRussia, German initial rates of advance weresimilar. Guderian’s 2d Panzer Group covered665 km in 24 days, averaging 28 km per day(its best advance in one day was 120 km).
FINAL OBJECTIVEOBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE OF THE DAY
WORLD WAR II
1941 1.5 – 2.5 — 3–4
1942 2–3 — 4 –6
1943 2 –4 — 5–7
1944 3–5 5–7 10– 12
1945 3 –5 6 –8 18–20
akkEmT,.,,
is – 20., ~.;..,,,....,.. ,
k,”” 3s—404
The Soviet Army in WW II quickly learned the value of maintaining high rates of
advance and of driving for deep objectives.This table, taken from a mid-’7O Sovietsource, shows the trend toward thegreaterdepth of objectivesassignedto Red Armydivisions.
As can be seen from the table, the Sovietsperceive division objectives ten times deeperthan they sought at the outset of World WarII.
Soviet Army doctrine strongly holds thatmobility and a high tempo of combatoperations bring success in battle; they hold
The commander who seeks aspecific modern battlefield
this to be especially true in nuclear warfare—a high rate of advance reduces the danger oftroop destruction by enemy nuclear strikes.Forces opposing Soviet equipped and trainedtroops must expect intense, highly mobilecombat. Battle will be fought on a scale andat a tempo rarely seen in all history.
greater understanding of amust first appreciate the
potential of the world’s first line armies. The leader on themodern battlefield must be an expert in weapons effects andemployment—both his own and those of the enemy. War isbecoming increasingly complex. Morale and motivation mustbe backed up in weapons and tactical proficiency.
2-32
..
CHAPTER 3
How to Fight
FUTURE BAT’I’LE
IN CHAPTER 2, the impact of modern weapons on the modern
battlefield was discussed in detail. Changes in intensity and
lethality of modern battle and the need to fight outnumbered
present the US Army with challenges greater than those facedon previous battlefields. The objective, however, remainsunchanged—to win the land battle. Therefore, the US Armymust obtain the maximum combat effectiveness of all forces inthe combined arms team. To achieve this effectiveness ourArmy depends on sound doctrine. This doctrine must bederived from an accurate assessment of the dynamics ofmodern battle, and an understanding of all its implications.Then to be effective, this doctrine must be communicatedthroughout our forces.
CONTENTSPAGE
FUTURE BATTLE 3-1
LEADERSHIP 3-2
TERRAIN 3-2
BATTLEFIELD DYNAMICS 3-3
GENERALS: CONCENTRATING THEFORCES 3-5
COLONELS: DIRECTING THE BATTLE 3-9
COMBINED ARMS TEAMWORK 3-1o
CAPTAINS: FIGHTING THE BATTLE 3-11
COMMAND AND CONTROL ANDCOMMUNICATIONS (C3) 3-15
NIGHT OPERATIONS 3-17
OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) 3-17
The most demanding mission that could beassigned the US Army remains battle inCentral EuroRe against the forces of theWarsaw Pact.- How-to fight the-conventionalbattle in that environment is the mw~ose ofthis chapter. The forces of NATO- may,however; be called upon to conductconventional-nuclear as well as purelyconventional operations. Chapter 10discusses these operations and the associatedweapons effects and implications.Additionally, the problems, tactics andtechniques associated with the conduct oftactical nuclear warfare will be treated in aseparate manual of the 100-series.
3-1
—FM 100-5
LEADERSHIP
Modern combat can be sustained at highlevels of intensity, day and night, forprolonged periods. At the outset, let usrecognize that winning in such battledemands courage, audacity, confidence, andstamina. But tactical and technicalproficiency is equally important—we mustnot compensate for a lack of competenceamong our leaders with the bravery of oursoldiers.
Troops in combat at any echelon need astrong, cool, thoughtful, resourceful leadercapable of welding his followers into acohesive unit. Such a leader promotescohesion by inculcating discipline, a sense ofduty, a conscious pride of unit, and a feelingof mutual trust and obligation among itsmembers. Such a leader is prepared to exploitany opportunity on the battlefield withenergy and boldness. Because commandcommunications may be sparse,intermittent, or at crucial times, none-xistent,he must act responsibly and intelligently onhis own. The strength of our Army lies in thedecentralization of responsibility andauthority to the commander on the ground.We cannot afford to lose that additional +combat effectiveness which derives from theintelligent actions of trained leaders
OUR FIGHTING ABILITY WILL BE operating under a flexible system of mission-DETERMINED BY HOW WELL WE type orders. Thus, each officer must be
TRAIN OUR LEADERS imbued with the idea that success will dependupon the skill, initiative, and imaginationwith which he seeks to accomplish theassigned mission within the intent andconcept of his commander. Our success infinding and training such leaders willdetermine how well we are able to fight.
TERRAINLand battle takes place amid the variances
of the ground and the works of man upon it.Relief, surface conditions, drainage,vegetation, highways, cities and farms—these and countless other features of theearth’s surface profoundly affect combat. ForGenerals, terrain is mainly a matter ofcommunications: how the ground and man-built facilities influence strategic ingress,large scale troop movements, and logistics.
3-2
FM 100-5—
For Colonels, Captains and other leaders,terrain is mainly a matter of weapon systemsemployment: observation, fields of fire, coverand concealment. Corps and divisioncommanders consider road and railnetworks, airfields and ports, major terraincompartments, large bodies of water, andextensive built-up areas. Brigade, battalion,and company commanders look fordominating heights, weapon sites, fields offire, shielding hills, depressions, buildings,and terrain aids or impediments tomovement.
The range, accuracy, and destructiveeffects of weapon systems employed on thecontemporary battlefield impose fatal FAILURE TO MAKE FULLpenalties upon units and individuals failing PROTECTIVE USE OF TERRAINto make full protective use of terrain. For CAN PROVE FATALexample, we must move via covered andconcealed routes to mask friendly forces fromenemy observations and fires and fight fromskillfully camouflaged battle positions withfrontal cover in the suspected or knowndirection of the enemy.
The tactical leader visualizes what terraincan do for the enemy. He then positions ormaneuvers his forces on the ground to outwitand outfight the enemy. Terrain, therefore,provides a combat equalizer or multiplierwhen the tactician uses its strengths andreinforces its natural advantages throughmining, barriers, and other obstacles.
BA’M’LEFIELD DYNAMICSTo win a battle, four prerequisites must be
met:
1. Adequate forces and weapons must beconcentrated at the critical times and places.The combination is combat power.
2. The battle m ust be contro//edanddirected sothat the maximum effect of fire and maneuveris concentrated at decisive locations.
3. The battle must be fought using cover,concealment, suppression, andcombined armsteamwork to maximize the effectiveness of ourweapons and to minimize the effectiveness ofenemy weapons.
4 Our teams and crews must be trained to usethe maximum capabilities of their weapons.
3-3
—FM 100-5
If all these functions are performed - *correctly and on time, and if the resultingcombat power is skillfully applied byaggressive, confident leaders and cohesiveunits, then the enemy will be destroyed ordefeated—the mission of the force will beaccomplished.
GENERALS-CONCENTRATETHE FORCES
COLONELS—CONTROL ANDDIRECT THE BATTLE
CAPTAINS—FIGHT THE BAITLE
THE SKILLFUL COMMANDERSUBSTITUTES FIREPOWER FOR
MANPOWER WHENEVER HE CANDO SO
In the division of responsibilities on thebattlefield, Generals commanding corps anddivisions concentrate the forces.
Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels ofbrigades and battalions control and directthe battle.
Captains and their companies, troops, andbatteries fight the battle.
The defender has many advantages: fulluse of cover and concealment, selection of theground on which to fight, weapons sited formaximum effectiveness, reinforcement ofterrain with mines and obstacles, and thechoice of firing first. Because of theseadvantages, the defending force should beable to defeat an attacker superior in combatpower by a ratio of about 3:1.
The attacker, on the other hand, mustexpose his force by moving to contact, mustfight on ground selected by the defender, -must clear mines and obstacles while underfire, and must destroy or suppress weaponswhich have taken full advantage of cover andconcealment. Therefore, the weapons of theattacker are not as effective as the weapons ofthe defender, and his forces are morevulnerable. For these reasons, the attackershould seek a combat power ratio of at least6:1 at the point of decision. If he is short onforces, he must make it up in firepower,surprise, deception, or superior skill.
Whether on the offense or the defense, USArmy forces must exploit to the maximumthe mobility of our weapons systems. Swiftlymassed field artillery, totally mobile tankand mechanized infantry battalions,airmobile antiarmor weapons, attackhelicopters, close air support aircraft and, insome circumstances, tactical employment ofnuclear weapons offers us the means toconcentrate overwhelming combat powerand to decisively alter force ratios when andwhere we choose.
3-4
.—
FM 100-5—
- GENERALS: CONCENTRATINGTHE FORCES
The Employment of Large Units.There are many things Generals ought to do.But there is one thing they must do: deploytheir forces so that on the defense they arenever outnumbered or outgunned more than3:1 at the point and time of decision, and sothat in the attack they have concentratedcombat power of about 6:1 superiority.Obviously, these ratios are not fixed, but theyconvey a realistic approximation of therequirement. There are many ways to achievethe necessary su eriority, including surprise,
$shock, and spee . Regardless of strength, asleeping, bewildered, or terrified enemy doesnot comprise an effective force. Colonels andCaptains attack or defend when ordered,regardless of force ratios. But they alwaysseek to develop the maximum combat powerwithin their capabilities. Nonetheless, aconcern with force ratios and the means ofaltering them in our favor is central to theresponsibilities of the Generals.
It is almost inevitable that initially we willbe outnumbered in the theater of war. But,whether the mission is to crush an enemyattack or to launch an offensive operation, itis the job of the corps and divisioncommanders to bring about a winningconcentration of force at the point of actualcombat. Concentration of force-or combatpower —includes provision of logistic supportfor maneuver elements (ammunition, POLand forward maintenance). To concentrate atthe right place, everytime, corps and divisioncommanders must be prime intelligenceoperators. To concentrate in time alsorequires continuous, instant communica-tions. Concentrating forces at the criticalplace at the right time is of course, a two-sidedgame. The enemy will endeavor to beat us atthis game by matching our buildup as weconcentrate to attack, or by overmatchingour buildup as we concentrate to defend.
Intelligence. In the defense, the corps anddivision commanders must ascertain thelocation and direction of the enem ‘s main or
ibreakth}ou h effort. He must do t is as soon%as possible ecause the defense is a race for
time. Only corps and division commandershave the resources to “see” into the enemyrear far enough to detect his major thrustbefore it overwhelms the initial defenders.
MASSIVE AND VIOLENTFIREPOWER IS A CHIEFINGREDIENT OF COMBATPOWER
FIREPOWER SAVES MANPOWERAND THUS SAVES LIVES
TO CONCENTRATE AT THERIGHT PLACE EVERYTIME,COMMANDERS MUST BE PRIMEINTELLIGENCE OPERATORS
THE DEFENSE IS A RACE FORTIME TO DETECT THE ENEMY’SMAIN THRUST AND TOCONCENTRATE COMBAT POWER
3-5
– FM 100-5
In the attack, the corps and divisioncommanders must select a time and placewhere the enemy is weak, and by the use ofmobility and deception, overwhelm himthere. Intelligence fkom all sources will berequired.Some sources are tactical and someare strategic or national in nature. He willneed them all.
Defense! Covering Force.
Corps and division commanders inthe defense may use strong coveringforces, at least in the initial battle. Thechief mission of these forces must be tofight with sufficient strength andtenacity to force the enemy to disclosethe size and directionof his main attack,and to buy time while defending forcesconcentrate m front of the main thrust.Reinforced cavalry is well suited foremployment as covering forces.
Defense: Main Battle Area.
Once the corps or divisioncommander ascertains the area ofenemy concentration, he must moueswiftly. The attacker is seeking adecisive superiority, and will win if heachieves it. The defender must reinforcerapidly and continuously until he hasconcentrated an adequate defensiveforce.
In mounted warfare, armored andmechanized elements must be set inmotion toward battle positions in thepath of the enemy thrust. Artillery mustbe concentrated. The terrain must bereinforced by means of barriers andobstacles. Attack helicopters and USAir Force aircraft can concentrateheavy firepower even before reinforcingground elements can be committed inreinforcement.
DECISIVE RESULTS REQUIRESKILLFUL CONCENTRATION OF
COMBAT POWER
Soviet doctrine calls for theconcentration of forces of up to sixdivisions echeloned in depth on a 10 to12 kilometer fkont. For example, theattack could involve three successiveechelons of two divisions each. Thiswould put 20 to 25 battalions and up to600 tanks in the first echelons. Armydivision commanders must be preparedto shift firepower to meet this thrust,and to concentrate up to 6 or 8 heavilysupported maneuver battalions in suchnarrow sectors, accepting risks on theflanks.
The Army is increasingly mobile. Bold,skillful and quick thinking commanderscan concentrate combat power wherethey need it to win.
Offense: Surprise andDeception.
If a smaller force is to win against alarge force, it must eventually take theoffensive. It may be necessary first toweaken the enemy by defensiveoperations, but decisive results requirethat the smaller force go over to theattack, penetrate or outflank the enemy,and destroy his support, his commandand control, and, eventually, hisdisorganized combat elements.
OUTNUMBERED FORCESCANNOT AFFORD MISTAKES
If a smaller force is to concentratesuperior combat power at the point ofdecision, corps and divisioncommanders must employ surprise and
3-6
.
FM 100-5—
ieception as well as the full mobility ofthe force. Just as in the defense, theconcentration of forces for the attack is arace for time. If we concentrate slowly or~penly, the enemy will match ourbuildup in the critical area and we willnot achieve the necessary superiority fora successful attack. Worse still, we willtake heavy losses with no follow-onsuccess. Outnumbered forces cannotafford such mistakes. Movement atnight over long distances, electronicdeception, diversions, camouflage, andcommunications security-these andother countermeasures against allenemy intelligence collectors andsensors are required.
Offense: Shock Effect.
In the attack, corps and divisioncommanders must concentrateoverwhelming forces and firepowerwhere and when the enemy is relativelyweak. To do so, the commander mustattack on very narrow fronts in greatdepth, and sustain his attack bycommitting follow-on echelons as soonas the momentum of the attack showsany signs of slowing. The cumulativeeffect on the enemy of such tactics areoften shock and paralysis. If it ispossible to attack at night, the shockeffect is increased. In the daytime,smoke, artillery, and air delivered minescan isolate the point of penetration fromenemy reserves and adjacent forces.Such isolation of small enemy unitsfaced by overwhelming force alsoinduces shock and panic. The greaterthe violence the attacking force cangenerate in the immediate battle area,the lower its casuulty rate will be.,
If, in addition to mass, attackingforces utilize the cover of the terrain, andsuppress or obscure the enemy gunnerswhile maintaining forward momentum,the attack will succeed.
Fire Support. A principal component ofcombat power is indirect fire. The fieldartillery provides:
� Fires in support of the scheme of maneuver,including destruction or suppressionof directfire weapons.
� CounterFires to suppress or destroy theenemy’s indirect fire weapons.
� Fires to suppress enemy air defenseweapons.
� Interdictionand deep fires on enemy logisticinstallations, reserves, command postscandcommunications.
Adequate fire support means must be readyfor massing at the critical point in the battle.Massed fires, especially when delivered withsurprise, are devastating, and a primarymethod of countering enemy mass. Corpsand division commanders must allocate fieldartillery resources to provide for massingfires. They must also:
� Establish target engagement criteriaspecifying what and when to shoot, and thetarget priority.
� Insure that the counterfire mission receivesadequate target acquisition means andweapons.
� Coordinate fire support of alltypes, includingtactical air, to insure mutual support and toavoid duplication.
� Provide for control of ammunitionexpenditures and resupply of ammunition.
Air Support and Air Defen8eSuppression. In addition to concentratingadequate forces and fires at the right placesand times to defend or attack, corps anddivision commanders must plan and conductjoint operations with the US Air Force(USAF), leading to effective air support of allcritical operations. The US Army reliek uponthe USAF for air superiority over thebattlefield and for reconnaissance support,particularly in deeper zones. The ArmYexpects the USAF to penetrate enemy airdefenses and to attack reserve and
3-7
–FM 100-5
ARMY AND AIR FORCEOPERATIONS REQUIRE JOINT
PLANNING AND SYNCHRONIZEDEMPLOYMENT
reinforcing units, fire support sites,command and control facilities, and logistic ..activities. The Army recognizes that airforces are most effective against the larger,more vulnerable targets deep in the enemy’srear.
However, at critical times and places wherevictory or defeat may hang in the balance,the Army requires close air support ofengaged ground forces. In the main battle,the Army wants and needs close air supportdirected against targets and forces selectedby the Captains and Colonels on theimmediate battlefield. In the face of heavysophisticated air defenses, the Arm y cancontribute to this effective close air support ifit wages with the USAF a successful airdefense suppression battle in the area of theground fighting. To this battle, the Armymust contribute intelligence collectingcapabilities, target designator capabilities,and both EW and firepower suppression ofenemy air defense systems.
Electronic Warfare. As with firepower,EW means can be concentrated to influencethe ratio of combat power. Enemy aviation,fire support units, and maneuver control ~headquarters above company, beingparticularly dependent upon electronicemitters of various kinds, are vulnerable toour EW. Therefore, our EW systems should bedeployed forward and EW commanders mustintegrate them into our total combat power.
Support Forward. The highercommander must also concentrate andmanage the support of his forces. He aims atperforming support functions essential tobattle as far forward among the fightingelements as possible. He enjoins leaders ofsupport elements to arm, fuel, fix and feedforward.
3-8
FM 100-5–
The commander sees to it that his combat .~ service support moves men and materials
forward to the fighters. They, in turn, insurethat support is properly protected, efficientlysited and managed. Supplies arethroughput—moved to the forward areaswithout off-loading. Maintenance teams(including higher echelon technical expertswhen appropriate) undertake maintenance,repair, and cannibalization forward on thefringe of the battle.
The commander checks repeatedly to seethat combat service support operations:
�RESPOND t. d,m~nds fO~ criticalsupplies and essential maintenance.
� MOVE to and with the forwardelements.
�ADAPT to changing situations(tailor resources to combat posture,and provide support from any basearrangement).
�APPLY support resources properly.
He sets priorities and insists they be- observed. He provides for realistic
replacement and expenditure rates, full use oflocal resources, security for stocks and linesof communications, and sound materielmanagement. When necessary, he assumesprudent logistic risks.
COLONELS: Bf&RfECTING THE
After the corps and division commandershave set in motion the necessaryconcentration of power, provided for airsupport through joint suppressionoperations, and established the systems ofmaintenance supply and other support, theymust turn over the immediate direction of thebattle to brigade and battalion commanders.The brigade and battalion commanders thenmust fit the forces to the ground andmaneuver against the enemy as the battledevelops, and coordinate the concentration offirepower.
THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCK INMOUNTED DEFENSIVE
WARFARE IS THECROSS-REINFORCED TANK ORMECHANIZED COMPANY TEAM
OR BATTALION TASK FORCE
In the defense, the brigade commander inthe critical area may assign battalion areasand sectors of defense, or he may simplyorder the occupation of designated battlepositions by battalion task forces orcombined arms company teams. In mounteddefensive warfare, the cross-reinforced tankor mechanized company team or battaliontask force is the basic building block. Bothhave a combined arms capability whensupported by field artillery and air defenseartillery and can move independently on thebattlefield. During critical phases of thedefensive battle, either brigade or battalioncommanders may move these task fomes orteams fi=ombattle position to battle position,or call upon them to counterattack alone or inconcert with other elements operating in adeep sector of a highly active defense. Whenthe situation requires heavier concentrationsof force on narrow sectors, the battle may befought by battalions rather than companies.This is particularly true of tank battalions,which may sometimes be massed for decisiveattacks or counterattacks.
In the attack, the brigade or battalioncommanders assign objectives, coordinate orconduct suppressive fire operations, andsupervise the conduct of operations bybattalions or companies.
In heavy combat, the battalion commanderparticipates directly in control of combatoperations. He deals personally withproblems of cover, concealment, suppression,and teamwork. He controls or supervisesweapons employment, suppressive fires,maneuver, and battlefield resupply. Thebattalion commander puts the combinedarms team together and keeps it togetheruntil the job is done.
3-
—FM 100-5
COMBINED ARMS TEAMWORKNo single weapon, no single arm, no single
service can hope to win on the modernbattlefield. In order to concentrate, fight, andwin, Army forces must move. To move in theface of lethal modern weapons, we must coverand conceal ourselves from them or suppressthem. To suppress them, we need all theweapons of the combined arms team, and weneed leaders who can use each and everyweapon system at peak efficiency. Eachelement of the combined arms team hasspecial capabilities for the destruction orsuppression of enemy weapons.Commanders must elicit the fill capability ofeach. Combined arms teamwork on a fastmoving battlefield requires highly developedand often practiced systems of standardoperating procedures for command, control,and coordination. These systems, calledtroop leading procedures, facilitate rapiddissemination of orders, conduct of necessaryreconnaissance, early movement of troops,and the fastest, most effective execution ofthe mission. The best troop leadingprocedures permit the commanders and thetroops of several echelons to workconcurrently so that the troops themselveshave the maximum amount of time on thedefensive position or in detailed preparationfor the attack.
The commander who employs hisweapons at their full effectiveness,reduces his vulnerability by using cover,concealment, and suppression, andmoves decisively on the battlefield toaccomplish his mission, has masteredthe command of the combined armsteam.
3-10
Infantry can destroy or suppress enemyinfantry and ground-mounted antitankweapons by dismounting and attacking orby using cannons and automatic weaponsfrom mechanized fighting vehicles. In thed#:l~;, infantry can employ long-,
-, and short-range antitankweapons and missiles. It can hold groundwhere fields of fire are short and terrain iscompartmented or jumbled. Infantry canorganize strong points, and, whenequipped with appropriate antitankweapons, infantry is extremely difficult todislodge or overcome.
Field artillery can destroy or suppressinfantry at short ranges, antitank guidedmissiles at medium ranges, and enemyartillery or air defense weapons at longranges. Suppression, of course, gives ahigh probability of destruction of enemyweapons if their gunners or crews fail totake evasive or protective action. Artillerycan destroy light-armored vehicles, andcan cause enemy tanks to lose a highpercentage of their effectiveness byforcing them to button-up. Artillery cansmoke enemy tanks and ATGM gunners,thus rendering their long-range firesineffective. And artillery can deliverscatterable mines to impede movement ofenemy forces or deny specific areas fortheir use.
Tanks can kill or suppress infantry withtheir machine guns, and kill enemy tankswith their main guns.
Attack helicopters can similarly destroyenemy tanks at long range.
Air Force aircraft can destroy orsuppress infantry ATGM, tanks andarmored vehicles, artillery and airdefenses.
Engineers can assist the movement offriendly forces and also degrade enemymobility through the use of barriers andobstacles.
Air Defense weapons can destroy orsuppress fighter aircraft.
Electronic Warfare units can destroythe enemy’s ability to command, controland communicate.
FM 100-5—
CAPTAINS: FIGHTING THE BATTLE
The company commander, the platoonleaders, and the squad leaders or tankcommanders fight the battle. At theseechelons, cover, concealment, suppres-sion, and teamwork are the rules by whichthe battle is fought. For example, thecompany commander decides on a reverseslope defense—the platoon leader places histanks in selected hull down positions—andthe tank commander fires the first shot.
At the fighting level, success depends uponthe proficiency of the crews or individuals
who serve the weapons and the skill of thecommanders who employ and emplace them.The Captain must understand completely thecapabilities and limitations of his weapons,and those of the enemy, and how theyinteract with other weapons and the terrain.
Above all, he must lead and train his mendecisively, so that they know he willaccomplish the unit mission by inflictingmaximum casualties on the enemy whileminimizing his own losses. Soldiers willfollow such a leader.
3- 11
—FM 100-5
Each weapon system will have its ownpeculiar requirements for cover. andcover will provide differing advantagesto each. Foratankplatoon leader,covermay be a ridge, a hill, a streambed. Forthe rifle team leader, cover may becorners of buildings, an upstairswindow, a wall, a mound. For a rifleplatoon leader, cover may be adepression,or it might be foxholes withfrental parapets.
QUANTITY OF PROTECTIVE MATERIALREQUIRED TO PROVIDE PROTECTIONFROM INCOMING ROUNDS ATMAXIMUM VELOCITY
REQUIRED FOR:
m 23NlM A?
m 7.62X 39 API
P;&$? 7,62 X 54 BALL
REIJ4TIVE PROTECTIONAGAINST VT-FUZEDINDIRECT FIRE
Individual foxholes provide a 10-fold orgreater reduction in casualtiesagainstimpact fuzed artillery ammunition.Against VT-fuzed indirect fire, theadvantage of foxholes is also clear:
PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES
.—.
.:”’’/-!
.
F ‘- . . . .. .
INCREASING NUMBER OF ROUNDS ,=mm,mggi,,-,~}r
3-12
FM 100-5—
“1.0
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
.0
Concealment. Modern weapons have very high hit and kill probabilitiesagainst point targets at long ranges.
Antitank guided missiles are watching or suppressing elementsparticularly accurate even against should remain covered and concealedmoving targets. Therefore, forward to the maximum extent possible;fighting elements should remain forward moving elements should moveconcealed until it is necessaryfor them by covered routes, Every wrinkle of theto break into the open in the attack or terrain should be used to decreasecounterattack. Even then, over- vulnerability.
PROBABILITY OF FIRST ROUND KILLSAGGER SHOOTING AT M60A1
I.. ‘i!
I
..--.s ..”. ,... -.
-. ...- ---- L. --- ~TARGEr FULLY k)(POSED
.. . .
.-.
. .
. . . .
.-. .7*
.... .-~’
ITARGET FULLY EXPOSED ANDMOVING AT 12 MPH
ITARGET STATIONARY AND INHULL DEFILADE
METERS 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Suppression. The proper use of cover and cover and move in the open on the battlefield,concealment, both natural and man-made, there is one other fundamental techniquegreatly reduces the vulnerability of forces upon which success of failure is almostand weapons; measures such as firing first wholly dependent: suppression.and the coordination of obstacles and firesgreatly increases the effectiveness of forces It is, of course, desirable to destroy enemyand weapons. When it is necessary to break weapons whenever possible, but a well-
3-13
—FM 100-5
trained, well-positioned enemy force is hardto destroy. When under tank, artillery,mortar or automatic weapons fire, hisinfantry can simply “go to ground.” Histanks can pull back into defilade or button-up. His ATGM gunners can leave theirweapons and go into shelter. His artillery cancease fire and take cover.
Armored forces are more difficult tosuppress than dismounted forces, andarmored forces can often continue to delivereffective fires despite attempts to suppressthem. However, the use of smoke to blind the
SUPPRESSION REQUIRES gunners in armored vehicles is effective.COMBINED ARMS TEAMWORK Artillery-delivered smoke is extremely
OF THE HIGH EST ORDER effective against ATGM as well. Certainenemy weapons, such as radar-directed airdefense weapons, can be suppressed byelectronic countermeasures (ECM)—jamming is one example.
Forward maneuver elements must betrained to suppress enemy weapons or theywill suffer unacceptable losses every timethey break cover or shed concealment. The <conduct of effective suppression over all theranges, and against all the weapons whichpose a threat to Army forces moving on thebattlefield requires combined armsteamwork of the highest order.
Teamwork. The Captain must know howto combine his maneuver with suppression.He must know that tanks should not seekduels with ATGM at ranges beyond 2000 .meters. Conversely, he should not permitenemy tanks to close with his ATGM wherethe tank has the advantage through armor,mobility, and a high rate of fire. He mustknow how to site his weapons and place hisobstacles to increase the effectiveness ofboth. He must train his gunners to fire first
THE CAPTAIN MUST TRAIN HIS and fire accurately. He must be able toGUNNERS TO FIRE FIRST ANDTO distribute his fires across many
FIR E ACCURATELY simultaneously appearing targets. Whentanks, ATGM, artillery, attack helicopters,and close air support are all available, firmcontrol of fire distribution will be essential.Multiple kills on one target resulting in the
3-14
FM 100-5—
absence of coverage of all targets will spelldefeat. This is one of the greatest challengeson the modem battlefield and techniquesmust be devised to solve the problem atplatoon, company, and battalion level.
COMMAND AND CONTROL ANDCOMMUNICATIONS (C3).
If the smaller force is to win against alarger force, it must be more agile and more intune with the flow of the battle. It cannotafford to be in the wrong place at the wrongtime. It cannot afford to be surprised, tricked, COIUIIUIAIUDERS IVIIJSTBEor by-passed by large forces. This means our FORWARD TO SEE, FEEL, ANDcommanders must know more about their CONTROL THE BATTLEown units and the enemy actions than theenemy commanders know about the battlesituation. The prime requirement is forcommanders to be forward where they cansee, feel, and control the battle. The staffsmust feed essential, and only essential,information on fi-iendly, enemy, and firesupport matters to these forwardcommanders. Not since the war between theNorth and the South, will commanders ofbrigades and divisions as well as battalionsbe so personally and closely involved in thebattlefield direction of combat elements.
Obviously, the conduct of any active highlymobile operation, as set forth in this manual,demands continuous reliable communica-tions. Commanders must be able tocommunicate with each other, within theirunits, and with fire support elements andsupporting staffs.
At battalion and brigade level, the problemwill be compounded by the necessity for thecommander to omrate far forward, inamored vehicles. - Battalion and brigade DEpUTy COMMANDERS ANDtactical command. grOUpSml! c:?slst of only EXECUTIVE OFFICERS MUST BEtwo or three vehl~les; the dnmaon tactical READY TO TAKE COMMANDcommand post Will not have many more.There will be greater losses amongcommanders; deputies and executive officersmust be informed and ready to takecommand.
3-15
-=——-=——.—-.————— ._. .. —.=_—.=._..=-—..-—..--.-—=.-==-.=ss
—FM 100-5
Commander to commander communi-cationfrom division down will normallybe eye-ball to eye-ball or FM securevoice. Fire support communicationswill be FM secure voice; communica-tion from staff to staff will often betelephone multichannel and teletype.
It is necessary to understand thepriorities of communication. First iscommander to commander—realtime—all the time. Second is firesupport. Third is combat information(information on enemy actions whichrequires an immediate operationalresponse) which always travels oncommand or operational nets fromcorps level and below. Fourth, iscombat service support of the majorcombat weapons systems.
FIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS
STAFF TO STAFF COMMUNICATIONS x x
I(DCOMMANDER TO COMMANDER I[@ FIRE SUPPORT I
Ml~ COMBAT INFORMATION I
l@ COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT I
.---’
Staffs support commanders. They provide analysis takes place no lower than division24 hour radio links to higher and adjacent and is mainly at corps. They support theheadquarters; they channel intelligence commander’s decisions by arranging orinformation up to the levels where it can be directing the movement of reserves, fireassembled with all other information, support, or service support. They take all ~analyzed, and put to operational use. This actions required to support the plan.
The division directs the counterfireprogram. The division and corps directEW operations. The division and corps,in concert with the Air Force, directintelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance operations. The corpsdirectsairdefensesuppression,again inconcert with the Air Force. The AirForcedirects non-divisional airdefenseweapons and coordinates divisionalweapons. Corps, divisions, and,sometimes, brigade and air defenseunits participatein the management ofair space.
COUNTERFIRE PROGRAM “ “ ‘_ ~
EW OPERATIONS “ )(x
INTEL, SURV, RECON OPNS ‘“ X1X1X
AIR DEFENSE SUPPRESSION : X1X— — m
AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ‘~ “ ‘ “,-. x
AIR SPACE MANAGEMENT [~ xx ~
All of these latter responsibilities require multichannel communicationbetween staffs and headquarters. They must all expect jamming anddeception and train to work through or around it.
3-16
� �� �� � A—— —A—l . . . . .
FM 100-5—
~ NIGHT OPERATIONS
Passive viewers and sights will soonenable the US Army to fight at night almostas we do in the day. This equipment will havesufficient range and clarity that tanks,mechanized infantry, cavalry, and attackhelicopters can conduct both offensive anddefensive combat operations at night andduring reduced visibility. Fundamentaltactics—cover, concealment, suppression,and teamwork-will not be restricted todaylight operations. Night sight ranges willbe equivalent to weapons ranges. Nightmaneuver speeds will approach daylightmaneuver capability. Armor andmechanized forces will be able, at fulleffectiveness, to attack and to maneuver withsupporting fires. Continuity of operationsthrough night and poor visibility will providecommanders a decisive advantage overenemy forces less well-equipped and lessprepared for these conditions.
OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)
In the battlefield area, OPSEC is the art ofapplication of signal security (SIGSEC),physical security, information security, anddeception to deny the enemy knowledge ofour operations and activities. OPSEC mustbe considered both before and during thebattle to conceal potentially revealingtraining, logistical, personnel, and otheradministrative and support activities. ForGenerals, OPSEC includes strageticdeception, large scale feints, and majordemonstrations to deceive the enemy, as wellas stringent security measures to protect orprovide cover for those operations. ForColonels, Captains, and other leaders,OPSEC includes strict attention tocommunications security (COMSEC) andelectronic security (ELSEC), avoidance ofstereotyped activity patterns, strict control ofclassified information, and the correct use ofcamouflage, noise and light discipline, andother countersurveillance techniques.
The Battle Must Be Fought Using.-
� COVER
� CONCEALMENT
� SUPPRESSION
�TEAMWORK
3-17
CHAPTER 4
Offense
PURPOSE
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS are undertaken to:
� Destroy enemy forces.
� s ecure key terrain.
� Deprive the enemy of resources, demoralize him, anddestroy his will to continue the battle.
� Deceive and divert the enemy.
� Develop intelligence.
By taking the offensive, we gain the initiative, carry the fight tothe enemy, fight in his positions, and seek decision on ourterms.
CONTENTSPAGE
PURPOSE 4-1
WHEN TO AITACK 4-2
FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSE 4-3
COMBINED ARMS IN THE AITACK 4-7
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 4-9
OTHER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 4-12
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THE COMMANDER ATTACKSWHEN HE BELl EVES HE CAN
INFLICT DISABLING LOSSES ONTHE ENEMY
AITACKS SET THE TEMPOOF BATTLE
INITIAL LOSSES CAN BE HIGHWHEN FIGHTING ON
ENEMY-SELECTED GROUND
WHEN TO ATTACKThe commander of larger forces weighs
carefully the ability of his force to overcomeenemy defenses and to cope with enemycounterstrokes. He undertakes the offensivewhenever he believes his maneuver and fireswill inflict disabling personnel and materiellosses on enemy units, neutralize majorforces, or accomplish some lesser effect for aspecific purpose.
The goal of some attacks is to establishcontrol over key terrain, airlanding or water-crossing sites, ports, oilfields or other naturalresources, roads, railways, or political,population, or communication centers.Capture of these features denies them to theenemy, controls them for our own purposes,and positions our forces for future operations.
Attacks are a prime source of informationabout enemy strengths, dispositions,weapons, morale, supply, and intentions.Some attacks are launched exclusively togain information. Some may have otherlimited objectives —to divert enemy reserves,to relieve other forces, or to spoil an enemyattack.
If the commander prepares his attack -skillfully, the enemy will not readily knowwhether the attack is for a limited objective orrepresents the onset of a major offensive.Therefore, attacks can be a means ofdeception whereby the commander can tie-down enemy units in defensive or blockingpositions while he concentrates major forceselsewhere. Attacks are central to setting thetempo of the battle. A commander can, with aquick thrust, break up an impending enemyattack or a congealing defense, while theenemy is concentrating. In an offensive,attacks delivered in rapid succession helpgain and maintain momentum, increasingpressure on enemy command-control, andheightening trauma among enemypersonnel.
A commander must know well theadvantages which normally accrue to thedefender, and recognize that initial lossesmay be high in an attack against a concealedand protected enemy fighting on ground ofhis choice. If a commander fightingoutnumbered estimates the cost of success to
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be high, he should attack only if he expectsthe eventual outcome to result in decisivelygreater enemy losses than his own, or resultin the capture of objectives crucial to theoutcome of the larger battle.
FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSE
Attacks are planned around six basicconcepts:
o See the battlefield.
eConcentrate overwhelming combatpower.
e Suppress enemy defensive fires.
@Shock, overwhelm and destroy theenemy.
eAttack deep into the enemy rear todestroy his system of defense.
o� Provide continuous mobile support.
See the Battlefield. Knowledge of theenemy is prerequisite to success. ‘We mustknow how the enemy intends to defend. Thecommander planning an attack must knowas much as possible about:
. The number, type, location, and strengthsof units opposing him.
. The capabilities and vulnerabilities ofweapons in enemy hands, and how henormally employs these weapons.
. The morale and physical condition of theenemy force.
To acquire this information, commandersand staffs at all echelons must develop athirst for information about enemy tacticsand weapons. They must relentlessly seek outtheir enemy’s weaknesses. The enemy cannotbe equally strong everywhere; therefore, thecommander must find where the enemy isleast strong or most vulnerable. The
commander must expect to launchintelligence, reconnaissance, or even combatoperations to locate main enemy forces andweapons, and identify areas where the enemyis weak or can be weakened. The mainpurpose of these operations is to determinewhere an attacker might succeed, and to findcovered and concealed avenues into theenemy’s weak area. That knowledge isunlikely to come to any commander solely outof intelligence staff work by his own, higher,or supporting staffs. The severe penaltiesthat can result from poor intelligence aboutthe enemy or terrain demand that eachcommander actively seek from all sources theinformation he needs to attack and win.
The coordination of intelligence gatheringoperations and utilization of all-sourceintelligence is the commander’s personalresponsibility. The better he sees the battle-field, the more surely he will concentrate hisforces at the right time and place.
SEEK ROUTES AFFORDINGCOVER AND CONCEALMENT
UTILIZE EVERY MEANSPOSSIBLE FOR GATHERING
INTELLIGENCE
Concentrate Overwhelming CombatPouter. The attacker must develop superiorcombat power where and when he wants it; ifhe does this correctly, the time and place ofhis choosing becomes the decisive point andcritical time.
DECEIVE THE ENEMY ANDFRUSTRATE HIS ABILITY TO
COLLECT INFORMATION
To succeed in the attack, the commandermust concentrate on a narrow front at a sitewhere the enemy is weak. Ordinarily an
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THE COMMANDER MUSTCONSIDER ALL MEANS OF
OPERATIONAL SECURITY
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMYWEAPONS IN THE CRITICAL
AREA MUST BE NULLIFIED
attacker can assemble the required forcesonly if he thins out his forces opposing the ~enemy elsewhere. This means he must moveforces to the point where his attack is to belaunched. To do this with tolerable risk, hemust deceive the enemy concerning thelocation, timing, direction, and strength ofhis attack. No means of deception andoperational security can be neglected. Theattacker must frustrate the enemy’s ability tocollect information about his force by carefuluse of terrain, camouflage, movement duringperiods of reduced visibility, decoys,electromagnetic countermeasures, and othermeans of countering or spoofing enemysurveillance.
The mobility of armored, mechanized,airborne and airmobile forces, and theflexibility of field artillery, Army aviationand tactical airpower, permit the commanderto redispose rapidly, mass at the last possiblemoment, and so achieve surprise. Infantryforces might infiltrate by stealth throughurban areas, across dificult terrain, or moveat night or in bad weather to seize criticalterrain in advance which, if held by theenemy, could seriously affect the probabilitythat the attacker could succeed.
Suppress the Enemy’s DefensiveFires. As forces concentrate, they becomeincreasingly vulnerable to enemy fires.Accordingly, maneuver must coincide withsuppressive strikes against enemy weaponswhich can interfere. These strikes must be ofsuch intensity and duration as to destroy orsubstantially degrade the effectiveness ofenemy weapons in the critical area. Eachcommander should express his priorities forsuppression so supporting field artillery andtactical air forces will know where to allocateresources and how to time the strikes orcountermeasures.
Air defense suppression is a prerequisite toclose air support. The suppression of enemyartillery-by air attack or counterbattery-isessential to avoid high losses. Suppression ofATGM and tanks at the point of attack bydirect fire, artillery and mortars, smoke, or
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air attack is essential. Darkness can be aform of suppression as it reduces the abilityof enemy gunners and combat vehicle crews.Coordination of suppression with themaneuver of forces is the essence of success.
Shock Overwhelm and Destroy theEnemy. Once the attack is launched, thecommander coordinates action to ensuremaximum speed, surprise, and violence.Maneuver elements cross exposed areas asrapidly as possible, their advance timed to THE AITACKMAXIMIZES SPEED,
coincide with intense suppressive fires, SURPRISE, AND VIOLENCE
supporting attacks, close- air support,electronic warfare, air defense support, andother operations. These actions build up inintensity for maximum effectiveness duringcritical moments of the attack. The attackmust be narrow and in depth. Attacking unitswhich become stalled or disorganized mustbe bypassed by fresh formations pressing onto deeper objectives. Once the initial attacktakes effect on the enemy, he must be allowedno let-up. Initial successes should causedislocation and redisposition of enemyforces, and this in turn destroys the integrity
~ of his defensive system.
The attacker must be alert to thesechanges, for in them lie new opportunities.we attacker, retaining his initiative, shif~s INlTIAL SUCCESS SHOULD BEhm forces to explolt each weakness that 1s REINFORCED. THE ATTACKrevealed to him. The pace of new attacks MUST STRIKE DEE PLY—FASTdelivered on the enemy should exceed hisability to react, so as the offensive progresses,teamwork among enemy forces deteriorates,his defenses disintegrate, and his units losecohesion. Foremost, advancing units mustbypass points of resistance, striking deep andfast.
Attack the Enemy Rear. Enemy combatsupport units, engineers, signal, artillery,and enemy command and control facilitiesare often less well protected and usually lesscapable of self-defense than maneuver units.Least likely to be protected, least well armed,and weakest overall are enemy combat
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DISRUPT ENEMY COMMAND,CONTROL, SUPPORT, AND
SUPPLY
service support elements—supply,maintenance, transportation, andadministration. Once enemy forward combatelements have been penetrated, the attackershould seek out the enemy rear, destroyingheadquarters, combat support and combatservice support units. Attacks should aim atwide destruction among these elements.Disrupting enemy command and control;interrupting the flow of fuel, ammunition,repair parts, food, and other necessities; andinterfering with enemy air defense andartillery support weakens or destroys thewhole system of defense and makes itpossible to overpower the enemy with fewerforces. Successful attack into the enemy’srear will often force him to abandon theadvantages of prepared defensive positions,and to commit his maneuver units to hastycountermoves where they are significantlymore exposed. In general, the most decisiveoffensive is one which strikes withoverwhelming force into the enemy’s rear,and destroys or captures his service support,combat support, and command and control.
COMBAT SUPPORT ANDCOMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ELEMENTS MUST KEEP PACEWITH MANEUVER UNITS
Provide Continuous Mobile Support.A successful attack requires continuouscombat support and combat service supportto sustain the weapon systems essential forthe momentum of the attack. Field artillery,engineers, air defense, and other combatsupport and combat service support elementsmust carefully plan movement to keep pacewith the maneuver elements. The weaponsystems must not run out of ammunition orfuel. When those systems break down in use,or are damaged in combat, they must berepaired quickly or replaced. The deeper theattack strikes into enemy controlled territory,the more difficult it is to maintain supportand keep lines of communication open, and tokeep the weapons and the men serving themin action. Imaginative planning, vigorousexecution, and flexibility of response must beas characteristic of support commanders asof combat commanders—and they must worktogether as a team.
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COMBINED ARMS INTHE ATTACK
In mounted offensive combat, the basicelement of the combined arms is the battaliontask force. Battalion task forces areorganized from tank or mechanized infantrybattalions, supported by field and air defenseartillery, engineers, attack helicopters, andclose air support. Battalion task forces can betank-heavy, mechanized infantry-heavy, orpure, depending on the concept and plan ofthe brigade commander. Within the battalion THE BASIC COMBAT ELEMENT
task force, company teams may be formed. OF THE COMBINED ARMS IS THE
Like task forces, company teams can be tank- BATTALION TASK FORCE
heavy, mechanized ~nfa~try-heavy, or pure,depending on the scheme of maneuver andplan of the battalion commander.
In dismounted battle, infantry battalions,supported by tanks, field artillery, air defenseartillery, engineer, attack helicopters, andclose air support, are the basic buildingblocks of the offense.
In mounted warfare, the tank is theprimary offensive weapon. The tank has the THE TANK IS THE PRIMARY
OFFENSIVE WEAPON INfir(?power, protection, and mobility to carry ~O”NTE D WAR FAREthe battle to the enemy and destroy him;however, the tank cannot move alone on amodern battlefield without unacceptablelosses. Therefore, all other elements on thecombined arms team must be employed tosupport and assist the forward movement ofthe tanks.
TANKS. Tanks can fight other tanks, punch rapid movement over relatively longthrough suppressed defenses, create shock distances. A few examples are:and panic, and wreak havoc against softtargets. But tanks are vulnerable in close
� Seizure of airfields and airheads
terrain, woods, cities, and when visibility isthousands of miles distant.
reduced by bad weather or smoke; they �Deep airmobile penetration or raids.cannot cross most rivers or swamps withoutbridging and they cannot climb steep hills or
� Wide-area surveillance and denial
mountains.operations.
� Assaults in towns, forests and mountains.
Notwithstanding the differences inherentINFANTRY. In dismounted operations, in these operations by iighter forces, theairborne, airmobile or other light infantry concept of the combined arms team remainsleads the combined arms attack. All the valid. Support of the infantry by the other
arms, including any tanks available, arms and the USAF is simply adapted to the
support the infantry attack. Airborne and different modes of movement, the differentairmobile infantry have “long legs” and can terrain, and distances. The principles and
be employed on missions requiring very functions are unchanged.
.
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-FM 100-5
MECHANIZED INFANTRY. As tanks forward area air defense to assist friendly
move forward, mechanized infantry close air support.
supports and assists by: .Preparing to support ensuing offensive
.Dismounting and clearing mines and actions by moving with or close behind the
obstacles blocking the way or supporting deep penetrating armored forces.
engineer troops so involved.
.Suppressing by fire enemy infantry closeenough to engage tanks with RPG-7 type
AIR DEFENSE. As tanks move forward, air
rocket weapons mounted or dismounted. defense weapons support and assist by:
�Suppressing ATGM within range..Destroying enemy high-performance
aircraft.�Dismounting and eliminating enemy
�Destroying enemy attack helicopters.infantry or ATGM positions which cannotbe suppressed. .Causing enemy aircraft to lose effective-
�infiltrating on foot in advance of or in sup- ness (releasing ordnance at other than
port of tank attacks to seize terrain from optimum altitudes, ranges, speeds, and
which the defender could stop the attack. attitudes).
�Protecting tanks from enemy infantry .Providing, on order, suppressive fire
during bad weather, in smoke, or at night. against ground targets.
�Protecting tanks in urban areas.
�Providing long-range ATGM support fromCOMBAT ENGINEERS. As tanks move
overmatching positions during the attack.forward, combat engineers support andassist by.
.Breaching and clearing minefield,obstacles, barriers, and fortified positions.
FIELD ARTILLERY. As tanks move .Assisting in river crossing operations.forward, field artillery supports andassists by: �Assisting the forward movement of fuel
and ammunition..Providing planned massed fires at the
critical time and place. .Laying mines and creating obstacles onflanks of the attack.
.Destroying or suppressing enemy ATGMwhich could destroy the tanks. Operating as infantry if required.
.Destroying and suppressing enemyInfantry who could destroy tankswith RPG. ATTACK HE LlCOPTERS. As tanks move
forward, attack helicopters support and.Suppressing enemy tanks by causing assist by:
them to button up, or by smoking their�Guarding open flanks.
positions; and in the future by destroyingthem with precision guided munitions. .Reinforcing in the case of enemy counter-
�Isolating the breakthrough area by smokeattacks.
on flanking defensive positions and .Deepening penetration.deeper battle positions.
�Sweeping around flanks to engage.Destroying and suppressing enemy reserves.
artillery and mortars by counterfire..Overwatching, or firing on enemy tanks
.Destroying and suppressing enemy or ATGM.
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USAF AIRCRAFT. As the tanks move NIGHT OPERATIONS. Current nightforward, USAF aircraftsupport and assist vision equipment provides armor andby: mechanized forces an offensive capability at
� Destroying or suppressing enemy tanksnight. Thermal devices will extend that
and ATGM at the point of breakthrough.capability to other conditions of reducedvisibility such as smoke, fog, and haze and
.Attacking enemy reserves and will permit full utilization of effectivereinforcements. weapons range. Night offensive tactics for
.Spotting and engaging enemy counter-these forces will almost equate to day
attacks.tactics. Armor and mechanized forces willbe able to:
.Interdicting enemy supplies..Concentrate forces and maneuver at
.Defeating enemy fighters. speeds approaching those achievable in
.Destroying enemy artillery and airdaylight.
defenses. .Take full advantage of cover and conceal-ment offered by terrain.
.Detect and engage enemy targets atranges near the weapons capabilities.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE. Astanksmove .Employ suppressive fires on known and
forward, Army and USAF electronic warfaresuspected enemy locations.
(E W) units support and assist b y: �Fight as an integrated, coordinated team.
.Jamming enemy command and control Except for selected small elements,communications. dismounted mechanize infantry and light
.Jamming enemy air defense radars.infantry will continue to be restricted whilemaneuvering at night unless full and
.Jamrning enemy weapon systems which continuous artificial illumination isrely on electronic guidance or control. employed.
Night offensive capabilities allow OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
co-m=anders to continfie the tempo of Movement to Contact. When aoperations from day into darkness. Successcan be followed through to destroy enemyforces, continue pressure, and prevent hisdisengagement or reorganization of hisdefenses. Concentration of forces andinitiation of attacks at night against anenemy not prepared or equipped to conductnight operations on a similar scale offers theattacker significant advantages. Theattacker can gain a momentum at night towhich the defender cannot fully respond withmaneuver or the full potential of his firepower. Once momentum has been achieved,day and night offensive operations arecontinued without respite throughout thatphase of the attack.
combatant force moves on the battlefieldagainst an enemy equipped with largenumbers of modern weapons, it must beguided by several principles:
� It should move so as to meet the enemywith the least force possible, thus avoidingexcessive casualties in those first fewconfusing moments of battle which takeplace on ground selected by the enemy.
� Particularly at task force and team level,the moving force should always move alongcovered or concealed routes from one coveredor concealed position to another, usingterrain to minimize its own vulnerability toenemy weapons. Further, the moving
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—FM 100-5
element should always be covered by an ~element in position to bring fire on whateverenemy weapons may open upon the movingforce.
� The force should use movementtechniques designed to take advantage of theterrain, and to adapt to the likelihood ofenemy contact. Terrain and enemy dictatehow movement to contact is conducted.Movement to contact is a tactical operation tofind and engage the enemy. The attacker,unsure of exactly where or when he will fight,moves aggressively toward the enemy. Allsources of intelligence are used to obtaininformation of the enemy. The commanderholds back the bulk of his combat power topermit flexible maneuver and decisive firesupon contact. He decentralizes tacticalexecution to leaders on the front and flanks,but maintains sufficient control to assureeffective use of long-range supporting firesand prompt followup by succeeding echelonsupon contact.
For larger units such as corps or divisions,movement to contact is normally conductedin multiple columns. The command is usually ~organized into a covering force or an advanceguard and a main body. Flank and rearsecurity forces may also be employed. The
FORCES IN A MOVEMENT TO composition, size, and operation of theCONTACT MUST SKILLFULLY usE Cov=’w force or advance guard may
THE TERRAIN influence the entire course of the battle. Themission assigned this force is to develop theenemy situation and prevent unnecessarydelay of the main body. Its operations mayinclude attacking to destroy enemyresistance, securing or controlling keyterrain, or containing large enemy units. Theforce should be a highly mobile, well-balanced force prepared to accomplish itsmission well forward of the main body. Forsmaller units, most offensive action begins asa movement to contact.
The defender always has a potentialadvantage since he can ambush theadvancing force. Therefore, the attackermust avoid blundering into enemy killingzones with a large part of his force. As theadvancing unit approaches suspected enemypositions or defended areas, its leader must
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select covered and concealed routes, and keepa part of his force in positions to deliverprompt suppressive fire. Upon contact, heinitiates swift , hard-hitting fire andmaneuver.
l?cz8tY Attack. Once contact with theenemy is made, the commander deploys hisforce, coordinating maneuver, fires, airsupport, and other means in an attempt todestroy the enemy in contact or develop theenemy situation sufficiently to determinewhat to do next. Generally, if the leading taskforce(s) of a division cannot fairly quicklydefeat, bypass, or fight through the enemywith which they are in contact, thecommander must decide whether to conduct ahasty attack or, alternatively, to take thetime to more carefully develop the situationand then conduct a deliberate attack.Maybe the intelligence available to thecommander will indicate clearly whichcourse he should follow. However, he mayfind it necessary to conduct a hasty attack tobe sure that he is not being held up by inferiorforces and being lured into an unnecessarydelay. This is a tough decision.
Conduct of a hasty attack is a difficult andchallenging operation. Ideally, there shouldbe no pause in the forward momentum of theforce upon initial contact. Maneuver unitsswing into action using movementtechniques appropriate to enemy and terrain.The commander must summon and bringinto the battle, air defense and field artillery,aerial fires of attack helicopters and USAFaircraft, and all other available support,coordinating and maneuvering all resourcesso as to apply the maximum combat poweragainst the enemy. The hasty attack must tryto fix forward enemy elements in place withfire power, find gaps, weak spots, or openflanks, and move through them rapidly.Speed is essential. If momentum is lost, thehasty attack will fail.
Deliberate Attack. When thecommander of a force determines that he hasencountered a strong enemy force in well-prepared defensive positions, he mayconclude that it will be necessary to conduct adeliberate attack. A deliberate attack is
characterized by greater and widelydistributed knowledge of enemy positions, bymore extensive preparation, by greatervolumes of more effectively deliveredsupporting fires, by more extensivedeception, by full exploitation of EW, and byother measures beyond those possible in ahasty attack. A deliberate attack aims atbreakthrough on a narrow front, seekingpenetration deep into the enemy’s rear.
Exploitation. If an attack succeeds,exploitation and pursuit should ensue.Exploitation is an operation undertaken tofollow up success in the attack. Following theprinciple of reinforcing success, it isadvisable to use a previously uncommittedforce to exploit. In this way the forcesachieving the penetration remain to hold theshoulders of the penetration; they follow onas part of the exploiting force as the enemydefense system breaks up. The exploitingforce drives swiftly for deep objectives,seizing command and control facilities,severing escape routes, destroying reserves,and denying the enemy an opportunity toreorganize his defense. Such an exploitationforce should be large, reasonably self-sufficient, and well-supported by tactical air,air cavalry, and attack helicopters. It wouldnot pause to achieve minor tactical successesagainst isolated enemy units; it shouldbypass them and drive for deep objectives.The commander must provide mobile supportincluding full use of helicopters foremergency supply of POL and ammunition,and insure sufficient follow-on forces toestablish control over the battlefield behindthe exploiting force.
The commander holds out only thosereserves necessary to insure flexibility andcontinued momentum. He uses airmobile andairborne forces to leap ahead to objectivescritical to the advance, and conducts raids,hasty attacks, or feints to prevent enemyescape or reorganization. The exploitingforce commander must be alert to preventdissipation of his combat power. His aimmust be to reach his assigned objective in
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—FM 100-5
maximum strength as rapidly as possible.His operations must be characterized byboldness, prompt use of all available <firepower, and firm leadership to offsetfatigue among subordinate leaders andtroops.
Forces following and supporting theexploiting force widen or secure the shouldersof the penentration, open lines ofcommunication, and eliminate bypassedenemy forces.
Pursuit. Pursuit is an offensive actionagainst a retreating enemy. Normally itspurpose is to cut off and annihilate a hostileforce. It does this by maintaining pressurewith an exploiting force and encircling withsufficient force to cut escape routes anddestroy the enemy. It culminates successfulpenetration and exploitation. As enemydemoralization begins, exploitation maydevelop into pursuit. A pursuit may developin any operation in which the enemy has losthis ability to operate effectively and attemptsto flee. Pursuit requires great energy and theresolution to press on despite fatigue,dwindling supplies, or the approach ofdarkness. Nighttime pursuit increasesenemy confusion and speeds hisdisintegration.
THE PURSUIT MUST BERELENTLESS AND PLACE
UNREMITTING PRESSUREON THE ENEMY
As in the exploitation, there are the samerequirements and command relationships forforces which follow and support. Inconducting a pursuit, the commandermaintains unremitting, direct pressureagainst the enemy, while trying to envelophim to cut his line of retreat. He orders doubleenvelopments of the retreating enemy whenconditions permit. He makes maximum useof field artillery and tactical air, airmobile,and airborne forces, and offensive electronicwarfare.
OTHER OFFENSIVEOPERATIONS
The Dictionary of United States ArmyTerms (AR 310-25) defines several additionaltypes of offensive operations: raids, diver-sions, feints, demonstrations, reconnais-sance-in-force. Generally, all these arelimited-objective? limited-scale, or speciallydesigned operations which follow the basicconsiderations set forth earlier in describinghasty and deliberate attacks.
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