Civil Law Review

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

I. PRELIMINARY TITLE; HUMAN RELATIONS; PERSONALITY; DOMICILE;

a. Effectivity of Laws

Article 2, Civil Code

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication

Tanada vs. Tuvera: Publication is indispensable. “unless it is otherwise provided,” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted.

Art. 5 of the Labor Code

Art. 5. Rules and regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation.

Sec. 3(1) & 4, Chapter 2, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987

Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

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SECTION 4. Effectivity.—In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them

BSP Circular No. 799 (Series of 2013): amending Sec. 2 of Circular No. 905 series of 1982, reducing interest to 6% from 12% for the loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest.1. Published: June 28, 2013;2. Filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register: June

28, 2013;3. Effectivity: July 1, 2013.

CASES:

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES – PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,RespondentG. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013

FACTS: Proclamation No. 423: reserved parcels of land in the

Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal and

Pasay City for a military reservation – Fort William McKinley; amended by:

Proclamation No. 208: excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine – Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Serices – Philippine Veterans Affairs (MSS-PVA); further amended by:

Proclamation No. 2476 : excluded Barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of RA No. 2741 and 7302. Said Proclamation included a handwritten addendum by then President Marcos which reads “P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan.” However, such addendum was not included in the published version.

Proclamation No. 172 reiterated Proclamation No. 2476 but excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan and declared said lots open for disposition.

Members of herein petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig Inc. (NMSMI) filed a petition before the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to have Lot 3 of Western Bicutan declared as alienable and disposable pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476.

Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association (WBLOA) filed a petition-in-intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs prayed for by NMSMI with regard to Lot 7 in Western Bicutan.

COSLAP granted the petition holding that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476 and was controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.

Herein respondent filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the resolution of COSLAP. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the handwritten addendum of President Marcos which was not included in the published version is valid and therefore Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan are excluded from Fort Bonifacio and are therefore alienable public lands?

HELD: No. Under Art. 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

xxx all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules

1 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS TO SUBDIVIDE THE LANDS WITHIN MILITARY RESERVATIONS

BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH ARE NO LONGER NEEDED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, AND TO DISPOSE OF THE SAME BY SALE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES)2 AN ACT TO PERMIT THE SALE WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS

1 Cesar Nickolai F. Soriano Jr.Arellano University School of Law 2011-0303CIVIL LAW REVIEW (discussions under the class of Atty. Lorenzo

and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law. This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., PetitionerVs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentGR No. 180705; Nov. 27, 2012

FACTS: PD No. 755 was issued which authorized the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to utilize Coconut Consumers Stabalization Fund (CCSF) and Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) (cocolevy funds) to acquire a commercial bank to provide readily available credit facilities to coconut farmers at preferential rates. The said law was published, however, the text of the “Agreement” for the acquisition of shares of First United Bank (FUB, eventually United Coconut Planters Bank [UCPB]) referred to under Sec. 1 thereof, was not.

The said Agreement was entered into between the PCA and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., where PCA would buy the latter’s option to buy shares for P200 each and as a condition thereto, provide Cojuangco with 10% of the shares purchased. PCA acquired 72.2% of the capital stock of FUB, 64.98% of which were placed under its name and 7.22% under Cojuangco.

The above-mentioned agreement was entered into after an earlier agreement between Cojuangco and Pedro Cojuangco, the latter having the controlling interest over FUB.

The ownership of the said shares were conclusively given to the government pursuant to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan on a civil case filed against herein petitioner Cojuangco.

ISSUE: WON the Agreement between PCA and Cojuangco, as stated under Sec. 1 of PD 755, is valid even if the text thereto was not published?

HELD: No. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. As held in Tanada vs. Tuvera: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be

recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and

give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.

*However, the Court held that the PCA-ECJ Agreement had a valid consideration therefor, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.*However still, the UCPB shares were acquired through the use of coconut levy funds, and as such are to be treated as public funds, and consequently public property. As such, Cojuangco cannot stand to benefit by receiving, in his private capacity, 7.22% of the FUB shares without violating the constitutional caveat that public funds can only be used for public purpose. Accordingly, the 7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were given to Cojuangco shall be returned to the Government, to be used “only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry.

As such, the PCA-ECJ Agremeent was declared unconstitutional, for it “allows Cojuangco to personally and exclusively own public funds or property, the disbursement of which We so greatly protect if only to give light and meaning to the mandates of the Constitution.”

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.GMA NETWORK, INC., respondentG.R. No. 164026; December 23, 2008

FACTS: Respondent GMA Network, Inc. (GMA) filed for various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. Upon such filing, GMA was assessed a filing fee of P1,212,000, which it protested and was dismissed. On appeal to the SEC en banc, the appeal was likewise denied.

On appeal to the CA, GMA argued that its application for extension of corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a new filing of AOI for which the assessment was issued. The CA upheld SEC’s decision, but held that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid for lack of publication.

In its memorandum, SEC argued that the Circular is in the exercise of its delegated legislative power to fix fees and charges uniformly imposed on the transacting public and are essential to its supervisory and regulatory functions and are not in the form of penalty or sanction, and therefore requires no publication.

GMA, on the other hand, argues that SEC MC No. 1, Series of 1986 should apply, since it covers amendments to AOI for extension of corporate existence. While MC No. 2, Series of 1994, pertains to filing fees for AOI.

ISSUE1: WON SEC MC No. 1-86, instead of 2-94 should apply?

HELD: No. A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed pertain to different matters, as GMA points out. SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fee for the amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life, while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the filing fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the former circular, being squarely applicable and, more importantly, being more favorable to it, should be followed.

ISSUE2: WON SEC MC NO. 2-94 is valid?


HELD: No. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”

The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987.

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the National Administrative Register.

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner, vs.PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondentG.R. No. 173918; April 8, 2008

FACTS: PD No. 1956 created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to

minimize frequent price changes brought about by exchange rates adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.

On 1991, the Department of Energy informed herein respondent that its contribution to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge were insufficient and its Audit Task Force noted an underpayment of more than P14.4M for which a surcharge of P11.6M was imposed pursuant to Ministry of Finance Circular No. 1-85.

On a later date additional underpayments were noted for which additional surcharges amounting to P2.8M were likewise assessed in accordance with the same Circular.

The respondent paid the principal amounts of underpayment, but refused to pay the surcharges. Instead, it filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President, which affirmed the decision of the DOE.

On appeal to the CA, respondent presented certifications from the Office of the National Administration Registrar (ONAR) that the said circular has not been filed before said office. The CA reversed the decision of the OP, and held that MOF Circualr No. 1-85 was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with the ONAR.

ISSUE: WON the non-registration of MOF Circualr No. 1-85 will render it ineffective?

HELD: Yes. As held in Tanada vs. Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the

Administrative Code of 1987 – filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center – for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances.

ISSUE2: WON knowledge of respondent as to the existence of the MOF Circular renders its registration no longer necessary?

HELD: No.In the National Association of Electricity Consumers case, it was held that “[t]he requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.”

ISSUE3: WON the MOF Circular gainst vitality from the subsequent enactment of EO No. 137 which reiterates the rule making power of the Minister of Finance and should not therefore be rendered ineffective by a subsequent law?

HELD: No. Such contention is irrelevant in the present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned requirements.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondentsG.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

FACTS: DOLE Deparment Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991 was issued temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.

PASEI filed a petition for prohibition with TRO to prohibit and enjoin the implementation of the above Order and Circulars.

ISSUE: WON the Department Order and MCs are invalid for failure to comply with the publication requirement?

HELD: Yes. They are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not


the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

b. Retroactivity of Laws; Vested Rights

Art. 3 and 4 of the Civil Code

Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Arts. 105 and 256 of the Family Code

Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Art. 40 of the Family Code

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

SC AM 02-11-10: Rule on Declaration of Absoulte Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages

CASES:

AMBROSIO ROTAIRO (substituted by his spouse MARIA RONSA YRO ROTAIRO, and his children FELINA ROTAIRO, ERLINDA ROTAIRO CRUZ, EUDOSIA ROTAIRO CRIZALDO, NIEVES ROTAIRO TUBIG, REMEDIOS ROTAIRO MACAHILIG, FELISA ROTAIRO LEGASPI, JOSEFINA ROTAIRO TORREVILLAS, and CRISENCIO R. ROTAIRO, MARCIANA TIBAY, EUGENIO PUNZALAN, and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs.ROVIRA ALCANTARA and VICTOR ALCANTARA, RespondentsG.R. No. 173632; September 29, 2014

FACTS: Herein respondent Rovira Alcantara (Rovira) filed for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land formerly owned by her father Victor Alcantara (Alcantara), and Alfredo Ignacio (Ignacio) who mortgaged the property to Pilipinas Bank and Trust Company (Pilipinas Bank) in 1968.

Later on, the property was parcelled out by Alcantara and Ignacio through their firm Wilfredo S. Ignacio & Co. (Ignacio & Co.) and separately sold to different buyers, one of which is Ambrosio Rotairo, who then constructed his house on the property identified as Lot C-1.

In the meantime, Alcantara and Ignacio faulted on their loan and the mortgaged property was foreclosed. Without redemption being made,

the title was consolidated in the name of Pilipinas Bank, the highest bidder. Pilipinas Bank later on sold the property to Rovira.

In 1988, Rovira filed her amended complaint. The RTC dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC holding that PD No. 957 is not applicable since the mortgage was constituted prior to the sale to Rotairo.

ISSUE: WON PD No. 957 can be given retroactive effect?

HELD: Yes. The retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 to transactions entered into prior to its enactment in 1976 is already settled. In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which involved a land purchase agreement entered into in 1972, the Court stated that the unmistakeable intent of the legislature is to have P.D. No. 957 operate retrospectively. Moreover, the specific terms of P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect even to contracts and transactions entered into prior to its enactment. In particular, Section 21 of P.D. No. 957 provides:

Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.

In this case, the contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was entered into in 1970, and the agreement was fully consummated with Rotairo’s completion of payments and the execution of the Deed of Sale in his favor in 1979. Clearly, P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case.

It was error for the CA to rule that the retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 is "warranted only where the subdivision is mortgaged after buyers have purchased individual lots." According to the CA, the purpose of Section 18 requiring notice of the mortgage to the buyers is to give the buyer the option to pay the instalments directly to the mortgagee; hence, if the subdivision is mortgaged before the lots are sold, then there are no buyers to notify. What the CA overlooked is that Section 21 requires the owner or developer of the subdivision project to complete compliance with its obligations within two years from 1976.The two-year compliance provides the developer the opportunity to comply with its obligation to notify the buyers of the existence of the mortgage, and consequently, for the latter to exercise their option to pay the instalments directly to the mortgagee.

Nevertheless, such concomitant obligation of the developer under Section 21 did not arise in this case. It must be noted that at the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 957 in 1976 and as early as 1974, Pilipinas Bank had already foreclosed the mortgage and bought the properties in the foreclosure sale. There was, thus, no mortgage to speak of such that Rotairo should be notified thereof so that he could properly exercise his option to pay the instalments directly to Pilipinas Bank.

ISSUE2: WON Rovira can be considered a buyer in good faith for purposes of applying PD No. 957?

HELD: No.

1. She cannot be considered a third person for purposes of applying PD No. 957. She is the daughter of the mortgagor and was charged with constructive knowledge of the sale to Rotairo. Thus, the fact that


http://www.chanrobles.com/civilcodeofthephilippines.htm

http://www.chanrobles.com/civilcodeofthephilippines.htm

the contract to sell was unregistered became immaterial and she is, therefore, bound by the provisions of the contract to sell and eventually, the contract of sale, executed by her father in favor of Rotairo.

2. She had actual knowledge of the disposition and Rotairo’s possession thereof as she lives only 50 meters away and she knew

that there are structures on the subject property. Rovira, however, claims that "she did not bother to inquire as to the legitimacy of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the bank of its title to the property." But Rovira cannot rely solely on the title and assurances of Pilipinas Bank; it was incumbent upon her to look beyond the title and make necessary inquiries because the bank was not in possession of the property. "Where the vendor is not in possession of the property, the prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in possession." A purchaser cannot simply close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard, and thereafter claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. Hence, Rovira cannot claim a right better than that of Rotairo' s as she is not a buyer in good faith

Under different circumstances, the prior registration of the mortgage between Pilipinas Bank and Alcantara and Ignacio, and Rovira's subsequent purchase of the subject property would have been valid and binding, and could have defeated Rotairo's unregistered claim over it. But given Rovira's privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and the fact that she had actual knowledge of the disposition of the property and Rotairo's possession thereof, her acquisition of the property cannot be upheld.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs.MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, RespondentG.R. No. 189121; July 31, 2013

FACTS: Herein respondent filed for a petition for issuance of Letters of Administration in behalf of her daughter Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise) to be appointed as Administratrix of the estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), the latter’s father. Likewise, they impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to herein petitioner as bigamous claiming that Amelia was formerly married to one Filipito Sandico.

Herein petitioners opposed the above petition and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and denied the allegations on the validity of her marriage.

The RTC directed the issuance of the Letters of Administration to Elise and declared the marriage of petitioner Amelia to Eliseo as not valid due to a pre-existing marriage. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON the validity of Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo can still be questioned even after the latter’s death?

HELD: Yes. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the

parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, vs.RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, RespondentsG.R. No 176556; July 4, 2012

FACTS: On October 26, 2000, Respondent Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner.

The decree of legal separation was granted by the RTC where petitioner’s share in the “net profits earned” by the conjugal partnership forfeited in favour of the common children in accordance with the Family Code.

After seeking clarification of the meaning of “net profits earned” which was defined by the RTC as "the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts,” the petitioner sought reconsideration of the order, which was denied.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102 of the Civil Code. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation

ISSUE: WON the Family Code is applicable?

HELD: Yes. [A]t the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

ISSUE2: WON Petitioner had a vested right over half of the conjugal partnership?

HELD: No. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:

“A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which


enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.

To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of property.”

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:

Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.

In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty part.

More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr., we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:

[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,RespondentsG.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple

FACTS: Sen. Tamano married herein petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave twice: (1) under Islamic Laws and tradition in Cotabato City; (2) before the RTC judge of Lanao del Sur. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano indicated his civil status as “divorced.”

Herein private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda Tamado and her son Adib Ahmad Tamano, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other legitimate children of Zorayda, filed for the declaration of nullity of

the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano, claiming that it was bigamous.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts, which was denied.

She filed a petition for Certiorari before the SC, which was referred to the CA, which decided against her and filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC, which upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC.

By this time, the RTC already rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Estrellita with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio, declaring that their marriage was entered into during the subsistence of the first marriage of the Senator with Zorayda and declaring that he is divorced did not in any way affect the void character of the 2nd

marriage.

ISSUE: WON the marriage of Estrellita with Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous?

HELD: Yes. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.

ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,


vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.G.R. No. 158298; August 11, 2010

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, herein petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage between his brother, the late Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato, for being celebrated without a marriage license.

He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed out of time and that Isidro is not a party to the marriage.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Isidro is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?

HELD: Yes. A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license.

[O]ther than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According toCarlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be

the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES,respondentsG.R. No. 163707; September 15, 2006

FACTS: Private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration alleging that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate and whose known heir are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and their children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator and that, for the meantime, petitioner Michael Guy be appointed Special Administrator.

Petitioner opposed the above petition claiming that his father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration and further argued private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Art. 175 of Family Code.

Petitioner and his other co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

The motion to dismiss was denied by the RTC holding that Remedios was not the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE: WON there was valid waiver of the private respondents’ rights?

HELD: No. Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.


Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: “Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.”

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

ISSUE2: WON private respondents are barred by prescription in proving filiation?

HELD: No. a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.

GLORIA SANTOS DUEÑAS, petitioner, vs.SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondentG.R. No. 149417 June 4, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Gloria Santos Duenas is the daughter of the late Cecilio Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land which was turned into a subdivision. By the time of his death, there were already several residents and homeowners in the Santos Subdivision (SS).

Later on, the Homeowners Association asked herein petitioner to provide a common area for recreational and community activities in accordance with PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1216, which the latter requested, prompting the SSHA to seek redress form the NHA.

The NHA referred the case to the HLURB-NCR which held that the PD is not applicable to the SS. SSHA filed a MR claiming that PD 957 should apply retroactively and that Gloria should be bound by the verbal promise of her father. The MR was denied.

On appeal the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the above decision was affirmed.

On appeal, the CA reversed the HLURB relying upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which held that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application, nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be given retroactive effect so as to extend its coverage even to those contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976.

ISSUE: WON SSHA has legal capacity to sue?

HELD: No. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Article 44 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. The records of the present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHA’s lack of capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 nor in this case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action.

ISSUE2: WON PD 957 can be given retroactive application absent an express provision to that effect?

HELD: No. Although it may seem that this particular issue, given our ruling on the first issue regarding the lack of capacity of SSHA to bring any action in its name, is now moot and academic, we are constrained to still address it.

Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. We held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts


entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-payment of amortizations was justified under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project

Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a subsequent case that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus:

…Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation….

At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus on the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957per se.

We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs.CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondentG.R. No. 140500; January 21, 2002

FACTS: The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered as son with his secretary of 23 years, herein respondent Carolina Alejo. The son was named Adrian Bernabe.

Herein petitioner, is the sole surviving heir of Fiscal Bernabe and his wife (both deceased). The respondent filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an illegitimate child of Fiscal Bernabe and that he be given a share in the latter’s estate.

The RTC, applying Art. 175 of the Family Code, held that the complaint is barred by prescription as it should have been instituted during the lifetime of the putative father.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and held that Art. 285 of the Civil Code is applicable, since Adrian was born in 1981. Accordingly, he had 4 years after attaining the age of majority to file for recognition and that right was not taken away by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code.

ISSUE: WON the period to file an action for recognition has already prescribed?

HELD: No. Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."

Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:

ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar

as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

ISSUE2: WON the action for recognition is procedural in nature and accordingly, no vested right attaches?

HELD: No. Bustos v. Lucero distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

"x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion."14 (Citations omitted)

Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto, the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:

"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure."

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondentsG.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

FACTS: Private Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes had a civil and church wedding with Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in 1977. Later on, these marriage was declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license (civil) and lack of consent (church).

Even before the decree was issued nullifying the above marriages, Edgardo married herein petitioner Ofelia Ty on April 4, 1979 (civil) and on April 4, 1982 (church).

On Jan. 3, 1991, Edgardo filed a civil case for his marriage to Ofelia to be declared null and void alleging that: (1) there was no marriage license; and (2) he was still married to Anna since the decree for nullity of his marriage was not yet issued at the time of his civil wedding with Ofelia.

The RTC sustained the respondent and declared his marriage to Ofelia null and void. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?

HELD: No. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person


http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/sep1998/gr_129742_1998.html

http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jan2002/gr_140500_2002.html#fnt14

with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolvedxxx

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting

Originally, in People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage.

In Gomez v. Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra, however, we recognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.

But in Odayat vs. Amante (1977), the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. This ruling was affirmed inTolentino v. Paras.

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

In Yap v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.

At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.

[A] recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid

ISSUE2: WON there were vested rights that would be violated by the retroactive application of the Family Code?

HELD: Yes. [T]he provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter

properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners vs.CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondentsG.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999

FACTS: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, herein respondents, filed a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.

The SolGen was then represented by the assistant city fiscal of Angeles City. Respondents adduced evidence that they are both American citizens. Claude is a member of the US Air Force assigned in Clark and the family maintains a residence in Balibago, Angeles City since 1985.

The RTC granted the petition. In due time, the SolGen interposed an appeal to the CA, which later certified the case to the SC as involving purely questions of law.

ISSUE: WON the court may allow aliens to adopt despite the prohibition in the Family Code, effective Aug. 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988 under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allow aliens to adopt?

HELD: Yes. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under


Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs.JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Atienza against Judge Brillantes.

He alleges that he has two children with Yolanda de Castro who lives in Makati, where he stays whenever he is in Manila. That in Dec. 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw herein respondent sleeping on his bed and was informed by the house boy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro.

Thereafter, he was prevented by the respondent from visiting his children and alienated the affection of his children from him.

He further alleged that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children.

Respondent, for his part, denied the above allegations, specifically his marriage to Ongkiko, claiming that the same, celebrated before a town mayor in Nueva Ecija on April 26, 1965, was void for lack of a marriage license. The same goes with their subsequent marriage in Manila on June 5, 1965.

Respondent claims that when he married de Castro in California on Dec. 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith that he was single because his first marriage was celebrated without a marriage license.

Respondent argues that Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965.

ISSUE: WON Art. 40 of the Family Code applies to respondent Brillantes even if the first marriage took place in 1965 and the second marriage after the effectivity of the Family Code?

HELD: Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.

Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

c. Stare Decisis

Art. 8 of the Civil Code:

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

CASE:

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, REVENUE DISTRICT NO. 44, TAGUIG and PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RespondentsG.R. No. 175707; November 19, 2014

FACTS: This is a consolidation of 3 cases involving the same parties, same facts and similar questions of law.

This is not the first time that Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation (FBDC) has come to this Court about these issues against the very same respondents, and the Court En Banc has resolved them in two separate, recent cases.

In May 1996, petitioner commenced developing Global City and since October 1996, started selling parcels of land which were bought at the time the VAT was not yet imposed. On starting Jan. 1, 1996, RA No. 7716 (E-VAT Law) took effect including “real properties” in the definition of “goods or properties,” thereby making the sale of real properties subject to VAT.

Petitioner filed for VAT refund pertaining to transitional input VAT based on its inventory of real property.

Except for the amounts being claimed and the periods covered by each claim, the facts in the case and in the other two consolidated cases are the same.

The argument of the petitioner is based on the validity of Sec. 4.105-1 of RR No. 7-95 which limited the definition of “goods” in regards real properties to “improvements” thereby excluding real property which effectively limited the amount of transitional input VAT petitioner may claim under Sec. 105 of the NIRC.

On the other hand, the consistent denial of petitioner’s claim for refunds is premised on the following:1. The 8% transitional input VAT is based on the improvements;2. The taxpayer is entitled to transitional input VAT only if it has

previously paid the VAT or sales tax on its inventory of land;3. Sec. 4.105-1 of RR No. 7-95, implementing Sec. 105, is valid.

ISSUE: WON the favourable decision of the SC in two other previous cases involving the same facts, issues and parties can apply to the present cases?

HELD: Yes. As previously stated, the issues here have already been passed upon and resolved by this Court En Banc twice, in decisions that have reached finality, and we are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to apply those decisions to these consolidated cases, for they involve the same facts, issues, and even parties.

The Court’s pronouncements in the decided cases regarding these issues are discussed below. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases," compels us to apply the rulings by the Court to these consolidated cases before us. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same." This is to provide stability in judicial decisions, as held by the Court in a previous case:Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.

More importantly, we cannot depart from the legal precedents as laid down by the Court En Banc. It is provided in the Constitution that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc."

What is left for this Court to do is to reiterate the rulings in the aforesaid legal precedents and apply them to these consolidated cases.


BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs.CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, RespondentG.R. No. 166562; March 31, 2009

FACTS: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist. In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.

She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis.

ISSUE: Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

HELD: No. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.” The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.” As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.”

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent “arbitrary discretion in the courts.” Madison agreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.” Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.” He added that their ideas “reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.”

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution. It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.” In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.” This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's “separate but equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be


segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that “separate . . . is inherently unequal.” Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant f an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

ISSUE2: By virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, when should doctrines promulgated by the Court take effect?

HELD: To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

d. Arts. 15, 16, 17, 50 and 51 of the Civil Code

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country

Art. 26 of the Family Code

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Rules of Court:Rule 103: Change of NameRule 108: Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Civil Register: Arts. 407-413 of the Civil Code

407

Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

408

The following shall be entered in the civil register:(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

409

In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning.

410

The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

411

Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt himself from such liability if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration.

412

No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.

413

All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

CASES:

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, vs.SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, RespondentG.R. No. 205487; November 12, 2014


FACTS: Suzuki purchased a condominium unit and a parking slot in Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City from Yung Sam Kang (a Korean national and holder of a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa) through Helen Soneja.

After execution of the Deed of Sale dated Aug. 26, 2003, Suzuki occupied said unit and thereafter made repeated demands that Kang transfer the title to the same to him, which at that time was in possession of one Alexander Perez (Orion’s Loan Officer).

Learning that Kang already left the country, Suzuki verified the status of the title with the Mandaluyong Register of Deeds. Suzuki later on learned that the title to the parking lot is still in the name of Cityland Pioneer, but Assistant VP of Cityland Rosario Perez, certified that the unit and the parking lot has already been fully paid and that there are no encumbrance, except that conveyance or encumbrance of the unit shall be subject to the approval of the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA).

Although the title to the unit contained an entry for a P1M loan in favour of Orion, the same has already been cancelled. However, the title remained in possession of Perez.

Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse claim dated Sept. 8, 2003 and demanded the delivery of titles. Orion (through Perez) refused to do so. On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter form Orion’s counsel stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000, for which the unit was used as payment through a Dacion en Pago, after failure to pay the said amount. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago until October 15, 2003.

On Jan. 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance against Kang and Orion which was granted by the RTC.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC except for the part awarding moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and cost of suit.

In this petition, Orion is raising that under Korean law, any conveyance of conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses.

ISSUE: WON the Deed of Sale executed by Kang is void for failure to comply with Korean Law?

HELD: No. Philippine law governs the transfer of real property.

Real or Immovable PropertyIt is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.

Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.

This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.

Property Relations Between SpousesOn the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly

pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.

How to Prove Foreign LawTo prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner, vs.DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RespondentG.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner Edelina married Yuchiro Kobayashi, a Japanese national on Sept. 16, 2001, for which a divorce was later on obtained by Kobayashi on Sept. 16, 2004.


Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando.

Petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi. However, the same was denied requiring her to prove by competent court decision that her marriage to her said husband is valid.

She then filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief praying, among others, that her marriage to Ando be declared valid and a passport be issued to her in her husband’s surname, which was denied.

A reconsideration was granted and was to a Special Family Court who consequently denied such petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON filing with the RTC is the proper remedy?

HELD: No. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name.

With respect to her prayer for recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.

ISSUE2: WON petitioner’s second marriage should be recognized as valid?

HELD: Not yet. In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies available.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, RespondentG.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, vs.MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RespondentsG.R. No. 196049 ; June 26, 2013

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, vs.LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.G. R. No. 183622; February 8, 2012

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs.DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, RespondentsG.R. No. 186571; August 11, 2010

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.G.R. No. 155635; November 7, 2008

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MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondentG.R. No. 163979; November 7, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, RespondentG.R. No. 154380; October 5, 2005

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondentG.R. No. 145226; February 06, 2004

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs.MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondentsG.R. No. 142820; June 20, 2003

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.REDERICK A. RECIO, respondentsG.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondentsG.R. No. 80116; June 30, 1989

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs.HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondentsG.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985

e. Human Relations; Abuse of Rights, Unjust Enrichment; Malicious Prosecution; Independent Civil Action

f. Civil Personality; Birth; Death

g. Domicile

II. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

A. MARRIAGE

1. Classification of Marriage/Relationships; Parties in Interest

Other Classifications


2. Marriage requirements under Family Code

Civil Wedding vs. Church Wedding

Certificate of Civil Registrar

Art. 352 of the Revised Penal Code

3. Marriage Certificate vs. Presumption of Marriage

Torrens Title Entry “Single, Civil Status”

4. Declaration of Nullity

Civil Code vs. Family Code

AM No. 02-11-10 SC

Civil Code

Muslim Code (PD 1083)

5. Art 15 – 17 Family Code

Art. 50-55 Family Code

Art. 26 Family Code

Divorce

Filipino; Foreigner; Parenting; Children; Property Rights; Succession Rights

Declaratory Relief

Rule 108

Art. 412 of the Civil Code

6. Art. 36 of the Family Code

AM No. 02-11-10

See also Arts. 48, 68-71, 220-221 and 225 of the Family Code


Prejudicial Question;

Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Civil Procedure


Arts. 36, 40, 45 of the Family Code

Sec. 19(1) of AM No. 02-10-11-SC

Arts. 147 and 148 of the Family Code

9. RA 9262; Law on Violence against Women and their Children

Support

Art. 213 Family Code

10. Art. 40 Family Code

AM No. 02-10-11-SC,

Civil Code

Rule 108, Rules of Court

11. Arts. 40, 35(4) and 41, Family Code

Art. 349 Revised Penal Code

Civil and Criminal Bigamy

Art. 83, Civil Code

12. Arts. 41-44 and 49 of the Family Code

Art. 83(2) Civil Code

ARCA


Documents

Civil Law Review