CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS IN

PAKISTAN: AN ANALYSIS OF PERVEZ

MUSHARRAF ERA (2000-2008)

BY

ZAHIR SHAH

Thesis submitted to Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan in the partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Ph. D

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

ABDUL WALI KHAN UNIVERSITY MARDAN

SESSION (2015 – 18)

DEDICATION

To my parents, children and my dear wife Farah Shah

Abstract

Institutional imbalance has been the hall mark in the state of Pakistan right from

the time of its inception in 1947. It has inherited the whole state apparatus from

the British Raaj, including legal, political and military institutions. Talking

about administrative and political institutions, especially the military one,

remained imbalanced in terms of their respective maturity and growth. Main

reason for the institution imbalance is our weak political institution and non-

democratic political parties which could not bring strong dynamic and

sustainable political institutions.

Failure of political administration and bureaucratic regimes caused to create

space for army into the political domain which was more organized, strong and

disciplined. During the history of Pakistan four military regimes have imposed

martial law, political activities and parties were banned, censorship on media

was imposed, assemblies were dissolved and constitution was suspended and

abrogated.

Besides the mentioned internal factors, external factors like geo-strategic

location of Pakistan and its security-centered foreign policy also plays

important role in supporting such anti-democratic steps by the military. The

findings revealed that poor governance and legitimacy crises has contributed to

the imbalance between the civil-military relations.

This study investigated to discern the fluctuation in the Civil-Military relations,

especially during Musharraf regime. Qualitative and Quantitative methods have

been used to analyze the variable dynamics which interplay significant role in

the Civil-Military relations.

List of Abbreviations

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization

WWII World War II

NCA National Command Authority

NWFP North Western frontier Province

LOC Line of Control

COAS Chief of Army Staff

GHQ General Head Quarter

AL Awami League

VCOAS Vice Chief of Army Staff

DG-ISI Director General Inter-Services Intelligence

PLM (N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)

CMR Civil Military Relations

CIA-ISI Central Investigation agency – Inter Services

Intelligence

JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

NAB National Accountability Bureau

TTP Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan

LFO Legal Framework Order

PCO Provisional Constitution Order

HRCP Human Right Commission of Pakistan

PPP Pakistan People Party

MMA Mutahidda Majlis e Amal

MQM Muhtahidda Qaumi Movement

ARD Alliance for Restoration of Democracy

GDP Gross Domestic Product

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CEO Chief & Executive Officer

SC Supreme Court

PTI Pakistan Tahreek e Insaaf

NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority

DCC Defense Committee of the Cabinet

PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development

and Transparency

FGCM Field General Court Martial

NDMA National Disaster Management Agency

ECW Construction Work

FIA Federal Investigation Agency

NRB National Reconstruction Bureau

LGO Local Government Ordinance

DC Deputy Commissioner

DCO District Coordination Officer

FPSC Federal Public Service Commission

KPK Khyber Pakhtun Khwa

CMLA Chief Minister of Legislative Assembly

Table of Contents Chapter One ..................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1

Historical Accounts ..................................................................................................... 3

Statement of the Problem ........................................................................................... 25

Objectives of the Study .............................................................................................. 25

Research Questions .................................................................................................... 26

Research Methodology .............................................................................................. 26

Organization of Study ................................................................................................ 27

Chapter Two .................................................................................................................. 29

LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 29

Works Related to Civil-Military Relation in Pakistan ............................................... 29

Theoretical Paradigms ............................................................................................... 44

Chapter Three ................................................................................................................ 68

THE MUSHARRAF ERA ............................................................................................. 68

Political Maneuvering Of Musharraf ..................................................................... 73

Legal Framework Order 2002 ................................................................................... 80

Uniform Issue ............................................................................................................ 84

The Event of 9/11 ...................................................................................................... 90

Devolution of Power .................................................................................................. 92

Military and Religious Parties ................................................................................... 92

War on Terror and Musharraf ................................................................................ 93

End of Musharraf Era ................................................................................................ 93

General Musharraf’s Seven Points Agenda ............................................................... 97

Islamization under Pervez Musharraf ...................................................................... 100

Treason Case against Musharraf .............................................................................. 105

Party Pledges on Civil-Military Relations ............................................................... 107

Institutional Solutions for Civil-Military Relations ................................................. 109

Revised Military Doctrine – not from Democratic Government ............................. 110

.Revelations made on Kargil Operation ................................................................... 111

Lal Masjid Commission ........................................................................................... 112

Amend the Army Act: Asks the Supreme Court ..................................................... 113

Rising Power of Civil-Military Bureaucracy ........................................................... 123

Security Threat ........................................................................................................ 126

Civil Dependence on Army ..................................................................................... 126

Chapter Four ................................................................................................................ 128

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................ 128

Study Design ............................................................................................................ 128

Sampling .............................................................................................................. 128

Sample Size ......................................................................................................... 129

Characteristics of Respondents ............................................................................ 129

Data Collection ........................................................................................................ 130

Tool of Data Collection ....................................................................................... 131

Indexation ............................................................................................................ 131

Data Analysis ........................................................................................................... 131

Uni-variate Analysis ............................................................................................ 131

Bi-variate Analysis .............................................................................................. 132

Chi-square test ..................................................................................................... 132

Chapter Five ................................................................................................................ 134

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS ................................................................................ 134

a. Demographic profile ........................................................................................ 134

i. Age composition of the respondents ................................................................ 134

iii. Educational qualification of the respondents ............................................... 136

b. Uni-Variate Analysis ....................................................................................... 137

4.1 Governance .................................................................................................. 137

4.2 Bureaucracy ................................................................................................. 145

4.3 Judiciary ....................................................................................................... 154

4.4 Weak Civilian Institutions ........................................................................... 163

4.5 Corruption .................................................................................................... 172

4.6 Foreign Policy .............................................................................................. 181

4.7 Weak Political System ................................................................................. 195

4.8 Terrorism ..................................................................................................... 209

4.9 Civil-Military Relations ............................................................................... 220

Chapter Six .................................................................................................................. 228

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 228

Reasons of Military Intervention ............................................................................. 230

a. Internal Political Dynamics .............................................................................. 230

b. Corporate Interests of the Army ...................................................................... 234

c. Regional Factors and Geo-Strategic ................................................................ 234

Consequences of Military Rule ............................................................................... 236

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 243

Appendix I ................................................................................................................... 255

QUESTIONNAIRE ..................................................................................................... 255

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

It is an irrefutable fact that the intervention of military in the politics of Pakistan

is an undeniable reality that has left deep imprints on the whole political

apparatus of the country. The state and its various institutions are primarily the

outcome of a social contract concluded by people at different stages in history.

These institutions include mainly the judiciary, parliament, civil intelligence

and security agencies, bureaucracy, policing and the military. On behalf of the

society, the state delegates power, rights and prerogatives to the military in

order to safeguard the citizens from all internal and external threats and

aggression and protect the borders of the state. Delegating powers to the

military by the state allows it to take actions of an agent democratically,

morally, ethically and constitutionally. Apparently then, the equation of

delegating power from the state to the military should not be turned around into

getting to be delegating power from military to state unless there is a will of

former or the will of principal in the form of the majority.(Economist 2002).

In the nineteenth and twentieth century the military has made several attempts

to intervene into politics. Ironically, military coup has often staged d’état. Thus,

there are many examples of direct or indirect military interventions in the

Asians, Africans and the Latin Americans countries. It is obvious that military

had a number of motives or reasons to intervene in the politics of these

countries. These reasons include corporate interests, national interests or

sectional interests and personal interests.

Over the period of time, the democratic norms gained ground in these Afro-

Asian and Latin American regions, where military’s direct or indirect

intervention continued to take place from time to time. Specifically in the

context of South Asia, democracy has always been considered as a topic of

constant interest by the experts in this field. The military intervention in the

politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh seems to be direct i.e. in the form of coups.

However, in some other countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka, the military is

playing a significant role with certain interest of the institution. However, the

military has refrained itself from taking over the power, (Chadda, 2000). In the

context of South Asia, the case of India in the conditions of its devotion and the

custom or practice of self-ruled operation and relating institutions are

paradoxically and remarkably unique. Although both of the states, Pakistan and

India were part of the same British Rule and both of the countries have inherited

almost the same state institutions like military, parliament, civil bureaucracy,

legal norms and practices. This shows a fascinating and uninterrupted presence

of democracy in India as against the state of Pakistan. Therefore, it needs to

analyze the difference in the situations existing in both of the countries and pin

point the weak areas in case of Pakistan, where the military coups have taken

place recurrently. Hence, it is essential to identify and explain the dynamics of

political policies of Pakistan, more especially focusing on the role of military in

the politics of the country (Gardezi, et al, 1983).

The relations of the civil-military are at the sentiment of the central democracy

concern. However, there are two major characteristics that Asian politics have

shown over the period of previous twenty years along with the interaction

between two of them is concerned. All these are the democracy erosion and also

the effective concern of military of the basis of the political change. In some of

the states, there is direct power assumed by the military in some of the states

and sometimes in the cooperation with the other parties they are performing

their political roles. There was hardly any country found in the South Asia

excluding India which has been successful in restricting the borders defenders

to be at their designated constitutional responsibilities. In the way of viewing

the involvement of the military in the civilian's affairs, an everlasting taste for

the prestige and the power has been developed. The thirst for power and weak

democracies has combined so that they could make the military as the stake

holder in the civilian's affairs of the country (Shah, 2004).

In case of Pakistan military it has come to recognize itself as the state rather

then they watch itself as one the main core element of the constitutional state.

First, the army of Pakistan is known by many as the corporate entity which is

performing as the most effective politicians in the country. Second, due to the

reason of their distinct institutional interest they cannot make any compromise.

Army is always in the strong and the better position after being the strongest of

all the state institutions; now it can give practical shape to the perceived

institutional interests. So at the cost of the tremendous democratic country, the

generals can go to the level of the imposing the martial law. However there is an

opinion or the impression created in the society that there is ability in the armed

forces that they handle the situation when it is not controlled by the civilians

government. Third, the citizens are provided with the reason that in the uniform

they welcome the men being the new rulers of the state (Abbas, 2005).

Historical Accounts

In Pakistan, all the civilian-military relations have not only been stormy

throughout the Pakistan history. And in the process of the historical growth, it

has been proved an uneasy relationship with the general military interventions.

Over the time through the largely unfettered access and coup to the state

resources the important coercive powers were used by an army with the military

underlying threat so that they could challenge the authority of the state, and then

they capture the power time. In general, the armed force remained the dominant

and the key element in the Pakistan’s polity. They have enough power to fill

and move any vacuum they may see in the political system. It is true that there

was not any role of the constitution in the affairs of the country civilians, so

they have crafted the role for themselves (Ahmed, 2006).

The Pakistan government is a pendulum swinging between the military rule and

the democracy. Since independent, Pakistan Army has maintained the

hampering tradition to the process of the politicians. Then again through coup

d’état, the mid-20th-century scourge so that they could make its presence feel.

There has been the direct and the indirect involvement of the military in the

affairs at the political level. On the Pakistan directions which had taken, it had

the huge impacts.

There is a long history of army appeals to common sense. The accumulated

frustration and bitterness and pain associated with the creation of the state of

Pakistan, and there is a constant threat to the existence of the larger neighbor

conditioned political history since I947. Akhand Bharat will continue to

dominate the politics of Congress and agreed to go to war until they were

returned to Pakistan and India. Goa occupation by the Army of India was

interpreted in Pakistan as the signal for the warning. Then the domination fear

of India became a very important factor in the providing the guidance to the

external and the internal factors and the actions. Then the Afghanistan failed to

reconcile to Pakistan and then they made the hostile gestures so that the latter

could feel insecure. Due to this insecurity, there was huge expenditure on the

troops and the arms. As there is not any enough industrial base in the newly

born country, so they can support the huge expenditure of the defense (Zaidi,

2005).

In the period of 1954, the Assistance Program (MAP) as session was made to

the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and joining was made with

the Baghdad Pact in 1955 not only the funds were made to the defense arena

and capacity of the strengthened defense and they were exposed to the armed

forces personals to the advanced training of the nations which are developed.

The armed forces institutional superiority in the financial terms along with the

human capacity coupled with their exposure to the civil administration in the

weakening writ wake that gave them enough confidence for doing the

interference in the matters which can be called civilian influence purely

domain(Almond, 1966).

On October 7, 1958, by a military coup d’état an end was out to the

parliamentary democracy. The 1956 constitution was also abrogated by the

Field Martial Ayub Khan, and the power of the Chief Martial Law

Administrator was assumed after when the political dispensation of the civilian-

military was dismissed. Some of them were available who accepted the coup as

to the weak political system of Pakistan the inevitable was given while on the

other hand the others attributed to the superior organization the leadership and

training of the armed forces from British imperialism, after winning the freedom

was gained. Unluckily when the freedom was won from the British imperialism

the politicians were not succeeded that they think about the regional interest and

the narrower communal and they were found involved in the cruel race for the

fighting and power with each other (Amin, 1994). All this had the net result that

in the system people had lost hope that they could relieve them of the miseries

that they had to face in the newly born country and that they were doing wait for

the saviors. For the cash on the imagination of the people, the army had been in

the better position. The concept of ‘Controlled Democracy' was introduced by

Ayub Khan for winning the will of the public and along with the legitimacy for

years ahead. In the year of 1962, the general army framed the constitution in the

way so that they could have the maximum power. When all the good and the

bad works were given to the mounting public pressure Ayub had to surrender

and the power was handed over to the General Yahya in 1969. There was not

any planning of new Chief Martial Law that they stay in the planning for a long

period. In the year of 1971, they had the elections order of under the Provisional

Constitution and those kinds of elections which resulted in the United Pakistan

breakup. The transfer of power to the national leader and newly Zulifqar Ali

Bhutto appeared in an appropriate manner. So once again the country to

representative democracy again with Z.A. Bhutto as Prime Minister (Ansari,

2002).

It had often proved by the General elections need to be discussed for the

Pakistan. It as the country disintegration that was the result of the elections

while in the case of next in 1977 they caused serious differences among the

actors and the political forces. When the announcement was made for election

data, there was a general impression, and that was there would be the

emergence of the strong opposition that would work as the effective check on

the activities of PPP. But the results of the actions stunned everyone with

surprise that PPP was winning the seats 155 and to Pakistan National Alliance

35 were won. The elections were termed with the help of the opposition parties,

and then they refused to reject the results. Then on a large scale, the

demonstration was started and by all the parties which are in the opposition in

the country. As the time went on, then the situation was worsened with every

negotiation round that was making the no headway. The martial law was

imposed by General Zia ul Haq for the third time in Pakistan’s short history on

5th July (Arif, 1995).

Military intervention in politics is hardly unique to Pakistan. Military

intervention is seen commonly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and also in

some Arab countries, though military rulers have been forced by the people

with the help of external forces to leave their palaces. The recent example in

Egypt is glorifying the democratic forces in other authoritarian Muslim states

for instance Libya, and Morocco, etc. The military rulers only can be ousted

with massive support which is encouraged by the international or regional

forces. Indeed, military rulers come and survive with indigenous and external

supporters. There are several factors which lead the army to come out from their

barracks to command civilians. It was observed by Edmund Burke that in its

essence the armed discipline body is considered harmful to liberty. No doubt at

first glance the conflict potential between military and democracy seems too

much obvious. If the democracy is defined as the political system that gives

promotion to the individual system and as the organization, the military is based

on the strong application of hierarchy, and discipline and then the contrast are

stark. So in spite of asking that why there was involvement of the military in the

politics we need surely to ask what why they ever do otherwise. The military-

political advantages at first sight vis-a-vis other and the groupings of the

civilians are overwhelming. Finer also suggested four levels of intervention e.g.

(1) influence, (2) blackmail, (3) displacement, and (4) supplement. The military

works upon for the first and the second level and the civil authorities which

remained behind the scene, the third replacement level that leads to the removal

of one special set of the civilians throwing the civilian regime (Bamforth,

2006).

The level of supplement which sweeps ways the civilian regime and establishes

the military in its place. Thus tangible and intangible features support to the

military to intervene in politics in any week state. Many weak states have failed

to maintain the relationship of civil-military for the longer time and independent

states created after the WWII have experienced direct or indirect military rule.

William Jesse defined civil-military relation; a national decision will be made

politically responsible civilian officials and using providing the guidance to

these policies that will be under the control of civilians’ officials which are

politically responsible. If the balance between the civil-military relationship

fails, it affects state's domestic sovereignty, security and leads to military

intervention. Pakistan's international sovereignty has been threatened twice, in

1971, East Pakistan (Present Bangladesh) separated and security threatened

again in 1973-77 when the Baloch nationalists took weapons against their state(

Baluchistan). Political crisis provided an opportunity for the then chief of the

army staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, to impose Martial law to curb the nationalist

(separatist) movement in an important province in Pakistan.

Finer said it: there are three massive advantages of the armed forces over

those organizations which are civilians. A symbolic status which is highly

emotional and monopoly of arms. An example of how the military is capable of

governing the country as successfully as the government of civilians does. It

possesses its democracy view, good governance and political stability(Belkin,

2003).

In many parts of the world, the military takes over and runs the so-called

civilian administration permanently or periodically. The liberal democratic

assumption that executive and their senior administrators control the military is

just invalid in many states. The military is involved to some extent in the

politics of every country, it is not only Pakistan.

According to C.E.Welch, the civil-military relationship is determined as:

1) Civilian Control: In the liberal democratic model the civilian

government maintains the dominant position. The military acts like any

other large Bureaucracy. It fights for personal and resources within the

government. It has the influence to the extent that it manages to

convince the public, government, and politicians that it has the best case.

2) Civilian Control and Military Participation: In wartime, for example,

military power increases even in a liberal democracy. It is not as just

equal layer with other parts of the bureaucracy it can insist on having a

dominant role in decision-making

3) Military Control and Civilian Participation: when the government is

controlled by the military then it possesses the degree of the civilian's

participation either for the purpose of practical or symbolic. For the

objective of missing the effect that the strings are pulling by the military

behind the scene and at the government head the civilian leaders may be

put.

4) Direct Military Control: In such system, the military publically and

unabashedly controls the government. It may employ civilian for tasks

the bureaucracy, but the military is Cleary the political authority

(Bennett, 2011).

Over the decisions that are considered very important, there is a monopoly of

the military of the state. So aside from being the external society guards of the

nation this institution is well accepted. The Pakistani Army has the direct

control over Pakistan's nuclear program and foreign policy. The National

Command Authority (NCA) was established by the Army Staff former Chief

and, General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan to assure the West that

Pakistan's nuclear weapon is safe (Chaudhri, 1967).

The Pakistani Army has unique characteristics. It has been called by the civil

regimes in the time of crisis. It feels itself the true guardian of the country, in

fact, it has proved it whenever the state faces internal security dilemma. The

military of Pakistani got such a strengthen position has its deep roots in history.

Pakistan faced several crises after its inception 1947.It was the army which

rescued the nation in times of true crisis. During the disaster of earthquake 2005

and sad flooding situation, the army had had always protected the people and

had left immensely positive impacts on their minds and heart. In fact, the

Pakistani army has won the people's mind and heart in their favor no matter

what the circumstance is.

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic nation. Internal riots had weakened the civil regime in

the 1950s. East Pakistan and the West Pakistan, both Pakistani wings were

being threatened by the ethnic-nationalists. Army curbed the linguistic and

ethnic movement when it rose in Sindh and Baluchistan in 1952-54. In 1953 the

army assisted the civilian governments when the people stood up against

Ahmad in Lahore (Choudhury, 1967).One would be surprised to know that

under the ‘operation service first' the army also played its role in nation building

process; executive and the magisterial power was granted in 1956 for

controlling the widespread hoarding along with the black marketing which

resulted in the shortage of food in East Pakistan. In 1951-1952 earlier, the army

carried out "process jute" to stop smuggling jute between India and East

Pakistan. Pakistan lost an important source of income. This process was a good

cooperation with civilian agencies. Thus began the military's role in civilian

areas to expand, which cannot be prevented. Pakistan could not have the high

quality of leadership after Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In the early 1950s, social

chaos in Pakistan did make the political organizations weak and corrupt which

promoted nepotism. The newly born ‘Islamic state' was passing through the

gravest situation. Landlords, powerful politicians, and bureaucrats were

holding powers and influence over the public offices. The mainstream forces

‘Political parties' lost the people's trust. Doubtful circumstances created by the

politician's enhanced military are power. Very often elections were avoided by

the state elite, and when conducted they led political turmoil. A Worth

mentioning fact is that Pakistan's neighboring countries e.g. India and

Afghanistan both created tension and trouble in Pakistan's internal provinces

such as NWFP (North Western Frontier Province), currently Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The separatists and ethnic movements had been

supported either by Afghanistan or India to destabilize Pakistan. Unfortunately,

the civil governments have always failed to control the situation. External forces

and conflicting neighboring states also provided strong grip to the army over

Pakistan's week institutions. Army's direct interaction and interference in public

affairs had affected politicians' credibility. Army's cooperative image toward the

people created trust deficit between the people and political leaders, which is

still going on (Cochrane, 2008).

Usually, because politicians are considered responsible for inviting the army to

share their burden during the conflicting situation in the country, the military

has legitimized its involvement by the state destabilization threat and doubted

leadership, the political leadership was perceived as ‘security risk' to stage the

military coup. As mentioned earlier military rule could not be effective or last

long without political co-optation of the same elites who held public offices in

the civilian governments. But their cooperation with the military government

could never be possible without political fragmentation that the military regime

and intelligence agencies under it caused

In the inner functioning of the political parties the regular intervention, the

election of the assemblies, other institution and media that proved the in making

the political institutions weak and that are considered important for the

parliamentary democracy. The tradition of the Generals of Pakistan accusing

their political leaders has continued from the first army ruler to the last one.

“The army meanwhile learned over time to establish patron-client relationships

with the Islamic parties and with the bureaucracy, and that was used in the

efforts for fighting the populist leaders in both the West and East Pakistan.

Coup d'états in the history of Pakistan have been validated by the superior

courts by the misinterpretation of Roman law" that which otherwise is not

lawful; necessity makes lawful" (Cohen, 2006).

So into the direct government control, the army of Pakistan pushed itself

through sidelining the weak class of the politicians. In the year of 1958, the first

martial law was imposed and then to become the dominant player the military

has made its position very strong in the politics. Over the period of 63 years for

the four times, the army had experienced the direct power and then learned to

the negotiate authority when they were not in the direct government control

The Ayub Khan Regime: The Counter Coup

In 1958 after seizing power, chief of Army staff Ayub Khan, made himself and

gave promotion to Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Field

Marshal, and he was witnessed as a compliant political officer. Compared to

other military rules Ayub Kept the army at a distance to run the day to day

affairs of the country. The administration was mainly handled by the

bureaucracy he used to rely on; this was the reason many senior officers did join

military regime of Ayub and became ministers, governors, Ayub by introducing

―Basic Democracy and the constitution 1962 replaced the parliamentary

government. Basic Democracies bestowed legitimacy on Ayub rule and elected

him as a president in 1960 to 1965, with the time, Ayub started relying more on

civilians for the formulation of public policies, instead of his staff and corps

commanders. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was foreign minister during Ayub‘s resign,

who became has closest confidants. On the other hand, he gave the military

significant high degree of autonomy (Country Profile, 2009).

With massive enlargement in the defense expenditure and the enormous

moderation secured there were US Military aid packages first visible splits were

seen in 1964–65 between the military and Ayub. For the favorable path on

Kashmir Ayub, Bhutto and other started plotting a military solution. But

military as an institution showed reluctance, so the planning for the operation

was delegated to the joint civilian-military cell by Ayub. This cell has been

influenced and controlled by men of Bhutto officer and some foreign

intelligence officers. This cell has undermined the military leadership and

challenged his independence, strength, and unity. The plan for the two-stage

system was the first infiltration across the Line of Control in India held Kashmir

through 30,000 Fedayeen, and incitement to revolt. The second phase of the

plan was, Army would cross the LOC and would capture strategic areas before

the Indian Army could take action, having reservation about the high risk of

escalation. COAS Musa Khan and senior Army officer raised the objection to

Ayub Khan about the plan‘s success, which he dismissed. The army was

confident in case of Indian army loses a fight in Kashmir vale, they would

counter attack on Punjab border and the military knew it was unlikely to win.

In alliance with the military high command that was avoided in the supporting

plan with the objective of war, and to General Malik‘s divisional headquarters

were assigned the responsibility for the operations of Kashmir and then by

general headquarters the solely execution. No efforts were made for notifying

the combat and then the army preparation and the other war services. With the

Pakistan‘s bitter defeat the war of Kashmir was ended, but some success was

achieved in the Kashmir. At that time when the Indian counter attack into

Punjab, Islamabad‘s forces were there, and they were not prepared, and as an

institution, the military was not for this plan, and then they were disappointed

became disillusioned with Ayub & Bhutto‘s war mishandling (Easterly, 2001).

The poor generalship showed by the GHQ, totally disappointed senior combat

commanders and mid-level officers. In place of COAS Musa Khan, General

Yahya Khan was appointed as a COAS. Breach rapidly diverged after the war

between Ayub‘s regime and military, furthermore political support also

declined, resulted in the rising of political parties. Bhutto separated from Ayub

Khan and established his own Pakistan people‘s Party (PPP). In 1967, and

larger popularity in Punjab West Pakistan and Awami League (AL) had a

separatist agenda was on rising became threatening for the military regime.

Traditional opposition parties started demanding parliamentary democracy, and

soon Ayub‘s Basic Democracy collapsed seek imposing marshal law, tried to

suppress the violent mass protests. With the Army, consequences were not

agreed that there would be a martial law on Ayub’s behalf. Ayub Khan had

already lost the support of the Army active leaders finally resigned and handed

over powers to Yahya Khan.

The General’s Revolt: The Yahya Khan Regime

In the period of 1969 the prudence from Ayub Khan was assumed by Yahya

Khan. He structured the entire new shape ―Military – as – Government by

promoting his close associates General Abdul Hamid Khan as Chief of Army

Staff. General Yahya Khan himself wanted to address the underlying political

domestic issues of Pakistan, which could not be solved as independence for the

objective of extraditing the military form from the direct power. He announced

free elections for National Assembly within 1970 and abrogated the constitution

of 1962 given by Ayub and proportional representation to East Pakistan

compared to West Pakistan was guaranteed for the first time in Pakistan.

Military on the other head, had reservations to transfer political power to

civilians because they had engaged in long-term corporate business and did not

want to put at risk and especially enfranchising the Bengalis, split between the

various political parties showed throughout the each wing of the country. There

wasn‘t constitution in the country and the regime used to believe among the

divided parties it could perform as it could perform as arbiter and it could also

protect the military-corporate long term interest. Election results totally derailed

the military regime‘s plan, to withdraw in East Pakistan the Awami League got

an outright majority concept. Bhutto in West Pakistan could win two-thirds of

the seats. The sweeping majority in East Pakistan by Awami League issued six

demands which were having regional autonomy based and East Pakistan‘s

Military. On the other hand, Bhutto did not want to make a government with

Awami League. Negotiations were drawn between the parties and the regime, in

March 1971 but failed, and indefinite delay of National Assembly was

delivered. Awami League provided East Pakistan as an independent state as

Bangladesh and descended into open revolt. Excluding Bengal regiments,

Yahya with the support of Army called a brutal military crackdown in the East

wing. This situation turned into full seek civil war, during nine months

thousands of civilian were killed. Due to the massive flow of Bengali refugees

into India, Indian Army in 1971 invaded East Pakistan to support Bangladeshi

rebels in early December (Fair, 2011).

Pakistan launched an invasion on East Pakistan. In response, India successfully

fought on two fronts, and a third was captured by the Pakistani army trapped in

Eastern Pakistan, Yahya was forced to surrender. Yahya and his team wanted to

remain in power, but the fault of many military commanders and senior quarters

of the head of Yahya complete disaster for both the prestige of the state and

military and good bottoming regime. Many of the demands of the lowest leaders

sent Chief of Staff (CGS), Lieutenant General Gul Hassan threat to the regime's

tanks roll into the capital and out of the seat if by next day Yahya, army

astronomy not out of the government. Sub coordination of the Army, General

Yahya. Hamid Khan represented himself as an acceptable replacement by senior

officer corps, but they rejected him. Yahya and Gen, Hamid had to resign by

late December 1971. Once the top leadership of the regime was removed, Gen.

Gul Hassan was honored to be COAS and arrangement were made to transfer

the power to Bhutto and the People‘s Party and returned the military to the

barracks after the downfall of East wing of Pakistan (Gondal, 2011).

General Zia-ul-Haq Regime

In 1977, Bhutto rigged parliamentary elections to suppress opposition protests;

efforts were made to implement the martial law, but Zia-ul-Haq and the Army

seized power, and he wanted to have military as- institution a stakeholder in his

regime and made lots of efforts at the beginning of his administration. Zia was

not expecting that he would be the army head before the senior officers and the

coup and then their policy view is used to solicit. A claim was made by Rizvi to

the Zia-ul-Haq invulnerability the main core was the assistance and the support

that he enjoyed from the senior commanders of the army. Zia showed lots of

favors in the form of incentives to the military regarding private pay, defense

expenditures enlargement, residences, and bank loans the large track of

agriculture and other sides of perks. In 1980, the military showed favor, for free

elections to return to democracy. It wanted to go along with Zia‘s efforts as long

as military‘s self-interests were not threatened in 1984 referendum gave Zia

presidentship for five years term. Zia wanted to hold a general election on the

nonparty basis in the coming year (Gul, 2010). Muhammad Khan Junejo was

appointed as Prime Minister and the martial law was lifted. Zia had a

misperception about Junejo and legislature that they would fulfill the wishes of

Zia, but they proved that instead of being anticipated and refused to act like

rubber stamp they want to be more dynamic. These differences in a relationship

brought political divisions within the military-as-government, whereas for the

opposition political parties, were fuel for revival. Biggest Political Party that

time PPP started demanding the end of military rule to bring parliamentary

democracy. Between Zia and Junejo relations, military‘s corporate interests

become tangled, disagreements arose over cabinet appointments, military

spending, promotions, perks and Zia‘s dual hated role. The military showed

resentment about Junejo's Attitude, like an attack on its autonomy and Zia,

inability to protect the institutional interests of the army also intervene in its

internal affairs, to save his civil own. To save the civilian government, Zia kept

distanced from the army as an institution. Zia had to ignore the system static

update and interference in the hierarchy of the Army showed blatant favoritism

and small series extracted command, rather Zia was surrounded by civilians and

loyal agents. Many active and retired officers established and enforced civil

bureaucracy, so that could not be commanded. Due to turnover of seniors at the

top, Zia had to promote Junior officers on the senior posts, and stop taking

political inputs and meeting with senior officers and with corps commanders

and top brass became infrequent Zia started giving importance to meet the

commanders of the younger group and the junior officers privately. There was a

lot of tension of the politicians in the regime and between the military and the

government. For the purpose of arming the Afghan mujahideen, an ISI

ammunitions dump used was exploded in the military capital of Rawalpindi and

hundreds of civilians were killed (Haleem, 2003).

To stop public outrage, Junejo demanded the trail of the head of the ISI and the

directorate‘s former head who was the Zia‘s closest. In return, Zia dismissed

Junejo and dissolved the legislature without the consultation of VCOAS or

corps commanders and ordered to seize key buildings and arrested civilian

leaders of his government. Ignore political setbacks and agitation, Zia planned

for new elections to stay in power. In August 1988, Zia after leaving a

demonstration of tanks, along with most of his closest the US ambassador in

Islamabad military aide, died in an accident in C-130. Shortly after the death of

Zia-ul-Haq, the General Command issued for Big VCOAS, during the hours of

Big Feet, leaders of the Force and the General Command of the employees

decided unanimously to return to barracks. It has been designated as the civil

works for the government to hold free elections in November 1988, Benazir

Bhutto regained the ability of the administration of democratic parliamentary

government in Pakistan.

The Musharraf Regime

It could be said that Pakistan is a suitable model of praetorian state with the

military that is performing efficiently in the country mainstream politics. Once

again Pakistan returned to the army after playing hide and seeks with the

democracy in the period of eleven years, when with the COAS General Pervez

Musharraf on October 12, 1999, in a bloodless coup, took power from Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif. At the moment of the coup, a democratic reversal

occurred, but ‘democratic reversal' for the time of military brought about the

coup, when the government of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad was sent packing, out of

its 53 years of existence it was the period of the age of 25 when the military was

in power. When in Pakistan army took charge of the government for the fourth

time in October 1999. It was not any shocking or the surprising thing for most

of the foreign politicians. Unlike the previous Pakistan military coups, there

was not any law imposed by the General Musharraf in the country. As being the

only state in the in South Asia, the coup left the Pakistan with the government

of military in Pakistan.

The immediate provocation of the Sharif's for precipitating the political crisis

and sacking Musharraf was the exciting clash between the two state institutions.

Before the departure to Sri Lanka, the army chief had made some moves due to

which the interest of the prime minister was affected. This was now considered

something unique to occur. It was expected from the army men that they would

show huge loyalty to the military as the institutions and the institution's

priorities would be on the top. To antagonize the PM considered two steps

sufficient army commander on the one hand, while on the contrary a clear line

between the two heads of institutions, respectively is drawn. Even one of the

confrontational approaches to this aspect, for some time can be seen at the head

of two recorders (Haqqani, 2002).

During the army chief time, the tension between the civilian leadership and the

military was started, when the letter of the mismanagement was made of the

affairs of the government in the public gathering and then for the public

remedies they were asked. There was a very clear message between the lines to

the civilian ruling agenda. When the doors were closed to the army chief, it was

the strong reaction by the Sharif in October 1998 to the Army Chief. It was for

the first time in the history when the Army Chief resigned. And in the next step,

Admiral Fasih Bukhari was forced by the Prime Minister to quit. Being misled

and driven by the past arbitrary but the successful political encounters like

kicking out the president, Naval Chief of Staff, Chief Justice and also the Army

Chief. It was continued by to perform in the same way. Due to the successful

encounters with the armed forces gave enough confidence to Nawaz Sharif that

they intrude the affairs in the proper way (Haqqani, 2007).

One of the primary element which made the contribution to the military

takeover in the year of 1999 was effort of PM to get away from "Troika" model

of power that are being shared in Pakistan. Three triangles arms were composed

of the Army Chief, President and the Prime Minister with each balancing the

other by not giving any permission to disturb or tilt the system to its advantage.

From the 1973 Constitution with the scraping off 58-2(b) and for the Prime

Minister the power balance was shifted. In the Pakistan Constitution, the

Article 58 2 (b) was the clause which was instituted by the General Zia-ul-Haq

in 1985 and that gave the power to the president that they dismiss the

government which was elected. The Army was stopped from the direct

takeover. That was the strong argument since this provision addition to the

constitution, and there was not any martial law in Pakistan. There were

complaints every time by the government and then as the result the assemblies

were dissolved it was ordered that there would be new elections. Due to the

instability, the 1990's era was marked and due to which war was caused by the

president and the prime minister and the role of mediator was performed by the

army chief. To all these issues the 58 2 (b) was not the proper issue rather it was

the part of the problem (Haqqani, 2005).

There were two factors which added to thefury of the fire. One of the acts of

Sharif of the commission when in October 1998, the Karamat left service was

to provoke the army with the replacement of the DG-ISI, by a new officer,

General Nasim Rana, and Lt General Zia Uddin. Another factor which was

more important was that it performed again and again without the new COAS,

known as the General Musharraf the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence is apex

spy agency whose reputation touched the new heights after the active role in the

war of Afghan against the defunct USSR in 1980's. Direct reports were made

by the head of ISI to the country prime minister. So it was doubted that Nawaz

Sharif wanted that someone who is very trustworthy enough that he keep on

informing that what can be the army ill intentions against the government of

civilians. For the two reasons the army was antagonized, the first one had not

been taken into the consideration and the confidence when the new DG ISI was

appointed. The second was that over the number of years the army had

protected itself from the civilian's interference in almost all the respects. With

the new appointment, General Musharraf was not satisfied, and he was waiting

for the right occasion for demonstrating the new displeasure. These were the

four months when the time came, the visit A.B. Vajpayee to Lahore which is of

high profile in February 1999. On occasion, Army General remained absent. In

the coffin, the factor of Kargil proved to be the last nail. Although there was

involvement of the two arch rivals in the confrontation since independence,

between the two the Kargil was the first battle in May 1998 they acquired the

nuclear weapons. The Pakistan Army militants of Kashmiri in the case of Kargil

episode whoever were involved for highlighting the issues of Kashmir by taking

the control over the main route through Kargil (Hassan, 2004). However, there

is an opinion difference as it is believed by some of the scholars which have the

belief that on the part of the military Kargil was a deliberate effort to damage

the efforts of the civilian government for improving the relations within the next

neighbor door. It was objection by Nawaz Sharif that he had been kept in vague

of the Kargil operation and the whole fault on the military was moved when in

the wake of Kargil scene the global group arranged against Pakistan. Musharraf

had all the acclamation for the fruitful conduction of operation on sloping

statures being an armed force man. In the historical backdrop of the Pakistan

Army the Kargil operations were a milestone considered absolutely in military

terms, keeps up Army General. However seeing more grounded in the field

Pakistan involvement was deliberate. Politically and strategically military

course was in especially awkward position. On Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif

International weight had a dampening impact. Between both PM Sharif and

General Musharraf, there was a distinction of conclusion over the military

withdrawal from Kargil. There would be no Pakistani drawback, was expressed

by Musharraf all the while wanting to hurry to Washington and "surrender

singularly" to India was made by Sharif. A discretionary catastrophe for the

nation against India was made so Pakistani impression of the Kargil issue is

anticipated as a military victory. The previous submitted a stumble by

disregarding the institutional standards of the armed force on the day when

Nawaz Sharif rejected General Musharraf in the arrangement of the new armed

forces however in any given setting line and staff power. For performing

principle exercises (for which the association exists mainly), Line power is the

one considered fundamentally dependable and team power helps line power in

giving special counsel. The convention that the armed force was the first

attacking corps, line control for this situation were kept up by the Pakistan

military. Considering that no DG-ISI has ever turned into the armed force boss

till now in Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif's decision of Lt General Zia Uddin as

the new COAS had left from custom. The armed force all in all will

undoubtedly respond as new Army Chief was not from the standard battling

wing of the military and was from the Engineering Corps. (Huntington, 2006)

The performance of PML (N) was exceptionally great. Out of 207 general seats

it won 136 seats in the National Assembly. For the military, the takeover was

the walk that there was a vast majority which voted Sharif and to the corridors

of power of his company. Why no one resisted this action of the radical

unconstitutional? Why there was not any who came out on the roads that they

could show the solidarity with the solidarity democracy? The welcome was

made by the people in the Pakistan.

There were some unforgiving facts in which the answer lied. To the

inconvenience of the selected government the societal elements further warped

the circumstance unless to bring the economy again from the edge of failure,

some supernatural occurrence can help and reestablish its discolored picture; an

unlawful upset is completely on the cards. A point where nonmilitary personnel

government had surrendered certain crucial state claimed foundations and

Inefficiency had come to there. The Army had assumed control as substantial

parts of the state by doing welcome even before the coup of 1999 in which

General Pervez Musharraf kicked out or overthrow Nawaz Sharif. While regular

citizen government was giving way, the armed force was advancing. Execution

gives authenticity to any selected government in vote based system and a solid

base to remain on. The government that was elected turns out to be more

powerless against a military overthrow in a creating nation like our own for

being discovered non-receptive to the essential issues and requests of the voters.

As far as monetary pointers the year 1998 was may be the most noticeably bad

especially when authorization commenced in the wake of May 1998 nuclear

tests. By nation's desperate financial circumstance Pakistan's government

officials did not appear to be troubled. With their lavish spending spree on

themselves, they proceeded to the dishonor of the administration, estranging the

socialized society the attack on Supreme Court constructing further included.

On the weak establishments, the legislature was. There is huge importance to

the concepts of shirking and working for the selected government through the

popular vote. If the factor is avoided that what has been elected or mandated,

then it will be punished with the extreme comfort. Coup d etat is the extreme

form of this punishment by the military. One in the messes the support base is

lost in case of underperformance, then the government mandate is put into the

question, and for resisting the coup, the government finds it difficult. Due to

that reason, there was hardly a dissenting opinion in the country which is

expressed. As once again the army took charge so sensible Pakistanis are not

happy astonishing.

Statement of the Problem

In Pakistan, poor governance, legitimacy crises, corruption and poor socio-

economic conditions are the motivating factors behind every military

intervention in to main stream politics and due to these factors, the public

overwhelmingly support such intervention. Due to personal interest, civilian

institution, oppositions and anti-democratic lobbies also endorse the take-over

of military. Besides the mentioned internal factors, external factor like geo-

strategic location of Pakistan and its security centered foreign policy also plays

in important role in supporting such anti-democratic steps by the military. The

disequilibrium and imbalance in civil military relationship is mainly due to the

above mentioned internal and external factors. Sufficient work have been done

on civil military relationship however, the general perceptions about the civil

military relationship needs to measured and assessed for better understanding of

civil-military relations in Pakistan in general and during Musharraf regime in

particular.

Objectives of the Study

To find out contributing factors towards imbalanced civil-Military

relationship in Pakistan.

To explain the core bases for military intervention in politics.

To assess the dynamics of changing civil-military relationship.

To identify the perceptions at different level regarding civil-Military

relationship in Pakistan.

To determine the different variables effecting the relationship between

the Military and Civil government in the country.

To put forward recommendations for the consideration of Policy

makers.

Research Questions

What are the bases for military intervention in politics during Musharraf

era?

How the civil society (politicians, judiciary and bureaucracy) interacted

with Musharraf in the civil-military relations?

How did Musharraf interact with civil society after coming into power?

What are the perceptions of the civil society towards military regimes,

especially Musharraf regime in Pakistan?

Research Methodology

This study is relevant to in depth analysis of the Civil-Military Relations (CMR)

in Pakistan and to discern the causes of repeated incursions of military into

politics on one hand and highlight the military activism during the civilian

government on the other hand. Direct interaction with various political and

military stake holders will be done to reach the roots of the matter. Also

empirical and qualitative assessment of the available data on the topic will help

this research more productive. An attempt will be made to fill the gap and

highlight the lacunas in the subject. The sudden change in the governments as a

result of military coups will be treated as dependent variables, while the

interests of military versus the society interests, and agency/ shirk will be taken

as independent variables. Both primary and secondary sources are used to make

the study more objective and coherent. Identification of variables and

recognizing the significance of relationships among explanatory variables can

be done by qualitative interpretative methodology. The perceptions of the civil

society towards military regime are identified and measured through

quantitative analysis conducted through questionnaire distributed among a set of

respondents. Data is then analyzed through Statistical Package for Social

Sciences (SPSS).

Organization of Study

The present thesis has been organized in six chapters. A brief introduction of

each chapter is given below.

Chapter One (Introduction): The chapter focuses on a broader introduction of

the subject in question and the historical account of the military coups in

Pakistan. It also includes statement of the problem, objectives of the study,

research questions and a brief methodology of study. The detailed methodology

for quantitative analysis is given in chapter four of the thesis.

Chapter Two (Literature Review): The review of the literature given in this

chapter is based on global and National level. This chapter briefly describes the

issue in hand coupled with theoretical perspective and the theories significant to

the study under the consideration.

Chapter Three (Musharraf Era): This chapter provides a brief analysis of the

events that led to the military Coup of 1998 and describes the events and the

civil-military relations during Musharraf regime.

Chapter Four (Research Methodology): The research methodology involves

the nature of the study, universe, parameters of the study, research techniques

used for the selection of respondents, tools which were used for data collection

and procedure of data analysis and presentation.

Chapter Five (Data Anlysis and Discussion): This chapter consists of result

and discussion that deals with data analysis and presentation. Data is presented

in Uni-variateand Bi-variate cross tabulations. Standard statistical techniques

are applied for exploring association between the variables and testing

statements. The brief explanations of the table have been given for the

understanding of the readers.

Chapter Six (Conclusion and Recommendations): This chapter comprises of

research findings, conclusions of the study and finally important

recommendations have been given towards the resolution of the research

problem.

At the end, specimen copy of questionnaire and list of references have been

annexed.

Chapter Two

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter critically analyzes and reviews already existing literature about the

civil-military relationship.

Works Related to Civil-Military Relation in Pakistan

According to Gardezi (1983), the legal intervention of the military in politics

can be assessed and analyzed from the "legitimization of regimes" till 1971 in

Pakistan. It is recognized that the military is being served as a kind arbitrator.

There had been no interest by the army to interfere in the political system of

Pakistan unless the government has failed due to the civil bureaucracy of

Pakistan. Failure of government brought Ayub Khan in power and presented

himself as a military ruler of Pakistan during 1958-1969. General Fazal

Muqeem Khan (1963) states that military rule is legitimized and justified by

organization's history, warfare and recruitment of Pakistan army. Ayub Khan

(1967), showed himself for political developments as a legitimist. During this

tenure, it was believed by various writers that the masses were guided towards

development and democracy by ignoring the suppression of fundamental human

rights and pinching questions concerning the 1956 constitution and its

abrogation. Ayub Khan had legitimized and justified subsequent political

developments and his martial law (Hassan, 1998).

Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan (R) (1993) stated himself as the legitimist narrative in

his biography. He was the first chief of army staff after the separation of East

Pakistan (Bangladesh) in December 1971. It was also demonstrated by Gul

Hassan Khan that, since the birth of Pakistan political authority and the civil

bureaucracy are dealing with the affairs of this country. General Ayub Khan

ensured to take over his flight and had a pleasant relation with Head of the

State, President Iskander Mirza. However, he had feared from some other

generals of his team members who had a plan to takeover against Ayub Khan.

India was able to hostile Pakistan at that serious stage. However, Iskander

Mirza imposed the martial law under the supervision of Ayub Khan. After the

martial law of 1958, the responsibility of Pakistan was put on the shoulders of

an incompetent politician. Gul Hassan Khan was exiled from the country after

three weeks of the hostile takeover.

Though there is no empirical evidence that can be provided for the cause of

politicization of generals in Pakistan, it can be seen that the ex-army chief holds

a view that Field Marshal General Ayub Khan was not having interest to

participate civil authority in the country. All he provided Pakistan was a

"constitution and a half-baked democracy" (Khan, 1993). Again, legitimacy in

the Ayub-Yahya encounter is given to Ayub by the writer. Hassan Khan

considers that it was the cabinet members who forced Ayub to takeover in

March 1969. The latter did not do any progressive thing for the good of this

country, and Yahya Khan imposed martial law (Khan, 1993). The family and

General Ayub Khan himself had no involvement in corruption. Moreover, the

author is also silent on the fact that the ambassadorship of Austria was accepted

that was offered by Bhutto, the same man who forced Lt-Gen to resign from the

command of the Army as a chief after being putting in protective custody.

Despite all these compassion from Bhutto, the researcher still has a view that it

was Bhutto, not Zia who dragged the country on the edge of another martial

law. Due to this belief of the researcher, he did not highlight the causes and

consequences of the coup in 1977. Tariq Ali’s writings are extensively based on

a conspiracy point of view about the different phases of Pakistan's politics

(1970; 1983). According to the author, the involvement of Pakistan's military in

politics is directed by America. Against the communist USSR, the alliance of

Pakistan with the capitalist block in the context of the Cold War. Brave

Generals could provide a better service to Washington's geostrategic interests.

Therefore, the military was encouraged to stage a coup in 1959, 1969 and 1977.

In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the nominated Prime Minister

and imposed martial law. There is also an "internal aspect" of the conspiracy

theory of the writer. The theory explains that there is an argument in

contradiction of the already established view by the great leader of East

Pakistan, namely Sheikh Maulana Bashani and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman. They

had information about the 1969 takeover by the Pakistan army. Furthermore,

after information and encouragement from General Headquarters (GHQ),

Bhutto started denouncing the six points by the Awami League (Jalal, 1995).

Later, it was only with the support of military that Bhutto became The President

and Martial Law Administrator in 1972. Although, arguments of the author

stand on weak empirical grounds, but they still seem catchy. In addition to this,

the researcher fails to include details about the civil-military relationship and

politics of Pakistan. A Military coup in 1958 is an example where the author has

not put any substantial grounds for the reasons of interference except the 1959

elections. However, elections are the best ways, but these are still not suitable to

the takeover by an illegal way (Jalal. 2009). In the light of the relationship with

the army of Bhutto, Khan (2005) has assumed military as the master and Bhutto

as a weak partner. Moreover, the author has also not mentioned the unpopularity

and demoralization of the military's officer. Also, it has not been discussed that

a demoralized organization with stakes in Pakistan's politics was in need of a

better strategic understanding with Bhutto rather than the need of Bhutto to

form a. Understanding with the former. The writer's accounts are biased and are

of negative mind (Burki, et al. 2007).

Rizvi (2015) has analyzed the supremacy and evolution of Military in Pakistan.

He after describing the short background of political history of Pakistan focused

on the military interventions into the political arena and its withdrawals,

because of the divergence of interests between the leaders of military regimes.

He argued that Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to fire Musharaf, peace and friendship

with India, Military defeat in Kargil war, amid the rising civil military tension.

Furthermore, he stated that for strengthening his military rule, General

Musharaf increased defense budget as well as other side benefits to the Corps

Officers but Honorable Supreme Courts of Pakistan challenged the legality of

military regime in 2007 and Military also withdraws from its supports to the

Military Government. General Musharaf at this time took sharp move and

declared the national emergency, suspended the courts again. The divisions

grew up between Military and General Musharraf over the issue of Emergency

and ended in the defeat of Musharraf led Political Party, PML (Q). The author

of the paper highlighted the causes of Military interventions in Pakistan as;

instability in the nation’s political regimes, violent internal behavior, powerful

neighbours, role of Army as an Arbitrator in domestic politics, army’s

unacceptability of democratic authority, inability of Judiciary not to question

the interventions of Army, lobby of religious preachers against Democracy and

the corrupts civil administration. Beside these internal factors, the geo-strategic

importance of Pakistan always attracts the super power to favour the army over

the Politicians. Rizvi concluded the paper by advising the civil Government that

they must exercise their control over military and work sincerely to regain full

Civilian institutional Control. Civilian Governments must watch the coup

opportunities like floundering political process, external security threats,

internal threats and economic crises.

Faqir, Islam and Rizvi (2013) studied the role of lawyers in support for independence

of judiciary. Judiciary must be independent from all other institutions in the country. In

Pakistan, Judiciary faced challenge due to authoritarian governance. In shape of

military coup, Musharraf came into power which negatively affected this institutions

after 2007, when chief justice was deposed, judicial require was started in a movement

of lawyers begins for independence of judiciary in the country.

Kalia (n.d.) highlighted dynamics of policy making under different regimes by

configuration of the nature of Pakistan bureaucracy and its role in policy making in the

country. Bureaucracy is not limited to execution of policies but it is an integral part of

government. Bureaucracy due to its political role has been so notorious. Best talent of

the country should be recruited to civil services and procedural control must be

strengthened with a system of accountability which requires a visionary leadership.

This factor can also lead to the intervention of military into political matters.

Khalid (2012) studied the role of judiciary in the evolution of democracy in Pakistan.

Technical issues and the failure of judiciary to check institutions in Pakistan has

affected the journey of democracy in Pakistan. Both the constitutional and political

weaknesses have stopped the political and democratic growth in the country. The

research concludes that more comprehensive and solid policies are required to reframe

the judicial and constitutional weakness, so that a good democratic system may grow in

the country. If the judicial and constitutional policies of a country are well conducted

and implemented, all the institutions will work in their respective jurisdiction and

democratic process will grow up. Check and balance of all institutions backed by

efficient judiciary will maintain role of law in the country. However for efficient work

of judiciary for a long time all the constitutional and legislative bodies should be made

well established first. The key finding is that both the judiciary and legislative system

of the country should move in a coordinated way to grow the democratic system of

Pakistan

Amjad (2006) analyzed Musharraf era from the development and growth perspective of

the country. Since Musharraf take over his administration started new strategy for the

development of the country called the Musharraf development strategy. Amjad

investigated that Musharraf strategy was successful for achieving his own goals and

that of the country. The overall face of economic growth in that era was satisfactory. In

the era, growth takes place confidence of the private sector grows up public sector

investment program increased and unemployment decreased. On the negative side,

some macro-economic indicators i.e. inflation and growth was not specifically

contributing to eradicate poverty. To conclude, there were some positive as well as

negative aspects of Musharraf era. Growth took a boost but with high inflation. There

were high infrastructure projects but no focus given to labor market.

Hussain (2007) views that in countering the threat and expansion of

communism, jihadists were not only granted legitimacy by CIA-ISI but also

their cause was well propagated and their actions were accounted as heroic by

the world two largest spy agencies. The incident of 9/11 compelled the state of

Pakistan in parting its ways with those jihadists as a result of which it shakes the

whole fabric of Pakistani society. The concept of jihad has been misinterpreted

and wrongly propagated; it has found a room in the poor, the uneducated and

misguided. The Islamic seminaries became a breeding ground for terrorists;

militants in these seminaries were motivated to join Taliban and Al-Qaida

forces in Pakistan. Nothing has been done by the state of Pakistan in the

decades of the 1980s and 1990s to stop the constant involvement of religious

seminaries in jihadist politics. The recent attacks in Pakistan by jihadist

organization is a wakeup call, Pakistan should focus on unraveling the network

of terrorism and lawless frontiers of Pakistan.

Kiacker (2007) the continuity of democracy is much needed for the whole

world, the world needs Pakistan’s support in fighting its war on terror both in

Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan as a failed state will have an adverse effect

on global and regional level, derailment of democracy or a semi-governed

Pakistan can turn a haven for global militants and jihadists and could bring

uncertainty and instability in the whole region. The threat of falling nuclear

weapons in the hands of terrorists may cause a serious ramification for the

whole world. The western world cannot remain immune to the political

instability of a strategically important Pakistan. He further argues that the

international community should also support the institutions of the government

of Pakistan such as the organization of human rights, the judiciary, media

organizations and civil society failing which strengthens the undemocratic

forces and will push the state further into Islamic bigotry fundamentalists. The

international world should establish bilateral relationship with the civilian

government in Islamabad and must contribute in adding money to those

programs which strengthen the civilian agencies and judiciary. The world must

focus on strengthening good governance practices and service delivery.

Khan (2012) in his paper about the Role of Military in the politics of Pakistan

took the historical evolution of political participation of military in India and

Pakistan by giving a detailed description of Pre-Colonial heritage of Muslims in

India, British Colonial Experience of the Muslims in the united India and the

Nature of Muslim League leadership after Jinnah. After a brief over view of

historical content, the author argued about the weak civil institutions and

political participation of Military in Pakistan due to lack of institutional pre-

requisite for democracy, institutional problems in Pakistan, feudal aristocracy

and political legitimacy. Here the author highlighted the Military’s belief about

its role in the society, in which military and bureaucracy are more organized and

developed than political and democratic institutions. The Military intervention,

besides the above stated factors is also due to personal grievances of the

Military officers and the engagement and disengagement of Military with civil

society. He also stated that Military bureaucracy was always more concerned

with the security problem of the country. Corruption also destroyed the image

of politicians and gave rise to increasing public disenchantment with politics

and political process. He also highlighted the global factors in this regard by

stating that incidents of 9/11 increased the importance of Pakistan’s role in the

eyes of Super Powers. The author argued in the paper that Super powers and

foreign players promote authoritarian regimes in Pakistan as compared to

democratic regimes.

Singh & Singh (2011) stated that Pakistan’s history has been characterized by

periods of military rule and political instability. It is a developing country that

faces problems with high levels of poverty and illiteracy. Singh & Singh (2011)

further said that Military can influence the nature and direction of political

change without necessarily assuming power and claimed that the military has

seldom had to face opposition in coming into power. Pakistan swings back and

forth between military and civilian rule on one side and feudal and capitalist

economies on the other. Military rule was welcomed in Pakistan, since the

nation had experienced a very unstable political climate since independence.

The Chief of Army Staff, rather than the Defense Minister or the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), is the most powerful position in the

defense arena. Hundreds of army personnel have posts in civilian institutions

whereby civilian officials have long complained about military officers taking

up senior posts in the civil service, universities and ministries. Unlike

Musharraf, current civilian leaders have shown themselves to be poor managers,

and have not inspired confidence in the market. The history of Pakistan shows

that Pakistani Army Chiefs have never relinquished power voluntarily.

Syed Abdi (2004) declared that Pakistan's political system can best be

understood as a pendulum between civilian rule and military rule. Huntington

(2006) claimed that Governance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between

the military chiefs and the elected civilian government. a weak economy has a

major positive impact on the probability of low income and poor economic

performances increases the risk, which keep income and growth at low rates and

therefore increase the chances of future. Pakistan is the typical example of this

situation in which Military leadership hopes to change the situation as they feel

the civilian government is not pushing the economic growth and the rampant

disturbances by external and internal threats.

Inayatullah (1998) claimed that Military became more independent and thus,

powerful for controlling national politics. Its top brass developed an ideology

and a set of perceptions to justify their political role. As guardians of the nation,

they believe they have the right to rule the nation. Once the civilians come into

power, feeling threatened by the military, they attempt to control them. As with

their feudal roots, a pattern of patronage and corruption sets in.

Chaudhary (n.d) claimed that if the civilian governments take rational position

against the military agency in Pakistan, then the role of military in shaping

foreign policy of Pakistan would be curtailed. The military intervenes in politics

because of its inherent agency not culture, identity’ or even its structure, or

external or internal threats. The military’s presence in domestic and foreign

policy is constrained.

The weak political parties and leadership as well as social institutions created

space for governance to civil military bureaucracy. This causes derailment of

the democracy and alternate civil and military supremacy. Although the overall

socio-political environments have improved and healthy civil military relations

are witnessed in the present era. As in any democratic set up healthy civil-

military relationship are very necessary where an elected civilian government

enjoys the overall control of the military. However during the past history of

sixty-five years in Pakistan the control over governance has oscillated between