FM 100-7 Army in Theater Operations

8/2/2019 FM 100-7 Army in Theater Operations

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*FM 100-7Field Manual Headquar t ers

No. 100-7 Depar tment of the Army

Washin gton, DC, 31 May 1995

DECISIVE FORCE:The Army In Theater Operations

ContentsPage

PREFACE......................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION ................................ ....................................................... .........iv

PART ONE BACKGROUND

Chapter 1 DECISIVE VICTORY.........................................................................................1-1

Planning and Execution.......... ........................................................ ................1-1

Operational Art .............. ........................................................ ......................... 1-2

Operations in War........................................................................... ................1-2

Military Operations Other Than War ............................................... ................1-3Multinational Operations........................................................ ......................... 1-3

Chapter 2 THE THEATER.................................................................................................1-1

Section I. The Strategic Hierarchy.................................................................. 2-1

National Security Strategy..................................................... ......................... 2-3

National Military Strategy................................................................................ 2-4

Theater Strategy ................................................. ............................................ 2-4

Section II. The Chain of Command ................................................ ................2-5

National Command Authorities....................................................... ................2-5

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................................................... ................2-5

Combatant Commander........................................................................... .......2-5

Service Branch (Military Departments) ........................................... ................2-6

Command Authorities..................................................................................... 2-7

Section III. Joint Force Commands................................................................. 2-9

Combatant Commands.................................................................................2-10

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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Theater Combatant Commands ...................................................... ..............2-10

Section IV. Multinational Commands2-14

Command Structure..2-14

Command and Control..2-16

Section V. Theater Organizations.................................................... ..............2-17

Types of Theaters.........................................................................................2-17

Allocation of Resources Among Theaters............................................... .....2-18

Internal Theater Organizations........................................................ ..............2-18

Section VI. The Army in Theater......................... .......................................... 2-22

Army Operational-Level Commander ...................................................... .....2-22

Army Service Component Commander ................................................... .....2-24

Army Commander as a Subordinate Joint Force Commander ..................... 2-27

Operational-Level Environment ...................................................... ..............2-27

Chapter 3 THEATER STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE..............3-0

Operational Art .............. ........................................................ ......................... 3-0

Resources.......................................................................................................3-4

Operational-Level Command.. ........................................................ ................3-5

PART TWO PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Chapter 4 PLANNING FRAMEWORK...............................................................................4-0

Campaigns......................................................................................................4-0

Major Operations.. ........................................................ ................................ 4-11

Interagency Operations................................................. ................................ 4-14

Chapter 5 EXECUTION ....................................................................................................5-0

Operational Movement and Maneuver.......................... .................................. 5-0

Operational Fires............................................................................................5-3

Operational Protection.................................................. .................................. 5-9

Operational Battle Command ....................................................................... 5-15

Operational Intelligence.................... ....................................................... .....5-17

Operational Logistics.................................................... ................................ 5-19

PART THREE ARMY COMPONENT OPERATIONS

Chapter 6 FORCE PROTECTION.....................................................................................6-1Crisis................................................. ....................................................... .......6-1

Contingency Operations................................................................................. 6-2

Force-Projection Stages................................................ ................................ 6-14

Chapter 7 ARMY OPERATIONS IN WAR..........................................................................7-1

Modern Warfare .................................................. ............................................ 7-1

Army Service Component Functions in War...................................................7-2


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Termination of War/Postconflict Operations................................................. 7-18

Chapter 8 MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.................................................8-1

Fundamentals of MOOTW ................................... ............................................ 8-1

Responsibilities in Peacetime ............................................... ......................... 8-1

Operations in Peacetime ......................................................................... .......8-8

Transition to Hostilities................................................. ................................ 8-10

Operations in Conflict ................................................... ................................ 8-16

Transition to Peacetime or War ...................................................... ..............8-18

APPENDIX A ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATION...................................... ............... A-0

APPENDIX B SUBORDINATE CAMPAIGN PLAN MODEL ............................... B-1

APPENDIX C MAJOR OPERATIONS IN PLAN MODEL:

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL.................................................................... ............... C-1

APPENDIX D DIGITIZATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD ..... ...... ..... ...... ..... ..... ...... D-0

GLOSSARY........... ........................................................ ..................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES ..................................................... ............................References-0

INDEX......................................................... .............................................Index -1


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Chapter 2 COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION, AND LIAISON ...... ..... ...... ...... ..... ..... 2-1

Command Structure ........................................................ .................................. 2-2Command Authority ........................................................ .................................. 2-7

Roles and Responsibilities................................................................. ..............2-12

Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability.........................................2-15

Security Assistance............................................... .......................................... 2-17

Information Operations ................................................... ................................ 2-17

Coordination ..................................................................................................2-18

Liaison ................................................................. .......................................... 2-20

PART TWO BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

Chapter 3 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS..... ..... ...... ..... ...... ..... ...... ...... ..... ..... 3-0Movement and Maneuver................................................ .................................. 3-0

Intelligence.......................................................................................................3-3

Firepower.........................................................................................................3-4

Support ......... ....................................................... ............................................ 3-5

Protection.......................................................................................................3-13

Chapter 4 TACTICAL-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS ...... ..... ...... ...... ..... ...... ..... ...... ...... ..... ..... 4-0

Maneuver.........................................................................................................4-0

Intelligence ................................................. ..................................................... 4-1

Firepower.........................................................................................................4-2

Combat Service Support ................................................. .................................. 4-4

Command and Control ................................. ..................................................... 4-9

Mobility and Survivability ................................................. ................................ 4-11

Chapter 5 PLANNING AND PREPARATION...................................................... ................5-0

Setting the Stage ..................................................................... ......................... 5-0

Planning...........................................................................................................5-1

Preparation.......................................................................................................5-5

Appendix A GUIDE FOR COALITION OPERATIONS....... ...... ..... ...... ..... ...... ...... ..... ...... ..... .. A-0


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PART ONE

Background

Commanders employ forces within the three states (peacetime, conflict, and

war) of the theater strategic environment. Army commanders, particularly at theoperational level, operate with other services, government agencies, UnitedNations (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntaryorganizations (PVOs), and multinational partners. These unified operationsjoint,multinational, and interagency effortsrequire a thorough understanding of Armycapabilities as they contribute to the unified structure. Combatant commands andtheaters form the unified structure for this organizational environment. A combatantcommand is one of the unified or specified commands established by thePresident. A theater is the geographical area outside the continental United States(CONUS) for which a commander of a unified command has been assignedmilitary responsibility. Combatant commanders conduct unified operations.

To discuss the US Army in theater operations at the operational level of war,commanders must understand the theater strategic and operational environment.

To do that, they must understand the fundamentals that define that strategicenvironment and how the application of those fundamentals affects Armyoperations. Chapter 1 discusses planning and execution of major operations,operational art, operations in war, and military operations other than war(MOOTW). Chapter 2 describes the national and theater strategic environmentsand provides a means to assess Army operations at the operational level.Chapter 3 examines how the commander in chief (CINC) and the Army servicecomponent commander (ASCC) apply operational art and design. Operational artand design are the linkage between execution of tactical operations and campaignplans to obtain strategic objectives in theater. These chapters provide the basisnecessary for understanding Army operations at the operational level.

Chapter 1

Decisive Victory

In peacetime, conflict, and war, the Army is the nationspredominant decisive land force. Whenever the Army is called upon,it fights to win and operates to achieve decisive results at minimumcost to life and treasure. Army forces (ARFOR) in combat seek toimpose their will on the enemy. In MOOTW, they seek to create, set,or control conditions to achieve their purpose. The standard is toachieve the military commanders end state within the strategic endstate articulated by the National Command Authorities (NCA).

PLANNING AND EXECUTIONIn todays global-based, force-projection ever-increasing threats and instabilities. Still,

Army, planning and executing major the opportunities for peace, growth, andoperations to support a theater campaign is a stability are evident. Army capabilities toformidable task. The theater strategic succeed in leveraging the environmentenvironment is uncertain and dynamic, with consistent with national policy and strategy is

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the key. Commanders at all levels mustorganize, resource, train, and employ theirforces to be the decisive force when and whererequired. The Army operational-levelcommanders challenge is to shape the military

environment and set the conditions for decisiveresults or victoryunqualified success in allmajor operations, whether in peacetime,conflict, or war. This chapter is synchronizedwith Joint Pubs 1, 0-2, 3-0, 4-0, and 5-0;multiservice publications (FMFM 1, NDP 1,AFM 1); and Army FMs 100-1 and 100-5.

THEATER CAMPAIGNThe theater campaign is the focus of army

operations in war, conflict, or peacetime. It islinked to a theater strategy. The campaign is a

series of related and integrated majoroperations with strategic, operational, andtactical complementary actions simultaneouslyand sequentially arranged to accomplishnational strategic, theater strategic, andoperational objectives within a given time andspace. The campaign plan describes theconduct of air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations. If appropriate, it also includesinteragency operations, NGOs and PVOs, andmultinational operations, often in relation toUN actions. To win rapidly and decisively, bothcombat and noncombat operations occur

simultaneously throughout the combatantcommanders campaign space and theoperational-level commanders battle spaceand against the enemys theater depths.

In wartime, a broadly conceived theatercampaign plan normally involves theemployment of large unified and joint forces. Asingle, unifying strategic concept of operationssynchronizes the actions taken at each level ofwar against the enemys depth. The intent is toconcentrate strategically the decisive force,simultaneously destroying and disrupting key

enemy capabilities and functions, andexploiting the resultant strategic advantageand initiative before the enemy can react.Achieving the theater strategic objectives,while striving to incur minimum casualties, isthe measure of success.

Other campaigns may also be broad inscope but usually call for smaller forces andmay include UN forces as well as other

international agencies, NGOs, PVOs,Government agencies. Also based on

and UStheater

strategies, these campaigns involve a series ofintegrated operations with strategic aims atinternational, national, and theater levels. The

intent is to establish and maintain the desiredmilitary conditions while employing a widerange of military and nonmilitary capabilitiesto achieve theater strategic and operationalobjectives.

Campaigns covering the full range ofmilitary operations demand plans with soundlinkages between theater strategy, thecampaign plan, and major operations plans.The theater campaign must include forward-deployed forces and force-projection forcesinvolved in peacetime engagement for

example, the Partnership for Peace Program,multilateral training, meetingsall part of theCINCs strategy.

THEATER STRATEGY, CAMPAIGN,AND MAJOR

OPERATIONS LINKAGESThe vital linkage between national and

theater strategic direction and the tacticalemployment of forces on the battlefield takesplace in major operational-level planning. Thetheater strategy and campaign relate the ends,

ways, and means of national strategy to theoutcomes, methods, and resources foroperational activities. Translating national,alliance, or coalition guidance, the theatercommander devises theater strategicobjectives, concepts, and resource implicationsfor a broad range of activities in the theater,including provisions for both war and MOOTW.The theater strategy is the foundation for thecampaign plan and forms the framework forthe employment of forces.

With the outbreak of crisis or, more

optimally, in anticipation of an outbreak, theCINC modifies portions of his strategy andcampaign and, when necessary, develops a newcampaign plan. His critical tasks are to identifythe military operations that will achieve thedesired military end state, therebycontributing to conditions for achieving thestrategic end state. The military end statenormally represents the conditions the CINCwants the campaign to achieve and is reflected

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in his mission statement, concept, and intent.The NCA normally directs the military tosupport other elements of national power toachieve a strategic end state that may bebroader in scope than the necessary militaryend state. The intent of the CINC to meet thenecessary military end state must be nestedinside the broader intent of the NCA. Withinthe theater of war and theaters of operations,the CINCs campaign plan supports thestrategic intent, concepts, and objectives.

Operational-level commanders set theconditions for tactical plans and support thecampaign with operational intents, concepts,and objectives. Commanders at the tacticallevel ensure their intents, concepts, andobjectives are nested within those of theoperational-level commander. Regardless of

level, Army commanders consider the objectivefactors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops-timeavailable (METT-T) in their battle space toachieve dominance over the enemy and toprotect the force.

MAJOR OPERATIONSCommanders of major operations require a

fundamental understanding of the principles ofplanning. Operational and tactical planningshare the same basic, self-evidentrequirementsa complete definition of themission, clarity of the commanders intent,

thoroughness of estimates, and sound conceptsof operations. At the operational level, theimperative is to remain capable of respondingto continually changing conditions. Theseprinciples assist operational-level plannerssignificantly.

Mission

To the Army operational-level commander,a mission is more than expressing what theunit must accomplish and for what purpose. Inanalyzing the mission, he considers hissuperiors intent and the battle space andanticipates the missions that could logicallyfollow from the mission in the campaign plan.Anticipating and staying ahead of changerequires the operational-level commander tocontinuously reassess the stated mission inlight of changing strategic and operationalconditions. Subordinates still require clear,

understandable statements of mission andintent before and during battle. In assigningmissions, commanders consider that nestedconcepts contribute to the unified effort anddominance of the enemy.

EstimatesJust as at the tactical level, the

operational-level commanders continuousestimate assists commanders in choosing thebest course of action (COA) and in makingadjustments to changing situations duringexecution. Commanders first consider theenemys capabilities, his likely intent and COA,and wargame friendly alternatives to get fromthe current friendly state to the desiredmilitary end state. Once a commander selects aCOA, he articulates the operational conceptadescription of his vision for the operation. Healso begins to formulate ways to support theCINCs plan to keep the public informed of thecampaign, thereby gaining its understandingand support. The result of the estimate is anaccurate assessment of the current enemy andfriendly situation, a refined understanding ofthe mission, and a clear expression ofalternatives, which is the basis for the rest ofthe plan.

Estimates never stop. Operational-levelcommanders continually review the situationby

Visiting subordinates and getting theirestimates

Observing operations.

Meeting with higher and adjacentcommanders.

Receiving updated intelligence andinformation about support efforts.

Commanders revise their conceptsaccordingly. During the execution of the plan,they may adjust the operation. Estimatesinclude changes in military and strategicconditions as a basis for future missions.

Further consideration of estimates isimportant for resource allocation changes,particularly in support operations.

Commanders Intent

After mission analysis, the operational-level commander clearly describes the

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operations purpose, the desired end state, thedegree of acceptable risk, and the method ofunifying focus for all subordinate elements.The operational-level commanders intentcontains the intent statement of the next seniorcommander in the chain of command. Thecommanders intent is meant to be a constantreference point for subordinates to disciplinetheir efforts. It helps them focus on what theyhave to do to achieve success, even underchanged conditions when plans and conceptsno longer apply. For major operations, a clearstatement of intent is essential to successfulintegration and synchronization of effort,including support operations throughout thedepth of the battle space.

Concept of Operations

The concept of operations describes how acommander visualizes the major operationunfolding. The concept is based on the selectedCOA to accomplish the mission, expressingwhat, where, and how the various subordinateoperations will affect the enemy. The conceptaddresses the sequence and timing of eventsmost likely to produce the desired end state.Support, in particular, can be a dominantfactor in the determination of the nature andtempo of operations. Operational-levelcommanders answer these questionswhat,

where, and howin sufficient detail for thestaff and subordinate commanders tounderstand what they are to do, how they areto fight, and how they are to provide support forthe fight. In the concept of operations,subordinate commanders describe how they

see the actions of each unit fitting together toaccomplish the mission. They describe theirview of probable enemy actions and how theyplan to defeat the enemy. The operational-levelcommander ensures that his concept isconsistent with his intent, the intent of theCINC, andcampaign.

OPERATIONAL ARTThe subordinate commanders application

of operational art begins with understandingthe theater strategic concept and guidanceabout the military end state. As strategicrealities tend to constrain the strategicpossibilities, the guidance also limitsoperational-level possibilities. Directly stated,strategic guidance allows the operational-levelcommander to proceed along clear lines inplanning an operational concept to support adesired military end state.

the strategic purpose of the

Every subordinate campaign or operationplan (O-PLAN) requires an overarchingoperational concept. The subordinate joint

force commander (JFC) is normally responsiblefor the conceptan idea that is initially aproduct of the higher commanders intent,mission analysis, personal estimate of thesituation, and creative imagination andintuitive judgment. Initially, it exists only inhis mind. Yet, the operational concept must beclearly articulated relative to the conditions inwhich it will apply. No finite set of principles

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exists to help in formulating an operationalconcept, but history has validated theapplication of several key military notions orconcepts.

Three commonly used concepts are centerof gravity, lines of operations, and decisivepoints. Center of gravity usually relates to themain enemy force or capability. The concept ofcenter of gravity is useful as a tool to analyzeenemy strengths and vulnerabilities. Byidentifying and controlling decisive points,commanders gain a marked advantage over theenemy and can influence the outcome of anaction. A line of operation connecting a forcewith its base of operations is useful for focusingthe effects of combat power toward a desiredoutcome. A commander who uses more than

one line of operation produces flexibility andcreates opportunities for success. By applyingall three concepts, either separately or inconcert, the commander forms a concept to setconditions for operations and battles withconclusive, and sometimes, decisive results.Other useful theoretical concepts includeculminating point, synergy, simultaneity anddepth, anticipation, leverage, tempo, directversus indirect approach, and termination.

In developing the concept, operational-level commanders should consider alternativesthat lead to decisive operations and battles.

These operations are key to determining theoutcome of engagements, battles, and majoroperations. Many other operations supportdecisive operations. For example, twosupporting ground battles, an interdiction

operation, and a deception operation all couldsupport a separate, decisive ground battleduring a single phase of a campaign.

Commanders at all levels provide focus bydesignating the main effort and supportingefforts, which help set priorities, determinerisks, and unify the effort. The operational-level commander focuses by applying structureto the theater of war and his area ofresponsibility (AOR). Structure is a product ofthe strategic objectives, forces allocated for thetheater, a concept for their employment, the

factors of METT-T, and the presence of allianceor coalition structures.

Thinking more broadly and outside thestructure, the commander synchronizes majoractions within his battle space. Theoperational-level operating systemsmovement and maneuver, fires, protection,battle command, intelligence, and combatservice support (CSS) are logical ways forcommanders to describe systematically theintegration of functions that occurs in eachphase of the campaign plan within a givenbattle space.

OPERATIONS IN WARThe Army operational-level commander

dominates land combat to provide decisiveresults for the CINC. He recommends forceprojection into theaters; links strategy andcampaigns to major operations and tacticsthrough battle dynamics (described later inthis chapter); integrates assigned andsupporting joint capabilities effectively; andtransitions smoothly from crisis back to

peacetime. The Army operational-levelcommander also understands all aspects of theCINCs intent. More than merelycomprehending the Army or land force role inthe joint operation, he understands theplanning considerations of the other serviceoperational-level commanders and ensures amutual understanding and contribution to theaccomplishment of all subordinate missions.

He also realizes that the joint team shareslimited resources. The CINCs vision for thecampaign provides direction for the allocationof these limited resources. Most significantly,the Army operational-level commanderrecognizes that theater success requires morethan the success of a single service component;it requires unified success of the joint team, asdirected by the CINC.

FORCE PROJECTION ANDEARLY ENTRY

Power projection is the ability of the US toapply any combination of economic, diplomatic,informational, or military instruments ofnational power. An effective power-projectioncapability serves to deter potential adversaries,

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conduct joint, multinational, and interagencyoperations anywhere in the world fromCONUS or forward-deployed locations.

Ensuring the projection of lethal forceworldwide represents the operational-levelcommanders most critical and difficult task.This task is essential because power projectionforms a central element of the US NationalSecurity Strategy. This task is challengingbecause it requires the operational-levelcommander to deploy limited forces thousandsof miles and conduct a high-stakes, come-as-you-are operation. The importance of theanticipation, balance, and timing of offensiveoperations represents three critical force-projection considerations.

Anticipation

The operational-level commander improves

his ability to project decisive force throughanticipation. Predeployment and deploymentdecisions are crucial. Made under conditions ofgreat uncertainty and friction, these decisionsinfluence the success of entry, combat, andpostconflict operations. Once made, thedecisions are most often irretrievable. Theoperational-level commander improves theseearly decisions by anticipating alert anddeployment. Anticipation also plays a key rolethroughout the deployment. Time remains acritical resource, while ambiguity anduncertainty continue to cloud the environment.

Continuous force tracking, total assetvisibility, and continuous intelligence-preparation-of-the-theater enable theoperational-level commander to anticipatechanges and maximize his freedom of action.

Balance

The most difficult predeployment decisionsin support of the campaign plan concern forcemix and balance. The operational-levelcommander must resolve requirements forquick, decisive victory with strategic

constraints and uncertainty. Initially, he mustseek a balance in joint capabilities instead of abalanced ARFOR. He will want to deploycredible, lethal forces early, but limitedstrategic lift, undeveloped theaterinfrastructure, and time constraints mayprevent him from doing so. Conversely, he mayrequire the maximum amount of combat power

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at the costCINC can

of logistical support. Either way, theseldom afford duplicate capabilities

among elements of the joint team. Maritime airand amphibious capabilities, naval gunfire,and fleet ballistic missiles represent lethalforce often available to support early entryoperations. These or other forward-presenceforces may protect the lodgment, deter enemyattack, or initiate limited offensive operationsif conditions limit the early entry of fullybalanced Army combat power. The operational-level commander must exploit forward-presence forces; split-based operations; andhost nation, coalition, and joint assets tobalance early entry capabilities.

Timing

The operational-level commander alsofaces a critical decision as he plans thetransition to offensive operations. Early entryunits may initially secure the lodgment asadditional forces arrive. However, Americanoperations doctrine and the situation willprevent long-term defensive operations. Theoperational-level commander must decidewhen he has sufficient combat capability totransition to offensive operations. He must alsoconsider other joint capabilities thatcomplement Army force projection

characteristics. He must apply the CINCsintent and guidance to evaluate trade-offsbetween the time required to assembleoverwhelming combat force and the benefits ofearly offensive action against an enemy that isconsolidating gains or preparing for offensiveaction. The preferred model remains OperationJust Cause, which emphasized overwhelmingand paralyzing the enemy through decisive,simultaneous strikes throughout the depth ofthe battle space. This action resulted inminimal losses and rapid strategic conclusion.

BATTLE DYNAMICSWITHIN THE THEATER

Operational art links success in tacticalengagements and battles with strategic aims.The aspects of battle dynamics establish thisrelationship: battle command; battle space;depth and simultaneous attack; early entry,lethality, and survivability; and CSS. AlthoughFM 100-5 describes each of these dynamics,

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is the first documentthat codifies the elements of battle dynamics.

Battle Command

Battle command describes one dimension

of the linkage among strategy, operations, andtactics. Battle command is a commandersmental decision-making frame work. Theattributes of battle commandassigningmissions, prioritizing and allocating resources,assessing and taking risks, guiding andmotivating the organizationcontribute topositive impact on commanders at criticalpoints in the battle or on the battlefield.Commanders visualize current and futurestates of friendly and enemy forces and thenformulate concepts of operation to accomplish

the mission. The Army operational-levelcommander faces unique responsibilities inthis area. Time constraints and requirementsduring force projection strain the process oftranslating theater strategy and design intooperational design and tactical objectives. TheArmy operational-level commander mayproceed through the first iteration of theestimate process concurrently with the CINCand subordinate Army commanders.Consequently, the CINC may not fully developand communicate his strategy in militaryterms early enough to support parallel

planning. The Army operational-levelcommander must translate nonmilitarytheater end states into clear military objectivesto support the planning of his staff andsubordinate commands.

Battle SpaceBattle space characterizes another facet of

the linkage among the levels of war. Itrepresents the domain in which commandersconduct their operations at the tactical,operational, and theater strategic levels. TheArmy operational-level commanders battle

space forms a subset of the CINCs andcontains the battle space of all subordinatecommanders. Its physical volume expands orcontracts in relation to the Army operational-level commanders ability to acquire andengage the enemy. It includes the breadth,depth, and height in which he positions andmoves assets over time. It also reflects thecapabilities of the intelligence systems thatsupport him and the deep operations

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capabilities of the units and systems thatsupport his command. The Army operational-level commanders battle space may extendbeyond his operations area, and it may not becontiguous. It also extends back to CONUS, to

include the deployment and logistical systemsthat support Army operations in theater.

Depth and Simultaneous Attack

Depth and simultaneous attack reinforcethe linkage among strategy, operations, andtactics. The operational-level commandersupports the CINCs aims by dominating theopponent in his battle space through depth andsimultaneous attack. The operational-levelcommander cannot maximize depth throughunilateral action. To achieve it, he must linkthe levels of war by augmenting his intelligenceand deep operations systems with jointcapabilities. The operational-level commanderalso joins the levels of war throughsimultaneous attack. His efforts to achievesimultaneity concentrate the effects ofengagements, battles, and major operations inthe dimension of time. Resulting concurrentoperations at all levels of war increase therequirement for tightly integrated activities.Application of depth and simultaneous attackblurs the boundaries among tactics, operations,and strategy.

Early Entry, Lethality,and Survivability

Early entry forces are those operationaldeploying forces required to support the CINCor other JFC concepts of operations in aprecrisis or crisis situation. Early entry forcesmust be able to deploy rapidly, enter theoperational area, and secure the lodgment.They must either immediately have a decisiveeffect or create conditions for the arrival ofsubstantial follow-on forces that can thenconduct decisive operations. Early entry forces

must consist of lethal and survivable unitstailored to support or carry out the operationalintent of the JFC.

Combat Service Support

The functions of CSS have not changed inmany centuries. Logisticians have and willcontinue to have similar requirements to arm,fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiers and theirsystems. The primary differences are in the

execution of the support provided. Thesedifferences are a result of diplomatic, economic,social, and technological changes. Successfularmies recognize and adapt to this change,harness it to their benefit, and are ultimately

victorious.

Rapid force projection from CONUS,extended lines of communication (LOCs), andpotential forcible entry into logistically bare-based areas of operations (AOs) require Armydevelopment of a CSS system that is versatile,deployable, and expansible. The CSS systemmust be as capable as the joint andmultinational forces, to include the SOF, itsupports. The CSS system must include boththe deployed force and the sustainment base.Its purpose must be to maintain readiness and

sustain ARFOR in all operations across therange of military operations and at all levels ofwarstrategic, operational and tactical. Thefocus of the CSS system must continue to besoldiers and their weapons systems.

INTEGRATION OF JOINTCAPABILITIES

The operational-level commander plays acritical role in integrating joint capabilities. Heunderstands all aspects of the CINCs intentand recognizes the importance of unity of

effort. These two abilities underpin the conceptof integrated joint capabilities. Theoperational-level commander integrates jointcapabilities during the land phase of jointoperations and as a service componentcommander reinforcing other members of the

joint team.

The operational-level commander is theprimary coordinator and integrator of jointcapabilities during decisive land operations.The CINC seeks combinations of forces andactions to achieve concentration in various

dimensions throughout all phases of thecampaign. During the decisive phase of jointoperations, the operational-level commanderbecomes the integrator of joint capabilitieswithin his battle space. During this phase, theCINC coordinates the availability of resourcesand integrates supporting joint forceoperations elsewhere in the theater. Theoperational-level commander synchronizes theactions of theater intelligence assets, naval

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gunfire and fleet ballistic missiles, airinterdiction, close air support (CAS), jointelectronic warfare assets, SOF, and other jointand national assets. He and his staff mustexploit the capabilities of these resources.

The operational-level commander alsointegrates joint operations indirectly throughthe support of other services. He contributes tothe integration of operations in which theCINC assigns him support missions. Theattack of enemy air defenses to support airoperations and the attack of small enemy navalvessels in support of maritime operationsduring the Gulf War are two examples of this.The operational-level commander also seeksopportunities to integrate his capabilities intothe operations of the other members of the jointforce. He understands the planning

considerations of air, maritime, and SOF andseeks opportunities to contribute to unity ofeffort and the accomplishment of other servicemissions.

TRANSITION TO PEACETIME OR WARThe operational-level commander

considers postconflict operations early in theplanning process. They fall in two broadcategories:

Actions to restore order and normal socialactivities following armed conflict.

Operations toreadiness levels.

Early decisions

reestablish precrisis

concerning mobilizationand deployment establish conditions for criticalpostconflict operations. Long-term solutions to

regional crises usually require more than thedefeat of the enemys military. The operational-level commander develops plans for conflicttermination and postconflict operations early.He reviews them as branches and sequels todeployment and combat operations and plansfor simultaneous combat. ARFOR assist theJFC in supporting the host nation withoperations to handle refugees, clear minefieldfor immediate tactical purposes, controlprisoners of war, provide humanitarianassistance, and provide other forms of support.

Nonmilitary considerations often require theinitiation of these MOOTW before thecompletion of combat operations.

Once the conflict ends, forces may deploy totheir home stations or to another theater. Theoperational-level commander must plan forthis possibility. He must expect the NCA toalert his forces, as in precrisis operations. Hisforces must be versatile enough to transitionrapidly from one regional conflict to another.Once forces return to their home stations, theyrapidly reestablish premobilization levels ofreadiness in anticipation of future operations.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WARThe Army operational-level commanders

role in MOOTW is critical to achievingstrategic success. Like the decisive phase ofcombat, most of these operations are land-based. Consequently, the Army operational-level commander functions as the centralintegrator of a joint and multinational team.He faces ambiguous threats, unpredictable

conflicts, ad hoc staffs, and force packages, aswell as a multitude of nonmilitary participants.The operational-level commander prepares fora mission of unknown duration and anticipateschanges in its nature and scope. To ensuresuccess, he applies operational art executedwithin the framework of battle dynamics. Heachieves his desired end state by carefullyplanning, integrating complementary

capabilities, and using versatile forces.Transitions may have no clear divisionbetween combat and peacetime activities, maylack definable timetables for transferringresponsibilities, and may be conducted in afluid, increasingly diplomatic environment.

JTF Andrew coordinated with manyfederal, state, and private organizations. These

included the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American RedCross, the General Services Administration,the Public Health Service, the Department ofAgriculture, the Salvation Army, the BoyScouts of America, and many religious relieforganizations. The commander of JTF Andrewdetermined that victory would be achievedwhen the local schools reopened. This had a

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Chapter 1

significant focusing effect on the efforts of DODand non-DOD participants and answered thequestion, How do I know when I am done?

This disaster-relief effort demonstratedthe versatility of the US armed forces. Thetraining for war that developed initiative,ingenuity, and flexibility in the conduct ofoperations served the nation well in anoncombat situation. The alert of the 10thMountain Division for Somalia less than sixweeks after sending more than 6,000 soldiers

and their equipment to south Florida furtherhighlights their versatility.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Military decision making and planningprocesses also apply to MOOTW. Theoperational-level commander faces unique

planning considerations because of the natureof MOOTW. Areas that require specialplanning considerations include interagencycooperation, parallel and continuous planning,intelligence, and constraints and restraintsplaced on the operation.

Gaining cooperation among the multitudeof participants is a formidable task. Theoperational-level commander unifies theefforts of all participants operating within hisbattle space by attempting to reach agreement

on common goals and objectives. Consensus ongoals and objectives requires an understandingof the roles, missions, and capabilities of eachparticipating member. Additionally, bothnational and international representatives ofthe media will likely cover the operation.Facilitating their mission keeps the servicemember, the local populace, and the

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FM 100-7

international community apprised of thesituation and may contribute to theachievement of national aims and objectives.

Parallel planning is essential. Ideally, this

begins with the NCA decision to commitmilitary forces. The uncertainty surroundingthe mission requires commanders tosimultaneously begin planning at all levels.Parallel planning provides planners with theability to influence task organizations, missionstatements, and force caps and obtain access tocritical strategic intelligence early in theplanning process. The operational-levelcommander must participate in thedevelopment of end states, conditions, andmeasures of effectiveness (MOEs). He mustunderstand the diplomatic, economic, and

social objectives of the operation beforedetermining the military end state andsequencing operations to achieve it. Clarity ofmission and desired end state is critical.

Intelligence is the key to force protection.The Army operational-level commanderacquires and disseminates information on thecountry, the people, and the diplomatic,economic, and military situations. Key items ofinformation are shared with members ofparticipating civilian organizations, who inturn can be vital sources of intelligence.Continuous access to strategic intelligence andreliable low-level sources is paramount tosituational awareness. The viability of therules of engagement (ROE) are assessedcontinuously with the current mission, friendlyforce capability, threat conditions, andenvironment within which operations areconducted. ROE protect the force and alsoprovide a framework within which hostile actsare controlled.

The Army operational-level commandermust conduct a continuous estimate process.He operates in a dynamic environment.Changes in strategic objectives, operationalconstraints, or the nature of the threat arethree examples that may invalidate the initialmission analysis. Operations, intelligence,deployment, engineer, and logistics estimatesare constantly updated as new informationbecomes available. The commanderscontinuous estimate process serves to integrate

the parallel planning and estimate processesongoing in each functional area.

The operational-level commander obtainsclear, strategic guidance on constraints andrestraints early in the planning phase. Hedetermines his authority and capability toenforce local laws and assesses restraints onweaponry, tactics, and levels of violence.Excessive force could impede the attainment ofoperational goals and hamper the efforts tomaintain legitimacy and obtain internationalacceptance. Disciplined forces, measuredresponses, and patience are essential tosuccessful outcomes.

INTEGRATION OF COMPLEMENTARYCAPABILITIES

The operational-level commanderintegrates and synchronizes complementarycapabilities within his battle space.Establishing cooperation among manyparticipants is demanding; integrating theircapabilities is even more so. The simultaneousapplication of complementary strengths,concurrently conducted at all levels, providesthe necessary leverage to achieve the desiredend state. The key to developing this leverageis the ability to establish unity of military andcivilian efforts. Without a formal interagency

command structure, commanders ensure unityof effort through leadership. They mustdemonstrate the logic and soundness of theirsolutions and the competence of theirexecution. Robust liaison is critical in this role.Providing assistance to other participantspromotes integration of their uniquecapabilities. Operational-level commandersenhance their integration efforts by

Collocating their headquarters with localand regional governments.

Establishing a civil-military operations

centers.Aligning military and diplomaticboundaries.

By planning, implementing, andcontinuously updating a complementary jointand interagency concept, operational-levelcommanders integrate diplomatic, military,and economic power across all dimensions ofthe environment.

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TRANSITION TO WAROR OTHER OPERATIONS

The operational-level commander plansMOOTW anticipating the requirement totransition to another, similar operation or evenwar. The experiences of the 10th MountainDivision (Light Infantry) during 1992 and 1993

set the precedent. MOOTW require flexibleleaders with versatile forces. The operational-level commander must be able to address awide array of missions against a multitude ofdiverse threats. His versatile force must becapable of fighting and winning our nationswars, yet it must be fully capable of

transitioning from warfighting to otheroperations. Rapid changes in the strategicsituation may force sequential commitmentfrom one theater to another; while changeswithin the same theater may require a

transition from one type of operation toanother. Activities such as nation assistance,humanitarian support, and disaster-reliefoperations may continue when higher levels ofviolence arise. Commitments to MOOTW mayprecede combat, follow combat, or flow readilyback and forth between the two.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Throughout history, military operationshave been conducted with armed forces ofseveral nations in pursuit of common

objectives. The changing world environmentdictates that future operations will most likelyrequire multinational involvement.

An operation conducted by forces of two ormore nations is termed a multinationaloperation. An operation conducted by forces oftwo or more nations in a formal arrangement iscalled and alliance operation. An operationwhere the military action is temporary orinformal is called a coalition operation.Campaigns and major operations may beconducted within the context of an alliance,

coalition, or other international arrangement.Such operations, whether or not they involvecombat, are planned through bothinternational and US channels. In practice,each coalition operation is unique. Planningand conduct of the operations vary with theinternational situation and the composition ofthe forces. Alliance or coalition members maynot have identical strategic perspectives, butthere should be sufficient harmony of intereststo ensure a common purpose for the campaign.The need to maintain consensus within the

unified effort.

Multinational operations require closecooperation among all forces. Capabilities willoften differ substantially among national

forces, but higher considerations of nationalprestige will often be as important to the finalsuccess as the contributions to the overalleffort. Seemingly small decisions, such asnational composition of the main effort, mayhave significant consequences for the outcomeof the operation. Members should be consultedon their recommendations for COAdevelopment, ROE, and assignment ofmissions.

To assure unity of effort, all plans requiredetailed coordination with essential supporting

plans for liaison and the provision of mutualsupport. Host nation support and thecapabilities of coalition partners in particularmay dictate the tempo of the attack and itsform. The commander must focus on lateralcoordination across national and interagencyboundaries, in particular the effective sharingof information. Though unity of commandpromotes unified effort, American commandersshould be prepared to operate within thealliance or coalition under command of otherthan a senior US commander.

alliance or coalition is paramounted to preserve a

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Chapter 2

The Theater

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes criteria for a

unified theater based on National Security Strategy, NationalMilitary Strategy, geography, and history. The President approvesthe UCP, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatantcommanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and forcestructure; delineates the general geographical AOR for geographiccombatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities forfunctional combatant commanders. A key consideration is strategicobjectives. National strategic direction and evolution of geopoliticalcircumstances shape the theaters geographic boundaries.

Theater commanders provide strategic direction and operationalfocus to subordinate commanders. They develop a theater strategyand campaign plan, organize their theaters, and establish commandrelationships for effective unified (joint and multinational)operations. Through this process, theater commanders plan andconduct unified operations that ensure a united effort within thecommand.

The military instrument of national security policy requiressynchronization with the diplomatic, informational, and economicefforts. Circumstances determine the extent of the synchronizationrequired. The national synchronization effort is referred to as unifiedaction; the theater level is referred to as unified operations.Interagency operations are another consideration for Armycommanders in the theater.

The US Constitution requires civilian control (the NCA) of US

military forces. Consequently, subsequent legislation has moldedtodays defense establishment and produced the concept of theunified theater. Unity of command requires that one responsiblecommander focus resources toward obtaining defined objectives andstrategic end states. Across the range of military operations, unity ofcommand gives a single, unified commander responsibility for allmilitary operations within a designated theater strategicenvironment (see Figure 2-1). Command lines within the unifiedtheater are established to designate one responsible commander.

Section I

The Strategic HierarchyThe first round of the first battle is a strategic-level decision.

GEN William W. HartzogCommander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

To accomplish unity of effort within the unified theater, the CINC devisesa theater strategy for that geographic portion of the globe. This militarystrategy is a combination of the art and science of employing armed forces or

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the potential threat posed by the presence and capabilities of that force tosecure national security objectives through the application of force. The CINCderives his military strategy for a geographic region from a hierarchy ofguidance and manifests it in the unified theater campaign plan and theatercontingency plans.

The theater strategic environment is shaped by the special conditions,circumstances, and influences in the theater that affect the employment ofmilitary forces and the decisions of the chain of command. The theaterstrategic direction is expressed through hierarchical levels of strategy.

National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and theater strategyall provide the basis for each theaters strategic direction. These strategiesintegrate national security and military objectives (ends), national securitypolicies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and militaryforces (means) to achieve national security objectives. The Armys planningand conduct of major operations or MOOTW is the operational-level linkbetween the tactical level forces actions and the strategic hierarchydiscussed above. This operational-level link is discussed later in this chapterand in the Chapter 3 discussion of operational art and design.

TheNational Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended, created theDepartment of Defense and the positions of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The National Security Act of1947, andsubsequent implementing memorandums, authorized the formation ofunified and specified combatant commands. Commanders of these combatantcommands are called CINCs.

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FM 100-7

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The NCA establish the National SecurityStrategy and appropriate strategic end states.TheNational Security Strategy announces USinterests and objectives. This strategy is the artand science of developing, applying, andcoordinating the instruments of nationalpowerdiplomatic, economic, military, andinformationalto achieve objectives thatcontribute to national security. National valuesand principles form the foundation of USinterests and objectives. The Armys keystonedoctrine (FM 100 5) reflects these values as the

American view of war. US interests andobjectives outlined in the 1994 version of

National Security Strategy include

Enhancing our security. The survival of theUS as a free and independent nation, withits basic values intact and its institutionsand people secure.

Promoting prosperity at home. A healthyand growing US economy to ensureopportunity for individual prosperity andresources for national endeavors at homeand abroad.

Promoting democracy. Healthy, cooperative,and diplomatically vigorous relations withallies and friendly nations. A stable andsecure world where political and economic

freedom, human rights, and democraticinstitutions flourish.

The 1995 National Military Strategydescribes two fundamental strategic militaryobjectives derived from the National Security

Strategy.Promote stability through regionalcooperation and constructive interaction.

Thwart aggression through credibledeterrence and robust warfightingcapabilities.

To achieve these strategic objectives, USmilitary forces must perform three tasks:

One, remain constructively engaged inpeacetime.

Two, attempt to prevent the eruption of

conflict.Three, should conflict prevention fail, fightand win our nations wars.

The overlapping and interrelated strategicconcepts that allow the military to executethese three tasks are overseas presence and

power projection. Figure 2-2 depicts therelationships between the strategic concepts ofoverseas presence and power projection and thenational military objectives.

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NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The Goldwater Nichols DOD The National Military Strategy andReorganization Act of 1986 requires the defense policy provide strategic guidance forChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the employment of military forces. The Jointhelp the NCA in providing strategic direction Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) providesfor the armed services. The National Military planning guidance to the CINCs and chiefs ofStrategy and the Joint Strategic Planning the services to accomplish their missions basedSystem (JSPS) are the methods the CJCS uses on current military capabilities.for providing that assistance.

THEATER STRATEGYThe CINC translates the national level

strategic directives into a theater strategy.This strategy is the basis for developing acampaign plan and leads to operations plansfor execution. Joint or multinational forcesimplement these plans in theater to achievetheater strategic objectives that, in turn,achieve national objectives.

The CINCs strategy has severalcomponents. First, it expresses his vision andintent (military objectives). the theater endsto which operations are conducted. Next, itprovides integrated strategic concepts, COAs,and guidancethe theater ways designed tosecure national objectives, using the theaterswide-ranging military capabilities. Finally, itgives the service and functional componentcommanders guidance for planning andemploying nuclear, conventional, and SOFtheater means.

The plans process allocates the theater

means. Forces are allocated based on theatermissions as they compete with requirements inother theaters. Means are expected to fall shortof what would ideally be available. The theatercampaign plan sequences unified activitiesover time and space to compensate for theseshortcomings.

METT-T analysis is a traditionalassessment method for tactical-level leaders.Under deliberate planning circumstances,tactical-level commanders and staffs shoulduse the Armys deliberate decision makingprocedures in FM 101-5. As part of the JointOperations Planning and Execution System(JOPES) procedures, strategic and operational-level leaders use more formal methods, such asstrategic estimates or commanders estimates,as they analyze military and diplomaticsituations (see Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-00.2).

includes the mission analysis and theassessment of the operational-levelenvironment discussed in Section VI of thischapter. At the theater strategic level, theCINC develops his theater strategy by firstidentifying specified and implied missions andtasks for his theater. He derives these frommany sources, including the national security

and military strategies, policies, directives, theJSCP, the UCP, Joint Pub 0-2, and otherdirectives and agreements.

While identifying theater missions, theCINC analyzes his theater strategicenvironment. Using the strategic estimate,which includes the factors of METT-T, heconsiders the potential instabilities or threats,the limitations, and the nature of anticipatedoperations. Assessment factors include theintegration of capabilities by diplomatic,informational, and economic instruments ofnational power provided to the military. Inaddition, the CINC must consider

international security agreements. Thisanalysis leads to formulation of a strategicestimate that defines the strategic situation inthe theater. Thus, the estimate produces broad,strategic concepts of what must be done intheater. Then, the CINC integrates theseconcepts into the theater strategy.

The CINCs staff and subordinates, toinclude his service and functional componentcommanders, contribute to the development ofthe theater strategy. The functional componentcommander is the commander in charge of aservice or functional component command,

which consists of all individuals, units,detachments, organizations, and installationsunder the command assigned to the unifiedCINC. The development of the multiple theaterstrategic concepts leads to a specific strategicCOA for implementation in the theater

At the strategic level, METT-T analysis campaign. Once the CINC selects the desiredfocuses on conditions, circumstances, and course, his staff and subordinate jointinfluences of the theater strategic commands use the theater strategy to developenvironment. At the operational level, it and integrate OPLANs, including campaigns.

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FM 100-7

Section II

The Chain of Command

The Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 prescribes thechain of command. The NCA exercises authority and control of the armedforces through the chain of command with two distinct branches. The firstbranch runs from the President to the SECDEF to the combatantcommanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The secondbranch runs from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments tothe chiefs of the service forces for execution of service functions.

Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for thepreparedness of their commands and execution and accomplishment ofassigned missions. The secretaries of the military departments areresponsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces. Theauthority exercised by the military departments is subject by law to theauthority provided to the combatant commanders.

The DOD Reorganization Actplaced the CJCS within the chain ofcommand to communicate the directions of the NCA. Though he does notexercise military command over any combatant forces, all communicationsbetween the NCA and combatant commanders pass through the CJCS.Figure 2-3 displays the chain of command.

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

This portion of the chain of command action is passed to combatant commanders.begins with the President and SECDEF, who The President, with the advice of the SECDEF

make up the NCA. They alone have the and CJCS, establishes combatant commands

constitutional authority to direct US armed and appoints combatant commanders under

forces into military action. Once the NCAthe authority of the National Security Act of1947. The JSCP apportions forces for each

makes the decision, authorization for military combatant command for planning.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFWhile the CJCS does not exercise

command over military forces, the SECDEFmay assign oversight responsibilities to theCJCS to assist in controlling and coordinatingthe combatant commanders. The CJCSfunctions within the chain of command byconveying to the CINCs the orders of thePresident and SECDEF.

The CJCS coordinates all communicationson matters of joint interest addressed to theCINCs by other authority. The CJCS acts asthe spokesperson for the CINCs, especially onthe operational requirements of theircommands. The CJCS monitors the geographicregions of the world not assigned to acombatant command.

COMBATANT COMMANDER

A combatant commander is a commander statutory authority (combatant command) toof a unified or specified command. A combatant organize and task all services under his controlcommander is called the CINC. A combatant to accomplish military missions. Combatant

commander is the only military leader with commanders are key links in the chain ofcommand.

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Chapter 2

SERVICE BRANCH (MILITARY DEPARTMENTS)

The chain of command for the militarydepartments runs from the NCA to thesecretaries of the military departments. Thesecretaries exercise authority, direction, andcontrol through the service chiefs of their forcesnot assigned to combatant commands. Thischain of command includes all military forceswithin the respective service. This branch ofthe chain of command is separate and distinctfrom the branch that exists within a combatantcommand.

The secretaries of the militarydepartments are responsible for theadministration and support of their forces, toinclude those assigned or attached to

combatant commands. The secretaries fulfilltheir responsibilities for forces apportioned tocombatant commands by exercisingadministrative control (ADCON) through theservice component commanders assigned to thecombatant commands. ADCON is subject to the

command authority of the combatantcommander.

The ASCC, using ADCON authority, isresponsible for preparing, maintaining,training, equipping, administering, andsupporting ARFOR assigned to the unified andspecified commands. The emphasis of theservice branch of the chain of command isadministrative (legal, personnel, finance) and

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FM 100-7

logistical support to respective service forces.Training during peacetime, in preparation forwar, and before commitment of forces is also akey element and task for the ASCC.

The CINC provides the channel for

strategic and operational guidance in theaterand ensures the US unity of command. Theservice administrative and support channelprovides administrative, training, and logisticssupport, ensuring that the CINC receivesorganized, equipped, and trained US military

forces. Figure 2-3 illustrates this branch of thechain of command.

Within the parameters set by the CINCsorganization of the theater and the commandrelationships he establishes, the ASCCorganizes the ARFOR to best accomplish theassigned missions. The CINC has the authorityto direct certain Army organizational optionsbut normally leaves internal Armyorganization and command relationships to theASCC.

COMMAND AUTHORITIESCommand is central to all military actions.

Unity of command is central to unity of effort.The authority vested in a commander must becommensurate with the responsibility

assigned. Commanders in the chain ofcommand exercise authority as prescribed bylaw or a superior commander. Commanders ofUS military forces use various levels ofauthority, which are described as commandrelationships and other authorities. Within theseven levels of authority, four are commandrelationshipscombatant command(COCOM), operational control (OPCON),tactical control (TACON), and support. Theother three are coordinating authority,ADCON, and direct liaison authorized(DIRLAUTH).

COMBATANT COMMANDCOCOM is the command authority

authorized by Title 10, US Code, Section 164,or as directed by the President in the UCP tocombatant command commanders (unified orspecified). COCOM provides full authority toorganize and employ commands and forces asthe combatant commander considers necessaryto accomplish assigned missions. Thisauthority enables the CINC to organize andemploy his commands and forces, assign tasks,designate objectives, and give authoritativedirection over all aspects of military

operations, joint training, and logisticsnecessary to accomplish the assigned missions.The CINC normally exercises COCOM throughhis service component commanders. COCOM isnot transferable.

OPERATIONAL CONTROLCommanders at or below the combatant

commander exercise OPCON as theircommand authority. OPCON is inherent in

COCOM and is the authority to perform thefunctions of command over subordinate forces.

The CINC may delegate OPCON to hissubordinates. OPCON is the most authority

with which subordinates can direct all aspectsof military operations and joint training neededto accomplish any assigned mission. Acommander with OPCON may control forcesfrom one or more services. OPCON does notnormally include the authority to directlogistics, administration, discipline, internalorganization, or unit training. The servicecomponent commander retains his serviceresponsibility and authority for forces underOPCON of another command. Commandersmust be aware of the US and North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) terms of OPCONand not interchange the two. The NATO term

OPCONmore closely resembles the USdefinition ofTACON.

TACTICAL CONTROLThe CINC uses TACON to limit the

authority to direct the tactical use of combatforces. TACON is authority normally limited tothe detailed and specified local direction ofmovement and maneuver of the tactical force toaccomplish an assigned task. TACON does notprovide organizational authority oradministrative and support responsibilities.The service component continues to exercise

these authorities.

SUPPORTThe CINC identifies support relationships

for one force to aid, assist, protect, orlogistically support another force. Thesupporting force gives the needed support tothe supported force. Establishing supportedand supporting relationships between

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components is a useful option to accomplish supporting action, and other instructionsneeded tasks. This concept applies equally to necessary for coordination and efficiency. Theall dimensions of the joint force organized bythe CINC.

Each subordinate element of the joint forcecan support or be supported by other elements.

Normally an establishing directive is issued tospecify the purpose of the support relationship,the effect desired, and the scope of the action tobe taken. Joint Pub 0-2 states, Unless limitedby the establishing directive, the commander ofthe supported force will have the authority toexercise general direction of the supportingeffort. The execution of general directionincludes the designation and prioritization oftargets or objectives, timing and duration of the

supporting commander is responsible forascertaining the needs of the supportedcommander. The supporting commander mustfulfill those needs from within the existing

capabilities, priorities, and requirements ofother assigned tasks. The categories of supportare general, mutual, direct, and close.

General Support

General support provides designatedsupport to an entire supported force and not toany particular subdivision. General support isthe most centralized support relationship. For

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combat units, this relationship provides themost flexibility for influencing the battleduring conduct of operations and is used whenthe enemy situation is unclear. It is morecommonly used in the defense than the offense.

Mutual Support

Mutual support describes actions thatunits provide one another against an enemybecause of their assigned tasks, their positionsrelative to one another and to the enemy, andtheir inherent capabilities.

Direct Support

Direct supportprovides designatedsupport to a specific force and authorizes thesupported force to seek this support directly.

The supporting force provides support on apriority basis to the supported force. Also, thesupporting force may provide support to otherforces when it does not jeopardize the missionor put the supported force at risk. Theauthority to accomplish support of other thandirectly supported forces rests with the highertactical or operational commander but alsomay be delegated. An example of this support iswhen the elements of a general supportartillery brigade assigned a direct supportmission are diverted temporarily to support aforce other than the designated force.

Close SupportThe fourth alternative, close support, is

that action of the supporting force againsttargets or objectives that are sufficiently nearthe supported force as to require detailedintegration or coordination of the supportingaction with the fire, movement, or other actionsof the supported force.

FM 100-7

OTHER AUTHORITIESOther authorities granted outside the

command relations delineeated above arecoordinating authority, ADCON, andDIRLAUTH.

Coordinating AuthorityCoordinating authority is a consultation

relationship between commanders, but not anauthority to exercise control. The CINC andother subordinate commanders designatecoordinating authority to assist duringplanning and preparation for actualoperations. The CINC specifies coordinatingauthority to foster effective coordination;however, coordinating authority does notcompel any agreements.

Administrative ControlADCON is the direction or exercise of

authority necessary to fulfill militarydepartment statutory responsibilities foradministration and support. ADCON may bedelegated to and exercised by servicecommanders at any echelon at or below theservice component command. The secretariesof military departments are responsible for theadministration and support of their forcesassigned or attached to unified commands. Thesecretaries fulfill this responsibility byexercising ADCON through the servicecomponent commander of the unifiedcommand. ADCON is subject to the command

authority of the combatant commander.Direct Liaison Authorized

DIRLAUTH is the authority granted by acommander at any level to a subordinatecommander to coordinate an action directlywith a command or agency within or outsidethe command. DIRLAUTH is a coordinationrelationship, not a command relationship.

Section III

Joint Force Commands

The NCA, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishescombatant commands (unified and specified) on a regional or functional basis.Regionally oriented unified commands are called theater combatantcommands. The CINC, using the COCOM options, establishes the theatercommand structure. He may establish subordinate JFCs (subunifiedcommands and JTFs). These subordinate JFCs may be established on aregional or functional basis.

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COMBATANT

With the advice and assistance of theCJCS, the NCA establishes combatantcommands (unified and specified) to performmilitary missions and prescribes the forcestructure of such commands. Commanders of

combatant commands are responsible to theNCA for the preparedness of their commandsto execute assigned missions and for theaccomplishment of the military missionsassigned to them.

SPECIFIED COMMANDSA specified command is a command that

has broad, continuing missions. The NCA, withadvice and assistance of the CJCS, establishesa specified command. A specified command iscomposed normally of forces from a singlemilitary department. Still, it may include units

and staffs from other services. Currently, nospecified commands exist.

UNIFIED COMMANDSUnified commands are those combatant

commands with significant forces from two ormore services. Unified commands may befunctionally or regionally oriented.

Functionally Oriented (Global)Unified Commands

Functionally oriented unified commandsare the US Space Command (SPACECOM), the

US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),the US Special Operations Command(SOCOM), and the US Strategic Command(STRATCOM). Functionally oriented unified

COMMANDS

commands operate globally across allgeographic regions. The UCP providesmissions, geographical areas, and forcesassigned to unified commands. The UCP isnormally reviewed biennially during an odd

year. Suggested changes are submitted forconsideration. Those that receive support aresubsequently implemented.

Regionally Oriented (Theater)Unified Commands

Unified commands with regionalresponsibilities are the US Atlantic Command(ACOM), the US Southern Command(SOUTHCOM), the US European Command(EUCOM), the US Central Command(CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command(PACOM). Each regional combatant command

has a specific geographic AOR or theater thatincludes the land, sea, and airspace in thestrategic region. UCP-designated AORsprovide military focus and a basis forcoordination worldwide.

A theater combatant commander has theflexibility to organize and employ forceswherever required to accomplish his assignedresponsibilities in coordination with othersupporting combatant commanders. Effectiveuse of the nations military power requiresclose integration of the separate services. Unityof effort is required for effectiveness and

efficiency. Centralized direction provides forunified action by forces. Decentralizedexecution is essential because of the enormityof the command and control (C

2) span.

THEATER COMBATANT COMMANDS

The theater combatant commander,referred to as the CINC, is a strategic-levelcommander of a unified command, whoprovides strategic direction and operationalfocus to his subordinate commands. CINCsserve as the vital link between nationalmilitary strategy and theater strategy. Theyprovide the strategic and operational directionrequired for major unified and joint land, air,and maritime operations. The CINC is notsimply a planner and allocator of resources; hehas a broad range of responsibilitiesestablished by public law and described in jointpublications.

The CINC organizes his forces, assignstasks, designates objectives, providesauthoritative direction, and employs his forces.He designs and executes theater campaignsand unified operations, supports the operations

of other theater CINCs, and continuallyassesses the environment, anticipating theneed for theater operations where his forcesmay play a supporting or supported role.

A CINC is assigned a myriad ofresponsibilities to fulfill his unique commandrole. Joint Pub 0-2 discusses the CINCsresponsibilities at length. It specifies that theCINC is responsible for maintaining thesecurity of his command and protecting the

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FM 100-7

interests of the US, its possessions, and itsbases against direct and indirect hostilethreats. The CINC ensures that his commandis prepared to carry out missions assigned bythe NCA. The CINC assigns responsibilitiesand missions to his component forces and

maintains unity of command.The CINC executes his strategic planning

responsibilities for developing a theaterstrategy and theater campaigns (war plans toachieve national strategic objectives). He usesoperational art and theater design whileperforming the following critical tasks:

Prepares the estimates (strategic andcommanders) of the situation.

Establishes a theater strategic end state.

Determines strategic center of gravity.

States his strategic vision and intent in hisstrategic concept of operations.

Organizes the theater.

Identifies subordinate commands anddetermining specific forces required toexecute campaign plans.

Establishes command relationships anddelegating authority.

States readiness shortfalls and developingprograms to correct those shortfalls.

Concentrates his forces and suppliesstrategically.

Conducts strategic maneuver to destroy,dislocate, or neutralize the strategic centerof gravity.

Seeks strategic advantage and theinitiative.

Directs the development of theatercontingency plans and concept plans leadingto the conduct of operations in war orMOOTW.

Achieves a theater strategic end state.

The CINCs campaign plan provides acommon frame of reference within whichoperations of land, air, maritime, specialoperations, and space forces, as well asinteragency, multinational, or UN forces, areunified, integrated, and harmonized. Jointcampaign doctrine is found in Joint Pubs 3-0,5-0, 5-00.1.

The services provide forces to operatewithin a subordinate JFC in the operational

areas that the theater commander organizes.They further subdivide these areas amongtheir forces. The SECDEF directs the Secretaryof the Army to assign ARFOR to the CINCs.Operating within national budget constraints,the NCA cannot satisfy all of the CINCs

requirements. Therefore, during deliberateplanning, CINCs identify their force shortfalls.The CJCS, through the military departmentchiefs, identifies forces to fill these shortfalls.The JSCP apportions forces to each CINC forplanning purposes. This apportionment maynot equal the current forces assigned. The NCAassigns additional forces when a CINC isrequired to implement a specific plan requiringmore forces than assigned or apportioned forplanning.

The CINC, by exercising COCOMauthority, performs the following legal

functions of command over assigned forces:Determines forces required to achieve themilitary end state, organizes availableforces, allocates resources, and commandsforces.

Employs commands and forces.

Assigns tasks.

Designates objectives.

Exercises authoritative direction over allaspects of military operations, signalsupport, logistics, and joint training toaccomplish missions assigned to hiscommand.

Combatant commanders alone exerciseCOCOM authority by establishing commandrelationships with subordinates, delegatingappropriate authorities, and assigningresponsibilities to their subordinates (seeFigure 2-4). The CINC strives for centralizeddirection and decentralized planning andexecution. The CINC has the following sixoptions, including combining options, throughwhich he may exercise COCOM authority(Joint Pub 0-2):

Service component command.

Functional component command.

Subordinate unified command.

Joint task force.

Single-service force.

Direct command.

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Chapter 2

SERVICE COMPONENTCOMMAND

A service component command consists ofthose individuals, units, detachments,organizations, and installations of a singlemilitary service assigned to the unifiedcommand. Except for the CINC and membersof his joint staff, the senior officer of the servicecomponent assigned to a unified command andqualified for command by the regulations ofthat service is designated the servicecomponent commander. His assignment issubject to the concurrence of the CINC. Theservice component commander is responsiblefor all command aspects of his force, to includelogistics within the unified command.

The ASCC serves as the principal advisorto the CINC for supporting and employingARFOR in theater and ARFOR outside thetheater tasked to support theater operations.

The ASCC may delegate part of this

responsibilitycomplex, and

as the theater becomes moreit may become necessary to

establish an intermediate headquarters, basedon the complexity of the operational

environment. This alternative is discussedfurther in Section VI of this chapter.

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTCOMMMAND

Based on his mission analysis, the CINCmay form a functional component composed oflike functional forces from more than oneservice. Functional component commands maybe established for MOOTW or war to performparticular operational missions that may be ofshort duration or may extend over time and

involve forces from two or more services. The

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FM 100-7

functional component commanders are asfollows:

Joint force land component commander

(JFLCC). Joint force air component commander(JFACC).

Joint force maritime component commander(JFMCC).

Joint force special operations componentcommander (JFSOCC).

Each focuses on operational responsibilities,leaving logistical support to the respective servicecomponent commander. See Figure 2-5. Functionalcomponent commanders may serve simultaneously

as service component commanders. For example,an Army JFLCC could direct Marine forces andserve as the ASCC commander.

SUBORDINATE UNIFIEDCOMMAND

Unified commanders, with approval fromthe NCA, may establish subordinate unifiedcommands (also called subunified commands).CINCs establish subunified commands toconduct operations on a continuing basisaccording to the criteria that established theunified command.

The CINC may exercise COCOM through asubunified commander for operations on acontinuing basis. The subunified commanderexercises functions, authority, andresponsibilities similar to those of a unifiedcommand CINC, except for COCOM. Heexercises OPCON of assigned commands

Documents

FM 100-7 Army in Theater Operations