JURISDICTION Judicial StabilityAtty. Cabili vs. Judge Balindong2011-09-06 | A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225

FACTS:Illigan RTC issued a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of a decision against MSU, holding the latter liable for damages for a vehicular accident. The sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSU's depositary bank, the LBP. The OSG opposed the motion for execution but denied. The MSU responded to the denial by filing a petition with the Marawi City RTC presided by the respondent judge, for prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.

The respondent judge issued a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing from MSU's LBP-Marawi City Branch account. Later on, respondent judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the judge violated the elementary rule on judicial stability or non-interference.

Held: YES.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Court's deliberations, finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent; a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with another court which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any other court, or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari. In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court presidedover by the respondent Judge.

It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary. The appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body.

SPOUSES ALFREDO vs CAG.R. No. 118830 | 2003-02-24

Facts: This case involves three different cases filed in separate jurisdictions.CFI Manila - Family Savings Bank (Bank) filed a complaint with the CFI of Manila, for the collection of a sum of money against its debtor Cheng Ban Yek & Co., Inc. and Alfredo Ching, who acted as a surety for Cheng Ban. The Bank obtained a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants. Respondent Ferdinand J. Guerrero, the deputy sheriff of the CFI of Manila, proceeded to levy upon a conjugal property belonging to the spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching. CFI Rizal Spouses Ching filed a petition seeking to declare illegal the levy on attachment upon their conjugal property. The trial court, however, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the subject property was already under custodia legis of the CFI of Manila.Meanwhile, CFI MNL favored the Bank and granted its motion for execution pending appeal (CA). As a consequence, the attached conjugal property was levied upon and sold through public auction by the deputy sheriff to the Bank.

RTC Makati - Spouses Ching filed a second annulment case to declare void the levy and sale on execution of their conjugal property on the basis that the sheriff had no authority to levy upon a property belonging to the conjugal partnership.

The decision in the collection case became final.

The RTC of Makati rendered judgment in favor of spouses Ching and declared void the levy and sale on execution upon the conjugal property. Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC of Makati and declared that the Makati annulment case is barred by res judicata because of the prior Rizal annulment case and Manila collection case.

ISSUE: WON RTC of Makati has jurisdiction.

Held: RTC Makati has no jurisdiction.

RTC of Makati does not have the authority to nullify the levy and sale on execution that was ordered by the CFI of Manila, a co-equal court. The determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in execution of a judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.

No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.

A separate and distinct case from that in which the execution has issued is proper if instituted by a "stranger" to the latter suit. Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, the executing court. This is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.

Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" NO. EXC: what were executed upon were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a spouse who was not a party to the case.

JURISDICTION OVER SM

HOME GUARANTY CORP. vs. R-II BUILDERS INC., and NHAG.R. No. 192649 | 2011-03-09Facts: NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the PNB (later replaced by PDB) as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which provided the mechanics for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP).

The parties likewise executed a Contract of Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by the trustee and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and to pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.However, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool.R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA before Branch 24 of the MNL RTC, a Special Commercial Court (SCC); for HGC's failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining possession of the Asset Pool. Branch 24 of the MNL RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders.HGC went on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue.R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. In lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool.Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order to the effect, among other matters, that it did not have the authority to hear the case. As a consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of the Manila RTC (respondent RTC) which subsequently issued an order which, having determined that the case is a real action, admitted the aforesaid Amended and Supplemental Complaint, subject to R-II Builders' payment of the "correct and appropriate" docket fees. However, R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of the correct docket fees therefor. Said Second Amended Complaint notably resurrected R-II Builders' cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool.Respondent RTC denied HGC's motion to dismiss; granted R-II Builders' motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint;HGC filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, w/c denied the petition and affirmed the order of RTC.ISSUES:1) Whether a branch of the RTC which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction.2) Whether the case is a real or personal action; and whether correct docket fees were paid.HELD: Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law,the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.1) RTC Br. 24 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 24 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.The directive for the re-raffle of the case is an exercise of authority over the case, which authority it had in the same breath declared it did not have. So faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left the impression that its previously issued preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from which it issued was not dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

2) R-II Builders' original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both interposed causes of action for conveyance and/or recovery of possession of the entire Asset Pool, for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid. Despite the R-IIs withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of the correct docket fees.The test in ascertaining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation is by determining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand, considered capable of pecuniary estimation if the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought. To our mind, the application of foregoing test does not, however, preclude the further classification of actions into personal actions and real action, for which appropriate docket fees are prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages, real actions are those which affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. While personal actions should be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,the venue for real actions is the court of the place where the real property is located.In Gochan v. Gochan, this Court held that an action for specific performance would still be considered a real action where it seeks the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance of real property. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.(An action for declaration of nullity of share issue, receivership and corporate dissolution is one where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.)Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.Applying the rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,77 viz.:1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant, respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders' Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case. Although a catena of decisions rendered by this Court eschewed the application of the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case, said decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of the party to pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to evade payment of the correct docket fees. This cannot be said of R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second Amended Complaint.DESPOSITION: REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered NULLIFYING the regular courts'(RTC Branch 22, 24) orders. The complaint of R-II Builders first before Br. 24 and thereafter before Br. 22 both of the RTC of Manila is hereby DISMISSED.

JURISDICTION OVER PARTIES

CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, et. AlG.R. No. 162416 | 2006-01-31

FACTS: Chester de Joya was among the incorporators and members of the board of directors of State Resources Development Management Corporation charged as participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated estafa.

The respondent judge found the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused. De Joya filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to seek relief from SC or from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction.

HELD: NO.

There is no exceptional reason (when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice) in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. It should be remembered that he who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

(Justice Regalado)Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:

a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.

c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.

e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.

In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.

The documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

JUROSDICTION OVER THE RES

MELINA P. MACAHILIG vs. The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALITG.R. No. 141423 | 2000-11-15

FACTS: Magalit filed with the then Philippine Fisheries Commission -- now BFAR-- Fishpond Application for 11 hectares of land situated in the Municipality of Batan, Province of Aklan. Macahilig protested Magalit's application contending that for a period of 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the five-hectare area included in Magalit's application.

The Committee on Fishpond Claims and Conflict, Office of the President and IAC concluded that Macahilig was merely Magalit's laborer and caretaker.

Magalit instituted Civil Case No. 3517 in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Then it filed a Motion for Correction of the Implementation for the court to properly implement the IAC decision.

On September 17, 1992, Judge Maria Carillo-Zaldivar issued the following Order:

"Finding from the Ma[n]ifestation of counsel on record for the movant that the two (2) hectares of land she desires to be executed thru an alias writ is outside the ten (10) hectares awarded to her by the Fisheries, this Court has no jurisdiction over her claim.

Subsequently, Dr. Magalit filed a "Petition for Contempt Against Melina Macahilig," alleging that Macahilig had refused to turn over Lot 4417 to her. The trial court and CA ruled in favor of Magalit.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res - Lot 4417. 2. WON September 17, 1992 Order constitute res adjudicata barring the June 18 and July 14, 1993 Orders of the trial court.

HELD:

1. YES. It is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. She clearly submitted to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517. We cannot allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. If, by deed or conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to the latter.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.

The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents' predecessors in interest. Without taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.

2. NO. September 17, 1997 Order of the trial court is an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order cannot give rise to res judicata. Only a final and unappealable judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction can effectively bar another action that has identical parties, subject matter and cause of action as the prior one.

Petitioner insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it. We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category.

For res judicata to apply, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. For example, an order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata that will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment.

Strictly speaking, res judicata does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating interlocutory motions.

The interlocutory nature of the Order of September 17, 1992 is evident from the fact that the trial court proceeded to hear and determine the inclusion of Lot 4417 in the Fishpond Case.

PETITION DENIED.

CAUSE OF ACTION

SPOUSES HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES EMBUDoG.R. No. 149554 | 2003-07-01

FACTS: Spouses Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Embudo a complaint for "Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees," before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo Embudo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land situated for a consideration of P15,000.00. However, the TCT was issued solely in Teofredo's name and that despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.

Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the RTC is for the annulment of deed of sale and partition, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for annulment of title and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction

HELD: NO. Designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint.

What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from respondents; it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

Pineda vs. CA and the Department of Education, etc.G.R. No. 181643 | 2010-11-1

FACTS: Pineda entered into a MOA with Lakandula High School (LHS) represented by its principal, Dr. Blas, for a 5-year lease of the school canteen. The faculty and personnel of LHS questioned the validity of the MOA.

DepEd, through Usec. Gascon, declared the MOA "null and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen. Pineda filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC, which the latter granted.

DepEd, this time represented by Asec. Montesa, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the orders of the RTC.

CA affirmed the order of the RTC denying DepEd's motion to dismiss but reversed its order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

ISSUES:1. WON Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to file the petition2. WON MR s/b filed before going to the CA on certiorari3. WON CA erred in disolving the Writ of Injunction in favor of Pineda HELD:1. YES. Respondents were sued in their official capacities. What was actually being assailed by Pineda in her petition before the RTC was the implementation of DepEd's existing guidelines with the nullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then principal of LHS.15 As Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized to institute the petition before the CA in order to advance and pursue the policies of his office - DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case before the RTC.

2. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,17 it was written:

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

3. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated.20 The DepEd already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC's preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained:

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.

Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status.

Petition DENIED.

INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, et.al vs. SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIO RICAFORTG.R. No. 150159 | 2003-07-25

FACTS: Respondent Spouses Pablo and Antonia Ricafort and spouses Renato and Teresita Villareal entered into a compromise agreement approved by the court, to divide in half a portion of land under the name of Spouses Renato and Teresita Villareal.

Not long thereafter, respondents filed a motion to cite Renato and Teresita in contempt of court for refusing to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement. Before the motion was heard by the trial court, the siblings of Renato and his co-heirs to the subject lot, filed a motion for intervention and substitution of parties, alleging that Renato and Teresita have waived their interest in the disputed lot in their favor.

Later, upon realizing that the compromise judgment was already final, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment. They insist that the compromise judgment was a nullity because they were not impleaded as parties-defendants despite the fact that they were co-heirs of Renato and indispensable parties therein. They alleged that they only learned of the compromise judgment a year after it was promulgated.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are indispensable parties?

HELD: NO.

This assertion has no merit given the fact that on its face, the certificate of title shows that the property is solely owned by Renato Villareal, married to Teresita Villareal, and without any indication whatsoever that petitioners have an interest in the disputed lot. It must be emphasized that respondents cannot be expected to know details that are not reflected on the face of the certificate of title. In other words, no one could have guessed that petitioners were claiming a right over the property by virtue of succession or, assuming petitioners' allegations to be true, that Renato only held the property in trust for his brothers and sisters.

Petitioners are also estopped from denying Renato's absolute title to the lot.Verily, since petitioners themselves admitted that they donated and caused registration of the lot in Renato's name, they cannot now be allowed to defeat respondents' claim by conveniently asserting that they are co-owners of the lot.

Thus, for purposes of the action for annulment of TCT No. 199241, the only indispensable party-defendant was Renato and his wife. He is the registered owner of the lot and is conclusively presumed, for all intents and purposes, to be its owner in fee simple. A certificate of registration accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner which, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title showing exactly the owner's real interest over the property covered thereby.

VENUE

SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN, Petitioners, versus HON. JANE AURORA C. LANTION, et.alG.R. No. 160053 | 2006-08-28

FACTS:

Petitioners defaulted on the payments for peso and dollar loans to the respondent bank, so the latter foreclosed the mortgaged lots.

Subsequently, petitioners filed against PDB and its officers a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. They alleged that only their peso loans were covered by the mortgages and that these had already been fully paid, hence, the mortgages should have been discharged. Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.

The respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the case for improper venue.

HELD: NO. Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements.

Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

REAL ACTIONCABUTIHAN vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONG.R. No. 146594 | 2002-06-10

A case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.

Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. A suit for such breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate, subject of the said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees.

FACTS:

Respondent Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation entered into an Agreement with Petitioner Cabutihan to execute the appropriate document assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering particular lots (situated in the Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal) in favor of the latter, as a compensation upon accomplishment of some undertakings. Cabutihan performed and accomplished the undertakings in the agreement but the respondent failed to comply with its obligations, as embodied in the agreement, despite petitioner's formal demand.

Cabutihan filed an action for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Pasig City.

Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismis alleging improper venue as one of the issues.They contended that the case is for recovery of respondent corporation's land or her interest therein. Thus, a real action or an action in rem.

ISSUE: WON Venue was improperly laid.

HELD: YES.

The action is in personam. The petitioner ultimately sought the conveyance of real property, not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action was instituted.

In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission.

In Commodities Storage cited earlier, petitioner spouses obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over their land and ice plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Because they had failed to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed and the ice plant auctioned. Before the RTC of Manila, they sued the bank for damages and for the fixing of the redemption period. Since the spouses ultimately sought redemption of the mortgaged property, the action affected the mortgage debtor's title to the foreclosed property; hence, it was a real action.[18] Where the action affects title to the property, it should be instituted in the trial court where the property is situated.[19]

In National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court held that "an action in which petitioner seeks the execution of a deed of sale of a parcel of land in his favor x x x has been held to be for the recovery of the real property and not for specific performance since his primary objective is to regain the ownership and possession of the parcel of land."

However, in La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada,[21] private respondents filed an action for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City - - a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while the case was pending before the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants' ownership thereof. This Court ruled that the venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in Bago.

In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals,[22] private respondent filed a case for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners' position that the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint.

ACTION IN PERSONAM

GOMEZ vs. CAG.R. No. 127692 | 2004-03-10

FACTS:

Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to petitioners.

An action for specific performance and/or rescission was filed by herein petitioners.

Defendants filed for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the RTC-Cebu in favor of the plaintiffs. They alleged that the trial court's decision is null and void on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and the complaint.

ISSUE: W/N action is an action in personam

HELD: YES.

To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature of the action filed against them must first be determined. It will be helpful to determine first whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.

In the present case, petitioners' cause of action is anchored on the claim that the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino reneged on their obligation to convey ownership of the two parcels of land subject of their sale. Thus, petitioners pray in their complaint that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the appropriate deed of sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners); or in the alternative, that the sale be revoked and rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners their down payment in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted by petitioners affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

Contrary to petitioners' belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to or possession of the two parcels of land, it does not automatically follow that the action is already one in rem.

The objective sought in petitioners' complaint was to establish a claim against respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to them the title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who was one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners. Hence, this case is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their persons.

PLEADINGSNHA versus BASAG.R. No. 149121 | 2010-04-20

FACTS:NHA obtained a Writ of Possession from RTC, ordering spouses Basa to vacate the lots extrajudicially foreclosed in favor of the former. Spouses Basa filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and their right of redemption.

Issue:W/N the petition complies with the requirements of Rules on verification of pleadings

Held:

3. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the best of my own personal knowledge."

A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed that he had read the allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on his personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of my personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the affiant declared that the allegations in the petition are true and correct based on his personal knowledge.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good faith.[37] To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming that the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the affiant's personal knowledge or based on authentic records.[38]

We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.

CERT. AGAINST FS

HEIRS OF JUANA GAUDIANE et.al vs. CAG.R. No. 119879 | 2004-03-11

FACTS:Felix executed a document entitled Escritura whereby he sold to his sister Juana his one-half share in Lot No. 4156 covered by TCT No. 3317-A. However, the Escritura stated that Lot No. 4156 was declared under Tax Declaration No. 18321 and said tax declaration was for another parcel of land, Lot 4389 and not Lot 4156.

Descendants of Juana, the Isos, claimed that the sale included not only Lot 4156 but also Lot 4389. So they filed a pleading in the trial court seeking to direct the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City to cancel OCT 2986-A covering Lot 4389 and to issue a new title in favor of the Isos. This was later withdrawn after respondents' predecessors-in-interest, Gaudiane, opposed it on the ground that the Isos falsified their copy of the Escritura by erasing "Lot 4156" and intercalating in its place "Lot 4389."

The Isos again tried their luck to acquire title in their name by filing in 1975 a case for quieting of title of Lot 4389 but the same was dismissed without prejudice.

The Isos later filed another action for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 6817, but it was again dismissed by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, due to the failure of the plaintiffs (the Isos) to prosecute and to comply with the orders of the court. When the judgment became final, respondents sent a letter to Ines Iso asking her to surrender the possession of the one-half portion of Lot No. 4389 comprising Felix' share. The Isos refused.

The respondents filed the present case for partition of Lot 4389, accounting of proceeds and damages against herein petitioners.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: WON the defense of ISOS in present case is barred by res judicata

Held: YES.

We cannot delve anymore into the legality and validity of the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 6817 because it has long become final and executory for failure of the petitioners to file an appeal. In accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[8] said order had the effect of judgment on the merits although no trial was conducted because it did not contain any statement that the case was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a similar future action. As such, based on the principle of res judicata, the petitioners are barred in another action (involving the same subject matter, parties and issues) from raising a defense and from asking for a relief inconsistent with an order dismissing an earlier case with prejudice.

Considering the similarity of petitioners' defense in this case with their main averment in the case for quieting of title, petitioners are barred by res judicata from claiming sole ownership of Lot 4389.

In Medija vs. Patcho, et al. we ruled that a case for partition and an action for quieting of title have identical causes of action and can therefore be the subject of res judicata.

For reasons of public policy, res judicata cannot be waived by a party because the time and energy of the State and the taxpayers are wasted by the re-litigation of settled issues.

Genuiness of a Document

SPOUSES DONATO vs. CAG.R. No. 102603 | 1993-01-18

Facts: In this case, the petitioners possessed a land which is not the same land they hold title to. The land in dispute is Lot 5145. owned by the deceased mother of the respondents, but is still in possession of the petitioners, who likewise owned Lot no. 5303 (foreclosed mortgage from Carolina, original vendee) located near the land in question. The petitioners believed that Lot 5145 is the very same Lot No. 5303 over which they hold the title of ownership; that it was a matter of oversight on the part of the Bureau of Lands, that the identity of these two parcels was not reflected in their title. According to the petitioners, Ochave's (original vendor) ownership over the same parcel finds support in the Deed of Sale executed by Basilio Rarang, who allegedly derives his authority as petitioners mother's agent from a Special Power of Attorney duly executed in his favor.

Issue: 1. WON the SPA executed by the mother of the respondents is null and void.2. WON respondents deemed admitted the genuiness and execution of the SPA.

HELD: The SPA is null and void and all subsequent transactions involving Lot 5145 and springing from the SPA are also null and void. Consequently, on this alone, petitioners' claim of ownership should be rejected outright.

Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the rule on implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document subject of an action or defense, the same is not without exception. One such exception is when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. Respondents Lolita and Ernesto were mere witnesses to the SPA in question and as such, they cannot be considered as parties to the instrument. Moreover, the same document should not be afforded a presumption of genuineness and due execution. In view of the various discrepancies found by the trial court, it lacks the veracity to entitle it to any degree of credibility.

Negative Pregnant

PHILAMGEN and TPI vs. SLI, DVAPSI and CAG.R. No. 87434 | 1992-08-05

Facts:SLI is an interisland carrier used by a foreign common carrier to tranship to Davao two consignments of cargoes covered by Bill of Ladings. The cargoes took on board at Baton City, LA for shipment to Manila and later for transhipment to Davao. Both cargoes consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics. However, when the cargoes were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of the consignee, it was found out that some bags were either shortlanded or were missing, and some of the bags were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially emptied, but, worse, the contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and therefore could no longer serve their intended purpose.

The petitioners filed for damages due to respondents negligence and the trial court ruled in their favor. However, the CA reversed the lower court's decision, in effect dismissing the complaint of petitioners.

Issue:WON respondent court erred in upholding, without proof, the existence of the so-called prescriptive period.

Held: Although the bills of lading that contains the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such bills of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto.

Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so considered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant pleadings. In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer, except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be maintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere references thereto.

As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or defense based on said documents

Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.

Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the procedural earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to. Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them. WAIVER OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA and PASTORG.R. No. L-47847 | 1981-07-31

Facts:Respondent Manuela Pastor applied for the registration under R.A. 496 of 13 parcels of land. The respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots under claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.CFI granted the application. Upon appeal, the petitioners contend that some of the lots are subject of a Cadastral case, which either way, whether the decision in such case had become final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496 cannot prosper because of the principles of res adjudicata and litis pendentia. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto.

Issue: WON the defense of res judicata and/or litis pendencia were deemed waived by failure to set up during the trial.

Held: YES. The oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal.

Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:

"SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; . . ."

The defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal.

But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

SPECIFIC DENIAL

RP, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.DE NERIG.R. No. 139588 | 2004-03-04

FACTS:OCT No. 0662 was issued by the Register of Deeds of CDO City as compliance to Decree No. N-361749 issued by the CFI in its decision granting the heirs of Graciano their application for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title for Lot 2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, which was also approved by the Land registration Commission and certified by the Bureau of Forest Development as alienable and disposable.

Subsequently, the OSG thru the Director of the Bureau of Lands sought for the annulment of the OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of the property, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction over the person and on the subject matter, as well as due to non-compliance with Comm. Act No. 141, which mandates that a copy of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title should be duly served on the Director of the Bureau of Lands; and non-compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239, which requires the plan to be re-verified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, in this case, Plan (LRC) SWO-150.

Issue: WON the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents and that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the same.

Held: YES.

As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the private respondents had the burden of complying with the statutory requirement of serving the Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application and amended application, and to show proof of their compliance thereon.

The question that comes to fore then is whether or not the petitioner was burdened to prove its allegation that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had approved Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The answer to the question is dependent on the resolution of the issue of whether or not the private respondents admitted the same, impliedly or expressly, in their answer to the complaint and in their pleadings.

"As regards the Report required by the provisions of Section 3 of PD 239, the records show that a Report has been made to the Director of Lands, Manila, by the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands in Cagayan de Oro City. "

The private respondents failed to specifically deny the petitioner's averment in its complaint that LRC Plan SWO-150 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The private respondents thereby impliedly admitted that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan as required by Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239.

In light of the private respondents' admission, the petitioner was relieved of its burden of still proving that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan of Lot 2821 before the trial court rendered its decision.

No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of no value.

Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party would be successful if he offers no evidence.

However, we also agree with the CA that it was the burden of the petitioner in the trial court to prove the material allegations of its complaint. This is provided in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Burden of proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven by evidence except the following:

(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues.

(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have been sufficiently alleged.

(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well as those admitted by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.

(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.

(5) Facts which are legally presumed.

(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.

The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail; it does not shift the burden of proof.[36] In this case, the personnel of the Land Registration Commission and the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531 are presumed to have performed their duty of serving a copy of the application and its appendages to the petitioner. It was thus the burden of the petitioner to prove..

A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary evidence and thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence.

On the first issue, the rule is that only questions of law may be reviewed in this Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also been held that the finding of facts of the appellate court may be questioned in this Court, where as in this case, the latter's judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, or such findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties, or when certain relevant facts are overlooked, which, if property considered, would justify a different conclusion.

COUNTERCLAIM

SPOUSES JAVIER vs. IAC G.R. No. 75379 | 1989-03-31

FACTS: Private respondent has been charged with estafa under B.P. Blg. 22 in the RTC of Makati for issuing a check subsequently dishonored. The civil case was not reserved. Subsequently, private respondent filed a civil action - a complaint for damages - against the petitioners in the RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar. In this complaint, the defendants were charged with having inveigled Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of the criminal case in the Makati court. The complaint in effect explains why he issued the check for which he is now facing prosecution.

Issue: WON respondent can raise the reason for issuing the check in another court, in a separate civil action for damages filed by him against the petitioners.

Held: NO. As the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal case in the RTC of Makati.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court.

It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as defendant in the criminal charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the civil action based on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was also before that same court that he could offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the petitioners. This he should have done in the form of a counterclaim for damages for his alleged deception by the petitioners. In fact, the counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action.

A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances are present: (1) that it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) that it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 12

All these circumstances are present in the case before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

As Chief Justice Concepcion said in Aytona v. Castillo: 14

Good faith, morality and propriety form the basic foundation of claims to equitable reliefs . . . Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only strict, legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.

Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments for harassment and the circumvention of the law through cunning manipulations of the procedural rules by counsel who may be too clever for their own good. Rules of procedure are intended to expedite rather than complicate, and much less to obstruct, the administration of justice. There is no excuse why the bench and the bar should not know this principle by now.

The applicable provision is Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, reading in full as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

CALIBRE TRADERS, INC. vs. BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC.G.R. No. 161431 October 13, 2010

FACTS:

Calibre was one of Bayerphils distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within the provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac. However, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to Calibre after the latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts in the total amount of P1,751,064.56. As Bayerphils authorized dealer, Calibre then enjoyed discounts and rebates. Subsequently, however, the parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and computations of these discounts. Calibre, although aware of the deadline to pay its debts with Bayerphil, nevertheless withheld payment to compel Bayerphil to reconcile its accounts.

Calibre then filed a suit for damages, accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating Calibres accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out of business. Bayerphil counterclaimed the unpaid accounts of Calibre, but failed to pay docket fees on the belief that their counterclaim is compulsory.

Issue: WON Bayerphil's counterclaim is permissive.

Held:

YES. Bayerphils counterclaim is permissive, but the trial court should have given it the opportunity to pay the docket fees since it did not avoid paying said fees.

Court has already laid down the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? The fourth test is the compelling test of compulsoriness.

Bayerphils suit may independently proceed in a separate action. Although the rights and obligations of the parties are anchored on the same contract, the causes of action they filed against each other are distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. The counterclaim for collection of money is not intertwined with or contingent on Calibres own claim for damages, which was based on the principle of abuse of rights. Both actions involve the presentation of different pieces of evidence.

All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory.

VERIFICATION

Attys. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. ARUGAY vs. Judge RALPH S. LEE and Sheriff DE LA CRUZ JR.A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518 | 2004-01-15

FACTS: Petitioners filed an administrative complaint against Judge Lee with manifest partiality, incompetence and gross ignorance of the law; and Sheriff de la Cruz Jr. with unjust, oppressive, irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of attachment.

The complainants are counsels for the defendants in a civil case for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. Properties of the defendants were attached bu later on discharged because of the bond deposited by the defendants. Subsequently, respondent judge through an urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw cash deposit, ordered the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered.

In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that the Complaint was fatally defective, because complainants did not have legal personality to file it; neither did they present affidavits, verified statements or any authority to represent their clients. Further, the Complaint did not contain a certification of non-forum shopping, but instead had a handwritten verification not sworn to or subscribed before an administering officer.

Issue: WON the complaint is fatally defective.

Held: NO.

Specious is the argument of respondent judge that complainants have no legal personality to file the instant Administrative Complaint against him. His contention that the allegations contained therein are hearsay also deserves scant consideration. Rule 140 allows the institution of disciplinary proceedings against judges, not only upon a verified complaint -- supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents substantiating the allegations -- but even upon an anonymous one. Complainants herein have the requisite personal knowledge and have, in fact, executed a joint Complaint-Affidavit and substantiated their allegations with pertinent documents.

The verification in their Complaint, albeit handwritten after the jurat, is sufficient in form and substance. Such verification is a clear affirmation that they are prepared to establish the truth of the facts pleaded. In fact, the lack of it is "merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal." This Court may order the correction of a pleading, "if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice." The jurat that preceded the verification simply evidences the fact that the Affidavit was properly made and sworn to before the officer certifying it. Furthermore, a certification against forum shopping is not needed in this case; Rule 140 makes no such requirement.

However, With respect to the charges against respondent judge, we find that his grant of the withdrawal of the cash deposit -- an Order he later reversed by ruling that the deposit be returned to the clerk of court -- was a mere error of judgment, not an act revealing gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of a trial -- specifically, the satisfaction of a pecuniary obligation.[12] Such order is enforced through a writ that may be issued at the commencement of an action,[13] commanding the sheriff to attach property, rights, credits or effects of a defendant to satisfy the plaintiff's demand.[14] Hence, the property of a defendant, when taken, is put in custodia legis.[15]

In order to prevent the sheriff from levying an attachment on property, the defendant (also called the adverse party) may make a deposit or give a counter-bond in an amount equal to that fixed in the order of attachment. Such deposit or counter-bound is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff (also called the attaching party or the applicant to the writ) may recover in the action.[16] After a writ has been enforced, however, the adverse party may still move for the discharge of the attachment, wholly or in part, by also making a deposit or giving a counter-bond to secure the payment of any judgment[17] the attaching party may recover in the action.[18] The property attached shall then be released and delivered to the adverse party; and the money deposited shall be applied under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment that may be rendered in favor of the prevailing party.[19]

In the instant case, respondent judge had ordered[20] the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered. This action was clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after the discharge of an attachment, the money deposited shall stand in place of the property released.[21] However, the inadvertence[22] of respondent judge was not gross enough to merit sanction.

ESTEL vs. DIEGOG.R. No. 174082 | 2012-01-16

FACTS: Respondents and petitioners entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. After receiving the amount of P17,000.00 as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the subject property to respondents; respondents had been in actual, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot. However the petitioner, together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed herein respondents thru the use of force and violence. The respondents then filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for TRO.

In petitioners' Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, she denied the material allegations in the Complaint. MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the RTC and CA.

On appeal to the CA, the petitioner raised the issue that complaint states no cause of action because the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and, as such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading.

ISSUE:WON the complaint should have been dismissed due to non-compliance with the requirement regarding verification.

HELD: NO.

Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding verification.

A reading of respondents' verification reveals that they complied with the above quoted procedural rule. Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct based on their personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their personal knowledge.

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents' Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents.

It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of.22 This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.23 It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case.

MEDADO vs HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSINGG.R. No. 186720 | 2012-02-08

FACTS: Spouses Medado) and the Estate of Consing, as represented by Soledad, executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage for the former's acquisition from the latter of the property in Cadiz City identified as Hacienda Sol. Records indicate that the sale included certain parcels of land. As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with PNB. Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government via the DAR's Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program. The Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC, Branch 44 of Bacolod City an action for rescission and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-11320 against Spouses Medado, PNB and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement. In the meantime that civil case for rescission was pending, LBP issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian reform bonds, as compensation for the lots covered by the VOS. It prompted Spouses Medado to institute an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, with the RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City. They asked that the following be issued by the trial court: (a) writ of prohibitory injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the VOS proceeds of the lots offered by the Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds; and (b) writ of mandatory injunction to compel LBP to release the remaining amount of the VOS to the spouses. The RTC of Cadiz City issued an Order granting Spouses Medado's application for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. However, this was nullified and set aside by the CA upon appeal.

Issue: WON CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari filed before it, notwithstanding alleged deficiencies in its verification and certification against forum shopping.

Held: The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA petition were substantially complied with, following settled jurisprudence.

The petitioner contended that the consolidated verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition filed with the CA was defective for being signed only by Soledad, instead of by all the petitioners.

Records show that Soledad signed the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue of a SPA attached to the petition filed with the CA, which provides that their attorney-in-fact Soledad.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the authority of Soledad includes the filing of an appeal before the CA, including the execution of a verification and certification against forum shopping therefor, being acts necessary to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and proper in relation to their rights over the subject properties. In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

LIM versus NAPOCORG.R. No. 178789 | 2012-11-14

FACTS:

This case is about the consequence of a party's failure to explain in his motion why he served a copy of it on the adverse party by registered mail rather than by personal service.

Respondent NPC filed an expropriation suit against Lim before the RTC of Lingayen covering Lots 2373 and 2374 that the NPC needed for its SualCoal-Fired Thermal Power Project. Pending the case, respondent spouses Arcinues filed a motion for leave to admit complaint in intervention, alleging that they owned and were in possession of Lot 2374, one of the two lots subject of the expropriation. On January 7, 1997 the RTC granted the Arcinues' motion and but Lim and the NPC failed to file their answers to the complaint-in-intervention. The Arcinues filed a motion for judgment by default. Lim sought to expunge the motion on the ground that it lacked the requisite explanat