Civpro cases under Rules 10-19

8/11/2019 Civpro cases under Rules 10-19

1/44

Civil Procedure | February 14, 2014

Case Digests for Rules 10-19 | page 1

RULE 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Siasoco vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186

Doctrine: Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one defendant, thecomplaint may still be amended once, as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect toclaims against the non-answering defendant(s). The Court also reiterates that certiorari isnot the proper remedy to contest a lower courts final adjudication, since appeal is available

as a recourse.

Facts:Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban,Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer the subject properties for sale. Subsequently,Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) negotiated with the petitioners, but the parties failed to agree on the

terms of the purchase. In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that theINC had not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of theaforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already contracted with Carissafor the sale of the said properties due to the absence of any response to their offer fromINC.Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the correspondingdeed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused. The ensuing events were narrated bythe Court of Appeals, as follows:

On January 14, 1997, private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific [p]erformance and

[d]amages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc(Carissa).

Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack ofcapacity to sue.

Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint on February 24, 1997.

Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated with

Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of CarissaHomes by private respondent.

On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an [A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping CarissaHomes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case fordamages.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the complaintcannot be amended without leave of court, since a responsive pleading has been filed.

On August 11, 1997, the first assailed order denying petitioners Motion to Strike OutAmended Complaint was rendered.

On August 31, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceeding pending theresolution [by] the respondent court of the Motion to Dismiss earlier filed.

On September 11, 1997, the second assailed order denying petitioners Motion toSuspend Proceeding was rendered[;] the Order reads:

Filed also last September 1, 1997 [was] a Motion for Suspension by the defendantSiasoco thru their counsel Atty. Clara Dumandang-Singh. Although the court could notconsider the motion filed because it violates the new rules on personal service, in the

interest of justice, the court will resolve the motion. In the resolution of this court datedAugust 11, 1997, it state[d] that defendants [were being] given a period of five (5) dayswithin which to file [an] answer to the Amended Complaint. The defendants here obviouslyrefer to the defendants Mario Siasoco, et. al. In the Motion for Suspension filed by thedefendants Siasoco, et al., the latter insist on the court resolving the motion to dismiss. Asstated in the resolution, the motion to dismiss is now moot and academic because of the

Amended Complaint from Specific Performance with Damages to just Damages. For thiscourt to resolve the Motion to Dismiss xxx the first complaint, would be an exercise in futility.The main complaint now is damages and no longer Specific Performance with damages

which [was] actually what the Resolution dated August 11, 1997 [was] all about. Be that asit may, the court gives defendants Siasoco, et al. fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order

to file their respective Answers to the Amended Complaint, not from the receipt of theresolution of the Motion to Dismiss which will not be forthcoming.

RTCs Decision: RTC (1) admitted the Amended Complaint; (2) dropped DefendantCarissa from the Complaint; and (3) denied the Motion to Declare Defendants Siasoco et al.(herein petitioners) in Default. The second Order denied the Motion for Suspension filed bydefendants and directed them to file their answer to plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

CAs Decision:The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that although private respondent could nolonger amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing sowith leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted with grave abuseof discretion in admitting private respondents Amended Complaint.

Petitioners argued that the trial court where the original Complaint for specific performancehad been filed was not the proper venue. Debunking petitioners argument, the CAexplained that the RTC nevertheless had jurisdiction over the said Complaint. The CA alsoheld that the Amended Complaint did not substantially alter private respondents cause ofaction, since petitioners were not being asked to answer a legal obligation different from

that stated in the original Complaint.

Issue: WON CA erred in affirming the two Orders of the RTC which had allowed the

Amended Complaint?

Held/ SCs Decision:No.The petition is devoid of merit. We sustain the Court of Appeals, but for reasons differentfrom those given in the assailed Decision.

Admission of Amended Complaint

Petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in admitting the Amended Complaint. Underthe Rules, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before aresponsive pleading is served xxx. When private respondent filed its Amended Complaint,Carissa, the other party-defendant in the original Complaint, had already filed its Answer.Because a responsive pleading had been submitted, petitioners contend that privaterespondent should have first obtained leave of court before filing its Amended Complaint.This it failed to do. In any event, such leave could not have been granted, allegedly

because the amendment had substantially altered the cause of action.

This argument is not persuasive. It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can

amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, before a responsive pleading is filed.Contrary to the petitioners contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer didnot bar private respondent from amending its original Complaint once, as a matter of right,against herein petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered,


2/44



plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claimsasserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims assertedagainst the other defendants.

The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,which provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may berejected when the defense is substantially altered. Such amendment does not onlyprejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place, where aparty has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no defenses that can be altered.

Furthermore, the Court has held that [a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored andshould be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as

possible be determined on its real facts and in order to speed the trial of cases or preventthe circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such asinexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might

justify a refusal of permission to amend.

In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were prejudiced by privaterespondents Amended Complaint. True, Carissa had already filed its own Answer.Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that theirdefense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondents claims againstthe latter and against petitioners are different. Against petitioners, whose offer to sell thesubject parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter issuing for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. Although privaterespondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its Complaint against Carissa, it

could do so against petitioners who, at the time, had not yet filed an answer.

The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the action. On the contrary, itsimplified the case and tended to expedite its disposition. The Amended Complaintbecame simply an action for damages, since the claims for specific performance and

declaration of nullity of the sale have been deleted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

Versoza vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119511, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 100

DOCTRINE: When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes ofaction, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the originalcomplaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint

FACTS:

Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Verzosa. FeUson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have themortgage foreclosed.Fe Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the ProvincialSheriff for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction. Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The complaint was dismissedon the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson. Fe Uson filed a motionfor reconsideration which was granted by the court. She filed her amended complaint which

bears the proper verification. Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceedwith the foreclosure of mortgage.

On July 4, 1989, the foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold

to Verzosa being the highest bidder. Verzosa subsequently sold the same land to MartinezOn September 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint ofFe Uson.

At this po int, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898 for certiorari.He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with graveabuse of discretion. CA denied certiorari.

On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additionaldefendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying,

among others, the annulment of the latters title -- T.C.T. No. 11107.

On November 22, 1991, respondent judge issued an order to the effect that the status quobeing maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land (grounded on thetime of filing if the original complaint) and that such status quo does not refer to defendant

Pilar Martinez being the registered owner.

TC: Status Quo is in effect at the time of the original complaint

CA: Affirmed TC

ISSUE: WON the suit is deemed to have been filed on the date of the original complaint orthe amended complaint

HELD: When there is no new issues, cause of action or demands made, it is deemed to

have been filed on the date of the original complaint

SC:

According to the SC, The status quo is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation

which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.Although the Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the firstComplaint was filed. Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the

Amended Compla int was filed, because the previous Complaints were expunged from therecords. Petitioners invoke Ruymann v. Director of Lands, in which the Court ruled that thefiling of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original.However, in Ruymann,the Court held that an amendment to a complaint which introducesa new or different cause of action, making a new or different demand, is equivalent to afresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations continues to run untilthe amendment is filed.

It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causesof action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date theoriginal complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint.In other words, for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemedto have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint. In short, for purposes ofdetermining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed abandoned andsuperseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or

different cause of action or demand.

Chua vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 109840, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 356

DOCTRINE:Any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time suchevidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes


3/44



apparent,otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence will formpart of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. Rule 10, 5of theRules of Civil Procedure allows the amendment of the pleadings in order to make themconform to the evidence in the record.

FACTS:! Petitioners were lessees of a commercial unit in Paraaque. The lease was for 5

years, from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1989.

! The contract expressly provided for the renewal of the lease at the option of the

lessees in accordance with the terms of agreement and conditions set by thelessor.

! Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties discussed the possibility ofrenewing it. They exchanged proposal and counterproposal, but they failed toreach agreement. The dispute was referred to the barangay captain for

conciliation but still no settlement was reached by the parties.! On July 24, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer

against petitionersMTC: Petitioners were granted an extension of (2) years extension of occupancy of thesubject premises starting the date of the filing of the instant complaintOn appeal, RTC: ordered petitioners to vacate the premises turn over possession to privaterespondentsCA: affirmed RTCs decisionArguments and SC Ruling:

1.

Petitioners allege that the CA erred in affirming the lower courts finding that

they owe private respondent unpaid rentals because neither the letter ofdemand nor the complaint for unlawful detainer alleged a claim for unpaidrentals.

HELD:o

While it is true that there was no express demand in private

respondents complaint for unlawful detainer againstpetitioners for the latters payment of rental arrearages,private respondent in a pleading filed with the MTC (by wayof comment to petitioners motion to admit amended answer)it stated That moreover the unpaid rentals from January1987 to December 31, 1989 amounts to FORTY TWOTHOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX PESOS (P42,306.00),exclusive of rentals from January 1 to December 31, 1990which would be one hundred eighty thousand pesos(P180,000.00) or a total of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO

THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX PESOS (222,306.00)o

Then, at the pre-trial of December 17, 1990, among the issues

proposed by counsel for private respondent was W/NDefendants are in arrears for the rentals from Dec. 31, 1987to January 1989, in accordance with the contract.

o

And since counsel for petitioners did not object to the

statement of issues made by plaintiffs counsel and insteadsimply stated as their own main issue whether plaintiff had avalid cause of action for ejectment against them as he is not

the sole owner of the leased premises, and then averred thatbased on this premise, the other issues raised by plaintiffcould be dependent on the resolution of the stated issues .

o

Obviously, then, petitioners rental arrearages from 1986 to

1989 was an issue raised at the pre-trial and on which issueprivate respondent presented evidence without any objection

from petitioners.! Indeed, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made

at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as theobjection to its admissibility becomes apparent,otherwise the objectionwill be considered waived and such evidence will form part of therecords of the case as competent and admissible evidence. Rule 10,5of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the amendment of thepleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record.

2.

Petitioners claim that they are entitled to an extension of time to occupy the

premises in question.! HELD : Without merit. After the lease terminated on January 1, 1990

and without the parties thereafter reaching any agreement for itsrenewal, petitioners became deforciants subject to ejectment from thepremises.

3. The appellate court found petitioners guilty of bad faith in refusing to leavethe premises. But petitioners contend that they acted in good faith under thebelief that they were entitled to an extension of the lease because they had maderepairs and improvements on the premises.

! HELD: Devoid of merit. The fact that petitioners allegedly maderepairs on the premises in question is not a reason for them to retainthe possession of the premises. There is no provision of law whichgrants the lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on thatground.

4. Lastly, Petitioners contend that the CA erredd in affirming the denial of their

counterclaim for damages for their failure to enjoy the peaceful possession of thepremises because private respondent allowed vendors to ply their trade at thefront portion of the leased premises. Petitioners claim that, as a result, theysuffered business losses and moral injuries.

! HELD: There no evidence to support this claim. Petitioners never

complained before about the sidewalk vendors occupying a portion ofthe leased property. It was only after negotiations for renewal of thelease had failed and private respondent had filed a complaint for

unlawful detainer against them did they complain about the vendors.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Asean Pacific v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008

DOCTRINE: Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence isobjected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings,

the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if thepresentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subservedthereby.

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer forpreliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent WaldoC. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta andCeferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners

Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific PlannersConstruction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into fivecontracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twincinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public fundsamounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For


4/44



minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed thatall the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object isa piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a publicpurpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from thefeasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because theywere all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta CityMayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer, joined in the defense and

asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with priorauthority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has

no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. For respondentCeferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaimand motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.

After pre-trial, Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed thatinadequate legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings inrepresentation of its interests.

TC: In its Order dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of UrdanetaCity, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo'scomplaint, and directed the defendants to answer the city's complaint.

In its February 14, 2003 Order,the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002

Order. It also granted that the complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta be admitted andconsolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.

CA: CA dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and

certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified truecopies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack ofwritten explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.

CA also

denied APP and APPCDC's motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004Resolution.

ISSUE: WON Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that thecontracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in goodfaith.

SC/HELD: We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected toat the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the courtmay allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation ofthe merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002

already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed ispresentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or againstthe validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5,

Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform tothe evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to

consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevailover documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open courtmay also override admissions in the Answer.

Tiu v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009

DOCTRINE: Even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense,such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of

substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition ofactions and proceedings.

Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by petitioners, applied and wasapproved for real estate loans with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM).

The first loan was secured by a piece of land as collateral. The second, a bigger loan, wasunsecured. Instead, the members of the Board of Directors of AWRI became sureties undera Surety Agreement; all copies thereof, except two, were kept by PBCOM -- of these twokept by the notary public, one copy was retained for his notarial file and the other sent tothe Records Management and Archives Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk ofCourt.

AWRI defaulted . It offered PBCOM all its present properties as dacion en pago. PBCOMdenied the request, instead demanding full payment. AWRI failed to respond thus PBCOM

filed a complaint for collection against petitioners.

In their answer, petitioners alleged that the Surety Agreement was falsified. The words "Inhis personal capacity" did not yet appear in the document and were merely intercalatedthereon without their consent evidenced by a certified photocopy of the Surety Agreement

issued by the Records Management and Archives Office showing no entry of the words "Inhis personal capacity" in the original document. The notarial copy too showed that thewords "In his personal capacity" did not appear on the Surety Agreement.

PBCOM discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor. They therefore fileda Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to substitute thesubject document on the Complaint with the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file ofthe notary public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and explainedthat it was made without the knowledge and consent of the notary public. PBCOMmaintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to speak the truth of

the parties intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners were already primarily liableon the Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion was made, having admitted in theirpleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement in the originalform. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules, emphasized that the motionincorporated in the pleading can be treated as a motion for leave of court to amend andadmit the amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

RTC DECISION: the RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the altered

document with the original Surety Agreement, the pertinent portion. A motion forreconsideration filed by the petitioners thereafter was also denied.

CA DECISION: Dismissed the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE:WON the substitution of the document is valid.


5/44



HELD:Yes. PBCOMs right under Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, to amend itscomplaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed theiranswer, specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next precedingsection, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leavemay be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motionfiled in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,26 thus:

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former

rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantiallyaltered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of suchamendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, whendespite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, theamendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, andprevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the

sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitationsthat the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theoryof the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.Nevertheless, as enunciated inValenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense,such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of

substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition ofactions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity ofsuits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rightsdetermined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberalityis greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendmentwas made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed bylaw to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberallyallowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, bedetermined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent thecircuity of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances suchas inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might

justify a refusal of permission to amend.

In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the

altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part tohave submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that,through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein

the words "IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" were inserted to conform to the banksstandard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public.PBCOMs counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, therebynecessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that

the case would be judiciously resolved.

Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that thewritten document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of bothprinciple and policy that when the written contract is established as the repository of theparties stipulations, any other evidence is excluded, and the same cannot be used tosubstitute for such contract, or even to alter or contradict the latter. The original suretyagreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties respective rights andobligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the complaint, which

consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of theoriginal.

It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed tofacilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application that would result in

technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always beavoided. Applied to the instant case, this not only assures that it would be resolved basedon real facts, but would also aid in the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing the bestevidence possible to determine the rights and obligations of the party- litigants.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, they could not be prejudiced by thesubstitution since they can still present the substituted documents as part of the evidenceof their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay theaction. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides,the petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM

for attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution ofthe documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The casebefore the RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is separateand distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible error when it allowed thesubstitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the original.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the RegionalTrial Court are AFFIRMED.

RULE 12 Bill of Particulars

Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic G. R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428

Doctrine: The function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and

limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG) filed a case before Sandiganbayan against Kokoy Romualdez,Ferdinand Marcos et. al. (including Francisco Tantuico) for reconveyance, reversion,accounting, restitution and damages. Tantuico, being the previous chairman of theCommission on Audit, was alleged to have acted in conspiracy with the other defendantsfor misappropriation, theft of public funds, plunder, and other acts of corruption.

Tantuico filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars asking for clarification on several allegationsagainst him, arguing that the Complaint filed was couched in too general terms, not

particularly describing acts allegedly committed by him. However, the Sandiganbayandenied his Motion stating that the Complaint was clear and sufficient for Tantuico to knowthe nature and scope of the cause of action against him. Tantuico filed his Motion forReconsideration but was also denied.


6/44



Thus, he filed this case with the SC.

Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying TantuicosMotion for Bill of Particular.

Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan should have granted Tantuicos Motion for Bill ofParticulars.

It must be noted that a complaint must state only ultimate facts, not conclusions of law,constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. This is to inform the defendant clearly

and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet theissues at the trial.

The definition of ultimate facts is as follows: important and substantial facts which eitherdirectly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongfulacts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probativematter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. Itrefers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entirecause of action rests.

A perusal of the complaint shows that the allegations against Tantuico were mereconclusions of law unsupported by factual premises.[1] In fact, the complaint does notallege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular rights he abused. Thus,

it failed to inform Tantuico the claims made against him so that he may be prepared tomeet the issues at the trial

Premises considered, it is correct for Tantuico to file a Bill of Particulars, as the object ofwhich is to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or

defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in thepleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, andextent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite

party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limitedto the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trialmay be avoided.

Uy vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. L-49059, May 9, 1980, 232 SCRA 579

FACTS:The case started in the municipal court of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya which dismissed theJanuary 1975 complaint for ejectment filed by Busa against herein petitioners. Thecomplaint was based on the ground that petitioners were occupying Busa's lot without anylease contract and without paying any compensation for the use thereof.

Busa appealed to the CFI which found that the petitioners occupied Busa's lot and built aschool building on the basis of a 15-year lease contract which expired on April 1972. After

the lease expired, Busa sent demand letters informing petitioners that he was not renewingthe lease and required them to vacate the lot.

TC:The CFI held that, as the lease was not renewed and no rentals were paid, Busa wasentitled to recover possession of his lot and that petitioners are liable to pay reasonablecompensation for their use and occupation. Petitioners appealed to the CA.

CA:The CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners' MR was also denied. Petitioners did not appealfrom the decision; hence, entry of judgment was made on July 1978.

About 3 months later, the petitioners filed the instant petition con tending that the municipalcourt had no jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, the proceedings there and in theother courts are void.

The lack of jurisdiction is based on the theory that petitioners (as defendants) pleaded inthe municipal court the defense that the lease was renewed by virtue of the provision in the

contract that it "shall be for a period of 15 years renewable at the option of the Lessee".Hence, it was necessary for the municipal court to interpret the renewal clause and thus theaction was transformed from an unlawful detainer case into an action that is "incapable of

pecuniary estimation" which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the CFI.

ISSUE:W/N the action was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court being one that isincapable of pecuniary estimation rather than an unlawful detainer case?

SC:NO. Original jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Court; action is a valid unlawful detainercase. Petition dismissed. Judgment of the CFI should be enforced.

The complaint in the municipal court was for ejectment based on the demands to vacate,the last of which was a July 1974 letter, wherein Busa required the petitioners to vacate hislot, remove their improvements and pay P150 a month as the reasonable compensation forthe use of the lot. The filing of the ejectment or unlawful detainer action was within the 1-year period counted from the last demand.

The inferior court's jurisdiction in an ejectment case is determined by the nature of theaction set forth in the complaint. Even if this case involved the interpretation of the renewal

clause of the lease contract, it was, nevertheless, within the exclusive original jurisdiction ofthe municipal court because thepetitioners were ejected not because of the non-renewal ofthe lease but because of nonpayment of rentals.

Consequently, we cannot apply to this case the ruling that where the case hinges on thecorrect interpretation of the renewal clause of the lease contract, the action is not forunlawful detainer but one which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and is beyond

the competence of the municipal court. As already stated, the CFI ejected the petitioners onthe ground of nonpayment of rental.

Furthermore, the jurisdictional issue as to the case not being susceptible of pecuniaryestimation was never raised by the petitioners in the municipal court and in the CFI nor intheir brief in the CA. They assailed for the first time the municipal court's jurisdiction on thatground in their MR in the CA.

Therefore, there is some basis for Busa's contention that the CFI decided the case in theexercise of its original jurisdiction without any objection on the part of the petitioners andthat they are estopped to question the jurisdiction of the municipal court, although ordinarily

jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived and lack of jurisdiction may be raisedanytime.


7/44



Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007 Doctrine:

Default judgments are frowned upon, and the SC has been advising the courtsbelow to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every chance to

present their case fairly without resort to technical ity; Judicial experience shows that resortto motions for bills of particulars is sometimes intended for delay or, even if not so intended,actually result in delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading issuspended and the subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime.

The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a

motion to dismiss, as the remedy for perceived ambiguity or vagueness of acomplaint forthe recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

Facts:! The main issue in this case is the propriety of filing and granting of a motion for a

bill of particulars filed for the estate of a defaulting and deceased defendant (Pres.F. Marcos).

! Roman Cruz is impleaded as an alleged crony of President Marcos." Cruz, then Pres and GM of GSIS, Pres of PAL, Pres and owner of

Hyatt Hotel. Chairman of Commercial Bank of Manila,! When the PCGG went after the cronies, in hopes of recovering the wealth he and

his family (Marcoses) and cronies amassed during his reign, an alias summonswas served upon him in Hawaii, his place of exile. Since he was not able to file aresponsive pleading, he was then declared in default, upon motion by theRepublic of the Philippines.

! When the order of exile was lifted after the death of the fallen President, his wife,Mrs. Marcos moved to set aside the order of default, which motion was grantedby the Sandiganbayan.

" Sandiganbayan: found that a myriad of events, such as their exile,President Marcos ill health and numerous other civil and criminal suits

against the latter was reasonable cause to lift the order of default.! The Presidents son, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (BongBong), as the executor of his

fathers estate, petitioned the court for extension of time to file a responsive

pleading, which the court granted." However, instead of filing an answer, Bong-Bong filed a Motion For Bill

of Particulars, praying for clearer statements of the allegations whichhe called mere conclusions of law, too vague and general to enabledefendants to intelligently answer.

# Sandiganbayan: upheld respondent, explaining that theallegations against former President Marcos were vague,

general, and were mere conclusions of law. It pointed outthat the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts offormer President Marcos' participation in Cruz's allegedaccumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively preventingrespondent from intelligently preparing an answer. It notedthat this was not the first time the same issue was raisedbefore it, and stressed that this Court had consistently ruledin favor of the motions for bills of particulars of the

defendants in the other ill-gotten wealth cases involving theMarcoses.

# The PCGG opposed the motion, arguing that the requested

particulars were evidentiary matters; that the motion wasdilatory.

! The Republic argued that since Bong-Bong filed a motion for extension of time tofile an answer, the Sandiganbayan should not have accepted the formers motion

for bill of particulars." It argued that the charges were clear, and that other parties, such as

Cruz, also linked to the controversy of ill-gotten wealth, have alreadyfiled their own answers, thus proving that the complaint was not in factcouched in too general terms.

ISSUE:Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of particulars as

executor of former President Marcos' estates considering that the deceaseddefendant was then a defaulting defendant when the motion was filed? (found on

SCRA page 444)

HELD

NO. In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specificnature, manner and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets citedabove under Cruz; particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner ofthese properties; and the specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.

While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they werevague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawfulconcert with" the former.

There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on thecollaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz inthe commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the

allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched ingeneral terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that could show theconspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth bypetitioner.

SC: Resolutions of Sandiganbayan affirmed.

Addl notes:

A motion for bill of particulars becomes moot and academic where, prior to i ts filing, thedefendant has already filed his answer and several other pleadings.

Estardante v. People, G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008

DOCTRINE: While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of theOffice of the Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining what

specific criminal charges should be filed against herein petitioner, it behooves theOmbudsman to accord the petitioner her basic rights to due process in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation.

FACTS: Petitioner was the school principal of the Ramon Torres National High School(RTNHS).

On 1998, a group of concerned RTNHS teachers, composed of the Faculty and Personnel

Club Officers and department heads (private complainants), sent an undated letter to theSchools Division attaching a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by the petitioner,which the private complainants requested to be investigated. Two complaints were

eventually filed by private complainants against petitioner with the Office of theOmbudsman-Visayas.

The Ombudsman-Visayas forwarded the complaint City Prosecutor for preliminary


8/44



investigation. The City Prosecutor served the petitioner with a subpoena on August 28,2000 and another on August 30, 2000, requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit \

Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed before the City Prosecutor a Motion forBill of Particulars with Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit. In the Motionfor Bill of Particulars, petitioner alleged that there were no specific criminal charges thatwere stated in the subpoenas. Thus, petitioner insisted that she cannot intelligentlyprepare her counter-affidavit unless the criminal charges and the laws she violated arespecified.

On March 10, 2000, the City Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the private complainants

Bill of Particulars pertinent portions of which read:

Complaint 23 & 25

The principal Ms. Estandarte accepted cash and in kind donations without beingproperly channeled and accounted first by the property custodian and the cashwithout first deposited in the Trust Fund.

x x x x

and directing the petitioner to file her counter-affidavit. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavitlimiting herself only to the charges specified in the Bill of Particulars.

Thereafter, the City Prosecutor referred the case back to the Ombudsman The latter foundsufficient grounds to hold petitioner liable for five counts of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.No. 3019, as amended, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and filed before theRTC the corresponding Informations.

On May 21, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation before the RTC on theground that she cannot allegedly be charged with violation of Sections 68 and 69 ofPresidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445 since she was not a collecting officer. She also asserts

that she cannot be charged under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as the acts which she wascharged with, did not constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusablenegligence.

TC:On September 24 2002, RTC denied MR.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 24,

2002 Order. Petitioner maintains that when the five Informations for the violation of Section3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed by the Ombudsman, her right to due process was violated;and that the Ombudsman in effect went beyond the Bill of Particulars filed by the privatecomplainants.

In the other assailed Order dated December 20, 2002, the RTC denied the Motion forReconsideration.

Hence, herein petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Ombudsman-Visayas erred in not considering the Bill of Particularssubmitted by the private complainants and should have limited the charges filedagainst the petitioner to the crimes mentioned in the Bill of Particulars -- NO

2. WON the Ombudsman violate the petitioners right to due process when it wentbeyond the bill of particulars remanded to rtc for determination

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE:The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a bill of particulars is not allowed by

Administrative Order No. 7, en titled Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman (A.O. No. 7); and that therefore the Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of Particulars

submitted by private complainants.

The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting thepetitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of A.O.No. 7, to wit:

Section 4. Procedure- The preliminary investigation of cases falling under thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conductedin the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject tothe following provisions:x x x x

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neithermay a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If the respondentdesires any matter in the complainants affidavit to be clarified, the

particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in themanner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

The Court finds the argument of petitioner that when the City Prosecutor was deputized bythe Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation, any action taken therein is, in

effect, an action of the Ombudsman, who is bound by the act of the City Prosecutor ingranting the Motion for Bill of Particulars, and is not tenable.

Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that thosedesignated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman shall be under his supervision andcontrol. Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of theOmbudsman, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman whichmeans that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,reverse or modify the prosecutors decision.

Consequently, in the present case, petitioner has no valid basis for insisting that theOmbudsman-Visayas must be bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor ingranting petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars. Laws and jurisprudence grant the Officeof the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or nullify the acts of the prosecutor pursuant toits power of control and supervision over deputized prosecutors. Hence,it was within theprerogative of the Ombudsman-Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particularssubmitted by the private complainants.

SECOND ISSUE:

Petitioner claims that her right to due process was violated when the Ombudsman-Visayas

filed the Informations charging her with violations of R.A. No. 3019, which went beyond thecharges specified in the Bill of Particulars. Petitioner further argues that since there were nocriminal charges stated in the subpoenas served on her on August 28, 2000 and August 30,2000, she was not properly informed of the nature of the crime which she was supposed to


9/44


10/44



relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for theprovisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition. In urgentcases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, beprovisionally arrested on the application of the requesting Party. There was urgency in thepresent case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will be informed ofthe pending request for extradition especially given the fact that if he will be found guilty ofthe charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability ofMunoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty. Sec. 20 (d) of PD 1069 provides that ifwithin a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has

not received the request for extradition, the accused shall be released from custody. Whilethe RP-HK Extradition Agreement provides for 45 days. Cuevas argument that the latter

agreement amended PD 1069 has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that thePhil. DOJ had already received a request for extradition as early as 12 days after hisprovisional arrest.

Contrary to Munozs contention, the request for extradition need not be filed incourt, rather only need be received by the requested state. The request, as well as theaccompanying documents, are valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extraditionlaw does not provide for a requirement of authentication for the provisional arrest. Moreover,the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK and thewarrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extraditionagreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for theprovisional arrest. Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as theprocess of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents istime-consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting

state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile. Thetemporary hold on private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint onhis right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decideto resist the request for his extradition to HK. There is no denial of due process as long asfundamental fairness is assured a party. As to Munoz contention that it should be the

Foreign Diplomat who should send the request for provisional arrest, as required by PD1069, the invoked provision only provides for the request for extradition and not theprovisional arrest. There is sufficient compliance with the law if the request for provisional

arrest is made by an official who is authorized by the government of the requesting state tomake such a request and the authorization is communicated to the requested state.

AFP Mutual Benefit Association vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104769, March 2, 2000

Doctrine: Notice of Lis Pendens! there is no such action as one for annotation of lispendens. A notice of lis pendensis not ad can not be sought as a principal action for reliefas the notice of lis pendensis ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court$Incase the annotation of Lis Pendensis denied by the Register of Deeds, the same could beappealed en consulta to the commissioner of Land Registration, and the resolution maythen be appealed to the CA...The annotation of notice of Lis Pendenson the titles of theproperty is not proper in cases where the action is inpersonam

Facts: Ivestco Inc. was the owner of (6) parcels of land. Investco then agreed to sell the (6)parcels of land to Solid Homes. Solid Homes would be given (5) years to pay the balance insemi-annual installments.

After paying (4) semi annual installments and a portion of the fifth installment, Solid Homesmade no further payment. Likewise, the postdated checks were dishonored.

Investco filed a case with the Court of First Instance a claim to collect from Solid Homes theremaining balance. Solid Homes, likewise filed with the trial court a complaint alleging thatthe purchase pruce under the contract was not yet due. As such, it prayed for dismissal.Solid Homes then filed with the Register of Deeds a notice of lis pendens. However, thenotice was not annotated on the titles in the name of Investco.

Investco then executed a deed of absolute sale to AFP Mutual Benefit Association Inc (AFPMBAI). AFP MBAI then verified the records of the Register of Deeds, and Metropolitan TrialCourt and found the absence of any lis pendens. AFP MBAI completed its payments and

the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificates.

Solid Homes prayed that the Register of Deeds be ordered to annotate the titles registeredin the name of Investco the notice of lis pendens

Issue: Whether Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis pendens?

Held: NO, Investcos complaint was an action to cellect sums of money, and damages torecover from Solid Homes unpaid installments on the purchase price of the property. Insuch a case, the annotation of notice of lis pendens on the titles of property was not properas the action is in personam. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens is inapplicable to this case.

Notice of Lis Pendens is not and can not be sought as a principal action for relief. Thenotice is but an incident to an extra-judicial action. Lis Pendens is intended merely asconstructive advice to warn people who deal with such property

Eduardo Fernandez, et al vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115813, October 16, 2000

Doctrine: The trial court's inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised onlyunder exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the

party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudiceof the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the casewhich is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the

part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such anotation.

Facts: Petition involves Lot 435 of the Bacolod cadastre originally titled to petitioners'predecessor-in-interest, Prudencio Fernandez. After Fernandez acquired ownership of thelot, he tried to eject private respondent Jesus Ciocon and some other occupants off theproperty. Allegedly, Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a "last chance" to

repurchase the lot. Fernandez refused. After this rejection Ciocon instituted a civil case(Civil Case No. 7687) for reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after deductingportions already sold to others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the full reconveyance priceto Fernandez on February 7, 1958 for which Fernandez signed a receipt. Fernandezthrough his guardian ad litem denied receiving any money from Ciocon and averred thatCiocon's receipt was a forgery. Fernandez died and is now substituted by his heirs.

Respondents Levita Llera, Hospicio Pedrina, Rufo Calves, and Monserrat Villalba were

intervenors in said suit who claimed that they had purchased portions of Lot 435 fromCiocon. Another case (Civil Case No. 7723) was filed by was filed by Alfonso Jardenil,

Anunciacion Jover, and Vicente Urbanozo claiming that they had purchased portions of the

lot as well from Ciocon.

RTC: noting that the parties were indifferent about submitting to a decision based on extantbut incomplete records proceeded to render judgment dismissing both complaints and


11/44



ordering private respondent Ciocon and the intervenors to deliver immediate possession ofLot No. 435 to the heirs of Fernandez.

Private respondents and intervenors timely filed their notices of appeal

Judge Jocson (same judge in RTC), issued an Order requiring the parties to state in writingwithin fifteen (15) days whether or not they agree to have the records transmitted to theCourt of Appeals with incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes, and if they should fail toreply after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, the court would consider the parties'

silence as conformity and order the transmittal of the extant records to the Court of Appeals.

After a month, Court ordered transmittal of the records to the appellate court.

Court of Appeals noted the incompleteness of the records and ordered the re-taking and

completion of missing testimonies.

Ciocon filed a Motion to have Above-Entitled Cases Decided Anew, which Judge Jocsongranted. Judge Jocson reasoned that since the cases were decided on the basis of therecords taken by his predecessor, and without the testimony of Roberto Tolentino, thehandwriting expert who testified on the alleged forgery of Fernandez' signature, grantingthe motion was in the best interest of justice.

2nd judgment of RTC (by Judge Jocson): In the second decision, the judge explained thatthe Court of Appeals, after receiving the notices of appeal and the incomplete records,

"remanded" the case and ordered the re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon andTolentino. The second decision was a complete reversal of the first decision and directedthe return of the disputed lot to Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still beinglitigated. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title issued to Fernandez and theissuance of a new title in the name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors.

Oct. 25 Petitioners appealed the second decision. %day after: Ciocon moved for executionpending appeal. % 6 days after: trial court granted the motion ex parte. The TCT in the

name of Fernandez was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of respondentCiocon. petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order was denied.

Ciocon filed a motion asking that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City be directed tocancel entries in TCT No. T-164785, particularly Entries Nos. 44213, 1063, 5121, 5381 and13188 upon the plaintiff's filing of additional bond of P300,000.00. %Entry No. 178073, thenotice of lis pendens involved in Civil Case No. 7687 and 7723, was not among the entries

listed in the motion. % only after a month, Entry No. 178073 was annotated. % JudgeJocson ordered the cancellation of the entries of the notices of lis pendens

Ciocon then sold the subject property to one Eduardo Gargar who was issued with a newTCT in Gargars name. Gargar immediately mortgaged the property to the RizalCommercial and Banking Corporation to secure a loan for P2,000,000.00.

Trial court issued another Order, directing the transmittal of the records to the Court of

Appeals.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for

preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set aside the Order of the RTC cancellingthe lis pendens notations in the TCT, and its Decision setting aside its original decision forhaving been issued without jurisdiction.

The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the the cancellation of lis pendens was issued without jurisdiction and inviolation of due process and fundamental rules of procedure?

Held: YES. The order of cancellation of notation of lis pendens was based on the ex parteapproval of the motion for execution pending appeal of the trial court's second decision.

This order is fatally flawed, for being the result of a hearing ex parte, hence without noticeto the adverse party and thereby violative of due process.

The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in this case, Entry No. 178073, shouldbe set aside for three reasons. First, it was granted ex parte. Petitioners were deprived of

their right to be heard on notice. Second, there was no showing that the annotation of thenotice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, nor that it was not necessary toprotect the rights of those who sought the annotation. And third, at the time of the order ofcancellation of the notice, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction.

While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power isexercised under express provisions of law. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement tothe whole world that a particular real property is in litigation. Such announcement isfounded upon public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties inlitigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the

defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Under Sec. 14 of Rule 13 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled only after propershowing that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is notnecessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated.

The trial court's inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only underexceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the partywho caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of

the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the casewhich is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on thepart of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such anotation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled. These exceptionalcircumstances are not present in this case. It will be noted that although the case took longto resolve, it was not due to petitioners. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged owners of thelot in the first decision and it was private respondents who filed a motion that the case be

decided anew, despite a timely notice of appeal from the first decision. Furthermore, it wasthe Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of the lost testimonies, which the trialcourt erroneously took as a "remand" of the case, resulting in a second decision which wasalso timely appealed. The records mentioned no such order to ''remand'' by the Court of

Appeals. The cancellation of the lis pendens notations should not have been ordered sincethere had been no final judgment yet, the decisions having been timely appealed.

A notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less

without any motion at all. There should be notice to the party who caused the annotation sothat he may be heard to object to the cancellation of his notice and show to the court thatthe notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is not merely to molest the

other party.

Private respondent Ciocon's motion to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not includea request to cancel Entry No. 178073 in particular, and it certainly could not have been


12/44



included since the entry was annotated in the TCT only a month after the filing of themotion. However, Judge Jocson's order of cancellation included Entry No. 178073. % anotice of lis pendens cannot be ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less withoutany motion at all. There should be notice to the party who caused the annotation so that hemay be heard to object to the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that thenotice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is not merely to molest the otherparty.

Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled upon the mere filing of a bond by

the party on whose title the notice is annotated. The ultimate purpose of the annotationwhich is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court and to prevent the

defeat of the judgment by subsequent alienation will be rendered meaningless if privaterespondents are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of saidnotice.

Aberca et al. v. Ver, et al., G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012

SUMMARY:This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. Itposes the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by militarypersonnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the

Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable forsuch violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their

superiors as well.

FACTS:

SUMMARY:This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. Itposes the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusbars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel andother violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action fordamages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military

personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of therights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "toconduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses

in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffsallege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided severalplaces, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during

these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personalitems belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued bythe courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives andlawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel;

that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms ofviolence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order topunish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted anddeliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffsand to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to andsanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-GeneralEstelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the

circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts canentertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the

performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action againstthe defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs.

The Regional Trial Court (Judge Fortun Presiding) issued a resolution granting the motionto dismiss. It found that (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into thecircumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court canentertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in theperformance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of actionagainst defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint

confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, andwith the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabocommitted acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercisedirect supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability asemployers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful

study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must,therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition arelacking in merit."

A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion forreconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs.

Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in thecase and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to JudgeLising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid

pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffsassertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pendingmotion."

This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signedin the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by

Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.

In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, withoutacting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order stating that

as appearing from the records, several plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconsider theOrder of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefromwithin the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now finalagainst said plaintiffs.


13/44



The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not truethat several of the plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8,1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that themotion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion forreconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.

The RTC denied such motions nevertheless. Hence this petition for certriorari.

ISSUE (relevant to CivPro): W/N The RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with respect toplaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino,

Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin (the "several plaintiffs"mentioned earlier), on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion forreconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's

motion to dismiss?

HELD: Yes.

It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filedby 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo,counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez andManuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and CarlosPalma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counselfor Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of allthe plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counselhimself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not justto the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose

Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, AntonioRosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag,Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneysdid so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. Theauthority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unlessquestioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was neverdone in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it uponhimself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the

complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearlyintended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent

judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of thecomplaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers didnot sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot besanctioned.

FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMF AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006DOCTRINE: Personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under theconstitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the

party concerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may becompleted by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight inthe morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with aperson of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

FACTS: In 1994, petitioner FEU-NRMF (a medical institution organized and existing underthe Philippine laws), and respondent union (a legitimate labor organization and is the dulyrecognized representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner), entered into a CBAthat will expire on 30 April 1996. In view of the forthcoming expiry, respondent union sent aletter-proposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF stating their economic and non-economicproposals for thenegotiation of the new CBA.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF rejected respondent unions demands and proposed to maintain the

same provisions of the old CBA reasoning that due to financial constraints, it cannot affordto accede to a number of their demands. In an effort to arrive at a compromise, subsequent

conciliation proceedings were conducted before the NCMB, but the negotiation failed.

Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB on the ground of bargaining

deadlock.

Union staged a strike.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certificationof Labor Dispute with the NLRC, underscoring the fact that it is a medical institutionengaged in the business of providing healthcare for its patients. Secretary of Labor grantedthe petition and an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute was issued, therebyprohibiting any strike or lockout and enjoining the parties from committing any acts whichmay exacerbate the situation.

September 6, 1996, Francisco Escuadra, the NLRC process server, certified that, onSeptember 5, 1996 at around 4:00 P.M., he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption ofJurisdiction Order (AJO) to the union officers but since no one was around at the strikearea, he just posted copies of the said Order at several conspicuous places within the

premises of the hospital.

Striking employees continued holding a strike until 12 September 1996, claiming that they

had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over thepending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the AJO.

Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing all the striking employees to return towork and the petitioner FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same terms and conditionsprevailing before the strike. A Return to Work Agreement was executed by the disputingparties.

Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending thatrespondent union staged the strike in defiance of the AJO, hence, it was illegal.

LABOR ARBITER: LA declared the strike illegal and allowed dismissal of union officers forconducting the strike in defiance of the AJO.

NLRC: NLRC affirmed in toto the Decision of the LA.

CA:CA granted the Petition and reversed the Resolutions of NLRC.

ISSUE:W/N the service of the AJO was validly effected by the process server so as to bindthe respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed subsequent to theissuance of the said Order.


14/44



HELD: The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service wasrendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike area. Thismode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules ofProcedure or the Revised Rules of Court.

The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read:Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.

(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on theparties to the case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public

officer within 3 days from receipt thereof or by registered mail;Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be

effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules ofCourt; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards,copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or

representative by registered mail; Provided further, that in cases wherea party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service ofthe decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall bedeemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, thatwhere parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel andupon such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shallbe considered substantial compliance with Article 224(a) of the LaborCode, as amended.

An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is

not a final judgment for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. Consequently,the rule on service of summons and orders, and not the proviso on service of decisions andfinal awards, governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made

by the process server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to theurgent nature of the AJO and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by theissuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most

expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by theintended parties as may be warranted under the circumstances. Thus, personal service isthe proper mode of serving the AJO.

It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summonsmay be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Parenthetically, the manner upon which personal service may be made is prescribed by thefollowing provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:

Rule 13. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments And Other Papers.Section 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by deliveringpersonally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with hisclerk or with a person having charge thereof. if no person is found in his office, orhis office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving a copy, between thehours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels

residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residingtherein.

Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption ofJurisdiction Order in conspicuous places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed bythe rules, nor is it even referred to when the said rules enumerated the different modes of

effecting substituted service, in case personal service is impossible by the absence of theparty concerned.

Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutionalrequirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the partyconcerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed bysubstituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morningand six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a person ofsufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore

required that statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfullyand fully observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substitutedservice along with the proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid

requirement is that the person, to whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, ismade to answer for the consequences of the suit even though notice of such action ismade, not upon the party concerned, but upon another whom the law could only presumewould notify such party of the pending proceedings.

Applying this principle in the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of theAssumption of Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the circumstancesconsidering the adverse effect in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed bysuch Order. Worthy to note that in a number of cases, we have ruled that defiance of the

Documents

Civpro cases under Rules 10-19